Performance Audit Into The Administration of Ghana National Service Scheme Chapter One Background 1.1 Reasons For The Audit

PERFORMANCE AUDIT INTO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
GHANA NATIONAL SERVICE SCHEME
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background
1.1 Reasons for the audit
The Ghana National Service Scheme mobilises graduates from

accredited degree and diploma awarding tertiary educational
institutions to serve the nation by working in institutions, agencies
and communities assigned them for a period of one year to augment
the manpower needs of the country. From 2002 to 2006, a total of
103,893 completing students had been assigned to do service in
sectors of the economy with the most acute manpower needs. In 2005
and 2006 there were around 30,000 service personnel assigned to jobs
even in parts of the country that most workers do not find attractive.
Even though over the years the Scheme has helped in augmenting the
manpower needs of the country, there is still room for improvement
as the country 's manpower requirement continues to increase from
year to year.
2. Despite the achievement of the Scheme regarding augmenting

the nation’s manpower needs, concerns have been expressed about the
way the scheme is operated. The concerns raised include inability to
implement all aspects of the Scheme’s programme, misapplication of
1
Performance audit report of the auditor-general on the administration of the
Ghana National Service Scheme
funds by the administrators of the Scheme, dissatisfaction by service
personnel regarding delays in posting, delays in payment of
allowances as well as complaints from user agencies of misalignment
of the service year with the academic year and unacceptable levels of
absenteeism among some service personnel.
3. The need to enhance the effectiveness of the Scheme so as to

better meet the ever-growing manpower needs of our economy was
the prime motivation for this study. The study was commissioned by
the Auditor-General in accordance with Section 13(e) of the Audit
service Act, Act 584 of 2000.
1.2 Purpose and scope of the audit

4. The purpose of the audit was to evaluate, how effectively
national service personnel were deployed to augment the manpower
needs of the country. It was also to evaluate the effectiveness of
monitoring of service personnel at their job locations by the various
regional and district secretariats of NSS as well as the management of
payment of allowances of service personnel.
5. The audit covered the period 2002 and 2003 to 2005 and 2006.
It was carried out in six regions, which were selected from the coastal,
mid-belt and northern sectors of the country. The Greater Accra
region was selected based on the fact that it has the bulk of service
2
personnel. Two regions namely, Volta and Eastern were added to the
four selected earlier to enable the team quickly interact with service
personnel before they proceeded on leave prior to the end of their
period of service.
1.3 Method and implementation

6. The study consisted of interviews, focus groups and review of
documents to enable the team understand the activities and processes
pertaining to the placement of national service personnel in
establishments and communities throughout the country.
Interviews
7. We interviewed current service personnel, key officers in the
national secretariat, six regional secretariats, eighteen district offices
of the Scheme, the Budget, Planning and Monitoring unit of the
Ministry of Education Science and Sports as well as the external and
internal audit units that oversee the Ghana National Service Scheme.
We interviewed officials of the National Accreditation Board as to
how tertiary institutions and courses obtain accreditation. The team
interviewed schedule officers who dealt with the compilation of the
penultimate and final year lists of completing students in three
universities and six polytechnics as well as schedule officers in the
Internally Generated Funds and Budget divisions of the Ministry of
Finance.
3
Focus Groups
8. To obtain first hand information about the experiences and
challenges faced by service personnel, focus groups were conducted
for personnel in three locations, namely, Ghana Education Service
Regional Accounts Office- Ho, Community Water And Sanitation
Agency (CWSA)-Koforidua and Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana -
Tafo.
Document Review
9. The audit team studied the Ghana National Service Act of
1980, Act 426 which established the Ghana National Service Scheme
with a view to determining whether the Scheme was performing its
functions as spelt out in the Act in relation to the deployment,
monitoring, payment of allowances as well as providing the welfare
needs of service personnel.
10. The team reviewed the GNSS Country reports for 2003, 2004
and 2005 to have insight into the activities of GNSS for the two years,
especially with regards to the deployment, monitoring and payment of
allowances to service personnel. Other documents reviewed include
Posting Rules and Regulations, National Service Rules and
Regulations and training manuals for national service personnel. We
further looked at the nominal rolls, payrolls and monthly expenditure
returns on monthly allowances for service personnel to ascertain the
4
timeliness of payments of allowances and how the Scheme managed
unclaimed allowances.
1.4 Structure of the Audit Report

