Statutory Construction
VILLANUEVA vs COMELEC
GR No. L – 54718, December 4, 1985
FACTS:
Mendoza, on the last day for filing, filed his sworn certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores,
Quezon for the 1980 elections. On the same day, Mendoza filed an unsowrn but handwritten letter
withdrawing his candidacy. Immediately after his withdrawal, Villanueva filed his own sworn
Certificate of Candidacy in substitution of Mendoza’s. Villanueva won said election. The COMELEC,
however, disregarded the votes cast in favor of Villanueva and declared the other candidate as the
winner.
The COMELEC argued that the withdrawal of Mendoza was invalid and consequently, he could not
have been substituted by Villanueva since the Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn to as required by
Sec. 27 of the Election Code which provides:
... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdrawn... unless the
candidate filed with the office which received the certificate... or with the commission a
sworn statement of withdrawal...
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects.
RULING:
No. The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should
not be used to frustrate the people's will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman
us, Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211, clearly applicable, mutatis mutandis this Court held that "(T)he
will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been
properly sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election
would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed
their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to
his certificate or candidacy." (See also Gundan vs. Court of First Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As likewise
ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607, the legal requirement that a withdrawal be
under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to observe the requirement should
be "considered a harmless irregularity."
As to the second ground, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy right on the
very same day that he filed his certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980 which was the very last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy shows that he was not serious about his certificate of candidacy.
But this could not be done to would be bonafide candidates, like petitioner who had not filed his
candidacy in deference to Mendoza's candidacy who was one of his " co-planners " with "some
concerned citizens ... (who) held causes to put up a slate that will run against the erstwhile unopposed
KBL slate."
AQUINO, C.J., dissenting:
Vivencio G. Lirio of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan was the candidate for vice mayor of Dolores,
Quezon Province in the election held on January 30, 1980.
The other candidate for vice mayor was Narciso L. Mendoza, Jr., who filed as certificate of candidacy
on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. But at 7:27 in the evening of that
day, Mendoza withdrew his candidacy by means of a handwritten letter of withdrawal which was not
under oath. He handed that letter to the election registrar of Dolores.
Five days before the election or on January 25, 1980, Crisologo Villanueva filed his certificate of
candidacy for vice mayor in substitution for Mendoza. On January 26 the election registrar transmitted
Villanueva's certificate of candidacy and Mendoza's withdrawal letter to the provincial election
registrar who, in turn, indorsed the same to the Commission on Elections. These papers were received
by the Comelec Law Department only on February 11, 1980 or after the election and after the
proclamation of Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor.
Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of candidates. However, on the eve of the
election or on January 29, he addressed a letter to all chairmen and members of the board of election
inspectors of Dolores wherein he informed them of his candidacy in substitution for Mendoza. He
requested them to count the votes cast in his favor.
The municipal election registrar asked the provincial election registrar to clarify the status of
Villanueva's candidacy. On election day, the provincial election registrar replied that since Villanueva's
name was not included in the official list of candidates it could be legally presumed that the Comelec
did not approve his certificate of candidacy.
On January 31, 1980 the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Lirio as the duly elected vice
mayor. The votes cast for Villanueva were not counted because he was not an official candidate. They
were regarded as stray votes. It cannot be assumed that he received 3,112 votes as against 2,600 votes
for Lirio.
Villanueva filed a petition to annul Lirio's proclamation. The Comelec dismissed it on the grounds (1)
that Mendoza's withdrawal had no legal effect because it was not under oath as required in section 27
of the Election Code and (2) that even assuming that it was effective, Villanueva's substitute candidacy
was not valid under section 28 of the Election Code since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4
but on that very day.
Any votes cast for Villanueva were stray votes under section 155 (15) of the Election Code. It cannot
be said that Villanueva obtained more votes than Lirio, a reelectionist.
It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law which we cannot see nor handle and which we
do not know very much.
The Comelec resolution was affirmed by this Court. Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration. I
vote to deny said motion.
Statutory Construction
RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC. vs CTA
100 Phil 850
FACTS:
Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of
Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and
supplies invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently,
however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional customs duties
were levied and imposed upon petitioner.
On May 23, 1955, a motion to dismiss was filed at the Court of Tax Appeal but was dismissed on the
ground that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing
section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court
ISSUE:
Whether Section 11 of RA 1125 allows the respondent court to review decisions of the Collector of
Customs?
RULING:
The court holds that under the law, particularly, the Customs Law and Republic Act No. 1125, the
Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs.
The Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas, appeal to the Court of Tax Appeal is
manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before one resorts to the Courts, the administrative
remedy provided by law should first be exhausted. In the second place, the two remedies suggested by
the petitioner would result in confusion because a person adversely affected by a decision of a
Collector of Customs could not be sure where to seek the remedy, whether with the Commissioner of
Customs or with the Court of Tax Appeals, and it might even be difficult for him to decide because, if
he took the appeal directly to the Tax Court, that would ordinarily cut off his remedy before the
Commissioner of Customs for the reason that, should the Court of Tax Appeals decide against him, he
may not appeal said decision to the Commissioner of Customs because the Commissioner as an
administrative officer may not review the decision of the Court. On the other hand, if the person
affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, and
there receives an adverse decision, he may yet appeal wherefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals. In the
