GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN
Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, petitioner,
Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO,
respondents.
Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to
post bail for his provisional liberty.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings
Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption
of innocence is not at issue.
Ruling/s:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction
of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead
of taking it, he ran away.
Government of Hongkong v.
Facts:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were
issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private
respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same
in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following
conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that
he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold
himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If
accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling:
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi:
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v.
Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B.
Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in
criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their
treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth
of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in
Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
The Case of the S.S. Lotus
Facts. A collision occurred shortly before midnight on the 2nd of August 1926 between the
French (P) mail steamer Lotus and the Turkish (D) collier Boz-Kourt. The French mail steamer
was captained by a French citizen by the name Demons while the Turkish collier Boz-Kourt
was captained by Hassan Bey. The Turks lost eight men after their ship cut into two and sank
as a result of the collision.
Although the Lotus did all it could do within its power to help the ship wrecked persons, it
continued on its course to Constantinople, where it arrived on August 3. On the 5th of August,
Lieutenant Demons was asked by the Turkish (D) authority to go ashore to give evidence. After
Demons was examined, he was placed under arrest without informing the French (P) Consul-
General and Hassan Bey. Demons were convicted by the Turkish (D) courts for negligence
conduct in allowing the accident to occur.
This basis was contended by Demons on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over him.
With this, both countries agreed to submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
question of whether the exercise of Turkish (D) criminal jurisdiction over Demons for an incident
that occurred on the high seas contravened international law.
Issue. Issue: Does a rule of international law which prohibits a state from exercising criminal
jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of the state’s national jurisdiction
exist?
Held. (Per curiam) No. A rule of international law, which prohibits a state from exercising
criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of the state’s national
jurisdiction, does not exist. Failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary is the first
and foremost restriction imposed by international law on a state and it may not exercise its
power in any form in the territory of another state.
This does not imply that international law prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction in its own
territory, in respect of any case that relates to acts that have taken place abroad which it cannot
rely on some permissive rule of international law. In this situation, it is impossible to hold that
there is a rule of international law that prohibits Turkey (D) from prosecuting Demons because
he was aboard a French ship. This stems from the fact that the effects of the alleged offense
occurred on a Turkish vessel.
Hence, both states here may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over this matter because there is
no rule of international law in regards to collision cases to the effect that criminal proceedings
are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state whose flag is flown.
In the Matter of the Requested Extradition of Joseph Patrick Thomas DOHERTY by the
GOVERNMENT OF the UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND.
JUDGE: SPRIZZO, District Judge:
Petitioner United States of America, acting on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, has requested the extradition to the United Kingdom of respondent
Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty. This request is made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184 and the
Treaty of Extradition between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 (effective Jan. 21, 1977) (“the
Treaty”). The Government of the United Kingdom seeks Doherty’s extradition on the basis of
his conviction in Northern Ireland on June 12, 1981 for murder, attempted murder, and illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition, and for offenses allegedly committed in the course of
his escape from H.M. Prison, Crumlin Road, Belfast, on June 10, 1981.
Doherty was arrested by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service on June
18, 1983, in New York City. A provisional warrant of arrest was issued by Chief Judge
Constance Baker Motley on June 27, 1983, pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty. A formal
request for extradition was filed in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty in the Southern
District of New York on August 16, 1983. A hearing was held by the Court in March and April
1984 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
The facts of this case are not in substantial dispute. The incidents giving rise to the extradition
request are briefly as follows. Respondent Doherty was a member of the provisional Irish
Republican Army (“PIRA”). On May 2, 1980, at the direction of the IRA, Doherty and three
others embarked upon an operation “to engage and attack” a convoy of British soldiers.
Transcript of Hearing (“Tr.”) at 631.
Doherty testified that he and his group took over a house at 371 Antrim Road in Belfast, and
awaited a British Army convoy. Some three or four hours later, a car stopped in front of 371
Antrim Road and five men carrying machine guns emerged. These men, members of the
Special Air Service of the British Army (“SAS”), and Doherty’s group fired shots at each other.
In the exchange of gunfire Captain Herbert Richard Westmacott, a British army captain, was
shot and killed. Doherty was arrested, charged with the murder, among other offenses, and
held in the Crumlin Road prison pending trial. On June 10, 1981, after the trial was completed
but before any decision by the Court, Doherty escaped from the prison along with seven others.
He was convicted in absentia on June 12, 1981 of murder, attempted murder, illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition, and belonging to the Irish Republican Army, a proscribed
organization.
