G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993.
* unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, vs. PRADO
Constitutional Law; Doctrine of separation of powers; Under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress.—Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may
not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill
is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like
the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill.) The journals are themselves also binding on
the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we
explained the reason thus: To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter
and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with
the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Applying these principles, we shall
decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading
of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were
not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2)
of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.—The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon
to cut it down is the equal protection clause. According to a long line of decisions, equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate
against others. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the
laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What
the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, EDELWINA DG. PARUNGAO, PRIMO T. LOMIBAO and ALICE
MARIE C. OSORIO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Commission on Audit; Powers; The Constitution specifically vests in the
COA the authority to determine whether government entities comply with laws and
regulations in disbursing government funds.—On the issue of jurisdiction, it was held that the
Constitution specifically vests in the COA the authority to determine whether government
entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow
illegal or irregular disbursements of the same. This independent constitutional body is tasked
to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government’s, and
ultimately, the people’s property. It has the authority to investigate whether directors, officials
or employees of government-owned and controlled corporations, like MCWD, are entitled to
receive additional allowances and bonuses under applicable laws.
Statutory Construction; Stare Decisis Doctrine; When a court has laid down a principle of law
applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to such principle and apply it to all future
cases with substantially the same facts.—Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the
decisions arid disturb not what is settled. It is a salutary and necessary judicial practice that
when a court has laid down a principle of law applicable to a certain state of facts, it must
adhere to such principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts sued upon are
substantially the same.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. CAYAT, defendant and
appellant.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; GUARANTY OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS;
LEGISLATION BASED ON REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION.—It is an established principle
of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (!) must
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-CHRISTIAN TRIBES.—Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is
not based upon "accident of birth or parentage" but upon the degree of civilization and culture.
The term "non-Christian tribes" refers, .not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical
area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippines of a low grade of civilization, usually
living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to
meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of
certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their
Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—That the classification is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted.
The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer,
wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the socalled native wines and liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the
passage of this Act," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the
non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower
court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have
often resulted in lawlessness and crimes thereby hampering the efforts of the government to
raise their standard of life and civilization.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of
its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was
not predicated upon the assumption that the nonChristians are "impermeable to any civilizing
influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a
slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—That the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a
perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-
Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its
application.
7.ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW.—To constitute due process of law, notice and
bearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the
discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. Due process of
law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers
of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation;
(3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4)
that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER OF THE STATE.—Neither is the Act an improper exercise
of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and
least limitable of all the powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power
coextensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure
intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to
increase the industries of -the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity,
is a legitimate exercise of the police power, and unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as
to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Act No. 1639 is designed to promote peace and order in the non-
Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and,
eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers.
Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater
Philippines. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less
capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public
policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment
of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality
before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by
appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of
their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on
the basis of true equality.
10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF "SALUS POPULI SUPREMA EST LEX.—In the
constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether
the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist,
the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures
enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the
application of the law, the educated. non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification
still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex.
11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS.—When the public safety or
the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by a certain class of persons,
the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any
incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of
such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs.
Mass., 97 U. S., 25; 24 Law. ed., 989).

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, JOHN H. OSMEÑA and RODOLFO G. BIAZON, petitioners, vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, and EDSA LRT CORPORATION, LTD., respondents.
Public Utilities; Administrative Law; What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership
but their use to serve the public.—The phrasing of the question is erroneous; it is loaded. What
private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations,
terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these
facilities to serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a public utility. What
constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public (Iloilo Ice &
Cold Storage Co. v. Public Service Board, 44 Phil. 551, 557-558 [1923]).
Constitutional Law; Franchise; Public Utilities; Constitution does not require a franchise before
one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate them
to serve the public.—The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the
operation of a public utility. However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the
facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the
public.
Same; Same; Same; There is distinction between “operation” of a public utility and ownership
of the facilities used to serve the public.—In law, there is a clear distinction between the
“operation” of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve
the public.
Same; Same; Same; Ownership Defined.—Ownership is defined as a relation in law by virtue
of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in everything not
prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another (Tolentino, II Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 45 [1992]).
Same; Same; Same; The operation of a rail system as a public utility includes the transportation
of passengers from one point to another point, their loading and unloading at designated
places and the movement of the trains at prescheduled times.—The exercise of the rights
encompassed in ownership is limited by law so that a property cannot be operated and used
to serve the public as a public utility unless the operator has a franchise. The operation of a rail
system as a public utility includes the transportation of passengers from one point to another
point, their loading and unloading at designated places and the movement of the trains at
prescheduled times (cf. Arizona Eastern R.R. Co. v. J.A. Matthews, 20 Ariz 282, 180 P. 159, 7
A.L.R. 1149 [1919]; United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Northern P.R. Co., 30 Wash 2d. 722, 193 P. 2d
868, 2 A.L.R. 2d 1065 [1948]).
Same; Same; Same; Right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately
from the ownership of the facilities thereof.—The right to operate a public utility may exist
independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said
facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a public
utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property to serve
the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not
necessarily be the owner thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Mere owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public utility is not a public
utility.—Indeed, a mere owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public utility is not a public
utility (Providence and W.R. Co. v. United States, 46 F. 2d 149, 152 [1930]; Chippewa Power
Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 205 N.W. 900, 903, 188 Wis. 246 [1925]; Ellis v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, Ill. 35 S. Ct. 645, 646, 237 U.S. 434, 59 L. Ed. 1036 [1914]).
Neither are owners of tank, refrigerator, wine, poultry and beer cars who supply cars under
contract to railroad companies considered as public utilities (Crystal Car Line v. State Tax
Commission, 174 P. 2d 984, 987 [1946]).
Same; Same; Same; Mere formation of public utility corporation does not ipso facto characterize
the corporation as one operating a public utility. It becomes so when it applies for a franchise,
certificate or any other form of authorization for that purpose.—Even the mere formation of a
public utility corporation does not ipso facto characterize the corporation as one operating a
public utility. The moment for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity
applies for a franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for that purpose (People
v. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333 [1953]).
Administrative Law; Public Utilities; Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Scheme; Build-operate-
and-transfer (BOT) scheme is defined as one where the contractor undertakes the construction
and financing of an infrastructure facility, and operates and maintains the same.—The BOT
scheme is expressly defined as one where the contractor undertakes the construction and
financing of an infrastructure facility, and operates and maintains the same. The contractor
operates the facility for a fixed period during which it may recover its expenses and investment
in the project plus a reasonable rate of return thereon. After the expiration of the agreed term,
the contractor transfers the ownership and operation of the project to the government.
Same;Same; Build-and-Transfer (BT) Scheme; In build-and-transfer (BT) scheme, contractor
undertakes the construction and financing of facility, but after completion, ownership and
operation thereof are turned over to the government.—In the BT scheme, the contractor
undertakes the construction and financing of the facility, but after completion, the ownership
and operation thereof are turned over to the government. The government, in turn, shall pay
the contractor its local investment on the project in addition to a reasonable rate of return. If
payment is to be effected through amortization payments by the government infrastructure
agency or local government unit concerned, this shall be made in accordance with a scheme
proposed in the bid and incorporated in the contract (R.A. No. 6957, Sec. 6).
Same; Same; BOT Scheme; Under the BOT scheme, owner of the infrastructure facility must
comply with the citizenship requirement under the Constitution.—Emphasis must be made
that under the BOT scheme, the owner of the infrastructure facility must comply with the
citizenship requirement of the Constitution on the operation of a public utility. No such a
requirement is imposed in the BT scheme.
Same; Same; Contracts; Lease Purchase Agreement; Stipulation that title to leased premises
shall be transferred to the lessee at the end of the lease period upon payment of agreed sum,
the lease becomes a lease-purchase agreement.—A lease is a contract where one of the parties
binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a certain price and for a
period which may be definite or indefinite but not longer than 99 years (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 1643). There is no transfer of ownership at the end of the lease period. But if
the parties stipulate that title to the leased premises shall be transferred to the lessee at the end
of the lease period upon the payment of an agreed sum, the lease becomes a lease-purchase
agreement.
Same; Same; Same; P.D. No. 1594; Section 5 of BOT Law in relation to Presidential Decree No.
1594 allows the negotiated award of government infrastructure projects.—Contrary to the
comments of then Executive Secretary Drilon, Section 5 of the BOT Law in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1594 allows the negotiated award of government infrastructure
projects.
Same; Same; Same; Same; P.D. No. 1594 is the general law on government infrastructure
contracts while BOT Law governs particular arrangements or schemes aimed at encouraging
private sector participation in government infrastructure projects.—Indeed, where there is a
lack of qualified bidders or contractors, the award of government infrastructure contracts may
be made by negotiation. Presidential Decree No. 1594 is the general law on government
infrastructure contracts while the BOT Law governs particular arrangements or schemes aimed
at encouraging private sector participation in government infrastructure projects. The two laws
are not inconsistent with each other but are in pari materia and should be read together
accordingly.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 3 of R.A. 7718 authorizes government infrastructure
agencies, government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units to enter
into contract with any duly prequalified proponent.—Petitioners’ claim that the BLT scheme
and direct negotiation of contracts are not contemplated by the BOT Law has now been
rendered moot and academic by R.A. No. 7718. Section 3 of this law authorizes all government
infrastructure agencies, government-owned and controlled corporations and local government
units to enter into contract with any duly prequalified proponent for the financing,
construction, operation and maintenance of any financially viable infrastructure or
development facility through a BOT, BT, BLT, BOO (Build-own-and-operate), BTO (Build-
transfer-and-operate), CAO (Contract-add-operate), DOT (Develop-operate-and-transfer),
ROT (Rehabilitate-operate-and-transfer), and ROO (Rehabilitate-own-operate) (R.A. No. 7718,
Sec. 2 [b-j]).
Statutory Construction; Curative Statute; Curative statute makes valid that which before
enactment of the statute was invalid.—Republic Act No. 7718 is a curative statute. It is intended
to provide financial incentives and “a climate of minimum government regulations and
procedures and specific government undertakings in support of the private sector” (Sec. 1). A
curative statute makes valid that which before enactment of the statute was invalid. Thus,
whatever doubts and alleged procedural lapses private respondent and DOTC may have
engendered and committed in entering into the questioned contracts, these have now been
cured by R.A. No. 7718 (cf. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA
342 [1980]; Santos v. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041 [1965]; Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43
[1922]).
Officials; Regularity of Performance of Function; Government officials are presumed to
perform their functions with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this
presumption.—Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity
and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. Petitioners have not presented
evidence on the reasonable rentals to be paid by the parties to each other. The matter of
valuation is an esoteric field which is better left to the experts and which this Court is not eager
to undertake.
Administrative Law; Public Utilities; DOTC has the power, authority and technical expertise
to determine whether or not a specific transportation or communications project is necessary,
viable and beneficial to the people.—Definitely, the agreements in question have been entered
into by DOTC in the exercise of its governmental function. DOTC is the primary policy,
planning, programming, regulating and administrative entity of the Executive branch of
government in the promotion, development and regulation of dependable and coordinated
networks of transportation and communications systems as well as in the fast, safe, efficient
and reliable postal, transportation and communications services (Administrative Code of 1987,
Book IV, Title XV, Sec. 2). It is the Executive department, DOTC in particular, that has the
power, authority and technical expertise to determine whether or not a specific transportation
or communications project is necessary, viable and beneficial to the people. The discretion to
award a contract is vested in the government agencies entrusted with that function (Bureau
Veritas v. Office of the President, 205 SCRA 705 [1992]).
FELICIANO,J., Dissenting:
Administrative Law; Contracts; Public Biddings; Public Utilities; R.A. 6957; R.A No. 6957 in
connection with BOT and BLT type of contracts imposed an unqualified requirement of public
bidding.—Republic Act No. 6957 and Republic Act No. 7718 must be held, in my view, to be
special statutes applicable to a more limited field of “infrastructure projects” than the wide-
ranging scope of application of the general statute, i.e., Presidential Decree No. 1594. Thus, the
high relevance of the point made by Mr. Justice Davide that Republic Act No. 6957 in specific
connection with BOT-and BLT-type of contracts imposed an unqualified requirement of public
bidding set out in Section 5 thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 6957 made no mention of negotiated contracts being
permitted to displace the requirement of public bidding.—It must, upon the one hand, be noted
that the special law Republic Act No. 6957 made absolutely no mention of negotiated contracts
being permitted to displace the requirement of public bidding. Upon the other hand, Section
5-a, inserted in Republic Act No. 6957 by the amending statute Republic Act No. 7718, does not
purport to authorize direct negotiation of contracts except in four (4) situations where there is
a lack of pre-qualified contractors or complying bidders. Thus, even under the amended special
statute, entering into contracts by negotiation is not permissible in the other two (2) categories
of cases referred to in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1594, i.e., “in exceptional cases where
time is of the essence” and “when there is conclusive evidence that greater economy and
efficiency would be achieved through these arrangements, etc.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Public bidding is the method by which a government keeps
contractors honest and is able to assure itself that it would be getting the best possible value
for its money in any construction or similar project.—Public bidding is the normal method by
which a government keeps contractors honest and is able to assure itself that it would be
getting the best possible value for its money in any construction or similar project. It is not for
nothing that multilateral financial organizations like the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank uniformly require projects financed by them to be implemented and
carried out by public bidding. Public bidding is much too important a requirement casually to
loosen by a latitudinarian exercise in statutory construction.
DAVIDE, JR.,J., Dissenting Opinion:
Contracts; Public Bidding; Public Utilities; Challenged contract is void for being an ultra-vires
act of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and entered into
without complying with the mandatory requirement of public bidding.—I most respectfully
submit that the challenged contract is void for at least two reasons: (a) it is an ultra-vires act of
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) since under R.A. 6957 the
DOTC has no authority to enter into a Build-Lease-and-Transfer (BLT) contract; and (b) even
assuming arguendo that it has, the contract was entered into without complying with the
mandatory requirement of public bidding.
Same; Same; R.A. 6957; Contractual Arrangements; Contract was entered into under R.A. 6957
which recognizes only two (2) kinds of contractual arrangements, which are (a) the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) scheme and (b) the Build-and-Transfer (BT) scheme.—
Respondents admit that the assailed contract was entered into under R.A. 6957. This law,
fittingly entitled “An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and
Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and For Other Purposes,”
recognizes only two (2) kinds of contractual arrangements between the private sector and
government infrastructure agencies: (a) the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) scheme and (b)
the Build-and-Transfer (BT) scheme. This conclusion finds support in Section 2 thereof which
defines only the BOT and BT schemes, in Section 3 which explicitly provides for said schemes.
Same; Same; Same; Build-Lease-and-Transfer (BLT) scheme is not authorized under R.A.
6957.—A Build-Lease-and-Transfer (BLT) scheme is not authorized under the said law, and
none of the aforesaid prior acts and negotiations were designed for such unauthorized scheme.
Hence, the DOTC is without any power or authority to enter into the BLT contract in question.
Same; Same; Same; BLT scheme was never intended as a permissible variation “within the
context” of the BOT and BT schemes.—The majority opinion maintains, however, that since
“[t]here is no mention in the BOT Law that the BOT and the BT schemes bar any other
arrangement for the payment by the government of the project cost,” then “[t]he law must not
be read in such a way as to rule out or unduly restrict any variation within the context of the
two schemes.” This interpretation would be correct if the law itself provides room for
flexibility. We find no such provision in R.A. No. 6957. If it intended to include a BLT scheme,
then it should have so stated, for contracts of lease are not unknown in our jurisdiction, and
Congress has enacted several laws relating to leases. That the BLT scheme was never intended
as a permissible variation “within the context” of the BOT and BT schemes is conclusively
established by the passage of R.A. No. 7718.
Administrative Law; Contracts; Public Biddings; Public Utilities; Any government contract
entered into without the required bidding is null and void and cannot adversely affect the
rights of third parties.—The requirement of public bidding is not an idle ceremony. It has been
aptly said that in our jurisdiction “public bidding is the policy and medium adhered to in
Government procurement and construction contracts under existing laws and regulations. It is
the accepted method for arriving at a fair and reasonable price and ensures that overpricing,
favoritism and other anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized. And any Government
contract entered into without the required bidding is null and void and cannot adversely affect
the rights of third parties.” (Bartolome C. Fernandez, Jr., A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW 25 [rev. ed. 1991], citing Caltex vs. Delgado Bros.,
96 Phil. 368 [1954]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is null and void as the law itself does not recognize or allow
negotiated contracts.—The Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Franklin
Drilon correctly disapproved the contract because no public bidding in strict compliance with
Section 5 of R.A. No. 6957 was conducted. Secretary Drilon further bluntly stated that the
provision of the Implementing Rules of said law authorizing negotiated contracts was of
doubtful legality. Indeed, it is null and void because the law itself does not recognize or allow
negotiated contracts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5 mandates that BOT or BT contract should be awarded “to
the lowest complying bidder,” which means that there must at least be two (2) bidders.—
However, the majority opinion posits the view that since only private respondent EDSA LRT
was prequalified, then a public bidding would be “an absurd and pointless exercise.” I submit
that the mandatory requirement of public bidding cannot be legally dispensed with simply
because only one was qualified to bid during the prequalification proceedings. Section 5
mandates that the BOT or BT contract should be awarded “to the lowest complying bidder,”
which logically means that there must at least be two (2) bidders. If this minimum requirement
is not met, then the proposed bidding should be deferred and a new prequalification
proceeding be scheduled. Even those who were earlier disqualified may by then have qualified
because they may have, in the meantime, exerted efforts to meet all the qualifications.
Same; Statutes; Retroactivity; R.A. No. 7718 cannot be given retroactive effect as it does not
provide that it should be given retroactive to pre-existing contracts.—Can this amendment be
given retroactive effect to the challenged contract so that it may now be considered a
permissible negotiated contract? I submit that it cannot be. R.A. No. 7718 does not provide that
it should be given retroactive effect to preexisting contracts. Section 18 thereof says that it “shall
take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.” If it were the intention of Congress to give said act retroactive effect then it would
have so expressly provided. Article 4 of cthe Civil Code provides that “[l]aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.”
Same; Same; Presumption is that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly
appears or is clearly, plainly, and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied.— The
presumption is that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is
clearly, plainly, and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied. In every case of doubt,
the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive application of laws. (Ruben E. Agpalo,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 225 [2d ed. 1990]).
MENDOZA,J., Concurring:
Political Law; Taxpayer’s Suit; Taxpayer has no standing to question legality of contract where
it did not involve a disbursement of public funds.—The building to the lessor, did not involve
a disbursement of public funds so as to give a taxpayer standing to question the legality of the
contract. I see no substantial difference, as far as the standing of taxpayers to question public
contracts is concerned, between the contract there and the build-lease-transfer (BLT) contract
being questioned by petitioners in this case.
Same; Same; Petitioners have no standing to bring the suit as citizens.—In the cases in which
citizens were authorized to sue, this Court found standing because it thought the constitutional
claims pressed for decision to be of “transcendental importance,” as in fact it subsequently
granted relief to petitioners by invalidating the challenged statutes or governmental actions.
Thus in the Lotto case relied upon by the majority for upholding petitioners’ standing, this
Court took into account the “paramount public interest” involved which “immeasurably
affect[ed] the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people ... and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system.” Accordingly, the
Court invalidated the contract for the operation of lottery.
Same; Same; Finding petitioner’s substantive contentions to be without merit, they must be
held to be without standing. The holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from
the finding that they did not have a cause of action.—In the case at bar, the Court precisely
finds the opposite by finding petitioners’ substantive contentions to be without merit. To the
extent therefore that a party’s standing is affected by a determination of the substantive merit
of the case or a preliminary estimate thereof, petitioners in the case at barmust be held to be
without standing. This is in line with our ruling in Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v.
Aquino and In re Bermudez where we dismissed citizens’ actions on the ground that
petitioners had no personality to sue and their petitions did not state a cause of action. The
holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have
a cause of action.
Same; Same; Citizen’s actions may be allowed if a party shows that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the government.—
In order that citizens’ actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436, G.R. No. 114222 April 6,
1995
Marcos vs. Manglapus
Political Law; Bill of Rights; Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel; The right to return to one’s
country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, though it may
well be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law which is part of the
law of the land.—The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel,
but it is our wellconsidered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution]. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, i.e.,against being “arbitrarily deprived” thereof [Art. 12 (4)].
Same; Same; The constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners are not absolute and
inflexible, they admit of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important
public interests.—The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek
to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of
the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are
sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor
inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression,
although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements
of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October
7, 1988].
Same; Separation of Powers; Executive Powers; The grant of execu-tive power means a grant
of all executive powers.—The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of
the three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v.
Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], “the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government.” [At 157]. Thus, the 1987 constitution explicitly provides that
“[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines” [Art. VI, Sec. 1],
“[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines” [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and
“[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law” [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. These provisions not only establish a separation of
powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary
legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the
Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626, (1910)] pointed
out “a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the
judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government.” [At 631-632.] If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by
two chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the
judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive
power which is vested in one official—the President.
Same; Same; Same; The President; The powers granted to the President are not limited to those
powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution.—It would not be accurate, however, to
state that “executive power” is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state
as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the
office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides
that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execu-tion of any provision of law, e.g.,his
power over the country’s foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although
the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specificpowers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power.”
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Commander-In-Chief Powers: The President can exercise
Commander-In-Chief powers in order to keep the peace and maintain public order and
security even in the absence of an emergency.—More particularly, this case calls for the exercise
of the President’s powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The Ameri-can Presidency.] The
power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-
in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal
threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of
peace is not in any way disminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the
enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presi-dent’s exercising as
Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpusor declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The President has the power under the Constitution to bar the
Marcoses from returning to our country.—That the President has the power under the
Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning has been recognized by members of the
Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and
signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the
Philippines “as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable
proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the
Constitution and our laws.” [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does
not question the President’s power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines,
rather, it appeals to the President’s sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in
his country. What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions,
or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present
one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing
in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand
should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.
Same; Same; Same; Power of Judicial Review; Political Question Doctrine; The present
Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry.—Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Goverment.” [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this
wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political
question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. The present Constitution
limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court’s jurisdiction the
determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people
themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the
President’s recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident
such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us
that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution
under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the
people.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the exercise of the power of judicial review, the function of the
court is merely to check, not to supplant the Executive.—There is nothing in the case before us
that precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen military establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular
the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the
controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the proverbial final straw that would break the camel’s back. With these before her, the President
determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in
abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official prohibiting their return.
concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In
this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution, defining “judicial power,” which specifically empowers the courts to determine FERNAN, C.J., Concurring
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang
v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448] that: Article VII of the [1935]
Political Law; Executive Department; Presidential Power; Presidential powers and
Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
prerogatives are not fixed and their limits are dependent on the imperatives of events and
corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.—Presidential powers
underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.
and prerogatives are not fixed but fluctuate. They are not derived solely from a particular
However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it
constitutional clause or article or from an express statutory grant. Their limits are likely to
goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
theories of law. History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded to
sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has
the Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative national
so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally
emergency. Many terms are applied to these powers: “residual,” “inherent,” “moral,”
supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check—not to
“implied,” “aggregate,” “emergency.” Whatever they may be called, the fact is that these
supplant—the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional
powers exist, as they must if the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
out effectively and efficiently. It is in this context that the power of the President to allow or
Same; Same; Same; Same; The President did not act arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically disallow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines should be viewed. By reason of its impact
in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to national interest and on national peace and order in these admittedly critical times, said question cannot be
welfare, and in prohibiting their return.—We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, withdrawn from the competence of the Executive Branch to decide.
from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein
petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual basis for the President’s GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting
decision. The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not
besieged from within by a wellorganized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in
Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of Political Law; The President; The Judiciary; Power of Judicial Review; Political Question; For a
military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented political question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power exclusively vested in the
history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier President or Congress, the exercise of which the courts should not examine or prohibit. The
narrated in thisponenciabolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time issue as to the propriety of the President’s decision to prohibit the Marcoses from returning is
would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more not a political question.—The most often quoted definition of political question was made by
chaos. As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who penned the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Significantly, the President herself has stated that the Court has the last word when it comes to
Baker v. Carr (369 US 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962]). The ingredients of a political constitutional liberties and that she would abide by our decision.
question as formulated in Baker v. Carr are: “It is apparent that several formulations which
Same; The Judiciary; Judicial Power; Political Questions; The constitutional provision defining
vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political
judicial power was enacted to preclude the Court from using the political question doctrine as
question, which identifies it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent
a means to avoid controversial issues.—The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
Constitution provides: “Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” This
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
new provision was enacted to preclude this Court from using the political question doctrine as
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
a means to avoid having to make decisions simply because they are too controversial,
adherence to a political decision already made; or potentiality of embarassment from
displeasing to the President or Congress, inordinately unpopular, or which may be ignored
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” For a political
and not enforced. The framers of the Constitution believed that the free use of the political
question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President
question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on prudence,
or Congress, the exercise of which the court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary
institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear that it
or inherent power against a civil right which claim is not found in a specific provision is
was extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike
dangerous. Neither should we validate a roving commission allowing public officials to strike
down an exercise of authoritarian power. Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and
where they please and to override everything which to them represents evil. The entire
their counsel were among the most vigorous critics of Mr. Marcos (the main petitioner) and his
Government is bound by the rule of law. The respondents have not pointed to any provision
use of the political question doctrine. The Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now
of the Constitution which commits or vests the determination of the question raised to us solely
precluded by its mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a
in the President.
convenient resort to the political question doctrine. We are compelled to decide what would
have been non-justiceable under our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters. This
is not to state that there can be no more political questions which we may refuse to resolve.
Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Liberty of Abode; The liberty of abode and of changing the same
There are still some political questions which only the President, Congress, or a plebiscite may
within the limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon a lawful order of the court, not
decide. Definitely, the issue before us is not one of them.
of an executive officer, not even the President.—Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states
categorically that the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel; The right to come home must be
law may be impaired only upon a lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not even more preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel.—With all due respect for the
by the President. Section 6 further provides that the right to travel, and this obviously includes majority opinion, I disagree with its dictum on the right to travel. I do not think we should
the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines, cannot be impaired except in the interest differentiate the right to return home from the right to go abroad or to move around in the
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. Philippines. If at all, the right to come home must bemore preferred than any other aspect of
the right to travel. It was precisely the banning by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court has the last word when it comes to Constitutional
Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of other “undesirables” and “threats to national
liberties.—There is also no disrespect for a Presidential determination if we grant the petition.
security” during that unfortunate period which led the framers of our present Constitution not
We would simply be applying the Constitution, in the preservation and defense of which all
only to re-enact but to strengthen the declaration of this right. Media often asks, “what else is
of us in Government, the President and Congress included, are sworn to participate.
new?” I submit that we now have a freedom loving and humane regime. I regret that the
Court’s decision in this case sets back the gains that our country has achieved in terms of
human rights, especially human rights for those whom we do not like or those who are against
us.
Same; Same; Same; Opposition to the government, no matter how odious and disgusting is not
sufficient to deny or ignore a constitutional right.—It is indeed regrettable that some followers
of the former President are conducting a campaign to sow discord and to divide the nation.
Opposition to the government no matter how odious or disgusting is, however, insufficient
ground to ignore a constitutional guarantee.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Denial of travel papers is not among the powers granted to the
government; There is no law prescribing exile to a foreign land as a penalty for hurting the
nation.—Of course, the Government can act. It can have Mr. Marcos arrested and tried in court.
The Government has more than ample powers under existing law to deal with a person who
transgresses the peace and imperils public safety. But the denial of travel papers is not one of
those powers because the Bill of Rights says so. There is no law prescribing exile in a foreign
land as the penalty for hurting the Nation.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting
Political Law; Bill of Rights; Petitioner, as a Filipino, is entitled to return to or live or die in his
own country.—It is my belief that the petitioner, as a citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to
return to and live—and die—in his own country. I say this with a heavy heart but say it
nonetheless. That conviction is not diminished one whit simply because many believe Marcos
to be beneath contempt and undeserving of the very liberties he flouted when he was the
absolute ruler of this land.
Same; Same; Same; The government failed dismally to show that the return of Marcos, dead or
alive, would pose a threat to national security.—In about two hours of briefing, the government
failed dismally to show that the return of Marcos dead or alive would pose a threat to the
national security as it had alleged. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on
mere conjectures of political and economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete
evidence to back up their apprehensions. Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the
conclusion that there exist “factual bases for the President’s decision” to bar Marcos’s return.
That is not my recollection of the impressions of the Court after that hearing.
Same; Same; Same; Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and liberty of abode that
Aquino then invoked.—Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also wanted to come back to the
Philippines against the prohibitions of the government then, Marcos is entitled to the same
right to travel and the liberty of abode that his adversary invoked. These rights are guaranteed
by the Constitution to allindividuals, including the patriot and the homesick and the prodigal
son returning, and tyrants and charlatans and scoundrels of every stripe.
PARAS, J., Dissenting
Political Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Travel; The former President, as a Filipino citizen, has the
right to return to his own country, except only if prevented by the demands of national safety
and national security.—There is no dispute that the former President is still a Filipino citizen
and both under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines, he has the right to return to his own country exceptonly if prevented by the
demands of national safety and national security. Our Armed Forces have failed to prove this
danger. They are bereft of hard evidence, and all they can rely on is sheer speculation. True,
there is some danger but there is no showing as to the extent.
PADILLA, J., Dissenting
Political Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Travel; Police Power; With or without restricting
legislation, the right to travel may be impaired or restricted in the interest of national security,
public safety and public health; Power of the state to restrict the right to travel finds abundant
support in police power.—Petitioners contend that, in the absence of restricting legislation, the
right to travel is absolute. I do not agree. It is my view that, with or without restricting
legislation, the interest of national security, public safety or public health can justify and even
require restrictions on the right to travel, and that the clause “as may be provided by law”
contained in Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution merely declares a constitutional leave
or permission for Congress to enact laws that may restrict the right to travel in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health. I do not, therefore, accept the petitioners’
submission that, in the absence of enabling legislation, the Philippine Government is powerless
to restrict travel even when such restriction is demanded by national security, public safety or
public health. The power of the State, in particular cases, to restrict travel of its citizens finds
abundant support in the police power of the State, which may be exercised to preserve and
maintain government as well as promote the general welfare of the greatest number of people.
And yet, the power of the State, acting through a government in authority at any given time,
to restrict travel, even if founded on police power, cannot be absolute and unlimited under all
circumstances, much less, can it be arbitrary and irrational.
Same; Same; Same; The government failed to present convincing evidence to defeat Marcos’
right to return to this country.—I have given these questions a searching examination. I have
carefully weighed and assessed the “briefing” given the Court by the highest military
authorities of the land last 28 July 1989. I have searched, but in vain, for convincing evidence
that would defeat and overcome the right of Mr. Marcos as a Filipino to return to this country.
It appears to me that the apprehensions entertained and expressed by the respondents,
including those conveyed through the military, do not, with all due respect, escalate to
proportions of national security or public safety. They appear to be more speculative than real,
obsessive rather than factual. Moreover, such apprehensions even if translated into realities,
would be “under control,” as admitted to the Court by said military authorities, given the
resources and facilities at the command of government. But, above all, the Filipino people
themselves, in my opinion, will know how to handle any situation brought about by a political
recognition of Mr. Marcos’ right to return, and his actual return, to this country. The Court, in
short, should not accept respondents’ general apprehensions, concerns and perceptions at face
value, in the light of a countervailing and even irresistible, specific, clear, demandable, and
enforceable right asserted by a Filipino.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting
Political Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Travel; The right to return to one’s own country cannot
be distinguished from the right to travel and freedom of abode.—I also find quite strained what
the majority would have as the “real issues” facing the Court: “The right to return to one’s
country,” pitted against “the right of travel and freedom of abode,” and their supposed
distinctions under international law, as if such distinctions under international law, in truth
and in fact exist. There is only one right involved here, whether under municipal or
international law: the right of travel, whether within one’s own country, or to another, and the
right to return thereto. The Constitution itself makes no distinctions; let, then, no one make a
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.
Same; The President; Bill of Rights; While the President may exercise powers not expressly
granted by the Constitution but may necessarily be implied therefrom, the latter must yield to
the paramountcy of the Bill of Rights.—While the Chief Executive exercises powers not found
expressly in the Charter, but has them by constitutional implication, the latter must yield to the
paramountcy of the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando: “A regime of constitutionalism is
thus unthinkable without an assurance of the primacy of a bill of rights. Precisely a constitution
exists to assure that in the discharge of the governmental functions, the dignity that is the
birthright of every human being is duly safeguarded. To be true to its primordial aim, a
constitution must lay down the boundaries beyond which lies forbidden territory for state
action.” My brethren have not demonstrated, to my satisfaction, how the President may
override the direct mandate of the fundamental law. It will not suffice, so I submit, to say that
the President’s plenitude of powers, as provided in the Constitution, or by sheer constitutional
implication, prevail over express constitutional commands. “Clearly,” so I borrow J.B.L. Reyes,
in his own right, a titan in the field of public law, “this argument . . . rests . . . not upon the text
of the [Constitution] . . . but upon a mere inference therefrom,” For if it were, indeed, the intent
of the Charter to create an exception, that is, by Presidential action, to the right of travel or
liberty of abode and of changing the same—other than what it explicitly says already (“limits
prescribed by law” or “upon lawful order of the court”)—the Charter could have specifically
declared so. As it is, the lone deterrents to the right in question are: (1) decree of statute, or (2)
lawful judicial mandate. Had the Constitution intended a third exception, that is, by
Presidential initiative, it could have so averred. It would also have made the Constitution, as
far as limits to the said right are concerned, come full circle: Limits by legislative, judicial, and
executive processes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the new Constitution, the right to travel may be
impaired only within the limits provided by law; The President has been divested of the
implied power to impair the right to travel.—Obviously, none of the twin legal bars exist. There
is no law banning the Marcoses from the country; neither is there any court decree banishing
him from Philippine territory. It is to be noted that under the 1973 Constitution, the right to
travel is worded as follows: Sec. 5. The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health. Under this provision, the right may be abated: (1) upon a lawful
court order, or (2) “when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health.” Arguably, the provision enabled the Chief Executive (Marcos) to moderate movement
of citizens, which, Bernas says, justified such practices as “hamletting,” forced relocations, or
the establishment of free-fire zones. The new Constitution, however, so it clearly appears, has
divested the Executive’s implied power. And, as it so appears, the right may be impaired only
“within the limits provided by law.” The President is out of the picture.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The determination of whether Marcos’ return poses a threat to
national security should not be left solely to the Chief Executive, the Court itself must be
satisfied that the threat is not only clear but also present.—Admittedly, the Chief Executive is
the “sole” judge of all matters affecting national security and foreign affairs; the Bill of Rights—
precisely, a form of check against excesses of officialdom—is, in this case, a formidable barrier
against Presidential action. (Even on matters of State security, this Constitution prescribes
limits to Executive’s powers as commander-in-chief.) Second: Assuming, ex hypothesi, that the
President may legally act, the question that emerges is: Has it been proved that Marcos, or his
return, will, in fact, interpose a threat to the “national security, public safety, or public health?”
What appears in the records are vehement insistences that Marcos does pose a threat to the
national good—and yet, at the same time, we have persistent claims, made by the military top
brass during the lengthy closed-door hearing on July 25, 1989, that “this Government will not
fall” should the former first family in exile step on Philippine soil. Which is which? At any rate,
it is my opinion that we can not leave that determination solely to the Chief Executive. The
Court itself must be content that the threat is not only clear, but more so, present. Marcos vs.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Lim, Sr. vs. Felix
Political Law; Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrant of Arrest; Probable Cause; A judge
may rely upon the fiscal’s certification of the existence of a probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. The certification however, does not bind the judge to come
out with the warrant of arrest.—This is not a novel question. In the case of Placer v. Villanueva
(126 SCRA 463 [1983]), we ruled that a judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification of the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the
certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. This decision
interpreted the “search and seizure” provision of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “x x x
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce x x x.” We
ruled: “x x x
The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Warrant of arrest, when issued.—If the judge be
satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer
that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable grbund to
believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest. Under
this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause,
he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has
been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil. 1) and Amarga v. Abbas (98 Phil. 739). And this
evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15,
16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other
evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the information
filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of
probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the
required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the case
where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In satisfying the existence of a probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
witness.—What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him iii arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Meaning of “personal determination by the judge”; The phrase
“personal determination by the judge” means, the determination of probable cause is a
function of the judge; second, the preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the
judge; and third, judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released.—The decision in People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July
25, 1990), reiterated the above interpretation of “personal” determination by the Judge: “We
emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that “xxxno search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge x x x’ (Article III, Section 2, Constitution) First, the determination of probable cause is a
function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election
Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination. Second,
the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to
make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the
Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all
other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor’s certification which are material in
assisting the Judge to make his determination. And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should
distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the
course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrasment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; RTC judges no longer have authority to conduct preliminary
investigations, said authority was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Neither did the 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure restore
that authority to judges of the RTCs.—The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v.
Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [1989]): ‘Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First
Instance) no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That authority, at
one time reposed in them under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964,
(See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, cited in Moran,
Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from them by the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11,
1984) which deleted all provisions granting that power to said Judges. We had occasion to
point this out in Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other
basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is ‘not a judicial
function x x x (but) part of the prosecution’s job, a function of the executive,’(2) that whenever
‘there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are
counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them,’ and the fact ‘that a certain
power is granted does not necessary mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised. The
1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective on October 1,
1988, (The 1988 Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin Today of October 29, 1988)
did not restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did not in
fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary
investigations. This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost
the power to make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether
probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant). Such a
power—indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power—has been and remains vested in every
judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the present [1987]
Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing
it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule or Statute to revoke. The distinction must,
therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations
to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or
information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine
whether there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added
that this distinction accords, rather than conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both law
and rule, in restricting to judges the G.R. No. 116437. March 3, 1997.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLITO ANDAN y
HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigation; Exclusionary Rule; Evidence; The
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.—Plainly, any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain
silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to
be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible
in evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is
forcefully apparent. The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation
also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired.
Same; Same; Same; An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e, when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with
an alleged offense.—It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to
“[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense.” An investigation begins
when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular
person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a
confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. As intended by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, this covers “investigation conducted by police authorities which
will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such
other police agencies in our government.”
Same; Same; Same; Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine; Where the police failed to inform the
accused of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated, his confession
secured thereby, as well as the fruits of his uncounselled confession, is inadmissible in
evidence.—Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the
police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when
he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So
too were the two bags recovered from appellant’s house. x x x The victim’s bags were the fruits
of appellant’s uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also
inadmissible.
Same; Same; Same; When the accused talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights.—The
police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad
visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They
went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded
for forgiveness. x x x Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that
appellant’s confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has
“operational supervision and control” over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, appellant’s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police
authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously,
freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that
appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not
violate his constitutional rights.
Same; Same; Same; The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime.— Thus, it
has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights
under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant’s confession to the mayor was correctly
admitted by the trial court.
Same; Same; Same; Confessions to the media in response to questions by news reporters, not
by the police or any other investigating officer, are admissible.—Appellant’s confessions to the
media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions
by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual—it governs the relationship between the individual and the
State.—We rule that appellant’s verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section
12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with
the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the
State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of
any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that
government has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of
Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
Same; Rape; Absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the commission of rape nor
does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen.—We have also ruled in the past
that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the commission of rape nor does
the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. What is essential is that there be
penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. Dr. Aguda testified that the fact of
penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the victim’s vagina. The lacerations were
fresh and could not have been caused by any injury in the first autopsy. People vs. Andan, 269
SCRA 95, G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997authority to order arrest, recognize the function to be
judicial in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The court may require that the record of the preliminary
investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is a probable cause which will warrant
the issuance of a warrant of arrest.—x x x in the recent case of People v. Delgado, et al. (G.R.
Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990) there is a statement that the judge may rely on the
resolution of COMELEC to file the information by the same token that it may rely on the
certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation in the
issuance of the warrant of arrest. We, however, also reiterated that “xxx the court may require
that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is
probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.” (Section 2, Article III,
Constitution). Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor’s certification
presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted
to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the
investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not on the strength of the
certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent judge committed a grave error when he issued
the questioned order without having before him any other basis for his personal determination
of the existence of a probable cause.—Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave
error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor’s certification and issued the questioned Order
dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of
the existence of a probable cause.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELMER MAPA Y DE GULA,
accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions
in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubts on the culpability of the appellant
and his guilt for the crime charged.—The inconsistencies were never explained by the
prosecution. Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the culpability of the appellant and his guilt for the crime
charged.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The evident falsehood spread on the records before the Court creates
a nagging doubt on the culpability of the accused-appellant.—The evident falsehood spread
on the records before Us creates a nagging doubt on the culpability of the accused-appellant.
It is sad to state that many innocent people become victims of physical violence and/or
harassment from police officers who are supposed to be the protectors of the citizenry. We
cannot condone such practices to continue in a civilized society.
Same; Same; Same; Court cannot close its eyes nor ignore the many reports of false arrests of
innocent persons for extortion purposes and blackmail or to satisfy some hidden personal
resentment of the informer or law enforcer against the accused.—While this Court commends
the efforts of law enforcement agencies who are engaged in the difficult and dangerous task of
apprehending and prosecuting drugtraffickers, it cannot, however, close its eyes nor ignore the
many reports of false arrests of innocent persons for extortion purposes and blackmail, or to
satisfy some hidden personal resentment of the "informer" or law enforcer against the accused.
Courts should be vigilant and alert to recognize trumped up drug charges lest an innocent
man, on the basis of planted evidence, be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for
drug offenses. People vs. Mapa, 220 SCRA 670, G.R. No. 91014 March 31, 1993
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK,
petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO,
Constitutional Law; Search warrants; Corporations; Only party affected may contest legality
of seizure effected by search warrants.—Officers of certain corporations, from which
documents, papers and things were seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the seizures because said corporations have personalities distinct
and separate from those of said officers. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby. The objection to an unlawful search is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Same; Evidence: When illegally seized evidence is admissible.—Officers of certain corporations
cannot validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations since the right to object to their
admission in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to which the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.
Same; Requisites for issuing search warrants.—The Constitution provides that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge, and that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.
Same; General search warrants.—Search warrants, issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a violation of Central Bank laws,
tariff and customs laws, Tax Code and Revised Penal Code do not satisfy the constitutional
requirements because no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. It was
impossible for the judges, who issued the warrants, to have found the existence of probable
cause, which presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts or committed specific omissions in violation of a
specific penal provision.
Same; Why general warrants are outlawed.—General search warrants are outlawed because
they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence
at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
Same; Provision of Revised Rules of Court.—To prevent the issuance of general warrants, the
Supreme Court amended the Old Rules of Court by providing in the Revised Rules of Court
that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense".
Same; Warrants not describing particularly the things to be seized.—Search warrants
authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records "showing all the business
transactions" of certain persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal,
contravene the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be
particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants.
Same; Evidence; Abandonment of Moncado ruling; Illegally seized documents are not
admissible in evidence.—The Moncado ruling, that illegally seized documents, papers and
things are admissible in evidence, must be abandoned. The exclusion of such evidence is the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. If there is competent evidence to establish
probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the constitutional
requirements If he has no such evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there
is a probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation for the issuance in that case is the necessity of fishing for evidence of the
commission of a crime. Such a fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause. Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
RETIRED SPO4 BIENVENIDO LAUD, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Reprimand; Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which
provides that “[t]he imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice Executive Judge of an
administrative penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his
position as such.”—Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that
“[t]he imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice Executive Judge of an administrative
penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his position as
such,” Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no authority to act as Vice Executive Judge and
accordingly issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 in view of the Court’s Resolution in Dee C.
Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta, 585 SCRA 93 (2009), wherein he was administratively
penalized with fines of P15,000.00 and P5,000.00. While the Court does agree that the
imposition of said administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s authority to
act as Vice Executive Judge, it must be qualified that the abstraction of such authority would
not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09--14407 considering that
Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts
would, nonetheless, remain valid.
