ANTI-HUMAN TRAFFICKING as evidence custodian, and PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Ariel Llanes (PO1 Llanes) as

poseur-customers and were given the marked money consisting of fifteen (15)
P100.00 bills.
[ G.R. No. 238889, October 03, 2018 ]

At the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes were approached by
Antonio Planteras, Jr., petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, respondent.
Marichu Tawi who offered girls for sexual favors for the price of P300.00 each. PO3
Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, along with three (3) girls, namely, BBB, CCC, DOD, then
went upstairs. PO3 Dumaguit requested the services of one more girl from Tawi. At
that time, Buhisan arrived and joined the on-going negotiation. Tawi left and when
DECISION
she returned, she brought with her a young girl, AAA. Petitioner was behind the
PERALTA, J.:
reception counter when the said negotiation took place and appeared to be listening
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
to the said transaction. PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes chose three (3) girls, one of
Court, dated May 18, 2018, of petitioner Antonio Planteras, Jr. that seeks to reverse
whom was AAA, and then handed over the marked money (P900.00) to Buhisan. The
and set aside the Decision dated April 24, 2017 and Resolution dated March 21,
police officers also gave P200.00 as "tip" for Tawi. After that, PO3 Dumaguit executed
2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02077, which affirmed the
the pre-arranged signal, a "missed call" on the rest of the team. When the rest of the
Decision dated November 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20,
team arrived at the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, PO3 Dumaguit announced that they are
Cebu City convicting the same petitioner of violation of Section 5, par. (a) of Republic
police officers and immediately thereafter, Buhisan, Tawi, petitioner and his wife,
Act (R.A.) No. 9208 or promoting trafficking in persons.
Christina, were arrested. PO3 Dumaguit retrieved the marked money from Buhisan,
and Tawi then handed it over to PO2 Almohallas. Consequently, the police officers
The facts follow.
brought the persons arrested to their office and turned over the girls who were
exploited to the DSWD.
P/S Int. Audie Villacin directed the elements of the Regional Investigation Detective
Division (RIDM) to conduct surveillance operations at xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, located
As a result, two (2) Informations were filed against Buhisan, Tawi, Christina and
along xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, after receiving reports sometime in the second week of
petitioner, thus:
March 2009, about the alleged trafficking in persons and sexual exploitation being
committed at the said place. On March 16, 2009, reports came in that pimps were
In Criminal Case No. CBU-86038 (against [petitioner] Planteras and Christina
indeed offering the sexual services of young girls to various customers at the
Planteras)
entrance/exit door of the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, owned by petitioner and his wife,
That on or about the 28th day of April 2009, and for sometime prior thereto, in the
Christina Planteras.
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with one
On March 19, 2009, PO3 Jose Erwin Dumaguit (PO3 Dumaguit) and PO1 Arnold another, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain, did then and there knowingly
Rusiana (PO1 Rusiana) conducted another surveillance. They proceeded to allow its establishment xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge located at xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, to
the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge armed with a concealed camera and at the said place, they be used for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons, that is, by allowing
were met by Marlyn Buhisan who offered girls for sex. The girls were made to line up BBB, CCC, DDD and AAA, a minor, 17 years old, to engage in prostitution in the
in front of the police officers. Thereafter, Buhisan led the police officers upstairs said establishment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
where they saw petitioner at the reception counter who appeared to be aware and
listening to the on-going negotiation. When PO1 Rusiana asked about the room rates,
petitioner informed him that the room charge is P40.00 per hour plus P50.00 for every
In Criminal Case No. CBU-86039 (against Buhisan and Tawi)
succeeding hour. After that, the police officers and the girls who were introduced to
That on or about the 28th day of April 2009, at about 10:00 p.m., in the City of Cebu,
them left the lodge for drinks within the vicinity of xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City.
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with
Subsequently, an entrapment operation was conducted on April 28, 2009 by deliberate intent, with intent of gain, did then and there recruit, transport and then
members of the Regional Special Investigation Unit, the Carbon Police maintain for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, or sexual exploitation four
Station, barangay tanods, and representatives from the Department of Social Welfare females, namely, DDD, CCC, BBB and one (1) of which is a child in the name of
and Development (DSWD). PO1 Hazal Tomongtong (PO1 Tomongtong) was AAA, 17 years old, with the qualifying aggravating circumstances:
assigned as the photographer and recorder, PO2 Linda Almohallas (PO2 Almohallas) 1. The trafficked persons are children; and
 2. That the crime is committed in large scale.
CONTRARY TO LAW
On arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused all pleaded "not guilty" to their
respective charges.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO3 Dumaguit and PO2 Almohallas.
The prosecution also presented the testimony of AAA to corroborate the testimonies
of the said police officers.
AAA, who was then 17 years old, testified that, in February 2009, while looking for her
sister at the vicinity of xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, she met Buhisan who inquired
whether she wanted money in exchange for her sexual services to customers. AAA
agreed and, thereafter. Buhisan would find customers for her. Upon instructions of
Buhisan, the latter would bring the customers to the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge where the
illicit activity will be consummated. AAA further narrated that she is familiar with Tawi,
who was also a prostitute. Tawi, according to AAA, on previous occasions, also acted
as a pimp for her. Each customer would pay Php300.00 for AAA's services. Of the
said rate, she receives only Php200.00, while the remainder is kept by either Buhisan
or Tawi as their commission.
Regarding petitioner, AAA said that he and his wife owned the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge
and that the spouses received payments for room charges and sold condoms at the
hotel. AAA further testified that on one occasion, after providing service to a
customer, petitioner offered her to another customer.
After the prosecution had rested its case, all the accused, including petitioner, filed a
Demurrer to Evidence. The Demurrer was granted, but only in favor of Christina
Planteras and, accordingly, the case against her was dismissed in an Order dated
January 21, 2013.
The defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi.
During trial, petitioner testified that he is the registered owner of
the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, and that on April 28, 2009, around 9 o'clock in the evening,
while he was watching television at the Lodge, three (3) males and three (3) females
went inside the same Lodge. Petitioner denied hearing the conversation that took
place among the 6 persons and claimed that his attention was fixed on the television
show. After a few minutes, petitioner noticed one of the women go down the stairs
and then went back with another girl. Thereafter, policemen arrived, searched the
area, and arrested him and his wife, Christina. Petitioner insisted that he does not
know Buhisan and Tawi.
Buhisan testified that she was merely a helper at the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, and that on
April 28, 2009, petitioner called her to assist four (4) guests who were accompanied
by Tawi. After Buhisan was able to prepare their rooms, she was requested by one of
the guests to find for them girls. for hire which she refused to do. Buhisan also
claimed that she declined the said request despite a promise of payment. However,
according to Buhisan, petitioner instructed her to collect the payment from the four (4)
guests which she complied. The customers gave her P200.00, but they immediately
took the payment back from her and was then immediately handcuffed and arrested.
Buhisan further testified that she knows AAA and the other girls in the Lodge that
night, because they frequently brought their customers to the New Perlito's Lodge.
Tawi, during her testimony, admitted that she was a sex worker and that she knows
AAA and Buhisan because they were engaged in the same activity. According to
Tawi, on April 28, 2009, upon the request ofPO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, she and
Buhisan introduced some girls to them. Tawi even offered her services in order to
earn money for herself, however on that same night, they were arrested by the police
officers.
The RTC rendered a Decision convicting petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of their respective charges, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. CBU-86039, the Court finds accused MARLYN BUHISAN
and MARICHU TAWI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
trafficking in persons in violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 9208, and hereby sentences each of them to life imprisonment. Each
accused is also ordered to pay fine in the amount of Two Million Pesos
(PhP2,000,000.00).
2. In Criminal Case No. CBU-86038, the Court finds accused ANTONIO
PLANTERAS, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of knowingly
allowing xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge to be used for the purpose of promoting trafficking in
persons of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9208, and hereby sentences him to a
prison term of Fifteen (15) Years and to pay [a] fine in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (PhP500,000.00).
The bail bond posted by accused Antonio Planteras, Jr. is hereby cancelled. Let a
warrant of arrest forthwith issue against accused Antonio Planteras, Jr.
SO ORDERED
Petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi, after their motion for reconsideration was denied by the
RTC, elevated the case to the CA. Eventually, the CA denied their appeals and
affirmed their convictions, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeals are DENIED. The Joint Decision
dated 10 November 2014, and the Order dated 17 April 2015, of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-
86038 and CBU-86039, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of petitioner
Planteras, Jr.
Petitioner raises the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS OF THE CASE
WHICH RESULTED TO ITS ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT THROUGH
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THE PROSECUTION HAS SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE TERM
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENT OF THE
LAW.
According to petitioner, there is no evidence that he was engaged in the trafficking of
women or that his acts would amount to the promotion of the trafficking of women. He
further argues that to be convicted of the charge against him, the offender must not
just be conscious of the fact that he or she is leasing the premises but that this
consciousness must extend to being aware that such acts promote the trafficking in
persons. Petitioner also claims that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to prove
the presence of criminal intent and cannot be said to have successfully overthrown
the constitutional presumption of innocence that he enjoyed. In addition, he avers that
the case against him is not a case against "trafficking in persons" within the meaning
and intent of the law.
The petition lacks merit.
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under Rule 45 This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of
fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on
the parties and upon this [c]ourt" when supported by substantial evidence. Factual
findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this
court.
However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to these rules
have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed
in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this court involving
civil, labor, tax, or criminal cases.
A question of fact requires this court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the
allegations of the parties. This review includes assessment of the "probative value of
the evidence presented."
There is also a question of fact when the issue presented before this court is the
correctness of the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by the
parties. In this case, petitioner asks this Court to review the evidence presented by
the prosecution. Clearly, this is not the role of this Court.
Nevertheless, granting that this Court shall review the factual incidents of this case,
the petition must still fail.
Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 9208, reads as follows:
Section 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. - The following acts, which
promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building or
establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons.
xxx
Under the above provisions of the law, in order for one to be convicted of the offense
of promoting trafficking in persons, the accused must (a) knowingly lease or sublease,
or allow to be used any house, building or establishment, and (b) such use of the
house, building or establishment is for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons.
Trafficking in persons is defined under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208, thus:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage
of the vulnerability of the person, or the giving, or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose
of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it
does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
Petitioner insists that there is no direct evidence that he knowingly allowed the use of
the New Perlito's Lodge as a place for the trafficking of persons. He further maintains
that he has no participation in the negotiation for the sexual services of, among
others, AAA and that he did not hear the conversation among the police officers,
Buhisan, and Tawi on April 28, 2009. He also contends that there was, in fact, no
human trafficking because AAA was not recruited to be a prostitute. As such,
according to petitioner, he is not guilty of promoting trafficking in persons. However,
this Court finds otherwise.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, still convicted petitioner of the crime charged
against him based on circumstantial evidence and the credibility of the testimonies of
the witnesses presented by the prosecution.
Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence with legal
consequences.
The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves the
relationship of the fact inferred to the facts that constitute the offense. Their difference
does not relate to the probative value of the evidence.
Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any inference.
Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, "indirectly proves a fact in issue, such
that the fact-finder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence."
The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to
circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court do not distinguish between "direct
evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact
may be inferred." The same quantum of evidence is still required. Courts must be
convinced that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which
it may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and
that the accused is its perpetrator. There is no requirement in our jurisdiction that only
direct evidence may convict. After all, evidence is always a matter of reasonable
inference from any fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference
is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.
Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that should
be established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a)There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt
The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt
may all be established by circumstantial evidence. The circumstances must be
considered as a whole and should create an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion
that the accused authored the crime.
The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding
of guilt is a qualitative test not a quantitative one. The proven circumstances must be
"consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."
The CA, therefore, did not err in finding that based on circumstantial evidence,
petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against him, thus:
Guided by the foregoing decisional and reglementary yardsticks, and based on the
evidence presented, We find that, through circumstantial evidence, the
prosecution has sufficiently established that the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, with the full
knowledge and permission of accused-appellant Planteras, was used for
promoting trafficking in persons. The material circumstances that led the Trial
Court to the same conclusion are as follows:
Admittedly, Antonio Jr. owns and manages the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge which is
engaged in the business of renting out rooms to lodgers/transients. It was issued
a Mayor's Business Permit and a Sanitary Permit. The evidence has established
that the pimps and prostitutes who hang around at the premises or sidewalk
outside xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge bring and engage their customers in sexual
intercourse at the said lodge. The customer pays Php50.00 per hour. The payment
is received by Antonio Jr. who stays at the counter or, at times, by his wife
Christina. This goes on night after night, various prostitutes, different customers.
Antonio Jr. cannot feign ignorance because he is always there. He sees it when
the negotiation or transaction takes place between the pimp, the prostitute and the
customer. Definitely, he knew that the lodge was being used for prostitution or
trafficking in persons and he allowed it. Yet, the most damning evidence against
Antonio Jr. was the testimony of AAA that at one time he requested her to
accommodate a customer for sex.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the negotiation between Marlyn, Marichu and the girls, on the one
hand, and the poseur customers (police), on the other, for the use of the girls for
sexual intercourse happened in the Lodge, right in the presence of Antonio Jr. Thus,
he knew it. If he did not approve of it or that it be done at the lodge, he could have
easily told them to go somewhere else. That he did nothing about it only means that
he acquiesced and consented to it as he has been wont to do.
Of the foregoing circumstances, We agree with the Trial Court that the most telling is
accused-appellant Planteras' own act of pimping in a not so distant past AAA herself.
This occasion was vividly narrated by AAA on the stand. This circumstance further
leads to the logical inference that accused-appellant Planteras knows AAA and her
trade. With accused appellant Planteras being only 1.5 m. from where the indecent
proposal was taking place among PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, on one hand, and
accused-appellants Buhisan and Tawi, on the other, the presence of AAA herself,
accused-appellant Planteras' feigned ignorance of the real nature of the transaction
taxes credulity too much.

The totality of these circumstances constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the
inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant Planteras, through his acts and
omissions, knew that the transaction happening within his hearing distance is for
prostitution, and he knowingly permitted the use of his establishment therefor.
We, therefore, find, as did the Trial Court, that the prosecution has, through
testimonial, documentary, and object evidence, overwhelmingly proved the elements
of Promoting Trafficking in Persons with moral certainty against accused-appellant
Plateras.
It is indisputable that petitioner owns and manages the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge. Evidence
was also presented to establish that the pimps, customers and prostitutes who hang
out near the said place utilize the same place for their illegal activities. Petitioner's
knowledge about the activities that are happening inside his establishment was also
properly established by the prosecution, most notably, through the testimony of AAA,
thus:
ATTY. INOCENCIO, JR. (to witness)
Q: You also testified earlier, AAA, that there was one occasion where Antonio
Planteras also provided you or gave you a customer, can you still recall that
incident?
AAA: (witness)
A: I cannot recall the date, but I can remember that it happened.
Q: And so can you tell us where were you at that time when you said that Antonio
Planteras gave you a customer?
A: I had just came out from (sic) the room.
Q: Why did you came (sic) out of the room?
A: I had just finished having sexual intercourse.
Q: And how did you come to meet your customer at that time?
A: It was him who approached me.
Q: And so what happened next after you came out of the room at that time?
A: When I came out of the room, Antonio Planteras called me and he requested
me to have sexual intercourse with the customer, because in the past the woman
of that customer always leave him.
Q: And who said that to you again, AAA?
A: Antonio Planteras.
COURT: (to witness)
Q: Did you agree to this request?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: In effect, did you have sexual intercourse with that customer who was offered
to you by Antonio Planteras?
A: Yes, you Honor.
It must be remembered that, "[n]o general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and
with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt." In this case, the totality of the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution prove beyond reasonable
ground that petitioner allowed the use of his establishment in the promotion of
trafficking in persons.
Also, it has been maintained in a catena of cases that when the issues involve
matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
effect. The assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. These factors are the most significant in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
The factual findings of the RTC, therefore, are accorded the highest degree of respect
especially if the CA adopted and confirmed these, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight were overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted as to
materially affect the disposition of the case. In the absence of substantial reason to
justify the reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, as when no
significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings.
As to the claim of petitioner that AAA freely engaged in prostitution, thus, no
trafficking in person was committed, such is unmeritorious. Knowledge or consent of
the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208. The victim's consent is
rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by
perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
This Court further finds it proper to award P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim, AAA. These amounts are in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Casio, where this Court held that:
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary
damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
 (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; and
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
xxx xxx xxx

