CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
LIM V STA. CRUS- LIM
Petitioner – Edward Lim
Respondent - Ma. Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim
FACTS:
 1978 : Petitioner and Respondent met in 1978 in Cebu, Petitioner
resides in Makati spent his sem break from college, at that time 26
yrs old. College student and working in the family business,
Respondent resides in Gingoog, Cagayan de Oro was a boarder in
petitioner’s uncle house, was a secretarial student after less than
year of courtship,
 two became sweetheart in early 1979, same year December 8,
respondent marry the petitioner, Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in
Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards as to customary
among those Chinese descents.
 During their stay in Forbes Park, all living expenses provided by
petitioner’s grandparents. Petitioner’s salary of ₱6,000.00 for
working in the family distillery went straight to respondent. Despite
set up and living arrangement, they both continued to insist that they
live separately and independently from petitioner’s family
 In 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the
children with her (then all minors) and forcibly opened their cabinet
and cleaned out the contents thereof, which included petitioner’s
passport, jewelry, and a land title in petitioner’s name, AFTER a
violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-
house midwife of his grandmother in what the trial court described a
very compromising situation. Respondent likewise filed a criminal
complaint for Concubinage and Physical Injuries against petitioner
which was eventually dismissed by the investigating prosecutor for
lack of merit.
 Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua
Giak and Mariano (defendants) in RTC for support. RTC ordered
Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 Thereafter, the trial
court directed petitioner to give a monthly support of ₱6,000.00 and,
in case of his inability to do so, petitioner’s parents were also
decreed to give a monthly support for the three minor children in the
amount of ₱34,000.00
 October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a petition & sought the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 3 yrs after, July 22, 2002, petitioner filed an amended petition
including an allegation of his own psychological incapacity, as both
he and respondent were diagnosed with personality disorders—
dependent personality disorder and histrionic personality disorder.
 Following the exchange of pleadings between the parties, petitioner
presented evidence consisting testimony from a psychiatrist, Dr.
Cecilia C. Villegas ; and Maxima Adato, petitioner's co-employee in
the distillery in addition petitioner included the report result that the
parties were suffering from personality disorder
RTC declared the marriage - null and void as the two were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. (ON THE GROUND ART. 36))
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MARRIAGE IS NULL AND VOID ON
THE GROUND THAT BOTH ARE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITATED UNDER ARTICLE 36?
RULING: No. OSG appealed to CA disagreeing and questioning RTC’s
ruling and the said ordered had been reversed and set aside on March 25
2002
 ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals cites 3 factors characterizing
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations:
(1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, (3) incurability. We expounded
on the foregoing, to wit:
 The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
 it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
 It also states in Republic V CA, as the party alleging his own
psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, had the special
albatross to prove that he and his wife were suffering from "the most

serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."
 Rather, Petitioner present petitioner presented the Psychiatric Report
of Dr. Villegas
 *READ THE REPORT OF PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE”
 The report and testimony of Dr. Villegas shows that she link
particular acts of the parties to the DSM IV's list of criteria for the
specific personality disorders but the results made by her where not
supported by any psychological test properly administered by
clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests use and
interpretation.
 The said report of Dr. Villegas was made only after maximum of 7
hours of interview without any separate psychological test cannot tie
the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own
factual finding on what happened in this case.
 The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a
mere statement of his theory or opinion
 -instead in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing
the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon
which the logic of his report is founded.
 Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
**notes: Hindi puede ung report kahit galling siya sa psychiatrist kasi ung
results na galling sa psychiatrist ay gawa lang sa paguusap nila nung parties
wala kahit anong psychological test na ginawa ung psychiatrist**
**Bakit bawal? The parties could fake their answer para magresult sila na
psychological incapacitated sila**
**Bakit bawal kahit galling lang na sa psychiatrist: there is possibility that
they only contracted the psychiatrist and the psychiatrist did not produce a
results from a psychological test that would help her to establish a good
evidence that the parties is psychological incapacitated**
CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
PADILLA RUMBAUA V RUMBAUA
PETITIONER: Rowena Padilla-Rambaua
RESPONDENT: Edward Rumbaua
FACTS:
 Respondent and petitioner were childhood neighbors in Dupax del
Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they met again and
became sweethearts but Edward’s family did not approve of their
relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, Edward
promised to marry Rowena as soon as he found a job. The job came
in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted Edward as a
computer engineer. Edward proposed to Rowena that they first have
a “secret marriage” in order not to antagonize his parents. Rowena
agreed; they were married in Manila on February 23, 1993. Rowena
and Edward, however, never lived together; Rowena stayed with her
sister in Fairview, Quezon City, while Edward lived with his parents
in Novaliches.
 They saw each other every day during the first 6 months of their
marriage. At that point, Edward refused to live with Rowena for fear
that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his application
for a PAL scholarship.
 Seven months into their marriage, the couple’s daily meetings
became occasional visits to Rowena’s house in Fairview; they would
have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, Edward enrolled at
FEATI University after he lost his employment with PAL.
 In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret
marriage. Edward’s mother tried to convince him to go to the United
States, but he refused.
 To appease his mother, he continued living separately from Rowena.
Edward forgot to greet Rowena during her birthday in 1992 and
likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions.
Edward indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.
 In April 1995, Edward’s mother died then he blamed Rowena,
associating his mother’s death to the pain that the discovery of his
secret marriage brought.