Same; De Facto Officers; Words and Phrases; A de facto officer is one who derives his
appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive
office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.—Funa v. Agra, 691 SCRA 196 (2013), defines
who a de facto officer is and explains that his acts are just as valid for all purposes as those of
a de jure officer, insofar as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned,
viz.: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority
to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He
may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging [his] duties under color
of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, insofar as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned.
Same; Same; The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is premised on the reality that third
persons cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office and,
as such, have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally
such.—The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is premised on the reality that third persons
cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office and, as such,
have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally such. Public
interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid
statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as distinguished from the officer in
question — is concerned. Indeed, it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de facto
doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but
rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of
persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrants; Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases
by the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of Manila and Quezon City.—Section 12, Chapter V of
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special
criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These special criminal cases pertain to
those “involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions, as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs
Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and
included herein by the Supreme Court.” Search warrant applications for such cases may be
filed by “the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and
the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF),” and “personally endorsed by the heads of such
agencies.” As in ordinary search warrant applications, they “shall particularly describe therein
the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules
of Court.” “The Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on official leave of
absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice Executive Judges” are authorized
to act on such applications and “shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in
places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.”
Same; Same; Same; In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.—
In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) provides that no search warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Same; Same; Same; Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search warrant shall
not be issued except upon probable cause in connection with one (1) specific offense.—Section
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search warrant shall not be issued except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense: SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; In determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances
must be personally examined by the judge in their totality, together with a judicious
recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case.—In light
of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the existence of
probable cause had been met. That a “considerable length of time” attended the search
warrant’s application from the crime’s commission does not, by and of itself, negate the
veracity of the applicant’s claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly
observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal and natural reluctance
to get involved in a criminal case. Ultimately, in determining the existence of probable cause,
the facts and circumstances must be personally examined by the judge in their totality, together
with a judicious recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities attending a criminal
case. To the Court’s mind, the supposed delay in the search warrant’s application does not
dilute the probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has
been sufficiently met.
Same; Same; Same; Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the
place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement.—“[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended
and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known
to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the
officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Forum Shopping; There is forum shopping when a litigant
repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable
decision if not in one court, then in another.—There is forum shopping when a litigant
repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable
decision if not in one court, then in another. Forum shopping cannot be said to have been
committed in this case considering the various points of divergence attending the search
warrant application before the Manila-RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one, the
witnesses presented in each application were different. Likewise, the application filed in
Manila was in connection with Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any crime.
Finally, and more importantly, the places to be searched were different — that in Manila sought
the search of the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for a particular area in the
Laud Gold Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of facts and circumstances between the
two applications, the rule against forum shopping was therefore not violated. Laud vs. People,
741 SCRA 239, G.R. No. 199032 November 19, 2014
RODEL LUZ y ONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 respondent.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A.
No. 4136); Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter.—Arrest is the taking of a person into custody
in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.It is effected
by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to
the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that
there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter: SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s
License.—Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director
shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant
thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act,
confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the
Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not
exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt.
The Petition was originally captioned as “Rodel Luz y Ong v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon.
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Naga City.” However, under Section 4, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the petition must state the full name of the appealing party as the
petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges
thereof either as petitioners or respondents period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended,
and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days
from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his
license.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Procedure Being Observed in Flagging Down Vehicles During the
Conduct of Checkpoints.—The Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manualprovides
the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule
is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall
undertake the following, when applicable: x x x m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately
issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in
prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicle’s
occupants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Custodial Interrogation; The roadside questioning of a motorist does
not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest.—In Berkemer
v. McCarty, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside
questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered
custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the
questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the
procedure is conducted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant
of arrest, if any.—This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty
of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against
them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied
with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Miranda Doctrine; In Berkemer vs. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the
U.S. Court noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due
to a traffic violation.—In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must
also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation: The purposes of the safeguards
prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into
confessing, to relieve the “inherently compelling pressures” “generated by the custodial setting
itself,” “which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist,” and as much as possible to
free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact,
whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-
custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of
persons suspected of felonies. If it were true that petitioner was already deemed “arrested”
when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he was waiting for his ticket, then
there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time—after the police
officers allegedly discovered the drugs—as he was already in their custody.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; Instances When a Warrantless Search is
Allowed.—The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in “plain view”; (iii)
search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a “stop
and frisk” search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.—Whether consent
to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all
the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person
giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the
defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and
positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily
given. In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at
three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Stop and Frisk; The stop and frisk is merely a limited protective
search of outer clothing for weapons.—Neither does the search qualify under the “stop and
frisk” rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or
unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and
frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; In Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998), the
U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and
correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not
authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car.—In Knowles v. Iowa,the U.S. Supreme
Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues
a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct
a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown
search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct
minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.—The
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.Any evidence obtained in violation of
said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of
no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government. Luz vs. People, 667 SCRA 421, G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The rule according great weight, even finality at
times, to the trial court’s findings of fact does hold sway when it appears in the record that
facts and circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied in a case under appeal.—Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality
at times, to the trial court’s findings of fact does hold sway when, as here, it appears in the
record that facts and circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal. Corollary, it is basic that an appeal in
criminal prosecutions throws the whole case wide open for review, inclusive of the matter of and concluded that the petitioner was then drunk mainly because of the cases of beer found at
credibility and appreciation of evidence. Peace officers and traffic enforcers, like other public the trunk of the vehicle.
officials and employees are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution and
Same; Resistance and Serious Disobedience; The two (2) key elements of resistance and serious
attention, which careful men usually exercise in the management of their own affairs.
disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) That a person
in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order
to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his
Criminal Law; Land Transportation and Traffic Code; Traffic Violations; Reckless Driving;
agent.—Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-
Swerving; Words and Phrases; “Swerving,” as ordinarily understood, refers to a movement
off between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latter’s refusal
wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or
to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain
movement. The act may become punishable when there is a sign indicating that swerving is
view search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful
prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature of reckless driving, a concept defined under
order. He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would
Republic Act (RA) No. 4136.—In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled
make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down,
to stop, to be precise, petitioner has not committed any crime or suspected of having committed
committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal
one. “Swerving,” as ordinarily understood, refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from
activity. He did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so
a lane to another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or movement. The act may
required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under
become punishable when there is a sign indicating that swerving is prohibited or where
Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
swerving partakes the nature of reckless driving, a concept defined under RA 4136, as:
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender
SECTION 48. Reckless Driving.—No person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway
resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.
recklessly or without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing,
curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and the conditions of the atmosphere Land Transportation and Traffic Code; Checkpoints; There is, to stress, nothing in Republic
and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the safety or rights of any person or so as to Act (RA) No. 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and
cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway. his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search.—There is, to stress,
nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior
his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search. And it bears to
let alone constitutive of reckless driving. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act
emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that would allow
must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a
what jurisprudence refers to as a “stop and frisk” action. As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the
willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.—Swerving is not necessarily
only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle was not because he has
indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving. To constitute the
committed a crime, but because of their intention to invite him to Station 9 so he could rest
offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the
before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the apprehending officers, in an
operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
act indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle and, in
required. Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a “no swerving or overtaking zone.”
the process of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the face. None of the police
Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the
officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioner’s allegation about being physically hurt
streets are usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and
before being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. What the
property to third persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped the petitioner’s car, they
policemen claimed was that it took the three (3) of them to subdue the fifty-five-year-old
did not issue any ticket for swerving as required under Section 29 of RA 4136. Instead, they
petitioner. Both actions were done in excess of their authority granted under RA 4136.
inspected the vehicle, ordered the petitioner and his companions to step down of their pick-up
Criminal Law; Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013; Drunk Driving; The Anti-Drunk
and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (Republic Act [RA] No. 10586) which also penalizes driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUIA), a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the “act of operating
a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected
to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the
(Department of Health [DOH]), the (National Police Commission [NAPOLCOM]) and the
(Department of Transportation and Communications [DOTC]).—It cannot be emphasized
enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are differing
concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty whether a
person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under
the influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of course changed with the approval in May
2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA), a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the “act of
operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being
subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the
[DOH], the [NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a
driver of a private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who
has BAC [blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said
driver is driving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the prism of RA 10586, petitioner
cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason:
he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during
the period material the threshold level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC
of 0.05% or over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC, penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar as they
are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136.
Verily, even by force of Art. 22 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner
could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, even if
the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.
Same; Same; Same; The absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while
driving coupled with the forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues
against or at least cast doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.—
Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason. It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account. Given the deviation of the
police officers from the standard and usual procedure in dealing with traffic violation by
perceived drivers under the influence of alcohol and executing an arrest, the blind reliance and
simplistic invocation by the trial court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the
conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed in People v. Ambrosio, 427 SCRA 312
(2004), the presumption of regularity is merely just that, a presumption disputable by contrary
proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. And
to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence
that prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offender’s culpability.
In the present case, the absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while
driving coupled with the forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues
against or at least cast doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.
Same; Criminal Liability; In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance
tips in favor of innocence or at least in favor of the milder form of criminal liability.—In case
of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or at
least in favor of the milder form of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic,
almost elementary, that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution
which must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. Sydeco
vs. People, 740 SCRA 288, G.R. No. 202692 November 12, 2014
G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN,
accused-appellant.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; The plain import of the language of the
Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the
same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are
normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of
arrest.—In People v. Ramos, this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers
only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. x x x This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition
against all searches and seizures as it operates only against “unreasonable” searches and
seizures. The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid
warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the
search and seizure clause is that between person and police must stand the protective authority
of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our
arrest. rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of
common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of evidence
Same; Same; Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement; A statute, rule or situation which allows
is required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly
issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by
construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law.—
virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body
to be searched. In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable
and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or
cause to be present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and
situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant
used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based
must perforce be strictly construed and their application limited only to cases specifically
on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and
committed.
would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often
violated. Same; Same; Same; Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; There is no valid warrantless arrest where the
accused was apprehended while merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner
Same; Same; Same.—The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law: 1.
that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
that she was committing a crime and it was only when the informant pointed to the accused
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; 2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the
and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the
elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
suspect.—Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence
crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground
must be immediately apparent; and (d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without
for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only
further search. 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s
when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as
occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6.
clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to
Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
Same; Same; Same; “Probable Cause,” Explained; Words and Phrases.—Although probable informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It arrests.
likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
Same; Same; Same; Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine; Where the arrest is incipiently illegal,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s),
it logically follows that the subsequent search is similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
lawful arrest.—Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
warrantless search of accused-appellant’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-
Same;Same;Same;Same; In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which his illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not
knowledge is technically nil.—It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could
not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree” and,
therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on
evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being
contrary to law.—Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be
incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.
Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence
produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to
law.
Same; Same; Same; Where the implied acquiescence to the search could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances, the same is
considered
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.—While in principle we
agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant—based
on the transcript quoted above—did not voluntarily consent to Bolonia’s search of his
belongings. Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering
that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent
based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.” (Emphasis
supplied) Thus, accused-appellant’s lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a
waiver of her constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search.
Same; Same; The purpose of the rule that search warrants must particularly describe the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized is to limit the things to be seized to those
and only those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be made.—Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the
things to be seized to those and only those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave
the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; The plea during arraignment and
active participation by an accused in the trial do not cure the illegality of the search and
transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof.—While it may be argued that by
entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in the trial, accused-appellant
may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to the
inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the instant case
for the following reasons: 1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the
illegality of the arrest as her plea of “not guilty” and participation in the trial are indications of
her voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search and
transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend
this far. 2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible
upon failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant
filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecution’s Formal Offer of
Evidence.
Same; Same; While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.—The exclusion of such evidence is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. While conceding that the officer making the unlawful
search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that
most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is “the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction” against abuse. This approach is based on the
justification made by Judge Learned Hand that “only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be
repressed.” Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at
times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. People vs.
Aruta, 288 SCRA 626, G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998
G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997.*
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Appeal; Jurisdiction; For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction
in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account.—
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the
penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty is
reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to us, and not the Court of Appeals,
pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), in relation
to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution and
Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of Rules of Court. The term “life imprisonment” as used in Section 9 of
B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include
reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside for having been rendered
without jurisdiction.—We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been
rendered without jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us,
with the petition for review as petitioner’s Brief for the Appellant, the comment thereon by the
Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the parties
as their Supplemental Briefs.
Constitutional Law; Admissions; Even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived
his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing,
neither was it executed in the presence of counsel.—Finally, even assuming that petitioner
admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio,
such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section
12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on
petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have
requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if
petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel,
the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of
counsel.
Same; Searches and Seizures; The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to
certain exceptions.—The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant
is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued
warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part: Sec. 5.—Arrest, without warrant;
when lawful—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped.*** A warrantless arrest under
the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one “in flagrante
delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest.
Same; Same; Instances where warrantless searches may be effected.—Turning to valid
warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of
moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search
incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.”
Same; Same; Trial Court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest.—At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-
and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches
differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in
their allowable scope.
Same; Same; In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made.—In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent
arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in
a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before
a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which
was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used
as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence. Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159, G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO MENGOTE, accused-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; Credibility of Witnesses; In the absence of any showing that
the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witness was flawed, Court is bound by its
assessment.—We are not unmindful of the crucial importance in a rape case of determining the
credibility of both the victim herself and her version as to how the crime charged was
committed but we repose almost important, it was not substantiated. The law presumes every
man to be sane and if the accused interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of
establishing such fact rests upon him. Insanity must be proven by clear and positive evidence.
As an exempting circumstance, insanity means that the accused must have been deprived
completely of reason and freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime or be
incapable of entertaining criminal intent.
Same; Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstance; Plea of Guilty; It has been held that a plea of
guilty made after arraignment and after trial had began does not entitle the accused to have
such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance; In cases where the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.—It is clear that appellant
initially denied that he molested his daughter although he later stated that he was admitting
the crime and was repenting what he did praying that a lower sentence be imposed and that
the death penalty is not the penalty to be imposed. The trial court did not act favorably on his
offer because the plea of guilty should be unconditional, i.e., not conditioned on his getting a
lower penalty. It has been held that a plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had
began does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance.
Moreover, in cases where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
Same; Same; Same; Court has ruled in numerous cases that an errorless recollection of a
harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness especially when she is recounting details
of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape.—The alleged inconsistencies in the
testimony of the victim do not cast doubt on her credibility. They refer to minor and
insubstantial details, e.g., whether the accused embraced Jenny first before kissing her or kissed
her first and then embraced her, or whether or not Jenny tried to evade her father by going to
the kitchen near the water jar. They do not detract from the substance of her testimony that her
father succeeded in performing the carnal act against her will. This Court has ruled in
numerous cases that an errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a
witness especially when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so
painful as rape. Minor errors in the testimony of a rape victim tend to buttress rather than
weaken her credibility since that would indicate that her testimony was not contrived. People
vs. Mengote, 305 SCRA 380, G.R. No. 130491 March 25, 1999
G.R. No. 137519. March 16, 2004.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANGELITO MARTINEZ and DEXTER
TAGLE, appellants.
Criminal Law; Kidnapping for Ransom or Serious Illegal Detention; Evidence; Witnesses;
Identification; The most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
features and faces of their assailants.—Common human experience tells us that when
extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the
important details. This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal
violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in
which the crime is committed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Police Line-Up; An identification without the presence of
counsel at a police line-up does not preclude the admissibility of an in-court identification.—
This Court has consistently held that the prohibition against custodial investigation conducted
without the assistance of counsel does not extend to a person in a police line-up. This particular
stage of an investigation where a person is asked to stand in a police line-up has been held to
be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it as yet involves a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has also been held that
an identification without the presence of counsel at a police line-up does not preclude the
admissibility of an in-court identification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Without evidence to show that the prosecution witness is
actuated by an improper motive, identification of offenders should be given full faith and
credit.—The appellants have not shown any ill-motive on the part of the victim to fabricate
charges against them. It is well-settled that when there is no evidence to show that the
prosecution witness is actuated by an improper motive, identification of the appellants as the
offenders should be given full faith and credit.
Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy; Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime.—Conspiracy need not be established by
direct proof of prior agreement by the parties to commit a crime but that it may be inferred
from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime which
indubitably point to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; The trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
must be accorded great respect.—It is well-settled that the trial court’s evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses must be accorded great respect owing to its opportunity to observe and
examine the witnesses’ conduct and demeanor on the witness stand.
Same; Same; Same; Same; State Witness; The discharge of an accused as a state witness is at the
discretion of the court.—The discharge of an accused as a state witness is at the discretion of
the court. The prosecution can only propose such discharge and the court can refuse it if the
objective of the prosecution will not be served thereby. Absolute certainty is not required in
the determination of whether the conditions for discharge are present since the trial court has
perforce to rely in large part on the representations of the prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Inconsistencies; Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral
matters do not affect the substance of their declaration.—The rule is that inconsistencies in the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies.
Same; Same; Elements; To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, the prosecution must prove the following
beyond reasonable doubt.—To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) the actual
deprivation of the victim of his liberty and (c) the motive of the accused to exact ransom for
the release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying
circumstance which may be proved by words or overt acts before, during or after the
kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of
ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. People vs. Martinez, 425 SCRA 528, G.R.
No. 137519 March 16, 2004
G.R. No. 124461. June 26, 2000.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, Presiding
Judge, RTC Br. 83, Quezon City & AIDEN LANUZA, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizure; If the producer, manufacturer or seller has no permit
or authority from the appropriate government agency, the drugs or medicines cannot be
returned although the search warrants were declared illegal.—Even if the medicines or drugs
seized were genuine and even if they contain the proper chemicals or ingredients for their
production or manufacture, if the producer, manufacturer or seller has no permit or authority
from the appropriate government agency, the drugs or medicines cannot be returned although
the search warrants were declared illegal. It might be the burden of the party seeking issuance
of a warrant to convince the issuing magistrate that probable cause exists, and to procure the
proper admissible evidence to show that the party against whom the warrant is directed is not
duly authorized by the Bureau of Foods and Drugs (BFAD). However, if there is an allegation
that the possession of the goods or things seized were illegal for lack of appropriate permit
from the duly authorized agencies, the party seeking the return of her seized properties must
show the corresponding permits or authority to manufacture, sell or possess the same. The
pharmaceutical genuineness of the drugs or medicines is not a sufficient justification to
demand its return. There must be compliance with requirements of the law regarding permits
and licenses.
Same; Same; Private respondent cannot rely on the statement of the trial court that the
applicant “failed to allege in the application for search warrant that the subject drugs for which
she was applying for search warrant were either fake, misbranded, adulterated, or
unregistered” in order to obtain the return of the drugs.—If the seized 52 boxes of drugs are
pharmaceutically correct but not properly documented, they should be promptly disposed of
in the manner provided by law in order to ensure that the same do not fall into the wrong
hands who might use the drugs underground. Private respondent cannot rely on the statement
of the trial court that the applicant “failed to allege in the application for search warrant that
the subject drugs for which she was applying for search warrant were either fake, misbranded,
adulterated, or unregistered” (Comment on Partial Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3; Rollo, p.
280; Order ofRTC Dated December 7, 1995) in order to obtain the return of the drugs. The policy
of the law enunciated in R.A. No. 8203 is to protect the consumers as well as the licensed
businessmen. People vs. Estrada, 334 SCRA 369, G.R. No. 124461 June 26, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF RTC, MANILA, BRANCH 34, PANTALEON ALVAREZ and LILIA CHENG,
respondents.
Banks and Banking; Anti-Money Laundering Act; Even if the bank inquiry order may be
availed of without need of a pre-existing case under the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA),
it does not follow that such order may be availed of ex parte.—We are unconvinced by this
proposition, and agree instead with the then Solicitor General who conceded that the use of
the phrase “in cases of” was unfortunate, yet submitted that it should be interpreted to mean
“in the event there are violations” of the AMLA, and not that there are already cases pending
in court concerning such violations. If the contrary position is adopted, then the bank inquiry
order would be limited in purpose as a tool in aid of litigation of live cases, and wholly inutile
as a means for the government to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain an
intended prosecution of the account holder for violation of the AMLA. Should that be the
situation, in all likelihood the AMLC would be virtually deprived of its character as a discovery
tool, and thus would become less circumspect in filing complaints against suspect account
holders. After all, under such set-up the preferred strategy would be to allow or even
encourage the indiscriminate filing of complaints under the AMLA with the hope or
expectation that the evidence of money laundering would somehow surface during the trial.
Since the AMLC could not make use of the bank inquiry order to determine whether there is
evidentiary basis to prosecute the suspected malefactors, not filing any case at all would not
be an alternative. Such unwholesome setup should not come to pass. Thus Section 11 cannot
be interpreted in a way that would emasculate the remedy it has established and encourage
the unfounded initiation of complaints for money laundering. Still, even if the bank inquiry
order may be availed of without need of a pre-existing case under the AMLA, it does not follow
that such order may be availed of ex parte. There are several reasons why the AMLA does not
generally sanction ex parte applications and issuances of the bank inquiry order.
Same; Same; In the instances where a court order is required for the issuance of the bank
inquiry order, nothing in Section 11 specifically authorizes that such order may be issued ex
parte.—In the instances where a court order is required for the issuance of the bank inquiry
order, nothing in Section 11 specifically authorizes that such court order may be issued ex
parte. It might be argued that this silence does not preclude the ex parte issuance of the bank
inquiry order since the same is not prohibited under Section 11. Yet this argument falls when
the immediately preceding provision, Section 10, is examined.
Same; Same; Section 10 uses specific language to authorize an ex parte application for the
provisional relief therein, a circumstance absent in Section 11.—Although oriented towards
different purposes, the freeze order under Section 10 and the bank inquiry order under Section
11 are similar in that they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which the AMLC may avail of
to effectively combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially, Section 10 uses
specific language to authorize an ex parte application for the provisional relief therein, a
circumstance absent in Section 11. If indeed the legislature had intended to authorize ex parte
proceedings for the issuance of the bank inquiry order, then it could have easily expressed such
intent in the law, as it did with the freeze order under Section 10.
Same; Same; With respect to freeze orders under Section 10, the implementing rules do
expressly provide that the applications for freeze orders be filed ex parte but no similar
clearance is granted in the case of inquiry orders under Section 11.—That the AMLA does not
contemplate ex parte proceedings in applications for bank inquiry orders is confirmed by the
present implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA, promulgated upon the passage of
R.A. No. 9194. With respect to freeze orders under Section 10, the implementing rules do
expressly provide that the applications for freeze orders be filed ex parte, but no similar
clearance is granted in the case of inquiry orders under Section 11. These implementing rules
were promulgated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Insurance Commission and the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and if it was the true belief of these institutions that
inquiry orders could be issued ex parte similar to freeze orders, language to that effect would
have been incorporated in the said Rules. This is stressed not because the implementing rules
could authorize ex parte applications for inquiry orders despite the absence of statutory basis,
but rather because the framers of the law had no intention to allow such ex parteapplications.
Same; Same; Court receiving the application for inquiry order cannot simply take the Anti-
Money Laundering Council’s (AMLC’s) word that probable cause exists that the deposits or
investments are related to an unlawful activity.—The court receiving the application for
inquiry order cannot simply take the AMLC’s word that probable cause exists that the deposits
or investments are related to an unlawful activity. It will have to exercise its own determinative
function in order to be convinced of such fact. The account holder would be certainly capable
of contesting such probable cause if given the opportunity to be apprised of the pending
application to inquire into his account; hence a notice requirement would not be an empty
spectacle. It may be so that the process of obtaining the inquiry order may become more
cumbersome or prolonged because of the notice requirement, yet we fail to see any
unreasonable burden cast by such circumstance. After all, as earlier stated, requiring notice to
the account holder should not, in any way, compromise the integrity of the bank records
subject of the inquiry which remain in the possession and control of the bank.
Same; Same; Search Warrants; The supposed analogy between a search warrant and a bank
inquiry order is unconvincing.—Petitioner argues that a bank inquiry order necessitates a
finding of probable cause, a characteristic similar to a search warrant which is applied to and
heard ex parte. We have examined the supposed analogy between a search warrant and a bank
inquiry order yet we remain to be unconvinced by petitioner. The Constitution and the Rules
of Court prescribe particular requirements attaching to search warrants that are not imposed
by the AMLA with respect to bank inquiry orders. A constitutional warrant requires that the
judge personally examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, such examination being in the form of searching questions and answers. Those are
impositions which the legislative did not specifically prescribe as to the bank inquiry order
under the AMLA, and we cannot find sufficient legal basis to apply them to Section 11 of the
AMLA. Simply put, a bank inquiry order is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it
contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of persons or property.
Same; Same; Bank Secrecy Act of 1955; There is a right to privacy governing bank accounts in
the Philippines and that such right finds application to the case at bar.—Sufficient for our
purposes, we can assert there is a right to privacy governing bank accounts in the Philippines,
and that such right finds application to the case at bar. The source of such right is statutory,
expressed as it is in R.A. No. 1405 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. The right
to privacy is enshrined in Section 2 of that law.
Same; Same; Same; Unless the Bank Secrecy Act is repealed or amended, the legal order is
obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank deposits.—Because
of the Bank Secrecy Act, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic state policy in the
Philippines. Subsequent laws, including the AMLA, may have added exceptions to the Bank
Secrecy Act, yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule. It falls within the
zones of privacy recognized by our laws. The framers of the 1987 Constitution likewise
recognized that bank accounts are not covered by either the right to information under Section
7, Article III or under the requirement of full public disclosure under Section 28, Article II.
Unless the Bank Secrecy Act is repealed or amended, the legal order is obliged to conserve the
absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank deposits.
Same; Same; Same; Exceptions prescribed in Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act whereby bank
accounts may be examined by “any person, government official, bureau or office”; The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 contains a provision relating to “access to bank accounts and
records.”—Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated.
Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may
be examined by “any person, government official, bureau or office”; namely when: (1) upon
written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank
accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section
8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this
Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality. A
subsequent law, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 contains a provision relating to “access to bank
accounts and records.”
Same; Same; Same; The Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) also provides exceptions to the
Bank Secrecy Act.—The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under
Section 11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in
cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause that the
deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law,
or a money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is
probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom, certain
violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, hijacking and other violations
under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to
obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts.Same; Same; Same; If there are
doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits against affirming the
authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the
former.—Just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it
does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the
older law that “[a]ll deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature.” Indeed, by
force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even
by the legislated exceptions referred to above. There is disfavor towards construing these
exceptions in such a manner that would authorize unlimited discretion on the part of the
government or of any party seeking to enforce those exceptions and inquire into bank deposits.
If there are doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits against
affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in
favor of the former. Such a stance would persist unless Congress passes a law reversing the
general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank
accounts.
Same; Same; Same; Nowhere in the legislative record cited by Lilia Cheng does it appear that
there was an unequivocal intent to exempt from the bank inquiry order all bank accounts
opened prior to the passage of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA).—Nowhere in the
legislative record cited by Lilia Cheng does it appear that there was an unequivocal intent to
exempt from the bank inquiry order all bank accounts opened prior to the passage of the
AMLA. There is a cited exchange between Representatives Ronaldo Zamora and Jaime Lopez
where the latter confirmed to the former that “deposits are supposed to be exempted from
scrutiny or monitoring if they are already in place as of the time the law is enacted.” That
statement does indicate that transactions already in place when the AMLA was passed are
indeed exempt from scrutiny through a bank inquiry order, but it cannot yield any
interpretation that records of transactions undertaken after the enactment of the AMLA are
similarly exempt. Due to the absence of cited authority from the legislative record that
unqualifiedly supports respondent Lilia Cheng’s thesis, there is no cause for us to sustain her
interpretation of the AMLA, fatal as it is to the anima of that law. Republic vs. Eugenio, Jr., 545
SCRA 384, G.R. No. 174629 February 14, 2008
Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. Court of Appeals
Money Laundering; Anti-Money Laundering Act; As presently worded, Section 11 of the Anti-
Money Laundering Act (AMLA) has three (3) elements: (1) ex parte application by the Anti-
Money Laundering Council (AMLC); (2) determination of probable cause by the Court of
Appeals (CA); and (3) exception of court order in cases involving unlawful activities defined
in Section 3(i)(1), (2), and (12).—The right to due process has two aspects: (1) substantive which
deals with the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the law; and (2) procedural which delves into
the rules government must follow before it deprives a person of its life, liberty or property. As
presently worded, Section 11 of the AMLA has three elements: (1) ex parte application by the
AMLC; (2) determination of probable cause by the CA; and (3) exception of court order in cases
involving unlawful activities defined in Section 3(i)(1), (2), and (12).
Same; Same; Due Process; Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) providing
for ex parte application and inquiry by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) into
certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no
physical seizure of property involved at that stage.—Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA
providing for ex parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and
investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of
property involved at that stage. It is the preliminary and actual seizure of the bank deposits or
investments in question which brings these within reach of the judicial process, specifically a
determination that the seizure violated due process. In fact, Republic v. Eugenio, Jr., 545 SCRA
384 (2008), delineates a bank inquiry order under Section 11 from a freeze order under Section
10 on both remedies’ effect on the direct objects, i.e., the bank deposits and investments.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The grant of jurisdiction over cases involving money laundering
offenses is bestowed on the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) and the Sandiganbayan as the case
may be.—The grant of jurisdiction over cases involving money laundering offences is
bestowed on the Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan as the case may be. In fact, Rule
5 of the IRR is entitled Jurisdiction of Money Laundering Cases and Money Laundering
Investigation Procedures: Rule 5.a. Jurisdiction of Money Laundering Cases.—The Regional
Trial Courts shall have the jurisdiction to try all cases on money laundering. Those committed
by public officers and private persons who are in conspiracy with such public officers shall be
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Rule 5.b. Investigation of Money Laundering
Offenses.— The AMLC shall investigate: (1) suspicious transactions; (2) covered transactions
deemed suspicious after an investigation conducted by the AMLC; (3) money laundering
activities; and (4) other violations of the AMLA, as ammended.
Same; Same; Anti-Money Laundering Council; Jurisdiction; Nowhere from the text of the law
nor its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) can we glean that the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) exercises quasi-judicial functions whether the actual preliminary
investigation is done simply at its behest or conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the Ombudsman.—Nowhere from the text of the law nor its Implementing Rules and
Regulations can we glean that the AMLC exercises quasi-judicial functions whether the actual
preliminary investigation is done simply at its behest or conducted by the Department of
Justice and the Ombudsman. Again, we hark back to Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA
160 (2000), citing Ruperto v. Torres, where the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of
an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation: [Such a body] does not exercise
judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating facts and making findings in respect
thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties
before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before
it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to
make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion
and judgment.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; That the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) does not exercise
quasi-judicial powers and is simply an investigatory body finds support in the Supreme
Court’s (SC’s) ruling in Shu v. Dee, 723 SCRA 512 (2014).—That the AMLC does not exercise
quasi-judicial powers and is simply an investigatory body finds support in our ruling in Shu
v. Dee, 723 SCRA 512 (2014). In that case, petitioner Shu had filed a complaint before the NBI
charging respondents therein with falsification of two (2) deeds of real estate mortgage
submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). After its investigation,
the NBI came up with a Questioned Documents Report No. 746-1098 finding that the
signatures of petitioner therein which appear on the questioned deeds are not the same as the
standard sample signatures he submitted to the NBI. Ruling on the specific issue raised by
respondent therein that they had been denied due process during the NBI investigation, we
stressed that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and informational in nature.
Same; Same; Due Process; Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), authorizing
a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay
Law Firm’s (SPCMB’s) constitutional right to procedural due process.—Plainly, the AMLC’s
investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money
laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order,
does not transform it into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence,
Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate
SPCMB’s constitutional right to procedural due process.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) subjected Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act
(AMLA) to heightened scrutiny and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and
authorization to Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to undertake an inquiry into certain
bank accounts or deposits.—We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny
and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and authorization to AMLC to undertake an
inquiry into certain bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we found that it provides safeguards
before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of
preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts: (1) The AMLC is
required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex parte application for bank inquiry order;
(2) The CA, independent of the AMLC’s demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a
finding of probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity
under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA; (3) A bank
inquiry court order ex parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court order ex
parte for the principal account which court order ex parte for related accounts is separately
based on probable cause that such related account is materially linked to the principal account
inquired into; and (4) The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account
and the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of
the Constitution. The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank
account are not undertaken whimsically and solely based on the investigative discretion of the
AMLC. In particular, the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC, and determination by
the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental action. We will revert
to these safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA’s denial of SPCMB’s
letter request for information concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order
involving its accounts.
Same; Same; Eugenio already declared that Section 11, even with the allowance of an ex parte
application therefor, “is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct
object but not the seizure of persons or property.”—As regards SPCMB’s contention that the
bank inquiry order is in the nature of a general warrant, Republic v. Eugenio, 545 SCRA 384
(2008), already declared that Section 11, even with the allowance of an ex parte application
therefor, “is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not
the seizure of persons or property.” It bears repeating that the ‘‘bank inquiry order” under
Section 11 is a provisional remedy to aid the AMLC in the enforcement of the AMLA.
Same; Same; Bank Inquiry Order; There is nothing in Section 11 nor the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) which prohibits the owner
of the bank account to ascertain from the Court of Appeals (CA), post issuance of the bank
inquiry order ex parte, if his account is indeed the subject of an examination.—Although the
bank inquiry order ex-parte passes constitutional muster, there is nothing in Section 11 nor the
implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA which prohibits the owner of the bank
account, as in his instance SPCMB, to ascertain from the CA, post issuance of the bank inquiry
order ex parte, if his account is indeed the subject of an examination. Emphasized by our
discussion of the safeguards under Section 11 preceding the issuance of such an order, we find
that there is nothing therein which precludes the owner of the account from challenging the
basis for the issuance thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.—An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done
in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is
well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as “grave” must be so patent or gross
as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act
at all in contemplation of law. In this relation, case law states that not every error in the
proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The degree of gravity, as above described, must be met. That the propriety of the issuance of
the bank inquiry order is a justiciable issue brooks no argument. A justiciable controversy
refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.
Same; Same; Same; This allowance to the owner of the bank account to question the bank
inquiry order is granted only after issuance of the freeze order physically seizing the subject
bank account. It cannot be undertaken prior to the issuance of the freeze order.—In enacting
the amendment to Section II of the AMLC, the legislature saw it fit to place requirements before
a bank inquiry order may be issued. We discussed these requirements as basis for a valid
exception to the general rule on absolute confidentiality of bank accounts. However, these very
safe guards allow SPCMB, post issuance of the ex parte bank inquiry order, legal bases to
question the propriety of such issued order, if any. To emphasize, this allowance to the owner
of the bank account to question the bank inquiry order is granted only after issuance of the
freeze order physically seizing the subject bank account. It cannot be undertaken prior to the
issuance of the freeze order.
Same; Same; Same; The owner of bank accounts that could be potentially affected has the right
to challenge whether the requirements for issuance of the bank inquiry order were indeed
complied with given that such has implications on its property rights.—The law plainly
prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the deposit. We relate the
principle to SPCMB’s relationship to the reported principal account under investigation, one
of its clients, former Vice- President Binay. SPCMB as the owner of one of the bank accounts
reported to be investigated by the AMLC for probable money laundering offenses should be
allowed to pursue remedies therefrom where there are legal implications on the inquiry into
its accounts as a law firm. While we do not lapse into conjecture and cannot take up the lance
for SPCMB on probable violation of the attorney-client privilege based on pure speculation,
the extent of information obtained by the AMLC concerning the clients of SPCMB has not been
fully drawn and sufficiently demonstrated. At the same time, the owner of bank accounts that
could be potentially affected has the right to challenge whether the requirements for issuance
of the bank inquiry order were indeed complied with given that such has implications on its
property rights. In this regard, SPCMB’s obeisance to promulgated rules on the matter could
have afforded it a remedy, even post issuance of the bank inquiry order.
Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; Rule 10.b. of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) defines probable cause as “such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or
a money laundering offense is about to be, is being or has been committed and that the account
or any monetary instrument or property sought to be frozen is in any way related to said
unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense.”—Rule 10.b. of the IRR defines probable
cause as “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or
cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about
to be, is being or has been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument or
property sought to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity and/or money
laundering offense.” Evidently, the provision only refers to probable cause for freeze orders
under Section 10 of the AMLA. From this we note that there is a glaring lacunae in our
procedural rules concerning the bank inquiry order under Section 11. Despite the advent of RA
No. 10167, amending Section 11 of the AMLA, we have yet to draft additional rules
corresponding to the ex parte bank inquiry order under Section 11. A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC
entitled “Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of
Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an
Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense Under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended,”
only covers what is already provided in the title. As we have already noted, the bank inquiry
order must likewise be governed by rules specific to its issuance where the AMLC regularly
invokes this provision and which, expectedly clashes with the rights of bank account holders.
Same; Same; Same; That there are no specific rules governing the bank inquiry order does not
signify that the Court of Appeals (CA) cannot confirm to the actual owner of the bank account
reportedly being investigated whether it had in fact issued a bank inquiry order for covering
its accounts, of course after the issuance of the Freeze Order.—That there are no specific rules
governing the bank inquiry order does not signify that the CA cannot confirm to the actual
owner of the bank account reportedly being investigated whether it had in fact issued a bank
inquiry order for covering its accounts, of course after the issuance of the Freeze Order. Even
in Ligot v. Republic, 692 SCRA 509 (2013), we held that by implication, where the law did not
specify, the owner of the “frozen” property may move to lift the freeze order issued under deposits and investments. Section 11 of the AMLA providing for the ex parte bank deposit
Section 10 of the AMLA if he can show that no probable cause exists or the 20-day period of inquiry is constitutionally firm for the reasons already discussed. The ex parte inquiry shall be
the freeze order has already lapsed without any extension being requested from and granted upon probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity as
by the CA. Drawing a parallel, such a showing of the absence of probable cause ought to be defined in Section 3(i) of the law or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the same
afforded SPCMB. law. To effect the limit on the ex parte inquiry, the petition under oath for authority to inquire,
must, akin to the requirement of a petition for freeze order enumerated in Title VIII of A.M.
No. 05-11-04-SC, contain the name and address of the respondent; the grounds relied upon for
Same; Same; Same; That the bank inquiry order is a separate from the freeze order does not the issuance of the order of inquiry; and the supporting evidence that the subject bank deposit
denote that it cannot be questioned. The opportunity is still rife for the owner of a bank account are in any way related to or involved in an unlawful activity.
to question the basis for its very inclusion into the investigation and the corresponding freezing
Same; Same; Same; Freeze Orders; From the issuance of a freeze order, the party aggrieved by
of its account in the process.—We cannot avoid the requirement-limitation nexus in Section 11.
the ruling of the court may appeal to the Supreme Court (SC) by petition for review on
As it affords the government authority to pursue a legitimate state interest to investigate
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising all pertinent questions of law and issues,
money laundering offenses, such likewise provides the limits for the authority given.
including the propriety of the issuance of a bank inquiry order. The appeal shall not stay the
Moreover, allowance to the owner of the bank account, post issuance of the bank inquiry order
enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless the SC directs otherwise.—If the CA
and the corresponding freeze order, of remedies to question the order, will not forestall and
finds no substantial merit in the petition, it shall dismiss the petition outright stating the
waylay the government’s pursuit of money launderers. That the bank inquiry order is a
specific reasons for such denial. If found meritorious and there is a subsequent petition for
separate from the freeze order does not denote that it cannot be questioned. The opportunity
freeze order, the proceedings shall be governed by the existing Rules on Petitions for Freeze
is still rife for the owner of a bank account to question the basis for its very inclusion into the
Order in the CA. From the issuance of a freeze order, the party aggrieved by the ruling of the
investigation and the corresponding freezing of its account in the process. As noted in Republic
court may appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
v. Eugenio, Jr., 545 SCRA 384 (2008), such an allowance accorded the account holder who wants
the Rules of Court raising all pertinent questions of law and issues, including the propriety of
to contest the issuance of the order and the actual investigation by the AMLC, does not cast an
the issuance of a bank inquiry order. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the subject
unreasonable burden since the bank inquiry order has already been issued. Further, allowing
decision or final order unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise. The CA is directed to draft
for notice to the account holder should not, in any way, compromise the integrity of the bank
rules based on the foregoing discussions to complement the existing A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC Rule
records subject of the inquiry which remain in the possession and control of the bank. The
of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary
account holder so notified remains unable to do anything to conceal or cleanse his bank account
Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity
records of suspicious or anomalous transactions, at least not without the wholehearted
or Money Laundering Offense under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended for submission to
cooperation of the bank, which inherently has no vested interest to aid the account holder in
the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court and eventual approval and promulgation
such manner. Rule 10.c of the IRR provides for Duty of the Covered Institution receiving the
of the Court En Banc.
Freeze Order. Such can likewise be made applicable to covered institutions notified of a bank
inquiry order.

LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) affirms the constitutionality of Section 11 of the
Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) allowing the ex parte application by the Anti-Money
Money Laundering; Anti-Money Laundering Act; View that the depositor has no right to
Laundering Council (AMLC) for authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank deposits
demand that it be notified of any application or issuance of an order to inquire into his or her
and investments.—We affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex
bank deposit.—I join the unanimous declaration that, based on the challenges posed by the
parte application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank
present petitions and only within its ambient facts, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160 or the
Anti-Money Laundering Act is not unconstitutional. Further, that we are unanimous in
declaring that the depositor has no right to demand that it be notified of any application or
issuance of an order to inquire into his or her bank deposit. The procedure in the Court of
Appeals is ex parte but requires proof of probable cause of the occurrence of the predicate
crime as well as the potential liability of the owner of the deposit.
Same; Same; View that after the inquiry of the bank deposits and related accounts within the
limitations contained in the court
order, it is still the option of the law enforcers or the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC),
to proceed to request for a Freeze Order in accordance with Section 10 of the same law.—After
the inquiry of the bank deposits and related accounts within the limitations contained in the
court order, it is still the option of the law enforcers or the Anti-Money Laundering Council, to
proceed to request for a Freeze Order in accordance with Section 10 of the same law. The
depositor is, thus, entitled to be informed only after the freeze order has been issued. In
questioning the freeze order, the depositor may then raise defenses relating to the existence of
sufficient evidence to lead the court to believe that there is probable cause that a covered crime
has occurred, that the depositor is a participant in the crime, and that the stay of all transactions
with respect to the bank account is essential in order to preserve evidence or to keep the
proceeds of the crime intact for and on behalf of the victims.
Same; Same; View that the majority opinion’s statement that the “inquiry by the [Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC)] into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate
substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage”
may have been inadvertent.—The numbers on a bank’s ledger corresponding to the amounts
of money that a depositor has and its various transactions, especially when digitized, are
definitely not physical. Yet, just because they are not physical does not necessarily mean that
they do not partake of the kinds of “life, liberty, or property” protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Neither should it mean that the numerical equivalent of the bank’s
debt to a depositor or the record of its various transactions have nothing to do with the
“persons . . . papers, and effects” constitutionally protected against “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” The majority opinion’s statement that the “inquiry by the [Anti-Money
Laundering Council] into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive
due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage” may have been
inadvertent. It does, however, neglect that the penumbra of rights protected by the due process
clause and the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures also pertains to
protecting the intangibles essential to human life. Definitely, every liberal democratic
constitutional order has outgrown the archaic concept that life is only that which can be
tangible.
Same; Same; View that every regulation therefore that limits this aspect of individuality may
be the subject of inquiry that it does not “deprive” one of their “life, liberty or property”
without “due process of law.”—The due process clause is crafted as a proscription. Thus, it
states that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law[.]” This means that there is a sphere of individual existence or a penumbra of individual
autonomy that exists prior to every regulation that should primordially be left untouched. In
other words, the existence of what Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren once called “the
right to be let alone” is now broadly, though at times awkwardly referred to roughly as the
right to privacy, presumed. Every regulation therefore that limits this aspect of individuality
may be the subject of inquiry that it does not “deprive” one of their “life, liberty or property”
without “due process of law.”