The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the

crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated May 18, 2018, of petitioner Antonio Planteras, Jr. is DENIED for lack of
merit. Consequently, the Decision dated April 24, 2017 and the Resolution March 21,
2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02077 are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that petitioner is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of
P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 234018, June 06, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. EVANGELINE DE
DIOS Y BARRETO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision dated May 12, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07879, which affirmed the Decision dated
October 26, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 192 of Marikina City,
finding accused-appellant Evangeline De Dios y Barreto (De Dios) guilty for violation
of Section 3 (a), in relation to Section 6 (a), of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208,
otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, as amended by R.A.
No. 10364.
De Dios was accused of trafficking in persons punishable under Section 4 (a), in
relation to Sections 3(a) and 6(a) of R.A. No. 9208, as portion that reads:
That on or about the 29th day of August 2013, in the City of Marikina, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused EVANGELINE DE
DIOS y BARRETO, by means of coercion, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of their vulnerability, for the purpose of exploitation,
such as prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit and harbor, XXX[3], 18 years old, YYY,
23 years old, and AAA, a minor (16 years old), to engage in or perform sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with different customers upon a monetary
consideration, to the damage and prejudice of the said victims.
That the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of minority,
complainant AAA being 16 years of age, and committed in large scale.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, De Dios pleaded not guilty to the charge. After pre-trial, trial on the
merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
AAA, who was born on October 21, 1996 , was only 16 years old when she was
peddled for sexual trade by De Dios on the evening of August 29, 2013 to Rugielito
Gay (Gay) and two other male customers in Marikina City, near the Marikina River
Park. De Dios approached Gay and as she introduced herself as "Vangie," asked him
"kung gusto ko daw ba gumimik?” She explained that "gimik" meant having sex with a
girl for P500.00. Negotiations ensued between Gay and De Dios, who claimed to
have three girls with her. When De Dios refused to lower the price to P300.00, Gay
handed to her the amount of P500.00; De Dios then called three girls who were
standing by steel railings. Gay was allowed to choose from among the girls, and then
selected AAA.
It turned out that Gay and his companions were mere poseur customers, and that De
Dios was the subject of an entrapment operation of the Anti-Human Trafficking
Division (AHTRAD) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Prior to the
operation, there was already information received by the NBI-AHTRAD that De Dios
was peddling minors for sexual trade under the bridge at the Marikina River Park. The
information was validated via a surveillance operation made by members of the
agency, which then prompted the conduct of the entrapment operation on August 29,
2013.
After the entrapment, Gay, who was actually an Intelligence Agent of the Department
of Justice (DOJ) – Inter Agency Council Against Trafficking (IACAT), brought AAA to
an area where personnel of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) was waiting, and then to the AHTRAD for investigation.
The accusation against De Dios was confirmed by minor AAA when she testified for
the prosecution during the trial. She claimed to have known De Dios through her best
friend, one Nicole, who also worked for De Dios in the latter's illegal activity.
Sometime in May 2012, AAA had her first "gimik" with De Dios' male customer who
brought her to a hotel in Antipolo City and there he had sexual intercourse with her.
From then on, AAA worked for De Dios and had sex with several other male
customers. She received P400.00 from De Dios for every transaction.
On the night of the entrapment, De Dios invited AAA for a friend's despedida party at
Lola Helen's Panciteria. Also present for the occasion were BBB, XXX, YYY, ZZZ,
KKK and MMM. From there, they proceeded to the park under the Marikina bridge,
where they saw De Dios approach two men and ask, "Kuya, gigimik kayo?" The men
replied, "Nasaan yung babae mo?'' De Dios then pointed at AAA, XXX and YYY. One
man chose AAA and then gave P700.00 to De Dios. Thereafter, AAA and her
customer took a tricycle to a McDonald's restaurant, where NBI and DSWD personnel
took custody of AAA.
Version of the Defense
Only De Dios testified for the defense. She claimed to have lived near the bridge in
Sto Nino, Marikina City since 2008, until she moved to Rodriguez, Rizal in 2011. On
August 29, 2013, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, she dined at Sienes
Panciteria in Barangay Sto. Nino, Marikina City upon the invitation of a friend named
Jay. On her way to the restaurant, she saw AAA, XXX, YYY and other companions.
AAA told De Dios that she was hungry, and so her group joined De Dios to the
restaurant.
De Dios knew AAA, XXX and YYY as they used to regularly hang out by the bridge,
where AAA, XXX and YYY looked for customers. Since her relocation to Rodriguez,
Rizal, De Dios stopped hanging out in the area, and would visit Sto. Nino only to visit
their old house.

Ruling of the RTC
On October 26, 2015, the trial court rendered judgment finding De Dios guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified trafficking in persons. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, EVANGELINE DE DIOS y
BARRETO, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons under Section 3 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) of Republic Act 9208 as
amended by Republic act 10364. The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and PAY a FINE of TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00). The accused is also ORDERED to pay moral damages of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos [(P500,000.00)] and exemplary damages of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) .
SO ORDERED.
Feeling aggrieved, De Dios appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On May 12, 2017, the CA rendered its Decision that affirmed the conviction of De
Dios. The decretal portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated October 26, 2015 in Criminal Case No. 2013-15282-
MK, is hereby AFFIRMED.
The accused-appellant EVANGELINE DEDIOS y BARRETO, is GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 3 (a) in
relation to Section 6 (a) of Republic Act 9208 as amended by Republic Act 10364
pursuant to Section 10 (c) thereof The accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and pay a fine of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00). The accused-appellant is also ORDERED to pay moral damages
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). Exemplary damages of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) is likewise ORDERED to be paid the
private complainant.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
The Present Appeal
In a Resolution dated November 29, 2017, the Court required the parties to submit
their respective supplemental briefs, should they so desire, within 30 days from
notice. Both De Dios and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel of
plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, however manifested that they would no
longer file supplemental briefs and instead asked the Court to consider the briefs that
they respectively filed with the CA.
De Dios insists on an acquittal, as she claims that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that she was guilty of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons under Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 9208. AAA voluntarily peddled herself near
the Marikina bridge for sexual services. De Dios was regularly seen in the area but
only because her house was situated under the bridge.[19] There was no threat, force,
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or abuse of power that was established in the
case. The activities of AAA were never under the monitor or control of De Dios.
This Court's Ruling
The Court dismisses the appeal. It affirms the conviction of De Dios for the crime of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 3(a), in relation to Section 6(a), of R.A.
No. 9208, as amended by R.A. No. 10364.
Contrary to the contentions of De Dios, the prosecution was able to sufficiently
establish the crime's commission. Pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9208, being the
law that defines the crime of Trafficking in Persons, read as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by
means of threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the
purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum,
the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring
or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation
shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons"
even if it does not involve any of the means set forth
in the preceding paragraph.
(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years
of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable
to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.
(c) Prostitution - refers to any act, transaction, scheme
or design involving the use of a person by another,
for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in
exchange for money, profit or any other
consideration.
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as
qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
 xxxx
Section 10(c) of the statute sets the applicable penalties for the crime,
particularly:
Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and sanctions are
hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:
xxxx
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (5,000,000.00)[.]
In People vs. Hirang, the Court reiterated the following elements of the offense,
as derived from Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring,
or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders";
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or abuse
of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of
the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another"; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes
"exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs."
AAA directly explained the participation of De Dios in her prostitution even prior to the
subject entrapment. De Dios convinced her to join the "gimiks" for the money. She
was first lured to prostitution in May 2012, when De Dios offered her to a male
customer and paid her P400.00 for the transaction. Several other transactions
transpired thereafter. De Dios would transact with the customers and then pay AAA
each time for her service.
It did not matter that there was no threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception
or abuse of power that was employed by De Dios when she involved AAA in her illicit
sexual trade. AAA was still a minor when she was exposed to prostitution by the
prodding, promises and acts of De Dios. Trafficking in persons may be committed
also by means of taking advantage of the persons' vulnerability as minors, a
circumstance that applied to AAA, was sufficiently alleged in the information and
proved during the trial. This element was further achieved through the offer of
financial gain for the illicit services that were provided by AAA to the customers of De
Dios.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 12, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07879 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
——o0o——

In this case, the trial and appellate courts gave the same factual findings that
established the foregoing. The prosecution witnesses who testified during the trial
included the minor child AAA, Special Investigator Doriente Durian of the NBI-
AHTRAD and Intelligence Agent Gay of the DOJ-IACAT, whose testimonies matched
as to how De Dios committed the crime on the evening of August 29, 2013. AAA, then
still a minor, was among the girls offered in the illicit sexual trade upon the promise of
financial gain for their services. The conduct of the entrapment operation became the
culmination of a surveillance operation that was conducted by the NBI-AHTRAD. It
was De Dios who approached and proposed a "gimik" to Gay, and when the latter
pretended to accede to the proposal, De Dios readily accepted prepared marked
money as consideration for the service.