11. Chapter 2 gives a detailed description of the processes in place
for identifying prospective service personnel, processing national
service placements, monitoring service personnel on the job, paying
allowances to service personnel, catering for the social well being of
personnel and awarding national service certificates. This was done
in terms of goals and objectives, funding, current development, key
players and their main activities. Chapter 3 presents the findings, and
a summary of findings and conclusions of the audit. In chapter 4 are
the recommendations made to enhance the effectiveness and
efficiency of the administration of the national service Scheme.
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CHAPTER TWO
DESCRIPTIVE CHAPTER
2.1 Historical background
12. The national service idea was conceived during Ghana’s
Second Republic as a voluntary Scheme called the Ghana National
Service Corporation through an enactment by the Presidential
Commission and the National Assembly in 1971. It did not however
see the light of day before the Progress Party (PP) Government was
overthrown in a coup d ’etat in 1971. The National Redemption
Council Government established the Ghana National Service Scheme
through a decree, NRCD 208, 1973. Under the decree, graduates of
the nations universities were required to render a year voluntary
service to the state.
13. Another act, The Ghana National Service Scheme Act of 1980,
Act 426, repealed NRCD 208. Under Act 426, national service
personnel were to render a mandatory service for a period of two
years including a minimum period of six months military training.
However after two years of implementation, the policy of a two-year
national service period was changed to a one-year national service
period due to financial constraints.
14. Over the years, the number of national service personnel

deployed by the National Service Secretariat has increased
6
tremendously. This is due to the increase in the number of graduates
who pass out of accredited tertiary educational institutions each year
and the establishment of more tertiary educational institutions in the
country. Currently, the Secretariat deploys about 30,000 service
personnel each year to both public and private institutions.
2.2 Goals and objectives

15. The objectives of the Scheme are to:
a. deploy all graduates of accredited tertiary educational
institutions on national service throughout the country
especially in deprived areas
b. augment the provision of competent personnel to areas
of the economy that suffers manpower shortfalls
c. organise military training for all service personnel and
instill in them self-discipline, alertness, physical fitness,
sense of patriotism and selfless devotion to work
d. extend the Scheme to cover all skilled retired persons
within the framework of a national volunteer
programme, and
e. make full use of its income generation potential in order
to reduce its dependence on the State for financial
support.
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2.3 Rules and Regulations
16. The Ghana National Service Scheme operates under Act 426 of
1980. The Act specifies persons legible to the Scheme and each year
the Scheme comes out with postings instructions to it’s regional and
district coordinators to regulate the deployment of national service
personnel to its user agencies. It also issues rules and regulations to
national service personnel as to how to conduct themselves during the
period of service and what is expected of them by the Scheme and its
user agencies.
2.4 Funding
17. There are two sources of funding for the Scheme: Government
of Ghana funding through budgetary releases from the Ministry of
Finance and Internally generated funds. From 2001 to 2005,
Government spent ¢336.3 billion on the Scheme while it internally
generated ¢5.7 billion as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Sources of Funding
YEAR GOG (¢) IGF (¢) Total (¢)
2001 26,528,702,137.52 379,443,713.06 26,908,145,850.58

2002 37,430,691,003.90 554,143,820.43 37,984,834,824.33
2003 70,644,380,405.25 1,295,963,158.61 71,940,343,563.86
2004 72,905,099,456.92 1,403,290,678.73 74,308,390,135.65
2005 128,783,540,408.02 2,067,595,898.16 130,851,136,306.16
TOTAL ¢336,292,413,411.59 ¢5,700,437,268.99 ¢341,992,850,680.58
Source: GNSS Financial Record
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2.5 Current development
18. The Board is instrumental in instituting a 20% service charge
payable by all private organisations to which service personnel are
assigned as well as having to take up the payment of monthly
allowances to all those engaged by them. The Scheme has also
acquired household items to sell to service personnel on credit basis to
alleviate the difficulties that the fresh personnel face when they leave
home to do national service in remote areas. Furthermore, the Scheme
launched its volunteer programme in October 2003 and as at June
2006, it operates fully in seven regions with 2,300 volunteers on its
nominal roll.
19. In order to overcome challenges emanating from the Scheme’s

current mandate, the Board has submitted proposals for amendments
to the Act to make it more empowering and proactive, to diversify as
well as enrich its functions in line with a revised vision, mission,
goals and objectives.
20. To overcome the problems of delays in completing the posting

of service personnel, the Scheme has developed an internet-based
software that will enable prospective service personnel access
information about their posting at the Scheme’s website with effect
from the 2006 and 2007 Service Year.
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2.5 Organisational Structure
21. The Ministry of Education, Science and Sports has oversight
responsibility for the Scheme. The Ghana National Service Scheme
has at its apex an eight member Governing Board that provides
general policy direction for its operations and reports annually to the
President. An Executive Director assisted by one deputy manages the
Scheme. The national Secretariat is made up of eleven departments.
The Scheme is represented by a Regional Coordinator in every region
and in all 136 districts by a District Coordinator.
2.6 Key players and activities