Same; Same; Due Process; View that due process of law simply means that regulation should
both be reasonable and fair.—More fundamentally, the reservation of a very broad sphere of
individual privacy or individual autonomy is implied in the very concept of society governed
under a constitutional and democratic order. The aspects of our humanity and the parts of our
liberty surrendered to the government, in order to assure a functioning society, should only be
as much as necessary for a just society and no more. While the extent of necessary surrender
cannot be determined with precision, our existing doctrine is that any state interference should
neither be arbitrary nor unfair. In many cases, we have held that due process of law simply
means that regulation should both be reasonable and fair.
Same; Same; Same; View that in the due process clause, there is the requirement of
“deprivation” of one’s right to “life, liberty or property.” In my view, this means more than the
occasional and temporary discomforts we suffer, which is consistent with the natural workings
of groups of human beings living within a society.—In the due process clause, there is the
requirement of “deprivation” of one’s right to “life, liberty or property.” In my view, this
means more than the occasional and temporary discomforts we suffer, which is consistent with
the natural workings of groups of human beings living within a society. De minimis discomfort
is a part of group life, independent of the workings of the State. The deprivation that may
trigger a judicial inquiry should be more than momentary. It must be fundamentally disruptive
of a value that we protect because it is constitutive of our concept of individual autonomy. For Same; Same; Same; View that considering its implications on the depositor’s right to privacy,
instance, a person who chooses to walk down a public street cannot complain that a police Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) explicitly mandates that “[t]he
officer glances or even stares at him or her. The discomfort of being the subject of the authority to inquire into or examine the main account and the related accounts shall comply
observation by others, under those circumstances, may be too fleeting and trivial that it should with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution[.]”—In a search
not cause any constitutional query. That we look at each other in public spaces is inherently a warrant proceeding, there is already a crime that has been committed and law enforcers apply
part of existing within a society. After all, one of the worst human indignities may be that we for a search warrant to find evidence to support a case or to retrieve and preserve evidence
are rendered invisible to everyone for all time within public spaces. already known to them. In the same way, a bank inquiry order is “a means for the government
to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain an intended prosecution of the
Same; Same; View that peering into one’s bank accounts and related transactions is sufficiently
account holder for violation of the [Anti-Money Laundering Act].” It is a preparatory tool for
disruptive as to be considered a “deprivation” within the meaning of the due process clause.—
the discovery and procurement, and preservation — through the subsequent issuance of a
Examining the petitioner’s bank accounts is analogous to the situation involving the uninvited
freeze order — of relevant evidence of a money laundering transaction or activity. Considering
and unwelcome glance. For some, their financial worth contained in the bank’s ledgers may
its implications on the depositor’s right to privacy, Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering
not be physical, but it is constitutive of that part of their identity, which for their own reasons,
Act explicitly mandates that “[t]he authority to inquire into or examine the main account and
they may not want to disclose. Peering into one’s bank accounts and related transactions is
the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the
sufficiently disruptive as to be considered a “deprivation” within the meaning of the due
1987 Constitution[.]”
process clause. It may be short of the physical seizure of property but it should, in an actual
controversy such as this case at bar, be subject of judicial review. Same; Same; Same; View that the phrase ‘upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
Same; Same; Bank Inquiry Order; View that a bank inquiry order is a provisional relief
may produce’ allows a determination of probable cause by the judge [or the Court of Appeals
available to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) in aid of its investigative powers. It
(CA) in Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) cases] ex parte.—“The phrase ‘upon probable
partakes of the character of a search warrant.—A bank inquiry order is a provisional relief
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
available to the Anti--Money Laundering Council in aid of its investigative powers. It partakes
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce’ allows a determination of probable cause
of the character of a search warrant. United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574 (2005),
by the judge [or the Court of Appeals in Anti-Money Laundering Act cases] ex parte.”
discussed the nature of a search warrant: On the first issue, we agree with the petitioner’s
contention that a search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the
commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; View that the absence of notice to the owner of a bank account
for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
that an ex parte application as well as an order to inquire has been granted by the Court of
drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect
Appeals (CA) is not unreasonable nor arbitrary. The lack of notice does not violate the due
with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings. While an application for a search
process clause of the Constitution.—The absence of notice to the owner of a bank account that
warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action. A search warrant
an ex parte application as well as an order to inquire has been granted by the Court of Appeals
is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to
is not unreasonable nor arbitrary. The lack of notice does not violate the due process clause of
procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases
the Constitution. It is reasonable for the State, through its law enforcers, to inquire ex parte and
of public prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A
without notice because of the nature of a bank account at present.
search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines. A
search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights
or maintaining mere private rights. It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the
ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. It may only be applied for in the Same; Same; View that the inherent constitutionally protected private rights in bank deposits
furtherance of public prosecution. and other similar instruments are not absolute.—A bank deposit is an obligation. It is a debt
owed by a bank to its client-depositor. It is understood that the bank will make use of the value
of the money deposited to further create credit. This means that it may use the value to create
loans with interest to another. Whoever takes out a loan likewise creates a deposit with another
bank creating another obligation and empowering that other bank to create credit once more
through providing other loans. Bank deposits are not isolated information similar to personal
sets of preferences. Rather, bank deposits exist as economically essential social constructs. The
inherent constitutionally protected private rights in bank deposits and other similar
instruments are not absolute. These rights should, in proper cases, be weighed against the need
to maintaining the integrity of our financial system. The integrity of our financial system on
the other hand contributes to the viability of banks and financial intermediaries, and therefore
the viability of keeping bank deposits.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION CASES
G.R. No. 206020. April 14, 2015.*
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Administrative Regulations; Statutes; It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution.—Like any other administrative regulations, Resolution No. 9615, or any
part thereof, must not run counter to the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and
has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be
valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In this regard, an administrative regulation, even if it
purports to advance a legitimate governmental interest, may not be permitted to run
roughshod over the cherished rights of the people enshrined in the Constitution.
Same; Freedom of Speech and of Expression; Prior Restraint; Freedom from prior restraint is
largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and
regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.—
Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public concern without prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment. Prior
restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression
in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely
freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and
regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the
government. Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its validity. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of
speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and
private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election
campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.
Same; Same; It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that freedom of speech and of the
press enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights.—It is now deeply embedded in our
jurisprudence that freedom of speech and of the press enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy
of rights. The rationale is that the preservation of other rights depends on how well we protect
our freedom of speech and of the press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred
freedom calls all the more for utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination
of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
Same; Same; Content-Neutral Regulation; A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and
under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free
speech.—A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined
standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided
that the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the
constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; The constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory
powers to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) over franchises and permits to operate, though
seemingly unrestrained, has its limits.—The constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory
powers to the COMELEC over franchises and permits to operate, though seemingly
unrestrained, has its limits. Notwithstanding the ostensibly broad supervisory and regulatory
powers granted to the COMELEC during an election period under Section 4, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, the Court had previously set out the limitations thereon. In Adiong v.
COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992), the Court, while recognizing that the COMELEC has
supervisory power vis-à-vis the conduct and manner of elections under Section 4, Article IX-C
of the Constitution, nevertheless held that such supervisory power does not extend to the very
freedom of an individual to express his preference of candidates in an election by placing
election campaign stickers on his vehicle.
Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; The Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s)
constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of
public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the
same.—In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory
and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers
over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or permits for the operation,” inter alia, of
transportation and other public utilities. The COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers
of supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport
terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the same. There is a marked difference
between the franchise or permit to operate transportation for the use of the public and the
ownership per se of the vehicles used for public transport.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech and of Expression; Prior Restraint; Regulating the
expression of ideas or opinion in a public utility vehicle (PUV), through the posting of an election
campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but a regulation on
the very ownership of the vehicle.—A franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities
pertains to considerations affecting the operation of the PUV as such, e.g., safety of the
passengers, routes or zones of operation, maintenance of the vehicle, of reasonable fares, rates,
and other charges, or, in certain cases, nationality. Thus, a government issuance, which
purports to regulate a franchise or permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to the considerations
affecting its operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation or supervision not on the
franchise or permit to operate, but on the very ownership of the vehicle used for public
transport. The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of
election campaign materials on the vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent to the
operation of the PUV. Surely, posting a decal expressing support for a certain candidate in an
election will not in any manner affect the operation of the PUV as such. Regulating the
expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the posting of an election campaign material
thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but a regulation on the very
ownership of the vehicle.
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) does
not have the constitutional power to regulate public transport terminals owned by private persons; A
regulation of public transport terminals based on extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the
posting of election campaign materials thereon, amounts to regulating the ownership of the transport
terminal and not merely the permit to operate the same.—In the same manner, the COMELEC does
not have the constitutional power to regulate public transport terminals owned by private
persons. The ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for use by the public
commuters, likewise remains private. Although owners of public transport terminals may be
required by local governments to obtain permits in order to operate, the permit only pertains
to circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal as such. The regulation of
such permit to operate should similarly be limited to circumstances affecting the operation of
the transport terminal. A regulation of public transport terminals based on extraneous
circumstances, such as prohibiting the posting of election campaign materials thereon,
amounts to regulating the ownership of the transport terminal and not merely the permit to
operate the same.
Election Law; Common Poster Areas; Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9006 authorizes political
parties and party-list groups and independent candidates to erect common poster areas and candidates
to post lawful election campaign materials in private places, with the consent of the owner thereof, and
in public places or property, which are allocated equitably and impartially.—Section 9 of R.A. No.
9006 authorizes political parties and party-list groups and independent candidates to erect
common poster areas and candidates to post lawful election campaign materials in private
places, with the consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or property, which are
allocated equitably and impartially. Further, Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 provides for the
authorized expenses of registered political parties and candidates for every voter; it affords
candidates equal opportunity in their election campaign by regulating the amount that should
be spent for each voter.
Same; Statement of Contributions and Expenditures; Section 14 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7166
requires all candidates and treasurers of registered political parties to submit a statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.—Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 requires
all candidates and treasurers of registered political parties to submit a statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the election. Section 14 is a post-audit
measure that aims to ensure that the candidates did not overspend in their election campaign,
thereby enforcing the grant of equal opportunity to candidates under Section 13. A strict
implementation of the foregoing provisions of law would suffice to achieve the governmental
interest of ensuring equal time, space, and opportunity for candidates in elections. There is
thus no necessity of still curtailing the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals by prohibiting them from posting election campaign materials on their properties.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech and of Expression; Captive-Audience Doctrine; The
captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive
speech, the speech can be restricted.—The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener
cannot, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The
“captive-audience” doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an
unwanted message in circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided. A
regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which
undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they
are more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the
speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either
impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.
Same; Same; Same; A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be
justified if the supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech.—A
government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the
supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The
prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under
the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since
they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
Same; Equal Protection of the Law; The Constitution does not require that things, which are
different in fact, be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different.—“The equal protection clause is aimed at all
official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments
of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions
of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is
taken.” Nevertheless, the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws to all citizens of the state. Equality of operation of statutes does
not mean their indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according
to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things, which are different in fact, be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the
four requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) it must be based upon
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the class.
Same; Freedom of Speech and of Expression; It bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one’s
political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression.—It bears stressing that
the freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom
of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most
valuable feature of the democratic way of life.
G.R. No. 205728. January 21, 2015.*
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, represented by the MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.
NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating
to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction.—Rule 64 is not the exclusive
remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating
to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a special civil action,
there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law.
Election Contests; Appeals; Conditions in Order for the Supreme Court (SC) to Review Orders
and Decisions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Electoral Contests Despite Not Being
Reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc.—Based on ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v.
COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000), this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC
— in electoral contests — despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if: 1) It will
prevent the miscarriage of justice; 2) The issue involves a principle of social justice; 3) The issue
involves the protection of labor; 4) The decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity;
or 5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy available.
Supreme Court; Jurisdictions; Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; The jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court (SC) over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in the petition.
Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority “to hear and determine cases of the general class
to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court and defines its powers.”—The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is
determined from the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the
authority “to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and
defines its powers.” Definitely, the subject matter in this case is different from the cases cited
by respondents. Nothing less than the electorate’s political speech will be affected by the
restrictions imposed by COMELEC. Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and
understood, to move people to action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to change the
contours of power whether through the election of representatives in a republican government
or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with which we protect this kind of
speech does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of the message. Neither do we assess
whether we should protect speech based on the motives of COMELEC. We evaluate
restrictions on freedom of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium
because the quality of this freedom in practice will define the quality of deliberation in our
democratic society.
Same; Same; During elections, the Supreme Court (SC) has the power and the duty to correct any
grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality.—During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any
grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore,
it is this court’s constitutional mandate to protect the people against government’s
infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate outweighs the
jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.
 Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was
created by the Supreme Court (SC) to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated
roles in an effective and efficient manner.—The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of
courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the
facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent
to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they
are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach
within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of
inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual
case’ that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences,
of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts
at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before
the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
4 and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political
Same; Court of Appeals; The Court of Appeals (CA) is primarily designed as an appellate court
that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature.—The
Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of
facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has
original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a
nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional
issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.
Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.—The
doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has “full discretionary power
to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . . filed
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
clearly and specifically raised in the petition.”
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; In a democracy, the citizen’s right to freely participate
in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-making is recognized.—In a democracy,
the citizen’s right to freely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political
decision-making is recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may provide, as
public participation in nation-building is a fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such,
their right to engage in free expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by this
court.
Same; Same; The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate,
but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes.—
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech
and freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles
laid down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future,
especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote
for one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in
the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote
necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of these
fundamental constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court.
Same; Same; This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are noncandidates, to post the
tarpaulin in their private property, as an exercise of their right of free expression.—The present
petition does not involve a dispute between the rich and poor, or the powerful and weak, on
their equal opportunities for media coverage of candidates and their right to freedom of
expression. This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are noncandidates, to post the
tarpaulin in their private property, as an exercise of their right of free expression. Despite the
invocation of the political question doctrine by respondents, this court is not proscribed from
deciding on the merits of this case.
Same; Political Questions; What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political,
capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the
government, with discretionary power to act.—In Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957), this court
previously elaborated on the concept of what constitutes a political question: What is generally
meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is
to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically
delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary
power to act. (Emphasis omitted) It is not for this court to rehearse and reenact political debates
on what the text of the law should be. In political forums, particularly the legislature, the
creation of the text of the law is based on a general discussion of factual circumstances, broadly
construed in order to allow for general application by the executive branch. Thus, the creation
of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts that affect the rights of certain
individuals, per se.
Same; Same; A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or
competence of different agencies and departments of the executive or those of the legislature.—A
political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of
different agencies and departments of the executive or those of the legislature. The political
question doctrine is used as a defense when the petition asks this court to nullify certain acts
that are exclusively within the domain of their respective competencies, as provided by the
Constitution or the law. In such situation, presumptively, this court should act with deference.
It will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was so capricious and arbitrary
so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
 Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Political Speeches; Sovereignty resides in the
people. Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental right.—Petitioners’ exercise of
their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of
criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech. In the context of this case, exhaustion
of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech. Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our
constitutional order. In Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008), Justice Carpio in a separate
opinion emphasized: “[i]f ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political
expression would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds of political expression,
the subject of fair and honest elections would be at the top.” Sovereignty resides in the people.
Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental right.
Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Suspension of the Rules; Time and again, we have held that the
Supreme Court (SC) “has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation
when compelling reasons so warrant, or when the purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat
constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon
the court.”—Time and again, we have held that this court “has the power to relax or suspend
the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or when
the purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause
that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court.” Certainly, this case of
first impression where COMELEC has threatened to prosecute private parties who seek to
participate in the elections by calling attention to issues they want debated by the public in the
manner they feel would be effective is one of those cases.
Election Law; Fair Elections Act (R.A. No. 9006); Section 17 of Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations implementing the Fair Elections Act,
regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to candidates and political parties, and
petitioners are neither of the two.—Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material
in their issuances. The above provisions regulating the posting of campaign materials only
apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9006 on “Lawful Election Propaganda” also states that these are “allowed for
all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating
under the party list elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective
positions subject to the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. .
. .” Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for a similar wording. These
provisions show that election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in
coordination with candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the
candidates and political parties for whom the election propaganda are released would ensure
that these candidates and political parties maintain within the authorized expenses limitation.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter
of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing of
the Reproductive Health Law (RH Law). Thus, petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.—
True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and
political parties themselves. The focus of the definition is that the act must be “designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.” In this
case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either
appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH Law. Thus, petitioners invoke
their right to freedom of expression.
Same; Same; The right to freedom of expression applies to the entire continuum of speech from
utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of
communication.—Communication exists when “(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others, uses
conventional actions because he or she reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by
the audience in the manner intended; and (2) the audience so takes the actions.” “[I]n
communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the claims by . . . either accepting the speech
act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or requests for justification.” Speech is not limited
to vocal communication. “[C]onduct is treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as
‘symbolic speech[,]’” such that “‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the
same course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be ‘sufficient to
bring into play the [right to freedom of expression].’” The right to freedom of expression, thus,
applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even
to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.
Same; Same; Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political
discontent, should be protected and encouraged.—Proponents of the political theory on
“deliberative democracy” submit that “substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue is a critical,
and indeed defining, feature of a good polity.” This theory may be considered broad, but it
definitely “includes [a] collective decision-making with the participation of all who will be
affected by the decision.” It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every democracy
is that sovereignty resides in the people. To ensure order in running the state’s affairs,
sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or nominated in key
government positions to represent the people. On this note, the theory on deliberative
democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make government accountable. Necessarily,
this includes the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to governmental functions.
Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent,
should thus be protected and encouraged.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as
“highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.” These rights enjoy precedence and primacy.—
Petitioners invoke their “constitutional right to communicate their opinions, views and beliefs
about issues and candidates.” They argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of approval
and appreciation of the named public officials’ act of voting against the RH Law, and their
criticism toward those who voted in its favor. It was “part of their advocacy campaign against
the RH Law,” which was not paid for by any candidate or political party. Thus, “the questioned
orders which . . . effectively restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression should
be declared unconstitutional and void.” This court has held free speech and other intellectual
freedoms as “highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.” These rights enjoy
precedence and primacy. In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973), this court discussed the preferred position
occupied by freedom of expression: Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription;
but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be
an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil liberties,
the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential
to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority “gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”
Same; Same; “Political Speech” and “Commercial Speech,” Distinguished.—We distinguish
between political and commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech “both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “foster[ing] informed and
civic-minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech
that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the
content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
Same; Same; Election Propaganda; While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda.—While
the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties,
this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party list group.
Same; Same; Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and
must be protected by the Supreme Court (SC).—Speech with political consequences is at the core
of the freedom of expression and must be protected by this court. Justice Brion pointed out that
freedom of expression “is not the god of rights to which all other rights and even government
protection of state interest must bow.” The right to freedom of expression is indeed not
absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are still subject to some restrictions. The degree
of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral.
Content-based regulations can either be based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the subject
of the expression.
Same; Same; Clear and Present Danger Rule; Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption
of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.—Size limitations
during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily
divorced from the size of its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure. Thus,
in Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008): A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter
will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions
imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. (Citations omitted) Under this rule, “the evil
consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden
of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Same; Same; Same; Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.—Even with the clear and
present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and
substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of
the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of
noncandidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the
tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
Same; Same; “Content-Based Restraint” and “Content-Neutral Regulation,” Distinguished.—
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the
incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
Same; Right of Peaceful Assembly; In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553
(1983), this court summarized the steps that permit applicants must follow which include informing the
licensing authority ahead of time as regards the date, public place, and time of the assembly.—In the
landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983), this court summarized the steps that
permit applicants must follow which include informing the licensing authority ahead of time
as regards the date, public place, and time of the assembly. This would afford the public official
time to inform applicants if there would be valid objections, provided that the clear and present
danger test is the standard used for his decision and the applicants are given the opportunity
to be heard. This ruling was practically codified in Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, otherwise known
as the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Subsequent jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa
Blg. 880 as a valid content-neutral regulation. In the 2006 case of Bayan v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 226
(2006), this court discussed how Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 does not prohibit assemblies but
simply regulates their time, place, and manner. In 2010, this court found in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Atienza, 613 SCRA 518 (2010), that respondent Mayor Atienza committed grave
abuse of discretion when he modified the rally permit by changing the venue from Mendiola
Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first affording petitioners the opportunity to be heard.
 Same; Freedom of Expression; Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective
petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression.—In this case, the size
regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum size of the
tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise
freedom of expression. The COMELEC’s act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the
effect of dissuading expressions with political consequences. These should be encouraged,
more so when exercised to make more meaningful the equally important right to suffrage.
Same; Same; The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to
any political candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be
elected.—The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to
any political candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking
to be elected. It is true that there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide
the candidate’s real levels of expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties
that tend to have an effect on the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia would be too
broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case. Instead, to address this evil,
better and more effective enforcement will be the least restrictive means to the fundamental
freedom.
Same; Same; Satire; Words and Phrases; Satire is a “literary form that employs such devices as
sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies,” and this may target any individual or
group in society, private and government alike.—The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political
parties. Satire is a “literary form that employs such devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to
deride prevailing vices or follies,” and this may target any individual or group in society,
private and government alike. It seeks to effectively communicate a greater purpose, often used
for “political and social criticism” “because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and
unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to have the high-and-
mighty lampooned and spoofed.” Northrop Frye, well-known in this literary field, claimed
that satire had two defining features: “one is wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of the
grotesque and absurd, the other is an object of attack.” Thus, satire frequently uses
exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical devices.
Same; Same; In an equality-based approach, “politically disadvantaged speech prevails over
regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech.”—In an equality-based
approach, “politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation
promoting political equality prevails over speech.” This view allows the government leeway
to redistribute or equalize ‘speaking power,’ such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing,
unpopular or dissenting voices often systematically subdued within society’s ideological
ladder. This view acknowledges that there are dominant political actors who, through
authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that may drown out the
messages of others. This is especially true in a developing or emerging economy that is part of
the majoritarian world like ours.
Same; Same; Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the
members of their political parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place, and
manner.—Clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by
candidates or the members of their political parties or their political parties may be regulated
as to time, place, and manner. This is the effect of our rulings in Osmeña v. COMELEC, 288
SCRA 447 (1998) and National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992). Regulation of speech
in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do not
speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a
social issue that the public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation
is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming
from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in
the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
Same; Same; Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches
into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they
are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its
principal object the endorsement of a candidate only; The regulation must only be with respect to the
time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message.—Regulation of election paraphernalia will still
be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak
as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech
that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation
(a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing
the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must
only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may
the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter
whether the speech is made with or on private property.
Same; Same; Right to Property; Other than the right to freedom of expression and the meaningful
exercise of the right to suffrage, the present case also involves one’s right to property.—Other than the
right to freedom of expression and the meaningful exercise of the right to suffrage, the present
case also involves one’s right to property.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property.—
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no
expression when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELEC’s
infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to
infringement on their fundamental right to speech.
Same; Same; This caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.—The
tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are running for
public office. Their message may be construed generalizations of very complex individuals and
party list organizations. They are classified into black and white: as belonging to “Team Patay”
or “Team Buhay.” But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
 Carpio, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Political Ads; View that Republic Act (RA) No. 9006 regulates a host of other
campaign related acts, such as the airing and printing of paid political ads (Section 3.4 in relation to
Section 4) and the conduct of election surveys (Section 5), which involve not only political parties and
candidates but also other individuals or entities who fall within the ambit of these provisions.—Section
3.3 of RA 9006 and its implementing rule for the 2013 elections, Section 6(c) of Resolution 9615,
are regulations of general applicability, covering campaign speech of all — candidates,
noncandidates, political parties and nonpolitical parties. This conclusion is compelled by the
absence of any provision in RA 9006, and indeed, in any related statutes, limiting their
application only to the campaign speech of candidates and political parties. On the contrary,
the penal clause of RA 9006 is couched in broad language encompassing within its
ambit anyone who breaches its provisions: “[v]iolation of th[e] Act and the rules and
regulations of the COMELEC issued to implement [it] shall be an election offense punishable
under the first and second paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.” Indeed,
RA 9006 regulates a host of other campaign related acts, such as the airing and printing of paid
political ads (Section 3.4 in relation to Section 4) and the conduct of election surveys (Section
5), which involve not only political parties and candidates but also other individuals or
entities who fall within the ambit of these provisions. RA 9006 is a generally applicable law
as much as the Omnibus Election Code is in the field of election propaganda regulation.
Same; Election Spending; Words and Phrases; View that “election spending” refers not only to
expenses of political parties and candidates but also to expenses of their supporters.—“Election
spending” refers not only to expenses of political parties and candidates but also to expenses
of their supporters. (Otherwise, all the limitations on election spending and on what
constitutes lawful election propaganda would be meaningless). Freeing noncandidates and
non-parties from the coverage of RA 9006 allows them to (1) print campaign ad banners and
posters of any size and in any quantity, (2) place TV and radio ads in national and local
stations for any length of time, and (3) place full-page print ads in broadsheets, tabloids and
related media. Obviously, printing posters of any size, placing full-page print ads, and running
extended broadcast ads all entail gargantuan costs. Yet, under the ponencia’s holding, so long
as these are done by noncandidates and nonpolitical parties, the state is powerless to regulate
them.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; Free Speech Clause; To satisfy the strictures of the
Free Speech Clause, Congress needs to craft legislation on the sizing of campaign posters and other
paraphernalia with sufficient flexibility to address concerns inherent in the present fixed-dimension
model.—The practical effect of the fixed-size rule under Section 3.3 of RA 9006 (and its
implementing rule) is to further narrow the choices of poster locations for anyone wishing to
display them in any of the venues allowed by law. Voters who wish to make known to the
public their choice of candidates (or for that matter, candidates who wish to advertise their
candidacies) through the display of posters are precluded from doing so from certain areas not
because these areas are off-limits but because, for reasons of geography vis-à-vis the size of the
poster, their contents simply become illegible. Such restriction on campaign speech appears to
me to be “greater than is essential” to advance the important government interests of
minimizing election spending and ensuring orderly elections. To satisfy the strictures of the
Free Speech Clause, Congress needs to craft legislation on the sizing of campaign posters and
other paraphernalia with sufficient flexibility to address concerns inherent in the present fixed-
dimension model.
Brion, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Judicial Review; View that the petition prematurely availed of the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) power
of judicial review by openly disregarding established Commission on Elections (COMELEC) processes
by bypassing the comelec En Banc.—In my view, the petition prematurely availed of the Court’s
power of judicial review BY OPENLY DISREGARDING ESTABLISHED COMELEC
PROCESSES BY BYPASSING THE COMELEC EN BANC. This is a legal mortal sin that will
sow havoc in future cases before this Court. The petition consequently failed to show any prima
facie case of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec, as it had not yet finally
decided on its course of action. Most importantly, the issues the petition presents have now
been MOOTED and do not now present any LIVE CONTROVERSY. The Court will recall that
we immediately issued a temporary restraining order to halt further Comelec action, so that
the petitioner was effectively the prevailing party when the elections — the critical time
involved in this case — took place. Subsequently, the interest advocated in the disputed
tarpaulin was decided by this Court to the satisfaction of the public at large, among them the
Church whose right to life views prevailed. THESE ARE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD
DISSUADE THIS COURT FROM RULING ON A CASE THAT WEIGHS THE RIGHTS OF
FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL VALUES.
Same; View on Requirements of Justiciability.—Judicial review under the traditional
jurisdiction of the Court requires the following requirements of justiciability: (1) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Failure to meet any of these
requirements justifies the Court’s refusal to exercise its power of judicial review under the
Court’s traditional power. The Court, however, has, in several instances, opted to relax one or
more of these requirements to give due course to a petition presenting issues of transcendental
importance to the nation.
Same; Locus Standi; Transcendental Importance Doctrine; View that when the standing is relaxed
because of the transcendental importance doctrine, the character of the injury presented to fulfill the
actual case or controversy requirement is likewise tempered.—In these cases, the doctrine of
transcendental importance relaxes the standing requirement, and thereby indirectly relaxes the
injury embodied in the actual case or controversy requirement. Note at this point that an actual
case or controversy is present when the issues it poses are ripe for adjudication, that is, when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. Standing, on the other hand, requires a personal and substantial interest manifested through
a direct injury that the petitioner has or will sustain as a result of the questioned act. Thus,
when the standing is relaxed because of the transcendental importance doctrine, the character
of the injury presented to fulfill the actual case or controversy requirement is likewise
tempered. When we, for instance, say that the petitioners have no standing as citizens or as
taxpayers but we nevertheless give the petition due course, we indirectly acknowledge that the
injury that they had or will sustain is not personally directed towards them, but to the more
general and abstract Filipino public.
Same; Political Questions; View that the political question doctrine prevents the Supreme Court
(SC) from deciding cases that are of a political nature, and leaves the decision to the elected officials of
government.—The political question doctrine prevents the Court from deciding cases that are
of a political nature, and leaves the decision to the elected-officials of government. In other
words, the Court, through the political question doctrine, defers to the judgment and discretion
of the Executive and Legislature, matters that involve policy because they are the people’s
elected officials and hence are more directly accountable to them.
Same; Same; View that the 1987 Constitution, recognizing the importance of the Supreme Court’s
(SC’s) active role in checking abuses in government, relaxed the political question doctrine and made it
a duty upon the Court to determine whether there had been abuses in the government’s exercise of
discretion and consequently nullify such actions that violate the Constitution albeit in the narrow and
limited instances of grave abuse of discretion.—The 1987 Constitution, recognizing the importance
of the Court’s active role in checking abuses in government, relaxed the political question
doctrine and made it a duty upon the Court to determine whether there had been abuses in the
government’s exercise of discretion and consequently nullify such actions that violate the
Constitution albeit in the narrow and limited instances of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, when
a government agency’s exercise of discretion is so grave as to amount to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction, it becomes the duty to step in and check for violations of the Constitution. In these
instances, the political question doctrine cannot prevent the Court from determining whether
the government gravely abused its jurisdiction, against the back drop of the Constitution.
Same; Same; View that translated in terms of the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) expanded jurisdiction, the
actual case or controversy requirement is fulfilled by a prima facie showing of grave abuse
of discretion.—Translated in terms of the Court’s expanded jurisdiction, the actual case or
controversy requirement is fulfilled by a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion. This
approach reflects the textual requirement of grave abuse of discretion in the second paragraph
of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. As I have earlier pointed out in my separate
opinion in Araullo v. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1 (2014), justiciability under the expanded judicial
power expressly and textually depends only on the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion, as distinguished from a situation where the issue of constitutional validity is raised
within a “traditionally” justiciable case which demands that the requirement of actual
controversy based on specific legal rights must exist.
Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; View that the constitutional grant to the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) of the power to investigate and to prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the
enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively ensure
to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections.—The petition characterizes the notices
as administrative acts of the Comelec that are outside the latter’s jurisdiction to perform. The
Comelec’s administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election
laws. Under Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec is expressly given the
power to “prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.” The constitutional grant to the
Comelec of the power to investigate and to prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the
enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to
effectively ensure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections.
Judicial Review; Jurisdiction; Expanded Jurisdiction; View that the Supreme Court (SC) reviews
Commission on Elections’ (Comelec’s) administrative acts only by way of exception, when it acts
capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Necessarily, this invokes the Court’s expanded jurisdiction under the second paragraph of Article VIII,
Section 1.—The Court reviews Comelec’s administrative acts only by way of exception, when
it acts capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Necessarily, this invokes the Court’s expanded jurisdiction under the second
paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1. That there is an alleged grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Comelec, however, does not automatically mean that the petition should be given due
course. It has to meet the requirements of justiciability which, under the terms of the Court’s
expanded judicial power, has been translated to mean a prima facie showing of a governmental
entity, office or official granted discretionary authority to act and that this authority has been
gravely abused. There can be no prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion unless
something has already been done or has taken place under the law and the petitioner
sufficiently alleges the existence of a threatened or immediate injury to itself as a result of the
gravely abusive exercise of discretion.
Election Law; Preliminary Investigation; View that Commission on Elections (Comelec)
Resolution No. 9386 (Rules of Procedure in the Investigation and Prosecution of Election Offense Cases
in the COMELEC), in particular, provides that once a complaint is initiated, an investigating officer
would have to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether it warrants prosecution.—
Comelec Resolution No. 9386 (Rules of Procedure in the Investigation and Prosecution of
Election Offense Cases in the Commission on Elections), in particular, provides that once a
complaint is initiated, an investigating officer would have to conduct a preliminary
investigation to determine whether it warrants prosecution. At this stage, the respondent(s) to
the complaint may submit his counter-affidavit and other supporting documents for the
complaint’s dismissal. The investigating officer may also hold a hearing to propound
clarificatory questions to the parties and their witnesses. The parties may even submit
questions to the investigating officer, which the latter may propound to the parties or parties
or witnesses concerned.
Moot and Academic; View that a case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties, or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.—A
petition becomes moot and academic when it “ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.” A case
becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties, or
no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
Judicial Review; View that after the Commission on Elections (Comelec) had been allowed to
exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest, judicial review of its actions may be availed of through a petition
for certiorari under the Rules of Court.—But while these issues are capable of repetition, they most
certainly cannot escape review. The administrative process outlined in Comelec Resolution No.
9615 provides a process through which the Comelec may decide these issues with finality.
After the Comelec had been allowed to exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest, judicial review of
its actions may be availed of through a petition for certiorari under the Rules of Court. At that
point, the issues would certainly no longer be premature.
Election Law; View that the content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting, makes it
subject of the regulations in Republic Act (RA) No. 9006 and Commission on Elections (Comelec)
Resolution No. 9615.—The content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting, makes it
subject of the regulations in RA 9006 and Comelec Resolution No. 9615. Comelec Resolution
No. 9615 contains rules and regulations implementing RA 9006 during the 2013 national
elections. Section 3 of RA 9006 and Section 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 seek to regulate
election propaganda, defined in the latter as: The term “political advertisement” or “election
propaganda” refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in
any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and
other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being associated with a candidate or
party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or
oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office.
In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances on TV
shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other forms of
advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers. Political advertising
includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet
website, including, but not limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites,
in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation.
Same; Election Propaganda; View that had Congress intended to limit its definition of election
propaganda to materials posted for or in behalf of candidates, it could have so specified.—Had Congress
intended to limit its definition of election propaganda to materials posted for or in behalf
of candidates, it could have so specified. Notably, Section 9 on the Posting of Campaign
Materials indicates who the Comelec may authorize to erect common poster areas for
campaign materials in public places. It does not, as the ponencia makes it appear, limit the
definition of election propaganda to those posted by candidates and parties. The title of
Section 9 uses the word “campaign materials” and not election propaganda; thus, it refers to
a particular type of election propaganda. Election propaganda becomes a campaign material
once it is used by candidates and political parties. Nevertheless, the latter is different from
the more generic term ‘election propaganda’ in the other parts of RA 9006.
Same; Same; View that that the subject poster was posted on private property does not divest the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) of authority to regulate it.—That the subject poster was posted
on private property does not divest the Comelec of authority to regulate it. The law specifically
recognizes the posting of election propaganda on private property provided its owner consents
to it. In the present case, the property owner is the Diocese of Bacolod itself, and the posting of
the subject poster was made upon its own directive.
Same; Same; Content-Neutral Regulations; View that the assailed regulations in the present case
involve a content-neutral regulation that controls the incidents of speech. Both the notice and letter sent
by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to the Diocese of Bacolod sought to enforce Section 3.3 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 which limits the size of
posters that contain election propaganda to not more than two (2) by three (3) feet. It does not prohibit
anyone from posting materials that contain election propaganda, so long as it meets the size
limitations.—Content-based regulations are viewed with a heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality. Thus, the government has the burden of showing that the regulation is
narrowly tailored to meet compelling state interest, otherwise, the Court will strike it down
as unconstitutional. In contrast, content-neutral regulations are not presumed
unconstitutional. They pass constitutional muster once they meet the following
requirements: first, that the regulation is within the constitutional power of the
Government; second, that it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third,
that the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth,
that the incidental restriction on speech is no greater than is essential to further that
interest. The assailed regulations in the present case involve a content-neutral regulation that
controls the incidents of speech. Both the notice and letter sent by the Comelec to the Diocese
of Bacolod sought to enforce Section 3.3 of RA 9006 and Section 6(c) of Comelec Resolution No.
9615 which limits the size of posters that contain election propaganda to not more than two by
three feet. It does not prohibit anyone from posting materials that contain election propaganda,
so long as it meets the size limitations.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; View that Philippine jurisprudence has long settled
that the time, place, and manner of speech may be subject to Government regulation. Since the size of a
poster involves a time, place and manner regulation, then it may be the proper subject of a government
regulation.—Philippine jurisprudence has long settled that the time, place, and manner of
speech may be subject to Government regulation. Since the size of a poster involves a time,
place and manner regulation, then it may be the proper subject of a government regulation.
That Congress may impose regulations on the time place, and manner of speech during the
election period is even implicitly recognized in Section 2, paragraph 7, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution. Under this provision, the Comelec is empowered to recommend to Congress
effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted. That Congress can pass regulations regarding places
where propaganda materials may be posted necessarily indicates that it can also pass other
content-neutral regulations, such as the time and manner of the speech’s utterance.
Same; Same; View that freedom of expression, in the first place, is not the god of rights to which
all other rights and even government protection of state interest must bow.—Freedom of expression,
in the first place, is not the god of rights to which all other rights and even government
protection of state interest must bow. Speech rights are not the only important and relevant
values even in the most democratic societies. Our Constitution, for instance, values giving
equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to a person’s status, or
the level of financial resources that one may have at one’s disposal.
Same; Same; View that size limits to posters are necessary to ensure equality of public information
campaigns among candidates, as allowing posters with different sizes gives candidates and their
supporters the incentive to post larger posters. This places candidates with more money and/or with
deep-pocket supporters at an undue advantage against candidates with more humble financial
capabilities.—Size limits to posters are necessary to ensure equality of public information
campaigns among candidates, as allowing posters with different sizes gives candidates and
their supporters the incentive to post larger posters. This places candidates with more money
and/or with deep-pocket supporters at an undue advantage against candidates with more
humble financial capabilities. Notably, the law does not limit the number of posters that a
candidate, his supporter, or a private individual may post. If the size of posters becomes
unlimited as well, then candidates and parties with bigger campaign funds could effectively
crowd out public information on candidates with less money to spend to secure posters — the
former’s bigger posters and sheer number could effectively take the attention away from the
latter’s message. In the same manner, a lack of size limitations would also crowd out private,
unaffiliated individuals from participating in the discussion through posters, or at the very
least, compel them to erect bigger posters and thus spend more.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; Content-Neutral Regulation; View that a
governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government, if [(a)] it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [(b)] the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [(c)] the incident restriction
on alleged [freedom of speech and expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.—As comprehensively explained in the seminal case of Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA
441 (2008), “[w]hen the speechrestraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a
substantial governmental interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of this type
are not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form
of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach — somewhere between the mere rationality
that is required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-based
restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the
validity of a law but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an
important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of
expression. The intermediate approach has [thus] been formulated in this manner: A
governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government, if [(a)] it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [(b)] the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [(c)] the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech and expression] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.”
Same; Same; Same; View that a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press
based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact.—A
governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act
has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Same; Same; View that while the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) regulatory powers
ought to be recognized, personal advocacies pertaining to relevant social issues by a private entity within
its own private property ought to fall beyond that broad authority, lest we stifle the value of a core
liberty.—Considering the totality of the factors herein detailed, and equally bearing in mind the
discussions made in Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992), I submit that the COMELEC
issuances subject of this case do not satisfy the substantial governmental interest requisite and,
hence, fail the intermediate scrutiny test. Surely, while the COMELEC’s regulatory powers
ought to be recognized, personal advocacies pertaining to relevant social issues by a private
entity within its own private property ought to fall beyond that broad authority, lest we stifle
the value of a core liberty.
No. L-82380. April 29, 1988.*
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS,
petitioners, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
No.L-82398. April 29, 1988.*
HAL McELROY, petitioner, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 and JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
 Constitutional Law; Freedom of speech and of expression; Freedom includes freedom to film,
produce and exhibit motion pictures in theaters and television.—Considering first petitioners’ claim
to freedom of speech and of expression, the Court would once more stress that this freedom
includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures
in theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a
universally utilized vehicle of communication and medium of expression. Along with the
press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass
communication for information, education and entertainment.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom available to locally-owned and foreign-owned motion picture
companies; Expectancy of yielding mone-tary profit in the production of motion pictures is not a
disqualification for availing freedom of speech and expression.—This freedom is available in our
country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore,
the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected
to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of
expression. In our community as in many other coun-tries, media facilities are owned either by
the government or the private sector but the private sector-owned media facilities commonly
require to be sustained by being devoted in whole or in part to revenue producing activities.
Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and
hence to exclude commercially owned and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally
protected freedom of speech and of expression and only result in the drastic contraction of such
constitutional liberties in our country.
Same; Same; Right of privacy; Right of privacy like right of free expression is not an absolute right;
The right cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest.—The
counter-balancing claim of private respondent is to a right of privacy. It was demonstrated
sometime ago by the then Dean Irene R. Cort&s that our law, constitutional and statutory, does
include a right of privacy. It is left to caselaw, however, to mark out the precise scope and
content of this right in differing types of particular situations. The right of privacy or “the right
to be let alone,” like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion
into a person’s privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public
figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him
constitute matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked
to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be
protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from “unwarranted publicity, from the
wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the
realm of legitimate public concern.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution” does not
constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent’s right ofprivacy.—Whether the “balancing
of interests test” or the “clear and present danger test” be applied in respect of the instant
Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The production
and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution” does
not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent’s “right of privacy.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No clear and present danger of any violation of any right to
privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.—It may be observed at the outset that what
is involved in the instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge
upon the exercise of speech and of expression by peUtioners. The respondent Judge has
restrained petitionefB from filming and producing the entire proposed motion picture. It is
important to note that in Lagunzad, there was no prior restraint of any kind imposed upon the
movie producer who in fact completed and exhibited the film biography of Moises Padilla.
Because of the preferred character of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and of
expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint upon the
exercise of such freedoms. The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint does not, of course,
mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to exercise
such constitutional freedoms. The respondent Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of
issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the
private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the
projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film
would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no “clear and present danger” of any
violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The subject matter of “The Four Day Revolution” is one
of public interest and concern and does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private
life of private respondent Ponce Enrile.—The subject matter of The Four Day Revolution” relates
to the non-bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in
February 1986, and the train of events which led up to that d&nouement. Clearly, such subject
matter is one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners’ argue, of international
interest. The subject thus relates to a highly critical state in the history of this country and as
such, must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an appropriate subject
for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The subject matter, as set
out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the
individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. Unlike
in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his
immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography, more or less fictionalized, of
private respondent Ponce Enrile. “The Four Day Revolution” is not principally about, nor is it
focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile; but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to
the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the
change of government in February 1986.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent is a public figure: Definition of ‘a public figure.—
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that
petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and
Keeton have referred to as a “public figure:” “A public figure has been defined as a person
who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling
which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a ‘public personage.’ He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this
category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the
public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other
entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors
and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a
personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has
arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.—Private respondent is a “public figure” precisely because,
inter alia, of his participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of
government in February 1986. Because his participation therein was major in character, a film
reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private
respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a “public figure” is
necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into
the seclusion of simple private citizenship. He continues to be a “public figure.” After a
successful political campaign during which his participation in the EDSA Revolution was
directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place,
the Senate of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; The proposed motion picture is required to be fairly truthful and historical in
its presentation ofevents.—The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may
be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly
truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other words, be no knowing
or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA
Revolution. There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private
respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrasing personal facts. The
proposed motion picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera
in Lagunzad referred to as “matters of essentially private concern.” To the extent that “The Four
Day Revolution” limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA
Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the
EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent’s privacy cannot be regarded as
unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from
private respondent.