As against the solid evidence presented by the prosecution, only De Dios testified for
her defense. Her denial, however, was uncorroborated and weak. It could not
overcome the weight of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, especially those given
by the investigator of NBI-AHTRAD and the agent of DOJ-IACAT. Their respective
accounts pertained to the discharge of their official functions presumed under the law
to have been regularly performed. They also did not appear to have any motive to
falsely testify against De Dios.
 G.R. No. 223528. January 11, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JEFFREY
HIRANG y RODRIGUEZ, defendant-appellant.
Criminal Law; Trafficking in Persons; Elements of.—In People v. Casio, 744 SCRA 113
(2014), the Court defined the elements of trafficking in persons, as derived from the aforequoted
Section 3(a), to wit: (1) The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt
of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders”;
(2) The means used which include “threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another”; and (3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes
“exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.”
Same; Same; Qualified Trafficking in Persons; Pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking, as it was committed in a large
scale and his four (4) victims were under eighteen (18) years of age.—The information filed
against Hirang sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation of the minor victims for
sexual activities and exploitation, with the offender taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
young girls through the guarantee of a good time and financial gain. Pursuant to Section 6 of
R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking, as it was committed in a
large scale and his four victims were under 18 years of age. The presence of the crime’s
elements was established by the prosecution witnesses who testified during the trial. The young
victims themselves testified on their respective ages, and how they were lured by Hirang to
participate in the latter’s illicit sex trade. Hirang recruited the girls to become victims of sexual
abuse and exploitation. Mainly upon a promise of financial benefit, the girls agreed and, thus,
joined him on June 27, 2007 in meeting with the Korean customers in search for prostitutes.
Police authorities personally, witnessed Hirang’s unlawful activity, as they conducted the
entrapment operations and arrested him after Hirang transacted with the supposed customers
and received payment therefor.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled time
and again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are
to be given the highest respect.—Hirang still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution
witnesses’ testimonies were conflicting and improbable. Such alleged inconsistencies pertained
to the supposed participation of Ka Lolet in the recruitment of the victims, how the IJM agents
came to personally know of Hirang, and other incidents that involved prior surveillance and the
entrapment operation itself. It is evident, however, that the supposed inconsistencies in the
witnesses’ testimonies pertained to minor details that, in any case, could not negate Hirang’s
unlawful activity and violation of R.A. No. 9208. Moreover, the Court has ruled time and again
that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the
probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to
be given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already
passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.
Criminal Law; Entrapment; Entrapment is an acceptable means to capture a
wrongdoer.—Hirang argued that he was merely instigated to commit the offense, but even such
defense deserves scant consideration. It has been established by the prosecution that Hirang
has been engaged in the illegal activities leading young women to prostitution, and the police
officers merely employed means for his capture. Trafficking of women was his habitual trade; he
was merely entrapped by authorities. Entrapment is an acceptable means to capture a
wrongdoer.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Any defect in the arrest of the accused was
cured by his voluntary act of entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the
issue.—Even as the Court considers the alleged failure of the apprehending police officers to
inform Hirang of the Miranda rights upon his arrest, there is no sufficient ground for the Court to
acquit him. The CA correctly explained that any defect in the arrest of the accused was cured by
his voluntary act of entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the issue.
In People v. Vasquez, 714 SCRA 78 (2014), the Court held: [T]he Court rules that the appellant
can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582
(2003), that “[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission
to the trial court’s jurisdiction.”
Criminal Law; Trafficking in Persons; Qualified Trafficking in Persons; Penalties; The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals (CA) correctly imposed the penalty of life
imprisonment and fine of two million pesos (P2,000,000.00), applying Section 10(c) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 9208.—There is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse Hirang’s conviction for
qualified trafficking under R.A. No. 9208. The RTC and CA correctly imposed the penalty of life
imprisonment and fine of P2,000,000.00, applying Section 10(c) of R.A. No. 9208, to
wit: Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions.—The following penalties and sanctions are hereby
established for the offenses enumerated in this Act: x x x x (c) Any person found guilty of
qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos
(5,000,000.00)[.]
Same; Same; Damages; In line with prevailing jurisprudence, each victim is entitled to five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages, and one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) as exemplary damages.—Damages in favor of the victims should, however, also
be awarded. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, each victim is entitled to P500,000.00 as moral
damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. This is supported by Article 2219 of the
New Civil Code, which reads: Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or
concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or
any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10)
Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35. x x x x The criminal
case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction,
abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse, thereby justifying the award of moral
damages. When the crime is aggravated, the award of exemplary damages is also justified.
 REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated March 9, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05129, which affirmed the conviction of defendant-
appellant Jeffrey Hirang y Rodriguez (Hirang) for violation of Section 6 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9208, otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
The Facts
Hirang, also known as Jojit and Jojie, was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City with the crime of qualified trafficking in persons, as defined
and penalized under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a),
(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9208, via an Amended Information that reads:
That on or about June 27, 2007, at Taguig City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruited, transported and provided in a large
scale minors [AAA],3 17 years old, [BBB], 17 years old, [CCC], 14 years old
and [DDD], 17 years old, for the purpose of prostitution by taking advantage
of their vulnerability as young girls through promise of a good time or “gimik” in a
disco and good food if they would simply accompany him in meeting and
entertaining his Korean friends and to induce their full consent further promise
them Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) to Ten Thousand Pesos
(Php10,000.00) each afterwards when in truth and in fact peddled them for sexual
favors and pleasure in consideration of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00)
each and engaged their services in prostitution as in fact he already received
Seven Thousand Pesos downpayment from the Korean national who engaged
their services.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis and underlining in the original)
Upon arraignment, Hirang entered a plea of not guilty. After pretrial, trial on the
merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The private complainants are minor victims of Hirang in his prostitution activities.
The following persons testified for the prosecution: victims DDD, AAA, CCC and BBB,
International Justice Mission (IJM) Investigators Alvin Sarmiento (Sarmiento) and
Jeffrey Villagracia (Villagracia), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special
Investigator (SI) Menandro Cariaga (Cariaga), SI Anson L. Chumacera and forensic
chemist Loren J. Briones.
AAA was born on November 25, 1989. She was only 16 years old when Hirang
recruited her in August of 2006 as a sex worker, for which she was paid P1,000.00
per day, less Hirang’s commission of P200.00. She was later prodded to work as a
sexy dancer and prostitute at the Catwalk Club along Quezon Avenue. She joined her
customers in their tables at the club, and gave sexual services in hotels. She left the
club after two nights, upon her live-in partner’s order. Still, Hirang sourced several
other prostitution jobs for AAA. He convinced AAA to work in a cybersex den in
Muñoz, Quezon City. She received P700.00 a month, less P200.00 commission
received by Hirang. In September 2006, Hirang made AAA work again as a sexy
dancer at Philippine Village bar in Puerto Galera. AAA had to quit her job when she
got pregnant, but resumed work for Hirang after she gave birth.
CCC was born on December 19, 1992. She was 14 years old when she was
recruited by Hirang for his illicit activities. She met Hirang at the house of Ka Lolet,
her best friend’s mother. She knew Hirang to be scouting young girls who could be
traded for sex. Sometime in June 2007, Hirang asked CCC to go with him and meet
some Koreans.
DDD, who was born on February 11, 1991, was 16 years old when she ran away
from home in 2007 and stayed at a friend’s house in Sta. Ana, Taguig City. As she
was then in need of money, she accepted an offer from one Ate Lolet, a pimp, that
she be introduced to a male customer, with whom she had sexual intercourse for
P2,500.00. It was Ate Lolet who later introduced DDD to Hirang.
BBB was born on March 28, 1990. CCC is her younger sister. She was 17 years
old when on June 27, 2007, she visited CCC at Ka Lolet’s house. There she saw
Hirang, who invited her to come with him in meeting some Koreans that evening.
Later in the evening, at around 8:00 p.m., BBB went back to the house of Ka Lolet to
meet Hirang. It was then on June 27, 2007 that Hirang sold BBB, along with AAA,
CCC and DDD, to his Korean customers for sexual activities. Hirang told his victims
that they would receive P5,000.00 after a “gimik” with them. At around 10:00 p.m.,
their group proceeded to meet with the Koreans at Chowking restaurant, C-5 in
Taguig City. Hirang instructed the girls to tell the Koreans that they were 16 years of
age, as this was their customers’ preference.
When their group arrived at Chowking, Hirang talked to a Korean and then
introduced the girls to him. The Korean handed money to Hirang and as the latter was
counting it, NBI agents arrived at the scene and announced a raid. NBI agents
arrested Hirang, while a social worker approached the girls and brought them to the
NBI for their statements.
The raid was conducted following a prior investigation conducted by IJM, a
nonprofit organization that renders legal services and is based in Washington, D.C.
IJM’s investigators Sarmiento and Villagracia gathered data on human trafficking in
Metro Manila, after information that Hirang was selling minors for prostitution. Hirang
was introduced by a confidential informant to Villagracia, who posed as a travel
agency employee having Korean friends. Villagracia claimed to have Korean friends
as they knew Hirang to be transacting only with foreign customers.
Hirang and Villagracia first agreed to meet on June 20, 2007 at Chowking
restaurant along C-5 Road in Taguig City. Villagracia introduced Hirang to Sarmiento,
who introduced himself as Korean national studying English in Manila. Hirang
informed Sarmiento that he had with him AAA, who was good in bed, only 15 years
old and could perform any sexual position, for a fee of P20,000.00. Sarmiento,
however, told Hirang that he and his other Korean friends had other plans for the
night. Hirang demanded a cancellation fee of P1,500.00 and scheduled another
meeting with Sarmiento and the other Koreans on June 26, 2007.
Thereafter, IJM submitted a report to the NBI-Field Office Division, and asked for
the agency’s investigative assistance and operation against Hirang. On June 26,
2007, IJM and NBI operatives agreed during a conference that they would conduct an
entrapment operation on June 27, 2007. Sarmiento reset his meeting with Hirang to
June 27, 2007. Hirang initially got mad, but was appeased after Sarmiento promised
to give a bonus of P20,0000.00. Cariaga prepared the marked money to be used
during the entrapment, and was tasked to be the driver of poseur-customer
Sarmiento. Several other NBI and IJM agents served as backup during the operation,
in case any untoward incident should happen.
On June 27, 2007, the entrapment was conducted with proper coordination with
local authorities. A social worker from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development and members of the media for the segment XXX of ABS-CBN Channel
2 joined the operation. Villagracia secretly recorded his conversation with Hirang.
Hirang introduced AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD to Sarmiento, who feigned his
desire to pursue the transaction. Hirang specified the sexual services that the girls
could offer, and assured Sarmiento that the girls could fulfill their customers’ sexual
fantasies. Sarmiento then handed to Hirang a fictitious check amounting to
P20,000.00, while Cariaga handed the P7,000.00 marked money. As Hirang was
counting the cash, he complained that the amount was not enough as he charged
P20,000.00 per girl, plus bonus. At this point, Cariaga performed the prearranged
signal with NBI operatives, who declared the entrapment operation and arrested
Hirang. An ultraviolet dust examination later performed upon Hirang rendered positive
result for fluorescent powder specks.
Version of the Defense
Hirang and his mother Myrna Hirang (Myrna) testified for the defense.
Hirang claimed to be self-employed, selling longganisa and other wares for a
living. He denied dealing with sexual trade. It was upon the instigation of Villagracia,
who was introduced to him by his friend Jun Valentin (Valentin), that he agreed to
bring the girls for the supposed Korean clients. Hirang described Villagracia as a drug
addict who frequently visited Valentin’s house for pot sessions. Villagracia told Hirang
that he knew of Koreans looking for girls and were willing to pay P20,000.00 to
P25,000.00 for each girl who must be 13 to 14 years old.
On June 20, 2007, Hirang, Valentin and two girls went to meet up with Villagracia
at Chowking in C-5 Road, but the Koreans cancelled the transaction. Villagracia was
disappointed that the girls brought by Hirang were already 23 years old. They agreed
to meet again, but Villagracia reminded Hirang to bring young girls next time. Hirang
promised to do so, and then received P500.00 from Villagracia.
When they later talked again over the telephone, Villagracia advised Hirang to
convince the Koreans to hire the girls so that Hirang and Valentin could receive the
P5,000.00 commission per girl. Another Korean promised to give a bonus of
P10,000.00 if Hirang could provide young girls. Since Hirang claimed to have no girls
for the service, he went to the house of Ka Lolet with whom he had previously
transacted whenever he needed girls for sexual services. Ka Lolet provided BBB,
CCC and DDD, while Hirang personally talked to AAA. Hirang and Ka Lolet agreed to
give each girl P5,000.00, while a P5,000.00 commission for each girl would be
divided among him, Ka Lolet, Villagracia and Valentin.
Hirang and Villagracia met again on June 26, 2007 at Valentin’s house.
Villagracia reminded Hirang that the girls should be young. He also gave instructions
on the dresses that the girls should wear during their meeting. On the evening of June
27, 2007, Hirang went to Ka Lolet’s house and from there, brought the girls to
Chowking in C-5 Road onboard a van provided by Ka Lolet. One Korean national
gave Hirang money for their food. As their order was being served at the restaurant,
NBI operatives approached Hirang and arrested him.
In her testimony, defense witness Myrna claimed knowing Villagracia, as the latter
frequently talked to Hirang over the cellphone. There were times that she answered
Villagracia’s calls, and the latter introduced himself as a friend of Hirang with whom
he had an arrangement.
Ruling of the RTC
On June 25, 2011, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station
rendered its Decision convicting Hirang of the crime of human trafficking. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, [HIRANG] is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Violation of Section 6 of [R.A.] No. 9208 and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos
(Php2,000,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Feeling aggrieved, Hirang appealed to the CA based on the following assignment
of errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING [HIRANG’S]
DEFENSE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
CONFLICTING AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
 III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [HIRANG’S]
RIGHTS UNDER [R.A.] NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS
OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING,
DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE VIOLATED.
Ruling of the CA
The CA denied the appeal via a Decision dated March 9, 2015, with dispositive
portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 25, 2011 of
the [RTC] of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station in Criminal Case No.
135682 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
The Present Appeal
On June 13, 2016, the Court issued a Resolution notifying the parties that they
could file their respective supplemental briefs. However, both Hirang and the Office of
the Solicitor General, as counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines,
manifested that they would no longer file supplemental briefs, as their respective
briefs filed with the CA sufficiently addressed their particular arguments.