Pursuant to Article IX of the Treaty, the Court must be satisfied that probable cause exists with
respect to the offenses for which the requesting party seeks Doherty’s extradition. See Sindona
v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 175 (2d Cir.1980). Petitioner produced a Certificate of Conviction for
the offenses related to the death of Captain Westmacott, and a Warrant for Arrest of Doherty
with respect to the escape from the Crumlin Road prison. See Request for Extradition. Doherty
has not contested that he is, in fact, the person named in those documents, or named as
respondent herein. Indeed, he testified as to his involvement in both the May 2, 1980 incident
which resulted in the death of Captain Westmacott and the June 10, 1981 prison escape. See
Tr. at 631-45, 654-67. Therefore, the Court finds that probable cause clearly exists.
Doherty asserts that the extradition request must be denied, however, pursuant to Article
V(1)(c)(i) of the Treaty, which provides:
(1) Extradition shall not be granted if:
***
[*273] (c)(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party
as one of a political character; ...
Petitioner denies that this so-called “political offense” exception to the Treaty is applicable in
this case. The Court must determine, therefore, whether the offenses for which Doherty was
convicted in relation to the May 2, 1980 incident, and those for which he is accused in
connection with the escape from prison, are of a political character.
It seems clear, as the evidence established, that the centuries old hatreds and political
divisions which were spawned by England’s conquest of Ireland in medieval times continue to
resist any permanent resolution. Instead they have smoldered, sometimes during long periods
of quescience, only to repeatedly erupt with tragic consequences. The offenses which give rise
to this proceeding are but the latest chapters in that unending epic. See In Re Mackin, 80
Cr.Misc. 1, p. 54 at 49-74 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d
Cir.1981).
The Provisional Irish Republican Army, of which respondent is a member, claims to be a
contemporary protagonist in that ancient struggle. The evidence established that the Irish
Republican Army and more particularly the PIRA, had for a time lost much public support and
had indeed become dormant, while other groups, emulating the pattern of civil rights groups in
this country, sought to achieve an amelioration of alleged political and economic deprivations
by peaceful means. It is indeed unfortunate that those efforts failed, but fail they did. Perhaps,
given the long standing enmities, anxieties, and fears that exist between the Unionists and
Republicans in Ireland, it was too much to expect that they would succeed. Nevertheless it was
the collapse of those peaceful efforts that ironically led to a resurgence of the PIRA.
On January 30, 1972 in Londonderry, what started out as a peaceful demonstration ended in
a bloody confrontation in which 13 civilians were killed. See Tr. at 61, 133-34. Since British
troops were regarded as at least in part responsible for that tragedy, their presence which had
been initially welcomed, became a subject of increasing antipathy and concern. [FN1] The
result was a fresh impetus for the PIRA, and increasing support for those who would resolve
Ireland’s political problems by violence. [FN2]
FN1. It was clear from the testimony that by August 1969, a state of civil disorder had been
reached that had threatened the viability of the Northern Irish government. As a consequence,
the Prime Minister requested assistance from the United Kingdom and British troops were sent
to maintain order. It is also clear that they were initially well received. See Tr. at 60, 130-31.
FN2. While the Court is not persuaded that the methods and objectives of the PIRA are in fact
shared by a majority of the people in Ireland, or indeed by a majority of the Catholics in Northern
Ireland, that circumstance is not dispositive of the issue of whether respondent, as a member
of that group, is entitled to rely upon the political offense exception to the Treaty. Indeed, at the
time of the American Revolution, there were a large number of colonists who not only desired
a continued union with England, but regarded the thought of armed opposition to the Crown as
both treasonous and abhorrent. See, e.g., J.R. Alden, The American Revolution 1775-1783
(1954); S.E. Morison, The Oxford History of the American People (1905); C.H. Van Tyne,
Loyalists in American Revolution (1902). Many loyalists suffered the consequences of these
beliefs both before and after independence. Given the nature of that history it would indeed be
anomolous for an American court to conclude that the absence of a political consensus for
armed resistance in itself deprives such resistance of its political character.