third place, even if the person affected by an adverse ruling of the Collector of Customs took his appeal
to the Court of Tax Appeals, as advocated by counsel for the petitioner, under the literal meaning of
section 11, the Tax Court may refuse to entertain said appeal, as was done in the present case, on the
ground that under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no jurisdiction to review a decision of the
Collector of Customs, section 7 clearly limiting its appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs.
NOTES:
Court change the phrase “collector of customs” to “commissioner of customs” to correct an obvious
mistake in law.
Sec. 7 - “commissioner of customs” - grants the CTA jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs
Sec. 11 - “collector of customs” - refers to the decision of the Collector of Customs that may be
appealed to the tax court
“Commissioner” prevails – Commissioner of Customs has supervision and control over Collectors of
Customs and the decisions of the latter are reviewable by the Commissioner of Customs
COMENDADOR vs DE VILLA
GR No. 93177, August 2, 1991
FACTS:
• The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for
their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9,
1989.
• January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant to
Office Order No. 16 to investigate the petitioners.
• January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually addressed to the
petitioners. The petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion. At
the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days to file their objections in writing through a
Motion for Summary Dismissal.
• February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days to
submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
• May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to raise
peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14 by invoking
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges
had been discontinued under P.D. No.39.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.
HELD:
Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to peremptory challenge was
originally provided under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War).
November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree
disallowed the peremptory challenge.
January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of
martial law throughout the Philippines. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the
military tribunals created there under, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to
peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was
dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18
of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory
challenge.
Statutory Construction
PEOPLE v. ALMUETE, supra
G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976
FACTS:
Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a
violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that the
accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or without her
consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five cavans of palay each to her damage.
The lower held that the information is basically deficient because it does not describe the circumstances
under which the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not
specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay
found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last normal
harvest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is
punishable pursuant to Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law.
HELD:
No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system. The evident
purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the
harvests. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing,
the law itself also ceases). applies to this case.
Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the country
as contrary to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential
Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country "as a land reform area".
The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without
notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact
section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for
penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord,
which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the
subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of
Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that
Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-
threshing without notice to landholder.
SAJONAS vs CA
GR No. 102377, July 5 1996
FACTS:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying inter alia to set aside the CA’s decision, and to reinstate
that of the RTC
Spouses Uychocde agreed to sell a parcel of residential to the spouses Sajonas on
installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. On Aug. 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the
annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property.
Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the
property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on Sept. 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was
registered almost a year after.
Meanwhile, one Pilare filed a Civil Case for collection of sum of money against Ernesto
Uychocde. They entered into a compromise agreement where Uychocde shall pay him in two years.
When Uychocde failed to pay, a writ of execution was issued. Pursuant to the order, a notice of levy on
execution was issued on Feb. 12, 1985. On the same date, defendant sheriff presented said notice of
levy on execution before the Register of Deeds and the same was annotated at the back of the TCT of
the subject land.
When the deed of absolute sale was registered on Aug. 28, 1985, the old title was cancelled
and in lieu thereof, the TCT was issued in the name of the Sajonas spoused. The notice of levy on
execution annotated by defendant sherriff was carried over to the new title. The Sajonas spouses
demanded that cancellation of the notice of levy over the execution but Pilares refused to cause the
cancellation of said annotation.
RTC: In favor of Sajonas couple. Ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy form the Sajonas’ title
based on the premise that the adverse claim filed by the Sajones couple is still effective despite the
lapse of 30 days from the date of registration. However, under the provisions of Sec. 70 of PD 1529, an
adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of 30 days from the date of its registration.
CA: Reversed and upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim inscribed in the TCT is still in force when the respondent caused the
notice of levy on execution to be registered and annotated in the said title, considering that more than
30 days had already lapsed since it was annotated.
RULING:
The decision of the RTC finding for the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution is hereby
reinstated. the adverse claim ceases to have any legal force and effect (30) days after August 27, 1984
pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect and a
construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole. For taken in solitude, a word
or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident
when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. In ascertaining the period
of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three,
paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
“The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration.”
Statutory Construction