Based on the parties’ contentions as raised before the CA, the Court is called
upon to resolve the following issues: (1) whether the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Hirang for the crime charged; and (2) whether
Hirang should be acquitted in view of the failure of the arresting officers to observe
R.A. No. 7438.
Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms Hirang’s conviction.
Hirang was charged and convicted for qualified trafficking in persons under
Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a), (b) and (c) of R.A.
No. 9208, which read:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons.—It shall be unlawful for any
person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by
any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons.—The following are
considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
xxxx
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale.
Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group;
Section 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, transportation,
transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a
minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for
the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as “trafficking in persons”
even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
(b) Child – refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who
is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition.
(c) Prostitution – refers to any act, transaction, scheme or design involving
the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in
exchange for money, profit or any other consideration.
In People v. Casio, the Court defined the elements of trafficking in persons, as
derived from the aforequoted Section 3(a), to wit:
(1) The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders”;
(2) The means used which include “threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another”; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes “exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.” (Citation omitted
and italics in the original)
The information filed against Hirang sufficiently alleged the recruitment and
transportation of the minor victims for sexual activities and exploitation, with the
offender taking advantage of the vulnerability of the young girls through the guarantee
of a good time and financial gain. Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime
committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking, as it was committed in a large scale
and his four victims were under 18 years of age.
The presence of the crime’s elements was established by the prosecution
witnesses who testified during the trial. The young victims themselves testified on
their respective ages, and how they were lured by Hirang to participate in the latter’s
illicit sex trade. Hirang recruited the girls to become victims of sexual abuse and
exploitation. Mainly upon a promise of financial benefit, the girls agreed and, thus,
joined him on June 27, 2007 in meeting with the Korean customers in search for
prostitutes. Police authorities personally, witnessed Hirang’s unlawful activity, as they
conducted the entrapment operations and arrested him after Hirang transacted with
the supposed customers and received payment therefor.
Hirang still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution witnesses’
testimonies were conflicting and improbable. Such alleged inconsistencies pertained
to the supposed participation of Ka Lolet in the recruitment of the victims, how the IJM
agents came to personally know of Hirang, and other incidents that involved prior
surveillance and the entrapment operation itself. It is evident, however, that the
supposed inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies pertained to minor details
that, in any case, could not negate Hirang’s unlawful activity and violation of R.A. No.
9208. Moreover, the Court has ruled time and again that factual findings of the trial
court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the
highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed
on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.
Hirang argued that he was merely instigated to commit the offense, but even such
defense deserves scant consideration. It has been established by the prosecution
that Hirang has been engaged in the illegal activities leading young women to
prostitution, and the police officers merely employed means for his capture.
Trafficking of women was his habitual trade; he was merely entrapped by authorities.
Entrapment is an acceptable means to capture a wrongdoer. In People v. Bartolome,
the Court distinguished between entrapment and instigation, as it explained:
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of
the offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is
the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing
a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce,
instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would
otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of
the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of
the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his
or her conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the
accused will have to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and
conviction. As has been said, instigation is a “trap for the unwary innocent” while
entrapment is a “trap for the unwary criminal.”
In this case, it was established during trial that Hirang had been recruiting and
deploying young girls for customers in the sex trade. The IJM personnel approached
him for girls precisely because of his illicit activities. Also, Hirang was not first
approached for prostitutes by police or government authorities, but by investigators of
IJM, which is a nonprofit and nongovernmental organization. IJM only sought
coordination with the police officers after Hirang, Sarmiento and Villagracia had
determined to meet on June 27, 2007 for the transaction with the purported Korean
customers. Clearly, there could be no instigation by officers, as barred by law, to
speak of.
Even as the Court considers the alleged failure of the apprehending police
officers to inform Hirang of the Miranda rights upon his arrest, there is no sufficient
ground for the Court to acquit him. The CA correctly explained that any defect in the
arrest of the accused was cured by his voluntary act of entering a plea and
participating in the trial without raising the issue. In People v. Vasquez, the Court held:
[T]he Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest.
We reiterated in People v. Tampis that [a]ny objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on
arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against
them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the
legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission
to the trial court’s jurisdiction. x x x. (Citations omitted)
Given the foregoing, there is no cogent reason for the Court to reverse Hirang’s
conviction for qualified trafficking under R.A. No. 9208. The RTC and CA correctly
imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P2,000,000.00, applying Section
10(c) of R.A. No. 9208, to wit:
Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions.—The following penalties and
sanctions are hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:
xxxx
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (5,000,000.00)[.]
Damages in favor of the victims should, however, also be awarded. In line with
prevailing jurisprudence, each victim is entitled to P500,000.00 as moral damages,
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. This is supported by Article 2219 of the
New Civil Code, which reads:
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
 (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
xxxx

The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case

to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is
worse, thereby justifying the award of moral damages. When the crime is aggravated,
the award of exemplary damages is also justified.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 9, 2015 of

the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05129
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that victims AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD are
each entitled to P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of
trafficking in persons is qualified. (People vs. Casio, 744 SCRA 113 [2014])

Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been
expanded. (Id.)

——o0o——
 [ G.R. No. 218806, June 13, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLORIA NANGCAS
accused-appellant.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
For review is the Decision dated 6 March 2015, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CRHC No. 01092-MIN, which affirmed in toto the Decision, dated 8 October
2012, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, 10th Judicial
Region, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. FC-2009-643, finding herein accused-
appellant Gloria Nangcas (Nangcas) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 in relation to Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 9208, committed against AAA, BBB, CCC, and Judith Singane (Judith), and
imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000.000.00).
THE FACTS
Accused-appellant was charged for Violation of Republic Act No. 9208 or the "Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" per the Information, dated 24 September 2009,
which reads:
"That on 22 March 2009 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and thereafter,
commencing in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully recruit, transport, transfer, harbor and provide four (4) women, namely,
fourteen (14) year-old [AAA], thirteen (13) year-old [BBB], seventeen (17) year-old
[CCC] and nineteen (19) year-old Judith Singane, by means of fraud, deception,
or taking advantage of the vulnerability of said victims for the purpose of offering
and selling said victims for forced labor, slavery or involuntary servitude, that is, by
promising them local employment (as househelpers in Camella Homes, Upper
Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City) with a monthly salary of PhP1,500.00 each and
that they could go home every Sunday, but instead, said accused brought them to
Marawi City and sold them for PhP1,600.00 each to their great damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 4, in relation to Section 6, of Republic Act
No. 9208.
By virtue of the Warrant dated 18 December 2009, Nangcas was arrested and
committed to the jurisdiction of the court a quo on 13 January 2010. With the
assistance of her counsel, Nangcas pleaded "not guilty" to the offense
charged.
The Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented Judith, AAA, BBB, P/Insp. Exodio Vidal, and Enerio
Singane (Enerio) as witnesses. Their testimonies, taken together, tended to
establish the following:
On 22 March 2009, at around three o'clock in the afternoon, Judith was with
AAA at xxx when they saw her uncle Junjun Singane and aunt Marites Simene
with Nangcas. The latter approached them and asked if they wanted to
work.[11] Judith, being interested, brought Nangcas to her house to ask
permission from her parents. Nangcas informed Judith's parents that the latter
would be working as a house helper at Camella Homes in Cagayan de Oro
City, with a salary of P1,500.00 per month and with a rest day every Sunday.
Judith's father, Enerio, was adamant at first, but Judith insisted because of the
salary Nangcas offered and the location of the employer was nearby at
Camella Homes; hence, Enerio gave his consent. Thereafter, Judith had her
things all ready and went with Nangcas. Nangcas, on the other hand, left her
cellphone number with Enerio.
Since AAA, who was only fourteen (14) years old then, showed interest in
Nangcas' proposition, the latter then proceeded to AAA's residence to meet
her parents. There, Nangcas also met CCC, AAA's sister, who was only
seventeen years old at that time. CCC also expressed her interest to work as a
house helper. Nangcas explained to AAA and CCC's parents that both would
be working as house helpers at Camella Homes in Cagayan de Oro, with a
salary of P1,500.00 each. The father of the two girls rejected the idea since he
could still manage to support them. Their mother was also apprehensive that
her daughters might be brought to Marawi. However, since AAA and CCC
were very much interested and Nangcas assured their parents that they would
only work at Camella Homes, the parents eventually agreed, thinking that both
their daughters would be within each other's reach as they would both be
working at Camella Homes. Thereafter, Judith, AAA, CCC, and Nangcas
proceeded to the house of BBB, a cousin of AAA and CCC, to inform her of the
job offer.
BBB was home attending to her younger sibling when Judith, AAA, CCC, and
Nangcas arrived. After Nangcas told her of work available at Camella Homes,
BBB agreed thinking that her mother could just visit her there.
All the recruits resided at xxx, Cagayan de Oro City.
After the girls had packed their things, Nangcas brought them to Camella
Homes. The alleged employer was not there, so Nangcas informed them that
they had to go to Cogon. When they were already in Cogon, Nangcas
instructed them to board a van as they would proceed to Iligan City where the
employer was. Though hesitant and doubtful, the girls followed Nangcas'
instructions. Judith, however, noticed that they were already travelling far and
tried to talk to Nangcas but to naught, as the latter slept during the trip. Upon
reaching their destination, it was only then that Nangcas told them that they
would be working as house helpers in Marawi. The girls complained that their
agreement was only to work at Camella Homes in Cagayan de Oro. But
Nangcas informed them that their alleged employer in Iligan was no longer
looking for helpers; and that it was in Marawi where they were needed. The
girls wanted to go home but they didn't have any money for their fare going
back to Cagayan de Oro. They had no other choice but to stay in Marawi. They
were then brought to the house of one Baby Abas (Baby) where they slept for
the night.
The following day, Nangcas brought Judith and BBB to the house of Baby's
sister, Cairon Abantas (Cairon), while AAA and CCC remained to work for
Baby. Nangcas went back to Cagayan de Oro.
The recruits worked in Marawi for more than a month. They were not paid their
salaries as, according to their employers, Nangcas had already collected
P1,600.00 for each of them. They were also made to eat leftover rice with only
"pulaka" (mixed ginger, chili and onion) as their viand. Furthermore, they were
threatened not to go out or attempt to escape or else, the soldiers would kill
them since they were Christians.
Since Judith failed to go home on her scheduled day-off on Sunday, Enerio
called up Nangcas to ask about his daughter. The latter told him that Judith
was with her just the other day and that she could go home only after two (2)
months.
On 14 April 2009, Judith asked permission to go home since it was her
birthday, but she was denied Subsequently, with the help of the "kasambahay"
of the neighboring house who lent them her cellphone, Judith was able to call
her father informing him of her whereabouts. Alarmed by the news from his
daughter, Enerio went to the Lumbia Police Station to report the incident and
seek assistance to rescue her daughter and three (3) other minors.
P/Insp. Exodio Vidal then assisted Enerio in looking for Nangcas. They went to
Nangcas' house but only her children were there. They left a message inviting
Nangcas to their station but she did not respond. On 5 May 2009, P/Insp. Vidal
received orders to proceed to Marawi City to retrieve the girls. The girls'
parents and a couple of Muslims accompanied the police officers. Enerio
Singane called the cellphone number used by Judith to contact him and he
was able to talk to the cellphone's owner. The latter gave him the directions to
the house of Judith's employer. The police officers successfully rescued the
four (4) girls. The parents of the recruited girls filed the instant action against
Nangcas.
The Version of the Defense
Nangcas and Cairon testified for the defense.
Nangcas denied the accusation against her. She claimed that her friend Joni
Mohamad (Joni) was looking for two (2) house helpers to work for him at
Camella Homes, Cagayan de Oro, and two (2) others for his mother who lived
in Iligan City. She went to xxx to look for interested applicants and there met a
couple who told her that their neighbor was interested. The couple took her to
Judith who expressed interest so she decided to meet her parents to ask for
their permission. She informed the parents that Judith would be working at
Camella Homes, Cagayan de Oro, with a salary of P1,500.00. She then went
to the parents of AAA and CCC and made the same offer. The girls' parents
gave their consent provided that the siblings would work in the same house.
After the girls had packed their things, she brought them to Camella Homes.
Nangcas alleged that while they were at the terminal, she chanced upon BBB,
a cousin of AAA and CCC. The former requested to accompany them to
Camella Homes so that she would know where to visit her cousins on her day-
off. She agreed; hence, BBB went with them to Camella Homes. When they
arrived at Camella Homes, she introduced the girls to Joni. However, Joni only
needed two (2) helpers and chose Judith and CCC to work for him but the
latter refused because she wanted to work as a house helper with her sister
AAA. Joni then called his mother to inform her about the house helpers. The
latter instructed him to send them to Iligan and that she would pay for their
fare. Nangcas took the four (4) girls with her to Cogon and boarded a van
going to Iligan. However, before they could reach Iligan, Joni's mother called
her and informed her that she was no longer hiring the helpers as her current
helper decided not to go home anymore. She asked the driver if he could take
them back to Cagayan de Oro but the latter asked for an additional charge.
When she replied that she had no money left, Judith immediately suggested
that they proceed to Marawi where she has an uncle. However, Judith could
not contact her uncle, hence she asked the girls if it was okay for them to go to
Marawi and they all agreed. She then contacted her friend Baby Abas (Baby)
in Marawi and the latter lent her money to pay the van driver. They stayed in
Baby's house for the night. When Baby asked the girls if they were willing to
work as house helpers, they said yes.
Nangcas furthermore alleged that on the following day, AAA and CCC
remained with Baby while she brought Judith and BBB to the house of Baby's
sister, Cairon, to work as house helpers with P1,500.00 salary each. Before
she left for Cagayan de Oro, Baby gave her P500.00 while Cairon gave her
P1,600.00 for providing them the helpers; Nangcas added that Judith
specifically asked her not to tell their parents about their whereabouts as they
would call to inform them themselves.