22. To deploy service personnel to areas and institutions where
their expertise are most required, the Scheme collaborates with other
key-players. Itemised below are the key-players and the activities they
undertake:
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Table 2: Key players and their activities
Key player Activities
Office of the President Appointment of Governing Board
Ministry of Education Science Supervisory responsibility for the Scheme. All correspondence
and Sports to the Presidency should be routed through this Ministry.
Budgetary responsibility for the Scheme. All correspondence
to the Ministry of Finance should be routed through this
Ministry.
Ministry of Finance Provides funds for the running of the Scheme as well as
paying the monthly allowances of service personnel.
Governing Board of Scheme General control and management of the Scheme on matters
of policy.
Provides the Scheme with data on final and penultimate
Tertiary institutions year students which serves as the basis for the generation of
the posting list of service personnel
Public /Private organizations Furnish the Scheme with their personnel requirements for
the subsequent year so the Scheme could assign personnel
to them.
Heads of these organisations endorse appointment letters of
service personnel to confirm that these personnel have
reported for duty.
Private organisations to which Service personnel are
assigned are required to pay these personnel from their own
resources.
Private organisations to which such personnel are assigned
are required to pay 20% of the allowance paid to each
service personnel assigned to them as service charge to the
Scheme
Regional Coordinating Councils Provides office accommodation for Scheme's Regional
Secretariats as well as assist in providing residential
accommodation for the Scheme’s region officers.
District Assemblies Provides office accommodation for Scheme's District
Secretariats as well as assist in providing residential
accommodation for service personnel
Source: Ghana Audit Service
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2.7 System description of the Scheme
23. The Scheme’s main activity is the deployment of graduates of
accredited tertiary educational institutions to do a mandatory one-year
national service in the various sectors of the economy, particularly in
areas experiencing shortfalls in manpower. Deployment of graduates
by the Scheme for national service entails the following activities:
 identifying and registering of graduates who are eligible
for service.
 organising orientation programmes for them
 posting them to the various sectors of the economy in
good time.
 organising military training for them whilst at post
during the service year
 monitoring them whilst at post to ensure that they
deliver value for money
 paying them monthly allowances
 helping them to secure accommodation upon posting
and taking care of their health needs, and
12
 issuing certificates to deserving personnel at the end of
service.
24. In return, the personnel are to serve diligently in the various

organisations they are assigned to and are to abide by the rules and
regulations of both the organisations they serve and the Scheme.
25. The Scheme collaborates with institutions such as the AIDS

Commission to ensure that its personnel are properly sensitised about
the dangers of irresponsible sexual behaviour during their tenure as
service personnel. It engages in community development activities
and skill training programmes for unschooled and unemployed youth
using its personnel in deprived communities as facilitators. It also
engages its personnel in income generation activities.
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CHAPTER THREE
FINDINGS
3.0 Introduction
26. The Scheme’s core activity of deploying graduates to do a
mandatory one – year national service has improved the manpower
needs of areas experiencing shortfalls.
27. We found during the audit that the impact of the Scheme will
be further enhanced if it overcomes the underlisted challenges:
 Service personnel were not adequately orientated before
they assumed duty with the organisations they have
been posted to
 Service personnel were not given military training to
make them physically and mentally alert
 the procedures followed in posting service personnel
were not efficient
 Service personnel were not properly monitored on the
job to ensure they gave value for the money they earned
14
 the Scheme did not refund unclaimed national service
personnel monthly allowances to the consolidated fund
contrary to laid down Regulation, and
 monthly allowances due the service personnel were not
paid promptly.
3.1 Service personnel are not adequately orientated before they

assumed duty
28. Orientating service personnel before they commence service is
one of the challenges that face the Scheme. Orientation entails
conscientising the personnel on the operations of the Scheme, what
they are to expect as service personnel and how they can serve
effectively. The Scheme is supposed to organise a minimum of two
orientation programmes for all prospective service personnel before
they assumed duty at their place of posting. The first orientation takes
place on campus before prospective graduates take their final year
examination and is therefore referred to as “on campus orientation”.
29. The prospective personnel are assembled and educated on

issues concerning the operations of the Scheme. They are also taught
how to fill the national service forms. The second orientation is
known as “off campus orientation” as it takes place after posting but
just before service personnel assume duty. It is usually organised by
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the Regional and District Secretariats with the emphasis on making
the personnel aware of the unique socio-cultural practices of the
localities where they will live and do service. Issues such as HIV
AIDS are discussed. Personnel posted to certain jobs that require
specific hands on skills such as teaching are given additional training.
30. Our visits to 13 districts in six regions revealed that all the six
regions organised “on campus orientations” for service personnel
assigned them in the 2005 and 2006-service year. However only three
out of the 18 districts visited organised “off campus orientations” for
service personnel in the 2005 and 2006 service year. Our interviews
with both the service personnel and officers of the Scheme showed
that all the “on campus orientations” organised were poorly attended
with less than 50% of prospective service personnel attending. This
was largely due to the fact that the “on campus orientation” was
organised during revision/examination week. Ten out of the 18
districts visited were unable to organise the “off campus orientation”
because of lack of logistics. Twelve out of 18 service personnel
interviewed in the Koforidua municipality claimed they knew little of
the area before assuming duty there.
31. Failure of the Scheme to adequately orientate service personnel

before they start service negatively impacts on their performance. We
were told by 16 out of the 40 national service personnel interviewed
16
in the Volta and Eastern regions that lack of adequate knowledge of
the job they were assigned adversely affected their performance. This
is more so because the personnel are relatively younger and find it
difficult to adjust to their new environment when they have to live
away from their usual homesteads for the first time.
32. We also noted instances of conflict of culture, which resulted