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS vs REYES, supra AISPORNA vs CA, supra

G.R. No. L-39419, 12 April 1982, 113 SCRA 459
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION vs PONFERRADA, supra
FACTS:
(naa file sa DOWNLOADS)
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act on November 21, 1970. A Policy was issued by Perla thru its author representative,
Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and for
P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of policy, information was filed against
the wife of Rodrigo because allegedly she unlawfully acted as an agent in the solicitation of the
insurance without having been first secured a certificate of authority to act as an agent from the office
of the Insurance Commission. The People of the Philippines presented evidence that aforementioned
policy was issued with active participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against which appellant in her
defense sought to show that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work,
as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to
renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s
desk to renew …
RTC and CA find the accused guilty and fined petitioner 500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency for the violation of the Insurance Act. Solicitor General was made to comment on the
case and the same said that the petitioner is not guilty because she does not fall under the definition of
agent as provided under par. 2 of the sec. 189 of the Insurance Act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section?

RULING:
No. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance agent as
found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word “agent” mentioned in the
first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is
explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence
—
Any person who for compensation … shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, …
Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true with respect to the
agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section. The second paragraph of Section 189
is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term “agent” mentioned in both the first
and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole.
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is
also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a compensation by the agent is
an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court
has established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for the issuance
of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a
misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a
certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor
was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. It must be noted that the
information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the
accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been
omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that
to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
Statutory Construction
NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMIN vs COA
311 SCRA 755 (1999)
FACTS:
The National Tobacco Administration (NTA), under EO No. 116, as amended by EO No.
245, is a GOCC tasked to supervise and improve the viability of the tobacco industry in this country.
On August 9, 1989, Congress passed RA No. 6758, entitled “An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification in the Government and for Other Purposes." On October 2,
1989, pursuant to Section 23 of said law, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (CCC No. 10) to serve as the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 6758.
Pertinent records shows that even prior to the effectively of Republic Act. No. 6758,
officials and employees of the NTA have been enjoying Mid-Year Social Amelioration Benefit
equivalent to one-and-half (11/2) month of their basic salary. From 1989 to 1993, however, the said
benefit was reduced to one (1) month of the basic salary due to the financial/budgetary constraints. In
May, 1993, the nomenclature of subject social amelioration benefit was changed to educational
assistance in order to reflect the rationale behind the same, which is to encourage its beneficiaries to
pursue graduate studies and to finance the schooling of their children.
Sometime in February, 1994, Miss Dalisay E. Aracan, Resident Auditor of NTA, issued a
Notice of Disallowance of the payment of the educational for calendar year 1993, opining that the NTA
has no statutory authority to grant the incentive. In January, 1995, the same Resident Auditor caused
the disallowance of the same benefit paid in 1994, for the same reason.
On April 25, 1994, the petitioner appealed to the Commission on Audit, praying for the
lifting of the disallowance in question, pointing out that: (1) Benefits received by employees as of July
1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized, pursuant to
Section 12 R.A. 6758; (2) the benefit having been received for so many years, even prior to the
effectivity of the Salary Standardization Law of 1989, has been a vested right, on the part of the
recipients and (3) such allowance regularly granted, forms part of the total compensation package of
NTA Officers and employees, and, therefore, the disallowance thereof amounts to unauthorized
diminution of pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not educational assistance given to individuals prior to the enactment of RA 6758 should be
continued to be received?
RULING:
Yes. Proper interpretation of section12 RA 6758 depends on the combination of first and second
paragraph.
First sentence states that “such other additional compensation not otherwise specified as may be
determined by the DBM shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed.”
The second sentence states “such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being
received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standard shall continue to be
authorized.”
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), and Land Bank of the Philippines vs CA and Acil Corp.
