PEOPLE vs. FE ABELLA y BUHAIN | G.R. No.

195666 | January 20, 2016

Facts:
1. The accused was charged with committing Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale against 12 persons. She allegedly promised them
employment as Laundrywomen/Laundrymen and Waiter in Istanbul, Turkey and Dubai.
2. In the trial, prosecution presented private complainants Miguel, Marcelino and Callang, Versoza from POEA Licensing
Division and SPO1 Bunag as witnesses.
3. According to Miguel, she came to know Abella through Zeny Agpalza (Agpalza) and Lina Mateo (Mateo), who informed her
that Abella could help her get work abroad. Interested, Miguel met Abella at the latter’s office, bearing the name Rofema
Business Consultancy (RBC). During their meeting, Abella offered Miguel work as a laundrywoman in Istanbul, Turkey, with
a salary of $600.00 to $700.00 but Miguel must undergo training in laundry service and pay a placement fee of P100,000.00.
Miguel, however, was able to raise and pay only P30,000.00 as placement fee for which Abella issued a cash voucher signed
by her in Miguel’s presence. Miguel also claimed that she underwent training in laundry service for five days valued at 5,000.00
pesos, sponsored by Abella. Abella discussed with Miguel the details of the latter’s job abroad and provided Miguel with a
photocopy of their written agreement, together with the certificate evidencing registration by Abella of the business
name of RBC. Until the day that Miguel gave her testimony before the RTC, Abella, contrary to her representation and promise,
was not able to deploy Miguel as a laundrywoman in Istanbul, Turkey, and neither did Abella return the placement fee of
P30,000.00 which Miguel had paid.
4. According to Marcelino, she came to know Abella through Rosette Danao (Danao). Danao first recruited Marcelino to work
as a domestic helper in Saipan, but later turned over Marcelino’s application to Agpalza who was in charge of those applying
for jobs in Turkey. Danao and Agpalza both referred to Abella as their Manager. Marcelino paid a total of P50,000.006 for the
processing of her papers in four installments, all personally received by Abella either at the RBC office or at Mcdo Ermita,
and evidenced by vouchers signed by Abella. Nothing happened to Marcelino’s application and the amounts she had paid to
Abella were not returned to her.
5. According to Callang, he was recruited by Danao, Abella’s agent, who brought him to the RBC office in Malate, Manila. At
the RBC office, Abella told Callang of the job order for laundryman in Istanbul, Turkey with a monthly salary of $600.00 and
for which the placement fee was P65,000.00. In three payments, Callang was able to pay a total of P40,000.00, evidenced by a
voucher signed by Abella in Callang’s presence. The first two payments were made at the RBC office while the last payment
was at McDonald’s, Ermita. Callang was not deployed for employment abroad, neither was he able to recover the amount he
paid to Abella.
6. According to Versoza who is an employee of the POEA Licensing Division, she recounted that upon instruction of her superior
OIC, she verified from the database that Abella/RBC had no license to recruit workers for employment abroad. She prepared a
Certification to that effect, signed by the OIC in her presence.
7. According to SPO1 Bunag, the investigator assigned to the case, he was the one who took down the private complainants’
Sinumpaang Salaysay Pagaresto, and prepared Abella’s Booking Sheet and Arrest Report and letter of referral for inquest.
8. Before Abella took the witness stand, her counsel, Atty. Rodrigo Mariñas, moved that the other private complainants be
provisionally dropped as such from the Information for their repeated failure to appear and testify in support of their complaints.
Asst Prosecutor did not object and RTC granted the defense’s motion.
9. Abella alleged that she had been working as cashier at RBC, a travel agency registered with DTI. As cashier, her main duty
was to receive payments from clients for which she issued cash vouchers. Abella claimed that she did not personally meet the
clients nor did she directly receive money from them, as the clients coursed their payments through Agpalza, an RBC agent.
Agpalza would then turn over the payments to Abella, for which the latter issued cash vouchers; and Abella would subsequently
hand over the payments to RBC owner. She insisted that she did not promise private complainants employment abroad.
10. RTC convicted Abella. CA affirmed, increasing the fine. In this present appeal, Abella contends that the first element of illegal
recruitment in large scale is absent since: a) it was not her who enticed private complainants to apply for work overseas but that
they learned of the job opportunities from Agpalza, Mateo and Danao; b) that she would have already fled after getting their
money if she was indeed guilty; and c) that the prosecution presented a mere photocopy of the handwritten agreement
supposedly executed by Abella in Miguel’s favor.
Issue: Whether Abella is indeed guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Ratio Decidendi:
YES. To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of
the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the same Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042); and (c) the offender committed the same
against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
First, it is undisputed that neither Abella nor RBC was licensed as a recruitment agency, in view of the POEA Certification.
Said certification, which Versoza testified on, is a public document issued by a public officer in the performance of an official duty;
hence it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Second, both the RTC and CA found that Abella had engaged in recruitment activities. The trial and appellate courts
accorded weight and credence to the consistent testimonies of private complainants. Miguel’s testimony is further supported by a
handwritten agreement signed by Abella, stating in detail the terms of Miguel’s alleged overseas employment. The non-presentation
of the original copy of the handwritten agreement is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. Miguel personally testified before the RTC
as to the circumstances of her recruitment by Abella. Abella made verbal, and not only written, promises to Miguel of employment
abroad. The handwritten agreement merely substantiates Miguel’s testimony at best.
 If Abella was really a mere employee at RBC, then she could have presented basic evidence of her employment, such as
appointment papers, an identification card, or payslips. Also, the vouchers for the placement fees paid by private complainants were
issued and signed by Abella herself, without any indication that she issued and signed the same on behalf of Reyes, the purported
true owner of RBC. There is likewise absence of any proof of Abella’s turnover to or Reyes’s receipt of the amounts received from
private complainants.
In contrast, the private complainants Miguel, Marcelino, and Callang were positive and categorical in their testimonies that
Abella promised them employment abroad in exchange for their payment of placement fees. Abella herself provided Miguel with a
Certification proving Abella’s registration of the business name RBC; hence, negating Abella’s claim that RBC is actually owned
by another person, Reyes.
Lastly, it was established that there were at least three victims in this case, namely, Miguel, Marcelino, and Callang, who
all testified before the RTC in support of their respective complaints.