 Pained by Edward’s action, Rowena severed her relationship with
Edward. They eventually reconciled through the help of Rowena’s
father, although they still lived separately.
 In 1997, Edward informed Rowena that he had found a job in Davao.
A year later, Rowena and her mother went to Edward’s house in
Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva
(Cynthia).
 When she confronted Edward about it, he denied having an affair
with Cynthia. Rowena apparently did not believe Edwards and
moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish
that her discovery brought.
 Rowena filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Edward. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also
presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract; and the
testimony, curriculum vitae, and psychological report of clinical
psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
 Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the
following tests on Rowena:
 a Revised Beta Examination;
 a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test;
 a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test;
 a Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s Sentence Completion
Test;
 and MMPI.
 She thereafter prepared a psychological report with his findings.
According to his evaluation, the character traits of Edward reveal
him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder – declared to be
grave, severe and incurable. However, at the end of his findings,
Dr. Tayag incorporated his personal idea about love.
 Love, according to him, means:
 “Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be
boundless as it goes beyond the expectations people
tagged with it. In love, “age does matter.” People
love in order to be secure that one will share his/her
life with another and that he/she will not die alone.
Individuals who are in love had the power to let love
CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
grow or let love die – it is a choice one had to face
when love is not the love he/she expected.”
 RTC nullified the marriage of Rowena and Edward.
 CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the
nullification of the parties’ marriage.
 observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not mention the
cause of the respondent’s so-called “narcissistic personality
disorder;” it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus
failed to give the court an insight into the respondent’s
developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she
came to the conclusion that the respondent’s incapacity was “deep-
seated” and “incurable.” Xxx
 -The petitioner now argues :
 the OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina cannot
be dispensed with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the
requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;
 vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to
the RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the defects in her
testimony, as well as to present additional evidence, would temper
justice with mercy; and
 Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her
psychiatric report.
 -The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be
reversed and set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for
further proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the
CA’s decision be set aside and the RTC’s decision be reinstated.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT INVALIDATING THE TRIAL COURT’S
DECISION AND REMANDING THE CASE FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IS PROPER
RULING: NO. We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable

1. In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for
the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages:
a. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
2. The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or
remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of
or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect, as we held
in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:
a. Procedural Laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statues - they may be
given retroactiveeffect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested
rights in rules of procedure.
3. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the
mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied
retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in
any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification
prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes
and Navales v. Navales have since confirmed and clarified that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline
on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no
collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is
CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the
remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From
this perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding
the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit.
A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper
4. A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings
amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper
at this stage.
a. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party
may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final
order already rendered and to grant a new trial within
the period for taking an appeal.
b. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on
the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence that could not have been guarded against by
ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved
party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the
aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced
at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if
presented.
5. In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the
evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a
remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the
RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima
facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent
in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s
counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a
new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that
the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First
Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:
a. Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings
in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify
as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as
valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be
an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be
employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had