Following the resurgence of the PIRA, the level of violence both by the PIRA and armed
Loyalist groups continued to escalate in a continuing and seemingly inexorable series of events
that between 1972 and 1979 claimed the lives of over 1,770 persons, nearly 1,300 of whom
were civilian casualties, and injured hundreds of others. See Review of the Operation of the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (the “Baker Report”) (P.Ex. 18) at 152; see
also New Ireland Forum, The Cost of Violence arising from the Northern Ireland Crisis since
1969 (R.Ex. UU) at ¶ 2.1. This alarming and at times wanton destruction [*274] of life and
property necessitated the enactment of special laws, see Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act 1973 (R.Ex. BB); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976
(R.Ex. CC); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (R.Ex. DD); see also Report of
the Commission to consider procedures to deal with terrorist activities in Northern Ireland (the
“Diplock Report”) (R.Ex. AA); Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 (P.Ex. 15), including the
creation of special Diplock Courts to try political offenders, and transformed the Catholic areas
of Belfast and Londonderry into zones of military occupation.
Were the Court persuaded that all that need be shown to sustain the political offense exception
is that there be a political conflict and that the offense be committed during the course of and
in furtherance of that struggle, the respondent would clearly be entitled to the benefits of that
exception. However, that conclusion is but the beginning and not the end of the analysis that
must be made to determine whether in fact Doherty may be properly extradited.
While it is true that some of the older English cases, see, e.g., In re Meunier [1894] 2 Q.B.
415, 419; In re Castioni [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, 156, 159, 166, and some of the American cases
that have relied upon them, see, e.g., In re Mackin, supra, 80 Cr.Misc. 1 at 24-25; In re
Gonzalez, 217 F.Supp. 717, 720-21 (S.D.N.Y.1963); In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 999
(N.D.Cal.1894), have assumed that that is all that need be shown, such an approach is hardly
consistent with either the realities of the modern world, or the need to interpret the political
offense exception in the light of the lessons of recent history. Nor is it reflective of the more
recent English precedents which have, relying upon that experience, adopted a more restrictive
view of that exception, see, e.g., Regina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex parte Cheng
[1973] [2] W.L.R. 746, 753 [,[1973] A.C. 931, 938]; Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex
parte Schtraks [1964] A.C. 556, 591-92, a view shared by at least one American court. See
Eain v. Wilkes 641 F.2d 504, 518-21 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390,
70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981). But see Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198, 204-05 (9th Cir.1957),
aff’g, Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F.Supp. 245 (S.D.Calif.1956), vacated, 355 U.S. 393, 78 S.Ct.
381, 2 L.Ed.2d 356 (1958); Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-6688 RPA, slip op. at 22-23, 29-32
(N.D.Cal. Oct. 3, 1983), appeal pending, 83-2455 (9th Cir. Oct. 14, 1983); In re McMullen,
Magistrate No. 3-78-1099 MG, slip op. at 3 (N.D.Cal. May 11, 1979).
How then is the political exception doctrine to be construed and what factors should limit its
scope? Not every act committed for a political purpose or during a political disturbance may or
should properly be regarded as a political offense. Surely the atrocities at Dachau, Aushwitz,
and other death camps would be arguably political within the meaning of that definition. The
same would be true of My Lai, the Bataan death march, Lidice, the Katyn Forest Massacre,
and a whole host of violations of international law that the civilized world is, has been, and
should be unwilling to accept. Indeed, the Nuremberg trials would have no legitimacy or
meaning if any act done for a political purpose could be properly classified as a political offense.
Moreover, it would not be consistent with the policy of this nation as reflected by its participation
in those trials, for an American court to shield from extradition a person charged with such
crimes.
The Court concludes therefore that a proper construction of the Treaty in accordance with the
law and policy of this nation, requires that no act be regarded as political where the nature of
the act is such as to be violative of international law, and inconsistent with international
standards of civilized conduct. Surely an act which would be properly punishable even in the
context of a declared war or in the heat of open military conflict cannot and should not receive
recognition under the political exception to the Treaty. Cf. McGlinchey v. Wren, 3 Ir.L.Rep.
Monthly 169 (Irish Sup.Ct.1982) (political offense exception of [*275] Treaty between Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland limited by the highest court of the Republic to “what
reasonable, civilised people would regard as political activity.”)
The Court rejects the notion that the political offense exception is limited to actual armed
insurrections or more traditional and overt military hostilities. The lessons of recent history
demonstrate that political struggles have been commenced and effectively carried out by
armed guerillas long before they were able to mount armies in the field. It is not for the courts,
in defining the parameters of the political offense exception, to regard as dispositive factors
such as the likelihood that a politically dissident group will succeed, or the ability of that group
to effect changes in the government by means other than violence, although concededly such
factors may at times be relevant in distinguishing between the common criminal and the political
offender.
Nor is the fact that violence is used in itself dispositive. [FN3] Instead the Court must assess
the nature of the act, the context in which it is committed, the status of the party committing the
act, the nature of the organization on whose behalf it is committed, and the particularized
circumstances of the place where the act takes place.