Ramos vs People of the Philippines | GR No. 178337 | June 25, 2009

Facts:
In 1993, Felix Biacora went to Saudi Arabia for overseas employment that was facilitated by one Cynthia Libutan who
worked for a recruitment agency. Several years after his return to the country, Biacora accidentally met Libutan in Baclaran
Church sometime in 2000. After they exchanged pleasantries, the former signified to the latter his desire to seek another overseas
employment. Libutan then gave Biacora the name, address and contact number of her friend, one Carmen Ritualo, the petitioner
herein, who was able to help Libutan’s sister find work in Australia. Biacora thereafter called petitioner Ritualo to set up a
meeting.
On 1 May 2000, accompanied by his wife, Biacora went to the house of petitioner Ritualo and inquired from her whether
she could help him secure overseas employment in Australia. Petitioner Ritualo answered in the affirmative, and to be convincing,
brought out travel documents of several people she was able to "help," who were then supposedly scheduled to leave for abroad
pretty soon. Biacora was then assured that he could leave for Australia in a month’s time if he will give petitioner Ritualo a total
amount of ₱160,000.00, and his salary would be US$700.00 per month as a farm worker. Biacora paid petitioner Ritualo the
amount of ₱40,000.00 as down payment, with the balance to be completed before he left for Australia. Upon receipt of the money,
petitioner Ritualo issued Biacora a Cash Voucher as evidence of said payment. To complete their transaction, Biacora left her a
copy of his Bio-data.
On 4 May 2000, Biacora again gave petitioner Ritualo ₱20,000.00 as additional payment, making the total amount
received by the latter ₱60,000.00. Again, petitioner Ritualo issued a Cash Voucher. Subsequently, Biacora was informed by
petitioner Ritualo that all he needed in securing an employment in Australia was his Passport and an endorsement from the
Representative of his district. Accompanied by petitioner Ritualo and one Anita Seraspe, the assistant of the former, Biacora went
to the Batasan Pambansa to secure the necessary endorsement. Thereafter, all three went to the Australian Embassy to apply for
Biacora’s working visa.
On 1 June 2000, Biacora went to see petitioner Ritualo to follow up the date of his departure. Petitioner Ritualo asked
from Biacora another ₱20,000.00 and told the latter to be patient. As with the other amounts given, proof of payment was
similarly issued to acknowledge receipt thereof.
Several dates were set for Biacora’s departure, but none pushed through. To top it all, his Australian Visa application was
denied by the Australian Embassy. Consequently, on 9 September 2000, Biacora demanded from petitioner Ritualo the return of
the ₱80,000.00. The latter promised to pay back the money on the 13th of September 2000. None came. Thereafter, Biacora filed
the subject criminal complaints against petitioner Ritualo.
In two Certifications dated 23 October 2000 and 5 November 2003, respectively, both identified by Belen Blones of the
Licensing Division of the POEA, it was confirmed that "per available records of [its] Office, CARMEN RITUALO, in her
personal capacity is not licensed by this Administration to recruit workers for overseas employment" ; and that "[a]ny recruitment
activity undertaken by [her] is deemed illegal."
In her testimony, Ritualo narrated that it was Libutan and Biacora who asked her to introduce them to a certain Anita
Seraspe, the person responsible for sending petitioner Ritualo’s own sister to Australia; that she had no agreement with Biacora
respecting the latter’s employment in Australia; that any talk of money was made among Libutan, Biacora and Seraspe only; that
she received a total of ₱80,000.00 from Biacora, but that the same was merely entrusted to her because Libutan and Biacora had
just met Seraspe, and that she turned over all the payments to Seraspe who acknowledged receipt of the same by writing on pieces
of paper said acceptance; that she accompanied Biacora to Batasan Pambansa at his request; that she did not earn any money out
of her referral and introduction of Libutan and Biacora to Seraspe; that even if she did not earn any money out of the subject
transaction, she returned ₱10,000.00 and ₱31,000.00, or a total of ₱41,000.00, to Biacora out of fear that the latter would file
charges against her; that she tried to find Seraspe, but the latter could not be found at her last known address; and that she gave
Biacora an additional ₱6,000.000 to obviate any more scandal befalling her family.
RTC convicted accused of Simple Illegal Recruitment and Estafa. Affirmed by CA. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.
Held:
Yes. Illegal recruitment is committed when two essential elements concur: (1) that the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers, and (2) that the offender
undertakes any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
In this case, the first element is, indeed, present. The prosecution established, through Belen Blones of the Licensing
Branch of the POEA, who identified and confirmed the two Certifications issued by the POEA Licensing Branch, that "per
available records of [its] Office, CARMEN RITUALO, in her personal capacity is not licensed by this Administration to recruit
workers for overseas employment."
As to the second element, it must be shown that the accused gave the private complainant the distinct impression that
he/she had the power or ability to send the private complainant abroad for work, such that the latter was convinced to part with
his/her money in order to be employed. Thus, to be engaged in illegal recruitment, it is plain that there must at least be a promise
or an offer of employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad. In the case at bar, the second element is
similarly present. As testified to by Biacora, petitioner Ritualo professed to have the ability to send him overseas to be employed
as a farm worker in Australia with a monthly salary of US$700.00.43 To further wet Biacora’s appetite, petitioner Ritualo even
showed him purported travel documents of other people about to depart, whose overseas employment she supposedly facilitated.
That petitioner Ritualo personally assisted Biacora in the completion of the alleged requirements, i.e., securing a Letter of Request
and Guarantee from the Representative of his Congressional District in Batangas to ensure the approval of Biacora’s application
for an Australian Visa, even accompanying Biacora to the Australian Embassy, all clearly point to her efforts to convince Biacora
that she (petitioner Ritualo) had, indeed, the ability and influence to make Biacora’s dream of overseas employment come true.
The claim of petitioner Ritualo that it was Anita Seraspe who was really the recruiter and the one who profited from the
subject illegal transaction holds no water. Petitioner Ritualo’s act of receiving payment from Biacora and issuing personal receipts
therefor; of personally assisting Biacora to complete the "necessary" documents; of failing to present evidence to corroborate her
testimony despite several opportunities given her by the trial court; of petitioner Ritualo having been positively identified as the
person who transacted with Biacora and promised the latter an overseas employment and who personally received money from
Biacora, all unhesitatingly point to petitioner Ritualo as the culprit.
Petitioner Ritualo next tried to impress upon this Court that she received nary a centavo from the subject illegal
transaction; therefore, she should not be held liable. It was rejected this outright. In the first place, it has been abundantly shown
that she really received the monies from Biacora. Secondly, even without consideration for her services, she still engaged in
recruitment activities, since it was satisfactorily shown that she promised overseas employment to Biacora. And, more
importantly, Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 does not require that the illegal recruitment be done for profit.
With respect to the criminal charge of estafa, this Court likewise affirms the conviction of petitioner Ritualo for said
crime. The same evidence proving petitioner Ritualo’s criminal liability for illegal recruitment also established her liability for
estafa. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 in
relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Ritualo was similarly guilty of estafa under Art. 315
(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code committed -- by means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Both elements of the crime were established in this case, namely, (a) petitioner Ritualo defrauded complainant by abuse
of confidence or by means of deceit; and (b) complainant Biacora suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation as
a result.54 Biacora parted with his money upon the prodding and enticement of petitioner Ritualo on the false pretense that she
had the capacity to deploy him for employment in Australia. In the end, Biacora was neither able to leave for work overseas nor
did he get his money back, thus causing him damage and prejudice. Hence, the conviction of petitioner Ritualo of the crime of
estafa should be upheld.

PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ | G.R. No. 214500 | June 28, 2017
Facts:
1. Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and 3 counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. The private complainants were Aguilar-Uy, Reformado and Lavaro.
2. According to Aguilar-Uy, she and appellant were introduced to each other by a certain Maggie Dela Cruz. Aguilar-Uy claimed
that appellant recruited her to work in South Korea as domestic helper. She was told that she will receive P50,000.00 for eight
hours of work and an overtime pay totaling to P80,000.00 per month. Appellant informed her that she has 12 visas with her and
still needed two more persons to go to South Korea. Appellant required her to submit the requirements that will be sent to South
Korea for authentication. Appellant asked for P100,000.00 from them as payment for expenses needed to go to South Korea.
Aguilar-Uy added that considering that she is also paying for her niece Reformado, who also wants to work abroad, she gave
appellant the total amount of P200,000.00. Aguilar-Uy waited for their visas but to no avail. Eventually, when they met,
appellant asked for additional paymentof $72 to renew their visas. Aguilar-Uy narrated that appellant gave them a stub which
purported to be coming from the Embassy of the Republic of South Korea. However, when they presented the same to the
Korean Embassy, they were told that all their documents were fake.
3. According to Reformado, she came to know appellant through their neighbor Gemma and her sister Maggie Dela Cruz, who
were also applying for work with appellant. The two went to her place and informed her that appellant needed two more
applicants to go to South Korea as overseas workers. As agreed upon per phone conversation with appellant, they met in front
of the Korean Embassy located in Makati. Appellant immediately asked for P40,000.00 from them since the working visa she
had with her will expire. She corroborated the claim of Aguilar-Uy that on different dates, they gave appellant the total amount
of P200,000.00. They waited for the processing of their passport and visa but to no avail. When they went to the Embassy with
the police to get their passports, the Consul scolded her since the papers they submitted were all fake.
4. According to Lavaro, she was introduced to appellant by Mary Anne Legaspi. Appellant called her up and told her that her
employer, Mr. Simeon Right, was looking for a domestic helper. Appellant told her that she will be the one to facilitate the
processing of her documents and assured her that she would be able to work in South Korea. Lavaro claimed to have given
appellant the amounts of (1) P40,000.00 as terminal fee, (2) P40,000.00 as processing fee, (3) $72 for the visa, (4) traveler’s
checks in the amount of US$200, and (5) P2,050.00 as terminal fee. Lavaro testified that she gave said amounts of money to
appellant because she trusted her and she really wanted to leave for abroad but nothing happened. When appellant asked her
for more money, she started to doubt appellant. She later learned that appellant has also been asking money from other people
who also wants to work abroad.
5. According to Rosales from POEA Licensing Division, appellant is not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.
6. For her defense, appellant alleged that complainants were introduced to her by a certain Alma Palomares, the sister of her
compadre Aldrin who was also an OFW in South Korea. Complainants allegedly asked her what are the necessary requirements
for them to be able to work in South Korea. She denied that she promised them employment abroad. She claimed that she
introduced the complainants to her agent “Rosa” who assisted her in going to South Korea. When confronted with an
acknowledgement receipt marked as Exh. “A,” appellant declared that said document represents the payment in securing the
ITR and the bank certification. She averred that the amount of P40,000.00 was personally delivered to her and thereafter she
gave the amount to Alma. On cross-examination, appellant testified that she facilitated for a fee the procurement of private
complainants’ papers like ITR, bank certificate and certificate of employment. She confirmed having received the amount of
P40,000.00 for the facilitation of said documents. Appellant likewise admitted that the documents which she produced for
private complainants were all fake. She recalled that her first entry to South Korea was illegal because she also used fake ITR,
bank certificate and certificate of employment. Appellant, however, averred that she merely referred private complainants to
the person who faked all her papers but she has no hand in the preparation of the fake documents.
7. RTC found appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. She was acquitted of the other two counts of estafa.
CA denied appeal.
Issue: Whether appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ratio Decidendi:
YES. In order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the following elements must concur: (1) the offender
undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any
of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042) and (2) the offender has no
valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. In the case of
illegal recruitment in large scale, as in this case, a third element is required: that the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment
and placement against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
In the instant case, appellant committed the acts enumerated in Section 6 of R.A. 8042. As testified to by private
complainants, appellant gave them an impression that she is capable of sending them to South Korea as domestic helpers.
First, appellant engaged in recruitment when she represented herself to be capable of deploying workers to South Korea
upon submission of the pertinent documents and payment of the required fees; Second, all three (3) private complainants positively
identified appellant as the person who
promised them employment as domestic helpers in Korea for a fee; and Third, Rosalina Rosales of the Licensing Division of the
POEA, testified that as per Certification issued by Noriel Devanadera, Director IV, Licensing and Regulation Office, appellant is
not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Furthermore, we agree with the court a quo that the same pieces of evidence which establish appellant’s liability for illegal
recruitment in large scale likewise confirm her culpability for estafa.
It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa.
The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent
representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such
false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c)
that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or
property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
In the instant case, the prosecution has established that appellant defrauded private complainants by leading them to believe
that she has the capacity to send them to South Korea for work as domestic helpers, even as she does not have a license or authority
for the purpose. Such misrepresentation came before private complainants delivered various amounts for purportedly travel expenses
and visa assistance to appellant. Clearly, private complainants would not have parted with their money were it not for such
enticement by appellant. All these representations were actually false and fraudulent and thus, the appellant must be made liable
under par. 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, as to appellant’s acquittal in the two other counts of estafa due to insufficiency of evidence that payment was
made to appellant, double jeopardy has already attached. Nevertheless, even if appellant was acquitted in these two estafa cases, it
must be clarified that she can still be convicted of illegal recruitment. This is because while in estafa, damage is essential, the same
is not an essential element in the crime of illegal recruitment. It is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of
payment that renders the recruitment activity of appellant unlawful.
People of the Philippines vs Delos Reyes | GR No. 198795 | June 7, 2017
Facts:
On January 15, 2003, Suratos went to an office in Cubao, Quezon City where she met the accused-appellant, who
promised her a job in Cyprus as a caretaker. She returned to the accused-appellant's office a month later. The accused-appellant
gave her a machine copy of her visa to prove that there was a good job waiting for her in Cyprus and that she would leave in three
months upon payment. Suratos gave the accused-appellant an amount totaling to PhP55,000, inclusive of her passport and medical
examination report. After three months, Suratos became suspicious. She demanded the return of her money, but the accused-
appellant simply told her to wait. A month later, Suratos learned that the accused-appellant was already detained and could no
longer deploy her abroad. She filed a complaint for illegal recruitment docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119663. Suratos
identified the accused-appellant in open court as well as the entry permit and receipts she had issued her.
Sometime in the third week of March 2003, Alayon met the accusedappellant at the All Care Travel Agency located at
302 Escueta Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City. Accused-appellant offered her a job in Cyprus as a part of the laundry staff and asked her
to pay the total amount of PhP55,000, to submit her resume and transcript of records, among others, and promised to deploy her
abroad by June. On April 10, 2003, Alayon initially paid PhP15,000 to the accused-appellant. When she returned to
accusedappellant's office to pay the balance, she learned that accused- appellant had been picked up by the police. Alayon
proceeded to the police station and demanded from the accused-appellant the return of her money. She filed a complaint against
accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119665.
During the first week of December 2012, Duldulao, through his wife's friend, was introduced to the accused-appellant.
When Duldulao mentioned that she had a sister working in Spain, accused-appellant promised a tourist visa for him in exchange
for PhP 45,000. In the first week of January 2003, he gave the accused-appellant PhP l 1,000 as partial payment for the processing
of his documents. The accused-appellant only took PhP l0,000 and gave back PhPl,000 for him to open an account with Land
Bank, Cubao branch. Upon the request of accused-appellant, Duldulao deposited the amount of PhP 8,000 to the BPI account of
accused-appellant. When he was required by the accused-appellant to complete the payment of PhP 45,000 for his tourist visa,
Duldulao obtained a bank loan of PhP l1,000 and gave it to the accused-appellant. Altogether, Duldulao paid the accused-
appellant a total of PhP 29,000. When he discovered that accused-appellant was arrested in April 2003, Duldulao went to Camp
Panopio and demanded that accusedappellant return his money but to no avail. He subsequently filed a complaint against accused-
appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119668.
Bagay, Jr. went to the office of the accused-appellant who offered him a job as a dentist in London. Accused-appellant
assured him that with an initial payment of PhP30,000, he would leave in three months. After paying the said amount, Bagay, Jr.
gave the accused-appellant his resume, transcript of records, diploma, passport, and I.D. pictures. Unfortunately, he was not able
to leave for London because in less than three months, Bagay, Jr. learned that accused-appellant was detained at Camp Panopio
for illegal recruitment. Despite her promise to Bagay, Jr., accused-appellant failed to return the amount to him. The complaint
filed by Bagay, Jr. against the accused-appellant was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119666.
Sometime in the third week of March 2003, Guillarte went to the office of the accused-appellant who promised her work
as a hotel staff member in Cyprus. She gave accused-appellant an amount totaling PhP 55,000 as full payment for her deployment
abroad. But the promise of deployment never materialized. Guillarte's demand for the return of her money from the accused-
appellant went unheeded. She filed a complaint against accused-appellant docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-119664.
Private complainant Doria, however, did not testify.
For her part, the accused-appellant admitted that she was the Overseas Marketing Director of All Care Travel &
Consultancy (Hongkong), with All Care Travel & Consultancy (Philippines) as its affiliate. She said that sometime in 1990, she
was issued a professional license as an Electronics Communication Engineer. She left the country in 2003 and was not in the
Philippines from January 2003 to February 2003. She returned to the country on June 4, 2003 and left the country in the same
month. She claimed that she did not know Suratos, Guillarte, Alayon, Bagay, Jr., and Gloria. Although she knew Duldulao, she
did not promise him any job. She likewise claimed that she neither signed nor issued any receipt using the name "Manzie delos
Reyes" in favor of the complainants. She further claimed that she was not engaged in any recruitment and placement activities.
During the pre-trial, she admitted that she had no license to recruit workers for overseas employment.
On rebuttal, prosecution witness Perla D. Sayana, Chief, Registration Division of the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC), testified that the name of accused-appellant, "Merceditas Matheus" does not appear in the books of PRC's
database. She issued a certification to the effect that "Merceditas Matheus" is not a Licensed Electronics Communication
Engineer.
Confidential agent of the Bureau of Immigration (BOI), Rustico B. Romero, whose main task was to verify travel records, also
appeared for the prosecution. He testified that based on the BOI's database, the name "Merceditas Matheus" did not leave the
country from January 31, 2003 to June 18, 2003.
On November 26, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of large scale illegal
recruitment and five counts of Estafa. On appeal before the CA, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue: WON the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.

Held:
Yes. The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (l) the person charged undertook any
recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042(2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage
in the recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a
group. These elements are obtaining in this case.
 First, the RTC found accused-appellant to have undertaken recruitment activity when she promised the private
complainants overseas employment for a fee.1avvphi1 This factual finding was affirmed by the CA. As correctly pointed out by
the CA, appellant, in fact, had stipulated at pre-trial that not only did she know private complainants, she also received money
from them for their deployment abroad, as she even issued receipts to them. At any rate, absence of receipts cannot defeat a
criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment. Private complainants positively identified appellant as the person who asked money
from them in consideration for their deployment abroad. She impressed on complainants that she had the power or ability to send
them abroad for employment so much so that the latter got convinced to part with their money in exchange therefor. Illegal
recruiters need not even expressly represent themselves to the victims as persons who have the ability to send workers abroad. It is
enough that these recruiters give the impression that they have the ability to enlist workers for job placement abroad in order to
induce the latter to tender payment of fees. 21
Second, the March 1, 2004 Certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration unmistakably
reveals that the accused-appellant neither had a license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas employment. Notably, instead
of assailing the certification, she admitted during the pre-trial that she did not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers.
Third, it was established that there were five complainants, i.e., Suratos, Guillarte, Alayon, Bagay, Jr., and Duldulao. The
CA observed that rivate complainants' individual testimonies were so replete with details on how appellant convincingly, albeit
deceptively, enticed them to pay all her demands in case, how she provided for their fake documents, and how she manipulated
their thoughts and dreams for a better life, ending up in the cruel realization that she was nothing but a fraud.
Indeed, the existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the prosecution.
Furthermore, it is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately of illegal recruitment under RA
8042 or the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.
The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the
offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
Here, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant deceived private complainants into
believing that she had the authority and capability to send them abroad for employment, despite her not being licensed by the
POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.1âwphi1 Because of the assurances given by accused-appellant, the private
complainants parted with their hard-earned money for the payment of the agreed placement fee, for which accused-appellant
issued petty cash vouchers and used fictitious names evidencing her receipt of the payments.In this case, appellant committed
estafa by using fictitious names, i.e., 'Manzie Delos Reyes', 'Manzie Matheus' in her transactions with private complainants,
falsely pretending that she possessed power, influence, capacity to employ abroad or procure visas for them, making it appear that
she had made transactions to acquire their entry permits and visas, thus, successfully inducing them to part with their money,
albeit, knowing full [sic] well she had no authority or license to do so.
Clearly, these acts of accused-appellant constitute estafa punishable under Article 315 (2)(a) of the RPC.