G.R. No. 80806. October 5, 1989.*
LEO PITA, doing business under the name and style of PINOY PLAYBOY,
petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON BAGATSING, and NARCISO
CABRERA, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Press Freedom; Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to
deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall is the test in determining the existence of
obscenity.—The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being asked to
pronounce what “obscene” means or what makes for an obscene or pornographic literature.
Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the test, in determining the existence of
obscenity, as follows: “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall.” “Another test,” so Kottinger
further declares, “is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an
indecency.”
Same; Same; Same; If the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art’s sake but rather
for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.—As the Court
declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor
divided. It is easier said than done to say, indeed, that if “the pictures here in question were
used not exactly for art’s sake but rather for commercial purposes,” the pictures are not entitled
to any constitutional protection.
Same; Same; There is no challenge on the right of the State in the legitimate exercise of police power
to suppress smut—provided it is smut.—In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the
State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut—provided it is smut. For
obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident
that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the
rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not
necessarily repulsive to the present generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored
in the thirties yet their works are considered important literature today. Goya’s La Maja
desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but now adorns the world’s most prestigious
museums.
Same; Same; Obscenity is not a bare matter of opinion.—But neither should we say that
“obscenity” is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent
perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than
resolved it.
Same; Same; Immoral lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression although not its
protection; Burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action
lies on the authorities.—Undoubtedly, “immoral” lore or literature comes within the ambit of
free expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently
been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a “clear and present danger” that would
warrant State interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, “the burden
to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action . . . lies
on the . . . authorit[ies].”
Same; Same; Clear and Present Danger Rule; There must be objective and convincing, not
subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger.—“There must be
objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and
present danger.” “It is essential for the validity of . . . previous restraint or censorship that the
. . . authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or
safety may require.” “To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and
sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court not convinced that private respondents have shown the required
proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had
been sought.—The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required
proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory
injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order:
(1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search
and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Police Power; Fact that the former respondent Mayor’s act was
sanctioned by police power is no license to seize property in disregard of due process; Police power
defined.—The fact that the former respondent Mayor’s act was sanctioned by “police power” is
no license to seize property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, we defined police power as “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” Presidential Decrees
Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves,
authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the
decree of the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos’), from the commandments of the
Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, specifically.
Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; Searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial
warrant otherwise they become unreasonable and subject to challenge.—It is basic that searches and
seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable
and subject to challenge. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, We countermanded the orders of the
Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the premises of We Forum and Metropolitan
Mail, two Metro Manila dailies, by reason of a defective warrant. We have greater reason here
to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The
fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a political
case, because, and as we have indicated, speech is speech, whether political or “obscene”.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court not ruling out warrantless searches.—The Court is not ruling
out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an offense may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense. But as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a
lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been
charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended,
of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Argument that there is no constitutional nor legal provision
which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been no warrant and that
violation of penal law must be punished, rejected.—We reject outright the argument that “[t]here is
no constitutional nor legal provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility
because there had been no warrant,” and that “violation of penal law [must] be punished.” For
starters, there is no “accused” here to speak of, who ought to be “punished”. Second, to say
that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut
campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, “violation of penal laws”
has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into
one. And precisely, this is the very complaint of the petitioner.
No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO,FLORENCIO PADRIGANO,RUFINO, ROXAS,MARIANO DE
LEON,ASENCION PACIENTE,BONIFACIO VACUNA,BENJAMIN PAGCU and
RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Political and Constitutional Law; Basic concepts and principles underlying a democracy.—In a
democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent
in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."
Same; Purpose of Bill of Rights.—The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of
liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who
have no patience with general principles." The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to "withdraw
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts..."
 Same; Same.—The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition
are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical
aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we
cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also
to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the
liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of
all are protected.
Same; Same.—The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to
his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely
in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen
is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or
agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on
erring public officers and employees.
Same; Same; Human rights supreme to property rights.—While the Bill of Rights also protects
property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the
"threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only
"with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but
human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then
the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful,
and of oligarchs—political, economic or otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of assembly and expression occupy a preferred position.—In the
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such "priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions."
Same; Same; Same; Why human civil liberties more superior than property rights disclosed.—The
superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose—that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive—would suffice
to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional
or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely, existence of
a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So
it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and
reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. It should be noted that Mr. Justice
Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co.
vs. Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we
shall be governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interest test. Chief
Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned
Hand, viz.—whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Workers who joined a demonstration against police abuses did not
violate CBA "no-strike no-lockout" provision.—Tested against the foregoing principles, the
conclusion of the Court of Industrial Relations that the petitioners by their "concerted act and
the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of Work," are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
hence violated the collective bargaining agreement cannot be sustained. The demonstration
held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm. Said
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general
and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before
appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the duty of employer to protect employees against police abuses.—
As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union
and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of herein
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that
they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform
more efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits.
Same; Same; Same; Demonstration against police abuses not a violation of collective bargaining
agreement.—As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights—freedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances—over property rights has been
sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon—at once the shield and
armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our
enlightened civilization—becomes Our Duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning
at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness
for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
Same; Demonstration against police abuses could not have been enjoined by any court.—The
mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally
enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike.
Same; Labor Law; All employees of a firm and not merely those belonging to a particular shift may
join demonstration.—The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to
participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and
regular shift from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the
firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely, the complete unity of the Union members
as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum
persuasive force that will gain for them not only public sympathy for the validity of their cause
but also immediate action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with
jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects
of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. ... At any rate, the Union
notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company
could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by
reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day shift employees who will join the demonstration. ... There
was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request... And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Employer who refuses its employees to join demonstration against police abuse guilty
of unfair labor practice.—Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the
subsequent separation of the eight petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional
restraint on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of petition for
redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in
Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of R.A. No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace
Act. Section 3 of R.A. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concerted
activities for xxx mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section Three." xxx The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that
the workers for the morning and regular shifts should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore state, "a potent means of inhibiting
speech."
Evidence; Lack of finding the company did not suffer any loss means not such loss was
sustained.—While the respondent Court found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large
extent the operations of the complainant company," the said court did not make any finding as
to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only means
that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage.
Constitutional and Political Law; Labor Law; Dismissal from work of leaders of demonstration
against police abuses constitutes denial of social justice.— Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution
imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section
6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor xxx".
Respondent Court as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning
and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise
these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter."
Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy
of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the
exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining
and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate
that said court failed to implement this policy.xxx
Same; When a court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null and
void.—Having violated the basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations
ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Same; CIR rules against late filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot prevail over basic
constitutional rights.—Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two days
late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees for their reinstatement? The answer should
be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not
only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is
superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural
reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid
court procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.
Same.—It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives
way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial
Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by
herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them
and in their defense to the said charge. In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human
freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application
of a CIR rule which impinges on such human rights.
Same; Civil Procedure; Court may suspend its own rules.—It is an accepted principle that the
Supreme Court has inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case
from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice requires." Mr. Justice Barredo in his
concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo reiterated this principle and added that "Under
this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about
procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice..." If we can disregard our
own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a CIR rule that classes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law.
Same; Same; Suspension of CIR rules authorized by C.A. 103.—The suspension of the
application of Section 15 of the CIR rules with reference to the case at bar, is also authorized by
Section 20 of C.A. 103, the CIR charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms."
G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.*
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L.
ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL
REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, petitioners, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Judicial Review; One of the
greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated
in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).—One of the greatest contributions of the American
system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803). This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation—The
Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all
political authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government
consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold
it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will
of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and
the end of the theory of judicial review.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites; The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts
a “self-starting capacity.”—The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a “self-
starting capacity.” Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are
present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a
question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; An actual case or controversy involves a
conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution—it is “definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest,” a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief.—An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is “definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest”; a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief. The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such
actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered “moot and
academic” by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic Questions; The “moot and academic”
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case; Courts
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution,
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, third,
when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.—A moot and
academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. The Court holds that
President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.
During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional
or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved
in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no
rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.” The
“moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi is defined as “a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”—Locus standi is defined as “a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by
the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Succinctly
put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits, as here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
does so as a representative of the general public.—The difficulty of determining locus standi arises
in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is
affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the
category of a “citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In either case, he has to adequately show that he is
entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in
the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suits; Citizen’s Suits; The plaintiff in a
taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit—in the former, the plaintiff
is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the
public concern.—Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both “citizen” and “taxpayer”
standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it
was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a
citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the
latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court
in People ex rel Case v. Collins: “In matter of mere public right, however . . . the people are the real
parties . . . It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence
be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.” With respect to
taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordanheld that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action
in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Direct Injury” Test; To prevent just about
any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with,
and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United States
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent “direct injury” test, which test has been adopted in this
jurisdiction.—To prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official
policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental
agencies engaged in public service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more
stringent “direct injury” test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same
Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity
of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of
that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the
public. This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56 (1937), it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.”
The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the
Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of
locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion, such as in cases of
“transcendental importance,” or where the issues raised have “far-reaching implications.”—Being a
mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in
the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v.
Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), where the “transcendental importance” of the cases prompted the
Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,
62 SCRA 275 (1975), this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the “far-reaching
implications” of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein
had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has
been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to
prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order that Taxpayers, Voters, Concerned
Citizens and Legislators may be Accorded Standing to Sue; Recent decisions show a certain toughening
in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing.—By way of summary, the following rules may be
culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are
met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there
must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a
claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court’s attitude toward legal
standing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is in the interest of justice that those affected by
Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the
attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.—In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition
Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of
whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers
incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by
PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the
alleged violations of their basic rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that
the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.—In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI),
this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994), Kapatiran Ng
Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, 197 SCRA 52 (1991), and Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), that when the issue
concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the
execution of the laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Organizations may be granted standing to assert the
rights of their members.—In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal
standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members. We take
judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and
canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; National officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) have no legal standing where they failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as
an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.—
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz, et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential
injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the
issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA
81 (2000), the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of
law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in
this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares
that petitioner have locus standi.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of a petitioner that she is a media personality
does not aid her where there is no showing that the enforcement of the issuances in question prevented
her from pursuing her occupation, and neither does her submission that she has a pending electoral
protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal have any relevance where she has not sufficiently
shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case.—In G.R. No. 171424, Loren
Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations
of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no
consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a
lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media
personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of
these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has
pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance.
She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But
considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may
relax the standing rules.
Same; Same; Same; Presidency; Parties; It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as
respondent—settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law; It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.—It is not proper to implead President Arroyo
as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for
it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the
Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it
is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable
him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative
and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not
mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains
accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by
law and that is by impeachment.
Presidency; Calling-Out Power; Declaration of State of National Emergency; Petitioners failed to
show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of
factual basis.—As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of
power, Lansang adopted the test that “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the
Court not that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.”
Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, this Court further ruled that “it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis” and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support
his assertion, then “this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.”
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing
PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance
of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of
the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist
leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners
presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Same; Same; Same; In times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a
certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it
obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.—In the final analysis, the
various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists—from Lock’s “theory of
prerogative,” to Watkins’ doctrine of “constitutional dictatorship” and, eventually, to
McIlwain’s “principle of constitutionalism”—ultimately aim to solve one real problem in
emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief
Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and
under effective limitations and checks. Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh
from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the
1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jackson’s
“balanced power structure.” Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the
President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own
sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve
as limitation or check upon the other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his
power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our
Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity
and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully
prescribed procedural limitations.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Facial Challenges; Overbreadth Doctrine; The
overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech
cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases; A plain reading of PP 1017 shows
that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct—it is actually a call upon the
AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.—A facial review of PP 1017, using the
overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for. First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases, also known
under the American Law as First Amendment cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it
is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the
AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno, the US
Supreme Court held that “we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment” (freedom of speech).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that “reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct”—“overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.”—The overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that
“reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered “harmful” and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.” In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, it was held: It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a law may
properly be held void on its face and when ‘such summary action’ is inappropriate. But the
plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our
traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise
unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and
that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect
legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only “spoken words” and again, that “overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct.” Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017
pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly
strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly and only as a last resort,” and is “generally disfavored.”—
Facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly
and only as a last resort,” and is “generally disfavored”; The reason for this is obvious. Embedded
in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to
whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A
writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further: The most distinctive feature of the
overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation.
Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the
litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise
the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules
give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
entire statute “on its face,” not merely “as applied for” so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that
motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
“chilling;” deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to
bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s “very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Related to the
“overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially invalid if
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,” and
like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications.—Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of
vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted. Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for
vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” It is subject to the same principles
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their
faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a
statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even
attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men
of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017. Same;
Same; Same; Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.—Under the calling-out power, the President
may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.
This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out
power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the
exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser
power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the
limitations.
Same; Same; Same; In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely
on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion but also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public
interest—indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.—President Arroyo’s
declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the
words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these
cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo
did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17,
Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of
an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal
significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
Same; Same; Same; Martial Law; PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law—it is plain therein
that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.—Some of the petitioners vehemently
maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the
character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was
her calling-out power. The declaration of Martial Law is a “warn[ing] to citizens that the
military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and
order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not
commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the
enforcement of law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted from
Former President Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081; We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted
President Marcos legislative powers.—A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was
lifted from Former President Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads: NOW,
THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place
the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law
and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. We all know
that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause
states: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.” Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by
President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees; President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to
Executive Orders, Administrative Orders, Proclamations, Memorandum Orders, Memorandum
Circulars, and General or Special Orders—she cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former
President Marcos under PP 1081.—The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter
2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the
following: Sec. 2. Executive Orders.—Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall
be promulgated in executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.—Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. Sec. 4. Proclamations.—Acts
of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend,
shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. Sec.
5. Memorandum Orders.—Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the
Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars.—Acts
of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to
bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the
Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars. Sec.
7. General or Special Orders.—Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or
special orders. President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She
cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.
Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes
because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the
period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate “decrees.”—This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
“decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; With respect to “laws,” President Arroyo cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts and the like—she can only order the military, under PP 1017, to
enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.—As this Court stated earlier,
President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,
therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to enforce or
implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017,
to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Same; Same; Same; President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national
emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment but the exercise of emergency powers, such
as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different
matter.—It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only
to war but also to “other national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution
was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a “state of national emergency”
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the
declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly,
they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a
“state of national emergency.” The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could
validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter.
This requires a delegation from Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI,
previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation
of the exercise of emergency powers.—Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari
materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and
provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together
and considered in the light of each other. Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section
23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together
to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.
Same; Same; Same; Emergency Powers; Requisites for Valid Delegation; Generally, Congress is
the repository of emergency powers.—Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This
is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that
during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be
a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation
must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must
be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
emergency powers clause, and the taking over of private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress—Section 17 refers to Congress,
not the President.—Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency
powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another
facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states
that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may
exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a
law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the
existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond
that which is accepted as normal—implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and
perception; Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United States since 1933, have
been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic,
b) natural disaster, and c) national security; “Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution, may
include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of
nationwide proportions or effect.—Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term
“emergency” under Section 17, Article XII refers to “tsunami,” “typhoon,” “hurricane” and
“similar occurrences.” This is a limited view of “emergency.” Emergency, as a generic term,
connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life
or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the
elements of intensity, variety, and perception. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or
executive in the United States since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations,
classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic, b) natural disaster, and c) national
security. “Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may
include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar
catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.—Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by
President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize
her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional
circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of
businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has
no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which
pertains to security, is that military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not
compatible.—One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to
security, is that military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not
compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and
trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless
arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights
suffered the greatest blow.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Review; Courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although
they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of
application—the validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.—Settled is the rule
that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. PP 1017 is merely an
invocation of the President’s calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to
suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end
desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017
allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the
citizens’ constitutional rights. Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance
unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no.
The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential
basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. This is
logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional
just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from
the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time
ago.
Same; Same; Same; General orders are “acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines”—they are internal rules issued by the
executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law.—
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General
orders are “acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.” They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his
subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and
regulations create no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who
receives them. They are based on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is their
source, and obedience, their object. For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be
valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP
and the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.”
Same; Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; The plain import of the language of the Constitution is
that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued
search warrant or warrant of arrest.—The Constitution provides that “the right of the people to
be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”The
plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests
are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of
arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and
police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse
to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Right of Assembly; Words and Phrases; “Assembly” means a right on the part
of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs—it is a necessary
consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech; The right of the people
to peaceably assemble is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.—”Assembly” means a right on the
part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a
necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As
in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on
a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble
is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior
issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the
assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for
the assembly itself, may be validly required.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime.—The ringing truth here
is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and
present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from
circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought.
Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers’
conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon, it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime,
thus: Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of
meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct
of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of
free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which
the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether
their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution
protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or
are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for
their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead
of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful
public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard
of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent”—tolerance is the
rule and limitation is the exception.—On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise
considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et al. (G.R. No. 171483)
unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s
directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary.
The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that
“freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.” Tolerance is the rule and limitation
is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger
that the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or
convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and
unprotected assemblies was eliminated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged
with the local government units; When a person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves
a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.—
Under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local
government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due
notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here,
petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.
The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is
a fatal defect. When a person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves a
democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to
procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; The warrantless search of the Daily Tribune’s offices is
illegal.—G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of
speech i.e., the freedom of the press. Petitioners’ narration of facts, which the Solicitor General
failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily Tribune’s offices were searched
without warrant; second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third,
the search was conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the
search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security
guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily
Tribune offices. x x x The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search
warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any
other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that
it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or
night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of the Press; The search of the Daily Tribune’s offices also
violated freedom of the press; The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom
enjoyed by its media.—The search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. The best gauge of a
free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos
v. Chief of Staff this Court held that—As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the
business and printing offices of the “Metropolitan Mail” and the “We Forum” newspapers. As a
consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further
result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the
nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners’ freedom to express themselves in print.
This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even
militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The search and seizure of materials for publication, the
stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of
government officials to media, are plain censorship—it is that officious functionary of the repressive
government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less
than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey; The Supreme
Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant
of our citizens—freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy.—While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that
the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials
for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and
the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious
functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if
allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of
punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was
subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court
cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant
of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always
be obsta principiis.
Same; Same; Same; PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence but PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees, (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all
laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President, and (3)
to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional.—The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The
proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant
jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce
obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated
by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the
press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII
of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-
owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have
not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the
said G.O.—The Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President—acting as
Commander-in-Chief—addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP
1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard—that the military and the police should
take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.” But the words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined
and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O.
While “terrorism” has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide
the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in
carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
Same; Same; Same; It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive
civil rights are ends in themselves; How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic
without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic
state; Two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and,
political responsibility of the government to the governed.—It is well to remember that military power
is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves. How to give the military the
power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the
eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state. During emergency, governmental action may vary in
breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain
our people’s liberty. Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied
the various competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the
authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of
constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the
government to the governed.
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Concurring Opinion:
Presidency; Declaration of a State of National Emergency; Judicial Review; Supreme Court; Some
of those who drafted PP 1017 may be testing the outer limits of presidential prerogatives and the
perseverance of the Supreme Court in safeguarding the people’s constitutionally enshrined liberty.—
The Dissent dismisses all the Petitions, grants no reliefs to petitioners, and finds nothing wrong
with PP 1017. It labels the PP a harmless pronouncement—“an utter superfluity”—and
denounces the ponencia as an “immodest show of brawn” that “has imprudently placed the
Court in the business of defanging paper tigers.” Under this line of thinking, it would be
perfectly legal for the President to reissue PP 1017 under its present language and nuance. I
respectfully disagree. Let us face it. Even Justice Tinga concedes that under PP 1017, the
police—“to some minds”—“may have flirted with power.” With due respect, this is a masterful
understatement. PP 1017 may be a paper tiger, but—to borrow the colorful words of an
erstwhile Asian leader—it has nuclear teeth that must indeed be defanged. Some of those who
drafted PP 1017 may be testing the outer limits of presidential prerogatives and the
perseverance of this Court in safeguarding the people’s constitutionally enshrined liberty.
They are playing with fire, and unless prudently restrained, they may one day wittingly or
unwittingly burn down the country. History will never forget, much less forgive, this Court if
it allows such misadventure and refuses to strike down abuse at its inception. Worse, our
people will surely condemn the misuse of legal hocus pocus to justify this trifling with
constitutional sanctities.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Presidency; Declaration of a State of National Emergency; Section 17, Article XII provision is not
self-executing as to be validly invoked by the President without congressional authorization—the
President, with all the powers vested in her by Article VII, cannot arrogate unto herself the power to
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without Congressional authorization.—The use of the word “State” as well as the reference
to “reasonable terms” under Section 17, Article XII can only pertain to Congress. In other
words, the said provision is not self-executing as to be validly invoked by the President without
congressional authorization. The provision merely declares a state economic policy during
times of national emergency. As such, it cannot be taken to mean as authorizing the President
to exercise “takeover” powers pursuant to a declaration of a state of national emergency. The
President, with all the powers vested in her by Article VII, cannot arrogate unto herself the
power to take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without Congressional authorization. To do so would constitute
an ultra vires act on the part of the Chief Executive, whose powers are limited to the powers
vested in her by Article VII, and cannot extend to Article XII without the approval of Congress.
Thus, the President’s authority to act in times of national emergency is still subject to the
limitations expressly prescribed by Congress. This is a featured component of the doctrine of
separation of powers, specifically, the principle of checks and balances as applicable to the
political branches of government, the executive and the legislature.
Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; We should bear in mind that in a democracy, constitutional
liberties must always be accorded supreme importance in the conduct of daily life; It is the function of
speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fear.—It cannot be gainsaid that government action
to stifle constitutional liberties guaranteed under the Bill of Rights cannot be preemptive in
meeting any and all perceived or potential threats to the life of the nation.
Such threats must be actual, or at least gravely imminent, to warrant government to take
proper action. To allow government to preempt the happening of any event would be akin to
“putting the cart before the horse,” in a manner of speaking. State action is proper only if there
is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the state has a right to prevent. We
should bear in mind that in a democracy, constitutional liberties must always be accorded
supreme importance in the conduct of daily life. At the heart of these liberties lies freedom of
speech and thought—not merely in the propagation of ideas we love, but more importantly, in
the advocacy of ideas we may oftentimes loathe. As succinctly articulated by Justice Louis D.
Brandeis: Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.
x x x It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
prevented is a serious one. x x x But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible
morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of
incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on.
The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt,
between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of
clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be
expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such
advocacy was then contemplated.
TINGA, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Supreme Court; Judicial Review; The majority, by its ruling, has imprudently placed the Court in
the business of defanging paper tigers.—I regret to say that the majority, by its ruling today, has
imprudently placed the Court in the business of defanging paper tigers. The immodest show
of brawn unfortunately comes at the expense of an exhibition by the Court of a fundamental
but sophisticated understanding of the extent and limits of executive powers and prerogatives,
as well as those assigned to the judicial branch. I agree with the majority on some points, but I
cannot join the majority opinion, as it proceeds to rule on non-justiciable issues based on fears
that have not materialized, departing as they do from the plain language of the challenged
issuances to the extent of second-guessing the Chief Executive. I respectfully dissent.
Presidency; Calling-Out Power; The “calling-out” of the police does not derive from the
commander-in-chief clause but from the power of the President as Chief Executive under Section 1,
Article VII, and the power of executive control under Section 18, Article VII.—Insofar as PP 1017 is
concerned, the calling out power is definitely involved, in view of the directive to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to “suppress all forms of lawless violence.” But there are nuances to
the calling out power invoked in PP 1017 which the majority does not discuss. The directive
“to suppress all forms of lawless violence” is addressed not only to the Armed Forces but to
the police as well. The “calling out” of the police does not derive from Section 17, Article VII,
or the commander-in-chief clause, our national police being civilian in character. Instead, the
calling out of the police is sourced from the power of the President as Chief Executive under
Section 1, Article VII, and the power of executive control under Section 18, Article VII.
Moreover, while the permissible scope of military action is limited to acts in furtherance of
suppressing lawless violence, rebellion, invasion, the police can be commanded by the
President to execute all laws without distinction in light of the presidential duty to execute all
laws.
Same; Same; Declaration of a State of National Emergency; Neither the declaration of a state of
emergency under PP 1017 nor the invocation of the calling out power therein authorizes warrantless
arrests, searches or seizures; the infringement of the right to free expression, peaceable assembly and
association and other constitutional or statutory rights.—If it cannot be made more clear, neither
the declaration of a state of emergency under PP 1017 nor the invocation of the calling out
power therein authorizes warrantless arrests, searches or seizures; the infringement of the right
to free expression, peaceable assembly and association and other constitutional or statutory
rights. Any public officer who nonetheless engaged or is engaging in such extra-constitutional
or extra-legal acts in the name of PP 1017 may be subjected to the appropriate civil, criminal or
administrative liability.
Same; Same; Same; Unlike in the 1987 Constitution, which was appropriately crafted with an
aversion to the excesses of Marcosian martial rule, the 1935 Constitution under which PP 1081 was
issued left no intervening safeguards that tempered or limited the declaration of martial law.—Let us
examine the differences between PP No. 1081 and PP 1017. First, while PP 1017 merely declared
the existence of a state of rebellion, an act ultimately observational in character, PP 1081 “placed
the entire Philippines under martial law,” an active implement that, by itself, substituted
civilian governmental authority with military authority. Unlike in the 1986 Constitution, which
was appropriately crafted with an aversion to the excesses of Marcosian martial rule, the 1935
Constitution under which PP 1081 was issued left no intervening safeguards that tempered or
limited the declaration of martial law. Even the contrast in the verbs used, “place” as opposed
to “declare,” betrays some significance. To declare may be simply to acknowledge the existence
of a particular condition, while to place ineluctably goes beyond mere acknowledgement, and
signifies the imposition of the actual condition even if it did not exist before.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Laws and decrees” in PP 1017 do not relate only to those
promulgated by President Arroyo, but other laws enacted by past sovereigns, whether they be in the form
of the Marcos presidential decrees, or acts enacted by the American Governor-General such as the
Revised Penal Code.—Further proof that “laws and decrees” stand as a class distinct from
“orders and regulations” is the qualifying phrase “promulgated by me,” which necessarily
refers only to orders and regulations. Otherwise, PP 1017 would be ridiculous in the sense that
the obedience to be enforced only relates to laws promulgated by President Arroyo since she
assumed office in 2001. “Laws and decrees” do not relate only to those promulgated by
President Arroyo, but other laws enacted by past sovereigns, whether they be in the form of
the Marcos presidential decrees, or acts enacted by the American Governor-General such as
the Revised Penal Code. Certainly then, such a qualification sufficiently addresses the fears of
the majority that PP 1017 somehow empowers or recognizes the ability of the current President
to promulgate decrees. Instead, the majority pushes an interpretation that, if pursued to its
logical end, suggests that the President by virtue of PP 1017 is also arrogating unto herself, the
power to promulgate laws, which are in the mold of enactments from Congress. Again, in this
respect, the grouping of “laws” and “decrees” separately from “orders” and “regulations”
signifies that the President has not arrogated unto herself the power to issue decrees in the
mold of the infamous Marcos decrees.
Same; The unique nature of the office affords the President the opportunity to profoundly influence
the public discourse, not necessarily through the enactment or enforcement of laws, but specially by the
mere expediency of taking a stand on the issues of the day.—The unique nature of the office affords
the President the opportunity to profoundly influence the public discourse, not necessarily
through the enactment or enforcement of laws, but specially by the mere expediency of taking
a stand on the issues of the day. Indeed, the President is expected to exercise leadership not
merely through the proposal and enactment of laws, but by making such vital stands. U.S.
President Theodore Roosevelt popularized the notion of the presidency as a “bully pulpit,” in
line with his belief that the President was the steward of the people limited only by the specific
restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution, or impleaded by Congress under
its constitutional powers.
Same; The President, as head of state, very well has the capacity to use the office to garner support
for those great national quests that define a civilization.—Yet the President is not precluded, in the
exercise of such role, to be merely responsive. The popular expectation in fact is of a pro-active,
dynamic chief executive with an ability to identify problems or concerns at their incipience and
to respond to them with all legal means at the earliest possible time. The President, as head of
state, very well has the capacity to use the office to garner support for those great national
quests that define a civilization, as President Kennedy did when by a mere congressional
address, he put America on track to the goal of placing a man on the moon. Those memorable
presidential speeches memorized by schoolchildren may have not, by themselves, made
operative any law, but they served not only merely symbolic functions, but help profoundly
influence towards the right direction, the public opinion in the discourse of the times. Perhaps
there was no more dramatic example of the use of the “bully pulpit” for such noble purposes
than in 1964, when an American President from Texas stood before a Congress populated by
many powerful bigots, and fully committed himself as no other President before to the cause
of civil rights with his intonation of those lines from the civil rights anthem, “we shall
overcome.”
Same; Declaration of a State of National Emergency; The declaration of a state of emergency, on
premises of a looming armed threat which have hardly been disputed, falls within such proper functions
of the President as the defender of the Constitution—it was designed to inform the people of the existence
of such a threat, with the expectation that the citizenry would not aid or abet those who would overturn
through force the democratic government.—The President as Chief Government Spokesperson of
the democratic ideals is entrusted with a heady but comfortable pursuit. But no less vital, if
somewhat graver, is the role of the President as the Chief Defender of the democratic way of
life. The “calling out” power assures the President such capability to a great extent, yet it will
not fully suffice as a defense of democracy. There is a need for the President to rally the people
to defend the Constitution which guarantees the democratic way of life, through means other
than coercive. I assert that the declaration of a state of emergency, on premises of a looming
armed threat which have hardly been disputed, falls within such proper functions of the
President as the defender of the Constitution. It was designed to inform the people of the
existence of such a threat, with the expectation that the citizenry would not aid or abet those
who would overturn through force the democratic government. At the same time, the
Proclamation itself does not violate the Constitution as it does not call for or put into operation
the suspension or withdrawal of any constitutional rights, or even create or diminish any
substantive rights.
 Same; Same; The fact that Section 17, Article XII, is purposely ambivalent as to whether the
President may exercise the power therein with or without congressional approval leads me to conclude
that it is constitutionally permissible to recognize exceptions, such as in extreme situations wherein
obtention of congressional authority is impossible or inexpedient considering the emergency.—I
concede that it is fundamentally sound to construe Section 17 as requiring congressional
authority or approval before the takeover under the provision may be effected. After all, the
taking over of a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest would
involve an infringement on the right of private enterprise to profit; or perhaps even
expropriation for a limited period. Constitutionally, the taking of property can only be
accomplished with due process of law, and the enactment of appropriate legislation
prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers of
the State under Section 17 stands as the best assurance that due process of law would be
observed. The fact that Section 17 is purposely ambivalent as to whether the President may
exercise the power therein with or without congressional approval leads me to conclude that
it is constitutionally permissible to recognize exceptions, such as in extreme situations wherein
obtention of congressional authority is impossible or inexpedient considering the emergency.
I thus dissent to any proposition that such requirement is absolute under all circumstances. I
maintain that in such extreme situations, the President may exercise such authority subject to
judicial review. It should be admitted that some emergencies are graver and more imminent
than others. It is not within the realm of impossibility that by reason of a particularly sudden
and grave emergency, Congress may not be able to convene to grant the necessary
congressional authority to the President. Certainly, if bombs from a foreign invader are falling
over Manila skies, it may be difficult, not to mention unnecessarily onerous, to require
convening Congress before the President may exercise the functions under Section 17, Article
XII. The proposition of the majority may be desirable as the general rule, but the correct rule
that should be adopted by the Court should not be so absolute so as to preclude the exercise
by the President of such power under extreme situations.
Same; Same; In truth, the Court’s pronouncement on Section 17, Article XII, is actually obiter.—
Considering that the authorized or actual takeover under Section 17, Article XII, is not
presented as a properly justiciable issue. Nonetheless, and consistent with the general tenor,
the majority has undertaken to decide this non-justiciable issue, and to even place their view
in the dispositive portion in a bid to enshrine it as doctrine. In truth, the Court’s
pronouncement on this point is actually obiter. It is hoped that should the issue become ripe for
adjudication before this Court, the obiter is not adopted as a precedent without the qualification
that in extreme situations wherein congressional approval is impossible or highly impractical
to obtain, the powers under Section 17, Article XII may be authorized by the President.
Freedom of Expression; Overbreadth Doctrine; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; The two concepts
of vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, while related, are distinct from each other—the doctrine of
overbreadth applies generally to statutes that infringe upon freedomof speech while the “void-for-
vagueness” doctrine applies to criminal laws, not merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental
constitutional right (not merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional rights).—
As I noted in my Separate Opinion in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371, 395-406
(2004), citing Justice Kapunan, there is a viable distinction between “void for vagueness” and
“overbreadth” which the majority sadly ignores. A view has been proffered that “vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines are not applicable to penal laws.” These two concepts, while related,
are distinct from each other. On one hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies generally to statutes
that infringe upon freedom of speech. On the other hand, the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine applies to
criminal laws, not merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional right. (not
merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional rights.) The fact that a particular
criminal statute does not infringe upon free speech does not mean that a facial challenge to the
statute on vagueness grounds cannot succeed. The distinction may prove especially crucial
since there has been a long line of cases in American Supreme Court jurisprudence wherein
penal statutes have been invalidated on the ground that they were “void for vagueness.” As I
cited in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, these cases are Connally v. General Construction Co., Lanzetta
v. State of New Jersey, Bouie v. City of Columbia, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, Kolender v.
Lawson, and City of Chicago v. Morales. Granting that perhaps as a general rule, overbreadth
may find application only in “free speech” cases, it is on the other hand very settled doctrine
that a penal statute regulating conduct, not speech, may be invalidated on the ground of “void
for vagueness.” In Romualdez, I decried the elevation of the suspect and radical new doctrine
that the “void for vagueness” challenge cannot apply other than in free speech cases. My view
on this point has not changed, and insofar as the ponencia would hold otherwise, I thus dissent.
Criminal Law; Terrorism; Even without an operative law specifically defining terrorism, the State
already has the power to suppress and punish such acts of terrorism, insofar as such acts are already
punishable, as they almost always are, in our extant general penal laws.—The majority correctly
concludes that General Order No. 5 is generally constitutional. However, they make an
unnecessary distinction with regard to “acts of terrorism,” pointing out that Congress has not
yet passed a law defining and punishing terrorism or acts of terrorism. That may be the case,
but does the majority seriously suggest that the President or the State is powerless to suppress
acts of terrorism until the word “terrorism” is defined by law? Terrorism has a widely accepted
meaning that encompasses many acts already punishable by our general penal laws. There are
several United Nations and multilateral conventions on terrorism, as well as declarations made
by the United Nations General Assembly denouncing and seeking to combat terrorism. There
is a general sense in international law as to what constitutes terrorism, even if no precise
definition has been adopted as binding on all nations. Even without an operative law
specifically defining terrorism, the State already has the power to suppress and punish such
acts of terrorism, insofar as such acts are already punishable, as they almost always are, in our
extant general penal laws. The President, tasked with the execution of all existing laws, already
has a sufficient mandate to order the Armed Forces to combat those acts of terrorism that are
already punishable in our Revised Penal Code, such as rebellion, coup d’etat, murder, homicide,
arson, physical injuries, grave threats, and the like. Indeed, those acts which under normal
contemplation would constitute terrorism are associated anyway with or subsumed under
lawless violence, which is a term found in the Constitution itself. Thus long ago, the State has
already seen it fit to punish such acts.
Declaration of a State of National Emergency; Judicial Review; Searches and Seizures; The
problem with directly adjudicating that the injuries inflicted on David, et al., as illegal, would be that
such would have been done with undue haste, through an improper legal avenue, without the appropriate
trial of facts, and without even impleading the particular officers who effected the
arrests/searches/ seizures.—I respectfully disagree with the manner by which the majority
would treat the “void as applied” argument presented by the petitioners. The majority adopts
the tack of citing three particular injuries alleged by the petitioners as inflicted with the
implementation of PP 1017. The majority analyzes the alleged injuries, correlates them to
particular violations of the Bill of Rights, and ultimately concludes that such violations were
illegal. The problem with this approach is that it would forever deem the Court as a trier or
reviewer at first instance over questions involving the validity of warrantless arrests, searches,
seizures and the dispersal of rallies, all of which entail a substantial level of factual
determination. I agree that PP 1017 does not expand the grounds for warrantless arrests,
searches and seizures or dispersal of rallies, and that the proclamation cannot be invoked
before any court to assert the validity of such unauthorized actions. Yet the problem with
directly adjudicating that the injuries inflicted on David, et al., as illegal, would be that such
would have been done with undue haste, through an improper legal avenue, without the
appropriate trial of facts, and without even impleading the particular officers who effected the
arrests/searches/seizures.
Same; Same; Same; While the Court will not be harmed by a symbolic reaffirmation of commitment
to the principles in the Bill of Rights, it will be harmed by a ruling that unduly and inappropriately
expands the very limited function of the Court as a trier of facts on first instance.—I understand that
the injurious acts complained of by the petitioners upon the implementation of PP 1017 are a
source of grave concern. Indubitably, any person whose statutory or constitutional rights were
violated in the name of PP 1017 or General Order No. 5 deserves redress in the appropriate
civil or criminal proceeding, and even the minority wishes to makes this point as emphatically
clear, if not moreso, as the majority. Yet a ruling from this Court, without the proper factual basis or
prayer for remuneration for the injury sustained, would ultimately be merely symbolic. While the Court
will not be harmed by a symbolic reaffirmation of commitment to the principles in the Bill of Rights, it
will be harmed by a ruling that unduly and inappropriately expands the very limited function of the
Court as a trier of facts on first instance. Same; Same; The function of the Supreme Court is to make
legal pronouncements not based on “obvious” facts, but on proven facts.—In my dissent in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 309, 335-348 (2004), I alluded to the fact that our legal system may
run counter-intuitive in the sense that the seemingly or obviously guilty may still, after trial,
be properly acquitted or exonerated; to the extent that even an accused who murders another
person in front of live television cameras broadcast to millions of sets is not yet necessarily
guilty of the crime of murder or homicide. Hence, the necessity of a proper trial so as to allow
the entire factual milieu to be presented, tested and evaluated before the court. In my
theoretical example, the said accused should nonetheless be acquitted if the presence of
exempting circumstances is established. The same principle applies in these cases. Certainly,
we in the Court can all agree that PP 1017 cannot be invoked to justify acts by the police or
military officers that go beyond the Constitution and the laws. But the course of prudence
dictates that the pronouncement of such a doctrine, while enforceable in a court of law, should
not yet extend itself to specific examples that have not yet been properly litigated. The function
of this Court is to make legal pronouncements not based on “obvious” facts, but on proven facts.
Same; By deciding non-justiciable issues and prejudging cases and controversies without a proper
trial on the merits, the majority has diminished the potency of the Court’s constitutional power in favor
of rhetorical statements that afford no quantifiable relief—it is for the poet and the politician to pen
beautiful paeans to the people’s rights and liberties, it is for the Court to provide for viable legal means
to enforce and safeguard these rights and liberties.—The country-wide attention that the instant
petitions have drawn should not make the Court lose focus on its principal mission, which is
to settle the law of the case. On the contrary, the highly political nature of these petitions should
serve as forewarning for the Court to proceed ex abundante cautelam, lest the institution be
unduly dragged into the partisan mud. The credibility of the Court is ensured by making
decisions in accordance with the Constitution without regard to the individual personalities
involved; with sights set on posterity, oblivious of the popular flavor of the day. By deciding
non-justiciable issues and prejudging cases and controversies without a proper trial on the
merits, the majority has diminished the potency of this Court’s constitutional power in favor
of rhetorical statements that afford no quantifiable relief. It is for the poet and the politician to
pen beautiful paeans to the people’s rights and liberties, it is for the Court to provide for viable
legal means to enforce and safeguard these rights and liberties. When the passions of these
times die down, and sober retrospect accedes, the decision of this Court in these cases will be
looked upon as an extended advisory opinion.
G.R. No. 84433. June 2, 1992.*
ALEXANDER REYES, ALBERTO M. NERA, EDGARDO M. GECA, and 138 others,
petitioners, vs. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, as Officer-in-Charge, Bureau of Labor
Relations, Med-Arbiter PATERNO ADAP, and TRI-UNION EMPLOY-EES UNION, et al.,
respondents.
Labor Law; Words and Phrases; The right to self-organization includes the right not to form or
join a union.—Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and
to disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with,
or assist any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor
organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is
self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also,
no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has opted
to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce
such membership.
Same; Same; Same.—The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment
of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not
to be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor
organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do
not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union
may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit
in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment. The minority employees—who wish to have a union represent them in collective
bargaining—can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification
election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted,
however, to impose their will on the majority—who do not desire to have a union certified as
the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit—upon the plea that they, the minority
workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. As
repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join or
assist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to form, join or assist any
labor union.
Same; INK employees have the right to participate in a certification election and vote for "No
Union."—That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense
of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as
the fact that when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented
by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-organization, albeit in its
negative aspect. The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote
because they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union"—"but members of the
INK which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor
organization"—and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and
exclusive bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor
jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take
part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is
to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are
members of a labor organization or not,
Same; Failure to take part in previous elections no bar to right to participate in future elections.—
Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they
"did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their
religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade
acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote
by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections. In denying the
petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public respondents
exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the
same.
A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent.
Actions; Judgments; Law of the Case; The issues which have already been ruled upon prior to the
remand of a case constitute “the law of the case” insofar as they resolved the issues of which framework
and test are to be applied in this case, and no motion for its reconsideration having been filed.—It bears
stressing, therefore, that the residual issues of the case pertained NOT TO WHAT APPROACH
THIS COURT SHOULD TAKE IN CONSTRUING THE RELIGION CLAUSES, NOR TO THE
PROPER TEST APPLICABLE IN DETERMINING CLAIMS OF EXEMPTION BASED ON
FREEDOM OF RELIGION. These issues have already been ruled upon prior to the remand, and
constitute “the law of the case” insofar as they resolved the issues of which framework and test are to be
applied in this case, and no motion for its reconsideration having been filed. The only task that the
Court is left to do is to determine whether the evidence adduced by the State proves its more
compelling interest. This issue involves a pure question of fact.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Since neither the complainant, respondent nor the government
has filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the ruling in this case, the same has attained finality and
constitutes the law of the case—any attempt to reopen this final ruling constitutes a crass contravention
of elementary rules of procedure, and insofar as it would overturn the parties’ right to rely upon the
Court’s interpretation which has long attained finality, it also runs counter to substantive due process.—
Mr. Justice Carpio’s insistence, in his dissent, in attacking the ruling of this case interpreting
the religious clauses of the Constitution, made more than two years ago, is misplaced to say
the least. Since neither the complainant, respondent nor the government has filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing this ruling, the same has attained finality and constitutes the law of
the case. Any attempt to reopen this final ruling constitutes a crass contravention of elementary
rules of procedure. Worse, insofar as it would overturn the parties’ right to rely upon our
interpretation which has long attained finality, it also runs counter to substantive due process.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause; Words
and Phrases; In simplest terms, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the Establishment Clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices.—The
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, it should be noted, were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal—to promote freedom of individual religious
beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
Establishment Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for
religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious
beliefs and practices.