263 SCRA 758, October 30, 1996, GR No. 122256
FACTS:
Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista,
Davao del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(R.A. No. 6657). Private respondent's certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
It appears, however, that in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings ("LISTASAKA")
which private respondent had earlier filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower
"Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner" was stated.
Private respondent rejected the government's offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to
the same crops were valued at the higher price. The matter was brought before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, sustained the initial valuation made by the LBP.
Private respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional Trial Court of
Tagum, Court. Private respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare.
However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board(DARAB), pursuant tothelatter's Revised Rules
of Procedure, before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition the RTC found that, in violation
of the DARAB's rules of procedure the petition had been filed more than fifteen (15) days after notice
ofthe decision of the PARAD.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied Private respondent
therefore filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending that a petition for just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657 §§56-57 falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
RTC. His contention was sustained by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the
RTC for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in cases involving claims for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal from
the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can
resort to the RTC.
RULING:
The contention has no merit. It is true that the DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate "agrarian reform matters"and exclusive original jurisdiction over" all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform," except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
However, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and
exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be
granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No.
6657) and over criminal cases.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from §57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort totransfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to
convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to §57 and
therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the
ultimate power to decide this question.
Statutory Construction

Dreamwork Construction v. Janiola, supra De la Cruz v. Paras

G.R. No. 184861; 30 June 2009 GR No. 42571-72, July 25, 1983

FACTS:
This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal
proceeding filed by the petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial
question with respect to the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent.
The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice-
President, filed a Complaint Affidavit against Janiola for violation of BP 22 at the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.
Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against
private respondent with the MTC, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September
20, 2006, Janiola instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged
construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the
ground that private respondent claim that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal
case. Petitioner opposed the Respondent’s Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding based on juridical
question for the following grounds:
(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which
the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether
private respondent violated BP 22; and
(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial
question is that “the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this element is missing in
this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioner appealed the Orders to
the RTC but denied the petition. Hence, this petition raised.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case
on the basis of “Prejudicial Question “, with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.
FACTS:
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No.
84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that
the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close
out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out
with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS” . Paras ruled
that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then
appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade,
the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD:
The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy
of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end
can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its
face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance,
Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

HELD:
This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.
The elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case
filed by the State with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. The Resolution of the Civil Case
Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action. Even if the trial court in the civil case
declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this
would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is
that private respondent issued checks that were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this
fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for
the existence of a prejudicial question, is absent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
Statutory Construction

