SYLLABUS TITLE: Positivist Theory – Criticisms of Positivist Theory

CASE TITLE: SERAFIN CHENG vs. SPOUSES VITTORIO and MA. HELEN DONINI, G.R. No. 167017
June 22, 2009
CORONA,J.:
FACTS:

 The subject of this petition is an oral lease agreement that went sour. Petitioner Serafin
Cheng agreed to lease his property located at 479 Shaw Blvd., Mandaluyong City to
respondents, Spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini, who intended to put up a restaurant
thereon. They agreed to a monthly rental of ₱17,000, to commence in December 1990.
 However, before respondents’ business could take off and before any final lease
agreement could be drafted and signed, the parties began to have serious disagreements
regarding its terms and conditions. Petitioner thus wrote respondents on January 28,
1991, demanding payment of the deposit and rentals, and signifying that he had no
intention to continue with the agreement should respondents fail to pay. Respondents,
however, ignoring petitioner’s demand, continued to occupy the premises until April 17,
1991 when their caretaker voluntarily surrendered the property to petitioner.
 This decision of the Supreme Court will be confined only to the issues raised by petitioner,
that is, the award of reimbursement and the deletion of the award of damages.
ARGUMENTS:

RTC RULING CA RULING

 Respondents then filed an action for
specific performance and damages
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 67, docketed as Civil Case No.
60769. Respondents prayed that
petitioner be ordered to execute a
written lease contract for five years,
deducting from the deposit and rent
the cost of repairs in the amount of
₱445,000, or to order petitioner to
return their investment in the amount
of ₱964,000 and compensate for their
unearned net income of ₱200,000
with interest, plus attorney’s fees.2
 Petitioner, in his answer, denied
respondents’ claims and sought the
 Respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA) which, in its decision5
dated March 31, 2004, recalled and set
aside the RTC decision, and entered a
new one ordering petitioner to pay
respondents the amount of ₱964,000
representing the latter’s expenses
incurred for the repairs and
improvements of the premises.
 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that
the award of reimbursement had no
factual and legal bases,7 but this was
denied by the CA in its resolution
dated February 21, 2005.
 award of moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.
 RTC rendered its decision in favor of
petitioner

ISSUE: Whether the respondents are entitled to reimbursement?

RULING:
Yes, but only as indemnity for the useful improvements done on the property. Petitioner Serafin
Cheng is ORDERED to pay respondents, spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini, the amount of
₱171,650.95 as indemnity for the useful improvement. Respondents, spouses Vittorio and Ma.
Helen Donini, are ORDERED to pay petitioner Serafin Cheng the following sums: a) ₱100,000.00
moral damages; b) ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages and c) ₱25,000.00 attorney’s fees.
Petitioner, correctly argued that the principle of equity did not apply in this case. Equity, which
has been aptly described as "justice outside legality," is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.18 Positive rules prevail over all abstract
arguments based on equity contra legem (against the law). Neither is the principle of unjust
enrichment applicable since petitioner (who was to benefit from it) had a valid claim.
SYLLABUS TITLE: Criticism of Constructivist Theory
CASE TITLE: BAYAN vs Executive Secretary Zamora G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000 (Dissenting
Opinion)
BUENA, J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE:

 Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant consolidated petitions for certiorari
and prohibition are issues relating to, and borne by, an agreement forged in the turn of
the last century between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
-the Visiting Forces Agreement.
 On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military
Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To further strengthen their
defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a
Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to
respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and
aircraft.
 On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,5 the Instrument
of Ratification, the letter of the President6 and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to
its Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople, and its Committee
on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for their joint
consideration and recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by the
two Committees
 On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 4438
recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative
Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation. Debates then ensued. On May 27,
1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds
(2/3) vote9 of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate
Resolution No. 18.10 On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an
Exchange of Notes between respondent Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador
ISSUE: Whether the act of the president is constitutional?
RULING:

Yes, the action is constitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be
under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution, whether under the general requirement in Section 21, Article VII,
or the specific mandate mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article
requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary
since Congress has not required it.

From the Dissenting Opinion:

Representatives, in utter violation of the intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution. 34 The
opposite school of thought, led by Myer S. McDougal and Asher Lans, holds that congressional-
executive agreements and treaties are interchangeable, thus, such agreements are
constitutional. These non-interpretivists buttress their stance by leaning on the constitutional
clause that prohibits States, without consent of Congress, from "enter(ing) into any Agreement
or Compact with another State, or with a Foreign Power." By making reference to international
agreements other than treaties, these scholars argue that the framers of the Constitution
intended international agreements, other than treaties, to exist. This school of thought generally
opposes the "mechanical, filiopietistic theory, (which) purports to regard the words of the
Constitution as timeless absolutes"35 and gives emphasis to the necessity and expediency of
congressional-executive agreements in modern foreign affairs.36 Finally, sole executive
agreements which account for a relatively small percentage of executive agreements are
the most constitutionally problematic since the system of checks and balances is inoperative
when the President enters into an executive agreement with neither the Senate’s or Congress’
consent. This last type of executive agreement draws authority upon the President’s enumerated
powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, such as the President’s power as Commander-in-
Chief of the U.S. army and navy.
SYLLABUS TITLE: Criticisms of Realist theory
CASE TITLE: Cruz vs Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (Separate Opinion) G.R. No.
135385 December 6, 2000
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:

 Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus
as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution
 Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral
domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.
 In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
 Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.

 After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
 Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
 Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed
a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
 As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained,
the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.
Separate Opinion

PUNO, J.:

PRECIS

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On
the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard
Posner1 wrote:2

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-
dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom,
ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy,
and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation,
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained
attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But,
by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it

introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled
constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural resources. The
sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct sociology
and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul
shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill
the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their
ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous
people.