Same; Same; Strains of U.S. Jurisprudence on the Religion Clauses; U.S. history has produced two
identifiably different, even opposing, strains of jurisprudence on the religion clauses—the first is the
standard of separation, which may take the form of either (a) strict separation or (b) the tamer version of
strict neutrality or separation, and, the second standard, the benevolent neutrality or accommodation.—
U.S. history has produced two identifiably different, even opposing, strains of jurisprudence
on the religion clauses. First is the standard of separation, which may take the form of either
(a) strict separation or (b) the tamer version of strict neutrality or separation, or what Mr. Justice
Carpio refers to as the second theory of governmental neutrality. Although the latter form is not
as hostile to religion as the former, both are anchored on the Jeffersonian premise that a “wall
of separation” must exist between the state and the Church to protect the state from the church.
Both protect the principle of church-state separation with a rigid reading of the principle. On
the other hand, the second standard, the benevolent neutrality or accommodation, is buttressed by
the view that the wall of separation is meant to protect the church from the state. A brief review
of each theory is in order.
Same; Same; Same; Strict Separation; Words and Phrases; The Strict Separationist believes that
the Establishment Clause was meant to protect the state from the church, and the state’s hostility towards
religion allows no interaction between the two.—The Strict Separationist believes that the
Establishment Clause was meant to protect the state from the church, and the state’s hostility
towards religion allows no interaction between the two. According to this Jeffersonian view,
an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state needs to be erected.
Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state. Nor
could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on
believers. Only the complete separation of religion from politics would eliminate the formal
influence of religious institutions and provide for a free choice among political views, thus a
strict “wall of separation” is necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlike the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view, which is a
tamer version of the strict separationist view, believes that the “wall of separation” does not require the
state to be their adversary—rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers. “State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to
favor them.”—The tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict
neutrality or separationist view, (or, the governmental neutrality theory) finds basis in Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946), where the Court declared that Jefferson’s “wall of
separation” encapsulated the meaning of the First Amendment. However, unlike the strict
separationists, the strict neutrality view believes that the “wall of separation” does not require
the state to be their adversary. Rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers. “State power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions than it is to favor them.” The strict neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, but it
is strict in holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of
governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or
obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis of government action. It does not permit,
much less require, accommodation of secular programs to religious belief.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however, is if applied
in interpreting the Establishment Clause, it could lead to a de facto voiding of religious expression in the
Free Exercise Clause.—The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however, is if applied
in interpreting the Establishment Clause, it could lead to a de facto voiding of religious
expression in the Free Exercise Clause. As pointed out by Justice Goldberg in his concurring
opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), strict neutrality could lead
to “a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to
the religious” which is prohibited by the Constitution. Professor Laurence Tribe commented
in his authoritative treatise, viz.: To most observers. . . strict neutrality has seemed incompatible
with the very idea of a free exercise clause. The Framers, whatever specific applications they
may have intended, clearly envisioned religion as something special; they enacted that vision
into law by guaranteeing the free exercise of religion but not, say, of philosophy or science. The
strict neutrality approach all but erases this distinction. Thus it is not surprising that the [U.S.]
Supreme Court has rejected strict neutrality, permitting and sometimes mandating religious
classifications.
Same; Same; Same; Benevolent Neutrality or Accommodation; Words and Phrases; The theory of
benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a different view of the “wall of separation,” in
that, unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to
protect the church from the state.—The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is
premised on a different view of the “wall of separation,” associated with Williams, founder of
the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect the state from the
church, the wall is meant to protect the church from the state. Benevolent neutrality recognizes
that religion plays an important role in the public life of the United States as shown by many
traditional government practices which, to strict neutrality, pose Establishment Clause
questions. Among these are the inscription of “In God We Trust” on American currency; the
recognition of America as “one nation under God” in the official pledge of allegiance to the
flag; the Supreme Court’s time-honored practice of opening oral argument with the invocation
“God save the United States and this Honorable Court”; and the practice of Congress and every
state legislature of paying a chaplain, usually of a particular Protestant denomination, to lead
representatives in prayer. These practices clearly show the preference for one theological
viewpoint—the existence of and potential for intervention by a god—over the contrary
theological viewpoint of atheism. Church and government agencies also cooperate in the
building of low-cost housing and in other forms of poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism
and drug addiction, in foreign aid and other government activities with strong moral
dimension.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government’s
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance;
What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially
neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its “burdensome effect,” whether by the legislature
or the courts.—But the more difficult religion cases involve legislative acts which have secular
purpose and general applicability, but may incidentally or inadvertently aid or burden
religious exercise. Though the government action is not religiously motivated, these laws have
a “burdensome effect” on religious exercise. The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with
respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to
promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion. As Justice Brennan explained,
the “government [may] take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would
otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which
voluntary religious exercise may flourish.” In the ideal world, the legislature would recognize
the religions and their practices and would consider them, when practical, in enacting laws of
general application. But when the legislature fails to do so, religions that are threatened and
burdened may turn to the courts for protection. Thus, what is sought under the theory of
accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an
exemption from its application or its “burdensome effect,” whether by the legislature or the
courts. Most of the free exercise claims brought to the U.S. Court are for exemption, not
invalidation of the facially neutral law that has a “burdensome” effect.
Same; Same; By juxtaposing the American Constitution and jurisprudence against that of the
Philippines, it is immediately clear that one cannot simply conclude that we have adopted—lock, stock
and barrel—the religion clauses as embodied in the First Amendment, and therefore, the U.S. Court’s
interpretation of the same; Unlike in the U.S. where legislative exemptions of religion had to be upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court as constituting permissive accommodations, similar exemptions for religion
are mandatory accommodations under our own constitutions.—By juxtaposing the American
Constitution and jurisprudence against that of the Philippines, it is immediately clear that one
cannot simply conclude that we have adopted—lock, stock and barrel—the religion clauses as
embodied in the First Amendment, and therefore, the U.S. Court’s interpretation of the same.
Unlike in the U.S. where legislative exemptions of religion had to be upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court as constituting permissive accommodations, similar exemptions for religion
are mandatory accommodations under our own constitutions. Thus, our 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions contain provisions on tax exemption of church property, salary of religious
officers in government institutions, and optional religious instruction. Our own preamble also
invokes the aid of a divine being. These constitutional provisions are wholly ours and have no
counterpart in the U.S. Constitution or its amendments. They all reveal without doubt that the
Filipino people, in adopting these constitutions, manifested their adherence to the benevolent
neutrality approach that requires accommodations in interpreting the religion clauses.
Same; Same; Benevolent Neutrality-Accommodation Standard; It is indubitable that benevolent
neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
underlying the Philippine Constitution—our own Constitutions have made significant changes to
accommodate and exempt religion.—There is no ambiguity with regard to the Philippine
Constitution’s departure from the U.S. Constitution, insofar as religious accommodations are
concerned. It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution. We
therefore reject Mr. Justice Carpio’s total adherence to the U.S. Court’s interpretation of the
religion clauses to effectively deny accommodations on the sole basis that the law in question
is neutral and of general application. For even if it were true that “an unbroken line of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions” has never held that “an individual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate,” our own Constitutions have made significant changes to accommodate and exempt
religion. Philippine jurisprudence shows that the Court has allowed exemptions from a law of general
application, in effect, interpreting our religion clauses to cover both mandatory and permissive
accommodations.
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions as in
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools, 219 SCRA 256 (1993), and the American Bible Society
v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957), in cases involving criminal laws of general application.—Two
things must be clarified: first, in relation to criminal statutes, only the question of mandatory
accommodation is uncertain, for Philippine law and jurisprudence have, in fact, allowed
legislative accommodation. Second, the power of the Courts to grant exemptions in general (i.e.,
finding that the Free Exercise Clause required the accommodation, or mandatory
accommodations) has already been decided, not just once, but twice by the Court. Thus, the crux
of the matter is whether this Court can make exemptions as in Ebralinag and the American Bible
Society, in cases involving criminal laws of general application. We hold that the Constitution
itself mandates the Court to do so.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; It has been noted that unlike other fundamental rights like
the right to life, liberty or property, the Religion Clauses are stated in absolute terms, unqualified by the
requirement of “due process,” “unreasonableness,” or “lawful order”—only the right to free speech is
comparable in its absolute grant.—We must consider the language of the Religion Clauses vis-à-
vis the other fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights. It has been noted that unlike other
fundamental rights like the right to life, liberty or property, the Religion Clauses are stated in
absolute terms, unqualified by the requirement of “due process,” “unreasonableness,” or
“lawful order.” Only the right to free speech is comparable in its absolute grant. Given the
unequivocal and unqualified grant couched in the language, the Court cannot simply dismiss
a claim of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause, solely on the premise that the law in
question is a general criminal law. If the burden is great and the sincerity of the religious belief
is not in question, adherence to the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach require that
the Court make an individual determination and not dismiss the claim outright.
Same; Same; Same; The adoption of the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach does not
mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it; Although
benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, the interest
of the state should also be afforded utmost protection—under the framework, the Court cannot simply
dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question offends a law or the
orthodox view for this precisely is the protection afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution; Our
constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching
pad from which the Court should take off in interpreting religion clause cases.—We must emphasize
that the adoption of the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach does not mean that the
Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. This is an
erroneous reading of the framework which the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio seems to entertain.
Although benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause
cases, the interest of the state should also be afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the purpose
of the test—to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and forbidden religious
exercise. Thus, under the framework, the Court cannot simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise
Clause because the conduct in question offends a law or the orthodox view, as proposed by Mr.
Justice Carpio, for this precisely is the protection afforded by the religion clauses of the
Constitution. As stated in the Decision: x x x While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal
formulation that can eliminate the difficult questions of judgment in determining the degree
of burden on religious practice or importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of the
means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a doctrine on the ideal
towards which religious clause jurisprudence should be directed. We here lay down the doctrine
that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only because of its merits
as discussed above, but more importantly, because our constitutional history and interpretation
indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take off
in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal towards which this approach is directed is the protection
of religious liberty “not only for a minority, however small—not only for a majority, however large but
for each of us” to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.
Same; Same; Same; A look at the evidence that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has
presented fails to demonstrate “the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests” which could limit
or override respondent Escritor’s fundamental right to religious freedom, and neither did the government
exert any effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least
intrusive means.—On the sincerity of religious belief, the Solicitor General
categorically concedes that the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief
and practice are beyond serious doubt. Thus, having previously established the preliminary
conditions required by the compelling state interest test, i.e., that a law or government practice
inhibits the free exercise of respondent’s religious beliefs, and there being no doubt as to the
sincerity and centrality of her faith to claim the exemption based on the free exercise clause,
the burden shifted to the government to demonstrate that the law or practice justifies a compelling
secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that objective. A look at
the evidence that the OSG has presented fails to demonstrate “the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests” which could limit or override respondent’s fundamental right to religious freedom.
Neither did the government exert any effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means.
Same; Same; Same; It is not enough to contend that the state’s interest is important, because our
Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred—the State must articulate in specific terms
the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom; The
government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given—it must precisely show
how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted.—There has never
been any question that the state has an interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the
family, or even in the sound administration of justice. Indeed, the provisions by which
respondent’s relationship is said to have impinged, e.g., Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec.
46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code, Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
and even the provisions on marriage and family in the Civil Code and Family Code, all clearly
demonstrate the State’s need to protect these secular interests. Be that as it may, the free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights—“the
most inalienable and sacred of human rights,” in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to
contend that the state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to
religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved
in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule
otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself. Thus,
it is not the State’s broad interest in “protecting the institutions of marriage and the family,” or
even “in the sound administration of justice” that must be weighed against respondent’s claim,
but the State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which
respondent’s faith finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the
objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives
will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This, the Solicitor General failed to do.
Same; Same; Same; The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or symbolic—the State cannot
plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling
interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition.—To paraphrase Justice Blackmun’s
application of the compelling interest test, the State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order
to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal
prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce
that prohibition. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing
the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. The State has never
sought to prosecute respondent nor her partner. The State’s asserted interest thus amounts
only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Incidentally, as echoes of the
words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and Vitug, in their concurring opinions in our Decision, dated
August 4, 2003, to deny the exemption would effectively break up “an otherwise ideal union
of two individuals who have managed to stay together as husband and wife [approximately
twenty-five years]” and have the effect of defeating the very substance of marriage and the
family.
Same; Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Substantive equality—a reading of the religion clauses which
leaves both politically dominant and the politically weak religious groups equal in their inability to use
the government (law) to assist their own religion or burden others—makes the most sense in the
interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document designed to protect minorities and individuals
frommobocracy in a democracy (the majority or a coalition of minorities).—The government’s conduct
may appear innocent and nondis-criminatory but in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. In
the interpretation of a document, such as the Bill of Rights, designed to protect the minority
from the majority, the question of which perspective is appropriate would seem easy to
answer. Moreover, the text, history, structure and values implicated in the interpretation of the
clauses, all point toward this perspective. Thus, substantive equality—a reading of the religion
clauses which leaves both politically dominant and the politically weak religious groups equal
in their inability to use the government (law) to assist their own religion or burden others—
makes the most sense in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document designed to protect
minorities and individuals from mobocracy in a democracy (the majority or a coalition of
minorities).
Same; Same; The records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any evidence to show that
the means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to respondent
Escritor’s religious freedom—Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out
a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.—Finally, even
assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the
state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate
state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. Again, the Solicitor General
utterly failed to prove this element of the test. Other than the two documents offered as cited
above which established the sincerity of respondent’s religious belief and the fact that the
agreement was an internal arrangement within respondent’s congregation, no iota of evidence
was offered. In fact, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence
to show that the means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least
restrictive to respondent’s religious freedom. Thus, we find that in this particular case and under
these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as
she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom
of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms—
including religious freedom—may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the
state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very
fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state
interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting:
Freedom of Religion; Public Officers; Civil Service; Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct; The degree
of morality required of every employee or official in the public service has been consistently high, and the
rules are particularly strict when the respondent is a Judge or a court employee.—The issue in this
case is simple. What is the meaning or standard of “disgraceful and immoral conduct” to be
applied by the Supreme Court in disciplinary cases involving court personnel? The degree of
morality required of every employee or official in the public service has been consistently high.
The rules are particularly strict when the respondent is a Judge or a court employee. Even
where the Court has viewed certain cases with human understanding and compassion, it has
insisted that no untoward conduct involving public officers should be left without proper and
commensurate sanction. The compassion is shown through relatively light penalties. Never,
however, has this Court justified, condoned, or blessed the continuation of an adulterous or
illicit relationship such as the one in this case, after the same has been brought to its attention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Those who choose to tolerate the situation where a man and a woman
separated from their legitimate spouses and decide to live together in an “ideal” and yet unlawful union
state—or more specifically, those who argue that respondent Escritor’s cohabiting with a man married
to another woman is not something which is willful, flagrant, or shameless—show a moral indifference
to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community in a manner prejudicial to the
public service.—Anything plainly evil or dissolute is, of course, unchangingly immoral.
However, at the fringes or boundary limits of what is morally acceptable and what is
unacceptably wrong, the concept of immorality tends to shift according to circumstances of
time, person, and place. When a case involving the concept of immorality comes to court, the
applicable provisions of law and jurisprudence take center stage. Those who choose to tolerate
the situation where a man and a woman separated from their legitimate spouses decide to live
together in an “ideal” and yet unlawful union state—or more specifically, those who argue that
respondent’s cohabiting with a man married to another woman is not something which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless—show a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community in a manner prejudicial to the public service.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue in this case is legal and not philosophical—is respondent
Escritor guilty of “disgraceful and immoral” conduct in the context of the Civil Service Law?—Insofar
as concepts of morality are concerned, various individuals or cultures may indeed differ. In
certain countries, a woman who does not cover herself with a burka from head to foot may be
arrested for immoral behavior. In other countries, near nudity in beaches passes by unnoticed.
In the present case, the perceived fixation of our society over sex is criticized. The lesser degree
of condemnation on the sins of laziness, gluttony, vanity, selfishness, avarice and cowardice is
decried as discriminatory. The issue in this case is legal and not philosophical. It is a limited
one. Is respondent Soledad S. Escritor guilty of “disgraceful and immoral” conduct in the
context of the Civil Service Law? Are there any sanctions that must be imposed? We cannot
overlook the fact that respondent Escritor would have been convicted for a criminal offense if
the offended party had been inclined and justified to prosecute her prior to his death in 1998.
Even now, she is a co-principal in the crime of concubinage. A married woman who has sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband, and the man who has carnal knowledge of her
knowing her to be married, commit the crime of adultery. Abandonment by the legal husband
without justification does not exculpate the offender; it merely mitigates the penalty.
Same; Same; Same; Same; I do not think the Court is ready to render a precedent-setting decision
to the effect that, under exceptional circumstances, employees of the judiciary may live in a relationship
of adultery or concubinage with no fear of any penalty or sanction and that after being discovered and
charged, they may continue the adulterous relationship until death ends it.—Our existing rule is that
an act so corrupt or false as to constitute a criminal act is “grossly immoral.” It is not merely
“immoral.” Respondent now asks the Court to go all the way to the opposite extreme and
condone her illicit relations with not even an admonition or a slight tap on the wrist. I do not
think the Court is ready to render a precedent-setting decision to the effect that, under
exceptional circumstances, employees of the judiciary may live in a relationship of adultery or
concubinage with no fear of any penalty or sanction and that after being discovered and
charged, they may continue the adulterous relationship until death ends it. Indeed, the decision
in this case is not limited to court interpreter Soledad Escritor. It is not a pro hac vice ruling. It
applies to court employees all over the country and to everybody in the civil service. It is not a
private ruling but one which is public and far-reaching in its consequences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Times are changing—illicit sex is now looked upon more kindly but we
should not completely disregard or overlook a relationship of adultery or concubinage involving a court
employee and not order it to be terminated.—Times are changing. Illicit sex is now looked upon
more kindly. However, we should not completely disregard or overlook a relationship of
adultery or concubinage involving a court employee and not order it to be terminated. It should
not ignore what people will say about our moral standards and how a permissive approach
will be used by other court employees to freely engage in similarly illicit relationship with no
fear of disciplinary punishment. As earlier mentioned, respondent Escritor and Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. had existing marriages with their respective legitimate spouses when they decided
to live together. To give an aura of regularity and respectability to what was undeniably an
adulterous and, therefore, immoral relationship, the two decided to acquire through a religious
ceremony what they could not accomplish legally. They executed on July 28, 1991 the
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to make their relationship what they alleged it would
be—a binding tie before Jehovah God.
Same; Same; Same; Same; We must be concerned not with the dogmas or rules of any church or
religious sect but with the legal effects under the Civil Service Law of an illicit or adulterous relationship
characterized by the facts of this case.—In this case, respondent is charged not as a Jehovah’s
Witness but in her capacity as a court employee. It is contended that respected elders of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses sanction “an informal conjugal relationship” between respondent and her
marital partner for more than two decades, provided it is characterized by faithfulness and
devotion to one another. However, the “informal conjugal relationship” is not between two
single and otherwise eligible persons where all that is missing is a valid wedding ceremony.
The two persons who started to live together in an ostensible marital relationship are married
to other persons. We must be concerned not with the dogmas or rules of any church or religious
sect but with the legal effects under the Civil Service Law of an illicit or adulterous relationship
characterized by the facts of this case. There is no conflict in this case between the dogmas or
doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church and those of the Jehovah’s Witnesses or any other
church or denomination. The perceived conflict is non-existing and irrelevant. The issue is legal
and not religious. The terms “disgraceful” and “immoral” may be religious concepts, but we
are concerned with conduct which under the law and jurisprudence is proscribed and, if
perpetrated, how it should be punished.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot be the instrument by which one group of people is
exempted from the effects of these laws just because they belong to a particular religion.—Respondent
cannot legally justify her conduct by showing that it was morally right by the standards of the
congregation to which she belongs. Her defense of freedom of religion is unavailing. Her
relationship with Mr. Quilapio is illicit and immoral, both under the Revised Administrative
Code and the Revised Penal Code, notwithstanding the supposed imprimatur given to them by
their religion. The peculiar religious standards alleged to be those of the sect to which
respondent belongs can not shield her from the effects of the law. Neither can her illicit
relationship be condoned on the basis of a written agreement approved by their religious
community. To condone what is inherently wrong in the face of the standards set by law is to
render nugatory the safeguards set to protect the civil service and, in this case, the judiciary.
The Court cannot be the instrument by which one group of people is exempted from the effects
of these laws just because they belong to a particular religion. Moreover, it is the sworn
mandate of the Court to supervise the conduct of an employee of the judiciary, and it must do
so with an even hand regardless of her religious affiliation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Wife; The strengthening of marriage ties and
the concomitant hostility to adulterous or illicit marital relations is a primary governmental concern.—
The argument that a marital relationship is the concern of religious authorities and not the State
has no basis. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the U.S. Supreme Court stated: It is
impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to
prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of social life. Marriage, while from
its very nature a sacred obligation, is, nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract,
and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring
social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily
required to deal. The strengthening of marriage ties and the concomitant hostility to adulterous
or illicit marital relations is a primary governmental concern. It has nothing to do with the
particular religious affiliations of those affected by legislation in this field. The relations, duties,
obligations and consequences of marriage are important to the morals and civilization of a
people and to the peace and welfare of society. Any attempt to inject freedom of religion in an
effort to exempt oneself from the Civil Service rules relating to the sanctity of the marriage tie
must fail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A clear and present danger of a substantive evil, destructive to public
morals, is a ground for the reasonable regulation of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession.—A clear and present danger of a substantive evil, destructive to public morals, is a
ground for the reasonable regulation of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession.
In addition to the destruction of public morals, the substantive evil in this case is the tearing
down of morality, good order, and discipline in the judiciary. Jurisprudence on immoral
conduct of employees in the civil service has been consistent. There is nothing in this case that
warrants a departure from precedents. We must not sanction or encourage illicit or adulterous
relations among government employees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The high degree of moral uprightness that is demanded of employees of
the government entails many sacrifices that are peculiar to the civil service—by aspiring to these
positions, government employees are deemed to have submitted themselves to greater scrutiny of their
conduct, all in the pursuit of a professional civil service.—The exacting standards of ethics and
morality imposed upon court judges and court employees are required to maintain the
people’s faith in the courts as dispensers of justice, and whose image is mirrored by their
actuations. As the Court eloquently stated through Madame Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma:
[T]he image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise,
of the men and woman who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its
personnel—hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to
maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice. The high degree of moral
uprightness that is demanded of employees of the government entails many sacrifices that are
peculiar to the civil service. By aspiring to these positions, government employees are deemed
to have submitted themselves to greater scrutiny of their conduct, all in the pursuit of a
professional civil service. The Court has repeatedly applied these principles in analogous cases.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Freedom of Religion; Free Exercise Clause; Compelling State Interest Test; The compelling state
interest test espoused in Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), has been abandoned more than 15 years
ago by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Employment Division v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1985) and 494
U.S. 872 (1990).—The compelling state interest test espoused in Sherbert has been abandoned more
than 15 years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Employment Division v. Smith cases. In
the Smith cases, the U.S. Supreme Court set aside the balancing test for religious minorities laid
down in Sherbert. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled categorically in the Smith cases that
the guarantee of religious liberty as embodied in the Free Exercise Clause does not require the
grant of exemptions from generally applicable laws to individuals whose religious practice
conflict with those laws.
Same; Same; The majority opinion blatantly ignores that whatever theory may be current in the
United States—whether strict neutrality, benevolent neutrality or some other theory—the undeniable
fact is what is clearly stated in Smith II that the Court has never held that an individual’s religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free
to regulate.—The majority opinion blatantly ignores that whatever theory may be current in the
United States—whether strict neutrality, benevolent neutrality or some other theory—the
undeniable fact is what is clearly stated in Smith II: x x x We have never held that an
individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. x x x Thus, from the 1879 case of Reynolds
v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878), on the practice of polygamy by Mormons to the 1988 and
1990 Smith cases on the use of prohibited drugs by native American Indians, the U.S. Supreme
Court has consistently held that religious beliefs do not excuse any person from liability for
violation of a valid criminal law of general application. The majority opinion simply refuses to
face and accept this reality.
Same; Same; Theories on the Religion Clause; A close reading of the major U.S. Supreme Court
opinions specifically relating to the religion clauses presents three principal theories at play, namely, (a)
the strict separation or “no aid” theory, (b) the governmental neutrality theory, and (c) the
accommodation or benevolent neutrality theory.—While the majority opinion only mentions
separation and benevolent neutrality, a close reading of the major U.S. Supreme Court opinions
specifically relating to the religion clauses presents three principal theories at play, namely,
(a) the strict separation or “no aid” theory, (b) the governmental neutrality theory, and (c) the
accommodation or benevolent neutrality theory.
Same; Same; Same; Strict Separation or “No Aid” Theory; Words and Phrases; The strict
separation or “no aid” theory holds that the establishment clause viewed in conjunction with the free
exercise clause requires a strict separation of church and state and that government can do nothing which
involves governmental support of religion or which is favorable to the cultivation of religious interests.—
The strict separation or “no aid” theory holds that the establishment clause viewed in conjunction
with the free exercise clause requires a strict separation of church and state and that
government can do nothing which involves governmental support of religion or which is
favorable to the cultivation of religious interests. This theory found its first expression in the
case of Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946), which espoused the “no aid” principle.
Thus, the government cannot by its programs, policies, or laws do anything to aid or support
religion or religious activities.
Same; Same; Same; Governmental Neutrality Theory; Words and Phrases; Under the
governmental neutrality theory, the establishment clause requires government to be neutral on religious
matters.—Under the governmental neutrality theory, the establishment clause requires
government to be neutral on religious matters. This theory was articulated by Mr. Justice Clark
in the case of Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), where he stated that what
the Constitution requires is “wholesome neutrality,” i.e., laws and governmental programs
must be directed to secular ends and must have a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion. This test as stated by Mr. Justice Clark embodies a theory of strict neutrality—
thus, the government may not use the religious factor as a basis for classification with the
purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion: The place of religion in our society is an exalted
one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable
citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience
that it is not within the power of government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to
aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the state is firmly
committed to a position of neutrality. (Italics supplied) However, the concept of governmental
neutrality can be interpreted in various ways—to some, anything but total neutrality is
anathema; to others, “neutrality can only mean that government policy must place religion at
neither a special advantage nor a special disadvantage.”
Same; Same; Same; Accommodation Theory; Words and Phrases; The accommodation theory
provides that any limitation derived from the establishment clause on cannot be rigidly applied so as to
preclude all aid to religion and that in some situations government must, and in other situations may,
accommodate its policies and laws in the furtherance of religious freedom.—The accommodation
theory provides that any limitation derived from the establishment clause on cannot be rigidly
applied so as to preclude all aid to religion and that in some situations government must, and in
other situations may, accommodate its policies and laws in the furtherance of religious freedom. The
accommodation theory found its first expression in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1951). The
U.S. Supreme Court held in Zorach that a state could authorize an arrangement whereby public
school children could be released one hour a week for religious instruction off the school
premises. Zorach did not involve religiously motivated conduct that constituted a violation of
a criminal statute.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The majority opinion fails to mention that a distinction is often drawn
by courts and commentators between mandatory accommodation and permissive accommodation—
mandatory accommodation is exemplified by the key idea in Sherbert that exemptions from generally
applicable laws are required by force of the Free Exercise Clause while permissive accommodation refers
to exercises of political discretion that benefit religion, and that the Constitution neither requires nor
forbids.—The majority opinion vigorously argues the merits of adopting the theory of
accommodation in the interpretation of our Constitution’s religion clauses. However, the
majority opinion fails to mention that a distinction is often drawn by courts and commentators
between mandatory accommodation and permissive accommodation. Mandatory accommodation is
exemplified by the key idea in Sherbert that exemptions from generally applicable laws are
required by force of the Free Exercise Clause,which the majority opinion adheres to in granting
Escritor’s claim of free exercise exemption. Permissive accommodation refers to exercises of
political discretion that benefit religion, and that the Constitution neither requires nor forbids.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Smith II that although the Free Exercise Clause did not
require permissive accommodation, the political branches could shield religious exercise
through legislative accommodation, for example, by making an exception to proscriptive drug
laws for sacramental peyote use.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Theories are only guideposts and “there is no magic formula to settle all
disputes between religion and the law, no legal pill to ease the pain of perceived injustice and religious
oppression, and certainly no perfect theory to bind judges or legislators.”—Theories are only
guideposts and “there is no magic formula to settle all disputes between religion and the law,
no legal pill to ease the pain of perceived injustice and religious oppression, and certainly no
perfect theory to bind judges or legislators.” The Smith cases, particularly Smith II, cannot be
so easily dismissed by the majority opinion and labeled as “best exemplifying the strict
neutrality approach.” The Smith Court affirmed the power and the discretion of legislatures to
enact statutory protection beyond what the Free Exercise Clause required. The U.S. Supreme
Court indicated in Smith II that legislatures could enact accommodations to protect religion
beyond the Free Exercise Clause minimum without “establishing” religion and thereby
running afoul of the Establishment Clause. What the Smith cases espouse, therefore, is not
really the strict neutrality approach, but more of permissive accommodation.
Same; Same; Public Officers; Civil Service; Courts; Court Personnel; Even assuming that the
theory of benevolent neutrality and the compelling state interest test are applicable, the State has a
compelling interest in exacting from everyone connected with the dispensation of justice, from the
highest magistrate to the lowest of its personnel, the highest standard of conduct.—Even assuming
that the theory of benevolent neutrality and the compelling state interest test are applicable,
the State has a compelling interest in exacting from everyone connected with the dispensation
of justice, from the highest magistrate to the lowest of its personnel, the highest standard of
conduct. This Court has repeatedly held that “the image of a court of justice is necessarily
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat.”
While arguably not constituting “disgraceful and immoral conduct,” Escritor’s cohabitation
with Quilapio is a patent violation of our penal law on concubinage that vitiates “the integrity
of court personnel and the court itself.” The public’s faith and confidence in the administration
of justice would certainly be eroded and undermined if tolerated within the judiciary’s ranks
are court employees blatantly violating our criminal laws. I therefore maintain that Escritor’s
admitted cohabitation with Quilapio is sufficient basis to hold her guilty of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and to impose upon her the appropriate penalty.
Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Wife; Equally compelling is the State’s interest in the
preservation of marriage and the family as basic social institutions, which is ultimately the public policy
underlying Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code.—Equally compelling is the State’s
interest in the preservation of marriage and the family as basic social institutions, which is
ultimately the public policy underlying Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This
Court has recognized in countless cases that marriage and the family are basic social
institutions in which the State is vitally interested and in the protection of which the State has
the strongest interest. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572 (1993), the Court stressed
that: Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an “inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family”; as such, it “shall be protected by the State.” x x x So
crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their “nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.”
Same; Same; Same; By choosing to turn a blind eye to Escritor’s criminal conduct, the majority is
in fact recognizing and according judicial imprimatur to a practice, custom or agreement that subverts
marriage, albeit one that is sanctioned by a particular religious sect.—By choosing to turn a blind eye
to Escritor’s criminal conduct, the majority is in fact recognizing and according judicial
imprimatur to a practice, custom or agreement that subverts marriage, albeit one that is
sanctioned by a particular religious sect. The majority’s opinion here bestows “a credibility and
legitimacy upon the religious belief in question simply by its being judicially recognized as
constitutionally sacrosanct.” This is another problem that arises in free exercise exemption
analysis—the benevolent neutrality approach fails to take into account the role that equality
plays in free exercise theory. While the text of the Free Exercise Clause is consistent with
protecting religion from discrimination, it does not compel discrimination in favor of religion.
However, the benevolent neutrality approach promotes its own form of inequality when under
it, exemptions are granted only to religious claimants like Escritor, whose religiously-
sanctioned but otherwise illegal conjugal arrangement with Quilapio acquires a veneer of
“special judicial reinforcement.”
Same; Same; Same; Slipper Slope Adjudication; If this Court condones Escritor’s act of
concubinage on religious grounds, then it will have to condone acts of concubinage by Catholics who
have secured church annulment of their marriage even without a final annulment from a civil court—
the majority pushes their opinion on a slippery slope.—Catholics may secure a church annulment
of their marriage. A church annulment does not exempt Catholics from criminal or
administrative liability if they cohabit with someone other than their legal spouse before their
marriage is finally annulled by a civil court. Catholics cannot legally justify before civil courts
such act of concubinage on the ground that the act conforms to their religious beliefs because
they have a secured a church annulment which freed them from their marital vows. If this
Court condones Escritor’s act of concubinage on religious grounds, then it will have to condone
acts of concubinage by Catholics who have secured church annulment of their marriage even
without a final annulment from a civil court. The majority pushes their opinion on a slippery
slope.
Same; Same; Same; It may well be asked how, under a well-meaning but overly solicitous grant of
exemption based on the Freedom of Exercise Clause of our Constitution, an individual can be given the
private right to ignore a generally applicable, religion-neutral law.—It may well be asked how, under
a well-meaning but overly solicitous grant of exemption based on the Freedom of Exercise
Clause of our Constitution, an individual can be given the private right to ignore a generally
applicable, religion-neutral law. For this is what the majority opinion has effectually granted
Escritor in dismissing the administrative complaint against her. The accommodation of
Escritor’s religious beliefs under the benevolent neutrality approach is too high a price to pay
when weighed against its prejudicial effect on the sound administration of justice and the
protection of marriage and the family as basic social institutions.
Same; Same; Same; There is even no claim here that concubinage is central to the religious belief
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, or even apart of the religious belief of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.—There is
even no claim here that concubinage is central to the religious belief of the Jehovah’s Witnesses,
or even a part of the religious belief of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Escritor merely claims that her
live-in arrangement with a married man is, in the words of the majority opinion, “in conformity
with her and her partner’s religious belief.” This case is not an issue of a statute colliding with
centrally or vitally held beliefs of a religious denomination, as in the case of Sherbert. This case
is about a religious cover for an obviously criminal act.
Same; Same; The positive law and the institutions of government are concerned not with correct
belief but with overt conduct related to good order, peace, justice, freedom, and community welfare—
certainly, observance of provisions of the Revised Penal Code, whose validity or constitutionality are not
even challenged, is a price that all religions in the Philippines must willingly pay for the sake of good
order and peace in the community.—The positive law and the institutions of government are
concerned not with correct belief but with overt conduct related to good order, peace, justice,
freedom, and community welfare. Hence, while there are times when government must adapt
to, or acquiesce to meet the needs of religious exercise, there are also times when the exercises
a religion wishes to pursue must be adapted or even prohibited in order to meet the needs of
public policy. For indeed, even religious liberty has its limits. And certainly, “there is a price
to be paid, even by religion, for living in a constitutional democracy.” Certainly, observance of
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, whose validity or constitutionality are not even
challenged, is a price that all religions in the Philippines must willingly pay for the sake of
good order and peace in the community. To hold otherwise would, as aptly stated in Reynolds
v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878), “make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land,” and in effect “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” The majority
opinion will make every religion a separate republic, making religion a haven for criminal
conduct that otherwise would be punishable under the laws of the land. Today concubinage,
tomorrow bigamy, will enjoy protection from criminal sanction under the new doctrine foisted
by the majority opinion.
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417. July 22, 2015.*
(formerly known as OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3466-RTJ)
ELADIO D. PERFECTO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO D. ESIDERA,
respondent.
 Administrative Law; Judges; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that Judge Desales-Esidera’s omission
to correct her child’s birth certificate is not sufficient to render her administratively liable under the
circumstances.—We find that Judge Desales-Esidera’s omission to correct her child’s birth
certificate is not sufficient to render her administratively liable under the circumstances. The
error in the birth certificate cannot be attributed to her. She did not participate in filling in the
required details in the document. The birth certificate shows that it was her husband who
signed it as informant.
Same; Morality; Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral
prescriptions of a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular religion.—Morality refers to what
is good or right conduct at a given circumstance. In Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003), this
court described morality as “‘how we ought to live’ and why.” Morality may be religious, in
which case what is good depends on the moral prescriptions of a high moral authority or the
beliefs of a particular religion. Religion, as this court defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201
(1937), is “a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator.”
A conduct is religiously moral if it is consistent with and is carried out in light of the divine set
of beliefs and obligations imposed by the active power. Morality may also be secular, in which
case it is independent of any divine moral prescriptions. What is good or right at a given
circumstance does not derive its basis from any religious doctrine but from the independent
moral sense shared as humans.
Constitutional Law; Non-Establishment Clause; The nonestablishment clause bars the State from
establishing, through laws and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion.—The
nonestablishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules, moral
standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality should be based on
a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and
policies, morality must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular
purpose. In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of morality, is
bound to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on secular moral standards.
When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality, courts should be careful not to overlook the
distinction between secular and religious morality if it is to keep its part in upholding
constitutionally guaranteed rights. There is the danger of “compelled religion” and, therefore,
of negating the very idea of freedom of belief and nonestablishment of religion when religious
morality is incorporated in government regulations and policies.
Attorneys; Immorality; To be guilty of “immorality” under the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), a lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public’s confidence in the Rule of Law.—
This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a particular religion. We do not
have jurisdiction over and is not the proper authority to determine which conduct contradicts
religious doctrine. We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it involves
conduct that affects the public or its interest. Thus, for purposes of determining administrative
liability of lawyers and judges, “immoral conduct” should relate to their conduct as officers of
the court. To be guilty of “immorality” under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public’s confidence in the Rule of Law.
Religious morality is not binding whenever this court decides the administrative liability of
lawyers and persons under this court’s supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only
persuasively on us. Therefore, we cannot properly conclude that respondent judge’s acts of
contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of her alleged first marriage and having
an alleged “illicit” affair are “immoral” based on her Catholic faith. This court is not a judge of
religious morality.
Administrative Law; Judges; Respondent judge’s act of participating in the marriage ceremony as
governed only by the rules of her religion is not inconsistent with our law against bigamy.—
Respondent judge’s act of participating in the marriage ceremony as governed only by the rules
of her religion is not inconsistent with our law against bigamy. What the law prohibits is not
second marriage during a subsisting marriage per se. What the law prohibits is a second
marriage that would have been valid had it not been for the subsisting marriage. Under our
law, respondent judge’s marriage in 1990 was invalid because of the solemnizing officer’s lack
of authority. Marriages entered into in accordance with the law may or may not include
marriages recognized in certain religions. Religious marriages are recognized in and may be
governed by our laws only if they conform to legal requirements. Religious marriages that lack
some or all the requirements under the law are invalid. They are not considered to have been
entered into. They do not enjoy the benefits, consequences, and incidents of marriage provided
under the law.
Same; Same; Respondent judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article 350 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), which prohibits knowingly contracting marriages against the provisions of laws.—
The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized respondent judge’s marriage in 1990
renders such marriage invalid. It is not recognized in our law. Hence, no second marriage can
be imputed against respondent judge while her first marriage subsisted. However, respondent
judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code, which
prohibits knowingly contracting marriages against the provisions of laws. Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code provides: ART. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws.—The
penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any
person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall
contract marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the
marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment. (Emphasis supplied) Respondent judge knew
that the solemnizing officer during her and her husband’s marriage in 1990 had no civil
authority to solemnize marriages. It is clear from her Comment that she and her husband’s
only consideration for their 1990 marriage was the recognition from the Roman Catholic
Church. She stated that: Fr. David Tither had no license to solemnize marriage from the
National Archives or from the civil government. Hence, he was not under obligation to register
our marriage. It was a purely sacramental marriage rite, without legal effect but definitely
valid and recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. It is called “matrimoña de conciencia.”
 Same; Same; Unless respondent judge’s act of participating in a marriage ceremony according to
her religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights or poses grave and imminent danger to the society, the
Supreme Court (SC) cannot rule that respondent judge is administratively liable for her participation
in her religious marriage ceremony.—Unless respondent judge’s act of participating in a marriage
ceremony according to her religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights or poses grave and
imminent danger to the society, we cannot rule that respondent judge is administratively liable
for her participation in her religious marriage ceremony. In Estrada, this court ruled that in
religious freedom cases, the test of benevolent neutrality should be applied. Under the test of
benevolent neutrality, religious freedom is weighed against a compelling state
interest: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible
within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. (Emphasis in the original) We find that
there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent judge’s right to participate in
religious and merely ceremonial acts that are non-violative of other people’s rights and with
no legally binding effect. The institution of marriage is not threatened when we accommodate
respondent judge’s freedom to participate in such ceremonies even if they have secular
counterparts under our laws.
Same; Same; Benevolent Neutrality; Religious Freedom; Benevolent neutrality and claims of
religious freedom cannot shield respondent judge from liability for misconduct under our laws;
Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with another person during the
subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her religious expression.—Benevolent neutrality and claims
of religious freedom cannot shield respondent judge from liability for misconduct under our
laws. Respondent judge knowingly entered into a civil marriage with her first husband. She
knew its effects under our laws. She had sexual relations with her second husband while her
first marriage was subsisting. Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations
with another person during the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her religious
expression. Legal implications and obligations attach to any person who chooses to enter civil
marriages. This is regardless of how civil marriages are treated in that person’s religion.
Same; Same; In finding respondent judge administratively liable for a violation of her marriage
obligations under our laws, this court protects the credibility of the judiciary in administering justice.—
Respondent judge, as a lawyer and even more so as a judge, is expected to abide by the law.
Her conduct affects the credibility of the courts in dispensing justice. Thus, in finding
respondent judge administratively liable for a violation of her marriage obligations under our
laws, this court protects the credibility of the judiciary in administering justice. In the words of
Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion in Estrada: Court employees, from the highest
magistrate to the lowliest clerk, are expected to abide scrupulously with the law. They are held
to a higher standard since they are part of the judicial machinery that dispenses justice. . . .
[T]here exists a compelling state interest to hold Escritor to the same standards required of
every court employee. If unsanctioned, Escritor’s unlawful conduct would certainly impair the
integrity and credibility of the judiciary.
Attorneys; Lawyers are officers of court; The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) jurisdiction over their
actions is limited to their acts that may affect public confidence in the Rule of Law.—Lawyers are not
and should not be expected to be saints. What they do as citizens of their faiths are beyond this
court’s power to judge. Lawyers, however, are officers of court. They are expected to care about
and sustain the law. This court’s jurisdiction over their actions is limited to their acts that may
affect public confidence in the Rule of Law. Our state has secular interests to protect. This court
cannot be expected to condone misconduct done knowingly on account of religious freedom
or expression.
SECTION 4.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech; The Constitution has expressly
authorized the Comelec to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises
or permits for the operation of media of communication and information.—The Comelec has
thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and
information. The fundamental purpose of such “supervision or regulation” has been spelled
out in the Constitution as the ensuring of “equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply,” as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities,
in connection with “public information campaigns and forums among candidates.”
Same; Same; Same; Rule applicable is that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that a
party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly
proving that assertion.—The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be
seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or
regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity
among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in
some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For supervision or regulation of the
operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such accompanying limitation.
Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time-honored one—that a statute is presumed to be
constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of
clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.
Same; Same; Same; Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability.—Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b)
is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2
January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority by the Constitution
(Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the
relevant election period.
Same; Same; Same; Section 11 (b) does limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media
of the candidates themselves.—Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and
of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear
and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX (C) (4) and
Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space
and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely
to make a crucial difference.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech; Freedom of speech and of the press or
of expression which the Bill of Rights guarantees is not an absolute right now settled.—It is
now settled that the freedom of speech and of the press, or of expression, which the Bill of
Rights guarantees, is not an absolute right.
Same; Same; Same; Section 11 (b) neither constitutes prescribed abridgment of the freedom of
expression nor prohibits free speech, it merely provides the rules as to the manner, time and
place for its exercise during a very limited period.—This provision, understood in the light of
Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is a reasonable regulation enacted to accomplish the
desired objectives and purposes earlier mentioned. It neither constitutes proscribed
abridgment of the freedom of expression nor prohibits free speech; it merely provides the rules
as to the manner, time and place for its exercise during a very limited period. It makes reference
to Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 on “COMELEC time” and “COMELEC
space.”