Vda. de Urbano v. GSIS The modes of disposal included Public auction and sale thru negotiation.
GR No. 137904, Oct 19, 2001
Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws, the Court held the question whether the subject property was
FACTS: covered by the said Circular or falls under its exception. It held that 89-296 was to be interpreted with
In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200 sqm property in Q.C. to Gsis to secure a housing loan. Since 86-264 in adherence with stat con wherein statutes that relate to the same thing ought to be taken in
they were unable to pay the loan, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage in 1988. GSIS bid 154k on the consideration in construing any one of them, and it is an established rule of law that all acts in pari
property and emerged as the highest bidder. In 1984, the petitioners tried to reclaim their property. material are to be taken together as if they were one law.
They wrote to the GSIS Acquired Assets Department signifying their intent to reclaim. On October 16, Moreover, the court looked into the intent of both laws and held that these were used to generate more
GSIS told them to pay the redemption price of 154k in full before Nov 18, 1984. revenue for GOCC’S through the disposition of its non-preforming assets. (Look into PD 50 or the
The petitioners asked for more time to recover the property while the Acquired Assets Dpeartment asset privatization trust in the case) According to the court, the policy intent on the disposition of
subsequently told them to pay 174k in cash with an extension of 30 days to the November date. Failure acquired assets then governed the case at bar.
to do so forfeited the reclamation of the property and sold in a public bidding. Was the property covered by the public bidding exceptions in these laws? The court said yes, which
The petitioners wrote again requesting for remortgage through repurchase of the property. The Gsis meant that their sale negotiation fell under the regular course of business, and thus did not offend the
AAD declined. The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval to file a loan worth 240,000 with the requirements of the said coa circulars.
GSIS real estate department to repurchase their foreclosed property. Despite attempts from Vice
Governor Mathay to adjust to a more liberal arrangement for the petitioners, the the petitioners were
unable to pay. GSIS then issued a TCT in its favor.
The respondent De La Cruz entered the picture and offered to purchase the property for 250,000 spot
cash. Without knowledge of the rival offer, the petitioners then offered a 50,000 downpayment with the
124k balance to be paid in 5 years. He also enclosed 10k in check as earnest money. The Board
informed them that it had adopted reolution 881 that declined their offer to repurchase.
At the same time, GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz for the purchase of the property. They accepted her
offer of purchase. A new TCT was issued to her.
The petitioners, on the other hand, had their loan request rescinded because a certificate of award or
sale was not issued in favor of the applicant. Moreover, the applicant, Urbano the petitioner, was 81
years old and no longer a member of the GSIS. It wasn’t given due consideration. Having learned about
the transaction with dela Cruz, the petitioners requested the formal investigation with the GSIS
regarding the sale. Not satisfied, they filed a case with the RTC of QC branch 102.
The petition was dismissed. The same view was upheld by the court of appeals.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject property through public bidding?