in frictions between the service personnel and the residents. In an
instance a service personnel claimed that he had contracted an
incurable skin disease because he had eaten gari in the market, which
was a taboo in the area. Fifteen percent of the personnel assigned to
teach in the Ho district claimed that initially, controlling the pupils
was difficult because they lacked the basic skills in teaching
methodology.
3.1 The Scheme is not able to organise military training for

service personnel
33. Section 4 of the GNSS Act of 1980 requires that the period of
National Service shall include a minimum of six months military
training. Also Section 10 of the GNSS Rules and Regulations requires
service personnel to undergo military training in every service year.
The main objective of military training for service personnel was to
imbue in them a high sense of punctuality and selfless attitude to
work during the tenure of the service and during their post service
working life.
17
34. Despite the laudable objectives of this activity, GNSS has for
several years not been able to organise military training for service
personnel as directed by the Act. During separate interviews with the
Director of the Scheme and two members of the governing board,
(chairman and acting Secretary/member), they all attributed their
inability to organise the military training to budgetary constraints, as
its annual budgets are drastically slashed by the Ministry of Finance.
For instance in 2005 the ¢13.06bn the Scheme budgeted for service
activity was slashed to ¢0.55bn representing a 95.8% cut. Also the
¢3.50bn budgeted for administrative activity was reduced to ¢0.45bn,
a cut of 87.4%.
3.2 The process of posting personnel for service was not done in
an efficient manner
35. Posting is the core activity in the deployment of National
Service personnel and is undertaken by the National, Regional, and
District secretariats of the service respectively. The process starts with
the publishing in the Daily Newspapers of invitations to organisations
that need service personnel to submit requests and ends with the
posting of prospective service personnel to serve in various sectors of
the economy in various districts of the country. In placing the
graduates for service, the Scheme considers the interplay of the
following factors: national programmes, priorities of Scheme, courses
of study pursued by graduates, requests of user agencies, locality of
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choice of graduates, health status of graduates and national
integration.
36. To meet the policy of personnel serving for a period of one

year and to achieve targets set by the Scheme with regard to posting
of service personnel, the activities involved in postings with an
interplay of the above considerations must not only be time-bound but
must also be done in an efficient manner. The audit however noted
that postings were not only done late, but also took a long time to
complete.
37. Analysis of the times posting started and ended during the
period reviewed as shown in Table 3 revealed that throughout the
period from 2002 to 2006, posting was never done on time to enable
the period of service to actually last for eleven months. We further
noted that the policy of aligning the beginning of the service year with
the beginning of the academic year is not adhered to as is shown by
Table 3.
Table 3: Alignment of academic year with start of posting

Year Date academic year Month posting started Month posting
begun completed
2002/03 September November March
2003/04 September November February
2004/05 September November March
2005/06 September November February
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38. The undue delays in placements and completion of the posting
process were attributed to the following:
 interference in the posting process
 late and prolonged placement process
 eagerness to internally generate funds from user fee
3.3.1 Undue public interference in the posting process

39. The Ghana National Service Scheme Act 426 of 1980
mandates the Scheme to post service personnel to designated sectors
of the economy, especially sectors that face manpower shortfall.
40. Our interviews with officials of the Scheme revealed that much
as the Scheme is trying to carry out its mandate of posting personnel
to areas where they can give optimum value to the nation, there is
serious interference by the public in the posting process. People in
influential positions such as politicians, senior public servants, chiefs,
businessmen and women put officials of the Scheme under so much
pressure that they sometimes succumb and manipulate the process to
benefit those persons. Such persons request that their favourites are
posted to specific organisations and location of their choice.
41. Interference in posting takes two forms: “pre-posting” where

requests are made for favourites to be posted to certain
organisations/locations before the release of the posting master list
20
and ‘post-posting” where requests are made for changes to be made in
the organisations/locations to which favourites have been posted after
the release of the posting master list. Interference by the public results
in prolonged posting periods, and imbalances in the distribution of
service personnel.
3.3.2 Prolonged period of posting
42. Analysis of the times posting started and ended during the
period reviewed and shown in Table 4 revealed that throughout the
period (2002 to 2006), posting was never done on time to enable the
period of service to actually last for eleven months. The national
service year ends in July to enable service personnel go on leave
during the month of August. From the Table, the longest period that
service personnel served during the entire period of four years was 9
months, that is, November to July and the shortest period was 5
months as was the case in 2004/5.
21
Table 4: Posting Schedules 2002-2006
Year Posting End of Service Duration of