Same; Same; Same; Statute.—Even granting for the sake of argument that a doubt exists as to
the constitutionality of the challenged provision, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its
validity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An act of legislative approved by the executive is presumed to be
within constitutional bounds.—The reason for this is that an act of the legislature approved by
the executive is presumed to be within constitutional bounds. The responsibility of upholding
the Constitution rests not only on the courts, but also on the legislature and the executive as
well.
PADILLA, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech; Police Power; It is fundamental that
these freedoms are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police
power.—But it is fundamental that these freedoms are not immune to regulation by the State
in the legitimate exercise of its police power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the
State and of the public to self-protection.—Police power rests upon public necessity and upon
the right of the State and of the public to self-protection. For this reason, it is co-extensive with
the necessities of the case and the safeguards of public interests.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—In short, the law in question (Sec. 11, Rep. Act No. 6646) has been
enacted for a legitimate public purpose and the means it employs to achieve such purpose are
reasonable and even timely.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech.—Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 will
certainly achieve one result—keep the voters ignorant of who the candidates are and what they
stand for.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech; The most important objection to Section
11 (b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination of ideas.—But the most
important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination of
ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government
who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than
what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.
Same; Same; Same; Same; What Section 11(b) does is prohibit the advertisement or commercial
itself in what is unmistakably an act of censorship that finds no justification in the
circumstances presented.—What is challenged in the case at bar is not that law but Section
11(b), which does not merely require mention of the candidate’s rivals in the paid
advertisement or commercial, an innocuous enough requirement, to be sure. What Section
11(b) does is prohibit the advertisement or commercial itself in what is unmistakably an act of
censorship that finds no justification in the circumstances here presented. Surely, that blanket
and absolute prohibition to use the mass media as a vehicle for the articulation of ideas cannot,
by the standards of Badoy, be considered “too insignificant to create any appreciable dent on
the individual’s liberty of expression.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; All the channels of communication should be kept open to ensure
the widest dissemination of information bearing on the forthcoming elections.—I submit that
all the channels of communication should be kept open to insure the widest dissemination of
information bearing on the forthcoming elections. An uninformed electorate is not likely to be
circumspect in the choice of the officials who will represent them in the councils of government.
That they may exercise their suffrages wisely, it is important that they be apprised of the
election issues, including the credentials, if any, of the various aspirants for public office. This
is especially necessary now in view of the dismaying number of mediocrities who, by an
incredible aberration of ego, are relying on their money, or their tinsel popularity, or their
private armies, to give them the plume of victory.
PARAS, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Speech; The freedom to advertise one’s political
candidacy in the various forms of media is clearly a significant part of our freedom of
expression and of our right of access to information.—The freedom to advertise one’s political
candidacy in the various forms of media is clearly a significant part of our freedom of
expression and of our right of access to information. Freedom of expression in turn includes
among other things, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Restrict these freedoms
without rhyme or reason, and you violate the most valuable feature of the democratic way of
life. National Press Club vs. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 102653, G.R. No.
102925, G.R. No. 102983 March 5, 1992
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech and Press; Section 5.4 of Republic Act 9006 (Fair
Election Act) lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press.—To be
sure, §5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by prohibiting
the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of
fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a local
election. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and
the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, “any
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity. . . . The Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the enforcement of such restraint.’ “ There is thus a reversal of the normal
presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.
Same; Same; There is no basis for the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) claim that this
petition for prohibition is inappropriate; Prohibition has been found appropriate for testing the
constitutionality of various election laws, rules, and regulations.—On the other hand, the
COMELEC contends that under Art. IX-A, §7 of the Constitution, its decisions, orders, or
resolutions may be reviewed by this Court only by certiorari. The flaws in this argument is that
it assumes that its Resolution 3636, dated March 1, 2001 is a “decision, order, or resolution”
within the meaning of Art. IX-A, §7. Indeed, counsel for COMELEC maintains that Resolution
3636 was “rendered” by the Commission. However, the Resolution does not purport to
adjudicate the right of any party. It is not an exercise by the COMELEC of its adjudicatory
power to settle the claims of parties. To the contrary, Resolution 3636 clearly states that it is
promulgated to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 9006. Hence, there is no basis for the
COMELEC’s claim that this petition for prohibition is inappropriate. Prohibition has been
found appropriate for testing the constitutionality of various election laws, rules, and
regulations.
MELO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech and Press; The prohibition against surveys within the
specified period is a prior and unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of expression.—To
reiterate, the prohibition against surveys within the specified period is a prior and
unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of expression which is not reasonably necessary to
achieve the purpose of clean, honest, orderly and peaceful elections. For the foregoing reasons,
I vote to grant the petition for prohibition and to declare Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
unconstitutional.
KAPUNAN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech and Press; The freedoms of speech and of the press are
not absolute or unlimited.—Although among our most cherished rights, the freedoms of
speech and of the press are not absolute or unlimited. In certain instances, this Court has
allowed the regulation of the exercise of these freedoms vis-a-vis election-related laws. In
Osmeña vs. Commission on Elections and National Press Club vs. Commission on Elections,
the law prohibiting newspapers, radio broadcasting and television station from selling or
giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes was
declared valid. In Badoy vs. Commission of Elections, the prohibition on the publication of
paid political advertisements outside the COMELEC space was likewise upheld. In Gonzales
vs. Commission on Elections, where the prohibition on the early nomination of candidates and
the limitation on the period of election campaign or partisan political activity under Republic
Act No. 4880 was assailed for being violative of the freedoms of speech, of the free press, of
assembly and of association, the Court declared the law not unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Congress may not only regulate the time, manner and place of the holding of the
elections but may likewise regulate the election campaigns and other activities relative
thereto.—Indisputably, the State has a legitimate interest in fostering an informed electorate.
It has a compelling interest in protecting voters from confusion and undue influence and,
generally, in preserving the integrity of its election process. In furtherance of these State
interests, Congress is empowered to enact laws relative to the conduct of elections. It may not
only regulate the time, manner and place of the holding of the elections but may likewise
regulate the election campaigns and other activities relative thereto.
Same; Same; Section 5.4 is a mere restriction not an absolute prohibition on the publication of
election surveys.—Viewed in the light of the legitimate and significant objectives of Section 5.4,
it may be seen that its limiting impact on the rights of free speech and of the press is not unduly
repressive or unreasonable. Indeed, it is a mere restriction, not an absolute prohibition, on the
publication of election surveys. It is limited in duration; it applies only during the period when
the voters are presumably contemplating whom they should elect and when they are most
susceptible to such unwarranted persuasion. These surveys may be published thereafter. Social
Weather Stations, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 357 SCRA 496, G.R. No. 147571 May 5,
2001
BLO UMPAR ADIONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The COMELEC’s
prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private
except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds.—The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the
COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
Same; Same; Same; The qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact
that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom.—This
qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the
indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
[1937]; Salonga v. Paño, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions
of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak
and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.
Same; Same; Same; Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted
is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle.—The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more
than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place,
including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the
COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so
broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-
owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places
whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.—In sum, the prohibition on posting
of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in the authorized
areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the
Constitution. Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 712, G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
ROSENDO O. CHAVES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRUCTUOSO GONZALES, defendant-
appellee.
Civil law; Obligations; Nature and effect of obligations; Obligation of a person obliged to do
something and fails to do it.—Under Article 1167 of the Civil Code, a person who is obliged to
do something and fails to do it shall be liable for the cost of executing the obligation in a proper
manner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Cost of obligation; Case at bar.—The cost of execution of the
obligation to repair a typewriter is the cost of the labor or service expended in the repair of the
typewriter. In addition, the obligor, under Article 1170 of the Code, is liable for the cost of the
missing parts because in his obligation to repair the typewriter he is bound to return the
typewriter in the same condition it was when he received it.
Same; Same; Obligation with period; Where obligation does not fix a period; When fixing a
period is mere formality.—Where the defendant virtually admitted non-performance by
returning the typewriter he was obliged to repair in a non-working condition, with essential
parts, missing, he cannot invoke Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The time for compliance having
evidently expired, and there being a breach of contract by non-performance, it was academic
for the plaintiff to have first petitioned the court to fix a period for the performance of the
contract before filing his complaint in this case. The fixing of a period would thus be a mere
formality and would serve no purpose than to delay.
Same; Damages; Claims for damages and attorney’s fees must be alleged and proved.—Claims
for damages and attorney’s fees must be pleaded, and the existence of the actual basis thereof
must be proved. Where there is no findings of fact on the claims for damages and attorney’s
fees in the lower court’s decision, there is no factual basis upon which to make an award
therefor. Chaves vs. Gonzales, 32 SCRA 547, No. 27454 April 30, 1970
SECTION 5
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN Ruiz, respondent,
1.PROHIBITION; ISSUANCE OF WRIT FOR ACTS PERFORMED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION.—While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to
restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J.,
658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to
"* * * inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial
or ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation,
board, or person * * *." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.)
2.ID.; ID.; DIRECTOR OF POSTS.—The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference
to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of
the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative
of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of * * * jurisdiction."
3.ID.; ID.; WRIT NOT CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO COURTS OR TRIBUNALS.—The
statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and
to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority.
Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of
justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner,
or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
4.CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—What is guaranteed by
our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however,
as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that
binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
5.ID.; ID.; POSTAGE STAMPS ISSUED UNDER ACT No. 4052.—The respondent Director of
Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the
Philippine Legislature which appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates
and' printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and
authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often
as may be deemed advantageous to the Government."
6.ID.; ID.; ID.—Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to
the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the
appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support
of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps
in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.—The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took
advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people." The stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead
of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines
and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself
but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.—While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any,
received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The
Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately
be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U.
S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.) Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, No. 45459 March
13, 1937
THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, petitioner,
vs. HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari’a District
Court, 4th Judicial District, Marawi City, and HEIRS OF THE LATE MACALABO
ALOMPO, represented by SULTAN DIMNANG B. ALOMPO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion to Dismiss; Courts; Shari’a District Courts; Although
the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss, this
procedural rule may be relaxed when the ground relied on is lack of jurisdiction which is patent
on the face of the complaint.—Although the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts
prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss, this procedural rule may be relaxed when the ground
relied on is lack of jurisdiction which is patent on the face of the complaint. As we held in
Rulona-Al Awadhi v. Astih, 165 SCRA 771 (1988): Instead of invoking a procedural
technicality, the respondent court should have recognized its lack of jurisdiction over the
parties and promptly dismissed the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings would
be, as they were, a futile and invalid exercise. A summary rule prohibiting the filing of a motion
to dismiss should not be a bar to the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction when the
jurisdictional infirmity is patent on the face of the complaint itself, in view of the fundamental
procedural doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court may be challenged at anytime and at any
stage of the action.
Same; Same; Same; Interlocutory Orders; An order denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves
something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.—An order
denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors
of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. As exceptions, however, the defendant may avail of
a petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant or over the subject matter, or when the denial of the motion to
dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Courts; Shari’a District Courts; Jurisdiction; Consistent with the purpose of the
law to provide for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws
among Muslims, it has a catchall provision granting Shari’a district courts’ original jurisdiction
over personal and real actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer; There is,
however, a limit to the general jurisdiction of Shari’a district courts over matters ordinarily
cognizable by regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are
Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts.—The
matters over which Shari’a district courts have jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, specifically in Article 143. Consistent with the purpose of the law to
provide for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among
Muslims, it has a catchall provision granting Shari’a district courts’ original jurisdiction over
personal and real actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The Shari’a
district courts’ jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent with regular civil courts, i.e.,
municipal trial courts and regional trial courts. There is, however, a limit to the general
jurisdiction of Shari’a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such
jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the
action must be filed before the regular courts.
Same; Same; Parties; When an action is defended by a representative, that representative is not
— and neither does he become — a real party-in-interest. The person represented is deemed
the real party-in-interest; the representative remains to be a third party to the action.—It is clear
from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only in
a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local government of Tangkal. When an
action is defended by a representative, that representative is not — and neither does he become
— a real party-in-interest. The person represented is deemed the real party-in-interest; the
representative remains to be a third party to the action. That Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is
therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirement under
Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To satisfy the requirement, it is the real party-
defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim. Such a proposition, however,
is a legal impossibility.
Muslim; Words and Phrases; The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a “Muslim” as “a
person who testifies to the oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and professes
Islam.”—The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a “Muslim” as “a person who testifies to
the oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam.” Although the
definition does not explicitly distinguish between natural and juridical persons, it nonetheless
connotes the exercise of religion, which is a fundamental personal right. The ability to testify
to the “oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad” and to profess Islam is, by its
nature, restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical persons are artificial beings with “no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.” They are considered persons only
by virtue of legal fiction. The Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category. Under the Local
Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and corporate that exercises powers as a
political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the
inhabitants of its territory.
Constitutional Law; Local Government Units; Non-establishment Clause; Courts; Shari’a
District Courts; Jurisdiction; As a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can
only act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects — consistent with
the nonestablishment clause; The Shari’a District Court appears to have understood the
foregoing principles, as it conceded that the Municipality of Tangkal “is neither a Muslim nor
a Christian”; The Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide private
respondents’ complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.—As
a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular purposes
and in ways that have primarily secular effects — consistent with the nonestablishment clause.
Hence, even if it is assumed that juridical persons are capable of practicing religion, the
Municipality of Tangkal is constitutionally proscribed from adopting, much less exercising,
any religion, including Islam. The Shari’a District Court appears to have understood the
foregoing principles, as it conceded that the Municipality of Tangkal “is neither a Muslim nor
a Christian.” Yet it still proceeded to attribute the religious affiliation of the mayor to the
municipality. This is manifest error on the part of the Shari’a District Court. It is an elementary
principle that a municipality has a personality that is separate and distinct from its mayor, vice
mayor, sanggunian, and other officers composing it. And under no circumstances can this
corporate veil be pierced on purely religious considerations — as the Shari’a District Court has
done — without running afoul the inviolability of the separation of Church and State enshrined
in the Constitution. In view of the foregoing, the Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction
under the law to decide private respondents’ complaint because not all of the parties involved
in the action are Muslims. Since it was clear from the complaint that the real party-defendant
was the Municipality of Tangkal, the Shari’a District Court should have simply applied the
basic doctrine of separate juridical personality and motu proprio dismissed the case.
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte vs. Balindong, 814 SCRA 237, G.R. No.
193340 January 11, 2017
SECTION 6.
PHIlLIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC, petitioner, vs. HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Labor Laws: Deployment Ban of Female Domestic Helper; Concept of
Police Power.—The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been
defmed as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition
of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable
of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace. "Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even
to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Police power constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill ofRights.—
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in
the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its governxnent limitations
to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a
group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated
to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights
itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even
liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will."
It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Same; Same; Same; Equality before the law under the Constitution; Requirements ofa valid
classification, satisfied.—The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to
"female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a
perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that
(1) such classiflcations rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made—the preference
for female workers—rests on substantial distinctions.
Same; Same; Same; Valid Discrimination between female and male contract workers under
Department OrderNo. l,justified.—The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In
the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad
have been afflicted with an identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument
that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course,
is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the
Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are
being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick
that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable
demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing
as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it
to state, then, that insofar as classification are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions
are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
Same; Same; Same; Department Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel.—The
consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right
to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety, "as may be
provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in
particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rulemaking authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner
assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we
have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Same; Same; Same; No merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an
invalid exercise of legislative power since the Labor Code itselfvests the DOLE with rule-
making powers.—Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of
the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As
we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment
with rule-making powers in the enforcement whereof.
Same; Same; Same; "Protection to Labor" does not signify the promotion ofemployment
alone.—Trotection to labor" does not signify the promotion of einployment alone. What
concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to
strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have
adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the
Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispuce, of the lack or
inadequacy of auch protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite
ban on deployment.
Same; Same; Same; Non-impairment clause must yield to the demands and necessities of State's
power of regulation to provide a decent living to its citizens.—The petitioner's reliance on the
Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decisionmaking processes
affecting their rights and benefits" is not welltaken. The right granted by this provision, again,
must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation. The
nonimpairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier
purposes targetted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never
been fully accepted as a controlling economic-way of life. This Court understands the grave
implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the
Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary
sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of
the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court
in tbis case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted witb a grave
abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for. Philippine Association
ofService Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386, No. L-81958 June 30, 1988
RUBI ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO,
defendant.
1.STATUTES; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917; VALIDITY;
CONSTRUCTION ; HISTORY.—Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as
follows: "With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board." Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, having reference to the Province
of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 411, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 1268,
1306 were enacted for the province of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela,
Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac,
Tayabas, and Zambales. Act No. 547 referred especially to the Manguianes.
All of these special laws with the exception of Act No. 1306 were repealed by Acts Nos. 1396
and 1397. ,The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language.
In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The last Administrative
Code retains the provision which originated in Act No. 387, enacted in 1902, in section 2145
herein quoted.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT POLICY.—These different laws denote an anxious regard
for the welfare of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent
practice with reference to the method to be followed for their advancement.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Every really new question that comes before the courts is in the last
analysis determined by the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. In balancing
conflicting solutions,. that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best
promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; "NON-CHRISTIAN ;" HISTORY.—A skeleton history of the attitude assumed
towards the backward inhabitants of the Islands both before and after the acquisition of the
Philippines by the United States is set forth in the opinion. The most important of the laws of
the Indies having reference to the subject are compiled in Book 6, Title 3. A clear exposition of
the purposes of the Spanish government in its efforts to improve the conditions of such
inhabitants by concentrating them in "reducciones" is f ound in the Decree of the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881. Ever since the acquisition of the
Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for dealing with the
primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one. Organic and statutory law has given the
subject consideration.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED.—"Non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory expression.
Legislative, judicial, and executive authority has held that the term "non-Christian" should not
be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degree
of civilization. This has been the uniform construction of executive officials who have been
called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The term "non-Christian" refers not to religious
belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands
of a low grade of civilization.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE "MANGUlANES."—The name "Manguian" signifies savage,
mountaineer, pagan, negro. The Manguianes are very low in culture.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY.— From the beginning of the United States, and
even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation
between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall
be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—With reference to the laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is
not within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason,
the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the
judicial department of the Government.
9.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.—The
maxim of constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected.
10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—"The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R.
Co. vs. Comrs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio St., 88.)
11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the
"necessity," of the case.
12.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice,
permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
13.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials and a
department head.
14.ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION.—Since the term "nonChristian" is here
construed to refer to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, section 2145
of the Administrative Code of 1917 does not discriminate between individuals on account of
religious differences and is therefore not invalid.
15.ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL LIBERTY.—Various conceptions of civil liberty are quoted in the
opinion. Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in
a, civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others.
Liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation,
and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential
to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion.
16.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—"Liberty" as understood in democracies is not license; it is "liberty
regulated by law." Whenever and whereever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercised
without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such
assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law.
17.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The authority conferred upon executive officials by section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 does not unduly interfere with the liberty of the citizen when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
18.ID.; ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.—"Due
process of law" is defined and analyzed in the opinion. The pledge that no person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all
of a class.
19.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are not
violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 since there exists a law; the law
seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and it applies
to all of a class.
20.ID.; ID.; ID.; SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.—Slavery and involuntary
servitude, together with their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced,
compulsory service of one to another."
21.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Confinement in reservations in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
22.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE POLICE POWER.—The police power of the State is a power coextensive
with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity."
23.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and
authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general
welfare and the public interest.
24.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual,
as axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a
widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity.
25.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot
fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority in enacting section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917.
26.ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; LEGISLATIVE INTENTION.—The
fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-
called non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic
development and advancement in civilization.
27.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purposes
of the Government are to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve
the health and morals—is in fine, to begin the process of civilization.
28.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned,
the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it,
are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop the resources of that great Island.
29.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PRESUMPTION.—Most cautiously should the power of this court to
overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The
whole tendency of the best considered cases is toward non-interference on the part of the courts
whenever political ideas are the moving consideration.
30.ID.; ID.; ID.—Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Per CARSON, J., concurring:
31.STATUTES; "NON-CHRISTIAN;" DEFINED.—The words "non-Christian" have a clear,
definite and well settled signification when used in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive
adjective, applied to "tribes," "peoples" or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote
districts and-provinces throughout the Islands.
32.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TESTS.—The tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribe
is, or is not of the "low grade of civilization" denoted by the words "non-Christian" are, and
throughout the period of American occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree
of advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community."
33.ID.; ID.; STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION OF INHABITANTS NOT NON CHRISTIAN.—
The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the
standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to justify its
removal from the class embraced within the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term" is
used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life
within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its
membership the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which
control the conduct of the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life,
furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to
brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to
expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the
members of the tribe.
allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered to or
maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether they reside
within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life
independent of and apart from that maintained by such tribe, but such a mode of life as would
not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the
Islands with whom they are brought in contact.
35.ID.; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917; BASIS; WHEN
PROPERLY APPLICABLE.—The power to provide for the issuance of the reconcentration
orders contemplated in section 2145 of the Administrative Code rests upon analogous
principles to those upon which the liberty and freedom of action of children and persons of
unsound minds is restrained, without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the
general welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and is
properly exercised only where certain individuals or groups of individuals are found to be of
such a low grade of civilization, that their own wishes cannot be permitted to determine their
mode of life or place of residence. Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro., 39 Phil., 660, No.
14078 March 7, 1919
Notes.—The COMELEC, as an administrative body and a specialized constitutional body
charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough
expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given
finality. (Grego vs. Commission on Elections, 274 SCRA 481 [1997])
Where an assailed order had been issued pursuant to COMELEC’s administrative powers and
in the absence of any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent,
said order shall stand—judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. (Sarangani vs.
Commission on Elections, 334 SCRA 379 [2000])

34.ID.; ID.; ID.—So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of ——o0o——
inhabitants of a particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a group,
must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the class
embraced within the statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization
which would naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent

REVEREND FATHER ROBERT P. REYES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; Coverage of the Writ of Amparo.—The Court, in
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., 568 SCRA 1 (2008), made a categorical
pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of
“extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” or to threats thereof.
Same; Same; Restriction on right to travel as a result of a pending criminal case is not unlawful
and thus not a valid ground to invoke issuance of Writ of Amparo.—The restriction on
petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against
him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was
impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to
life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; Administrative Law; Petition to lift an Hold
Departure Order (HDO) issued by the Sec. of Justice should be filed in the court where criminal
case against petitioner is pending.—We quote with approval the CA’s ruling on this matter:
The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its pronouncement
in Crespo v. Mogul that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite
the denial of respondent’s MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has
not lost control over Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its
residual power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case
to the exclusion of even this Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO
was and is available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of Amparo,
supra).
Same; Same; Same; Absence of actual controversy renders it unnecessary for Supreme Court
to pass upon constitutionality of Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 13 (On Hold
Departure Orders).—Petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his
apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner’s apprehension is
at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also
renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular
No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold
Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations
Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 606 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009
EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO and SHERYL G. SEE, petitioners, vs. HON.
LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, and RICARDO V. PARAS III, in his
capacity as Chief State Counsel, CRISTINO L. NAGUIAT, JR. and the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, respondents.
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, petitioner, vs. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, as Secretary of the
Department of Justice and RICARDO V. PARAS III, as Chief State Counsel, Department of
Justice and RICARDO A. DAVID, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner, Bureau of
Immigration, respondents.
Judicial Review; Limitations on the Power of Judicial Review.—Like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Same; Actual Case or Controversy; An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.—To be clear, “an actual case
or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. It is definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interest; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.” When the issues
have been resolved or when the circumstances from which the legal controversy arose no
longer exist, the case is rendered moot and academic. “A moot and academic case is one that
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value.” The Court believes that the supervening events
following the filing of the instant petitions, while may have seemed to moot the instant
petitions, will not preclude it from ruling on the constitutional issues raised by the petitioners.
The Court, after assessing the necessity and the invaluable gain that the members of the bar, as
well as the public may realize from the academic discussion of the constitutional issues raised
in the petition, resolves to put to rest the lingering constitutional questions that abound the
assailed issuance. This is not a novel occurrence as the Court, in a number of occasions, took
up cases up to its conclusion notwithstanding claim of mootness.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; The more precious gifts of democracy that the Constitution
affords us are enumerated in the Bill of Rights contained in Article III.—We begin by
emphasizing that the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation; it is deemed written in every statute and contract. If a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is a testament to the living democracy in this jurisdiction. It contains the
compendium of the guaranteed rights of individuals, as well as the powers granted to and
restrictions imposed on government officials and instrumentalities. It is that lone unifying
code, an inviolable authority that demands utmost respect and obedience. The more precious
gifts of democracy that the Constitution affords us are enumerated in the Bill of Rights
contained in Article III. In particular, Section 1 thereof provides: Section 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws. The guaranty of liberty does not, however, imply unbridled
license for an individual to do whatever he pleases, for each is given an equal right to enjoy his
liberties, with no one superior over another. Hence, the enjoyment of one’s liberties must not
infringe on anyone else’s equal entitlement.
Same; Right to Liberty; Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license
to act according to one’s will.—Surely, the Bill of Rights operates as a protective cloak under
which the individual may assert his liberties. Nonetheless, “the Bill of Rights itself does not
purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties. Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one’s will. It is subject to the
far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.”
Political Law; Police Power; The state’s exercise of police power is also well-recognized in this
jurisdiction as an acceptable limitation to the exercise of individual rights.—The state’s exercise
of police power is also well-recognized in this jurisdiction as an acceptable limitation to the
exercise of individual rights. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163
SCRA 386 (1988), it was defined as the inherent and plenary power in the State which enables
it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. It is rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group
of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to
ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
Constitutional Law; Right to Liberty; Right to Travel; The right to travel is part of the “liberty”
of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law.—The right to travel is part
of the “liberty” of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law. It is part and
parcel of the guarantee of freedom of movement that the Constitution affords its citizen.
Pertinently, Section 6, Article III of the Constitution provides: Section 6. The liberty of abode
and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health, as maybe provided by law.
Same; Same; Same; Section 6 itself provides that the right to travel may be impaired only in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.—
Liberty under the foregoing clause includes the right to choose one’s residence, to leave it
whenever he pleases and to travel wherever he wills. Thus, in Zacarias Villavicencio v. Justo
Lucban, 39 Phil. 778 (1919), the Court held illegal the action of the Mayor of Manila in expelling
women who were known prostitutes and sending them to Davao in order to eradicate vices
and immoral activities proliferated by the said subjects. It was held that regardless of the
mayor’s laudable intentions, no person may compel another to change his residence without
being expressly authorized by law or regulation. It is apparent, however, that the right to travel
is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right
to travel. Section 6 itself provides that the right to travel may be impaired only in the interest
of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
Same; Same; Same; There are only three (3) considerations that may permit a restriction on the
right to travel: national security, public safety or public health.—There are only three
considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security, public
safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of
statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment. The requirement for a
legislative enactment was purposely added to prevent inordinate restraints on the person’s
right to travel by administrative officials who may be tempted to wield authority under the
guise of national security, public safety or public health. This is in keeping with the principle
that ours is a government of laws and not of men and also with the canon that provisions of
law limiting the enjoyment of liberty should be construed against the government and in favor
of the individual.
Same; Same; Same; Liberty of Abode; The liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful
order of the court and, on the one hand, the right to travel may only be impaired by a law that
concerns national security, public safety or public health.—The liberty of abode may only be
impaired by a lawful order of the court and, on the one hand, the right to travel may only be
impaired by a law that concerns national security, public safety or public health. Therefore,
when the exigencies of times call for a limitation on the right to travel, the Congress must
respond to the need by explicitly providing for the restriction in a law. This is in deference to
the primacy of the right to travel, being a constitutionally protected right and not simply a
statutory right, that it can only be curtailed by a legislative enactment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In any case, when there is a dilemma between an individual claiming
the exercise of a constitutional right vis-à-vis the state’s assertion of authority to restrict the
same, any doubt must, at all times, be resolved in favor of the free exercise of the right, absent
any explicit provision of law to the contrary.—In any case, when there is a dilemma between
an individual claiming the exercise of a constitutional right vis-à-vis the state’s assertion of
authority to restrict the same, any doubt must, at all times, be resolved in favor of the free
exercise of the right, absent any explicit provision of law to the contrary.
Same; Same; Same; There is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of
justice to curtail the exercise of the right travel, in the interest of national security, public safety
or public health.—The Court is in quandary of identifying the authority from which the DOJ
believed its power to restrain the right to travel emanates. To begin with, there is no law
particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the
right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. As it is, the
only ground of the former DOJ Secretary in restraining the petitioners, at that time, was the
pendency of the preliminary investigation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary
Investigation Committee on the complaint for electoral sabotage against them. To be clear, DOJ
Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and
concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere
administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law
which the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise
known as the “Administrative Code of 1987.” She opined that DOJ Circular No. 41 was validly
issued pursuant to the agency’s rulemaking powers provided in Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title
III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 and Section 50, Chapter 11, Book IV of the mentioned Code.
Administrative Agencies; Rulemaking Power; Administrative agencies possess quasi-
legislative or rulemaking powers, among others.—Indeed, administrative agencies possess
quasi-legislative or rulemaking powers, among others. It is the “power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting
statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.” In the exercise of this
power, the rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is
required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must conform
to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or
regulation to be valid. It is, however, important to stress that before there can even be a valid
administrative issuance, there must first be a showing that the delegation of legislative power
is itself valid. It is valid only if there is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard
— the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.
Same; Declaration of Policy; A declaration of policy contained in a statute is, like a preamble,
not a part of the substantive portions of the act.—The declaration of policy is most useful in
statutory construction as an aid in the interpretation of the meaning of the substantive
provisions of the law. It is preliminary to the substantive portions of the law and certainly not
the part in which the more significant and particular mandates are contained. The suggestion
of the former DOJ Secretary that the basis of the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 is contained
in the declaration of policy of E.O. No. 292 not only defeats logic but also the basic style of
drafting a decent piece of legislation because it supposes that the authors of the law included
the operative and substantive provisions in the declaration of policy when its objective is
merely to introduce and highlight the purpose of the law. Succinctly, “a declaration of policy
contained in a statute is, like a preamble, not a part of the substantive portions of the act. Such
provisions are available for clarification of ambiguous substantive portions of the act, but may
not be used to create ambiguity in other substantive provisions.” In the same way, Section 3
does not authorize the DOJ to issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the constitutional right to
travel. There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in the Constitution that will justify the
impairment. The provision simply grants the DOJ the power to investigate the commission of
crimes and prosecute offenders, which are basically the functions of the agency. However, it
does not carry with it the power to indiscriminately devise all means it deems proper in
performing its functions without regard to constitutionally protected rights. The curtailment
of a fundamental right, which is what DOJ Circular No. 41 does, cannot be read into the
mentioned provision of the law. Any impairment or restriction in the exercise of a
constitutional right must be clear, categorical and unambiguous.
Administrative Orders; Without a clear mandate of an existing law, an administrative issuance
is ultra vires.—The questioned circular does not come under the inherent power of the
executive department to adopt rules and regulations as clearly the issuance of HDO and WLO
is not the DOJ’s business. As such, it is a compulsory requirement that there be an existing law,
complete and sufficient in itself, conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency to
promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ cannot make rules, its authority being confined to
execution of laws. This is the import of the terms “when expressly provided by law” or “as
may be provided by law” stated in Sections 7(4) and 7(9), Chapter 2, Title III, Book IV of E.O.
292. The DOJ is confined to filling in the gaps and the necessary details in carrying into effect
the law as enacted. Without a clear mandate of an existing law, an administrative issuance is
ultra vires. Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling law from which DOJ
Circular No. 41 must derive its life. Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities
relied upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test and sufficient standard test. The
DOJ miserably failed to establish the existence of the enabling law that will justify the issuance
of the questioned circular.
Same; The Department of Justice (DOJ) must have the best intentions in promulgating DOJ
Circular No. 41, but the end will not justify the means.—That DOJ Circular No. 41 was intended
to aid the department in realizing its mandate only begs the question. The purpose, no matter
how commendable, will not obliterate the lack of authority of the DOJ to issue the said
issuance. Surely, the DOJ must have the best intentions in promulgating DOJ Circular No. 41,
but the end will not justify the means. To sacrifice individual liberties because of a perceived
good is disastrous to democracy. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989), the Court emphasized: One of the basic
principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned,
the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere
expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the
strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual’s rights. It is no exaggeration to say that
a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one
even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
Constitutional Law; Hierarchy of Rights; The Department of Justice (DOJ) must constantly be
reminded that in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of
the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards
the former.—Indeed, the DOJ has the power to investigate the commission of crimes and
prosecute offenders. Its zealousness in pursuing its mandate is laudable but more admirable
when tempered by fairness and justice. It must constantly be reminded that in the hierarchy of
rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when
weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former. Thus, in Allado v.
Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994), the Court declared, viz.: The sovereign power has the inherent
right to protect itself and its people from vicious acts which endanger the proper
administration of justice; hence, the State has every right to prosecute and punish violators of
the law. This is essential for its self-preservation, nay, its very existence. But this does not confer
a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the State to prosecute is not a carte
blanche for government agents to defy and disregard the rights of its citizens under the
Constitution.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; In the conduct of a preliminary
investigation, the presence of the accused is not necessary for the prosecutor to discharge his
investigatory duties. If the accused chooses to waive his presence or fails to submit
countervailing evidence, that is his own lookout.—It bears emphasizing that the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is an implement of due process which essentially benefits the
accused as it accords an opportunity for the presentation of his side with regard to the
accusation. The accused may, however, opt to waive his presence in the preliminary
investigation. In any case, whether the accused responds to a subpoena, the investigating
prosecutor shall resolve the complaint within 10 days after the filing of the same. The point is
that in the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the accused is not necessary
for the prosecutor to discharge his investigatory duties. If the accused chooses to waive his
presence or fails to submit countervailing evidence, that is his own lookout. Ultimately, he shall
be bound by the determination of the prosecutor on the presence of probable cause and he
cannot claim denial of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Right to Liberty; Right to Travel; The Department of Justice (DOJ) cannot
justify the restraint in the liberty of movement imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 on the ground
that it is necessary to ensure presence and attendance in the preliminary investigation of the
complaints. There is also no authority of law granting it the power to compel the attendance of
the subjects of a preliminary investigation, pursuant to its investigatory powers under
Executive Order (EO) No. 292.—The DOJ therefore cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of
movement imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 on the ground that it is necessary to ensure
presence and attendance in the preliminary investigation of the complaints. There is also no
authority of law granting it the power to compel the attendance of the subjects of a preliminary
investigation, pursuant to its investigatory powers under E.O. No. 292. Its investigatory power
is simply inquisitorial and, unfortunately, not broad enough to embrace the imposition of
restraint on the liberty of movement. That there is a risk of flight does not authorize the DOJ to
take the situation upon itself and draft an administrative issuance to keep the individual within
the Philippine jurisdiction so that he may not be able to evade criminal prosecution and
consequent liability. It is an arrogation of power it does not have; it is a usurpation of function
that properly belongs to the legislature. Without a law to justify its action, the issuance of DOJ
Circular No. 41 is an unauthorized act of the DOJ of empowering itself under the pretext of
dire exigency or urgent necessity. This action runs afoul the separation of powers between the
three branches of the government and cannot be upheld. Even the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its power to promulgate rules is limited in that the same shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. This should have cautioned the DOJ, which is only one of the
many agencies of the executive branch, to be more scrutinizing in its actions especially when
they affect substantive rights, like the right to travel.
Political Law; Police Power; It bears noting that police power may only be validly exercised if
(a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.—The DOJ’s reliance on the police power of the state cannot also be countenanced.
Police power pertains to the “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” “It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society.” Verily, the exercise of this power is primarily lodged
with the legislature but may be wielded by the President and administrative boards, as well as
the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay, by virtue of a valid
delegation of power. It bears noting, however, that police power may only be validly exercised
if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to
the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. On its own, the DOJ cannot wield police power since the authority pertains to
Congress. Even if it claims to be exercising the same as the alter ego of the President, it must
first establish the presence of a definite legislative enactment evidencing the delegation of
power from its principal. This, the DOJ failed to do. There is likewise no showing that the
curtailment of the right to travel imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 was reasonably necessary in
order for it to perform its investigatory duties.
Same; Same; In any case, the exercise of police power, to be valid, must be reasonable and not
repugnant to the Constitution.—In any case, the exercise of police power, to be valid, must be
reasonable and not repugnant to the Constitution. It must never be utilized to espouse actions
that violate the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the
Constitution. In the clear language of the Constitution, it is only in the interest of national
security, public safety and public health that the right to travel may be impaired. None one of
the mentioned circumstances was invoked by the DOJ as its premise for the promulgation of
DOJ Circular No. 41.
Hold Departure Orders; Watch List Orders; Due Process; The apparent vagueness of the
circular as to the distinction between a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and Watch List Order
(WLO) is violative of the due process clause.—Apart from lack of legal basis, DOJ Circular No.
41 also suffers from other serious infirmities that render it invalid. The apparent vagueness of
the circular as to the distinction between an HDO and WLO is violative of the due process
clause. An act that is vague “violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid and leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.” Here, the distinction is significant as it will inform the respondents of the grounds,
effects and the measures they may take to contest the issuance against them. Verily, there must
be a standard by which an HDO or WLO may be issued, particularly against those whose cases
are still under preliminary investigation, since at that stage there is yet no criminal information
against them which could have warranted the restraint.
Same; The issuance of Hold Departure Orders (HDOs) shall pertain only to criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), to the exclusion of criminal
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and all other cases.—
The silence of the circular on the matters which are being addressed by DOJ Circular No. 41 is
not without good reasons. Circular No. 39-97 was specifically issued to avoid indiscriminate
issuance of HDOs resulting to the inconvenience of the parties affected as the same could
amount to an infringement on the right and liberty of an individual to travel. Contrary to the
understanding of the DOJ, the Court intentionally held that the issuance of HDOs shall pertain
only to criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, to the exclusion of criminal
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MTC and all other cases. The intention was made
clear with the use of the term “only.” The reason lies in seeking equilibrium between the state’s
interest over the prosecution of the case considering the gravity of the offense involved and
the individual’s exercise of his right to travel. Thus, the circular permits the intrusion on the Thereafter, on September 1, 2005, E.O. No. 459 was issued, streamlining the procedure in the
right to travel only when the criminal case filed against the individual is within the exclusive disposition of requests of government officials and employees for authority to travel abroad.
jurisdiction of the RTC, or those that pertains to more serious crimes or offenses that are
Hold Departure Orders; Right to Travel; Department of Justice; Jurisdiction; Contrary to its
punishable with imprisonment of more than six years. The exclusion of criminal cases within
claim, the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have inherent power to issue Hold Departure
the jurisdiction of the MTC is justified by the fact that they pertain to less serious offenses which
Order (HDO), unlike the courts, or to restrict the right to travel in any way.—The point is that
is not commensurate with the curtailment of a fundamental right. Much less is the reason to
the DOJ may not justify its imposition of restriction on the right to travel of the subjects of DOJ
impose restraint on the right to travel of respondents of criminal cases still pending
Circular No. 41 by resorting to an analogy. Contrary to its claim, it does not have inherent
investigation since at that stage no information has yet been filed in court against them. It is
power to issue HDO, unlike the courts, or to restrict the right to travel in any way. It is limited
for these reasons that Circular No. 39-97 mandated that HDO may only be issued in criminal
to the powers expressly granted to it by law and may not extend the same on its own accord
cases filed with the RTC and withheld the same power from the MTC.
or by any skewed interpretation of its authority.
Same; The power to issue Hold Departure Order (HDO) is inherent to the courts.—It bears
reiterating that the power to issue HDO is inherent to the courts. The courts may issue an HDO
against an accused in a criminal case so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. It Same; It is in the interest of fairness that there be a complete and exhaustive discussion on the
does not require legislative conferment or constitutional recognition; it coexists with the grant matter since it entails the imposition of penalty that bears upon the fitness of the respondent
of judicial power. In Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993), the Court declared, as a member of the legal profession.—It is well to remember that on November 18, 2011, a
thus: Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general Resolution was issued requiring De Lima to show cause why she should not be disciplinarily
grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers dealt or be held in contempt for failure to comply with the TRO issued by this Court. In view,
are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or however, of the complexity of the facts and corresponding full discussion that it rightfully
essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the court, as well as to the due deserves, the Court finds it more fitting to address the same in a separate proceeding. It is in
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution the interest of fairness that there be a complete and exhaustive discussion on the matter since
of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court’s jurisdiction and render it entails the imposition of penalty that bears upon the fitness of the respondent as a member
it effective in behalf of the litigants. The inherent powers of the courts are essential in of the legal profession. The Court, therefore, finds it proper to deliberate and resolve the charge
upholding its integrity and largely beneficial in keeping the people’s faith in the institution by of contempt against De Lima in a separate proceeding that could accommodate a full
ensuring that it has the power and the means to enforce its jurisdiction. opportunity for her to present her case and provide a better occasion for the Court to deliberate
on her alleged disobedience to a lawful order. Genuino vs. De Lima, 861 SCRA 325, G.R. No.
Application for Leave; The filing of application for leave is required for purposes of orderly
197930 April 17, 2018
personnel administration.—The same ratiocination can be said of the regulations of the Civil
Service Commission with respect to the requirement for leave application of employees in the
government service seeking to travel abroad. The Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O.
No. 292 states the leave privileges and availment guidelines for all government employees, SECTION 7
except those who are covered by special laws. The filing of application for leave is required for
purposes of orderly personnel administration. In pursuing foreign travel plans, a government
employee must secure an approved leave of absence from the head of his agency before leaving JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs. LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-Arms, Philippine
for abroad. To be particular, E.O. No. 6 dated March 12, 1986, as amended by Memorandum Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons, respondents.
Order (MO) No. 26 dated July 31, 1986, provided the procedure in the disposition of requests
of government officials and employees for authority to travel abroad. The provisions of this
issuance were later clarified in the Memorandum Circular No. 18 issued on October 27, 1992.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO CONDUCT
AN INQUIRY.—The power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
2.ID.; RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY.—The Congress of the Philippines has a wider
range of legislative field than either the Congress of the United States or a State Legislature,
and the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult to define any limits
by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. Suffice it to say that it must be
coextensive with the range of legislative power.
3.ID.; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH A WlTNESS FOR
CONTEMPT.—No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House
unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
4.ID. ; ID.—Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to
answer any question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject of course to his
constitutional privilege against selfincrimination.
5.ID.; ID.; MATERIALITY OF THE QUESTION.—The materiality of a question that may be
propounded to a witness is determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and
not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
6.ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO PASS UPON MATERIALITY.—Where the
immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon
to contest its jurisdiction, the Court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. Although
the legislative body has the power to make the inquiry, the Court is empowered to correct a
clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.
7.ID.; LACK OF POWER OF THE COURT TO INTERFERE WITH LEGISLATIVE ACTION.—
Since the Court has no power to determine what legislation to approve or not to approve, it
cannot say that the information sought from a witness which. is material to the subject of the
legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or possible legislation. It is not within the
province of the Court to determine or imagine what legislative measures Congress may take
after the completion of the legislative investigation.
8.ID.; AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO COMMIT A WlTNESS FOR
CONTEMPT BEYOND PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION.—There is no sound reason to
limit the power of the legislative body to punish. for contempt to the end of every session and
not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of
the House of Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The
Senate is a continuing body which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of
the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's
power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted.
9.ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO
ANSWER.—Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify
and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.
10.ID.; ID.; POWER OF COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER QUESTION is
INCRIMINATORY.—It is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate
him, as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear
reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well
as from his general 'Conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed,
it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate
or not. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection
against an. imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
11.ID.; RIGHT AND OBLIGATION OF A CITIZEN.—It is the duty of every citizen to give
frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. His constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, unless clearly established, must yield to that duty. When
a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or
uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the former must yield to the latter. The right
to live is one of the most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him
of it if he violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life of others. Arnault vs.
Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, No. L-3820 July 18, 1950
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
respondents.