FN3. In England the law may indeed be reaching the point where any violent conduct will not
be regarded as political when peaceful means are available. See testimony of David J. Bentley,
Legal Advisor to the Home Office of the United Kingdom, Tr. at 1270-74.
However, even a recent English case suggests that a political assassination committed in the
country where political change is sought to be effected may be protected political conduct. See
Cheng, supra, [1973] W.L.R. at 755-56.
Considering the offenses for which extradition is sought in the light of these precepts, the Court
is constrained to conclude that the political offense exception clearly encompasses those
offenses. We are not faced here with a situation in which a bomb was detonated in a
department store, public tavern, or a resort hotel, causing indiscriminate personal injury, death,
and property damage. Such conduct would clearly be well beyond the parameters of what and
should properly be regarded as encompassed by the political offense exception to the Treaty.
Whatever the precise contours of that elusive concept may be, it was in its inception an
outgrowth of the notion that a person should not be persecuted for political beliefs [FN4] and
was not designed to protect a person from the consequences of acts that transcend the limits
of international law.
FN4. The concept was first enunciated during an era when there was much concern for and
sympathy in England for the cause of liberation for subjugated peoples. See Schtraks, supra,
[1964] A.C. at 582-83; see also Cheng, supra, [1973] W.L.R. at 754-56. Nevertheless, even
then there was concern that the term “political offense” should not be defined too precisely or
too formalistically lest it unduly restrict proper modes of political conduct or impermissibly
sanction every act committed during the cause of a political struggle. In any event, it seems fair
to conclude that the Victorian and post-Victorian climate in which the doctrine arose would
hardly have been sympathetic to the kind of paramilitary terrorism that has become the plague
of the modern age.
It is also significant that even at an early stage in the development of the political offense
exception, the English courts found means to limit the concept by excluding from its definition
anarchistic activity directed at all governments in general rather than at a particular regime.
See In re Meunier, supra, 2 Q.B. at 419. Some American courts have resorted to a similar
rationale, see Eain, supra, 641 F.2d at 521-22. Eain is explicit in recognizing that the best
approach may be to balance the policy considerations which underline that exception against
those which make it necessary to limit that exception to insure that it does not afford a haven
for persons who commit the most heinous atrocities for political ends. See Eain, supra, 641
F.2d at 519-20; see also In re Quinn, Criminal No. CR-81-146-MISC, slip op. at 107-11
(N.D.Cal. Sept. 29, 1982) (Magistrate’s Opinion).
Nor is this a case where violence was directed against civilian representatives of the
government, where defining the limits of the political offense exception would be far less clear.
Similarly, this is not a case where the alleged political conduct was committed in a place other
than the territory [*276] where political change was to be effected, a circumstance that would
in all probability render the political offense exception inapplicable. See, e.g., Cheng, supra,
[1973] W.L.R. at 752-53, 755-56, 771; Schtraks, supra, [1964] A.C. at 591. Finally, the Court is
not presented with facts which establish that hostages were killed or injured or where the
principles embodied in the Geneva Convention have clearly been violated.
Instead, the facts of this case present the assertion of the political offense exception in its most
classic form. The death of Captain Westmacott, while a most tragic event, occurred in the
context of an attempted ambush of a British army patrol. It was the British Army’s response to
that action that gave rise to Captain Westmacott’s death. Had this conduct occurred during the
course of more traditional military hostilities there could be little doubt that it would fall within
the political offense exception. The only issue remaining therefore is does the political
exception become inapplicable because the PIRA is engaged in a more sporadic and informal
mode of warfare.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that it would be most unwise as a matter of policy to
extend the benefit of the political offense exception to every fanatic group or individual with
loosely defined political objectives who commit acts of violence in the name of those so called
political objectives. Therefore it is proper for the Court to consider the nature of an organization,
its structure, and its mode of internal discipline, in deciding whether the act of its members can
constitute political conduct under an appropriate interpretation of the Treaty.
However, the PIRA, as the evidence showed, while it may be a radical offshoot of the
traditional Irish Republican Army, has both an organization, discipline, and command structure
that distinguishes it from more amorphous groups such as the Black Liberation Army or the
Red Brigade. Indeed, as the testimony established, its discipline and command structure
operates even after its members are imprisoned and indeed, as Doherty testified, it was at the
direction of the PIRA that he escaped and then came to the United States. See Tr. at 650-73,
830; see also In Re Mackin, supra, 80 Cr.Misc. 1 at 78-80.