Service
2002/3 November July 9
December July 8
January July 7
February July 6
December July 8
January July 7
February July 6
December July 8
January July 7
February July 6
March July 5
December July 8
January July 7
February July 6
43. Interviews with the officers of the Scheme and service

personnel as well as review of documents revealed the following
reasons for the anomaly:
 placement of personnel, which is usually done in
September, takes five months to complete instead of the
three months stipulated
22
 some district coordinators do not officially write to user
agencies asking them to submit their requests for
service personnel
 changes and review of original postings delay the
completion of the posting process
 some tertiary institutions do not send their final year
list to GNSS in a timely manner, and
 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning sometimes
delays in the release of funds to the Scheme.
44. Late postings and the resultant inability of the service

personnel to serve the full eleven-month period distort the
programmes of the user agencies. Ghana Education Service is most
affected since majority of the service personnel are posted to the
teaching field. As the period of posting is prolonged, the first and
second cycle institutions go half-way through the first term before
service personnel report for work. The national service personnel are
also affected by the inability of the Scheme to run for the full twelve
months. Twenty-two out of 40 service personnel interviewed in the
Koforidua municipality claimed that they would have liked to serve
for a period of 12 months since that would have given them more
working experience.
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3.3.3 Imbalances in posting of service personnel
45. Article 3 (1) of Act 426 directs the postings of service

personnel to the following sectors of the economy: agriculture, co-
operatives, education, health, local government, military, rural
development, youth programmes and any field that the Board may
prescribe. In recent times, the Scheme posts service personnel to
private sector organisations who are enjoined to pay the allowances of
service personnel as well as pay 20% of such allowance to the
Scheme as user fee.
46. Our review of posting records revealed that posting to the

private sector is increasing steadily. The 2003/4 Country report states
that only 5% of service personnel were posted to the private sector
and this increased to 10% in 2005/6 as stated in page 2 paragraph 8 of
the 2005/6 posting instructions. Thus, posting to private sector
organisations increased by 100% within two years. Officials of the
Scheme attributed the steady increase in posting to the private sector
to the increasing attention to the sector by government as well as the
Scheme’s eagerness to generate substantial revenue from the 20% of
individual allowances paid to it as user fee. We found that posting to
the private sector adversely impacts on posting to the public sector.
The GES is affected more as shortage of teachers in the service is
increasing annually while the number of service personnel posted to it
is also decreasing.
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47. Page 29 paragraph 4 of the 2003/4 Country report states that
80% of the service personnel posted to GES are sent to teach. It
further states that the current usage shows that despite the deployment
of service personnel to teach in schools, an additional 16,000 teachers
were still needed to teach various subjects throughout the country. In
our view, that is where there is an acute shortage of manpower and we
expect postings to the teaching field especially to rural schools to be
increasing annually to match the decrease in teachers and not postings
to the private sector.
3.4 Service personnel were not properly monitored on the job

to ensure they gave value for the money they earned
48. Monitoring is the key activity that the GNSS undertakes to
ensure that service personnel give value for the allowances that they
earn. The monitoring exercise starts when personnel assume duty and
lasts till they complete service. This is supposed to be done in an
effective manner to ensure that service personnel are not paid
allowances when they have not worked. Effective monitoring entails:
 drawing up monitoring programmes at the national,
regional and district levels
 obtaining documents from heads of user agencies
testifying that service personnel are at post and working
25
 conducting regular spot checks on service personnel to
ascertain that they are at post, and
 preparing monitoring reports at the district, regional and
national levels.
49. Information gathered from our fieldwork showed that

monitoring of service personnel was not done in an efficient manner.
In all the six regional secretariats and the 18 district secretariats
visited, officials did not have any monitoring programmes. Out of the
18 districts, only one wrote monitoring reports. The National
Secretariat did not produce any evidence to the effect that it required
its district and regional secretariats to regularly furnish it with reports
on their monitoring activities. At best, monitoring was carried on as
and when the situation could allow or when it was suspected that
something was wrong. The reasons for the inability of the Secretariat
to effectively monitor service personnel was due to the following:
lack of resources, lack of collaboration with other stakeholders, and
posting skewed towards Ministries, Departments Agencies.
3.4.1 Lack of resources

50. Officials of the regional and district Secretariats visited
attributed the ineffective monitoring to lack of logistics like
stationery, office equipment and vehicles. All the regional and district
secretariats were without vehicles until the middle of 2006, when each
26
of the 10 regional secretariats was provided with a double cabin pick-
up each Six of the 18 districts visited were without typewriters and all
18 districts claimed that they had never been supplied with stationery.
The National Secretariat admitted that it was provided with funds
from the consolidated fund for administrative expenses, albeit
meager, hence its inability to properly resource its district secretariats
with stationery and office equipment.
51. Inadequate staff at the district secretariats has also contributed