RULING:
No. The agreement with de la Cruz was valid.
Petitioners aver that Sec. 79 of PD 1445 and the COA Circular 86-264 mandated the GSIS to dispose of
the assets through public bidding and only upon its failure, through a public sale.
GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD 1445 did not apply because it covered unserviceable govt property
and not acquired assets.
SC- Gsis was right. Why? The provision (SEC 79) applies only to unserviceable govt property or those
no longer needed. The house was obviously not unserviceable. And it was still used by petitioners.
With regard to COA Circular 86-264 or the “General guidelines on the divestment or disposal of assets
of government owned corporations” the law stipulated that it availed of an exception to the requirement
of disposition through public bidding and such exception applied to sales of merchandise held for sale
in the regular course of business. The Court read it in relation to Coa circular 89-296 which provided
for “Audit Guidelines on the Disposal of Property and other Assets of Government Agencies”, which
also did not apply the public bidding disposal requirement to merchandise or inventory held for sale in
the regular course of business nor to the disposal by gov’t financial institutions of foreclosed assets or
collaterals acquired in the regular course of business and not transferred to the Govt under
proclamation no 50.
Statutory Construction
CABADA vs ALUNAN
260 SCRA 828 (1996)
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the decision
(in the form of a letter) of 24 March 1995 2 of public respondent National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), which denied due course for lack of jurisdiction the appeal and the petition for review
filed by petitioners SP03 Noel Cabada and SP03 Rodolfo G. de Guzman, respectively. Challenged in
the said appeal and petition for review were the decision of 15 August 19943 and resolution of 25
October 1994 of the Regional Appellate Board of the Eighth Regional Command (RAB 8), which
affirmed their dismissal from the service.
On 29 October 1993, a complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention,
and Dishonesty was filed with the Office of the Commission on Human Rights in Tacloban City by
private respondent Mario Valdez. The complaint was referred to the Philippine National Police Eighth
Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which, after conducting its own investigation, filed an
administrative charge of Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and instituted summary dismissal
proceedings.
On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed down a decision finding the
petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the police service. Pursuant to
this decision, Special Order No. 174, dated 23 April 1994, was issued ordering, among other things, the
dismissal of the petitioners from the service. The petitioners claimed that they were not formally
furnished with a copy of the decision and that they were able to secure a copy thereof "thru their own
effort and initiative" only on 13 June 1994. However, they received a copy of Special Order No. 174 on
26 April 1994. Although they insist that the basis of the appeal before RAB 8 was Special Order No.
174, 9 petitioner Cabada stated under oath in his Appeal filed with the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) that he in fact seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed or refused to act on the said motion,
and that he asked that the said motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB.
In its decision of 15 August 1994, the RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the Regional Director. Petitioners
Cabada and De Guzman then filed with the Honorable Secretary of the DILG and Chairman of the
NAPOLCOM their "Appeal" and "Petition for Review"
DECLARADOR vs GUBATON
GR No. 159208, August 18, 2006
FACTS:
The Information filed charged Frank Bansales with murder for the death of Yvonne Declarador. During
trial, the prosecution showed that at around 9:45 am on July 25, 2002, inside a classroom in Cabug-
Cabug National High School in President Roxas, Capiz, accused Bansales attacked, assaulted and
stabbed with a knife victim Declarador. Consequently, the accused inflicted 15 fatal stab wounds in the
different parts of the body which caused the immediate death of Declarador. The trial court convicted
Bansales of murder since the crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength considering the accused carried
a long knife along with him from his house to the school and used it against the victim who was
unarmed and defenseless at that time. However, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603 (P.D. No.
603), the court suspended the sentence of the accused and ordered his commitment to the Regional
Rehabilitation for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras on the ground that he was only 17
years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
Petitioner Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the trial court's decision of suspending the sentence of the
accused and committing him to the rehabilitation center. Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of
P.D. No. 603, as well as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the benefit of a suspended
sentence does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.
Bansales avers that Section 32 of Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law entitles the accused to an
automatic suspension of sentence and allows the court to commit the juvenile to the youth center;
hence, the court did not abuse its discretion in suspending the sentence of the accused.
ISSUE: Is respondent Bansales entitled to the automatic suspension granted by P.D. No. 603?
HELD: No. The accused was found guilty of murder, a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. It is clear from the words of Section 32 of P.D. No. 603 that a person who is convicted of an
offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing the
benefits of a suspended sentence. The word "punishable" does not mean "must be punished," but
"liable to be punished" as specified. The term refers to the possible, not to the actual sentence. It is
concerned with the penalty which may be, and not which is imposed. The disqualification is based on
the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by
the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the
disqualification of a juvenile. Despite the disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge Salvador
Gubaton, nevertheless, ordered the suspension of the sentence meted against him. By this act,
respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Thus, the
Court granted the petition.
Statutory Construction