Presidency; Executive Privilege; Separation of Powers; Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation; There is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege; The
presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.—Respondent
Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the
truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995), affirmed that
the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita,
488 SCRA 1 (2006), the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept.
There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was
recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), 299 SCRA 744 (1998) and Chavez v. PEA, 384 SCRA 152 (2002). The
Court articulated in these cases that “there are certain types of information which the
government may withhold from the public,” that there is a “governmental privilege against
public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national
security matters;” and that “the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as
‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
meetings.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; When an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said
Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of
authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said executive official,
such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure.—Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed
the “presumption that inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure”
arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that
in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should
be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety. Note that the
aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v.
Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 464, Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads: From the
above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States
and in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted
against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt
from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the
“exemption” being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464,
solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive
official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt
from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege
given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Quintessential” and “Non-Delegable,”
Defined; The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make
such power less executive; “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of
something, the concentrated essence of substance; “Non-delegable” means that a power or
duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the
obligor; The fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board,
which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or
guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.—The fact
that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less
executive. “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the
concentrated essence of substance. On the other hand, “non-delegable” means that a power or
duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the
obligor. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that
the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to
Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans,
does not diminish the executive nature of the power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of “Operational Proximity”; The doctrine of
“operational proximity” was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege.—It must be stressed that the doctrine of “operational proximity”
was laid down in In re: Sealed Case, No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997, 121 F.3d 729, 326 U.S. App.
D.C. 276, precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S.
court was aware of the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore,
carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of
the agencies, and then only to White House staff that has “operational proximity” to direct
presidential decision-making.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Organizational Test”; In determining which test to
use—whether the Operational Proximity Test or the Organizational Test—the main
consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand
proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their
positions in the Executive’s organizational structure.—In the case at bar, the danger of
expanding the privilege “to a large swath of the executive branch” (a fear apparently
entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the
Cabinet, thus, properly within the term “advisor” of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a
member of her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved is
far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the Decision the organizational test laid down in
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 365 F 3d. 1108, 361 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 64 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv.141. This goes to show that the operational proximity test used in the Decision is not
considered conclusive in every case. In determining which test to use, the main consideration
is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the
President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the
Executive’s organizational structure. Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that the scope of the
privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational proximity test is
unfounded.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is
meant to protect.—It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not
merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15,
2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation
to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim.
Thus, the Letter stated: The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations
with the People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which this information
were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis
supplied) Even in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), it was held that Congress must not
require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel
disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect
for a coordinate and co-equal department.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the information sought through the three (3)
questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with
more reason, the Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire
into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal
discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague
legislative need.—Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions
subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more
reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into
not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal
discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague
legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted
consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with
increased frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional
functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the
President’s decision-making process, which inevitably would involve her conversations with
a member of her Cabinet.
Same; Same; Same; Public Officers; Right to Information; Accountability and Transparency;
The constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional policies on public
accountability and transparency are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a
democratic government.—There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of
the people to information and the constitutional policies on public accountability and
transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic
government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the
power has been delegated if they are denied access to information. And the policies on public
accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere empty words if access to
such information of public concern is denied. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding
executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the
public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and
transparency.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to information is not an absolute right—that
there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information covered by
executive privilege is a recognized principle in other democratic States.—This Court did not
rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is
nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the
NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify
again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely
excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers
covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before
respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these answers
are covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put
it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right. Indeed, the constitutional provisions
cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to information. By their
wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law is
unmistakable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a
subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress and neither does the right to information grant a
citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials.—The right primarily involved
here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation,
not the people’s right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in the assailed
Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA
1 (2006), “the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress” and “neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
testimony from government officials.” As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not to
the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are
respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for
information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts
to blur the distinctions between the Legislature’s right to information in a legitimate legislative
inquiry and the public’s right to information.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally
guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative
investigation, the legislative purpose of the Committees’ questions can be sufficiently
supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry
as a whole may have relevance—the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a
showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.—
It must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of respondent Committees’
inquiry into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’
power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this
Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is
validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose
of respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of
mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have
relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive
privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of
compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with
the compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to
the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies.—The need for hard facts in crafting
legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need
for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the
bare standard of “pertinency” set in Arnault cannot be lightly applied to the instant case, which
unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2) separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches
of the Government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the
conflicting claims between the Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized
existence of the presumptive presidential communications privilege.—Whatever test we may
apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the Executive and the
Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential
communications privilege. This is conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the Honorable
Chief Justice Puno, which states: A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion
that it bestowed a qualified presumption in favor of the Presidential communications privilege.
As shown in the previous discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the other related Nixon cases
Sirica and Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, et al. v. Nixon in the
D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent cases all recognize that there is a presumptive
privilege in favor of Presidential communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. v. Nixon and
recognized a presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential communications.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the
burden on the respondent Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating
their specific need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions
subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation—for sure, a factual basis for situations
covered by bills is not critically needed before legislative bodies can come up with relevant
legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law.—The presumption in favor of
Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees to
overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be
elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft
legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the
exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate
bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could not be determined without the said
information sought by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed out by the Honorable
Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring Opinion: …If respondents are operating
under the premise that the president and/or her executive officials have committed
wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from recurring by remedial legislation,
the answer to those three questions will not necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from
proceeding with such legislation. They could easily presume the worst of the president in
enacting such legislation. For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically
needed before legislatives bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the
adjudication of cases by courts of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Oversight Function; Anent the function to curb graft and corruption,
it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this
function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in
nature—curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.—Anent the
function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need
for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the
purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is
merely an oversight function of Congress. And if this is the primary objective of respondent
Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their
claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not
investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent
Committees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential
culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government
transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform—the role of the Legislature is to
make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing.—The general thrust and
the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President.
While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government
officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for
the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s
guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the
latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or
prosecute.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress; There is no Congressional power to expose for the
sake of exposure.—No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they
cannot assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The
determination of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role
played by each official, the determination of who should be haled to court for prosecution and
the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the
determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law
enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself;
it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation.
Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and “punish” those
investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of
exposure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; Courts; The Office of the Ombudsman is the
body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether
or not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor, and the same holds true
for our courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with
finality.—It is important to stress that complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been
filed against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Under our Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty “to investigate any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.” The Office of the Ombudsman is the body
properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not
the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our
courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality.
Indeed, the rules of procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman and the courts are well-defined
and ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all persons, parties and witnesses
alike, are protected and safeguarded.
Same; Same; Congress; The Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and
corruption cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information
validly covered by executive privilege.—Should respondent Committees uncover information
related to a possible crime in the course of their investigation, they have the constitutional duty
to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or branch of government. Thus, the Legislature’s
need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot be deemed compelling
enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive privilege. As
discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even without the
information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the petition.
Same; Same; Same; Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the
exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply
the law; Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper
proceedings by a competent court or body.—Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings,
are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual
findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that “technical rules of evidence applicable
to judicial proceedings which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the
Committee.” Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions or
questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry.
Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent court or body.
Same; Congress; An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked
Executive, generates its own abuses.—Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the
view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), requiring invitations or subpoenas
to contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry” along with
the “usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof” is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum. On the
contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these requirements. An
unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its
own abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused
(or has the potential for abuse) have been raised many times. Constant exposure to
congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively. The
requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit
Congress’ power. The legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus,
prevent the “roving commissions” referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168 (1880). Likewise, witnesses have their constitutional right to due process. They should be
adequately informed what matters are to be covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to
prepare the pertinent information and documents. To our mind, these requirements concede
too little political costs or burdens on the part of Congress when viewed vis-à-vis the
immensity of its power of inquiry.
Same; Courts; Judicial Review; While it is true that the Court must refrain from reviewing the
internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a
constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance
therewith.—Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend that their Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the “Rules”) are beyond the reach of this
Court. While it is true that this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of
Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a constitutional requirement
exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a
blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy.
Same; Same; Contempt; The Court does not believe that respondent Committees have the
discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish, and this is especially true where what is
involved is the contempt power; It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated to
benefit legislative committees—more than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest
stake in the proper observance of the Rules.—Obviously the deliberation of the respondent
Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt order is flawed. Instead of being submitted
to a full debate by all the members of the respondent Committees, the contempt order was
prepared and thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the contempt
order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the
proceedings that took place on said date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed
the contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was
taken up. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that: The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied) All the limitations embodied
in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled expectation. If the limitations are
not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered. Here, how could there be a majority
vote when the members in attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has
the right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding
in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of protection
for the witness when the concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated in such
proceeding. We do not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside
their rules anytime they wish. This is especially true here where what is involved is the
contempt power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More
than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in the proper observance of the
Rules.
Senate; Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members,
but in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.—On the nature of the Senate as a
“continuing body,” this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that
the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-
day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of
the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states: RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken
up at the next session in the same status. All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate
upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
present for the first time. (emphasis supplied) Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending
matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate
of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it
is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters,
not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a
rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will
typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound
by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a
continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will
not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for
its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state
that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed
to sufficiently put public on notice.—Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into
account the new composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the
amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term. However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its
main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state
“(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.” The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules
until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of
Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue
into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its
legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. The language of
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance
with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published
rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are
amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. If it was the intention of the Senate
for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could
have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Same; Same; Not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are
null and void—only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be
considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.—Lest the Court
be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings
conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation
of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for
the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.
Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; In a free and democratic society, the interests of
these Executive and Legislative branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the other with
official courtesy and respect.—On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the
Executive and the Legislature are political branches of government. In a free and democratic
society, the interests of these branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the other with
official courtesy and respect. This Court wholeheartedly concurs with the proposition that it is
imperative for the continued health of our democratic institutions that we preserve the
constitutionally mandated checks and balances among the different branches of government.
Same; Same; Accountability and Transparency; There is no question that any story of
government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity, but the best venue for this noble
undertaking is not in the political branches of government—the customary partisanship and
the absence of generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the
truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of
law.—While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ well-intentioned efforts to
ferret out corruption, even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not
validate or accord to Congress powers denied to it by the Constitution and granted instead to
the other branches of government. There is no question that any story of government
malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As respondent Committees contend, this is
founded on the constitutional command of transparency and public accountability. The recent
clamor for a “search for truth” by the general public, the religious community and the academe
is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation that demands an accounting of an entrusted
power. However, the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the political branches of
government. The customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted rules on
evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the
test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the people deserve a more
exacting “search for truth” than the process here in question, if that is its objective.
QUISUMBING, J., Separate Opinion on the Motion for Reconside-ration:
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; Due Process; In petitioners’ case, respondents had
neglected to observe elements of due process on more than one occasion in their proceedings,
and thereby committed grave abuse of discretion which is proscribed by the present
fundamental law.—For as long as the requirement of due pro-cess is paramount in proceedings
involving life and liberty, the instant motion for reconsideration, which merely reiterates
arguments that have been adequately threshed out in the Decision, must emphatically be
denied. With due respect, we find that in Neri’s case, respondents had neglected to observe
elements of due process on more than one occasion in their proceedings, and thereby
committed grave abuse of discretion which is proscribed by the present fundamental law.
Same; Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine; In the absence of a
published rule of procedure on a matter which is the subject of legislative inquiry, any action
which affects substantial rights of persons would be anathema, and risks unconstitutionality,
and even if there is such a rule or statute duly published, if it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application, the rule or statute would be repugnant to the Constitution.—The current Senate
cannot in good conscience neglect to publish its Rules of Procedure. Nor could its Committee
ignore the Rules, specially those on quorum. In the absence of a published rule of procedure
on a matter which is the subject of legislative inquiry, any action which affects substantial
rights of persons would be anathema, and risks unconstitutionality. Even if there is such a rule
or statute duly published, if it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application, the rule or
statute would be repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves the law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. How much more in this case where
there is a patent lack of publication and proper notice of the applicable rules. Or where the
rules are misread and misapplied resulting in lack of quorum.
Same; Same; Same; The denial of a person’s fundamental right to due process amounts to the
illegality of the proceedings against him.—Beyond debate, the fundamental law prohibits
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Comparatively speaking, the Court has on
many occasions required judges to comply strictly with the due process requirements on
issuing warrants of arrest, failure of which has resulted in the voiding of the warrants. The
denial of a person’s fundamental right to due process amounts to the illegality of the
proceedings against him. The doctrine consistently adhered to by the Supreme Court is that a
denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whichever branch of the
government the impress of nullity, the fundamental right to due process being a cornerstone
of our legal system. The right to due process is a cardinal and primary right which must be
respected in all proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; It is a well-settled principle in law that what due process contemplates is
freedom from arbitrariness; what it requires is fairness and justice; substance, rather than form,
being paramount.—In the instant controversy, the least respondents could have done, after
browbeating the petitioner Neri (who was sick at that time) with a barrage of questions was to
have granted his request for a copy of the questions for the next hearing. It is a well-settled
principle in law that what due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness; what it
requires is fairness and justice; substance, rather than form, being paramount. It is essential
that the contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard
in his defense, as contempt of court proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature.
A finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged
and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary principle of due process.
PUNO, C.J., Dissenting Opinion:
Senate; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; There is merit in the contention of respondent Senate
Committees that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries need not be published by the
Senate of every Congress, as the Senate is a continuing body.—It is my considered view that
there is merit in the contention of respondent Senate Committees that the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries need not be published by the Senate of every Congress, as the Senate is a
continuing body. The continuity of these rules from one Congress to the next is both an incident
and an indicium of the continuing nature of the Senate.

Same; The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the nature of the
Senate as a continuing body hinged on the staggering of terms of the Senators; The structure
of the Philippine Senate being evidently patterned after the U.S. Senate, it reflects the latter’s
rationale for staggering senatorial terms and constituting the Senate as a continuing body.—
Excerpts from the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission provide us a brief
history of the Senate of the Philippines and its intended nature as a continuing legislative body,
viz.: x x x The above deliberations show that the nature of the Senate as a continuing body
hinged on the staggering of terms of the Senators, such that the term of one-half or twelve of
the Senators (“remaining Senators”) would subsist and continue into the succeeding Congress,
while the term of the other half or twelve Senators (“outgoing Senators”) would expire in the
present Congress. As pointed out by Commissioner Gregorio J. Tingson, this arrangement
whereby half of the Senate’s membership continues into the next Congress is designed to help
ensure “stability of governmental policies.” The structure of the Philippine Senate being
evidently patterned after the U.S. Senate, it reflects the latter’s rationale for staggering
senatorial terms and constituting the Senate as a continuing body.
Same; It is the staggering of the terms of the 24 Senators and allowing the terms of office of a
portion of the Senate membership to continue into the succeeding Congress that provides the
stability indispensable to an effective government, and makes the Senate a continuing body as
intended by the framers of both the 1935 (as amended) and the 1987 Constitutions; Part of the
stability provided by a continuing Senate is the existence of rules of proceedings adopted
pursuant to the power granted by the U.S. Constitution, rules that continue to be in effect from
one Congress to the next until such rules are repealed or amended, but with the process for
repeal and amendment also being governed by the subsisting rules.—In sum, it is the
staggering of the terms of the 24 Senators and allowing the terms of office of a portion of the
Senate membership to continue into the succeeding Congress—whether two-thirds under the
1935 Constitution or one-half under the 1987 Constitution—that provides the stability
indispensable to an effective government, and makes the Senate a continuing body as intended
by the framers of both the 1935 (as amended) and the 1987 Constitutions. Part of the stability
provided by a continuing Senate is the existence of rules of proceedings adopted pursuant to
the power granted by the U.S. Constitution, rules that continue to be in effect from one
Congress to the next until such rules are repealed or amended, but with the process for repeal
and amendment also being governed by the subsisting rules. U.S. Senator Francis Warren
cautions that a Senate that is not continuing, but instead new in each Congress, opens all rules
to debate as a new matter; the Senate will be totally and wholly without rules as it proceeds
“at sea without rudder or compass regarding rules.” Thus, in the U.S., the Senate rules of
proceedings provide that “(t)he rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the
next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules.” These rules, adopted on
January 11, 1884 and made effective on January 21, 1884, continue to be in effect to this day
alongside the continuing membership of the Senate.
Same; The Senate Rules do not provide for their expiration at the termination of every
Congress—on the contrary, Rule LI provides that at the opening of every Congress, the Senate
President may endorse the Senate Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or
revision, which connotes that the Senate Rules must be subsisting for them to be subject to
amendment or revision.—Patterned after the U.S. Constitution, the 1987 Constitution also
provides under Article VI, Section 16(3) that “(e)ach House may determine the rules of its
proceedings…” As in the U.S. Senate, the Senate Rules (of proceedings) adopted by the
Philippine Senate have a continued effect from one Congress to the next as shown by the
following provisions of the Philippine Senate Rules: “Rule LII (Date of Taking Effect), Section
137: These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until
they are amended or repealed.” x x x x x x x x x “Rule LI (Amendments to, Or revisions Of,
The Rules), Section 136: At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the
preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the
appropriate committee for amendment or revision. “The Rules may also be amended by means
of a motion which should be presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote
of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.”
(emphasis supplied) It is obvious that the above rules do not provide for the expiration of the
Senate Rules at the termination of every Congress. On the contrary, Rule LI provides that at
the opening of every Congress, the Senate President may endorse the Senate Rules to the
appropriate committee for amendment or revision, which connotes that the Senate Rules must
be subsisting for them to be subject to amendment or revision. If the Senate were not a
continuing body, the Senate Rules governing its proceedings would not be given continuing
effect from one Congress to the next.
Same; Between the expiration of a Congress and the opening of the succeeding Congress, some
functions of the Senate continue during such recess—aside from the administrative functions
performed by Senate employees for the continued operation of the Senate as an institution,
legislative functions continue to be exercised.—While the present Senate Rules provide under
Rule XLIV (Unfinished Business), Section 123 that “(a)ll pending matters and proceedings shall
terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress,” between the expiration of a Congress and
the opening of the succeeding Congress, some functions of the Senate continue during such
recess. Aside from the administrative functions performed by Senate employees for the
continued operation of the Senate as an institution, legislative functions continue to be
exercised. The offices of the “remaining Senators” continue their legislative work in
preparation for the succeeding Congress. These continuing functions require continuing
effectivity of the Senate Rules. An example of a provision of the Senate Rules applicable to
these continuing activities is Rule XXII (Filing and Consideration of Bills and Resolutions),
Section 61, which provides that “(a)ll bills and resolutions shall be filed with the Office of the
Secretary whether the Senate is in session or not.”
Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; Prescinding from the continuing nature of the Senate and
the continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules (of proceedings), it is my considered view that
the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries adopted by the Senate of the Tenth Congress on
August 21, 1995 should likewise be recognized to have continuing force and effect after being
“duly published” in two newspapers of general circulation on August 24, 1995.—It should be
noted that the termination of unfinished business upon expiration of one Congress is
sanctioned by Rule XLIV, Section 123 of the Senate Rules. The Senate Rules, may, however, be
amended under Rule LI, Section 36. It remains to be seen whether by amendment of the Senate
Rules, the Senate would allow a Senate Committee conducting an investigation, for example,
to continue its proceedings after the expiration of a Congress as in the afore-discussed case,
McGrain v. Daugherty. Prescinding from the continuing nature of the Senate and the
continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules (of proceedings), it is my considered view that the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries adopted by the Senate of the Tenth Congress on
August 21, 1995 should likewise be recognized to have continuing force and effect after being
“duly published” in two newspapers of general circulation on August 24, 1995.
Same; Rules of Procedure; It cannot be gainsaid that rules of proceedings are a necessity in
preserving order, decency and regularity in a dignified public body.—It cannot be gainsaid
that rules of proceedings are a necessity in preserving order, decency and regularity in a
dignified public body. These rules are weapons of the weaker party to defend themselves from
irregularities and abuses “which the wantonness of power is but too often apt to suggest to
large and successful majorities.” Thomas Jefferson stated in the opening of his widely used, A
Manual of Parliamentary Practice, viz.: “Mr. Onslow, the ablest among the Speakers of the
House of Commons, used to say, ‘It was a maxim he had often heard when he was a young
man, from old and experienced members, that nothing tended more to throw power into the
hands of the administration and those who acted with the majority of the House of Commons,
than in neglect of, or departure from, the rules of proceeding; that these forms, as instituted by
our ancestors, operated as a check, and control, on the actions of the majority; and that they
were, in many instances, a shelter and protection to the minority, against the attempts of
power.’ ”
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The Court ought to take a deferential stance in interpreting
the rule-making power of the Senate as a co-equal branch of government, so long as rights of
private parties are not infringed; To the extent that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
does not transgress the requirement of due process as its outer limit, the Senate should be given
room to interpret the duration of its effectivity from one Congress to the next.—Following the
principles of Ballin and Santiago, I submit that the Court ought to take a deferential stance in
interpreting the rule-making power of the Senate as a co-equal branch of government, so long
as rights of private parties are not infringed. The Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries is
akin to the Senate Rules (of proceeding) in that the former governs the internal workings of the
Senate and its committees, although admittedly different in some respects from the Senate
Rules because it affects rights of parties not members of the Senate and, hence, requires
publication. To the extent that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries does not transgress
the requirement of due process as its outer limit, the Senate should be given room to interpret
the duration of its effectivity from one Congress to the next.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; It is within the competency of the Senate to prescribe a method
that shall reasonably conform to the due-process purpose of publication, and the Senate has
validly provided the method of one-time publication of its Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in two newspapers of general circulation.—Similar to Ballin, there is no standard set
by Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, as to the manner and frequency of publication
of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries. It is within the competency of the Senate to
prescribe a method that shall reasonably conform to the due-process purpose of publication,
and the Senate has validly provided the method of one-time publication of its Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in two newspapers of general circulation, in line with the ruling
in Tañada.
Same; Same; Same; The unbroken practice of the Senate of not adopting Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries and publishing the same in every Congress, owing to its nature as a
continuing body, is not something to be lightly brushed aside, especially considering the grave
consequences of cutting this continuity; Where rights are not violated, the Court ought not like
lightning strike down a valid rule and practice of a co-equal branch of government, lest the
walls delineating powers be burned.—The unbroken practice of the Senate of not adopting
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries and publishing the same in every Congress, owing to
its nature as a continuing body, is not something to be lightly brushed aside, especially
considering the grave consequences of cutting this continuity. Holding itself to be a continuing
body, the Senate has dispensed with the adoption not only of Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, but also of Senate rules (of proceedings) at the start of every Congress in the last ten
years. As a consequence of the absence of rules if the Senate is held to be not a continuing body,
its acts during these Congresses may be put into question. A mathematical calculation of a
quorum in view of the staggered terms of the Senate membership cannot simply subvert the
deeply-entrenched thought-out rationale for the design of a continuing and stable Senate,
shown to be necessary in promoting effective government and protecting liberties. Where
rights are not violated, the Court ought not like lightning strike down a valid rule and practice
of a co-equal branch of government, lest the walls delineating powers be burned.
AZCUNA, J., Separate Dissenting Opinion:
Senate; It was the intent of the Constitutional Commission to preserve the nature of the Senate
as a continuing body to provide an institutional memory in the legislature.—It was the intent
of the Constitutional Commission to preserve the nature of the Senate as a continuing body to
provide an institutional memory in the legislature. The deliberations in the Commission, cited
by the Chief Justice, clearly bear this out. The Senate, therefore, need not re-publish its Rules
with every new Congress.
Congress; Informing Function; Specific provisions of the present Constitution conferred on
Congress an information function, apart from its legislative function, which it may exercise to
enable our people to effectively take part in governance.—As I opined in my dissent in the
JPEPA case, specific provisions of the present Constitution conferred on Congress an
information function, apart from its legislative function, which it may exercise to enable our
people to effectively take part in governance. The Senate investigation at issue is, therefore, in
order even apart from the power to legislate.
REYES, R.T., J., Separate Opinion:
Courts; Judgments; A sad commentary of the times is when a Justice takes a stand which
flatters the political opposition, it is hailed as courageous; when the stand benefits the
administration, it is hounded as cowardly.—I AM one of two Justices who only concurred in
the result of the majority decision penned by esteemed colleague, Justice Teresita Leonardo-
De Castro. I again effectively do so now in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration
through this separate opinion. It has become necessary for me to clarify for the record my
position on the issues of executive privilege and the contempt and arrest powers of the Senate.
As expected, given the highly-politicized complexion of the case, the Court ruling received a
mixed reaction of praise and flak. My kind of concurrence and that of Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing did not escape criticism. An article erroneously described Our vote as “unclear,”
casting doubt on the final verdict of the Neri petition. Another item wrongly branded us as
mere “straddlers,” sitting on both sides of the fence and coming up with a decision only at the
last minute. A sad commentary of the times is when a Justice takes a stand which flatters the
political opposition, it is hailed as courageous; when the stand benefits the administration, it is
hounded as cowardly. But judicial independence is neither here nor there. For me, it is judicial
action that is right and reasonable, taken without fear or favor, unmindful of incidental
consequences.
Same; Same; Legal Research; A concurrence in the result is a favorable vote for the decision
crafted by the ponente.—A concurrence in the result is a favorable vote for the decision crafted
by the ponente. It simply means that I agreed in the outcome or disposition of the case, but not
necessarily on all the grounds given in the ponencia. I concurred with the weightier reasons
stated in the majority decision to grant the petition for certiorari and to quash the Senate arrest
and contempt order against petitioner, Secretary Neri. However, I did not share some of the
reasoning of the ponente. If an unqualified vote of concurrence is allowed on a majority
decision or dissenting opinion, there is no reason why a vote in the result should be treated
differently, much less proscribed.
Presidency; Executive Privilege; The distinction between presidential communication privilege
and executive privilege based on diplomacy and foreign relations is important because they
are two different categories of executive privilege recognized by jurisprudence, which two
categories have different rationale.—The distinction between presidential communication
privilege and executive privilege based on diplomacy and foreign relations is important
because they are two different categories of executive privilege recognized by jurisprudence.
The first pertains to those communications between the President and her close advisors
relating to official or state matters; the second are those matters that have a direct bearing on
the conduct of our external affairs with other nations, in this case the Republic of China. The
two categories of executive privilege have different rationale. Presidential communication
privilege is grounded on the paramount need for candor between the President and her close
advisors. It gives the President and those assisting her sufficient freedom to interact without
fear of undue public scrutiny. On the other hand, executive privilege on matters concerning
our diplomatic or foreign relations is akin to state secret privilege which, when divulged, will
unduly impair our external relations with other countries.
Same; Same; A relatively higher standard of specificity is required for a claim of executive
privilege based on diplomacy or foreign relations.—The fact of conversation is the trigger of
the presidential communication privilege. There is no need to give specifics or particulars of
the contents of the conversation because that will obviously divulge the very matter which the
privilege is meant to protect. It will be an illusory privilege if a more stringent standard is
required. In contrast, a relatively higher standard of specificity is required for a claim of
executive privilege based on diplomacy or foreign relations. As in state secrets, this type of
executive privilege is content based. This means that the claim is dependent on the very content
of the information sought to be disclosed. To adequately assess the validity of the claim, there
is a need for the court, usually in closed session, to become privy to the information. This will
enable the court to sufficiently assess whether or not the information claimed to be privileged
will actually impair our diplomatic or foreign relations with other countries. It is the content
of the information and its effect that trigger the privilege. To be sure, a generalized claim of
privilege will not pass the more stringent test of specificity.
Same; Same; Executive privilege is not an evil that should be thwarted and waylaid at every
turn—common sense and public policy require a certain degree of secrecy of some essential
government actions.—The Court’s statement in Ermita must be read in its proper context. It is
merely a general statement in favor of public disclosure and against government secrecy. To
be sure, transparency of government actions is a laudable virtue of a republican system of
government such as ours. After all, a public office is a public trust. A well informed citizenry
is essential in a democratic and republican government. But not all privileges or those that
prevent disclosure of government actions are objectionable. Executive privilege is not an evil
that should be thwarted and waylaid at every turn. Common sense and public policy require
a certain degree of secrecy of some essential government actions. Presidential communication
privilege is one of them. The President and her close advisor should be given enough leeway
to candidly discuss official and state matters without fear of undue public scrutiny. The
President cannot effectively govern in a fishbowl where her every action is dissected and
scrutinized. Even the Senate itself enjoys the same privilege in the discharge of its
constitutional functions. Internal workings of the Senate Committees, which include
deliberations between the Senators and their staffs in crafting a bill, are generally beyond
judicial scrutiny.
Same; Same; Congress; Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; Oversight Function; It is
difficult to draw a line between the oversight function and the legislative function of the
Senate.—There is a statement in the majority decision that respondent Senate Committees were
exercising their oversight function, instead of their legislative powers in asking the three
questions to Secretary Neri. The characterization of the Senate power as one in the exercise of
its oversight, instead of legislative, function has severe repercussions because of this Court’s
dicta in Ermita that the Senate’s oversight function “may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.” In exercising its oversight
function, the Senate may only request the appearance of a public official. In contrast, it may
compel appearance when it is exercising its power of investigation in aid of legislation. On this
score, I part way with the majority decision. To be sure, it is difficult to draw a line between
the oversight function and the legislative function of the Senate. Nonetheless, there is sufficient
evidence on record that the Senate Committees were actually exercising their legislative power
rather than their oversight function in conducting the NBN-ZTE investigation. Various
resolutions, privilege speeches and bills were filed in the Senate in connection with the NBN-
ZTE contract. Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Antonio Bautista, even concedes that the investigation
conducted by the Senate Committees were in aid of legislation.
Same; Same; There is a consensus among the Justices of the Supreme Court that a claim of
executive privilege cannot succeed in a criminal proceeding—the right of the accused to due
process of law requires nothing less than full disclosure.—There is a consensus among the
Justices of this Court that a claim of executive privilege cannot succeed in a criminal
proceeding. The reason is simple. The right of the accused to due process of law requires
nothing less than full disclosure. When vital information that may exculpate the accused from
a crime is withheld from the courts, the wheels of justice will be stymied and the constitutional
right of the accused to due process of law becomes illusory. It is the crucial need for the
information covered by the privilege and the dire consequences of nondisclosure on the
discharge of an essential judicial function which trumps executive privilege.
Same; Same; Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; The Senate Committees have more than
enough inputs and insights which would enable its members to craft proper legislation in
connection with its investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal—I do not see how the contents of the
conversation between Secretary Neri and the President, which is presumptively privileged,
could possibly add more light to the law-making capability of the Senate.—To my mind, the
Senate failed to present a case of compelling need for the information covered by the privilege.
It must be borne in mind that Secretary Neri is only one of the many witnesses in the NBN-
ZTE investigation. In fact, he had already testified lengthily for eleven (11) hours. Numerous
resource persons and witnesses have testified before and after him. The list includes Rodolfo
“Jun” Lozada, Jr., Jose De Venecia IV, Chairman Benjamin Abalos, technical consultants Leo
San Miguel and Dante Madriaga. To date, the Senate Committees had conducted a total of
twelve hearings on the NBN-ZTE investigation. Given the sheer abundance of information,
both consistent and conflicting, I find that the Senate Committees have more than enough
inputs and insights which would enable its members to craft proper legislation in connection
with its investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal. I do not see how the contents of the conversation
between Secretary Neri and the President, which is presumptively privileged, could possibly
add more light to the law-making capability of the Senate. At the most, the conversation will
only bolster what had been stated by some witnesses during the Senate investigation.
Senate; The Senate does not cease to be a continuing body merely because only half of its
members continue to the next Congress—even a lesser number of Senators continuing into the
next Congress will still make the Senate a continuing body.—The Senate does not cease to be a
continuing body merely because only half of its members continue to the next Congress. To
my mind, even a lesser number of Senators continuing into the next Congress will still make
the Senate a continuing body. The Senate must be viewed as a collective body. It is an
institution quite apart from the Senators composing it. The Senate as an institution cannot be
equated to its present occupants. It is indivisible. It is not the sum total of all sitting Senators at
any given time. Senators come and go but the very institution of the Senate remains. It is this
indivisible institution which should be viewed as continuing.
Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; Due Process; There is nothing in the constitutional
provision that commands that every new Congress must publish its rules of procedure—
republication is necessary only when there is an amendment or revision to the rules.—The
Constitutional provision requiring publication of Senate rules is contained in Section 21, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
its respective Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. The above provision only requires a “duly published” rule of
procedure for inquiries in aid of legislation. It is silent on republication. There is nothing in the
constitutional provision that commands that every new Congress must publish its rules of
procedure. Implicitly, republication is necessary only when there is an amendment or revision
to the rules. This is required under the due process clause of the Constitution.
Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; We must not lightly intrude into the internal
rules of a co-equal branch—the doctrine of separation of powers demands no less than a
prudent refusal to interfere with the internal affairs of the Senate.—In Avelino v. Cuenco, 83
Phil. 17 (1949), this Court by a vote of 6-4 refused to assume jurisdiction over a petition
questioning the election of Senator Cuenco as Senate President for lack of quorum. The case
cropped up when then Senate President Avelino walked out of the Senate halls followed by
nine other Senators, leaving only twelve senators in the session hall. The remaining twelve
Senators declared the position of the Senate President vacant and unanimously designated
Senator Cuenco as the Acting Senate President. Senator Avelino questioned the election,
among others, for lack of quorum. Refusing to assume jurisdiction, this Court held: The Court
will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede
might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of things has been proved that might change
the temper of the Filipino people as a (sic) peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should
not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the claim that should
characterize judicial delibe-rations. The same principle should apply here. We must not lightly
intrude into the internal rules of a co-equal branch. The doctrine of separation of powers
demands no less than a prudent refusal to interfere with the internal affairs of the Senate. The
issues of lack of quorum and the inclusion of the votes of the ex officio members are beyond
this Court’s judicial review.
Same; Same; Same; Judgments; If the Supreme Court allows Justices who are physically absent
from its sessions to cast their vote on a petition, there is no reason to treat the Senators
differently.—Apart from jurisprudence, common sense also requires that We should accord
the same privilege and respect to a co-equal branch. If this Court allows Justices who are
physically absent from its sessions to cast their vote on a petition, there is no reason to treat the
Senators differently. It is also common knowledge that even members of the House of
Representatives cast their vote on a bill without taking part in its deliberations and sessions.
Certainly, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If it is allowed in the House of
Representatives, it should be allowed in the Senate. Kung ito’y pinapayagan sa Mababang
Kapulungan, dapat payagan din sa Mataas na Kapulungan. Neri vs. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 564 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 180643 September
4, 2008
SECTION 8 and the closed shop as a means of encouraging the workers to join and support the labor union
of their own choice as their representative in the negotiation of their demands and the
protection of their interest vis-à-vis the employer. (Emphasis ours.) In other words, the purpose
of a union shop or other union security arrangement is to guarantee the continued existence of
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO
the union through enforced membership for the benefit of the workers.
CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK, respondent.
Same; Same; Same; All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Union Security Clauses; Words and Phrases; “Union Security,”
their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with management are subject to its terms;
“Closed Shop,” “Union Shop,” and “Maintenance of Membership,” Explained.—“Union
Exceptions.—All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their
security” is a generic term which is applied to and comprehends “closed shop,” “union shop,”
CBA with management are subject to its terms. However, under law and jurisprudence, the
“maintenance of membership” or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees
following kinds of employees are exempted from its coverage, namely, employees who at the
the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment.
time the union shop agreement takes effect are bona fide members of a religious organization
There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a
which prohibits its members from joining labor unions on religious grounds; employees
certain period for their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop
already in the service and already members of a union other than the majority at the time the
when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who
union shop agreement took effect; confidential employees who are excluded from the rank and
thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued
file bargaining unit; and employees excluded from the union shop by express terms of the
employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement
agreement.
is terminated. A closed-shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by
agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may Same; Same; Same; Right of Association; When certain employees are obliged to join a
be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, particular union as a requisite for continued employment, as in the case of Union Security
becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction of the freedom or right not to join any labor
union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part. organization because it is in favor of unionism.—When certain employees are obliged to join a
particular union as a requisite for continued employment, as in the case of Union Security
Same; Same; Same; It is the policy of the State to promote unionism to enable the workers to
Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction of the freedom or right not to join any labor
negotiate with management on the same level and with more persuasiveness than if they were
organization because it is in favor of unionism. This Court, on occasion, has even held that a
to individually and independently bargain for the improvement of their respective
union security clause in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association
conditions—the purpose of a union shop or other union security arrangement is to guarantee
guaranteed by the Constitution. Moreover, a closed shop agreement is an agreement whereby
the continued existence of the union through enforced membership for the benefit of the
an employer binds himself to hire only members of the contracting union who must continue
workers.—In the case of Liberty Flour Mills Employees v. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc., 180 SCRA
to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs. It is “the most prized achievement of
668 (1989), we ruled that: It is the policy of the State to promote unionism to enable the workers
unionism.” It adds membership and compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a
to negotiate with management on the same level and with more persuasiveness than if they
promise of employment in the closed shop, it wields group solidarity.
were to individually and independently bargain for the improvement of their respective
conditions. To this end, the Constitution guarantees to them the rights “to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations and peaceful concerted actions including the right to
strike in accordance with law.” There is no question that these purposes could be thwarted if Same; Corporation Law; Corporate Mergers; Words and Phrases; In legal parlance, human
every worker were to choose to go his own separate way instead of joining his co-employees beings are never embraced in the term “assets and liabilities”; The Corporation Code does not
in planning collective action and presenting a united front when they sit down to bargain with mandate the absorption of the employees of the non-surviving corporation by the surviving
their employers. It is for this reason that the law has sanctioned stipulations for the union shop corporation in the case of a merger.—In legal parlance, however, human beings are never
embraced in the term “assets and liabilities.” Moreover, BPI’s absorption of former FEBTC
employees was neither by operation of law nor by legal consequence of contract. There was no
government regulation or law that compelled the merger of the two banks or the absorption of
the employees of the dissolved corporation by the surviving corporation. Had there been such
law or regulation, the absorption of employees of the non-surviving entities of the merger
would have been mandatory on the surviving corporation. In the present case, the merger was
voluntarily entered into by both banks presumably for some mutually acceptable
consideration. In fact, the Corporation Code does not also mandate the absorption of the
employees of the non-surviving corporation by the surviving corporation in the case of a
merger.
Same; Same; Same; The rule is that unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as
employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable against a
transferee of an enterprise, labor contracts being in personam, thus binding only between the
parties.—The Articles of Merger and Plan of Merger dated April 7, 2000 did not contain any
specific stipulation with respect to the employment contracts of existing personnel of the non-
surviving entity which is FEBTC. Unlike the Voluntary Arbitrator, this Court cannot uphold
the reasoning that the general stipulation regarding transfer of FEBTC assets and liabilities to
BPI as set forth in the Articles of Merger necessarily includes the transfer of all FEBTC
employees into the employ of BPI and neither BPI nor the FEBTC employees allegedly could
do anything about it. Even if it is so, it does not follow that the absorbed employees should not
be subject to the terms and conditions of employment obtaining in the surviving corporation.
The rule is that unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as employment contracts and
collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable against a transferee of an enterprise, labor
contracts being in personam, thus binding only between the parties. A labor contract merely
creates an action in personam and does not create any real right which should be respected by
third parties. This conclusion draws its force from the right of an employer to select his
employees and to decide when to engage them as protected under our Constitution, and the
same can only be restricted by law through the exercise of the police power.
Same; Same; Same; Involuntary Servitude; The Court believes that it is contrary to public policy
to declare the former employees of the absorbed bank as forming part of the assets or liabilities
that were transferred and absorbed by the other bank in the Articles of Merger—assets and
liabilities, in this instance, should be deemed to refer only to property rights and obligations of
the absorbed bank and do not include the employment contracts of its personnel; The
employees of the absorbed bank retained the prerogative to allow themselves to be absorbed
or not, otherwise, that would be tantamount to involuntary servitude.—This Court believes
that it is contrary to public policy to declare the former FEBTC employees as forming part of
the assets or liabilities of FEBTC that were transferred and absorbed by BPI in the Articles of
Merger. Assets and liabilities, in this instance, should be deemed to refer only to property rights
and obligations of FEBTC and do not include the employment contracts of its personnel. A
corporation cannot unilaterally transfer its employees to another employer like chattel.
Certainly, if BPI as an employer had the right to choose who to retain among FEBTC’s
employees, FEBTC employees had the concomitant right to choose not to be absorbed by BPI.
Even though FEBTC employees had no choice or control over the merger of their employer
with BPI, they had a choice whether or not they would allow themselves to be absorbed by
BPI. Certainly nothing prevented the FEBTC’s employees from resigning or retiring and
seeking employment elsewhere instead of going along with the proposed absorption.
Employment is a personal consensual contract and absorption by BPI of a former FEBTC
employee without the consent of the employee is in violation of an individual’s freedom to
contract. It would have been a different matter if there was an express provision in the articles
of merger that as a condition for the merger, BPI was being required to assume all the
employment contracts of all existing FEBTC employees with the conformity of the employees.
In the absence of such a provision in the articles of merger, then BPI clearly had the business
management decision as to whether or not employ FEBTC’s employees. FEBTC employees
likewise retained the prerogative to allow themselves to be absorbed or not; otherwise, that
would be tantamount to involuntary servitude.
Same; Same; Same; From the tenor of local and foreign authorities, in voluntary mergers,
absorption of the dissolved corporation’s employees or the recognition of the absorbed
employees’ service with their previous employer may be demanded from the surviving
corporation if required by provision of law or contract.—From the tenor of local and foreign
authorities, in voluntary mergers, absorption of the dissolved corporation’s employees or the
recognition of the absorbed employees’ service with their previous employer may be
demanded from the surviving corporation if required by provision of law or contract. The
dissent of Justice Arturo D. Brion tries to make a distinction as to the terms and conditions of
employment of the absorbed employees in the case of a corporate merger or consolidation
which will, in effect, take away from corporate management the prerogative to make purely
business decisions on the hiring of employees or will give it an excuse not to apply the CBA in
force to the prejudice of its own employees and their recognized collective bargaining agent.
In this regard, we disagree with Justice Brion.
Same; Same; Same; Although in a merger it is as if there is no change in the personality of the
employer, there is in reality a change in the situation of the employee—once an employee is
absorbed, there are presumably changes in his condition of employment even if his previous
tenure and salary rate is recognized by the absorbing company.—That BPI is the same entity
as FEBTC after the merger is but a legal fiction intended as a tool to adjudicate rights and
obligations between and among the merged corporations and the persons that deal with them.