Given that defined structure, the fact that the PIRA may not be likely to achieve its objectives
does not deprive its acts of their political character. This Court cannot, in interpreting the Treaty,
make the political exception concept turn upon the Court’s assessment of the likelihood of a
movement’s success. History is replete with examples of political and insurrectionary
movements that have succeeded in effecting political changes that were believed to be
improbable if not impossible.
The Court is not, however, persuaded by the argument that respondent’s offense must or
should be regarded as political merely because the United Kingdom has recognized the
necessity to enact special legislation and to create special courts to deal with the problems
created by the escalating violence between Republicans and Unionists in Northern Ireland. If
that were the case, any lawless group could create political status for itself by merely escalating
the level of this lawlessness to a point where the government is constrained to deal with it by
special remedies.
The Court also specifically rejects respondent’s claim that the Diplock Courts and the
procedures there employed are unfair, and that respondent did not get a fair trial and cannot
get a fair trial in the courts of Northern Ireland. The Court finds the testimony of the Government
witnesses as to this issue both credible and persuasive. The Court concludes that both
Unionists and Republicans who commit offenses of a political character can and do receive fair
and impartial justice and that the courts of Northern Ireland will continue to scrupulously and
courageously discharge their responsibilities in that regard. Nevertheless, the fairness of the
administration of justice in those courts does not [*277] and cannot deprive respondent’s
offenses of their essentially political character. [FN5]
FN5. It is significant of course that the discretion vested in the prosecution by the emergency
legislation to try offenders in the Diplock Courts is indeed exercised on the basis of a
determination that what would otherwise be common law offenses are politically motivated.
See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (R.Ex. DD) at §§ 29, 31.-(1), Schedule
4 Notes 1 & 2; Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (R.Ex. BB) at §§ 26.-(1), 28.-
(1), Schedule 4 Notes 1 & 2; Diplock Report (R.Ex. AA) at ¶¶ 3-11 & Appendix; Tr. 409, 414-
18, 519, 918-20.
Finally, the Court does not accept as dispositive the view expressed by David J. Bentley,
Assistant Legal Advisor to the United Kingdom Home Office, which indicates that in England
the political offense exception to extradition is now believed to encompass only those situations
in which the sovereign has some interest over and above that of enforcing peace and public
order in prosecuting an alleged political offender. See Tr. at 1232-33, 1245-53. The fact that a
sovereign may be neutral in punishing violent conduct designed to achieve political ends does
not in itself transform offenses that would otherwise be clearly political in nature into ordinary
common law crimes.
Moreover, were the Court to accept such a view, it would be placed in the delicate situation of
having to assess the neutrality and indirectly the good faith of the sovereign seeking extradition,
[FN6] a circumstance that could adversely affect the conduct of foreign relations and might well
be inconsistent with the Treaty’s structure, which clearly places such determinations in the
hands of the Secretary of State. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 133-34 (2d Cir.1981); Eain,
supra, 641 F.2d at 513, 516-17. See also Sindona, supra, 619 F.2d at 174-76. That possibility
is obviously present here where it is certainly at least arguable that the United Kingdom may
not be entirely neutral with respect to the issue of Irish independence because it is the end of
British rule in Ireland that has been and continues to be the principal objective of the Irish
Republican movement.
FN6. The Court is not persuaded by the fact that the current political administration in the United
States has strongly denounced terrorist acts and has stated that to refuse extradition in this
case might jeopardize foreign relations. See Affidavit of Terrell E. Arnold ¶ 3 (June 14, 1984).
The Treaty vests the determination of the limits of the political offense exception in the courts
and therefore reflects a congressional judgment that that decision not be made on the basis of
what may be the current view of any one political administration. See, e.g., In re Mackin, 668
F.2d 122, 132-37 (2d Cir.1981); Eain, supra, 641 F.2d at 513.
In sum, the Court concludes for the reasons given that respondent’s participation in the military
ambush which resulted in Captain Westmacott’s death was an offense political in character.
The Court further concludes that his escape from Crumlin Road prison, organized and planned
as the evidence established that it was, under the direction of the PIRA and to effect its
purposes rather than those of Doherty himself, was also political. That conduct and all of the
various and sundry charges which are connected therewith and for which extradition is sought
are not extraditable offenses under Article V(1)(c)(i) of the Treaty. [FN7] The request for
extradition is therefore denied.