Nangcas finally alleged that by the end of March 2009, she went back to
Marawi to follow up on the girls and there learned that Judith failed to inform
their parents of their whereabouts. Nevertheless, all the girls assured her that
they were fine. On 5 May 2009, she was supposed to fetch Judith, who was
scheduled to go home for her birthday but she failed to do so because she had
to attend to her husband who was hospitalized for pneumonia. On 7 May 2009,
Judith's father called and informed her that he had already fetched his
daughter and the other girls.
Cairon also h stified and professed that she came to know Nangcas only when
she brought the girls to work for her. She recalled offering to pay the girls a
salary of P1,500.00 to which the girls agreed. She claimed that she even
asked for Enerio's number to inform him that his daughter was in good hands.
She further claimed that Nangcas did not ask for money but she volunteered to
reimburse Nangcas' expenses incurred in bringing the girls. Finally, Cairon
alleged that she paid the girls their salaries and she was surprised when their
parents came to her house to get them.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its decision, the RTC found Nangcas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.
The RTC ratiocinated that Nangcas' deception was apparent in the manner
with which she dealt with Enerio, Judith, and three other private complainants:
that they were made to believe that the victims would be working as house
helpers at Camella Homes in Cagayan de Oro City; and that Nangcas never
bothered to call the girls' parents to inform them of their children's
whereabouts. The RTC also reasoned that Nangcas further deceived Enerio
when she told him during the last week of March that Judith and the other girls
were at Camella Homes when she fully knew that they were in Marawi; that
she employed the same deception when she brought the girls from one place
to another until they reached Marawi; that the girls were left penniless and thus
had no fare to go back home, thus, leaving no choice but to work against their
will. Finally, The RTC declared that if there was truth to the claim of Nangcas,
she should have presented Joni Mohamad and his mother; that Nangcas had
also admitted previously providing helpers to others, and that the incident on
22 March 2009 was not the only occasion he did so. The fallo reads:
ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused Gloria Nangcas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons and
for which the Court hereby imposes upon GLORIA NANGCAS the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Feeling aggrieved with the decision of the RTC, Nangcas appealed to the Court of
Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
The Assailed CA Decision
The CA, through its Twenty-Second Division, accorded respect to the findings of fact
of the trial court in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the latter
ignored facts and circumstances which, if considered on appeal, would have reversed
or modified the outcome of the case. The CA found no merit in the arguments raised
by Nangcas, to wit:
First, there is no doubt that the accused-appellant recruited and transported the
private complainants to their supposed employer in Marawi. These are well within
the acts that may constitute trafficking, to wit: recruitment, transportation, transfer
or harboring. This meets the first elements of the offense. Second, we are
convinced that the accused-appellant employed fraud and deceit and took
advantage of the victims' vulnerability to successfully recruit them. These means
satisfy the second element. Lastly, the foregoing acts and means resulted in the
victims' forced labor and slavery.
The CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed. The October 8, 2012 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 2009-
643 for qualified trafficking in persons is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
The Present Appeal
On 19 August 2015, the Court issued a Resolution notifying the parties that they
could file their respective supplemental briefs.[41] However, both Nangcas and the
Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the
Philippines, manifested that they would no longer file supplemental briefs, as their
respective briefs filed with the CA sufficiently addressed their particular arguments.
Based on the arguments raised in Nangcas' brief before the CA, the Court is called
upon to resolve the following assignment of errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT
OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THERE WAS NO FRAUD, DECEPTION OR TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE
VULNERABILITY OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS.
III. THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WERE NOT OFFERED OR SOLD FOR FORCED
LABOR, SLAVERY OR INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
IV. INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS.
The Arguments of the Accused
Nangcas argues that there was no deception in this case. She maintained that she
did not deceive any of the private complainants nor their parents when their
daughters were hired as house helpers. She also maintained that in bringing the
alleged victims to Iligan City, she had no idea that the mother of Joni would no longer
be needing house helpers; hence, with no money to pay for the fare, she had no other
choice but to stay with Baby Abas in Marawi City.
Nangcas further argues that contrary to the findings of the court, she did not recruit
the victims under the pretext of domestic employment for the purpose of forced labor,
slavery or involuntary servitude. She averred that the alleged victims worked as
house helpers as previously agreed upon, that they were not forced to work contrary
to their agreement. She also averred that the alleged victims were not enticed to work
with a high salary and the amount offered was not that big to entice anyone to leave
one's home and work for someone else.
Nangcas finally argues that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
private complainants in the following manner: that Judith testified that she and BBB
were brought to the house of Cairon Abantas, the sister of Baby; while AAA testified
that it was she and BBB who stayed with Baby while Judith and CCC were brought to
Cairon.
THE COURT'S RULING
We affirm accused-appellant Nangcas' conviction
Accused-appellant's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Nangcas was charged and convicted for qualified trafficking in persons under Section
4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a), (b), and (d) of R.A. No.
9208, which read:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person,
natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any
means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as
qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
xxxx
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is
deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group;
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms
of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person
for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if
it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over
eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition.
Xxxx
(d) Forced Labor and Slavery - refer to the extraction of work or services from any
person by means of enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or
coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral
ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception.
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking m persons have been
expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,
transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;"
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person."
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs." (emphasis supplied)
The information filed against Nangcas sufficiently alleged the recruitment and
transportation of Judith and three (3) other minor victims for forced labor or services,
with Nangcas taking advantage of the vulnerability of the young girls through her
assurance and promises of good salary, accessibility of place of work to their
respective residences, and weekly dayoff. Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the
crime committed by Nangcas was qualified trafficking, as it was committed in a large
scale and three (3) of her victims were under 18 years of age.
The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution witnesses
who testified during the trial. The testimonies of Judith and three (3) other minor
victims established that Nangcas employed deception and fraud in gaining both the
victims and their parents' trust and confidence.

In the instant case, we concur with the trial court's decision, to wit:
"Deception was apparent in the manner with which accused dealt with Enerio,
Judith and the three other private complainants. Enerio was made to believe that
Judith and company will be working as house helpers at Camella Homes in
Cagayan De Oro City. Through the haze with which the private complainants were
transported from Cagayan de Oro City to Marawi City, what is clear is that Nangcas
has Enerio's number but she never called him to inform him they were proceeding
to Marawi City. Much worse, she deceived Enerio anew when she told him
sometime in the last week of March 2009 that Judith and her friends were in
Camella when she fully knew they were made to work in Marawi City."
The testimonies of the victims and Enerio gave a clear picture as to how the victims
were deceived by Nangcas into going with her, and how she orchestrated the entire
trip pretending to take them first to Cagayan De Oro City, then to Iligan, and finally to
Marawi City, so as to be sure that the victims have no other choice but to go to
Marawi City and serve as house helpers. The prosecution has aptly shown that the
victims would not have agreed or would not have been allowed by their parents if
Nangcas would directly offer them work at Marawi City; that she deliberately
fabricated a story to delude her victims and their parents.
All told, the prosecution has adequately proved Nangcas' guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense as defined in Section 4 of R.A No. 9208.
Nangkas employed fraud and deception in order to bring the victims to Marawi
City.
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by
false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it
to his legal injury; while fraud is every kind of deception whether in the form of
insidious machinations, manipulations, concealments or misrepresentations, for the
purpose of leading another party into error and thus execute a particular act.
From the factual milieu, it is clear that actual fraud and deception are present in this
case, such as when Nangcas induced and coaxed the victims to go with her. She
promised the victims and their parents that their daughters would be working within
Cagayan De Oro City, with an enticing salary of P1,500.00 per month.
At the outset, the intent of Nangcas was obvious. She specifically employed several
deceptive tactics to lure the victims and their parents into agreeing to take the victims,
who were mostly minors, and bring them allegedly to Camella Homes in Cagayan De
Oro City, to serve as house helpers. Nangcas represented to Judith and her parents
that Judith would be employed as a house helper, would be allowed to go home once
a week, and would be paid P1,500.00 monthly. After having convinced Judith and her
parents, Nangcas used Judith to entice some more of her friends to go with her as
house helpers in Cagayan De Oro City. After recruiting Judith and the three other
minor victims, Nangcas immediately boarded them in a jeepney to Cagayan De Oro
City supposedly to bring Judith and her friends to their employer at Camella Homes.
The record shows that Nangcas' decision to bring the victims to Marawi City was
planned, contrary to her defense that she only took them there after the supposed
employer in Iligan changed her mind to accept them as her house helpers. It was
sufficiently established that in Marawi City, Nangcas already had Baby and Cairon
ready and waiting for her to bring the recruits to them and collect her fees. Nangcas'
failure to notify the victims' parents of their whereabouts bolsters the allegation that it
was really her intention to conceal the fact that the work was actually in Marawi City
and not in Cagayan de Oro; her acts thus constitute deceit and fraud as defined by
law.
The victims were sold for forced labor, slavery or involuntary servitude.
Nangcas alleges that the victims were not sold to slavery as they knew that they
would be working as house helpers; as such, there was no slavery or involuntary
servitude. Her argument is completely unfounded.
Slavery is defined as the extraction of work or services from any person by
enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including
deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral ascendancy, debt bondage or
deception. In this case, Judith and the three (3) other minor victims were enticed to
work as house helpers after Nangcas had told them of their supposed salary and
where they would be working; only to discover that they were brought to another
place without their consent. In Marawi, the victims were constrained to work with the
intention to save money for their fare going back home; however, when they asked for
their salary they were told that it had already been given to Nangcas.
Alleged inconsistencies are minor and do not affect the credibility of the
witnesses.
Nangcas still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies were conflicting and improbable. Such alleged inconsistencies pertained
to the testimonies of Judith and the other minor victims as to who was employed by
whom. These inconsistencies, however, are of no consequence to the fact that Judith
and the three minor victims were taken by appellant to Marawi City against their will
and were made to work as house helpers without pay. It is evident that the supposed
inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies pertained to minor details that, in any
case, could not negate Nangcas' unlawful activity and violation of R.A. No. 9208.
Moreover, the Court has ruled time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the
highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed
upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.

Given the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse Nangcas' conviction
for qualified trafficking under R.A. No. 9208. The RTC and the CA correctly imposed
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P2,000,000.00, applying Section 10(c) of
R.A. No. 9208, to wit:
Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and sanctions are
hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:
xxxx
(e) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 6 March 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01092 for Qualified Trafficking in Persons
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