to the ineffectiveness of monitoring. Thirty-one of the Districts
visited were without functioning secretariats as shown in Table 5
whilst the existing secretariats are Understaffed. Twelve out of 18
district secretariats visited were run by a lone officer, meaning that
the office was locked up anytime the officer had engagements
elsewhere. The situation is worse where the district coordinator also
has oversight responsibility for another district as is the case of the
Bawku East coordinator who also oversees the Bawku West and Garu
Tempane districts, in such cases the coordinators reassign some of the
service personnel to be with them and assist them. Some of the
national service personnel who are assigned to work with the District
co-ordinators are at times sent out to monitor their colleague national
service personnel at their job locations.
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Table 5: Districts without coordinators
Northern Upper Upper Brong – Ashanti Western Central Volta Region Eastern Region
Region West East Ahafo Region
Bunkpurug Sassala Bolgatanga Kintampo Atwima Bia Assin Krachi East Kwahu West
u-Yunyoo West Municipal North Nwabiagya North
Adaklu Anyigbe East Akim
.Sawla- Wa East Garu- Tano North Amansie
Tuna-Kalba Tempane Central
Asunafo
Central Wa Builsa South
Gonja West
Jaman North
West Gonja Talensi
Nabdum Tain
West
Mamprusi Pru
Nanumba
South Sene
Zabzgu –
Tatale Sunyani
Tamale –
Metro
Source: GNSS Internal Audit Unit
3.4.2 Lack of collaboration with other stakeholders
52. Another reason why the Scheme is not able to effectively

monitor the service personnel at post is the lack of collaboration with
other government agencies. Greater contact with other organisations
such as the G.E.S would enable the Scheme depend on the resources
of other better-endowed agencies to good advantage. Lack of
effective monitoring results in the service personnel sometimes not
working but still enjoying their monthly allowances. Some personnel
posted to rural areas stay in the big towns but report occasionally at
work and are as such reckoned to have reported to work and are
therefore paid.
28
3.4.3 Posting is skewed towards Ministries, Departments and
Agencies
53. Since its inception the policy of the Scheme has always been to
post most service personnel to G.E.S. especially rural schools. This
according to GNSS officials is to help augment the perennial problem
of shortage of teachers. In page 29 of its Country report for 2003 and
2004, the GNSS states that, “ A bulk of the national service
personnel, nearly 80% are posted to the GES to undertake teaching
assignments in secondary and technical schools throughout the
country, as this is our most desired need”.
54. We found that in the case of regional distribution of service

personnel posted to the GES from 2002 and 2003 to 2005 and 2006,
the Scheme did not properly address the manpower shortfall in the
country contrary to its stated policy. For instance, the percentage of
service personnel posted to the Greater Accra region was 27.6% in
2003 and 2004, even though it has the largest concentration of trained
teachers in the country. This figure increased to 32.6% in 2004 and
2005 and then 40.7% in 2005 and 2006. On the other hand, the
percentage of personnel posted to the Upper East region which least
attracts trained teachers was 2.2% in 2002 and 2003, then rose to
2.5% in 2004 and 2005 but fell to 1.3% in 2005 and 2006.
55. Again page 2 of the GNSS posting instructions for 2005 and
2006 states that “The policy of posting service personnel to the public
29
sector has not changed. The Secretariat still attaches greater
importance to postings to the GES especially to rural schools. The
Scheme is determined and committed to improving access to quality
education at all levels especially among the rural populace. As a
result, 60 to 70% of the 2005 and 2006 total posting will go to the
education sector”. We found that this target was never met. An
analysis of sectoral posting of service personnel to various regions
from 2002 and 2003 to 2005 and 2006 shows that the Scheme was
barely able to fulfill its stated policy objective. On the whole it posted
more personnel to MDAs than to the GES.
56. The team found that even in the regions where the Scheme
seemed to be attaining its stated policy objective of posting majority
of personnel to GES, the percentages are declining markedly over the
years. In the Volta region for instance, the percentage of personnel
posted to the GES declined from 81.9% in 2003 and 2004 to 74% in
2004 and 2005 and to 56.3% in 2005 and 2006. Similarly in the
Western region the percentage posted declined from 62.3% in 2003
and 2004 to 60.9% in 2004 and 2005 and 57.7% in 2005 and 2006. As
a result, a lot of the rural schools are without teachers as most of the
service personnel are assigned to work in MDAs and with
organisations with offices in the urban areas. This observation was
further corroborated by the Upper East regional directorate of the
GES which declared it had vacancies for 2,396 teachers in the 2004
30
and 2005 academic year as is reflected in Table 6.The GES however
did not submit any formal request for the allocation of service
personnel.
Table 6: Teacher vacancies in schools in the Upper East

Region (2006/7)
Type of institution No. of vacancies
Training colleges 26
Second cycle 152
Basic (J.S.S) 218
Basic (primary) 2,000
Total 2,396
Source: Human resource e Division of G.E.S Bolgatanga
3.5 Scheme did not refund unclaimed monthly national service

allowances to the consolidated fund
57. Section 45 of Financial Administration Regulation 2004
requires that, any overpayment should be recovered immediately and
paid into the account from which it was originally paid. This is to
safeguard against misapplication of funds and possible fraud. Our
examination of reports on the payment of service personnel
allowances for the period 2002 to 2005 showed that a total ¢ 831.31
million was refunded to the National Service by the ten Regional
Secretariats of the Scheme as unclaimed service allowances. The
National Secretariat was yet to pay this amount into the Consolidated
Fund.
31
58. Our audit further revealed that the Scheme did not have an
adequate mechanism in place to ensure that the exact amounts of
unclaimed allowances were promptly paid by the district secretariats
to the national secretariats through their respective regional
secretariats. As a result, district coordinators paid unclaimed
allowances to their respective regional secretariats as and when they
deemed fit. Details of cumulative payments made to the respective
Regional Secretariats are provided in Table 7.
Table 7: Payment of OPRS By Regional Secretariat to the