PEOPLE vs. OCDEN | G.R. No. 173198 | June 1, 2011

Facts:
1. Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment and six counts of estafa. The prosecution witnesses were private complainants
Mana-a and Ferrer; and Julia Golidan, mother of complainants Jeffries and Howard Golidan.
2. According to Mana-a, she and Dao-as went to Ocden’s house in Baguio City to apply for work as factory workers in Italy.
Ocden required them to submit bio-data and passport, pay placement fee of Php70,000.00, and undergo medical treatment.
Upon submitting her biodata and passport, Mana-a paid Ocden P500.00 for her certificate of employment and P20,000.00 as
down payment for her placement fee. Ocden accompanied Mana-a and 20 other applicants to Zamora Medical Clinic in Manila
for their medical examinations, for which each of the applicants paid P3,000.00. Mana-a also paid to Ocden P22,000.00 as the
second installment on her placement fee. When Lawanag, Mana-a’s sister, withdrew her application, Lawanag’s P15,000.00
placement fee, already paid to Ocden, was credited to Mana-a. Mana-a failed to complete her testimony, but the RTC
considered the same as no motion to strike it was filed.
3. According to Ferrer, she and her daughter Jennilyn approached Ocden thru Alipio. Ocden showed Ferrer and Jennilyn a copy
of a job order from Italy for factory workers who could earn as much as $90,000.00 to $100,000.00. Ferrer and Jennilyn decided
to apply for work, so they submitted their passports and pictures to Ocden. Ferrer also went to Manila for medical examination,
for which she spent P3,500.00. Ferrer paid to Ocden the initial amount of P20,000.00, and the balance of her and Jennilyn’s
placement fees. All in all, Ferrer paid Ocden P140,000.00, as evidenced by the receipts issued by Ocden. Ferrer, Jennilyn,
and Alipio were supposed to be included in the first batch of workers to be sent to Italy. In preparation for their flight to Italy,
the three proceeded to Manila. In Manila, they were introduced by Ocden to Erlinda Ramos. Ocden and Ramos then
accompanied Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio to the airport where they took a flight to Zamboanga. Ocden explained to Ferrer,
Jennilyn, and Alipio that they would be transported to Malaysia where their visa application for Italy would be processed.
Sensing that they were being fooled, Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to get a refund of their money, but Ocden was nowhere to be
found. Ferrer would later learn from the Baguio office of the POEA that Ocden was not a licensed recruiter. Expecting
a job overseas, Ferrer took a leave of absence from her work. Thus, she lost income amounting to P17,700.00, equivalent to
salary for one and a half months. She also spent P30,000.00 for transportation and food expenses.
4. According to Julia Golidan, she inquired from Ocden about the latter’s overseas recruitment. Ocden informed her that the
placement fee was P70,000.00 for each applicant, that the accepted applicants would be sent by batches overseas, and that
priority would be given to those who paid their placement fees early. Golidan brought her sons, Jeffries and Howard, to Ocden.
The two handed over to Ocden their passports and P40,000.00 as down payment on their placement fees. Later, they paid the
balance of P100,000.00. Ocden issued receipts for these two payments. Ocden then informed Golidan that the first batch of
 accepted applicants had already left, and that Jeffries would be included in the second batch for deployment, while Howard in
the third batch. Later on, Jeffries called Golidan telling her that his flight to Italy was delayed due to insufficiency of funds, and
that Ocden went back to Baguio to look for more funds. Jeffries called Golidan again, informing her that he was stranded in
Zamboanga with the other applicants because Ramos did not give him his passport. (Ramos was the one who briefed the
applicants in Baguio) Golidan was unable to find Ocden in Baguio. Golidan, Mana-a and Dao-as went to Manila to meet Ocden
who explained that it would be easier for Jeffries and the other applicants to acquire their visas to Italy in Zamboanga. Ocden
was also able to contact Ramos, who assured Golidan that Jeffries would be able to get his passport. When Golidan went back
home to Baguio City, she learned through a telephone call from Jeffries that Howard was now likewise stranded in Zamboanga.
After some time, with her two sons still stranded in Zamboanga, Golidan went to Ocden’s residence where Ocden’s husband
gave her P23,000.00 to fetch the applicants. Golidan travelled again to Manila with Mana-a and Dao-as. Ocden begged Golidan
to give her the money because she needed it badly. Golidan retained P10,000.00, Dao-as got P3,000.00, and Ocden the rest.
Eventually, the two sons arrived in Manila. Golidan and her sons were only refunded P60,000.00, all in all. They later learned
at POEA Baguio that Ocden was not a licensed recruiter.
5. In her defense, Ocden denied recruiting the complainants and claimed that she was also an overseas job applicant. She identified
Ramos as the recruiter. As she was designated by Ramos as the leader of the applicants, Ocden received her co-applicants’
applications and documents; accompanied her co-applicants to Manila for medical examination because she knew the location
of Zamora Medical Clinic; and accepted placement fees. Ocden alleged that she turned over to Ramos the money Mana-a and
Ferrer gave her, although she did not indicate in the receipts she issued that she received the money for and on behalf of Ramos.
6. RTC found Ocden guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa. CA affirmed with modification on
penalties for three counts of estafa.
7. Ocden contends that the prosecution failed to prove her guilty beyond reasonable doubt as no certification from POEA was
presented showing that she was not licensed or authorized to engage in recruitment and placement. Ocden questions why
it was Golidan who testified for private complainants Jeffries and Howard. Golidan had no personal knowledge of the
circumstances proving illegal recruitment and could not have testified on the same. Also, Jeffries and Howard already executed
an affidavit of desistance. All Golidan wants was a reimbursement of the placement fees paid. Ocden further argues that the
prosecution did not sufficiently establish that she illegally recruited at least three persons, to constitute illegal recruitment on a
large scale. Out of the victims named in the Information, only Mana-a and Ferrer testified in court. Mana-a did not complete
her testimony, depriving Ocden of the opportunity to cross-examine her; and even if Mana-a’s testimony was not expunged
from the record, it was insufficient to prove illegal recruitment by Ocden. Although Ferrer testified that she and Mana-a filed a
complaint for illegal recruitment against Ocden, Ferrer’s testimony is competent only as to the illegal recruitment activities
committed by Ocden against her, and not against Mana-a. Ocden again objects to Golidan’s testimony as hearsay, not being
based on Golidan’s personal knowledge.
Issue: Whether the convictions are correct.
Ratio Decidendi:
YES. Under RA 8042, illegal recruitment is likewise committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder,
licensee or holder of authority when there is failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the
worker’s fault.
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression
that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money
in order to be employed.
As testified to by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan, Ocden gave such an impression through the following acts: (1) Ocden
informed Manaa, Ferrer, and Golidan about the job opportunity in Italy and the list of necessary requirements for application; (2)
Ocden required Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, to attend the seminar conducted by Ramos at Ocden’s
house in Baguio City; (3) Ocden received the job applications, pictures, biodata, passports, and the certificates of previous
employment (which was also issued by Ocden upon payment of P500.00), of Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and
Howard; (4) Ocden personally accompanied Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, for their medical
examinations in Manila; (5) Ocden received money paid as placement fees by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and
Howard, and even issued receipts for the same; and (6) Ocden assured Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons that they would be
deployed to Italy.
It is not necessary for the prosecution to present a certification that Ocden is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed by
any person, even by a licensed recruiter, a certification on whether Ocden had a license to recruit or not, is inconsequential. Ocden
committed illegal recruitment as described in said provision by receiving placement fees from Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s two
sons, Jeffries and Howard, evidenced by receipts Ocden herself issued; and failing to reimburse/refund to Mana-a, Ferrer, and
Golidan’s two sons the amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Italy, through no fault of their own.
Also, Golidan had personal knowledge of Ocden’s illegal recruitment activities, which she could competently testify to.
Golidan herself had personal dealings with Ocden as Golidan assisted her sons, Jeffries and Howard, in completing the requirements
for their overseas job applications, and later on, in getting back home from Zamboanga where Jeffries and Howard were stranded,
and in demanding a refund from Ocden of the placement fees paid. That Golidan is seeking a reimbursement of the placement fees
paid for the failed deployment of her sons Jeffries and Howard strengthens, rather than weakens, the prosecution’s case.
The affidavit of desistance purportedly executed by Jeffries and Howard does not exonerate Ocden from criminal liability
when the prosecution had successfully proved her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value
to affidavits of desistance, especially when it is executed as an afterthought.
 Ocden’s testimony is self-serving and uncorroborated. Ocden’s denial of any illegal recruitment activity cannot stand
against the prosecution witnesses’ positive identification of her in court as the person who induced them to part with their money
upon the misrepresentation and false promise of deployment to Italy as factory workers. Besides, despite several opportunities given
to Ocden by the RTC, she failed to present Ramos, who Ocden alleged to be the real recruiter and to whom she turned over the
placement fees paid by her co-applicants.
While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that
there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. In this case, there is conclusive
evidence that Ocden recruited Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, for purported employment as factory
workers in Italy. And even though only Ferrer and Golidan testified as to Ocden’s failure to reimburse the placements fees paid
when the deployment did not take place, their testimonies already established the fact of non-reimbursement as to three persons,
namely, Ferrer and Golidan’s two sons, Jeffries and Howard.
We are likewise affirming the conviction of Ocden for the crime of estafa. The very same evidence proving Ocden’s
liability for illegal recruitment also established her liability for estafa. Ocden represented to Ferrer, Golidan, and Golidan’s two
sons, Jeffries and Howard, that she could provide them with overseas jobs. Convinced by Ocden, Ferrer, Golidan, and Golidan’s
sons paid substantial amounts as placement fees to her. Despite the fact that Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, were stranded in
Zamboanga for almost a month, Ocden still assured them and their mother that they would be able to leave for Italy. There is
definitely deceit on the part of Ocden and damage on the part of Ferrer and Golidan’s sons, thus, justifying Ocden’s conviction for
estafa

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs Cabiles | GR No. 170139 | August 5, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Responding to an ad it
published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan. Joy’s application was
accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that
Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of ₱70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract,
she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter. Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was
terminated and that "she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport." She was asked to "prepare for
immediate repatriation."
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000. According to her,
Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally
dismissed. She asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23
months as well as moral and exemplary damages. She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign
principal.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in her
duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign [employer]." The agency also claimed that it did not
ask for a placement fee of ₱70,000.00. As evidence, it showed Official Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10, 1997, bearing the
amount of ₱20,360.00. Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific
Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997. Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by
Pacific Manpower.
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it. It alleged that there was no employer-
employee relationship between them. Therefore, the claims against it were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Pacific
Manpower argued that the employment contract should first be presented so that the employer’s contractual obligations might be
identified. It further denied that it assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal acts.
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint. Joy appealed to NLRC, which declared that Joy was
illegally dismissed. However, the NLRC did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees for lack of jurisdiction. It
refused to entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific. It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision not to rule on the matter.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals assailing the National Labor Relations Commission’s resolutions. The CA affirmed the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the equivalent of three months’ worth
of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
National Labor Relations Commission to address the validity of petitioner's allegations against Pacific. Dissatisfied, Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition.

Issue: WON respondent was illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of
her repatriation, and attorney’s fees despite the alleged existence of just causes of termination.
Held:
Yes. Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution. Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure
when they move to work in a different jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle
of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made). There is no question that the contract of employment in
this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws
affecting labor apply in this case.
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and after
compliance with procedural due process requirements. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by
the employer. Thus:
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of
his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties may, therefore, constitute a
just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer.
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer’s work requirements and was
inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what
requirements were not met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against which her work efficiency
and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as to the position held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as
the job title was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just cause for termination. There is no proof that
respondent was legally terminated.
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.
However, in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause
“or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause and substantive due process.
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the clause in Republic
Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent’s termination from work in 1997. Republic Act No. 8042 before it
was amended by Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case. The law passed incorporates the exact clause already declared as
unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.
Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in
any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution
cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a
nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured
by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any
compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void.
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with Section 10
of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. Since
she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997
to June 25, 1998. "To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would,in effect, send a wrong signal
that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment
contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law."

Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of Labor G.R. No. 79436-50, 17 January 1990

Facts:
J&B Manpower is an overseas employment agency registered with the POEA and Eastern Assurance was its surety
beginning January 1985. From 1983 to December 1985, J&B recruited 33 persons but none of them were ever deployed.
The surety bond stipulated, among others, that the liability of the Surety shall in no case exceed P150,000, notice to the
principal is also notice to the Surety; and the liability of the Surety shall expire on January 2, 1986 and the bond shall automatically
be cancelled 10 days after its expiration and it shall not be liable thereafter.
These 33 persons sued J&B and the POEA ruled in favor of the 29 of the 33 workers because the other 4’s claims were
transacted prior to the effectivity of the bond, and ordered J&B to refund them (with Eastern Assurance being solidarily liable). The
Secretary of Labor modified the ruling, ordering to refund all 33 persons as listed, while as to the complainants, they are entitled to
P15980 total, not each. Eastern Assurance assailed the ruling claiming that POEA and the Secretary of Labor have no jurisdiction
over non-employees, contending that the 33 were never employed, in short, there was no employer-employee relationship.
Issue:
1) Whether the POEA and the Secretary of Labor has jurisdiction over the claims for refund filed by non-employees.
2) Whether recruiter and the victims are in pari delicto.
3) Whether the petitioner is not liable for claims filed after the expiry of the stipulated period of the surety bond for filing
claims against it. And whether the Secretary of Labor acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling such.
Held:
1) Yes. The complaints in the case are for violation of Articles 32 and 34(a) of the Labor Code, specifically the
prohibited practice of charging or accepting, whether directly or indirectly, of any amount greater than that specified in the schedule
of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than actually received by him
as a loan or advance.
Secretary of Labor has the power and authority not only to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of
all agencies but also to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions governing said
activities.
Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA, “on its own initiative or upon
filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, x x (authority to) conduct the necessary
proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity” for certain enumerated offenses.
Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the victims of the offenses committed by the respondent agency
or contractor, specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as may have been fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or
such money, goods or services imposed and accepted in excess of what is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit
the sanction on an offending recruitment agency or contractor to suspension or cancellation of its license, without the concomitant
obligation to repair the injury caused to its victims. It would result either in rewarding unlawful acts, as it would leave the victims
without recourse, or in compelling the latter to litigate in another forum, giving rise to that multiplicity of actions or proceedings
which the law abhors.
2) No. Even more untenable is EASCO’s next argument that the recruiter and its victims are in pari delicto—the
former for having required payment, and the latter for having voluntarily paid, “prohibited recruitment fees”—and therefore, said
victims are barred from obtaining relief. The sophistical, if not callous, character of the argument is evident upon the most cursory
reading thereof; it merits no consideration whatever.
3) No. The Court discerned no grave abuse of discretion in the Secretary’s statement of his reasons for granting the
claims, which is that although EASCO received notice of the claims after the 10-day expiration period of the surety bond, the records
show that the EASCO’s principal, the respondent agency, was notified prior to the expiration period of the claims of the
complainants. In connection to this, it may be stressed that the surety bond provides that the notice to the principal is notice to the
surety. The contract of a compensated surety like the respondent EASCO is to be interpreted liberally in the interest of the promisees
and beneficiaries rather than strictly in favor of the surety.

Andrew McBurnie v. E. Ganzon, Inc. G.R. No. 178034 & 178117, 18 September 2009

Facts:
On October 4, 2002, Andrew James McBurnie (McBurnie), an Australian national, instituted a complaint for illegal
dismissal and other monetary claims against the respondents, claiming that on May 11, 1999, he signed a 5-year employment
agreement with the company EGI as an Executive Vice-President who shall oversee the management of the company hotels and
resorts within the Philippines. He performed work for the company until sometime in November 1999, when he figured in an
accident that compelled him to go back to Australia while recuperating from his injuries. While in Australia, he was informed by
respondent Ganzon that his services were no longer needed because their intended project would no longer push through.
The respondents contend that their agreement with McBurnie was to jointly invest in and establish a company for the
management of the hotels. They did not intend to create an employer-employee relationship, and the execution of the employment
contract that was being invoked by McBurnie was solely for the purpose of allowing McBurnie to obtain an alien work permit in
the Philippines, and that McBurnie had not obtained a work permit.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared McBurnie as having been illegally dismissed from employment. The respondents filed
their Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond, and posted an appeal bond in the amount of P100,000.00, claiming that
an award of more than P60 Million Pesos to a single foreigner who had no work permit and who left the country for good one month
after the purported commencement of his employment was a patent nullity.
The NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond explaining that in cases involving monetary award, an employer seeking to
appeal the LA decision to the Commission is unconditionally required by Art. 223, Labor Code to post bond equivalent to the
monetary award.
The motion for reconsideration was denied, the respondents appealed to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
(with extremely urgent prayer for the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order).
The CA granted the respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction. It directed the NLRC, McBurnie, and all
persons acting for and under their authority to refrain from causing the execution and enforcement of the LA decision in favor of
McBurnie, conditioned upon the respondents posting of a bond in the amount of P10,000,000.00. The reconsideration of issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by McBurnie was denied by the CA.
McBurnie filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA resolutions that granted the
respondent's; application for the injunctive writ. The Court denied the petition and subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Later, the CA rendered a decision allowing the respondent's motion to reduce appeal bond and directing the NLRC to give
due course to their appeal. The CA also ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in immediately denying the motion
without fixing an appeal bond in an amount that was reasonable, as it denied the respondents of their right to appeal from the decision
of the LA.
McBurnie filed a motion for reconsideration. The respondents moved that the appeal be resolved on the merits by the CA.
The CA denied both motions. McBurnie then filed with the Supreme Court the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The NLRC, acting on the CA order of remand, accepted the appeal from the LA decision and reversed and set aside the
decision of the LA, and dismissed McBurnie’s complaint.
On September 18, 2009, the third division of SC rendered its decision granting respondents’ motion to reduce appeal bond.
This Court also reinstated and affirmed the NLRC decision dismissing respondent's appeal for failure to perfect an appeal and
denying their motion for reconsideration. The aforementioned decision became final and executor on March 14, 2012.
Issue:
1) Whether the rules on perfection of appeals must be strictly applied.
2) Whether the CA erred in ruling that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
1) Yes. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that “Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions,
awards, or orders. * * * In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.”
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision
of the Labor Arbiter.
Moreover, the filing of the bond is not only mandatory but a jurisdictional requirement as well, that must be complied with
in order to confer jurisdiction upon the National Labor Relations Commission. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of
the Labor Arbiter final and executory. This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will
receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer’s appeal. It is intended to discourage employers from
using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees’ just and lawful claims.
The legislative and administrative intent to strictly require the employer to post a cash or surety bond securing the full
amount of the monetary award within the 10-day reglementary period. Nothing in the Labor Code or the NLRC Rules of Procedure
authorizes the posting of a bond that is less than the monetary award in the judgment, or would deem such insufficient posting as
sufficient to perfect the appeal.
In the case, records show that respondents filed their Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond on the
10th or last day of the reglementary period. Although they posted an initial appeal bond of P100,000.00, the same was grossly
inadequate compared to the monetary awards of US$985,162.00 representing salaries and benefits for the unexpired portion of the
contract, P2,000,000 as moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees equivalent to the total monetary award. Further, there is
no basis in respondents’ contention that the awards of the Labor Arbiter were null and excessive, and with premeditated intention
to render respondents, incapable of posting an appeal bond and deprive them of the right to appeal.
The failure of the respondents to comply with the requirement of posting a bond equivalent in amount to the monetary
award is fatal to their appeal. For filing their motion only on the final day within which to perfect an appeal, respondents cannot be
allowed to seek refuge in a liberal application of the rules. Under such circumstance, there is neither way for the NLRC to exercise
its discretion to grant or deny the motion, nor for the respondents to post the full amount of the bond, without risk of summary
dismissal for non-perfection of appeal.
2) No. While in certain instances, the Court allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, it never intended to
forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only
in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances, but none obtains in this case. The NLRC had,
therefore, the full discretion to grant or deny their motion to reduce the amount of the appeal bond. The finding of the labor tribunal
that respondents did not present sufficient justification for the reduction thereof cannot be said to have been done with grave abuse
of discretion.
Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. vs Schonfeld G.R. No. 166920, 19 February 2007
Facts:
Respondent Klaus Schonfeld, a Canadian citizen, had been a consultant in the field of environmental engineering and water
supply and sanitation. Pacicon Philippines Inc., a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan, is a corporation with the
primary purpose to engage in the business of providing specialty and technical services both in and out of the Philippines. The
president of PPI, Jens Peter Henrichsen, who was also the director of PCIJ, was based in Tokyo, Japan.
Respondent was employed by PCIJ, through Henrichsen, as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation Department.
However, PCIJ assigned him as PPI sector manager in the Philippines. Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed
his position as PP I Sector Manager. He was accorded the status of a resident alien. PPI applied for an Alien Employment Permit
for respondent before the DOLE and the DOLE granted the application and issued the Permit to respondent. Respondent later
received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that his employment had been terminated f or the reason that PCIJ and PPI had not
been successful in the water and sanitation sector in the Philippines. Respondent filed with PPI several money claims. PPI partially
settled some of his claims, but refused to pay the rest.
Respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal. Petitioners aver that since respondent is a Canadian citizen, the CA
erred in ignoring their claim that the principles of forum non conveniens and lex loci contractus are applicable. They also point out
that the contract of employment of respondent was executed in Tokyo.
 PPI moved to dismiss on the following grounds: 1) The LA had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, 2) the venue was
improperly laid. Further, it averred that respondent Schonfeld was a Canadian citizen, a transient expatriate who had left the
Philippines. He was also employed and dismissed by PCIJ, a foreign corporation with principal office in Tokyo, Japan. Under lex
loci contractus, the complaint should have been filed in Tokyo. Lastly, under Section 21 of the General Conditions of Employment
attached to his letter of employment, any employment-related dispute should be brought before London Court of Arbitration.
Petitioners insist that the U.S. Labor-Management Act applies only to U.S. workers and employers, while the Labor Code
applies only to Filipino employers and Philippine-based employers and their employees, not to PCIJ. In fine, the jurisdictions of the
NLRC and Labor Arbiter do not extend to foreign workers who executed employment agreements with foreign employers abroad,
although "seconded" to the Philippines.
Issue:
1) Whether there is an employer-employee relationship.
2) Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
1) Yes. First--one of the issues raised in this case is the employer-employee relationship between Schonfeld and
petitioner Pacific Consultants. In this case, the Court ruled that there exists an employer-employee relationship exists between them.
To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, these four-fold test must be applied: 1) the selection of
employees 2) the payment of wages, 3) the power to dismiss and 4) the power of control the employee’s conduct, being the most
important determining factor. As with control, the Court has consistently ruled that control in this case means the right to control
not only the end to be achieved, but the manner and method by which to perform such work.
The Court noted that the power to control petitioner's performance delved upon PPI. Likewise, the power to terminate
delved upon PPI as exercised by its President. It is not the letterhead used by the company in the termination letter which controls,
but the person who exercised the power to terminate the employee.
Further, Petitioner PPI applied for the issuance of an AEP to respondent before the DOLE. In said application, PPI averred
that respondent is its employee. Otherwise, DOLE will not grant the issuance of said permit.
The DOLE may issue an alien employment permit based only on the following:
a) Compliance by the applicant and his employer with the requirements of Section 2 hereof;
b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-availability of any person in the Philippines who is
competent and willing to do the job for which the services of the applicant are desired;
c) His assessment as to whether or not the employment of the applicant will redound to the national interest;
d) Admissibility of the alien as certified by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation;
e) The recommendation of the Board of Investments or other appropriate government agencies if the applicant will be
employed in preferred areas of investments or in accordance with the imperative of economic development.
2) Yes. Second--with respect to the jurisdictional issue--the Court ruled that the settled stipulations regarding venue,
as held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan is that while they are considered valid and
enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not as a rule, supersede the general rules set forth in Rule 4 of the Rules of Court,
in the absence of any qualifying words. In this case, they should merely be considered an agreement on national forum, not as
limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but rather, permissive.
In the instant case, no restrictive words are provided such as "solely", "only", "exclusively in this court".
Petitioners’ insistence on the application of the principle of forum non conveniens must be rejected. The bare fact that
respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a repatriate does not warrant the application of the principle for the following reasons:
First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include forum non conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint.
Second. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, it is properly
considered as defense.
Third. In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that: [a]
Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1)
that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make
an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision.

DREAMLAND HOTEL RESORT vs STEPHEN B. JOHNSON | 191455 | March 12, 2014

Facts:
Dreamland Hotel Resort (Dreamland) and its President, Westley J. Prentice (Prentice) (petitioners) alleged the following
facts in the instant petition:
Dreamland is a corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 15, 2003 to exist
for a period of fifty [50] years with registration number SEC A 1998-6436. Prentice is its current President and Chief Executive
Officer. It is engaged in the hotel, restaurant and allied businesses. Dreamland is presently undertaking operations of its business
at National Highway, Sto. Tomas, Matain Subic, Zambales, 2209.
Respondent Stephen B. Johnson is an Australian citizen who came to the Philippines as a businessman/investor without the
authority to be employed as the employee/officer of any business as he was not able to secure his Alien Employment Permit
["AEP" for brevity], which fact was duly supported by the Certification dated March 14, 2008 of the Department of Labor and
Employment ["DOLE" for brevity] Regional Director, Regional Office No. III, San Fernando City, Pampanga.
As a fellow Australian citizen, Johnson was able to convince Prentice to accept his offer to invest in Dreamland and at
the same time provide his services as Operations Manager of Dreamland with a promise that he will secure an AEP and Tax
Identification Number ["TIN" for brevity] prior to his assumption of work. Sometime on June 21, 2007, Prentice and Johnson
entered into an Employment Agreement, which stipulates among others, that the [sic] Johnson shall serve as Operations Manager
of Dreamland from August 1, 2007 and shall serve as such for a period of three (3) years. Before entering into the said agreement,
Prentice required the submission of the AEP and TIN from Johnson. Johnson promised that the same shall be supplied within one
(1) month from the signing of the contract because the application for the TIN and AEP were still under process. Thus[,] it was
agreed that the efficacy of the said agreement shall begin after one (1) month or on August 1, 2007.
On or about October 8, 2007, Prentice asked on several occasions the production of the AEP and TIN from Johnson.
Johnson gave excuses and promised that he is already in possession of the requirements. Believing the word of Johnson,
Dreamland commenced a dry run of its operations. Johnson worked as a hotel and resort Operations Manager only at that time. He
worked for only about three (3) weeks until he suddenly abandoned his work and subsequently resigned as Operations Manager
starting November 3, 2007. He never reported back to work despite several attempts of Prentice to clarify his issues.
On the other hand, respondent Stephen B. Johnson (Johnson) averred that: There is also no truth to the allegation that it
was [Johnson] who "offered" and "convinced" petitioner Prentice to "invest" in and provide his services to petitioner Dreamland
Hotel Resort. The truth of the matter is that it was petitioners who actively advertised for a resort manager for Dreamland Hotel.
It was in response to these advertisements that private respondent Johnson contacted petitioners to inquire on the terms
for employment offered. It was Prentice who offered employment and convinced Johnson to give out a loan, purportedly so the
resort can be completed and operational by August 2007. Believing the representations of petitioner Prentice, private respondent
Johnson accepted the employment as Resort Manager and loaned money to petitioners [consisting of] his retirement pay in the
amount of One Hundred Thousand US Dollars (USD 100,000.00) to finish construction of the resort. From the start of August
2007, as stipulated in the Employment Agreement, respondent Johnson already reported for work. It was then that he found out to
his dismay that the resort was far from finished. However, he was instructed to supervise construction and speak with potential
guests. He also undertook the overall preparation of the guestrooms and staff for the opening of the hotel, even performing menial
tasks (i.e. inspected for cracked tiles, ensured proper grout installation, proper lighting and air-conditioning unit installation,
measured windows for curtain width and showers for shower curtain rods, unloaded and installed mattresses, beddings, furniture
and appliances and even ironed and hung guest room curtains).
As [Johnson] remained unpaid since August 2007 and he has loaned all his money to petitioners, he asked for his salary
after the resort was opened in October 2007 but the same was not given to him by petitioners. [Johnson] became very alarmed
with the situation as it appears that there was no intention to pay him his salary, which he now depended on for his living as he has
been left penniless. He was also denied the benefits promised him as part of his compensation such as service vehicles, meals and
insurance. Johnson was also not given the authority due to him as resort manager. Prentice countermanded his orders to the staff at
every opportunity. Worse, he would even be berated and embarrassed in front of the staff. Prentice would go into drunken tiffs,
even with customers and [Johnson] was powerless to prohibit Prentice. It soon became clear to him that he was only used for the
money he loaned and there was no real intention to have him as resort manager of Dreamland Hotel.
Thus, on November 3, 2007, after another embarrassment was handed out by petitioner Prentice in front of the staff, which
highlighted his lack of real authority in the hotel and the disdain for him by petitioners, respondent Johnson was forced to submit
his resignation, x x x. In deference to the Employment Agreement signed, [Johnson] stated that he was willing to continue work
for the three month period stipulated therein. However, in an SMS or text message sent by Prentice to [Johnson] on the same day
at around 8:20 pm, he was informed that "… I consider [yo]ur resignation as immediate". Despite demand, petitioners refused to
pay [Johnson] the salaries and benefits due him.
On January 31, 2008, Johnson filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, among others, against
the petitioners.
On May 23, 2008, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision dismissing Johnson’s complaint for lack of merit with the
finding that he voluntarily resigned from his employment and was not illegally dismissed. There being competent, concrete and
substantial evidence to confirm the voluntary resignation of [Johnson] from his employment, there was no illegal dismissal
committed against him and for him to be entitled to reinstatement to his former position and backwages.
Johnson appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent Wes[t]ley Prentice and/or
Dreamland Resort & Hotel, Inc[.] are hereby ordered to pay [Johnson] backwages, separation pay, unpaid wages.
Consequently, the petitioners elevated the NLRC decision to the CA by way of Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 47. However, it was denied. Hence,
this petition.

Issue: WON Johnson was constructively dismissed.

Held:
Yes. As regards the NLRC findings that Johnson was constructively dismissed and did not abandon his work, the Court
is in consonance with this conclusion with the following basis:
Even the most reasonable employee would consider quitting his job after working for three months and receiving only an
insignificant fraction of his salaries. There was, therefore, not an abandonment of employment nor a resignation in the real sense,
but a constructive dismissal, which is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely.
The above preceding statement only goes to show that while it was Johnson who tendered his resignation, it was due to
the petitioners’ acts that he was constrained to resign. The petitioners cannot expect Johnson to tolerate working for them without
any compensation.
 Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided
are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the
employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement,
if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages. The normal consequences of respondents’ illegal
dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of separation
pay is in addition to payment of backwages.
Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to
reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what
could be a highly oppressive work environment.1âwphi1 On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable
obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust. In the present case, the NLRC found that due to the
strained relations between the parties, separation pay is to be awarded to Johnson in lieu of his reinstatement.
The NLRC held that Johnson is entitled to backwages from November 3, 2007 up to the finality of the decision;
separation pay equivalent to one month salary; and unpaid salaries from August 1, 2007 to November 1, 2007 amounting to a total
of ₱172,800.00. While the Court agrees with the NLRC that the award of separation pay and unpaid salaries is warranted, the
Court does not lose sight of the fact that the employment contract states that Johnson's employment is for a term of three years.
Accordingly, the award of backwages should be computed from November 3, 2007 to August 1, 2010 - which is three
years from August 1, 2007. Furthermore, separation pay is computed from the commencement of employment up to the time of
termination, including the imputed service for which the employee is entitled to backwages.42 As one-month salary is awarded as
separation pay for every year of service, including imputed service, Johnson should be paid separation pay equivalent to his three-
month salary for the three-year contract.

Bernardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission | 310 SCRA 186

Facts:
Complainants numbering 43 are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and
Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called ‘Employment Contract for Handicapped
Workers.

In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990, nineteen (19); in 1991 six (6); in
1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed every six months such that by the time this case
arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by respondent under the said employment agreement. The last one
was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and whose contract expired on July 1993.

Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company maintained that complainants
who are a special class of workers—the hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily under [a] special employment
arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank; that complain-
ant[s] were hired due to ‘pakiusap’ which must be considered in the light of the context of the respondent Bank’s corporate
philosophy as well as its career and working environment which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of professionals trained and
qualified officers and regular employees who are baccalaureate degree holders from excellent schools which is an unbending policy
in the hiring of regular employees; that in addition to this, training continues so that the regular employee grows in the corporate
ladder; that the idea of hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on a special arrangement basis; that it adopted the
special program to help tide over a group of handicapped workers such as deaf-mutes like the complainants who could do manual
work for the respondent Bank; that the task of counting and sorting of bills which was being performed by tellers could be assigned
to deaf-mutes; that the counting and sorting of money are tellering works which were always logically and naturally part and parcel
of the tellers’ normal functions; that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent Bank plantilla for
sorters or counters; that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of
their duties; that through the ‘pakiusap’ of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor
of deaf-mutes without creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the Philippines
which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations.

NLRC:
In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under Article 280 of the
Labor Code. We give due credence to the conclusion that complainants were hired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation
of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s] were covered by x x x Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on
duration of contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of the contract shall
be the law between the parties. The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable.

Issue: W/N NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioners—money sorters and counters working in
a bank—were not regular employees.

Held:
At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondent’s effort to provide employment to
physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of society. However, we cannot allow it to elude the
legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employment irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor
Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed
regular employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of
compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article
80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the
Labor Code.

The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC, in which this Court held: “The primary standard,
therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed
and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for
at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need
for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the
employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.” As held by the Court,
“Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees
by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary appointments, ad infinitum.” The contract signed by petitioners is akin
to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined the employees’ fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the
contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. No employer is
allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees. As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to
security of tenure; that is, their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show
such cause, these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money sorting is no
longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged, petitioners are hereby awarded
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

Respondent argues that petitioners were merely “accommodated” employees. This fact does not change the nature of their
employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the
mode or even the reason for hiring them.

Equally unavailing are private respondent’s arguments that it did not go out of its way to recruit petitioners, and that its plantilla did
not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v. NLRC, the Court held that “the determination of whether employment is casual or
regular does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of hiring x x x but on the nature of the activities
performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of performance and its continued existence.” Private respondent argues
that the petitioners were informed from the start that they could not become regular employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed
with the stipulation in the contract regarding this point. Still, we are not persuaded. The well-settled rule is that the character of
employment is determined not by stipulations in the contract, but by the nature of the work performed. Otherwise, no employee can
become regular by the simple expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment. In rendering this decision,
the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the working class, but also the concern of the State for the plight
of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but
on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deafmutes)
is not a hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment contracts. Why
then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired? The Court believes, that, after showing their fitness
for the work assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular employees.

Century Canning Corporation vs. Court of Appeals | 152894

Facts:
On 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as “fish cleaner” at petitioner’s tuna and
sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an apprenticeship agreement with petitioner. Palad received an apprentice allowance
of P138.75 daily.

On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program for approval to the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved peti-
tioner’s apprenticeship program. According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was
conducted on 15 November 1997, where petitioner gave Palad a rating of N.I. or “needs improvement” since she scored only 27.75%
based on a 100% performance indicator. Furthermore, according to the performance evaluation, Palad incurred numerous tardiness
and absences. As a consequence, petitioner issued a termination notice dated
22 November 1997 to Palad, informing her of her termination effective at the close of business hours of 28 November 1997. Palad
then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-payment of pro-rated 13th month pay for the year 1997.

On 25 February 1999, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but ordered petitioner to pay Palad her last salary
and her pro-rated 13th month pay.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. The
respondents are ordered to pay complainant’s backwages for two (2) months.

The Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was not valid and binding because it was executed
more than two months before the TESDA approved petitioner’s apprenticeship program. The Court of Appeals also held that
petitioner illegally dismissed Palad. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to show that Palad was properly apprised of
the required standard of performance. The Court of Appeals likewise held that Palad was not afforded due process because petitioner
did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

Issue: W/N private respondent wan not an apprentice.

Held:
The Labor Code defines an apprentice as a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with an employer. One of
the objectives of Title II (Training and Employment of Special Workers) of the Labor Code is to establish apprenticeship standards
for the protection of apprentices. In line with this objective, Articles 60 and 61 of the Labor Code provide: ART. 60. Employment
of apprentices: Only employers in the highly technical industries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations
approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.

ART. 61. Contents of apprenticeship agreements.— Apprenticeship agreements, including the wage rates of apprentices, shall
conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months.
Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75 percent
of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship programs duly approved by the
Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship.

Republic Act No. 7796 (RA 7796), which created the TESDA, has transferred the authority over apprenticeship programs from the
Bureau of Local Employment of the DOLE to the TESDA. RA 7796 emphasizes TESDA’s approval of the apprenticeship program
as a pre-requisite for the hiring of apprentices. Such intent is clear under Section 4 of RA 7796: SEC. 4. “Apprenticeship” training
within employment with compulsory related theoretical instructions involving a contract between an apprentice and an employer
on an approved apprenticeable occupation;k)“Apprentice” is a person undergoing training for an approved apprenticeable
occupation during an established period assured by an apprenticeship agreement; l) “Apprentice Agreement” is a contract wherein
a prospective employer binds himself to train the apprentice who in turn accepts the terms of training for a recognized apprenticeable
occupation emphasizing the rights, duties and responsibilities of each party; m) “Apprenticeable Occupation” is an occupation
officially endorsed by a tripartite body and approved for apprenticeship by the Authority [TESDA];

In this case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered into between the parties before petitioner filed its apprenticeship program
with the TESDA for approval. Petitioner and Palad executed the apprenticeship agreement on 17 July 1997 wherein it was stated
that the training would start on 17 July 1997 and would end approximately in December 1997. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted
for approval its apprenticeship program, which the TESDA subsequently approved on 26 September 1997. Clearly, the
apprenticeship agreement was enforced even before the TESDA approved petitioner’s apprenticeship program. Thus, the
apprenticeship agreement is void because it lacked prior approval from the TESDA. The TESDA’s approval of the employer’s
apprenticeship program is
required before the employer is allowed to hire apprentices. Prior approval from the TESDA is necessary to ensure that only
employers in the highly technical industries may employ apprentices and only in apprentice-able occupations. Thus, under RA 7796,
employers can only hire apprentices for apprenticeable occupations which must be officially endorsed by a tripartite body and
approved for apprenticeship by the TESDA. This is to ensure the protection of apprentices and to obviate possible abuses by
prospective employers who may want to take advantage of the lower wage rates for apprentices and circumvent the right of the
employees to be secure in their employment.

Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was enforced before the TESDA’s approval of
petitioner’s apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed a regular employee performing the job of a “fish cleaner.” Clearly, the job of
a “fish cleaner” is necessary in petitioner’s business as a tuna and sardines factory. Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, an
employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer.

In this case, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner terminated Palad for habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of performance.
Under Section 25, Rule VI, Book II of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of
performance are among the valid causes for which the employer may terminate the apprenticeship agreement after the probationary
period.

Under Article 227 of the Labor Code, the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause. Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that Palad was terminated for valid reasons. In fact, the NLRC found that petitioner
failed to prove the authenticity of the performance evaluation which petitioner claims to have conducted on Palad, where Palad
received a performance rating of only 27.75%. Petitioner merely relies on the performance evaluation to provePalad’s inefficiency.
It was likewise not shown that petitioner ever apprised Palad of the performance standards set by the company.
When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter
a case of illegal dismissal.

Almario vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. | 170928

Facts:
On October 21, 1988, petitioner, Almario was hired by respondent, Philippine Airlines,
Inc. (PAL), as a Boeing 747 Systems Engineer. On April 28, 1995, Almario, then about 39 years of age and a Boeing 737 (B-737)
First Officer at PAL, successfully bid for the higher position of Airbus 300 (A-300) First Officer. Since said higher position required
additional training, he underwent, at PAL’s expense, more than five months of training consisting of ground schooling in Manila
and flight simulation in Melbourne, Australia.

After completing the training course, Almario served as A300 First Officer of PAL, but after eight months of service as such or on
September 16, 1996, he tendered his resignation, for “personal reasons,” effective October 15, 1996. On September 27, 1996, PAL’s
Vice President for Flight Operations sent Almario a letter we urge you to reconsider your proposed resignation otherwise you will
be required to reimburse the Company an amount equivalent to the cost of your professional training and the damaged caused to the
Company. By letter of October 9, 1996, Almario’s counsel sought PAL’s explanation behind its September 27, 1996 letter
considering that Almario “did not sign anything regarding any reimbursement.” PAL did not reply, prompting Almario’s counsel
to send two letters dated January 6, 1997 and February 10, 1997 following-up PAL’s reply, as well as the release of Almario’s
clearances which he needed to avail of his benefits.

On February 11, 1997, PAL filed a Complaint against Almario before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC), for reimbursement
of P851,107 worth of training costs, attorney’s fees equivalent to 20% of the said amount, and costs of litigation. PAL invoked the
existence of an innominate contract of do ut facias (I give that you may do) with Almario in that by spending for his training, he
would render service to it until the costs of training were recovered in at least three (3) years. Almario having resigned before the
3-year period, PAL prayed that he should be ordered to reimburse the costs for his training. In his Answer with Special and
Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaims, Almario denied the existence of any agreement with PAL that he would have
to render service to it for three years after his training failing which he would reimburse the training costs. He pointed out that the
1991-1994 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline Pilot’s Association of the Philippines (ALPAP),
of which he was a member carried no such agreement.

The Secretary of Labor ruled that a pilot should remain in the position where he is upon reaching the age of fifty-seven (57),
irrespective of whether or not he has previously qualified in the Company’s turbo-jet operations. The rationale behind this is that a
pilot who will be compulsorily retired at age sixty (60) should no longer be burdened with training for a new position.
Thus, Article XXIII, Section 1 of the CBA provide[s]:
“Pilots fifty-seven (57) years of age shall be frozen in their position. Pilots who are less than fifty-seven (57) years of age provided
they have previously qualified in any company’s turbo-jet aircraft shall be permitted to occupy any position in the company’s turbo-
jet fleet.”

The reason why pilots who are 57 years of age are no longer qualified to bid for a higher position is because they have only three
(3) years left before the mandatory retirement age [of 60] and to send them to training at that age, PAL would no longer be able to
recover whatever training expenses it will have to incur.

The trial court denied Almario’s claim for moral damages, however. It denied too Almario’s claim for the monetary equivalent of
his family trip pass benefits (worth US$49,824), it holding that the same had been forfeited as he did not avail of them within one
year from the date of his separation.

On appeal by both parties, the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court’s decision. It found Almario liable under the CBA between
PAL and ALPAP and, in any event, under Article 22 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether the availing by petitioner of a required training is a legal ground justifying the entitlement to a benefit and therefore,
negating claims of unjust enrichment.

Held:
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is the law between the contracting parties—the collective bargaining representative
and the employer-company—and compliance with a CBA is mandated by the expressed policy to give protection to labor; Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) provisions should be “construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must
place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose
which it is intended to serve.”

As reflected in the above-enumerated issues raised by Almario, he cites the case of Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form
Manufacturing-United Workers of the Philippines (SMTFM-UWP) v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 171 (1998), (Manggagawa), in support of
his claim that the appellate court erred in interpreting the CBA as an ordinary civil law contract and in reading into it “a clause that
was not agreed to during the negotiation and not expressly stated in the CBA.” On the contrary, the ruling in Manggagawa supports
PAL’s position. Thus this Court held: The CBA is the law between the contracting parties—the collective bargaining representative
and the employer-company. Compliance with a CBA is mandated by the expressed policy to give protection to labor. In the same
vein, CBA provisions should be “construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and
realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to
serve.” This is founded on the dictum that a CBA is not an ordinary contract but one impressed with public interest. It goes without
saying, however, that only provisions embodied in the CBA should be so interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised
by a contracting party does not find print in the CBA, it is not a part thereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its
implementation.

The pertinent provision of the CBA and its rationale aside, contrary to Almario’s claim, Article 22 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him, applies. This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the principle that one may
not enrich himself at the expense of another. An authority on Civil Law writes on the subject, viz.: Enrichment of the defendant
consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may consist of some positive
pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff;
(2) the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4)
the increase of value of property of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right
of preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the conditions of life of
the defendant. x x x x The enrichment of the defendant must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or injury to the plaintiff.
This prejudice may consist, not only of the loss of property or the deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of nonpayment of
compensation for a prestation or service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on the part of the plaintiff, or the failure
to acquire something which the latter would have obtained. The injury to the plaintiff, however, need not be the cause of the
enrichment of the defendant. It is enough that there be some relation between them, that the enrichment of the defendant would not
have been produced had it not been for the fact from which the injury to the plaintiff is derived.

PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a higher level of skill,
proficiency, or technical competence so that he could efficiently discharge the position of A-300 first Officer. Given that, PAL
expected to recover the training costs by availing of Almario’s services for at least three years. The expectation of PAL was not
fully realized, however, due to Almario’s resignation after only eight months of service following the completion of his training
course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of
training without violating the principle of unjust enrichment.