NAGA CITY vs AGNA US vs TORIBIO, supra

GR No. 36049, May 31, 1976 G.R. No. L-5060 – 15 Phil. 85

FACTS: FACTS:
The City of Naga changed its tax system from graduated tax to percentage tax. Respondent taxpayers Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a permit to have his carabao slaughtered for human
insisted on paying the new taxes the following year, pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. consumption. His request was denied because his carabao was found not unfit for work. He
2309). It stated that tax enactments changing the current system prior to December 15 should take nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was
effect the following year. The Naga City government, on the other hand, claimed that under the Local sentenced by the trial court. His counsel argued that the law requiring one to acquire a permit before
Autonomy Act (RA 2264), tax ordinances take effect 15 days after publication; this allegedly impliedly slaughtering a carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
repealed Sec. 2309 of the Admin Code.
ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
Did RA 2264 repeal Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code?
HELD:
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for public use,
No, it did not. There is a presumption against implied repeal; a subsequent provision only repeals a within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the
prior provision clearly contradictory to it. If two laws can be harmonized, then the Courts shall do so. legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or
Sec. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code applies in this case because the new tax changed a prior tax injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it
system. RA 2264 only applies for entirely new tax provisions. shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and
interests of the community.” The wisdom behind said law: the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos
for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a
NOTES: “reasonably necessary” limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the
Requirements as to effectivity under Administrative Code services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of
Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates two types momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the
of municipal ordinances, namely: (1) a municipal ordinance which productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
changes a municipal license tax already in existence and (2) an
ordinance which creates an entirely new tax. Under the first type, a
municipal license tax already in existence shall be subject to change only
by an ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December of any year
after the next succeeding year. This means that the ordinance enacted
prior to the 15th day of December changing or repealing a municipal
license tax already in existence will have to take effect in next succeeding
year. The evident purpose of the provision is to enable the taxpayers to
adjust themselves to the new charge or burden brought about by the
new ordinance. This is different from the second type of a municipal
ordinance where an entirely new tax may be created by any ordinance
enacted during the quarter year to be effective at the beginning of any
subsequent quarter.
Statutory Construction
Ty-Delgado v. HRET
G.R. No. 219603, January 26, 2016
Facts:
September 2008, SC convicted Pichay of four counts of libel. October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of member of house of representatives for the 1st district of Surigao del
Sur for the May 2013 elections.
February 2013, Ty-Delgado filed a petition for disqualification against Pichay before COMELEC on
the ground of the libel conviction, a crime of moral turpitude; and that the 5-year period barring him to
be a candidate had yet to lapse.
Pichay answered that the petition for disqualification was filed out of time and argued that libel does
not necessarily involve moral turpitude because his conviction was based only on his presumed
responsibility as the president of the publishing company.
May 2013, Pichay was proclaimed as duly elected member of the HR. Ty-Delgado then filed an ad
cautelam petition for quo warranto before HRET reiterating that Pichay is ineligible. COMELEC
dismissed the petition for disqualification for lack of jurisdiction. HRET ruled that that it had
jurisdiction over the present quo warranto petition but concluded that Pichay's libel conviction did not
involve moral turpitude.
Issues: HRET erred in its decision.
Ruling:
We find merit in the petition.
A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration
by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a
period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen,
or to society in general.7 Although not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided
by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita
do not.
Republic v. Manalo, supra
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in
Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel
the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname,
Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the foreign
spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration. According to Justice
Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd
situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to
the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only
that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether
it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be
interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such
interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if
Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause.
They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
The violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had
initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to
the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family
but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is valid or
constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must
still be proved.
In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to
the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
Statutory Construction

Ramirez v. CA Garvida v. Sales

248 SCRA 590 (1995) 271 SCRA 767 (1997)

FACTS:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private
respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
“hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An
Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation
RULING:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations
of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
FACTS:
Petitioner Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of a
certain barangay. However the Board of election tellers denied her application on the ground that she is
already 21 years and 10 months old. She already exceeded the age limit for membership as laid down
in Sec 3(b) of COMELEC resolution no. 2824.
The municipal circuit trial court found her to be qualified and ordered her registration as member and
voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the RTC, but the
presiding judge inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner.
However, private respondent Sales a rival candidate, filed with the COMELEC en banc a “Petition of
Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” against Garvida for falsely representing her
age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. He claimed that Garvida is disqualified to become a
voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age
on May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her birth certificate.
ISSUE:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private Whether or not Garvida can assume office as the elected SK official
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly RULING:
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described. In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered as
voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no
On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from
those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local
concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824.
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting Thus, she is ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations
or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
“Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation,
as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private
conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
“meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning
of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and
“communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.
Statutory Construction

Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission

114 SCRA 555 (1962)

FACTS:

The Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor:

Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into
consideration and include in the Employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the
cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee’s remuneration or
earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for
any one month.

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the
Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous
Circular No. 7, expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers’ and
employees’ respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, “In order to assist your System
in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term ‘compensation’ for the purposes of” such computation,
their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the
words “compensation”, “remuneration” and “wages”. Counsel further questioned the validity of the
circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the
approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act
1161 empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval
of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and
purposes of this Act.”

RULING:

No. The Commission’s Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the
President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be
construed. The Circular purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the
light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of
their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based. The Circular neither
needs approval from the President nor publication in the Official Gazette.