National Secretariat. (¢‘Million)
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005
Ashanti 3.05 85.80 96.42 18.39
Gt. Accra - - 45.00
Brong Ahafo 3.62 14.58 9.13 -
Central 29.48 105.26 16.23 50.85
Western - 2 .67
1.28 96.78
Eastern 11.81 113.96 - 33.07
Northern 30.55 8.17 2.00 -
Upper East 1.41 0.54 1.54 -
Upper West 17.98 2.68 12.52 5.85
Volta - - 10.69 -
TOTAL 97.90 333.66 149.81 249.94
Source: Ghana National Service Scheme
59. The accountant explained that the Scheme anticipated that it

required 13.09bn to effectively fulfill its operations relating to
monitoring, district level pre-service orientation, and a special
32
orientation for personnel to be assigned to teaching, among others.
The Ministry of Finance slashed the vote for service and
administration to ¢ 0.60bn and the Scheme was compelled to use the
unclaimed allowances to cover operational costs and then request for
retrospective approval from the Ministry of Finance which they were
yet to obtain by the end of the audit.
3.6 Welfare of national service personnel was not adequately

taken care of
60. The Scheme is responsible for the well being of service
personnel. This takes the form of paying monthly allowances to
service personnel, assisting them to get accommodation and access
medical care.
61. About 40% of service personnel interviewed in the Volta and

Eastern regions claimed the district assemblies could only offer
accommodation to about 2% of service personnel posted that the rest
had to look for their own accommodation. They claimed that the
Scheme did not offer them loans to pay the rent advances that the
landlords were asking for. Others said they had to use most of their
meagre allowances to pay transport fares because the accommodation
they got was far from their job locations. Some district coordinators
interviewed said they could not assist the personnel in their districts
when they fell sick and had to go to hospital because the Scheme did
not release funds to them for that purpose.
33
62. Another area of concern with regard to the welfare of service
personnel is the late payment of monthly allowances to personnel.
Having rendered service to the nation, the personnel expected to be
paid on time since that money was their sole source of paying for their
rent, buying food, paying transport fares and paying for any
medication they may need.
63. Our analysis of dates on which allowances were paid as shown

in Table 8 revealed that payments were delayed for between two to
five weeks every month. The inability of the Scheme to adequately
cater for the welfare of service personnel at post invariably affects
their output. This is more serious during the first two months of the
service year making the personnel go back to their parents to look for
money to live on till they are paid. Service personnel use these
opportunities to abscond.
34
Table 8: Pay days to personnel allowances
Month First day of Period of delay

payment
Nov 2005 January 6 5 weeks
Dec. 2005 January 6 1 week
January 2006 January 26 On time
February 2006 March 3 On time
March 2006 April 13 2 weeks
April May 17 2 weeks
May June 2 On time
June June 29 On time
July August 4 1 week
August August 4 On time
Source: GNSS UER Secretariat, Bolgatanga
3.7 Summary of findings and conclusions
64. GNSS has since its establishment in 1973 been mobilising

graduates from accredited degree and diploma awarding tertiary
educational institutions to render voluntary service in key areas of the
Ghanaian economy such as education, agriculture, health, local
government and rural development. Inspite of the tremendous strides
made in these areas in addressing critical manpower shortfalls there is
the general feeling among Ghanaian that GNSS could do better. The
purpose of the audit was to evaluate the administration of the Scheme
with regard to such activities as budgeting, orientation, posting,
monitoring and payment of allowances to service personnel.
35
65. The Scheme is required to organise two orientation
programmes for the service personnel; the on-campus and off –
campus orientation programmes. On compus orientation programmes
were poorly attended with less than 50 percent of prospective service
personnel attending. This is because they were organised at a time
students were preparing for end of semester examinations.
66. Posting of national service personnel by GNSS is characterised
by a number of lapses:
 GNSS has not been able to post all service personnel to

locations where their services are most needed
 Due to late posting, user organisation are not able to
fully utilise the services of service personnel especially
those who teach in schools
67. To ensure the maximum use of services rendered by service

personnel and that allowances are not paid to non-performing
personnel, there is the need for effective monitoring. We however,
found that payment of allowances by GNSS to service personnel
because of inadequate staff and logistics and also its low level of
collaboration with stakeholders like the GES and District Assemblies.
36
68. The prompt payment of monthly allowances could boost the
morale of service personnel. We however found that payment of
allowances by GNSS to service personnel was sometimes delayed
five weeks. Under the circumstances service personnel posted to
locations and travel to their parents for financial assistance.
69. GNSS has failed to ensure that the right amount of unclaimed
allowances of service personnel are promptly paid by District
Coordinators to the national secretariats though their respective
regional secretariats. Additionally the national secretariat failed to pay
unclaimed allowances received from the districts to government chest
but rather misapplied them. The programme to provide military
training to service personnel as contained the GNSS Act, 1980 has not
been fulfilled due to budgetary constraints.
37
CHAPTER 4
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Posting Activities
 Postings to the private sector should be reviewed to enable

the GNSS meet its policy objectives of supplementing the
manpower needs of government agencies especially GES
 Since it takes about three months to process the national
service applications, the GNSS can start processing the
applications earlier to avoid late start of the service.
2. Weak Administrative Capacity.
 The GNSS should properly time the “on campus”

orientation to attract more participation from prospective
service personnel.
 GNSS must promptly pay allowances to avoid personnel
leaving their job locations in search of financial assistance
 GNSS should draw up and implement comprehensive
monitoring plans to ensure that service personnel give
value for their earned allowances
 GNSS must increase the staff strength in the district offices
and revive and adequately equip all non – functioning
secretariats and under staffed offices
38
 GNSS must endeavour to appoint a coordinator for every
district so as to ensure effective monitoring of all service
personnel at their job locations and,
 Effective monitoring of personnel by officers of the district

secretariats should be a matter of priority since that is the
only way performance of personnel can be assessed.
Others.
 The GNSS must deepen collaboration with all relevant
stakeholders before and after posting so that the expertise
of would be service personnel can be put to optimum use
 The Scheme should seek retrospective authorisation from

the Ministry of Finance for the use of unclaimed
allowances or otherwise take steps to recover and pay all
such monies back to government chest
 GNSS should seek authorization from the Ministry of

Finance to enable it apply any unclaimed allowances it
holds towards financing the military training component of
the national service Scheme and,
39
 GNSS should hold further discussions with the Ministry of
Defence and the Ministry of Manpower and Employment
to explore opportunities for the three bodies to consider
jointly funding the military training component of the
Scheme.
40

Performance Audit Into The Administration of Ghana National Service Scheme Chapter One Background 1.1 Reasons For The Audit

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Performance Audit Into The Administration of Ghana National Service Scheme Chapter One Background 1.1 Reasons For The Audit

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PERFORMANCE AUDIT INTO THE ADMINISTRATION OF

GHANA NATIONAL SERVICE SCHEME

The Ghana National Service Scheme mobilises graduates from

2. Despite the achievement of the Scheme regarding augmenting

3. The need to enhance the effectiveness of the Scheme so as to

1.2 Purpose and scope of the audit

1.3 Method and implementation

1.4 Structure of the Audit Report

14. Over the years, the number of national service personnel

2.2 Goals and objectives

Table 1: Sources of Funding

YEAR GOG (¢) IGF (¢) Total (¢)

2001 26,528,702,137.52 379,443,713.06 26,908,145,850.58

19. In order to overcome challenges emanating from the Scheme’s

20. To overcome the problems of delays in completing the posting

2.6 Key players and activities

Office of the President Appointment of Governing Board

 identifying and registering of graduates who are eligible

 organising orientation programmes for them

 posting them to the various sectors of the economy in

 organising military training for them whilst at post

during the service year

 monitoring them whilst at post to ensure that they

deliver value for money

 paying them monthly allowances

 helping them to secure accommodation upon posting

and taking care of their health needs, and

24. In return, the personnel are to serve diligently in the various

25. The Scheme collaborates with institutions such as the AIDS

 Service personnel were not adequately orientated before

they assumed duty with the organisations they have

 Service personnel were not given military training to

make them physically and mentally alert

 the procedures followed in posting service personnel

were not efficient

 Service personnel were not properly monitored on the

personnel monthly allowances to the consolidated fund

contrary to laid down Regulation, and

 monthly allowances due the service personnel were not

3.1 Service personnel are not adequately orientated before they

29. The prospective personnel are assembled and educated on

31. Failure of the Scheme to adequately orientate service personnel

32. We also noted instances of conflict of culture, which resulted

3.1 The Scheme is not able to organise military training for

36. To meet the policy of personnel serving for a period of one

Table 3: Alignment of academic year with start of posting

3.3.1 Undue public interference in the posting process

41. Interference in posting takes two forms: “pre-posting” where

3.3.2 Prolonged period of posting

Year Posting End of Service Duration of

43. Interviews with the officers of the Scheme and service

September, takes five months to complete instead of the

three months stipulated

agencies asking them to submit their requests for

 changes and review of original postings delay the

completion of the posting process

 some tertiary institutions do not send their final year

list to GNSS in a timely manner, and

 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning sometimes

delays in the release of funds to the Scheme.

44. Late postings and the resultant inability of the service

45. Article 3 (1) of Act 426 directs the postings of service