——o0o——
 [ G.R. No. 217978, January 30, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NANCY LASACA RAMIREZ
A.K.A. "ZOY" or "SOY" accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This is an Appeal assailing the Court of Appeals October 23, 2014 Decision in CA-
G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01655, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court January 9,
2013 Judgment in Crim. Case No. R-LLP-09-05622-CR. The trial court found Nancy
Lasaca Ramirez a.k.a. "ZOY" or "SOY" (Ramirez) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified trafficking of persons in relation to Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, or
the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
In an Information, Ramirez was charged with qualified trafficking of persons in relation
to Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208. It read:
That on the 5th day of December, 2009, at or about 9:45 o'clock (sic) in the evening,
in xxxxxxxxxxx, Lapu-Lapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully maintain or hire Nica Jean U. Goc-ong, 20 years old, AAA, 16 year old
minor, Cindy Pancho, 20 years old and BBB, 15 year old minor, to engage in
prostitution and offered them for sex or any form of sexual exploitation to poseur
customers.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Ramirez pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution alleged that at around 9:45 p.m. on December 5, 2009, Police Officer
1 Nef Nemenzo (PO1 Nemenzo) and 13 other members of the Regional Anti-Human
Trafficking Task Force conducted an entrapment operation in xxxxxxxxxxx, Lapu-
Lapu City. The operation was "based on their surveillance of a widespread sexual
service for sale by young girls" in the area.
The operation was divided into two (2) groups. PO1 Nemenzo's group targeted the
area of xxxxxxxxxxx KTV Bar in front of xxxxxxxxxxx Grill. He would be disguised as
a customer negotiating for the prices of the minors' services.
In the bar, PO1 Nemenzo and a team member, Police Officer 1 Llanes (PO1 Llanes),
ordered beers and waited for the pimps. Two (2) women approached them and
introduced themselves as AAA and BBB. Upon hearing that they would need two (2)
more girls, another woman approached them and introduced herself as Nancy, who
was later identified as Ramirez. She told the police officers that she could provide the
girls. Then, BBB and Ramirez left, and after a while, returned with two (2) more girls.
They agreed that each girl would cost P600.00 as payment for sexual services.
After Ramirez provided the four (4) girls, the group left and hailed a taxi heading
for xxxxxxxxxxx Motel. Ramirez had told the girls to accept the money that they would
be given. In the taxi, PO1 Llanes handed P2,400.00 to one (1) of the girls. As soon as
the girl received it, PO1 Nemenzo and PO1 Llanes introduced themselves as police
officers, and turned the girls over to their team leader in a civilian van parked near
them. The police officers were told to return to the area and await the other teams'
return. Later, Ramirez was arrested when BBB pointed to her as the pimp.
The prosecution also presented the testimony of BBB, a minor, who testified knowing
Ramirez and that she herself was pimped out by Ramirez several times already. BBB
stated that on the night of the incident, Ramirez approached her and asked if she
wanted to have sex for P200.00. She accepted and later, she and another girl, AAA,
approached two (2) customers. The men said that they needed two (2) more girls, so
Ramirez instructed BBB to get a couple more. She came back with two (2) girls, Nica
and Cindy. After the deal was made, the six (6) of them boarded a taxi.
Before they left, Ramirez instructed BBB to get the money from the two (2) men.
While in the taxi, one (1) of the men handed her P2,400.00. She received the money
and told her companions to set aside P400.00 as their pimp's share. Instead of going
to the motel, the taxi stopped and the men introduced themselves as police officers.
The prosecution likewise presented the testimony of AAA, a minor, who testified that
she had already been pimped by Ramirez twice. On the night of the incident, AAA
testified that Ramirez pimped her and three (3) other girls out to two (2) customers for
P2,400.00. She stated that she knew Ramirez to be a pimp because Ramirez would
look for customers, negotiate prices, get girls to have sex with the customers, and get
commission from it.
In her defense, Ramirez testified that at about 9:00p.m. on December 5, 2009, she
and her sister, Francy Ramirez, were at xxxxxxxxxxx Grill watching a live band when
two (2) men rushed to them, arrested her, and pushed her into a van. She asked why
she was being arrested but the men just laughed. In the van, she saw BBB, who told
her that police officers were around the area to arrest prostitutes. The men then
brought her to a gas station, where they were made to board another van with other
women and two (2) gay men. They were brought to the police station in xxxxxxxxxxx,
Cebu City, where they were investigated for prostitution.
In its January 9, 2013 Judgment,[16] the Regional Trial Court found Ramirez guilty.
The dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused, Nancy Lasaca Ramirez guilty of the crime of Qualified
Trafficking of Person in Relation to Sec. 4 (e) of R.A. 9208 beyond reasonable
doubt and sentences her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Ramirez appealed before the Court of Appeals. She argued that she does not work
at xxxxxxxxxxx KTV Bar, and that it was BBB who negotiated with the poseur
customers about the girls' prices and received the supposed payment for sexual
services. She posits that the advanced payment made to BBB was "contrary to
human nature and natural course of events" since no sexual activity had occurred yet.
She insists that she was in the area just to watch a live band.
In its October 23, 2014 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the Appeal and affirmed
the Regional Trial Court January 9, 2013 Judgment. It highlighted the trial court's
finding of overwhelming evidence against Ramirez, as two (2) of the minor victims
positively identified her as their pimp.
The Court of Appeals held that Ramirez not being employed at the xxxxxxxxxxx KTV
Bar was irrelevant. It also found that even if BBB initiated the negotiation with the
poseur customers, the deal was only closed when Ramirez brought another pair of
girls. It further noted that it was not uncommon for the payment to be received by the
hired girls instead of the pimps. In any case, BBB testified that P400.00 had already
been earmarked from the P2,400.00 payment as Ramirez' commission. This was
enough to conclude that she was the girls' pimp.
Ramirez filed a Notice of Appeal, to which the Court of Appeals gave due course,
elevating the case records to this Court.
In its June 29, 2015 Resolution, this Court noted the elevation of records and directed
the parties to file their supplemental briefs. Both parties manifested that they were no
longer submitting supplemental briefs and moved that this Court instead consider the
arguments in their briefs submitted before the Court of Appeals.
While the case was pending, accused-appellant sent a handwritten letter to this Court,
insisting that on the night of the incident, she was merely in the area with her sister to
watch a live band. She claims that she only met BBB that night, and that BBB
suddenly dragged her to look for two (2) more girls. She further alleges that it was
BBB who negotiated with the two (2) customers and that she had no idea what was
going on. She submits that BBB pointed to her as a pimp only because the police
officers were threatening to detain her instead.
This Court is confronted with the sole issue of whether or not the prosecution proved
accused-appellant Nancy Lasaca Ramirez' guilt beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
trafficking of persons.
Republic Act No. 9208 defines trafficking in persons as:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons — refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms
of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The crime is still considered trafficking if it involves the "recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harboring[,] or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation" even if it
does not involve any of the means stated under the law. Trafficking is considered
qualified when "the trafficked person is a child[.]"
In People v. Casio, this Court enumerated the elements that must be established to
successfully prosecute the crime:
The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under
Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208, thus:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders."
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over
another["]; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which
includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs."
Republic Act No. 9208 has since been amended by Republic Act No. 10364 on
February 6, 2013. In recognition of the amendments to the law, Casio clarifies that
crimes prosecuted under Republic Act No. 10364 must have the following elements:
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been
expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders[";]
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse
of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of
the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person"[;]
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs[.]" (Emphasis in the original)

Here, accused-appellant was charged with having violated qualified trafficking in
relation to Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, which provides that it is unlawful for
anyone "[t]o maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography[.]"
The prosecution established that on the night of December 5, 2009, accused-
appellant approached PO1 Nemenzo and offered him the sexual services of four (4)
girls, two (2) of whom were minors, for P2,400.00. The police operation had been the
result of previous surveillance conducted within the area by the Regional Anti-Human
Trafficking Task Force. Both minor victims testified that this incident was not the first
time that accused-appellant pimped them out to customers, and that any payment to
them would include the payment of commission to accused-appellant
This Court in People v. Rodriguez acknowledged that as with Casio, the
corroborating testimonies of the arresting officer and the minor victims were sufficient
to sustain a conviction under the law. In People v. Spouses Ybanez, et al., this Court
likewise affirmed the conviction of traffickers arrested based on a surveillance report
on the prostitution of minors within the area. In People v. XXX and YYY, this Court
held that the exploitation of minors, through either prostitution or pornography, is
explicitly prohibited under the law. Casio also recognizes that the crime is considered
consummated even if no sexual intercourse had taken place since the mere
transaction consummates the crime.
Here, accused-appellant cannot use as a valid defense either BBB's and AAA's
consent to the transaction, or that BBB received the payment on her behalf. In Casio:
The victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the
use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out
of his or her own free will.
Similarly, in People v. De Dios:
It did not matter that there was no threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception or abuse of power that was employed by De Dios when she involved
AAA in her illicit sexual trade. AAA was still a minor when she was exposed to
prostitution by the prodding, promises and acts of De Dios. Trafficking in persons
may be committed also by means of taking advantage of the persons' vulnerability
as minors, a circumstance that applied to AAA, was sufficiently alleged in the
information and proved during the trial. This element was further achieved through
the offer of financial gain for the illicit services that were provided by AAA to the
customers of De Dios.
Accused-appellant hired children to engage in prostitution, taking advantage of their
vulnerability as minors. AAA's and BBB's acquiescence to the illicit transactions
cannot be considered as a valid defense.
Accused-appellant initially used the defense of denial, testifying that she was merely
in the area to listen to a live band when the police rushed to her and arrested her.
Denial, however, becomes a weak defense against the positive identification by the
poseur-buyer and the minor victims.
Moreover, accused-appellant, in her handwritten letter to this Court, seemingly
abandoned her earlier statement that she was just in the area to watch a live band
when the police rushed to and arrested her. This time, she alleged that it was BBB
who approached and dragged her to the police officers, and who also started
negotiating prices. This contradicts her earlier statement that she had no knowledge
of the transaction. Worse, this appears to corroborate the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies that she was indeed at the transaction.
In any case, PO1 Nemenzo had categorically testified that he and PO1 Llanes were
approached by accused-appellant, who had negotiated prices on AAA and BBB's
behalf. Accused-appellant has not alleged any ill motive on PO1 Nemenzo's part to
testify against her.
This Court, therefore, affirms the trial court and the Court of Appeals' conviction of
accused-appellant in violation of Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(e), as qualified by
Section 6(a) and punished under Section 10(c). In Casio, however, this Court held
that moral damages and exemplary damages must also be imposed. In People v.
Aguirre:
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case
to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact[,] it is
worse, thus, justifying the award of moral damages. Exemplary damages are
imposed when the crime is aggravated, as in this case.
Thus, in line with jurisprudence, this Court deems it proper to impose moral damages
of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of P100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals October 23, 2014
Decision in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01655 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Nancy Lasaca Ramirez a.k.a "ZOY" or "SOY" is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Republic Act No. 9208,
Section 4(e), as qualified by Section 6(a). She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). She is further
ordered to pay Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages and
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages to each of the
minor victims, AAA and BBB.
All damages awarded shall be subject to the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
——o0o——
 [ G.R. No. 241247, March 20, 2019 ] give monetary consideration with intent to engage and actually engage in
prostitution, minor AAA, a minor 16 years old, against her will and consent, to her
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. REYNOLD MONSANTO damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.
Y FAMILARAN/PAMILARAN, accused-appellant.

On April 17, 2015, the foregoing criminal cases were consolidated, thus, the evidence,
stipulations and proceedings in Crim. Case No. 14-304088 were adopted in Crim.
Case Nos. 15-314082 and 15-314083.
DECISION
J. REYES, JR., J.:
We recount the facts as borne by the records.
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 31,
2018 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08986, which upheld the Decision dated November 15,
The private complainant, AAA, met accused-appellant on December 5, 2012, in
2016 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, finding Reynold
Valenzuela City, at the house of a certain Kristine and Reynante, a couple AAA had
Monsanto y Familaran/Pamilaran (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
been living with as their house helper. On the occasion of Kristine's birthday,
of child trafficking.
accused-appellant who is a friend of Reynante, was introduced to AAA.
Accused-appellant and AAA became textmates, which led to a romantic and sexual
Accused-appellant was charged under three separate Informations in the following
relationship. Accused-appellant promised AAA, an orphan with no known relatives
manner:
who at that time was only fourteen (14) years old, that he would send her to school.
Criminal Case No. 14-304088
This enticed AAA to live together with accused-appellant at his rented room in
For: Violation of Section 5 (a-1) of R.A. No. 7610
That in or about and/or for sometime during the period comprised between
Pandacan, Manila, in February of 2013. Accused-appellant worked as a part-time
February, 2013 and March 4, 2014, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said waiter for food caterings. For a time, AAA also joined accused-appellant as an on-call
accused, for money, profit or any other consideration, or due to coercion or waitress to augment his income.
influence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in or
promote child prostitution, by then and there acting as a procurer of AAA, a 16- As testified by AAA, the first time that accused-appellant brought her to Robinsons
year-old child prostitute, thereby gravely endangering her survival and normal Mall in Ermita, Manila, accused-appellant called her attention to the sight of foreigners
growth and development, to the damage and prejudice of the said AAA. in the company of local women. AAA said she was surprised as it was her first time to
Contrary to law.
see foreigners. Accused-appellant pointed to a foreigner whom AAA was told to
approach and say "hi." AAA was further instructed to accept an invitation to the
Criminal Case No. 15-314082
foreigner's hotel room. When AAA asked what she would be doing at the hotel,
For: Violation of Section 4 (a) & (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) of R.A. No. 9208
accused-appellant replied that she and the foreigner would just converse.
as amended by R.A. No. 10364
That sometime in or before February 2013, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, for purposes
AAA did as she was told. While accused-appellant observed from a distance of about
of prostitution, pornography or sexual exploitation, in consideration of price, reward two (2) meters,[14] AAA sat down beside the foreigner, conversed and shared a meal
or promise, recruit and transport to Manila AAA, a minor, 16 years old, under the with the latter, then agreed when invited to the hotel. At the hotel room, the foreigner
pretext of living-in together with the accused and with the promise that he would asked AAA to hold his penis. AAA asked why and the foreigner replied, "You don't
be sending her to school. know? You came with me, yet you don't know?" The foreigner then held AAA's hand,
That the crime is committed with the qualifying circumstances that the held her when she cried, and they subsequently had sex twice.
trafficked person is below 18 years old and the aggravating circumstances of
having committed the crime in consideration of price, reward or promise.
Afterwards, the foreigner accompanied AAA back to Robinsons Mall where the
Contrary to law. (Underscoring in the original)
accused-appellant was waiting. They used the money that AAA received from the
foreigner to buy food and to pay their electric bill. AAA later told the accused-
Criminal Case No. 15-314083
appellant that she thought she would only have to dine with the foreigner, but did not
For: Violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 7610
That sometime in February, 2013, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
expect to have sex with the latter. This allegedly made accused-appellant angry and
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, acting as procurer jealous.
of a child prostitute, where she is required to go out with foreign men, and in return,
Nonetheless, accused-appellant brought AAA again to Robinsons Mall the following
day. This time, accused-appellant instructed AAA to look for a foreigner and to do the
same as she did the day before, but she should first ask for the "price" before going
with the foreigner to a hotel. AAA did as she was instructed, had sex with a foreigner
and was paid for it. AAA then gave the money to accused-appellant. The same thing
happened many times. AAA would sometimes have sex with two (2) foreigners in one
(1) day.
In February of 2014, after about a year of living together, accused-appellant and AAA
quarreled when the latter complained that she couldn't sleep because their bed was
wet. Accused-appellant opened AAA's mouth and urinated in it, which caused AAA to
run away and take refuge at a customer's place where she stayed for a number of
days.
To persuade AAA to return, accused-appellant sent AAA a text message saying he
would give back her laptop computer. When AAA returned, accused-appellant told
her that she could only get back her laptop if she would not leave him. AAA pleaded
with accused-appellant and insisted on getting her laptop back, but the latter shoved
and choked her. AAA kicked accused-appellant and ran. Witnesses helped AAA and
sought the assistance of barangay officials.
As the arresting officer on record, barangay kagawad Estella Rebenito (Rebenito)
testified that she responded to a report at about 4:00 p.m. on March 4, 2014, about a
quarrel wherein accused-appellant placed a pedicab boarded by AAA in the middle of
the road to be run over by trucks. With the help of barangay tanods, Rebenito brought
accused-appellant and a shaking and visibly frightened AAA to the barangay hall for
investigation. Before the barangay chairperson and Rebenito, AAA disclosed that she
was sixteen (16) years old, and that the 43-year-old accused-appellant was her live-in
partner, as well as her pimp. Consequently, Rebenito brought AAA and accused-
appellant to the Women and Children Protection Section of the United Nations
Avenue police station, where PO3 Thelma Samudio prepared the booking sheet and
arrest report, and assisted Rebenito and AAA in the preparation of their respective
affidavits.
On March 5, 2014, AAA underwent an ano-genital examination by Dr. Sandra Stuart
Hernandez (Dr. Hernandez), a medical doctor assigned to the Child Protection Unit of
the Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Hernandez further testified that she issued a
Medico-Legal Report finding a healed laceration at the 4:00 o'clock position and
absence of hymenal tissue between the 6:00 and 8:00 o'clock positions, which are
diagnostic of blunt force or penetrating trauma.
Social worker Clementino Dumdum, Jr. (Dumdum), to whom AAA's case was
assigned, caused the dental examination of AAA upon order of the court to determine
her age. On September 23, 2014, the dentist/orthodontist of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), Dr. Michael Puertollano (Dr. Puertollano), found
that all of AAA's wisdom teeth have not yet erupted and concluded that she was at
least sixteen (16) years of age and a minor.
In his defense, accused-appellant denies any part in AAA's prostitution activities.
Accused-appellant claims he was surprised when he later discovered that AAA had
been going to Robinsons Mall whenever he was not at home. AAA allegedly
explained that she just strolled around the mall, but accused-appellant became
suspicious when he saw AAA talking to different foreigners on her mobile device.
As to the March 4, 2014 incident that led to his arrest, accused-appellant claimed that
he and AAA quarreled over money because AAA spent it all when she celebrated her
birthday. He shouted at AAA inside a pedicab, which made AAA cry. This prompted
some people to call for barangay officials who brought them to the barangay hall.
When barangay officials heard that AAA was sixteen (16) years old, social workers
from the DSWD and police officers were called. They then advised AAA to file a case
against accused-appellant.
In its November 15, 2016 Decision, the RTC did not find enough basis to convict
accused-appellant as charged under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 because there was
no evidence that he himself transacted directly or spoke with any of AAA's clients,
even if he taught her the tricks of the flesh trade. However, for having enticed AAA to
live with him by taking advantage of her vulnerability, facilitating her entry into
prostitution and benefiting from it, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant as
charged under R.A. No. 9208. As disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds accused
REYNOLD MONSANTO y FAMILARAN/PAMILARAN guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in Criminal Case No. 15-314082 of the offense of violation of Section 4 (a)
in relation to Section 6 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208. He is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, to PAY THE FINE of P2,000,000.00,
and to pay the costs.
He is further adjudged to PAY AAA moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P100,000.00, pursuant to the Supreme Court's rulings in People v.
Hadja Jarma Lalli and People v. Nufrasir Hashim.
He is however ACQUITTED of the charges for Violation of Section 5 (a-1) and 5
(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 in Criminal Cases Nos. 14-304088 and 15-314083,
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.(Citation omitted)
On appeal, the CA also ruled that the evidence adduced by the prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant's guilt under the charge of
child trafficking. Additionally imposing interest on the damages awarded, the
dispositive portion of its January 31, 2018 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated
15 November 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5 in Crim. Case
No. 15-314082 finding accused-appellant Reynold
Monsanto y Familaran/Pamilaran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 4(a) in relation to Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended by
 Republic Act No. 10364, imposing upon accused-appellant the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine in the amount of Php2,000,000.00 plus costs, and
ordering him to pay private complainant AAA the amount of Php500,000.00 as
moral damages and Php100,000.00 as exemplary damages is AFFIRMED. In
addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on the said damages,
from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Undaunted, accused-appellant now appeals his conviction before this Court.
In a letter dated November 9, 2018, the Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison
confirmed accused-appellant's confinement. For its part, the Public Attorney's Office
manifested on November 27, 2018, that it is adopting the Brief for the Accused-
Appellant dated July 3, 2017 as its supplemental brief. In turn, on December 10,
2018, the Office of the Solicitor General asked that it be excused from filing a
supplemental brief as the issues raised by the accused-appellant were fully
addressed in the November 3, 2017 Appellee's Brief.
The Issues
To recapitulate, accused-appellant argued that the RTC erred in giving credence to
AAA's testimony and in according weight on the medical certificate to prove that AAA
engaged in prostitution or that he had a direct hand in it. Accused-appellant further
asserted that AAA's minority was not sufficiently proven.
On the other hand, the plaintiff-appellee countered that AAA is a credible witness and
her testimony is sufficient to convict accused-appellant. Moreover, AAA's minority, her
sexual exploitation, and all the elements of trafficking in persons were duly
established by the prosecution.
The foregoing arguments may be distilled to the sole issue of whether or not the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant's guilt
under the child trafficking charge.
This Court's Ruling
We sustain the conviction.
The Court's general inclination to accord respect to the trial court's appreciation of the
testimonies of witnesses was thoroughly explained in People v. Ocdol, as follows:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in
determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in
the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and
inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness' credibility, and
the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids. These
cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate court can see are
the cold words of the witness contained in the transcript of testimonies with the risk
that some of what the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of
transcribing. As correctly stated by an American court, "There is an inherent
impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due
to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no
doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be,
there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in
his manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the
force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is
exposed in the very nature of things cannot be transcribed upon the record, and
hence they can never be considered by the appellate court."
We affirm the RTC's valuation of AAA's testimony, as affirmed by the CA, in light of its
spontaneity, steadfastness and consistency on material points. Moreover, while the
incriminating facts were chiefly anchored on the testimony of AAA, there is no merit in
the claim that the RTC relied solely on AAA's testimony.
Apart from accused-appellant's attempt to downplay his role in enticing AAA to live
with him and her sexual exploitation, his testimony jibes with that of AAA. The
testimonies of the barangay kagawad and Dr. Hernandez also bolster the truthfulness
of AAA's testimony. Although both the barangay kagawad and Dr. Hernandez had no
personal knowledge on the prostitution activities of AAA or on accused-appellant's
part in it, they had personal knowledge on the circumstances of its discovery which
led to accused-appellant's arrest. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of
a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be
trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to
convict the accused.
As reiterated in People v. Ortega:
It bears emphasis that when the offended parties are young and immature girls
from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their
version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also
the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the
matter about which they testified is not true. x x x
The stigma that AAA risked exposing herself to in disclosing how a person whom she
thought truly cared for her, manipulated and compelled her into prostitution, may be
gleaned from her response on cross-examination:
xxxx
Q Di ba seryoso siya sa iyo dahil ibinabahay ka niya?
A Nung una po.
Q Pero kahit ganyan siya[,] hindi ka niya inutusan magpagalaw
sa foreigner?
A Nung una po sinabi ko[,] kailangan bang magpagalaw ako sa
foreigner? Hindi ka ba nandidiri? Sabi niya okay lang yung
 [sic] kasi wala tayong pambayad ng bahay. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
Accused-appellant insists that the prosecution failed to prove that AAA was a minor
during the alleged period when the offense was committed. His argument is based on
the weight given by the RTC on the result of AAA's dental ageing examination
because Dr. Puertollano, who conducted it, was not presented and established as an
expert witness. The prosecution and the defense merely stipulated on the intended
testimony of social worker Dumdum, which included his having caused the dental
ageing examination of AAA and the result thereof.
The CA, nonetheless, upheld the finding of minority because AAA testified on such
fact, and the same was expressly and clearly admitted by accused-appellant. During
her direct testimony on June 13, 2014, AAA stated that she was sixteen (16) years
old.
Notably, both accused-appellant and Dr. Hernandez confirmed her minority. As
testified by accused-appellant himself -
Q [D]o you know that [AAA] was only 16 years of age during that time?
A When we met in 2012, she was only 14 years old. (Emphasis supplied)
On the continuation of his direct examination, he stated:
Q Now by the way, do you know for a fact that [AAA] is a minor when you decided to live with
her?
A Yes, I knew that she was just 16 years old, she told me "don't feel sorry for me, just love
me."(Emphasis supplied)
During cross-examination, accused-appellant again said:
Q How old was she then when you first met her?
A 14 years old. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, even Dr. Hernandez, whose expertise was duly established, declared on the
witness stand:
Q Upon examining the patient, could you tell us what you mean by tanner stage and what is
meant by estrogenized redundant type of hymen as indicated in your report?
A The tanner staging is the maturity rating. It is a criteria of a ratings [sic] scale that we
use to assess if the development of a child is consistent with her age in terms of having
reached puberty, because certain changes takes [sic] place when the child enters puberty.
She gets her menstruation and her breast becomes more developed, then hair developed
[sic]. This tanner stage 4 is consistent with her age. For a 16-year old. (Emphasis
supplied)
Without a doubt, AAA was a minor when she was enticed by accused-appellant to live
with him, and was still a minor when she was compelled to engage in prostitution up
to the time of accused-appellant's arrest. Her minority was expressly alleged in the
Information and sufficiently established by the prosecution.
To recall, accused-appellant was charged and convicted for violation of Section 4 (a)
and (e), in relation to Section 6 (a) of R.A. No. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act of 2003, as expanded in 2012 by R.A. No. 10364. The pertinent provisions state:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person,
natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any
means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;
xxxx
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
xxxx
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as
qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
xxxx
In People v. Casio, this Court derived the elements of trafficking in persons, namely:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,
transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;"
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person;"
and
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs." (Emphases supplied, italics in the original)
All the elements of human trafficking, relating to the act, the means, and the purpose,
are present in this case. Accused-appellant makes much of the fact that there is no
evidence that he transacted directly with AAA's clients. Examining the aforecited
elements of human trafficking, however, readily reveal that the offering or providing of
persons using any of the enumerated means for the purpose of exploitation, is only
one among several ways of committing the offense. In People v. Rodriguez, the Court
also clarified that the gravamen of the crime of human trafficking is not so much the
offer of a woman or child; it is the act of recruiting or using, with or without consent, a
fellow human being for sexual exploitation.
 ——o0o——
Here, AAA transferred from Valenzuela City to move in with accused-appellant in
Manila with the expectation that he would provide for her studies and because they
were already lovers. As it turned out, accused-appellant manipulated and coerced
AAA into engaging in prostitution with foreign men, from which income he also
benefited.