FN7. Of course it is clear that where an offense otherwise political in character is committed
for purely personal reasons such as personal vengence or vindictiveness, that circumstance
might well deprive the offense of its political character. In this case there is no suggestion that
Doherty had any personal hostility to Captain Westmacott. There is some suggestion that the
physical attack upon one of the guards may have had some retaliatory aspects, see R.Ex. Y at
2. However, on balance the Court is persuaded that that guard was assaulted because he
sought to prevent the escape.
It is SO ORDERED.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25,
and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the
extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant
for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the
request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical
evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed
to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the
extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice
denied request on the following grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation.
At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures
and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and
treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation
like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in
criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in
the documents.
3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with
an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties
such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge
Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested
papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize
them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law
should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed
in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state.
The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they
collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
Cuevaz v. Muñoz (G.R. No. 140520; December 18, 2000)
Facts:
The Hong Kong Magistrate’s Court at Eastern Magistracy issued a warrant for the arrest of
respondent Juan Antonio Muñoz for seven (7) counts of accepting an advantage as an agent
and seven (7) counts of conspiracy to defraud, contrary to the common law of Hong Kong
The Department of Justice received a request for the provisional arrest of the respondent from
the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit, International Law Division of the Hong Kong Department of
Justice pursuant to Article 11(1) of the RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement. Upon application
of the NBI, RTC of Manila issued an Order granting the application for provisional arrest and
issuing the corresponding Order of Arrest. Consequently, respondent was arrested pursuant
to the said order, and is currently detained at the NBI detention cell.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the
validity of the Order of Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the Order
of Arrest null and void on the grounds, among others that the request for provisional arrest and
the accompanying warrant of arrest and summary of facts were unauthenticated and mere
facsimile copies which are insufficient to form a basis for the issuance of the Order of Arrest.
Thus, petitioner Justice Serafin R. Cuevas, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department
of Justice, lost no time in filing the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying
documents must be authenticated.
Held:
The request for provisional arrest of respondent and its accompanying documents is valid
despite lack of authentication. There is no requirement for the authentication of a request for
provisional arrest and its accompanying documents. The enumeration in the provision of RP-
Hong Kong Extradition Agreement does not specify that these documents must be
authenticated copies. This may be gleaned from the fact that while Article 11(1) does not
require the accompanying documents of a request for provisional arrest to be authenticated,
Article 9 of the same Extradition Agreement makes authentication a requisite for admission in
evidence of any document accompanying a request for surrender or extradition. In other words,
authentication is required for the request for surrender or extradition but not for the request for
provisional arrest.
The RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement, as they are worded, serves the purpose sought to
be achieved by treaty stipulations for provisional arrest. The process of preparing a formal
request for extradition and its accompanying documents, and transmitting them through
diplomatic channels, is not only time-consuming but also leakage-prone. There is naturally a
great likelihood of flight by criminals who get an intimation of the pending request for their
extradition. To solve this problem, speedier initial steps in the form of treaty stipulations for
provisional arrest were formulated. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to
rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable.
Respondent’s reliance on Garvida v. Sales, Jr. is misplaced. The proscription against the
admission of a pleading that has been transmitted by facsimile machine has no application in
the case at bar for obvious reasons. First, the instant case does not involve a pleading; and
second, unlike the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which do not sanction the filing of a pleading
by means of a facsimile machine, P.D. No. 1069 and the RP Hong Kong Extradition Agreement
do not prohibit the transmission of a request for provisional arrest by means of a fax machine.
PILA Case Digest: Rodriguez V. Hon. Presiding Judge Of RTC Manila Branch 17 (2006)
FACTS:
After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda Gener Rodriguez,
they applied for bail which the trial court granted on September 25, 2001. They posted cash
bonds for the bail set for P1M for each. The US government moved for reconsideration of the
grant of bail which was denied. The US government filed a petition for certiorari entitled Gov’t
of the USA v. Hon. Ponferrada where the court directed the trial court to resolve the matter of
bail guided by this court’s ruling on Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan. The lower court,
without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration
of the cancellation of their bail which was denied. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition directed against the order for cancellation of cash bond and issuance of a
warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or NOT there should be notice and hearing before the cancellation of bail

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED IN PART. SET ASIDE for petitioner IMELDA GENER
RODRIGUEZ.

The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to
prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised
its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force,
co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release.

Under these premises, co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez has offered to go on

voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each;
that her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA
undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities;
that she never attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and
that she is now in her 60’s, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of
continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be
cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her
temporary liberty should not be discontinued. Absent prior notice and hearing, the bail’s
cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.

We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and
convincing showing that:
1) he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances