People vs.
Abatayo dubious and weak the denial and alibi interposed by the
G.R. No. 139456, July 7, 2004
FACTS:
The appellant was charged with the crime of double
murder. Upon arraignment, the appellant, assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty.
The first witness for the prosecution was Juanito
Gutang, whose direct examination was terminated
during the trial of November 22, 1994. The appellant's
counsel commenced with his cross-examination of the
witness, but later prayed for a resetting as he still had
many questions for the said witness. The court granted
the motion. However, during the continuation of the trial
on January 23, 1995, Juanito failed to appear due to
fever. The public prosecutor then asked the court to
defer the further cross-examination of Juanito until he
recovered from his illness, and that he be allowed to
present his second witness, Apolonio Quilag. The
appellant did not object. The court granted the motion,
but warned the public prosecutor that if Juanito would
not appear to continue with his testimony by the next
trial date, his testimony would be stricken off the record.
However, such warning was not contained in the order
issued by the court on even date.
During the trial on May 22, 1995, the public prosecutor
manifested that he was ready to offer his documentary
evidence and rest his case thereafter. He offered in
evidence the affidavit of Juanito as part of his
documentary evidence. The appellant objected to the
admission of the affidavit for the purpose for which it
was offered. The court nevertheless admitted the
affidavit and the public prosecutor rested his case.
After trial, the court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Foregoing considered and in the light of
Prosecution witness Juanito Gutang's positive
identification and eyewitness account of the
killing, the Court is constrained and so finds the
Accused GUILTY of the crime of two counts of
Murder. Accordingly, Accused is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for
each count of Murder.
In convicting the appellant, the trial court relied on the
testimony of Apolonio and eyewitness Juanito Gutang,
which were corroborated by the medical findings
showing the nature and the location of the wounds
inflicted on the victims. The court brushed aside as
appellant. According to the court, such defenses could
not prevail over the positive identification made by
Juanito of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in not
ordering the striking out of the entire testimony
of the prosecution’s alleged eyewitness Juanito
Guyang anent the crime charged in view of his
unjustified failure to allow himself to be further
cross-examined.
RULING:
NO. Under Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution, the appellant has the right to meet the
witnesses against him face to face. Under Rule 115,
Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court, he has the right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at
the trial, a fundamental right which is part of due
process. However, the right of confrontation and cross-
examination is a personal one. It is not an absolute right
which a party can claim at all times.
In Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang
Pilipino, we ruled that the right to confront the witness
may be waived by the accused, expressly or impliedly.
The right of a party to confront and cross-
examine opposing witnesses in a judicial
litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in
proceedings before administrative tribunals with
quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right
which is part of due process. However, the right
is a personal one which may be waived,
expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to
a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.
Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to
cross-examine a witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or
allowed to remain in the record.
The conduct of a party which may be construed
as an implied waiver of the right to cross-
examine may take various forms. But the
common basic principle underlying the
application of the rule on implied waiver is that
the party was given the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine an opposing witness but
 failed to take advantage of it for reasons
attributable to himself alone.
In the later case of Fulgado v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that the task of recalling a witness for cross-
examination is imposed on the party who wishes to
exercise said right, and stressed that it should be the
opposing counsel who should move to cross-examine
the plaintiff's witness. Thus:
The task of recalling a witness for cross-
examination is, in law, imposed on the party
who wishes to exercise said right. This is so
because the right, being personal and waivable,
the intention to utilize it must be expressed.
Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to
a renunciation thereof. Thus, it should be the
counsel for the opposing party who should move
to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses. It is
absurd for the plaintiff himself to ask the court
to schedule the cross-examination of his own
witnesses because it is not his obligation to
ensure that his deponents are cross-examined.
Having presented his witnesses, the burden
shifts to his opponent who must now make the
appropriate move. Indeed, the rule of placing
the burden of the case on plaintiff's shoulders
can be construed to extremes as what happened
in the instant proceedings.
In this case, we are convinced that the appellant waived
his right to further cross-examine Juanito. The records
show that Juanito testified for the prosecution on direct
examination on November 22, 1994. Thereafter, the
appellant's counsel cross-examined the witness on the
corpus delicti. He then moved for a resetting as he still
had many questions to ask the witness. Juanito failed to
attend the trial on January 23, 1995 for the continuation
of his cross-examination because he had a fever. The
appellant did not object to the deferment of Juanito's
cross-examination; neither did he object to the public
prosecutor's presentation of Apolonio Quilag as its
second witness. The trial was reset to March 2, 1995 for
the continuation of Juanito's cross-examination. 39
However, no subpoena ad testificandum was issued to
Juanito for the said trial. There is, likewise, no showing
whether Juanito was in court on March 2, 1995 when
the case was called. Furthermore, the appellant did not
object when the public prosecutor presented PO2
Andales and Silvina Basalan as witnesses.
During the trial on April 17, 1995, the public prosecutor
manifested, following the stipulation of the parties on
the authenticity of Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr.'s necropsy
report, that he would be ready to rest his case by the
next trial. Again, the appellant did not call the attention
of the court on the fact that he had not yet finished his
cross-examination of Juanito. He did not ask to be
allowed to terminate the cross-examination of the
witness first before allowing the prosecution to rest its
case. Neither did the appellant ask the court to strike
Juanito's testimony on direct and cross-examination
from the records. When the case was called for trial on
May 22, 1995, the public prosecutor announced that he
had no more witness to present and was ready to
formally offer his documentary evidence. There was no
objection from the appellant. Neither did the appellant
object to the offer of Juanito's affidavit 40 as part of his
testimony, on the ground that he was deprived of his
right to complete his cross-examination of the said
witness. Moreover, when he testified, the appellant
disputed the testimony of Juanito that he killed the
victims, claiming that he was at home when the victims
were killed. The appellant adduced testimonial evidence
corroborating his alibi.
All the foregoing instances conclusively show that the
appellant had waived his right to further cross-examine
Juanito. From the conduct of the appellant's counsel, it
can be fairly inferred that he considered the initial cross-
examination of Juanito adequate, and that there was no
longer a need to further cross-examine the witness.
Cariaga vs. CA
G.R. No. 143561, June 6, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner, permanent driver of Davao Light and Power
Co. (DLPC), was charged with qualified theft. Evidence
for the prosecution disclosed that petitioner sold several
equipment and supplies kept in his truck to Florencio
Siton, an undercover agent hired by the respondent
company. Siton testified that his transactions with
petitioner were made thru Ricardo Cariaga, petitioner's
cousin, who acted as the latter's fence. Also submitted in
evidence was the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga,
which was attached to respondent company's position
paper in the illegal dismissal case pointing to petitioner
as the source of the pilfered materials. Though
subpoenaed once, Ricardo failed to testify. The sheriff
was informed by Ricardo's wife that he was in Sultan
Kudarat, a mere four (4) hour drive from Davao City.
The defense timely objected to the admissibility of the
sworn statement, but was overruled.
The trial court gave credence to Siton's testimony which
corroborated that of Ricardo Cariaga's sworn statement.
Judgment was rendered convicting petitioner as charged
with the aggravating circumstance of use of motor
vehicle. Conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Court
of Appeals.
Hence, this recourse assailing the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and the admissibility of the sworn
statement of Ricardo who did not testify in open court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the court erred in admitting in
evidence the sworn statement of Ricardo
Cariaga without him taking the witness stand
since it violates the fundamental right of the
accused to meet the witnesses against him face
to face.
RULING:
YES. In Toledo, Jr. vs. People, 7 this Court emphasized
that "the preconditions set forth in Section 47, Rule 130
for the admission of testimony given by a witness out of
court must be strictly complied with and that there is
more reason to adopt such a strict rule in the case of
Section 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a rule of
evidence with additional specific requisites to those
prescribed by Section 47, more importantly, said
provision is an implementing translation of the
constitutional right of an accused person "to meet the
witnesses (against him) face to face." In Tan vs. Court
of Appeals, 8 it was ruled that "'unable to testify' or for
that matter 'unavailability', does not cover the case of
witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. It
may refer to inability proceeding from a grave cause,
almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old
and has lost the power of speech. It does not refer to
tampering of witnesses."
The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was
subpoenaed only once and did not appear to testify in
the criminal case against petitioner. Concededly, this
witness was not deceased or out of the Philippines. In
fact, the private prosecutor informed the court that he is
in Sultan Kudarat, 9 and previously, his wife informed
the sheriff that he was in Sultan Kudarat which is in
Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from Davao City.
Against this backdrop, can this witness be categorized as
one that cannot be found despite due diligence,
unavailable or unable to testify. We are inclined to rule
in the negative and reverse the Court of Appeals on this
point.
It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied
with in criminal cases; hence, "mere sending of
subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove
inability to testify. The Court must exercise its coercive
power to arrest." 10 In the instant case, no efforts were
exerted to have the witness arrested which is a remedy
available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses
who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. On this score
alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga should
not have been admitted as evidence for the prosecution,
and we shall no longer delve into the other aspects of
this rule.
Jacob vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated
March 27, 2000 finding probable cause against several
public officers and private individuals, including
petitioners Monico V. Jacob (Jacob), President, and
Celso L. Legarda (Legarda), Vice-President and General
Manager for Marketing, both of Petron, for perpetrating
the so-called "tax credit scam."
Petitioners provided an undisputed account of the events
that subsequently took place before the Sandiganbayan:
On April 14, 2000, petitioners and the four other Petron
officers who were similarly charged filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation [with the Office of the Ombudsman].
On 17 April 2000, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division]
issued an Order giving the prosecution a period of sixty
(60) days within which –
… to re-assess its evidence in these cases and to take
appropriate action on the said motion for reconsideration
of accused movants and to inform the Court within the
same period as to its findings and recommendations
including the action thereon of the Honorable
Ombudsman.
Sixty (60) days passed but the Office of the Ombudsman
did not even bother to submit a report on the status of
the motions for reconsideration. Months passed, and
then, AN ENTIRE YEAR PASSED. There was still nothing
from the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
In the meantime, petitioner Jacob was arraigned on 1
June 2000 while petitioner Legarda was arraigned on 18
May 2001.
In all the hearings conducted in the cases the defense
verbally and consistently invoked their right to speedy
trial and moved for the dismissal of the cases. In the
course of more than one year, however, the
[Sandiganbayan 4th Division] kept affording the
prosecution one chance after another. The sixty days
granted to the prosecution became more than four
hundred days – still, there was no resolution in sight.
Justice Nario, as the Chairman of the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division, ordered the dismissal of all criminal
cases arising from the purported tax credit scam on the
ground that the accused, including petitioners, had
already been deprived of their right to a speedy trial and
disposition of the cases against them. Petitioners assert
that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
reversing Justice Nario’s order of dismissal of Criminal
Case Nos. 25922-25939 because such reversal violated
petitioners’ constitutional right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying petitioners’ right to
speedy trial.
RULING:
NO. An accused’s right to "have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section
14(2), Article III of the Constitution. This right to a
speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective"
being to assure that an innocent person may be free
from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation
and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he
may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the
evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old
legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-
repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an
accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a
speedy trial.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived
of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a
speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length
of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to
the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light
of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was
designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-
trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of
the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is
the last.
Irrefragably, there had been an undue and inordinate
delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of
the Ombudsman, which failed to submit its
reinvestigation report despite the lapse of the 60-day
period set by the Sandiganbayan, and even more than a
year thereafter.
Nevertheless, while the re-investigation by the Office of
the Ombudsman delayed the proceedings in Criminal
Case Nos. 25922-25939, the said process could not have
been dispensed with as it was undertaken for the
protection of the rights of petitioners themselves (and
their co-accused) and their rights should not be
compromised at the expense of expediency.
In Corpuz, we warned against the overzealous or
precipitate dismissal of a case that may enable the
defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without having
been tried, thereby infringing the societal interest in
trying people accused of crimes rather than granting
them immunization because of legal error.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth
Division that Justice Nario’s dismissal of the criminal
cases was unwarranted under the circumstances, since
the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its
right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of
the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
There can be no denying the fact that the petitioners, as
well as the other accused, was prejudiced by the delay
in the reinvestigation of the cases and the submission by
the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor of his report
thereon. So was the State. We have balanced the
societal interest involved in the cases and the need to
give substance to the petitioners’ constitutional rights
and their quest for justice, and we are convinced that
the dismissal of the cases is too drastic a remedy to be
accorded to the petitioners. The People has yet to prove
the guilt of the petitioners of the crimes charged beyond
reasonable doubt. We agree with the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan that before resorting to the extreme
sanction of depriving the petitioner a chance to prove its
case by dismissing the cases, the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor should be ordered by the Sandiganbayan
under pain of contempt, to explain the delay in the
submission of his report on his reinvestigation.