Regarding the means employed in the trafficking of minors, People v. Villanueva

emphasized that:
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall still be considered "trafficking in persons" even if it
does not involve any of the means set forth in the first paragraph of Sec. 3(a) of
R.A. No. 9208. Given that the person allegedly trafficked in the case at bar is a
child, we may do away with discussions on whether or not the second element was
actually proven. (Citation omitted)

As already clarified by the Court:

x x x x A child exploited in prostitution may seem to consent to what is being done
to her or him and may appear not to complain. However, we have held that a child
who is a person below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition is incapable of
giving rational consent x x x

Accused-appellant himself admitted that his earnings were not enough to support
himself and AAA when he took her under his wing. Despite the fact that they could
barely afford to pay their rent and basic necessities, AAA eventually acquired an iPad
and a laptop computer. The Court finds it incredible that accused-appellant was
turning a blind eye to the source of these items, or that he also had no hand in AAA's
engagement in prostitution. Initiation into the flesh trade with foreign clients requires a
level of familiarity with its ways and inner workings that an untrained minor,
particularly one living under the same roof and under the economic control of her
middle-aged lover, would not have stumbled into on her own.

To echo Delantar, the forfeiture of the right to live free in society is the due requital for
peddling a child to sexual servitude.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January 31, 2018 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08986, upholding the conviction of
accused-appellant Reynold Monsanto y Familaran/Pamilaran in Crim. Case No. 15-
314082 for violation of Section 4(a) in relation to Section 6(a) of Republic Act No.
9208, as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, respectively known as the "Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" and the "Expanded Anti-Traffic king in Persons
Act of 2012," is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUSAN SAYO Y REYES and
ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON, accused-appellants.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
Subject of this appeal is the Decision of June 26, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04914 which affirmed the Decision dated September 23, 2010
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 261, convicting accused-
appellants Susan Sayo y Reyes (Sayo) and Alfredo Roxas y Sagon (Roxas)
(collectively referred to as accused-appellants) for violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
Facts
On November 16, 2005, accused-appellants were indicted under the following
Information:
That on November 15, 2005, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, accused Susan Sayo, willfully and unlawfully, did then and there,
recruit and transport minors [AAA[6]], 15 years old, [BBB[7]] 16 years old, together
with [CCC[8]], by taking advantage of their vulnerability, for the purpose of
prostitution and sexual exploitation; while accused Alfredo Roxas, in conspiracy
with accused Sayo, did then and there, willfully, and unlawfully, own, manage and
operate a room in his apartment in Pasig City used as a prostitution den, receive
and harbor said trafficked persons, also by taking advantage of their vulnerability
and for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation.
Contrary to law.
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
The prosecution's and defense's contrasting versions of the events, as summarized
by the CA, are as follows:
The Prosecution's Evidence
The combined testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC known as the "plaza girls"
disclosed that several months prior to November 15, 2005, these "plaza girls" have
been under the control and supervision of SAYO as commercial sex workers. AAA
testified in open court that she was only fifteen (15) years old at the time she began
working for SAYO in December 2004. The Certificate of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office showed that she was born on May 2, 1990. Same is true
with BBB who testified that she was born on November 11, 1989 and thus, indeed, a
minor during their rescue on November 15, 2005.
The "plaza girls" were introduced to SAYO on different occasions in 2004 by other
"plaza girls." SAYO then started to act as a pimp providing them with male customers
for a certain percentage. The "plaza girls" give her a flat rate of Fifty Pesos (P50.00)
for every male customer who will pay them Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and Two
Hundred Pesos (P200.00) for every Seven Hundred Pesos (P700.00) paying
customer.
SAYO would regularly furnish AAA, BBB and CCC with male customers on the
average five (5) customers per week. Whenever they have customers, SAYO would
bring them either to a motel or to ALFREDO ROXAS's house who provides them a
room for One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) for thirty (30) minutes use of the room.
ROXAS also provides condom for the male customers at Thirty Pesos (P30.00).
On November 3, 2005, the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group-Women and
Children Complaint Division (CIDG-WCCD) received a letter from the International
Justice Mission (IJM), an International Non Government Human Rights Organization,
requesting for police assistance on the possible rescue of three (3) minors exploited
for prostitution in Pasig City.
Acting on said request, PO2 Leonardo So conducted on November 8, 2005 further
surveillance to confirm the veracity of the report. It was verified and confirmed that
there were rampant offerings of minor prostitutes at the Pasig Plaza, specifically by a
pimp named SUSAN SAYO. Hence, on November 15, 2005, the CIDG-WCCD
headed by Superintendent Sotera P. Macatangay conceptualized an entrapment
operation called "Oplan Sagip Angel." A team was organized composed of WCCD
operatives, representatives from IJM and DSWD-NCR for the rescue operation.
During the briefing, PO3 Anthony Ong, PO2 Leonardo So and an agent from IJM
were designated to act as poseur-costumers. Then, one (1) five hundred peso bill and
fifteen (15) one hundred peso bills amounting to Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00)
were prepared and sent to PNP-Crime Laboratory for Ultra Violet Powder dusting.
The peso bills would be utilized during the entrapment operation as payments to the
owner of the apartment/room, for the pimp and for the services of the "plaza girls".
The "Oplan Sagip Angel" operatives proceeded to the target area in Pasig City. The
three men who were tasked to pretend as customers stayed in front of the church at
the Pasig Plaza. They were approached by SAYO who bluntly asked if they wanted
women and she further inquired if they wanted 15 year-old girls. The three customers
agreed to take the 15 year-old girls offered by SAYO for Three Hundred Pesos
(P300.00) each. Thereafter, SAYO informed the three customers about a room in
Baltazar Street which they could rent for P100.00 for each couple. The customers
agreed on the price.
Meanwhile, SAYO informed the "plaza girls" on November 15, 2005 that they have
customers for that night. AAA, BBB and CCC met SAYO at the Pasig Plaza. There,
she introduced them to the three men. The three male customers were actually the
agents of the ClOG-WCCD and IJM. After the negotiation was concluded, all of them
proceeded to the house of ALFREDO ROXAS at No. 638 Baltazar Street, Brgy. Sto.
Tomas, Pasig City on board a tricycle. Upon reaching the house, they were greeted
by "FRED" ROXAS who openly discussed with SAYO in front of the customers and
the ["]plaza girls["] regarding the transaction for the night. ROXAS told that the room
rate for each couple is P100.00. AAA saw the customers gave to ROXAS the Three
Hundred Pesos (P300.00).
The undercover agents, SAYO and ROXAS talked about the payment for the girls'
services outside the house. When the Nine Hundred Pesos (P900.00) was handed by
one of the customers to SAYO to cover the payment for the services of AAA, BBB
and CCC, the CIDG-WCCO agents announced that it was a raid. At that point, PO3
Anthony Ong executed the pre-arranged signal, in reaction to which, the back-up
operatives who were deployed in different strategic locations rushed towards them
and arrested SAYO and ROXAS.
Recovered from the possession of ALFREDO ROXAS was the marked money
amounting to Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00), the payment for the use of the room
for sexual activities while the Nine Hundred Pesos (P900.00) intended for the sexual
services to be provided by the "plaza girls" was recovered from SUSAN SAYO.
Thereafter, the two [accused-]appellants and the "plaza girls" were brought to the
headquarters of CIDG-WCCD in Camp Crame Quezon City for investigation,
documentation and medico-legal examination. After staying there for a day, the "plaza
girls" were brought under the care of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) in Marilac Hills, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
The [Defense's] Evidence
xxxx
SAYO testified on direct examination that on November 15, 2005, between 9:00 to
9:30 o'clock in the evening, while barking for jeepney passengers in front of the Pasig
Cathedral Church, she saw CCC, AAA and BBB together with the three male
persons. This group of men and CCC approached her and arrested her. CCC asked
her to accompany them to ALFREDO's house in exchange for One Hundred Pesos
(Pl 00.00). SAYO agreed and they boarded a tricycle heading towards Sto. Tomas,
Pasig City. Thereat, SAYO was surprised when a man suddenly grabbed her arm
when she alighted from the tricycle. She was taken to a dark place and hauled
immediately to a vehicle and brought to jail where she met for the first time her co
accused ROXAS.
xxxx
ALFREDO ROXAS, on the other hand, claimed that on the night of November 15,
2005, he was sleeping in his house in Baltazar Street, Sto. Tomas. He was awakened
by the barks of the dogs. He went outside to see for himself what was that commotion
all about. He saw CCC and Susan [Sayo] along with the men[,] AAA and BBB. One of
the men asked him if they could rent his room since it was the birthday of [CCC's]
compadre, but he refused. After rejecting their request for several times, the male
persons forced him to accept the money which turned out to be dusted with ultra
violet powder. He admitted having known CCC, AAA and BBB for about 6 to 7
months prior to the incident. As for SAYO, he just only met her on that day of
November 15, 2005 in front of the church in the Pasig Plaza. When asked how he
came to know CCC, AAA and BBB, he said that they were just introduced to him by
someone in their place.
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC promulgated its Decision on September 23, 2010.
The RTC first discussed the procedural infirmity in the Information as it contained
more than one offense. Under Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Information must charge only one offense except when the law
prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.
Sayo was charged with recruiting and transporting AAA and BBB (minors), as well as
CCC (of legal age) for prostitution. In the same Information, Roxas was separately
accused of managing and operating a room in his apartment to be used for
prostitution. Thus, the Information was duplicitous. Be that as it may, the RTC held
that the accused-appellants had waived any objection to the Information as they failed
to object prior to their arraignment. Citing Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, the RTC
held that with the waiver, the accused may be charged and convicted of as many
offenses as those charged in the Information and proved during trial.
On the substantive issue, the RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove the
guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of AAA, BBB,
and. CCC were clear, categorical, and corroborative of each other's testimony. The
testimony of the arresting officer, PO2 Anthony Ong (PO2 Ong), was also categorical
and straightforward regarding the investigation, pre-surveillance, entrapment
procedure, and arrest of the accused-appellants.
On the other hand, both accused-appellants merely interposed the defenses of denial
and alibi which are both inherently weak defenses. For denial to prosper, there must
be strong evidence that the accused was not capable of committing the crime. For
alibi, the accused must prove that he was at some other place which made it
physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of commission.
Contrary to the accused's defenses, the RTC held that in fact, both the accused in
this case were arrested as a result of an entrapment operations.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision held:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations, accused SUSAN
SAYO y REYES is hereby found. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified
 Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (a,e) and Section 6 (a) of R.A. 9208 insofar
as minors AAA and BBB, and is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of Two Million Pesos ([P]2,000,000.00) insofar as minors AAA and BBB are
concerned.
Accused ALFREDO ROXAS y SAGON is likewise found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 5 (a) and
Section 6 (a) of R.A. 9208, insofar as minors AAA and BBB are concerned, and is
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos
([P]2,000,000.00).
As for complainant [CCC] who was no longer a minor at the time of commission
of the offense, accused Susan Sayo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of trafficking in persons under Section 4 (a, e) of R.A. 9208 and is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of One
million pesos (P1,000,000.00). Accused Alfredo Roxas y Sagon is likewise found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of trafficking in persons under
Section S(a) of R.A. 9208 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modification, by adding an award
of moral and exemplary damages, but only to AAA and BBB. There was no
discussion on the omission of CCC in the award of damages.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the trial court dated
September 23, 2010 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified:
(1) SUSAN SAYO Y REYES is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 4 (a) (e) qualified by Section 6 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208
insofar as minors AAA and BBB are concerned and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT without eligibility for parole and to pay a fine of
Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). In addition, she is ordered to pay each AAA
and BBB P500,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
(2) ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5 (a) qualified by Section 6 (a) of R.A. No. 9208, insofar
as minors AAA and BBB are concerned, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT without eligibility for parole and to pay a fine of Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). In addition, he is ordered to pay each AAA and
BBB P500,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
(3) As for the complainant CCC, who was no longer a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense, SUSAN SAYO Y REYES is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 (a) (e) of R.A. 9208 and is sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of Twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00). ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON is likewise found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (a) of R.A. 9208 and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of Fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on July 30, 2015, which was given due
course by the CA in its Resolution dated August 20, 2015. Both plaintiff-appellee and
accused-appellants manifested before the Court that they would not be filing
supplemental briefs.
In a Certification issued on May 12, 2017, the Correctional Institution for Women,
Bureau of Corrections, certified that Sayo had died on November 30, 2011 due to
multiple organ failure, secondary to cervical cancer, attaching thereto the Certificate
of Death issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar.
Issue
Whether the guilt of Roxas was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court's Ruling
Sayo's death extinguished her criminal and civil liability
At the outset, the Court notes that Sayo had already died on November 30, 2011.
Thus, the death of Sayo extinguished her criminal liability. Article 89, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is ·extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment[.]
Likewise, the civil liability of Sayo arising from her criminal liability is extinguished
upon her death. The rules on the effect of the death of the accused on civil liability
pending appeal are summarized in People v. Bayotas:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section I, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
Applying these established rules in the instant case, the death of Sayo extinguished
her criminal and civil liability inasmuch as she is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action is also extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal action.
Thus, the Decision of the Court will now solely focus on the criminal liability of Roxas.
Affirmed factual findings of the RTC are afforded great respect by the
Court
Upon judicious review of the records of the case, the Court affirms the factual findings
of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The Court upholds the findings of the courts a
quo that Roxas knowingly leased a room in his house for the purpose of prostitution.
It is an established doctrine in appellate review that factual findings of the trial court,
including its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, probative weight of their
testimonies, as well as of the documentary evidence, are accorded great weight and
respect, especially when these are affirmed by the CA, as in this case. [27]
As correctly held by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the testimonies of AAA, BBB,
and CCC were direct, straightforward, and corroborative of each other's testimonies.
Likewise, the testimony of the arresting officer, PO2 Ong detailed the conduct of the
whole entrapment procedure. On the other hand, Roxas merely interposed the weak
defenses of denial and alibi. The positive identification and testimonies of the
witnesses greatly outweigh Roxas' bare denials.
However, the Court deems it fit to modify the legal conclusions of the courts a
quo, with regard to the offense committed and the appropriate penalty.
Roxas committed Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons as defined under
Section 5(a) of RA 9208
Roxas was convicted of Qualified Trafficking of Persons, under Section 5(a) in
relation to Section 6 of RA 9208 in connection with minors AAA and BBB and was
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00). With regard to CCC, who was of legal age at the time of the offense,
Roxas was convicted of Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a) of RA 9208 and
was sentenced to imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
The courts a quo committed serious error in convicting Roxas for Qualified Trafficking
of Persons and Trafficking in Persons as the offenses proscribed under Section 5 of
RA 9208 are properly denominated as Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons.
Thus, the Court affirms with modification Roxas' conviction and holds that he is guilty
of one count of violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for Acts that Promote Trafficking
in Persons and not Trafficking in Persons, qualified or otherwise.
There are four punishable acts under RA 9208: (1) Acts ofTrafficking in Persons
under Section 4; (2) Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5; (3)
Violation of the Confidentiality Rule under Section 7 in relation to Section 10(d); and
(4) Use of Trafficked Persons under Section 11.
The offense of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 and Acts that Promote
Trafficking in Persons under Section 5 of RA 9208 are separate and distinct offenses
with their own corresponding penalties. Section 6 provides for qualifying
circumstances of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4, which when alleged and
proved, will merit the imposition of the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) under Section 10(c).
The relevant portions of the provisions are quoted below:
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for any person,
natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any
means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;
xxxx
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. — The following acts which
promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building or
establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
xxxx
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are considered as
qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Section 10 of RA 9208 provides for the penalties of the above:
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. — The following penalties and sanctions are
hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:
(a) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and a fine of not less
 than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00);
(b) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section 5
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine of not less
than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00);
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00)[.]
Thus, Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve trafficking in
persons, such as recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, receiving, buying,
offering, selling, or trading persons to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage. Meanwhile,
Section 5 refers to those acts that promote or facilitate any of the aforementioned
predicate acts of Trafficking in Persons.
In arriving at its Decision, the RTC reasoned:
As for accused Alfredo Roxas, based on the evidence adduced during trial, the
prosecution was able to establish that Alfredo Roxas owned a house/apartment;
that said house/apartment had a room; that the room was offered for lease for
every paying customer of the complainants; that accused Roxas, in consideration
of the sum of One Hundred (100) pesos, would allow the complainants and
her (sic) customers to use the room and engage in sex therein; that Roxas had
knowledge of the fact that the complainants engaged in sex for a fee as he cleaned
the room after the complainant and her customer finished using it; that, moreover,
he sold condoms to complainant's male customers before using the room. All of
these acts promoted trafficking in persons as defined under Section 5 of [RA
9208]. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The RTC found that Roxas violated Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for knowingly leasing a
room for the purpose of prostitution. Unfortunately, in spite of this, it still convicted
Roxas of Qualified Trafficking in Persons as regards minors AAA and BBB and
Trafficking in Persons as regards CCC. The CA, for its part, affirmed the RTC's ruling.
The RTC and the CA thus committed serious error as the proper denomination of the
offense is Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a). In this regard,
it should be noted that the offenses punished under Section 5 cannot be qualified by
Section 6 as what the latter seeks to qualify is the act of trafficking and not the
promotion of trafficking. To be sure, this was clarified in the amendatory law, RA
10364 or the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012 where Section 6 was
amended accordingly:
SEC. 9. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of Section 4 of this Act
shall be considered as qualified trafficking:
"x x x
"(d) When the offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a
person who exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is
committed by a public officer or employee;
"x x x
"(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
"(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended
party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS);
"(h) When the offender commits one or more violations of Section 4 over a period
of sixty (60) or more days, whether those days are continuous or not; and
"(i) When the offender directs or through another manages the trafficking victim in
carrying out the exploitative purpose of trafficking." (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As can be gleaned from the above amendment, only violations of Section 4 on
Trafficking in Persons can be qualified. Section 5 on Acts that Promote Trafficking in
Persons, being separate and distinct offenses, cannot be qualified as the law does
not expressly provide therefor. The clarificatory amendment, being beneficial to the
accused, must be applied in his favor.
Accordingly, Roxas' conviction of Qualified Trafficking in Persons and Trafficking in
Persons as well as the sentence of life imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) must be modified.
The denomination of his conviction is corrected to Acts that Promote Trafficking in
Persons under Section 5(a) of RA 9208 with the appropriate penalty of imprisonment
of fifteen (15) years and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Roxas is liable for moral and exemplary damages to AAA, BBB,
and CCC
The award of damages is likewise modified. Moral damages are prescribed under
Articles 2217 and 2219 of the Civil Code:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act or omission.
xxxx
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
 (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No.
3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the
action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named. (Emphasis supplied)
In turn, exemplary damages are awarded in addition to moral damages by way of
example of correction for the public good:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to:
1. DECLARE accused-appellant ALFREDO ROXAS y SAGON, GUILTY of ACTS
THAT PROMOTE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS under Section 5(a) of Republic
Act No. 9208, as amended, for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as provided for under Section 10(b) of the same law.
2. ORDER accused-appellant ALFREDO ROXAS y SAGON to PAY AAA, BBB, and
CCC, the amounts of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 each, as moral and exemplary
damages, subject to legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of
judgment until full payment.
3. DISMISS the case insofar as accused-appellant SUSAN SAYO y REYES is
concerned, in view of her death.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability
SO ORDERED.
may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be
paid to the offended party.
——o0o——
Moral and exemplary damages of P500,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively, are
ordinarily awarded in cases of Trafficking in Persons as a prostitute. The ratio for the
award of damages in said cases was explained in People v. Lalli:
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to
the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is
worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without one's consent and to be sexually
violated four to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious.
There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of
Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award
of exemplary damages is likewise justified.

In the instant case, while the Information alleged that Roxas "received and harbored"
AAA, BBB, and CCC, it was not proven during the trial that Roxas directly participated
in their prostitution or solicited or assigned customers for them. However, his act of
renting out a room in his house promoted and facilitated their prostitution. Roxas
profited from the rental of the room and his actions are just as deplorable.

In Planteras, Jr. v. People, the Court set the award of moral and exemplary; damages
at P100,000.00 and 50,000.00 in cases of Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons
under Section 5(a) of RA 9208.

