Garcia v.

Drilon The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however,
denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for
prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the constituted collateral attack on said law.
RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus,
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
this petition is filed.
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and
for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened
that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on
and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
the validity of the law.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA
with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent
9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection
filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The
clause.
trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262

no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution

“axercise in futility.”
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution

for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the

RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial
product of an invalid law.” power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited
authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue
of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that
if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if
not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally
to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law
violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the
case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence
is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay
officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while
executive power is the power to enforce and administer the
laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the
issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive
function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
People v. Genosa
PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No.
135981, January 15 2004.
People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife
Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage,
Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and
the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became
violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk,
he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her
husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On
the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the
victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another
room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun.
The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the
cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe.
Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial,
the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and
imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1)
the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his
death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists
and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the
alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of
said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted
the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case
to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric
opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two
expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr.
Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently
submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman
syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that
she is afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in
order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the
so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-
building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving
(or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense
arising from the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of
the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear
of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate
and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the
existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were
duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence”
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No
doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove
that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through
a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard
to the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in
itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner.
Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in
our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must
face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1)
Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent
danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her
fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During that time,
he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the
imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no
longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and
obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be
clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of
the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the
repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological
paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of
her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has
been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a
result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome
reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should
concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be
proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is
the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel,
treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because
the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate
alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been
consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be
put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that
fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she
was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put
her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her
reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide.
However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances
and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as
appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she
is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262,
otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act
of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-
survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women
syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense
under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
People v. Baldo
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01930, which affirmed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73 in Criminal Case Nos.
00-18080 to 00-18082, convicting and sentencing appellant Elmer S.
Baldo to reclusion perpetua for the crime of rape.
On February 17, 2000, three Informations for rape were filed against
appellant and were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 00-18080 to 00-
18082. Except for the dates, all three informations were similarly
worded as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of February 2000 in the City of Antipolo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, while armed with a fan knife, by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one [AAA],3 against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment on March 16, 2000, appellant pleaded not guilty to
the three charges.5 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
Twenty-nine-year-old AAA, appellant, and Norman Echani were
housemates in a small one-room house in Purok Maligaya II,
Mambugan, Antipolo City. Appellant is her nephew while Echani is her
cousin. As AAA recently resigned from her job and appellant worked
during the night shift in a factory, the two were always left during
daytime when Echani was at work.
On February 10, 2000 at 1:00 p.m., appellant professed his love for
AAA in their living room. She, however, admonished him against his
protestation for they are relatives. He then told her that if she ignores
him, he would rape her. She pleaded to him not to do anything against
her will if he really liked her. Appellant then held her left hand and