not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or
learned. This will put a premium on the willful and
intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view
to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an
adverse decision, as in the instant case.
6. Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s
requested remand.
Petitioner failed to establish the respondent’s psychological incapacity
- Dr. Tayag’s testimony shows that she initially described the general
characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic personality
disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent the
respondent exhibited these traits. She mentioned the buzz words that
jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage – namely,
gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage,
psychological incapacity relating to marriage – and in her own
limited way, related these to the medical condition she generally
described. The testimony, together with her report, however, suffers
from very basic flaws, she was not able to rove that the PI existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June
25, 2004and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
Facts:
 In an earlier decision promulgated by the supreme court, it
dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
the parties upon finding that the petition had no merit.
 In the case, the petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent)
suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies
of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses
were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which
had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied
on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as
mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
 Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion.
A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not
totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her
marital and parental duties
 the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s
ruling that there was psychological incapacity. Petition denied
 In his Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioner implores the Court
to take a thorough 2nd look into what constitutes psychological
incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by
the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find
that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically
incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital obligation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent.

RULING:
 YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held
that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they
relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
 *****Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions
were just given much respect in this case.****
 Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
o The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic
v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application
to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the
drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity”
obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.”
Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts” in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours”
with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.
o In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts,
which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the
field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions
of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of
being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-
depth diagnosis by experts.
 Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence
must be considered
CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
 We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate
for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution
only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a
marriage that is null and void
 ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
o There is no requirement for one to be declared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by
a physician, because what is important is the presence of
evidence that adequately establishes the party’s
psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.”
o Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other
evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly
result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record,
the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as
an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.
o Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
should be considered as conjectural or speculative and
without any probative value only in the absence of other
evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under
such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would
justify their exclusion as evidence.
 Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to
psychological and emotional temperaments
o The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court
deserved credence because it was in the better position to
view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they
were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the
appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be
accorded due importance and respect.
o The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to
such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and
treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate

basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and
competently described the psychological incapacity of the
respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family
Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case
records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed
after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the
petitioner’s factual premises.
o The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to
expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of
marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family
Code the courts, “despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
 Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of
parental duties
o The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should
not have delimited our determination of the presence
or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the
determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate
the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she
made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such
duties and responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender ages to her
mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of
gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s
obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family
life, particularly on her very young children.
o The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to
her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose
them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her
children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of
her own personal and escapist desires.
o The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her
children’s moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her
children.
 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner
and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB
JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.
MALLILIN v. JAMESOLAMIN
G.R. No. 192718
Facts:
 Robert Malilin and Luz Jamesolamin were married on September 6,
1972 and begot three children. The petitioner filed a complaint for
nullity of marriage on the grounds that the respondent allegedly
suffered from psychological and mental incapacity at the time of the
marriage celebration, unpreparedness to enter into such marital life,
and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. .
Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage
when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity,
irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and
inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation
of a parent.
 He testified that Luz was already living in California, USA, and
married an American. While they were still together though, Robert
disclosed that respondent did not perform responsibilities of being a
housewife like keeping the house in order, preparing meals, washing
clothes and taking care of the children. He also stated that she dated
several men and contracted loans without his knowledge.

 In turn Luz filed her answer with a counterclaim, averring that it was
Robert who manifested psychological incapacity.
 On September 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court had rendered a
decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply
with the essential marital obligations but the Court of Appeals, in its
November 20, 2009 Decision, reversed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Held:
 The Supreme Court stated that Robert’s evidence failed to establish
the psychological incapacity of Luz. Other than his self-serving
testimony, no other witness corroborated his allegations on her
behavior. As the Court has repeatedly stressed, psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not
merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse.
 There was also nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz
had either been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological
examination.
 On interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, yes, they are given great respect by our courts, but they
are neither controlling nor decisive.
 Lastly, on petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden
of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless
the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties,
or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by
reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the
time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
 The petition is DENIED.
DISSENT
Judge Leonen voted to grant the petition for the reason that
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Believing that marriage involves two persons only, necessarily,
these two are in the best position to testify on the other’s
behavior during their marriage. Put in this context, Robert’s
testimony cannot be disregarded for being self-serving.
The constitution describes marriage as “inviolable” while the
law portrays it as a “permanent union.” Nevertheless, the state’s
interest in any and all marriages entered into by individuals
should not amount to an unjustified intrusion into one’s right to
autonomy and human dignity.
To end, it is a pure and simple cruelty to give the couple a false
status considering they now separated and living their own lives.
DIGNA A. NAJERA, petitioner,
vs. EDUARDO J. NAJERA, respondent
Facts:
 Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation,
with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of
the Conjugal Partnership of Gains. Petitioner alleged that she and
respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were
married but are childless.

 Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage,
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity
became manifest only after marriage: (1) that respondent was jobless
and was not exerting effort to find a job at the time of marriage; only
with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was
respondent able to land a job as a seaman; (2) that while employed as
a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial
support; (3) that respondent would quarrel with petitioner and falsely
accuse her of having an affair with another man whenever he came
home, and took to smoking marijuana and drinking; (4) that on July
3, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without
provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to
kill her with a bolo; and (5) after the said incident respondent left the
family home, taking along all their personal belongings, and
abandoned the petitioner. Petitioner reported the incident at the
police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.
 Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while
respondent’s parents were separated. Respondent’s brothers were
also separated from their respective wives. She also disclosed that
she filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the
ground of psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner
presented the psychological conclusions made by Psychologist
Cristina R. Gates on her interview with her, which says that
“(r)espondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are
rooted in the kind of family background he has”.
 RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of
the petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their
marriage. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and
she appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the CA. CA
affirmed the Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code
CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
RULING:
 The evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical
violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner
and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause
for more than one year are grounds for legal separation only and not
for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 Article 36 (2) of the Family Code says:
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical.
 SC agrees with the CA that the totality of the evidence submitted by
petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
 Petitioner erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina
Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is
supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal.
 Even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts
established by petitioner before the trial court, the basis of the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming
the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological
nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to
those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted.

 As found by the CA, Psychologist Cristina Gates’ conclusion that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated was based on facts
relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal
knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is
unscientific and unreliable. Moreover, the trial court correctly found
that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged
personality disorder of respondent was incurable.
Notes:
Art. 36, FC. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As
amended by EO No. 227)
The guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the FC requiring that “psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability” do not require
that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated—what is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. Those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. Those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. Those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
 as he did not show his penis. She said she had observed him using an
Facts:
 Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral,
Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract. After the
celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of
the Ching Ming Tsoi’s mother. There they slept together on the same
bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
 Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds
they were supposed to enjoy making love that night of their
marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching
however just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back
CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them
that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth
nights.
 In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they
can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife they
went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Ching’s mother,
uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was
no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since
 Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May
22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months).
 But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husband’s
private parts nor did he see hers.
 Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations
to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is healthy, normal
and still a virgin while Ching’s examination was kept confidential up
to this time.
 The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
She also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man
 Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by
reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does
not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her
very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically
and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very

young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can
still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them
has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be
cured.
 Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual
contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse
with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage
RULING:
 The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse,
although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal.
 Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
 One of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is “to procreate children basedon the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”
 Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS
parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to
psychologicalincapacity.
 While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and
fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120
Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
 The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
LEGAL DOCTRINE!!!!
*** this is an important legal case. In fact, it is a landmark case because it
laid down an important legal doctrine. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled
that refusal of one party to consummate the marriage is a sign of
psychological incapacity and hence, a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Indeed, the Supreme Court declared the marriage between Chi
Ming Tsoi and his wife as null and void. Since it was proven that Chi Ming
Tsoi was not impotent, it was clear that he simply refused to have sex with
his wife. Thus, according the Supreme Court:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
‘to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.’ Constant
 CRITERIA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS

non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or

wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.”
This case is also remembered for its definition of love and marriage. In its
final statements, Justice Torres stated:

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefor is
actually the ‘spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and
not any legal mandate or court order’. Love is useless unless it is shared
with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say ‘I could not have cared less.’ This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures
the continuation of family relations.”