Thus, Roxas is liable to pay moral and exemplary damages to AAA, BBB, and CCC of
P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 each. The monetary awards due to the victims shall
earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment until full
payment.
 G.R. No. 219952. November 20, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEHLSON AGUIRRE y ARIDIDON,
MICHAEL ARABIT y PACAMARA, JEFFERSON PARALEJAS y PIGTAIN and
JEFFREY ROXAS y ARAGONCILLO, accused,
JEHLSON AGUIRRE y ARIDIDON, MICHAEL ARABIT y PACAMARA and
JEFFERSON PARALEJAS y PIGTAIN, accused-appellants.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Findings of Fact; It has been an established
rule in appellate review that the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) factual findings — including its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the
conclusions drawn from the factual findings — are accorded great respect and even conclusive
effect.—It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings
— including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their
testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings — are accorded great respect
and even conclusive effect. These factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if
they are affirmed by the CA, as in this case. The Court refrains from disturbing the CA’s findings
if no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them.
Criminal Law; Trafficking in Persons; Elements of.—Based on Section 3(a) of RA 9208,
the elements of trafficking in persons are: (1) The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders”; (2) The means used which include “threat or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage
of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another”; and (3) The purpose of trafficking is
exploitation which includes at a minimum “exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.”
Same; Same; The recruitment and transportation punished under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9208 may be “with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge.”—To be
sure, the recruitment and transportation punished under Section 3(a) of RA 9208 may be “with or
without the victim’s consent or knowledge.” Thus, it is of no moment that accused-appellants
obtained the consent of private complainants. Furthermore, as the CA noted, BBB, CCC and
DDD were proven to be below 18 years old on the date the crime was committed; BBB was 14
years of age, while CCC and DDD were both 17 years old. They were, therefore, “children”
within the purview of Section 3(b) of RA 9208. Section 3(a) of RA 9208 explicitly provides that
when the victim is a minor, the recruitment or transportation need not involve “threat or use of
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another.” Indeed, this Court has
ruled that “[e]ven without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is
not given out of his or her own free will.
Same; Conspiracy; Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy.—Private
complainants’ testimonies have likewise established conspiracy among accused-appellants.
Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony. Direct proof, however, is not essential to
show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. Proof of concerted action before,
during and after the crime, which demonstrated their unity of design and objective is sufficient.
Accused-appellants’ actions, as consistently and categorically narrated by private complainants
under oath, unmistakably reveal “a common purpose and a community of interest indicative of a
conspiracy.” They were manifestly aimed at recruiting and transporting the victims for the
purpose of exploiting them and offering them for prostitution.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; It has been held that testimony of what
one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that
the statement was true, but that it was in fact made.—Contrary to accused-appellant’s argument,
private complainants’ testimonies as to what accused-appellants told them cannot be considered
hearsay. True, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal
knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be
hearsay. In this case, however, the alleged statements were addressed to and directed at
private complainants themselves. Thus, private complainants testified to a matter of fact that had
been derived from their own perception. Indeed, it has been held that testimony of what one
heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the
statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial
evidence necessary to convict the accused.
Same; Same; Witnesses; A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent is a credible witness.—A witness who
testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent
is a credible witness. Furthermore, it is settled that the issue of credibility is best addressed by
the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and
observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most
significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially
in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the
trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept
and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be
disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. The
Court finds no such misapprehension or misinterpretation as to warrant a reversal of the RTC’s
assessment of private complainants’ credibility as witnesses.
Same; Same; Motive; Where there is nothing to indicate that a witness for the prosecution
was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.—It is likewise settled that where there is nothing to
indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is
that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. In this case, it
has not been shown that private complainants were moved by any improper motive to falsely
implicate accused-appellants. AAA, in fact, testified that Arabit and Paralejas were members of
her “barkada.”
Criminal Law; Trafficking in Persons; The law does not require that the victims be
transported to or be found in a brothel or a prostitution den for such crime of recruitment or
transportation to be committed.—The Court cannot accept accused-appellants’ argument that
they cannot be convicted of trafficking in persons because the prosecution had not shown that
the apartment in Quezon City was a brothel or that the foreigners were therein present, waiting
to have “drug orgy and sex” with private complainants. As the CA correctly observed, “(t)he
absence of foreigners in the apartment was due to the fact that said place was not the ultimate
destination for the sex-trafficked victims”; as AAA testified, private complainants “were at the
apartment only to rest, afterwhich [sic] they would proceed to a hotel to meet these foreigners.”
Furthermore, the presence of the trafficker’s clients is not an element of the crime of recruitment
or transportation of victims under Sections 3(a) and 4(a) of RA 9208. In the same vein, the law
does not require that the victims be transported to or be found in a brothel or a prostitution den
for such crime of recruitment or transportation to be committed. In fact, it has been held that the
act of sexual intercourse need not have been consummated for recruitment to be said to have
taken place. It is sufficient that the accused has lured, enticed or engaged its victims or
transported them for the established purpose of exploitation, which includes prostitution, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, and the removal or sale of organs. In this case, the
prosecution has satisfactorily established accused-appellants’ recruitment and transportation of
private complainants for purposes of prostitution and sexual exploitation.
Same; Denials; It is doctrinal that to merit credibility, denial must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability.—Accused-appellants denied committing the offense charged,
claiming that they were themselves merely invited to join a swimming and drinking party.
Accused-appellants, however, failed to present any independent evidence other than their own
denial to bolster their claim. It is doctrinal that to merit credibility, denial must be buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability. If unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, it is
negative and self-serving, deserving no greater value than the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters. Verily, accused-appellants’ bare denial cannot prevail over the
declarations of private complainants which have been found to be “solid,” “very credible,”
“significantly corroborative” on material points, and untainted by any improper motive, and which
have clearly established accused-appellants’ guilt.
Same; Trafficking in Persons; Qualified Trafficking in Persons; Under Section 6(a) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9208, the crime of trafficking in persons is qualified “when the trafficked
person is a child.”—Under Section 6(a) of RA 9208, the crime of trafficking in persons is qualified
“when the trafficked person is a child.” BBB, CCC and DDD were minors or “children” at the time
of the commission of the offense. As the RTC noted, however, the Information alleged DDD to
be 18 years of age, thus, her minority cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
Nonetheless, as the CA correctly held, the minority of BBB and CCC, which has been sufficiently
alleged in the Information and proven by their respective birth certificates, suffices to qualify the
crime.
Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking shall suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P2 million but not more than P5
million.—Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than P2 million but not more than P5 million. The Court,
thus, finds no error in the RTC’s imposition of life imprisonment and P2 million fine on each of
accused-appellants, as affirmed by the CA.
Same; Penalties; Subsidiary Imprisonment; When the principal penalty imposed is higher
than prisión correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.—Since
accused-appellants were each sentenced to life imprisonment, the RTC’s imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment of the fine, as affirmed by the CA, is improper in
view of the proscription thereon under paragraph 3, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which provides that “(w)hen the principal penalty imposed is higher than prisión
correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.”
Same; Trafficking in Persons; Moral Damages; Exemplary Damages; The criminal case of
Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction,
abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse, thus, justifying the award of moral
damages. Exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is aggravated, as in this case.—
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse, thus, justifying the award
of moral damages. Exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is aggravated, as in this
case. As the CA correctly held, accused-appellants are jointly and severally liable to pay each
private complainant the moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 110 of the Revised
Penal Code.
TIJAM, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated August 29, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06220, which affirmed the conviction of
accused-appellants Jehlson Aguirre y Arididon (Aguirre), Michael Arabit y Pacamara
(Arabit) and Jefferson Paralejas y Pigtain (Paralejas) for the crime of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons, as rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 106 in its Judgment dated May 28, 2013 in Criminal Case No. Q-10-167652.
The Facts
Accused-appellants and accused Jeffrey Roxas y Aragoncillo (Roxas) were
charged with Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a), 4(a) and 6 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9208, or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, in relation
to violation of RA 7610, known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act, for recruiting, transporting, harboring, providing or
receiving, in conspiracy with one another, ten girls, including seven minors, for
purposes of prostitution and sexual exploitation.
Of the ten girls, four testified in Court against accused-appellants private
complainants AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD. Their testimonies showed that at different
times on November 16, 2010, they were convinced by accused-appellants to go
swimming and drinking, and to have sex, with foreigners in exchange for money
and/or shabu. Arabit and Aguirre convinced AAA to go swimming and drinking with
foreigners for which she would get paid. As on a previous occasion, accused-
appellants induced BBB to have sex with a man in exchange for money and shabu.
CCC, who had been invited by her classmate and Arabit’s cousin, EEE, to go drinking
with their high school friends, went with EEE to Arabit’s house where accused-
appellants told them that they would go drinking with some foreigners in Quezon City
in exchange for money. DDD initially declined Aguirre’s proposition to introduce her to
a foreigner who would give them money and shabu for sex with her. She relented
after hearing that aside from money, they would also have one “bulto” of shabu for
their personal use. Thereafter, Paralejas fetched DDD from her house. Private
complainants and six other girls (EEE, FFF, GGG, HHH, III and JJJ) were later
assembled at Arabit’s house where accused-appellants told them to primp
themselves as they had to look good for the foreigners. Subsequently, a white van
arrived and all ten girls, together with accused-appellants and Roxas, boarded the
van and travelled to Quezon City. On the way, Aguirre told the girls that they would be
meeting some foreigners who would take them abroad. At 7:00 p.m., they reached a
two-storey apartment in Quezon City, where they would rest after which they would
proceed to a hotel to meet the foreigners. Inside the apartment, the girls, as instructed
by accused-appellants, fixed their clothes and make-up to look pleasing to the
foreigners. Arabit and Paralejas also instructed the girls not to leave the house. Arabit
and Aguirre then offered to the girls what appeared to be shabu, which was payment
for sex with the foreigners in addition to money. Six of the girls accepted and they
were separated from the rest. They were looking for aluminum foil for the shabu when
there was suddenly a commotion. Several people, who came running down from the
second floor of the apartment, identified themselves as the police and told the girls to
sit together. The police officers arrested accused-appellants and Roxas.
The police officers were members of the Criminal Investigation Division Group-
Women and Children Protection Division (CIDG-WCPD) who acted on information
from a civilian informant of “Tutok-Tulfo,” a television program aired over TV Channel
5, that a certain “Booba” and his cohorts would be bringing at least ten women to said
informant in an unoccupied apartment in Quezon City, to be distributed in clubs
and videoke bars around Metro Manila as prostitutes/entertainers. Police team leader
SPO1 Robert Eblahan testified that they had positioned themselves on the second
floor of the apartment when they heard a group enter. Shortly thereafter, a male voice
said, “Kuya, asan na ang komisyon ko?” Another male voice answered “O, ayan,
kumpleto na yan!” The first male voice replied, “Ay, salamat kuya!” Upon receiving the
prearranged signal from the civilian informant through their mobile phone, the police
went down from the second floor and effected the arrest of accused-appellants, all
known homosexuals, and Roxas, and referred the ten girls to the social workers.
Testifying for their own defense, accused-appellants and Roxas denied the
charge. They claimed that they were each simply invited to a swimming and drinking
party.
Aguirre claimed that he received the invitation from Paralejas who gave him the
directions to the apartment. Inside the apartment, he asked Paralejas if there would
be a drinking and swimming party, and Paralejas told him that they were just waiting
for FFF to arrive before they could go swimming. Looking around the apartment, he
saw Arabit and eleven women before police came running down from the second
floor.
Paralejas, in turn, claimed that after EEE invited him to go swimming, they were
fetched by a white van with four women already onboard whom he did not know. The
van took them to the apartment where Aguirre, Arabit and Roxas later arrived with
some women. At that moment, policemen came down from the second floor and
caused their arrest.
For his part, Arabit claimed that he had accepted his kumare GGG’s invitation to
go swimming and drinking. He proceeded to the apartment with sisters GGG and JJJ,
aided by instructions texted by his cousin EEE. Other people were in the apartment
when they arrived and EEE told them to wait for the vehicle that would take them to
the resort. As they waited, people, who identified themselves as policemen, came
running down from the second floor and arrested him and the other accused-
appellants.
Arabit admitted knowing Paralejas, Aguirre and Roxas. Among the ten girls found
in the apartment, he claimed to know only GGG, JJJ and EEE, alleging that their
arrest was the first time had seen the other girls.
According to Roxas, he agreed to join them when Paralejas invited him to a
drinking party. A van subsequently took them, along with the other accused-
appellants and “many girls,” to a two-storey apartment in Quezon City. While he was
left outside the apartment, he was handcuffed and brought inside by a man wearing a
black jacket after he admitted knowing Paralejas.
The RTC’s Ruling
In its Judgment dated May 28, 2013, the RTC convicted accused-appellants of the
crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P2 million, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The RTC also ordered each of the accused-
appellants to pay AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD P100,000 each as moral damages and
P50,000 each as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
According to the RTC, while CCC and DDD were minors at the time of the
commission of the crime, the Information alleged that DDD was already of legal age.
It nonetheless considered CCC’s minority as a qualifying circumstance but not that
the crime was committed by a syndicate (involving three or more conspirators) and in
large scale (involving three or more victims) as the same was not alleged in the
Information.
The RTC did not convict accused-appellants under RA 7610, holding that such a
conviction would violate accused-appellants’ constitutional right as the Information did
not state the particular provision of said law — whether it is “Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse” under Section 5 or “Child Trafficking” under Section 7 — that
was violated.
 The RTC acquitted Roxas, finding doubt in his participation in the crime after
private complainants denied knowing him and testified to only seeing him inside the
white van that brought them to Quezon City.
Accused-appellants appealed the RTC’s Judgment to the CA on the sole ground
that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They argued that the
evidence used by the prosecution to prove the purpose for which the girls were
“recruited and transported” to the apartment was based on hearsay, and that there
was no evidence that said apartment was a brothel or a prostitution den.
The CA’s Ruling
On August 29, 2014, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the RTC’s
Judgment, subject to the modification that: (a) accused-appellants are jointly and
severally liable to pay each of the private complainants the sums of P100,000 as
moral damages and P50,000 as exemplary damages, and (b) interest at six percent
(6%) per annum is imposed on the total monetary award from the finality of the
decision until full payment.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual
findings — including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative
weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings — are
accorded great respect and even conclusive effect. These factual findings and
conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA, as in this case. The
Court refrains from disturbing the CA’s findings if no glaring errors bordering on a
gross misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them.
The Court finds no reason to overturn the CA’s findings and conclusion as to the
guilt of accused-appellants.
Based on Section 3(a) of RA 9208, the elements of trafficking in persons are:
(1) The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt
of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders”;
(2) The means used which include “threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another”; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes at a minimum
“exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.”
The prosecution has satisfactorily established these elements.
Private complainants’ testimonies show that accused-appellants lured them into
prostitution with the promise of financial benefit, the chance to use shabu and to
travel abroad. Aguirre expressly induced BBB and DDD to have sex with foreigners in
exchange for money and shabu. Paralejas fetched DDD from her home and brought
her to Arabit’s house. Together with AAA and CCC, who had likewise been enticed
with money to go drinking with foreigners, and six other girls, they were made to
gather at Arabit’s house where accused-appellants instructed them to primp
themselves to look good for the foreigners. Accused-appellants subsequently had all
ten girls board a van and transported them from Arabit’s house in XXX to an
apartment in Quezon City from which they would proceed to a hotel to meet the
foreigners. En route to Quezon City, Aguirre told the girls that the foreigners would
take them abroad. When they arrived at the apartment, accused-appellants forbade
the girls from leaving and instructed them anew to fix their clothes and makeup. Later,
Arabit and Aguirre offered all the girls what appeared to be shabu as payment for sex
with the foreigners in addition to money.
Accused-appellants’ actions clearly indicate their intention to exploit private
complainants. They establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
recruited and transported private complainants for purposes of prostitution and sexual
exploitation.
As the RTC found, private complainants were still in their teens when they
testified. That accused-appellants took advantage of their youth and vulnerability is,
thus, beyond doubt. In fact, as the RTC noted, DDD testified that although she agreed
to have sex with a foreigner, she felt scared and even wanted to turn back but had no
choice because they were already in Quezon City.
To be sure, the recruitment and transportation punished under Section 3(a) of RA
9208 may be “with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge.” Thus, it is of no
moment that accused-appellants obtained the consent of private complainants.
Furthermore, as the CA noted, BBB, CCC and DDD were proven to be below 18
years old on the date the crime was committed; BBB was 14 years of age, while CCC
and DDD were both 17 years old. They were, therefore, “children” within the purview
of Section 3(b) of RA 9208.28 Section 3(a) of RA 9208 explicitly provides that when
the victim is a minor, the recruitment or transportation need not involve “threat or use
of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another.” Indeed, this Court has ruled that “[e]ven without the use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or her own free
will.”

Private complainants’ testimonies have likewise established conspiracy among
accused-appellants. Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony. Direct
proof, however, is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the
parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a
common design. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which
demonstrated their unity of design and objective is sufficient.
Accused-appellants’ actions, as consistently and categorically narrated 34 by
private complainants under oath, unmistakably reveal “a common purpose and a
community of interest indicative of a conspiracy.” They were manifestly aimed at
recruiting and transporting the victims for the purpose of exploiting them and offering
them for prostitution.
Contrary to accused-appellant’s argument, private complainants’ testimonies as
to what accused-appellants told them cannot be considered hearsay. True, a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e.,
which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be
hearsay. In this case, however, the alleged statements were addressed to and
directed at private complainants themselves. Thus, private complainants testified to a
matter of fact that had been derived from their own perception.
Indeed, it has been held that testimony of what one heard a party say is not
necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was
true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial
evidence necessary to convict the accused.
The RTC, who had the opportunity to examine the demeanor of private
complainants on the witness stand, found their testimonies to be solid and credible,
thus:
The testimonies of the private complainants are worthy of belief, very credible
and significantly corroborative of each other, directly and categorically, on its
material points. When subjected to intense cross-examination by defense counsel,
these same testimonies were consistent and strong in their essential facts, and
even upon further questioning from the court, remained solid and unshaken. The
court saw and heard the witnesses testify and found that the substance of their
respective testimonies were further strengthened by the private complainants’
candid and spontaneous demeanor on the witness stand.
A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner and remains consistent is a credible witness. 40 Furthermore, it is settled that
the issue of credibility is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position
to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant
factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially
in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire
proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion,
whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial
court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so
as to materially affect the disposition of the case. The Court finds no such
misapprehension or misinterpretation as to warrant a reversal of the RTC’s
assessment of private complainants’ credibility as witnesses.
It is likewise settled that where there is nothing to indicate that a witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.42 In this case, it has not
been shown that private complainants were moved by any improper motive to falsely
implicate accused-appellants. AAA, in fact, testified that Arabit and Paralejas were
members of her “barkada.”
Furthermore, the hearsay rule has been premised on the theory that “(a) person
who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any
question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any
obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple
assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the absent
author.” In this case, accused appellants were able to cross-examine private
complainants; in fact, CCC was even subjected to re-cross-examination. Thus, it
cannot be said that private complainants had not been obliged to answer any
question or to explain obscurities or contradictions, or that their testimonies had not
been tested for veracity or truthfulness.
The Court cannot accept accused-appellants’ argument that they cannot be
convicted of trafficking in persons because the prosecution had not shown that the
apartment in Quezon City was a brothel or that the foreigners were therein present,
waiting to have “drug orgy and sex” with private complainants.
As the CA correctly observed, “(t)he absence of foreigners in the apartment was
due to the fact that said place was not the ultimate destination for the sex-trafficked
victims”; as AAA testified, private complainants “were at the apartment only to rest,
afterwhich [sic] they would proceed to a hotel to meet these foreigners.” Furthermore,
the presence of the trafficker’s clients is not an element of the crime of recruitment or
transportation of victims under Sections 3(a) and 4(a) of RA 9208. In the same vein,
the law does not require that the victims be transported to or be found in a brothel or
a prostitution den for such crime of recruitment or transportation to be committed. In
fact, it has been held that the act of sexual intercourse need not have been
consummated for recruitment to be said to have taken place. It is sufficient that the
accused has lured, enticed or engaged its victims or transported them for the
established purpose of exploitation, which includes prostitution, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, and the removal or sale of organs. In this case, the prosecution
has satisfactorily established accused-appellants’ recruitment and transportation of
private complainants for purposes of prostitution and sexual exploitation.
Accused-appellants denied committing the offense charged, claiming that they
were themselves merely invited to join a swimming and drinking party. Accused-
appellants, however, failed to present any independent evidence other than their own
denial to bolster their claim. It is doctrinal that to merit credibility, denial must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.47 If unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, it is negative and self-serving, deserving no greater value than
the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
Verily, accused-appellants’ bare denial cannot prevail over the declarations of
private complainants which have been found to be “solid,” “very credible,”
“significantly corroborative” on material points, and untainted by any improper motive,
and which have clearly established accused-appellants’ guilt.
Under Section 6(a) of RA 9208, the crime of trafficking in persons is qualified
“when the trafficked person is a child.” BBB, CCC and DDD were minors or “children”
at the time of the commission of the offense. As the RTC noted, however, the
Information alleged DDD to be 18 years of age, thus, her minority cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. Nonetheless, as the CA correctly held, the
minority of BBB and CCC, which has been sufficiently alleged in the Information and
proven by their respective birth certificates, suffices to qualify the crime.
Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than P2 million but not more than P5 million. The
Court, thus, finds no error in the RTC’s imposition of life imprisonment and P2 million
fine on each of accused-appellants, as affirmed by the CA.
Since accused-appellants were each sentenced to life imprisonment, the RTC’s
imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment of the fine, as affirmed
by the CA, is improper in view of the proscription thereon under paragraph 3, Article
39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that “(w)hen the principal
penalty imposed is higher than prisión correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall
be imposed upon the culprit.”
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases the award of moral
damages from P100,000 to P500,000 and the award of exemplary damages from
P50,000 to P100,000.
The award of moral damages finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code which,
in part, reads:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309.
xxxx
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case
to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is
worse, thus, justifying the award of moral damages. Exemplary damages are imposed
when the crime is aggravated, as in this case.
As the CA correctly held, accused-appellants are jointly and severally liable to pay
each private complainant the moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 110
of the Revised Penal Code.
The imposition of interest on the monetary award for damages finds support in the
Court’s ruling in People v. Jugueta.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated August 29, 2014 in C.A.-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06220 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that: (a) the
imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency is deleted; and (b) moral
damages and exemplary damages are increased to P500,000 and P100,000,
respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary
investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate
rights and obligations of parties. (Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 [2015])
The present case involves public interest as it imputes violations of Republic Act (RA) No.
9208, or the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003,” a crime so abhorrent and reprehensible
that is characterized by sexual violence and slavery. (Young vs. People, 783 SCRA 286 [2016])
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