poked a balisong (fan knife) at her, and then removed her pants and
panty while she was seated at a bench. Then he dragged her and laid
her on the floor, removed his shorts and brief, and placed himself on
top of her. AAA tried to resist by kicking him but he was stronger.
Thereafter he placed the knife aside, then held and pressed her thighs.
He then fingered her vagina with his right hand and inserted his penis
into it. After two minutes, appellant stood up but threatened to kill her if
she reported the incident to their relatives. As she was in shock, AAA
just stayed in her room. Appellant thereafter left for work at 5:30 p.m.
According to AAA, appellant repeated his beastly act the following day,
February 11 and on the next day, February 12, 2000.
In the evening of February 12, 2000, AAA decided to tell Echani what
appellant had done to her. Echani and his brother, Abraham, then
accompanied her to the barangay hall to file complaints against
appellant.
The medico-legal police officer who examined AAA on February 13,
2000 found "deep healing laceration" in her hymen, "compatible with
recent loss of virginity" but negative for spermatozoa.6 Dr. James
Belgira testified that the laceration could have been caused by a
penetration of a hard object like an erect penis. He also found
contusions on AAA’s left arm and thighs.7
Appellant, in his own defense, denied the charges against him. He
claimed that he and AAA were lovers since November 1999, and that
she had consented to have sex with him even prior to February 2000.
He contended that she charged him because her parents were against
their affair, and that her parents learned of their relationship because
two of their neighbors saw them having sexual intercourse. He likewise
denied poking a knife at her when they "made love." To prove they are
lovers, appellant presented two witnesses: Benjamin
Eubra, Purok Maligaya Chairman, and Simeon de los Santos,
appellant’s uncle and neighbor.
Eubra and De los Santos testified that appellant and AAA were always
together and held hands when walking. Being part of the barangay
investigating team, Eubra said that the crime scene is a single-room
house separated from adjacent houses by plywood and located in a
place where market people usually hang out. He did not believe the
charges because the neighbors could always see and hear what the
occupants inside the house were doing.8
On September 26, 2002, the trial court found appellant guilty in
Criminal Case No. 00-18080 but acquitted him in Criminal Case Nos.
00-18081 and 00-18082. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ELMER BALDO y
SANTAIN is hereby found guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 00-18080 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
He is further ordered to pay to the complainant, [AAA], the amount of
Php 50,000 as indemnity.
Criminal Cases No[s]. 00-18081 and 00-18082 are hereby DISMISSED
for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.9
Since the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, the case
was elevated to this Court for automatic review. Pursuant to People v.
Mateo,10 however, we referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
On July 4, 2006, the appellate court affirmed with modification the trial
court’s decision. Its fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED,
with MODIFICATION by ordering accused-appellant Elmer Baldo y
Santain to likewise pay [AAA] the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and the amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence this instant petition based on a lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN
[PROVEN] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.12
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether the crime of
rape, particularly the element of force or intimidation, has been proved
sufficiently.
Appellant insists that he and AAA are lovers and what happened
between them was consensual. He likewise capitalizes on AAA’s
admission that he was no longer holding the knife when he inserted his
finger and subsequently his penis into AAA’s vagina. Thus, she had all
the opportunity to resist his alleged sexual assault. Appellant further
claims that AAA’s failure to make an outcry to call the attention of their
neighbors, as the partition between the rooms was only made of
plywood, and to immediately disclose the incident to her cousin Echani,
showed she consented to the sexual congresses. As he was not
covering her mouth, she should have made her protestations in a voice
loud enough for others to hear.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that findings of fact
of the trial court deserve respect and that witnesses are usually
reluctant to volunteer information. It stresses that the elements of
simple rape, to wit, carnal knowledge and force or intimidation, were
proven during trial. Even granting that appellant and AAA were lovers,
such fact was not a valid defense as a man cannot force his
sweetheart to have sexual intercourse with him. The OSG adds that
AAA’s account evinced sincerity and truthfulness and she never
wavered in her story, consistently pointing to appellant as her rapist.
Besides, no woman would willingly submit herself to the rigors,
humiliation and stigma attendant in a rape case if she was not
motivated by an earnest desire to punish the culprit.
In our considered view, the prosecution has proven all the elements of
the offense of simple rape, including the use of force or intimidation.
We affirm appellant’s conviction.1avv phi 1.zw+
For conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a)
through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is
under 12 years of age or is demented.13
In this case, the presence of the first element is undisputed since
appellant admits his sexual congress with complainant. While making
such admission however, he contends that there is no force or
intimidation to speak of as it was consensual. Appellant alleges that
AAA willingly participated in the sexual act because they are lovers. He
even presented two witnesses to corroborate his claim. Their
testimony, however, leaves us unconvinced of appellant’s alleged
innocence.
The "sweetheart theory" or "sweetheart defense" is an oft-abused
justification that rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely
tests our patience.14 For the Court to even consider giving credence to
such defense, it must be proven by compelling evidence.15 The
defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the
theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required -- such as
tokens, mementos, and photographs.16 There is none presented here
by the defense.
Moreover, even if it were true that they were sweethearts, a love affair
does not justify rape. As wisely ruled in a previous case, a man does
not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal
desires.17
In a desperate attempt to prove the alleged consensual nature of the
sexual intercourse, appellant capitalizes on AAA’s failure to offer
resolute resistance despite the fact that he was no longer holding the
knife while consummating the sexual act. Appellant also points to
AAA’s failure to shout or make an outcry so that their neighbors can
come to her rescue.
AAA’s failure to shout or to tenaciously resist appellant should not be
taken against her since such negative assertion would not ipso
facto make voluntary her submission to appellant’s criminal act.18 In
rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the
victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime. As already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims react the
same way.19 Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be
shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the
intrusion.20 Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too
intimidated to offer any resistance at all.21 Moreover, resistance is not
an element of rape.22 A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did
all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon
her.23 As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was
more or less irresistible is beside the point.24 In this case, the presence
of a fan knife on hand or by his side speaks loudly of appellant’s use of
violence, or force and intimidation.

As to the civil indemnity and damages, the trial court, as affirmed by

the appellate court, correctly awarded ₱50,000 civil indemnity and
₱50,000 moral damages in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.25 Likewise, the award of ₱25,000 exemplary damages
due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly
weapon (fan knife) is proper.26

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01930 is AFFIRMED.