Although in a merger it is as if there is no change in the personality of the employer, there is in
reality a change in the situation of the employee. Once an FEBTC employee is absorbed, there
are presumably changes in his condition of employment even if his previous tenure and salary
rate is recognized by BPI. It is reasonable to assume that BPI would have different rules and
regulations and company practices than FEBTC and it is incumbent upon the former FEBTC
employees to obey these new rules and adapt to their new environment. Not the least of the
changes in employment condition that the absorbed FEBTC employees must face is the fact
that prior to the merger they were employees of an unorganized establishment and after the
merger they became employees of a unionized company that had an existing collective
bargaining agreement with the certified union. This presupposes that the union who is party
to the collective bargaining agreement is the certified union that has, in the appropriate
certification election, been shown to represent a majority of the members of the bargaining
unit.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Unions; Union Security Clauses; Words and Phrases; The Court
should not uphold an interpretation of the term “new employee” based on the general and
extraneous provisions of the Corporation Code on merger that would defeat, rather than fulfill,
the purpose of the union shop clause—the provision of the Article 248(e) of the Labor Code in
point mandates that nothing in the said Code or any other law should stop the parties from
requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition of
employment.—Justice Brion himself points out that there is no clear, categorical definition of
“new employee” in the CBA. In other words, the term “new employee” as used in the union
shop clause is used broadly without any qualification or distinction. However, the Court
should not uphold an interpretation of the term “new employee” based on the general and
extraneous provisions of the Corporation Code on merger that would defeat, rather than fulfill,
the purpose of the union shop clause. To reiterate, the provision of the Article 248(e) of the
Labor Code in point mandates that nothing in the said Code or any other law should stop the
parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition
of employment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; By law and jurisprudence, a merger only becomes effective upon
approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the articles of merger.—By law
and jurisprudence, a merger only becomes effective upon approval by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) of the articles of merger. In Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals,
291 SCRA 511 (1998), we held: The procedure to be followed is prescribed under the
Corporation Code. Section 79 of said Code requires the approval by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) of the articles of merger which, in turn, must have been duly
approved by a majority of the respective stockholders of the constituent corporations. The
same provision further states that the merger shall be effective only upon the issuance by the
SEC of a certificate of merger. The effectivity date of the merger is crucial for determining when
the merged or absorbed corporation ceases to exist; and when its rights, privileges, properties
as well as liabilities pass on to the surviving corporation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Union Shop Clause; Words and Phrases; In law or even under the
express terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), there is no special class of
employees called “absorbed employees”—in order for the Court to apply or not apply the
Union Shop Clause, it can only classify the employees of the absorbed bank as either “old” or
“new.”—Petitioner limited itself to the argument that its absorbed employees do not fall within
the term “new employees” contemplated under the Union Shop Clause with the apparent
objective of excluding all, and not just some, of the former FEBTC employees from the
application of the Union Shop Clause. However, in law or even under the express terms of the
CBA, there is no special class of employees called “absorbed employees.” In order for the Court
to apply or not apply the Union Shop Clause, we can only classify the former FEBTC employees
as either “old” or “new.” If they are not “old” employees, they are necessarily “new”
employees. If they are new employees, the Union Shop Clause did not distinguish between
new employees who are non-regular at their hiring but who subsequently become regular and
new employees who are “absorbed” as regular and permanent from the beginning of their
employment. The Union Shop Clause did not so distinguish, and so neither must we.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The effect or consequence of BPI’s so-called “absorption” of
former Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) employees should be limited to what they
actually agreed to, i.e. recognition of the FEBTC employees’ years of service, salary rate and
other benefits with their previous employer—the effect should not be stretched so far as to
exempt former FEBTC employees from the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
terms, company policies and rules which apply to employees similarly situated.—We agree
with the Court of Appeals that there are no substantial differences between a newly hired non-
regular employee who was regularized weeks or months after his hiring and a new employee
who was absorbed from another bank as a regular employee pursuant to a merger, for
purposes of applying the Union Shop Clause. Both employees were hired/employed only after
the CBA was signed. At the time they are being required to join the Union, they are both
already regular rank and file employees of BPI. They belong to the same bargaining unit being
represented by the Union. They both enjoy benefits that the Union was able to secure for them
under the CBA. When they both entered the employ of BPI, the CBA and the Union Shop
Clause therein were already in effect and neither of them had the opportunity to express their
preference for unionism or not. We see no cogent reason why the Union Shop Clause should
not be applied equally to these two types of new employees, for they are undeniably similarly
situated. The effect or consequence of BPI’s so-called “absorption” of former FEBTC employees
should be limited to what they actually agreed to, i.e. recognition of the FEBTC employees’
years of service, salary rate and other benefits with their previous employer. The effect should
not be stretched so far as to exempt former FEBTC employees from the existing CBA terms,
company policies and rules which apply to employees similarly situated. If the Union Shop
Clause is valid as to other new regular BPI employees, there is no reason why the same clause
would be a violation of the “absorbed” employees’ freedom of association.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is but fair that similarly situated employees who enjoy the
same privileges of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) should be likewise subject to the
same obligations the CBA imposes upon them—a contrary interpretation of the Union Shop
Clause will be inimical to industrial peace and workers’ solidarity.—It is but fair that similarly
situated employees who enjoy the same privileges of a CBA should be likewise subject to the
same obligations the CBA imposes upon them. A contrary interpretation of the Union Shop
Clause will be inimical to industrial peace and workers’ solidarity. This unfavorable situation
will not be sufficiently addressed by asking the former FEBTC employees to simply pay agency
fees to the Union in lieu of union membership, as the dissent of Justice Carpio suggests. The
fact remains that other new regular employees, to whom the “absorbed employees” should be
compared, do not have the option to simply pay the agency fees and they must join the Union
or face termination.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A certified union whose membership falls below twenty
percent (20%) of the total members of the collective bargaining unit may lose its status as a
legitimate labor organization altogether, even in a situation where there is no competing union,
in which case, an interested party may file for the cancellation of the union’s certificate of
registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations.—Without the union shop clause or with the
restrictive interpretation thereof as proposed in the dissenting opinions, the company can
jeopardize the majority status of the certified union by excluding from union membership all
new regular employees whom the Company will “absorb” in future mergers and all new
regular employees whom the Company hires as regular from the beginning of their
employment without undergoing a probationary period. In this manner, the Company can
increase the number of members of the collective bargaining unit and if this increase is not
accompanied by a corresponding increase in union membership, the certified union may lose
its majority status and render it vulnerable to attack by another union who wishes to represent
the same bargaining unit. Or worse, a certified union whose membership falls below twenty
percent (20%) of the total members of the collective bargaining unit may lose its status as a
legitimate labor organization altogether, even in a situation where there is no competing union.
In such a case, an interested party may file for the cancellation of the union’s certificate of
registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations. Plainly, the restrictive interpretation of the
union shop clause would place the certified union’s very existence at the mercy and control of
the employer. Relevantly, only BPI, the employer appears to be interested in pursuing this case.
The former FEBTC employees have not joined BPI in this appeal.
Same; Labor Unions; Union Security Clauses; Social Justice; The constitutional guarantee given
the right to form unions and the State policy to promote unionism have social justice
considerations.—It is unsurprising that significant provisions on labor protection of the 1987
Constitution are found in Article XIII on Social Justice. The constitutional guarantee given the
right to form unions and the State policy to promote unionism have social justice
considerations. In People’s Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization
v. People’s Industrial and Commercial Corporation, 112 SCRA 440 (1982), we recognized that
“[l]abor, being the weaker in economic power and resources than capital, deserve protection
that is actually substantial and material.”
Same; Same; Same; Right of Association; The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop
clauses in a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), even if they impinge upon the individual
employee’s right or freedom of association, is not to protect the union for the union’s sake—a
strong and effective union presumably benefits all employees in the bargaining unit since such
a union would be in a better position to demand improved benefits and conditions of work
from the employer.—The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in a CBA,
even if they impinge upon the individual employee’s right or freedom of association, is not to
protect the union for the union’s sake. Laws and jurisprudence promote unionism and afford
certain protections to the certified bargaining agent in a unionized company because a strong
and effective union presumably benefits all employees in the bargaining unit since such a
union would be in a better position to demand improved benefits and conditions of work from
the employer. This is the rationale behind the State policy to promote unionism declared in the
Constitution, which was elucidated in the above-cited case of Liberty Flour Mills Employees
v. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc., 180 SCRA 668 (1989).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Hierarchy of Rights; In the hierarchy of constitutional values, this
Court has repeatedly held that the right to abstain from joining a labor organization is
subordinate to the policy of encouraging unionism as an instrument of social justice.—In the
case at bar, since the former FEBTC employees are deemed covered by the Union Shop Clause,
they are required to join the certified bargaining agent, which supposedly has gathered the
support of the majority of workers within the bargaining unit in the appropriate certification
proceeding. Their joining the certified union would, in fact, be in the best interests of the former
FEBTC employees for it unites their interests with the majority of employees in the bargaining
unit. It encourages employee solidarity and affords sufficient protection to the majority status
of the union during the life of the CBA which are the precisely the objectives of union security
clauses, such as the Union Shop Clause involved herein. We are indeed not being called to
balance the interests of individual employees as against the State policy of promoting
unionism, since the employees, who were parties in the court below, no longer contested the
adverse Court of Appeals’ decision. Nonetheless, settled jurisprudence has already swung the
balance in favor of unionism, in recognition that ultimately the individual employee will be
benefited by that policy. In the hierarchy of constitutional values, this Court has repeatedly
held that the right to abstain from joining a labor organization is subordinate to the policy of
encouraging unionism as an instrument of social justice. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI
Employees Union-<br/>Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank, 627 SCRA 590,
G.R. No. 164301 August 10, 2010
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
Bar Integration; Attorneys; Disbarment; Payment of membership dues; Integration of the Bar,
its concept and purpose.—An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer
must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process
by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to hear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for
the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics
or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by
the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of
the offending member. The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by
overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than
constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal
interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers.
Same; Same; Same; Police power; Integration of the Bar is a valid exercise of police power of
the State; Practice of law, nature of.—Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all
legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained
as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not
a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession,
to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State—the administration of justice—as an officer of the court. The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for
the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court
through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression “affected with a public interest” is the
equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police power”.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Supreme Court authorized to adopt rules of court to effect
integration of the Philippine Bar; Purposes of integration of the Bar.—When, therefore.
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 authorizing the Supreme Court to “adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit,” it
did so in the exercise of the paramount-police power of the State. The Act’s avowal is to “raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.” Hence, the Congress in enacting such
Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP
into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted
by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the
demands of pressing public necessity. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and
welfare of the State (U.S. Gomez, Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, “Salus populi
eat suprema lex.” The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life
is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will
fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70, Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to
restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
Same; Same; Same; Practice of law and exercise of the legal profession clothed with public
interest and lawyers must be bound by such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good; Reasons.—Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon
the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common
good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit
himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public
with an interest in his concerns.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Constitutionality and validity of Bar integration
sustained by explicit grant of precise power to the Supreme Court under Art. X of the 1973
Constitution resting the Court with plenary power in all cases regarding admistion to and
supervision of the practice of law.—But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar Integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal
grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines. xxx Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even
without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power “to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law,” it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme
Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the
practice of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Membership dues; Effect of Bar integration upon a lawyer’s freedom
of association; Compelling a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar not violative of the
constitutional freedom to associate but the only compulsion a lawyer is subjected is the
payment of annual dues which is not violation of the Constitution; Compulsion upon a lawyer
if any justified by exercise of police power of the State; Reasons.—The first objection posed by
the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer
is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is no violative of his constitution
freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he
is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member. Bar Integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest
in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the professional in his fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program—the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State.
Same; Same; Same: Same; Same; Provisions of the Court Rule requiring payment of
membership dues by lawyers not violative of the Constitution; The 1973 Constitution does not
prohibit the Supreme Court from requiring lawyers to pay reasonable membership fees;
Nature of membership fees.—The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision
of the Court Rule repairing payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)—which power the respondent acknowledges—
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Enforcement of penalty provisions for non-payment
of membership dues not a deprivation of due process; Reasons; Practice of law in the courts
subject to regulation and inquiry; Practice of law is not property right but mere privilege.—
That respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount
to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is property right, in the sense of its being one
that entitles the holder of a license to practise of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practise a profession, we do not here pause to consider
at length, as it is clear that under the police power of the State, and under necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s right to practise law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if
the power to imposed the fee as regulatory measure is recognized, then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary. But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of
the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court has power
and jurisdiction to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys; Court’s jurisdiction
provided for in the 1973 Constitution.—Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient
to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. The Court’s
jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the
Court the power to “promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . . . . . and the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . . . .” (Article X, Sec. 5[5]) The power to
pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule of Court 139-A and ByLaws of the Integrated Bar
providing for payment of membership dues are neither unconstitutional nor illegal;
Respondent lawyer disbarred and his name striken from the Roll of Attorneys in the Supreme
Court for repeated failure to pay membership dues; Case at bar.—We thus reach the conclusion
that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. x x x It is the unanimous
sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred,
and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. In re Atty.
Marcial Edillon, 84 SCRA 554, AC-1928 August 3, 1978
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION
and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’
UNION, defendant-appellant.
Constitutional law; Construction and integration; There is a presumption of constitutionality
in statutes.—All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a
statute, alleging unconstitutionally, must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that
a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may
be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all
possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency
of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality
of legislation should be adopted.
Same; Right to form or join associations; An employee has the right to join or not join a labor
union.—What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the
“right” to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the
different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a “right”, it can be
safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad
notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby
an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the
employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and
should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join;
and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his
membership with said organization at any time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a
union includes the right to abstain from joining any union.
Same; Same; Labor laws; Unfair labor practice; Right to refrain from joining labor union limited
by the Industrial Peace Act.—The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized
by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to
such right to refrain from joining is withdrawal by operation of law, where a labor union and
an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only
members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members
of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of
the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that
although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer “to discriminate in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization” the employer is, however, not precluded “from
making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees.” By
virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350,
if any person regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his
employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of
said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Exception to closed-shop agreement provided for employees
prohibited by their religion from joining any union.—To that all-embracing coverage of the
closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to
Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: “but such agreement shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any
such labor organization”. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application
and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception
provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to
join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers;
that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union.
Same; Impairment of contracts; Prohibition against impairment of contracts is not absolute.—
It should not be over looked that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not
absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the
constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital
interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or
abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order
to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate pf the legal order. All contracts made
with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must be
understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that power. Otherwise, important
and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the
purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited.
Same; Same; Test for determining whether statute violates the impairment-of-contract
clause.—In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract
obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by
which the validity of each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but
every case must be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the
obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general
good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the
end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved
power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power.
Same; Same; Republic Act 3350 providing for exemption from closed shop agreements does
not violate the impairment-of-contract clause of the constitution.—What then was the purpose
sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief
and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those
members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming
thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are
usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their
dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate. The questioned Act also
provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates of group
strength from which the individual needs protection. The individual employee, at various
times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power—collective labor, directed
by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union, an institution
developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual employee
from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights,
and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management,
it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs
protection—the collective bargaining relationship. It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the
means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose—exempting the members of said religious
sects from coverage of union security agreements—is reasonable.
Same; Same; Religious freedom; Freedom of religion takes precedence over the right against
the impairment of contracts.—It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of
religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must,
therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on
several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion,
enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system. Religious freedom, although not
unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred position in the
hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only
where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to
the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 3350 does not advance or diminish the interest of any
particular religion.—The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in
favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor
organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective
bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and
by’ eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a
serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also
promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed
shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion.
Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit
their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely
incidental and indirect. The “establishment clause” (of religion) does not ban regulation on
conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of
some or all religions. The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require
that religious exercise be preferentially aided.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 3350 does not require religious test for the exercise of civil or
political right—The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act
require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as
a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from
a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such
religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious
objector is not required to do a positive act—to exercise the right to join or to resign from the
union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part.
Same; Equal protection of the law; Republic Act 3350 does not violate the equal protection of
the law clause of the constitution.—We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the
aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and
coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs
and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit
membership in labor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinction. The classification introduced by said Act is also germane
to its purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their
religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work and from being
dismissed from their work because of union shop security agreements.
Same; Social justice; Republic Act 3350 does not violate the concept of social justice contained
in the Constitution.—Appellant’s further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote
the welfare of all the people. Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks
after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the
Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining
whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state
be directly benefited—it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.
Same; Construction and interpretation; Statute is not unconstitutional merely because it is not
proper, necessary or denimble.—Appellant contends that the amendment introduced by
Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for—in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or
desirable. Anent this matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for
that reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the
courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation in
question. Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by
the people, are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of the people, and
it may change the laws accordingly.
Labor law; Labor dispute; Attorney’s fees; Case at bar, labor union liable for attorney’s fees.—
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed, for appellant sought the
discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of
Republic Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of employment is included in the term “labor
dispute”. The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It being the labor
dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in asking the employer to dismiss Appellee
cannot be “an act done x x x in furtherance of an industrial dispute”. The mere fact that
appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are in furtherance of an
industrial dispute. Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as
its shield. The article provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded
“when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff x x x to incur expenses to
protect his interest”; and “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered”. In the instant case, it cannot be
gainsaid that appellant Union’s act in demanding Appellee’s dismissal caused Appellee to
incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job.
Fernando, J.: Concurring
Constitutional law; Religious freedom; Religious freedom stressed.—Religious freedom is
identified with the liberty every individual possesses to worship or not a Supreme Being, and
if a devotee of any sect, to any act in accordance with its creed. This is constitutionally
safeguarded, according to Justice Laurel, that “profession of faith to an active power that binds
and elevates man to his Creator * * *.” The choice of what a man wishes to believe in is his and
his alone. That is a domain left untouched, where intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to which
the law is denied entry, whatever be his thoughts or hopes. In that sphere, what he wills reigns
supreme. The doctrine to which he pays fealty may for some be unsupported by evidence,
devoid of rational foundation. No matter. There is no requirement as to its conformity to what
has found acceptance. It suffices that for him such a concept holds undisputed sway. That is a
recognition of man’s freedom. That for him is one of the ways of self-realization. It would be
to disregard the dignity that attaches to every human being to deprive him of such an attribute.
The “fixed star on our constitutional constellation,” to borrow the felicitous phrase of Justice
Jackson, is that no official, not excluding the highest, has it in his power to prescribe what shall
be orthodox in matters of conscience—or to mundane affairs, for that matter.
Same; Same; Limitations on religious freedom cited.—One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical
when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. There was this qualification
though: “But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established
institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield, and give way to the latter.
The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one
exercising it.”
Same; Same; Republic Act 3350 does not diminish protection to labor.—There is, however, the
question of whether such an exception possesses an implication that lessens the effectiveness
of state efforts to protect labor, likewise, as noted, constitutionally ordained. Such a view, on
the surface, may not be lacking in plausibility, but upon closer analysis, it cannot stand
scrutiny. Thought must be given to the freedom of association, likewise an aspect of intellectual
liberty. For the late Professor Howe, a constitutionalist and in his lifetime the biographer of the
great Holmes, it even partakes of the political theory of pluralistic sovereignty. So great is the
respect for the autonomy accorded voluntary societies. Such a right implies at the very least
that one can determine for himself whether or not he should join or refrain from joining a labor
organization, an institutional device for promoting the welfare of the working man. A closed
shop, on the other hand, is inherently coercive. That is why, as is unmistakably reflected in our
decisions, the latest of which is Guijarno v. Court of Industrial Relations, it is far from being a
favorite of the law. For a statutory provision then to further curtail its operation, is precisely to
follow the dictates of sound public policy. Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59
SCRA 54, No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
ALEXANDER REYES, ALBERTO M. NERA, EDGARDO M. GECA, and 138 others,
petitioners, vs. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, as Officer-in-Charge, Bureau of Labor
Relations, Med-Arbiter PATERNO ADAP, and TRI-UNION EMPLOY-EES UNION, et al.,
respondents.
Labor Law; Words and Phrases; The right to self-organization includes the right not to form or
join a union.—Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to
disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with,
or assist any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor
organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is
self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also,
no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has opted
to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce
such membership.
Same; Same; Same.—The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of
the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to
be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor
organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do
not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union
may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit
in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment. The minority employees—who wish to have a union represent them in collective
bargaining—can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification
election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted,
however, to impose their will on the majority—who do not desire to have a union certified as
the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit—upon the plea that they, the minority
workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. As
repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join or
assist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to form, join or assist any
labor union.
Same; INK employees have the right to participate in a certification election and vote for "No
Union."—That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense
of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as
the fact that when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented
by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-organization, albeit in its
negative aspect. The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote
because they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union"—"but members of the
INK which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor
organization"—and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and
exclusive bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor
jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take
part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is
to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are
members of a labor organization or not,
Same; Failure to take part in previous elections no bar to right to participate in future
elections.—Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote
because they "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the
reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations,"
persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right
to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections. In denying the
petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public respondents
exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the
same. Reyes vs. Trajano, 209 SCRA 484, G.R. No. 84433 June 2, 1992
SPS. EUGENE C. GO and ANGELITA GO, and Minor EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO,
petitioners, vs. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, REV. FR. EDWIN LAO, REV. FR.
JOSE RHOMMEL HERNANDEZ, ALBERT ROSARDA and MA. TERESA SURATOS,
respondents.
Schools; Fraternities and Sororities; Even a cursory perusal of the rest of Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Order No. 20, s. 1991 reveals the education department’s
clear intent to apply the prohibition against fraternity membership for all elementary and high
school students, regardless of their school of enrollment.—Even a cursory perusal of the rest
of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991 reveals the education department’s clear intent to apply the
prohibition against fraternity membership for all elementary and high school students,
regardless of their school of enrollment. The order’s title, “Prohibition of Fraternities and
Sororities in Elementary and Secondary Schools,” serves to clarify whatever ambiguity may
arise from its fourth paragraph. It is a straightforward title. It directs the prohibition to
elementary and secondary schools in general, and does not distinguish between private and
public schools. We also look at the order’s second paragraph, whereby the department faults
an earlier regulation, Department Order No. 6, series of 1954, for failing to ban fraternities and
sororities in public and private secondary schools. With the second paragraph, it is clear that
the education department sought to remedy the earlier order’s failing by way of DECS Order
No. 20, s. 1991.
Same; Same; Manual of Regulations for Private Schools; Every private school shall have the
right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations it may deem necessary and
consistent with the provisions of this Manual for the maintenance of good school discipline
and class attendance.—Even assuming arguendo that the education department had not issued
such prohibition, private schools still have the authority to promulgate and enforce a similar
prohibition pursuant to their right to establish disciplinary rules and regulations. This right
has been recognized in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which has the character
of law. Section 78 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, in particular and with
relevance to this case, provides: Section 78. Authority to Promulgate Disciplinary Rules. Every
private school shall have the right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations it
may deem necessary and consistent with the provisions of this Manual for the maintenance of
good school discipline and class attendance. Such rules and regulations shall be effective as of
promulgation and notification to students in an appropriate school issuance or publication.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court finds Letran’s rule prohibiting its high school students from
joining fraternities to be a reasonable regulation, not only because of the reasons stated in
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Order No. 20, s. 1991, but also because
of the adult-oriented activities often associated with fraternities.—We find Letran’s rule
prohibiting its high school students from joining fraternities to be a reasonable regulation, not
only because of the reasons stated in DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, but also because of the adult-
oriented activities often associated with fraternities. Expectedly, most, if not all, of its high
school students are minors. Besides, Letran’s penalty for violation of the rule is clearly stated
in its enrollment contracts and in the Students Handbooks it distributes at the start of every
school year.
Same; Same; Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings
and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.—In
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, 222 SCRA 644 (1993), the Court held that Guzman
v. National University, 142 SCRA 699 (1986), not Ang Tibay, is the authority on the procedural
rights of students in disciplinary cases. In Guzman, we laid down the minimum standards in
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, as follows: [I]t bears stressing
that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not,
contrary to petitioners’ view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards
which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1)
the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
Administrative Due Process; Jurisprudence has clarified that administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial sense.—Jurisprudence has
clarified that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict
judicial sense. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation. Thus, we are hard pressed to believe that
Kim’s denial of his fraternity membership before formal notice was given worked against his
interest in the disciplinary case. What matters for due process purpose is notice of what is to
be explained, not the form in which the notice is given.
Same; The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.—The raison d’etre of
the written notice rule is to inform the student of the disciplinary charge against him and to
enable him to suitably prepare a defense. The records show that as early as November 23, 2001,
it was already made plain to the petitioners that the subject matter of the case against Kim was
his alleged fraternity membership. Thus, by the time Mr. Rosarda spoke to Kim and asked for
his written explanation in December 2001, Kim has had enough time to prepare his response
to this plain charge. We also note that the information in the notice the respondents
subsequently sent is no different from the information that they had earlier conveyed, albeit
orally, to the petitioners: the simple unadorned statement that Kim stood accused of fraternity
membership. Given these circumstances, we are not convinced that Kim’s right to explain his
side as exercised in his written denial had been violated or diminished. The essence of due
process, it bears repeating, is simply the opportunity to be heard.
Schools; Academic Freedom; The Supreme Court held that when a student commits a serious
breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his
contractual right, and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities.—In
Licup v. San Carlos University, 178 SCRA 637 (1989), the Court held that when a student
commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he
forfeits his contractual right, and the court should not review the discretion of university
authorities. In San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, et al., 197 SCRA 138 (1991), we held
that only when there is marked arbitrariness should the court interfere with the academic
judgment of the school faculty and the proper authorities. In this case, we find that the
respondents observed due process in Kim’s disciplinary case, consistent with our
pronouncements in Guzman. No reason exists why the above principles in these cited cases
cannot apply to this case. The respondents’ decision that Kim had violated a disciplinary rule
and should be sanctioned must be respected. Go vs. Colegio de San Juan de Letran, 683 SCRA
358, G.R. No. 169391 October 10, 2012
SECTION 10
Note.—Unpaid rentals after the lapse of the period agreed upon by the parties in their
compromise agreement constitute another cause of action which may not be demanded and
awarded in the same case where the compromise agreement was approved. (Tambunting vs.
Court of Appeals, 435 SCRA 48 [2004])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 155491. September 16, 2008.*
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented
herein by its Mayor HON. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, and the SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD OF DAVAO CITY, respondents.
Taxation; Public Utilities; Franchises; Republic Act No. 7294; Statutory Construction; The grant
of tax exemption by R.A. No. 7294 is not to be interpreted from a consideration of a single
portion or of isolated words or clauses, but from a general view of the act as a whole.—The “in
lieu of all taxes” clause in Smart’s franchise is put in issue before the Court. In order to ascertain
its meaning, consistent with fundamentals of statutory construction, all the words in the statute also repealed, amended, or modified all other laws, orders, issuances, rules and regulations, or
must be considered. The grant of tax exemption by R.A. No. 7294 is not to be interpreted from parts thereof which are inconsistent with it. In effect, the “in lieu of all taxes” clause in R.A. No.
a consideration of a single portion or of isolated words or clauses, but from a general view of 7294 was rendered ineffective by the advent of the VAT Law.
the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be construed with reference to the context.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The findings of the Bureau of Local Government Finance
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The uncertainty in the “in lieu of all taxes” (BLGF) are not conclusive on the courts.—In support of its argument that the “in lieu of all
clause in R.A. No. 7294 on whether Smart is exempted from both local and national franchise taxes” clause is to be construed as an exemption from local franchise taxes, Smart submits the
tax must be construed strictly against Smart which claims the exemption—in the instant case, opinion of the Department of Finance, through the BLGF, dated August 13, 1998 and February
the “in lieu of all taxes” clause applies only to national internal revenue taxes and not to local 24, 1998, regarding the franchises of Smart and Globe, respectively. Smart presents the same
taxes.—The uncertainty in the “in lieu of all taxes” clause in R.A. No. 7294 on whether Smart arguments as the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company in the previous cases already
is exempted from both local and national franchise tax is construed strictly against Smart who decided by this Court. As previously held by the Court, the findings of the BLGF are not
is claiming the exemption. Smart has the burden of proving that, aside from the imposed 3% conclusive on the courts.
franchise tax, Congress intended it to be exempted from all kinds of franchise taxes—whether
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Tax Exclusion and Tax Exemption; Both in their nature
local or national. However, Smart failed in this regard. Tax exemptions are never presumed
and effect, there is no essential difference between a tax exemption and a tax exclusion—an
and are strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
exclusion is also an immunity or privilege which frees a taxpayer from a charge to which others
They can only be given force when the grant is clear and categorical. The surrender of the
are subjected.—Smart gives another perspective of the “in lieu of all taxes” clause in Section 9
power to tax, when claimed, must be clearly shown by a language that will admit of no
of R.A. No. 7294 in order to avoid the payment of local franchise tax. It says that, viewed from
reasonable construction consistent with the reservation of the power. If the intention of the
another angle, the “in lieu of all taxes” clause partakes of the nature of a tax exclusion and not
legislature is open to doubt, then the intention of the legislature must be resolved in favor of
a tax exemption. A tax exemption means that the taxpayer does not pay any tax at all. Smart
the State. In this case, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Davao. The “in lieu of
pays VAT, income tax, and real property tax. Thus, what it enjoys is more accurately a tax
all taxes” clause applies only to national internal revenue taxes and not to local taxes.
exclusion. However, as previously held by the Court, both in their nature and effect, there is
no essential difference between a tax exemption and a tax exclusion. An exemption is an
immunity or a privilege; it is the freedom from a charge or burden to which others are
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Value-Added Tax; It should be noted that the “in lieu of all
subjected. An exclusion, on the other hand, is the removal of otherwise taxable items from the
taxes” clause in R.A. No. 7294 has become functus officio with the abolition of the franchise tax
reach of taxation, e.g., exclusions from gross income and allowable deductions. An exclusion
on telecommunications companies—the “in lieu of all taxes” clause in R.A. No. 7294 was
is, thus, also an immunity or privilege which frees a taxpayer from a charge to which others
rendered ineffective by the advent of the Value-Added Tax (VAT) Law.—It should be noted
are subjected. Consequently, the rule that a tax exemption should be applied in strictissimi juris
that the “in lieu of all taxes” clause in R.A. No. 7294 has become functus officio with the
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the government applies equally to tax exclusions.
abolition of the franchise tax on telecommunications companies. As admitted by Smart in its
pleadings, it is no longer paying the 3% franchise tax mandated in its franchise. Currently,
Smart along with other telecommunications companies pays the uniform 10% value-added tax.
Same; Same; Same; Public Telecommunications Policy Act (R.A. No. 7925); Most Favored
The VAT on sale of services of telephone franchise grantees is equivalent to 10% of gross
Treatment Clause or Equality Clause; Statutory Construction; The term “exemption” in Section
receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services. R.A. No. 7716, as amended by the
23 of R.A. No. 7925 does not mean tax exemption—it refers to exemption from certain
Expanded Value Added Tax Law (R.A. No. 8241), the pertinent portion of which is hereunder
regulations and requirements imposed by the National Telecommunications Commission.—
quoted, amended Section 9 of R.A. No. 7294: x x x R.A. No. 7716, specifically Section 20 thereof,
We find no reason to disturb the previous pronouncements of this Court regarding the
expressly repealed the provisions of all special laws relative to the rate of franchise taxes. It
interpretation of Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925. As aptly explained in the en banc decision of this
Court in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. City of Davao, 363 SCRA 522
(2001), and recently in Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) v. Province of
Pangasinan, 516 SCRA 541 (2007), Congress, in approving Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, did not
intend it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. The language
of Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925 and the proceedings of both Houses of Congress are bereft of
anything that would signify the grant of tax exemptions to all telecommunications entities,
including those whose exemptions had been withdrawn by R.A. No. 7160. The term
“exemption” in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925 does not mean tax exemption. The term refers to
exemption from certain regulations and requirements imposed by the National
Telecommunications Commission.
Same; Same; Same; Contract Clause; Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to
fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power
is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order—the Contract Clause has never
been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State’s power of taxation save only where a
tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.—Smart’s franchise was granted with
the express condition that it is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal. As held in Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994): It is enough to say that the parties to a contract
cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power
of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as
between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority
to secure the peace and good order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been
thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State’s power of taxation save only where a tax
exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. x x x. Smart Communications, Inc. vs.
The City of Davao, 565 SCRA 237, G.R. No. 155491 September 16, 2008
CITY GOVERNMENT OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA, CITY TREASURER OF SAN PABLO,
LAGUNA, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO V. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City and the MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
respondents.
Taxation; Statutes; Statutory Construction; Section 534 (f) partakes of the nature of a general
repealing clause.—Section 534 (f), the repealing clause of the LGC, provides that all general
and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions
of the Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. This clause partakes of the nature of
a general repealing clause. It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to
designate the specific act or acts identified by number or title, that are intended to be repealed.
Same; Same; Same; Repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed
with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject.—We are mindful of
the established rule that repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be
passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. A general law
cannot be construed to have repealed a special law by mere implication unless the intent to
repeal or alter is manifest and it must be convincingly demonstrated that the two laws are so
clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.
Same; Same; Same; It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.—Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax
exemption privileges. By stating that unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions
or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons whether natural or juridical,
including government-owned or controlled corporations except 1) local water districts, 2)
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, 3) non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code, the obvious import is
to limit the exemptions to the three enumerated entities. It is a basic precept of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In the absence
of any provision of the Code to the contrary, and we find no other provision in point, any
existing tax exemption or incentive enjoyed by MERALCO under existing law was clearly
intended to be withdrawn.
Same; Same; Same; Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., the tax exemptions
or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons are withdrawn
upon the effectivity of the LGC except with respect to those entities expressly enumerated.—
Accordingly in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Marcos, this Court held that
Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., the tax exemptions or incentives
granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons are withdrawn upon the
effectivity of the LGC except with respect to those entities expressly enumerated. In the same
vein, We must hold that the express withdrawal upon effectivity of the LGC of all exemptions
except only as provided therein, can no longer be invoked by MERALCO to disclaim liability
for the local tax. City Government of San Pablo, Laguna vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353, G.R. No.
127708 March 25, 1999
Section 11
SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA, petitioners, vs. THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL TEOXON,
ENGR. LEON PALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN NAVARRO, SR.,
respondents.
Actions; Parties; Pauper Litigants; The rule on pauper litigants was inserted in Rule 141
without revoking or amending Section 21 of Rule 3—on 1 March 2000, there were two existing
rules on pauper litigants.—It can be readily seen that the rule on pauper litigants was inserted
in Rule 141 without revoking or amending Section 21 of Rule 3, which provides for the
exemption of pauper litigants from payment of filing fees. Thus, on March 1, 2000, there were
two existing rules on pauper litigants; namely, Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 18.
Same; Same; Same; Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141,
Section 18 on 1 March 2000 and subsequently amended as Rule 141, Section 19 on 16 August
2003, which is now the present rule) are still valid and enforceable rules on indigent litigants.—
The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate
as indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to apply both Rule
141, Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such applications or should the court apply only Rule
141, Section 16 and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded by Rule 141, Section
16 on Legal Fees. The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later
amended as Rule 141, Section 18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently amended by Rule 141,
Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which is now the present rule) are still valid and enforceable
rules on indigent litigants.
Same; Same; Same; The fact that Section 22 which became Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigant
was retained in the rules of procedure, even elaborating on the meaning of an indigent party,
and was also strengthened by the addition of the third paragraph on the right to contest the
grant of authority to litigate only goes to show that there was no intent at all to consider said
rule as expunged from the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.—The history of the two seemingly
conflicting rules readily reveals that it was not the intent of the Court to consider the old Section
22 of Rule 3, which took effect on January 1, 1994 to have been amended and superseded by
Rule 141, Section 16, which took effect on July 19, 1984 through A.M. No. 83-6-389-0. If that is
the case, then the Supreme Court, upon the recommendation of the Committee on the Revision
on Rules, could have already deleted Section 22 from Rule 3 when it amended Rules 1 to 71
and approved the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. The fact that
Section 22 which became Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigant was retained in the rules of
procedure, even elaborating on the meaning of an indigent party, and was also strengthened
by the addition of a third paragraph on the right to contest the grant of authority to litigate
only goes to show that there was no intent at all to consider said rule as expunged from the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent litigants was amended twice:
first on March 1, 2000 and the second on August 16, 2004; and yet, despite these two
amendments, there was no attempt to delete Section 21 from said Rule 3. This clearly evinces
the desire of the Court to maintain the two (2) rules on indigent litigants to cover applications
to litigate as an indigent litigant.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Implied repeals are frowned upon unless the intent
of the framers of the rules is unequivocal—instead of declaring Rule 3, Section 21 has been
superseded and impliedly amended by Section 18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court
finds that the two rules can and should be harmonized.—It may be argued that Rule 3, Section
21 has been impliedly repealed by the recent 2000 and 2004 amendments to Rule 141 on legal
fees. This position is bereft of merit. Implied repeals are frowned upon unless the intent of the
framers of the rules is unequivocal. It has been consistently ruled that: (r)epeals by implication
are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended.
As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing
ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute[,] it was not
intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to same matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and
flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject
matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed.
Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction
they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. (Emphasis
supplied). Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly
amended by Section 18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can
and should be harmonized. The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section
19 because it is a settled principle that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all
efforts must be made to harmonize them. Hence, “every statute [or rule] must be so construed
and harmonized with other statutes [or rules] as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.”
Same; Same; Same; If the trial court finds that the application meets the income and property
requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the
grant is a matter of right, but if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been
met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that he has “no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family.”— The two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible with each other. When an
application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and
supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with
the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141—that is,
the applicant’s gross income and that of the applicant’s immediate family do not exceed an
amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own
real property with a fair market value of more than Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP
300,000.00). If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property
requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the
grant is a matter of right. However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have
not been met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant
has “no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for
himself and his family.” In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence
to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the
application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides
that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such authority at any time before
judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not
obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the
party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper
docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is
not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed
fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
Same; Same; Same; The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards
while Rule 3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption.—
The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule 3, Section
21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption. Knowing that the
litigants may abuse the grant of authority, the trial court must use sound discretion and
scrutinize evidence strictly in granting exemptions, aware that the applicant has not hurdled
the precise standards under Rule 141. The trial court must also guard against abuse and misuse
of the privilege to litigate as an indigent litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which
would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee requirement.
Same; Same; Same; Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and
secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged, and
the marginalized.—Access to justice by the impoverished is held sacrosanct under Article III,
Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. The Action Program for Judicial Reforms (APJR) itself,
initiated by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., placed prime importance on ‘easy access
to justice by the poor’ as one of its six major components. Likewise, the judicial philosophy of
Liberty and Prosperity of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban makes it imperative that the
courts shall not only safeguard but also enhance the rights of individuals—which are
considered sacred under the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt, one of the most precious rights
which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the
poor, the underprivileged, and the marginalized. Algura vs. The Local Government Unit of the
City of Naga, 506 SCRA 81, G.R. No. 150135 October 30, 2006
SECTION 12
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBELYN CABANADA y
ROSAURO, accused-appellant.
Constitutional Law; Miranda Doctrine; The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person
under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will
be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being
questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford
an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.—The Miranda
doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain
silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the
right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being
Same; Same; In People v. Javar, 226 SCRA 103 (1993), it was ruled that any statement obtained
questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any
in violation of the constitutional provision, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
questioning if he so desires. The said rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.—In People v. Javar, 226 SCRA 103 (1993), it was ruled
coercion by the State as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him
that any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision, whether exculpatory
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession
contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes
inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
Same; Custodial Investigation; Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
given. Cabanada’s confession without counsel at the police station, which led to the recovery
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and
of the other items at her house, is inadmissible. Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of Cabanada’s
the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect’s participation therein and which tend
admission made in CIU does not necessarily entitle her to a verdict of acquittal. Her admission
to elicit an admission.—The “investigation” in Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Bill of Rights
during the general inquiry is still admissible.
pertains to “custodial investigation.” Custodial investigation commences when a person is
taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under
investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect’s participation
Criminal Law; Qualified Theft; Elements of.—The elements of Qualified Theft committed with
therein and which tend to elicit an admission.
grave abuse of confidence are as follows: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the said
property belongs to another; 3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be
done without the owner’s consent; 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or
Same; Same; Miranda Doctrine; Republic Act (RA) No. 7438 reinforced the constitutional
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; 6. That it be done with grave abuse of
mandate and expanded the definition of custodial investigation. This means that even those
confidence.
who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights.—
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7438 reinforced the constitutional mandate and expanded the
definition of custodial investigation. This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered
Same; Same; Intent to Gain; Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed
before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. The same pressures of a
from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is
custodial setting exist in this scenario. A portion of Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 reads: SEC. 2.
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.—The fact that the money was
Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public
taken without authority and consent of Victor and Catherine, and that the taking was
Officers.— x x x x As used in this Act, “custodial investigation” shall include the practice of
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor force upon
issuing an “invitation” to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
things, were also proven during the trial. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the “inviting” officer for any
that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation.
violation of law. Applying the foregoing, Cabanada was not under custodial investigation
Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The taking was
when she made the confession, without counsel, to PO2 Cotoner that she took the missing
also clearly done with grave abuse of confidence. Cabanada was working as a housemaid of
P20,000.00. The prosecution established that the confession was elicited during the initial
the Victoria family since 2002.
interview of the police after Catherine called to report the missing money and personal effects.
The investigation was still a general inquiry of the crime and has not focused on a particular
suspect. Also, she admitted to the crime while at the residence of her employer, thus, she was
not yet taken into custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom. Same; Same; Penalties; Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that Qualified
Theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two (2) degrees than those respectively
specified in Article 309 of the RPC.—A modification is called for as regards the imposable
penalty. Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code provides that Qualified Theft “shall be punished
by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article,” while Article 309 of the RPC states: Art. 309. Penalties.—Any person guilty
of theft shall be punished by: 1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor
or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. People vs. Cabanada, 831 SCRA 485, G.R. No. 221424
July 19, 2017
BERNARDO U. MESINA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Malversation of Public Funds; The crime of malversation of public funds
charged herein is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended.—The crime of malversation of public funds charged herein is defined and penalized
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as follows: Article 217. Malversation
of public funds or property. — Presumption of malversation.—Any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property shall suffer: x x x x 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-
two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall
also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. The failure of a
public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by R.A. No. 1060)
Same; Same; Elements of Malversation of Public Funds.—The crime of malversation of public
funds has the following elements, to wit: (a) that the offender is a public officer; (b) that he had
the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that the
funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.
Same; Same; Conformably with Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the failure of the
petitioner to have the patubig collection duly forthcoming upon demand by the duly
authorized officer was prima facie evidence that he had put such missing fund to personal
use.—As to the fourth element of misappropriation, the petitioner did not rebut the
presumption that he had misappropriated the patubig collection to his personal use. He had
earlier feigned ignorance of having received the patubig collection when he phoned Ms. Baclit
to tell her that he did not receive the collection. He still insisted that he had not received the
sum from Ms. Baclit when the City Treasurer summoned them both. His denial continued until
the next day when City Mayor Malonzo himself asked them both about the matter. Only after
the petitioner’s vault was finally opened did he declare that the collection was intact inside his
vault. Even then, the actual amount found therein was short by P37,876.98. Conformably with
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, supra, the failure of the petitioner to have the patubig
collection duly forthcoming upon demand by the duly authorized officer was prima facie
evidence that he had put such missing fund to personal use. Although the showing was merely
prima facie, and, therefore, rebuttable, he did not rebut it, considering that he not only did not
account for the collection upon demand but even steadfastly denied having received it up to
the time of the inspection of the sealed vault. Under the circumstances, he was guilty of the
misappropriation of the collection.
Same; Same; All that is necessary for a conviction is sufficient proof that the accused
accountable officer had received public funds or property, and did not have them in his
possession when demand therefor was made without any satisfactory explanation of his failure
to have them upon demand.—Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence.
The dolo or the culpa is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode
charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is still committed;
hence, a conviction is proper. All that is necessary for a conviction is sufficient proof that the
accused accountable officer had received public funds or property, and did not have them in
his possession when demand therefor was made without any satisfactory explanation of his
failure to have them upon demand. For this purpose, direct evidence of the personal
misappropriation by the accused is unnecessary as long as he cannot satisfactorily explain the
inability to produce or any shortage in his accounts. Accordingly, with the evidence adduced
by the State being entirely incompatible with the petitioner’s claim of innocence, we uphold
the CA’s affirmance of the conviction, for, indeed, the proof of his guilt was beyond reasonable
doubt.
Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigation; According to People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565
(1994), custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant manner.—According to People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994), custodial
investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person
is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
The safeguards during custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into a still unsolved crime, and the interrogation is then focused
on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory questions that tend to elicit incriminating statements.
Same; Same; What was conducted was not an investigation that already focused on the
petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry into the missing city funds. Besides, he
was not as of then in the custody of the police or other law enforcement office.—Contrary to
the petitioner’s claim, the fact that he was one of those being investigated did not by itself
define the nature of the investigation as custodial. For him, the investigation was still a general
inquiry to ascertain the whereabouts of the missing patubig collection. By its nature, the
inquiry had to involve persons who had direct supervision over the issue, including the City
Treasurer, the City Auditor, the representative from different concerned offices, and even the
City Mayor. What was conducted was not an investigation that already focused on the
petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry into the missing city funds. Besides, he
was not as of then in the custody of the police or other law enforcement office.
Criminal Law; Malversation of Public Funds; Civil Liability; Under the law, the civil liability
of the petitioner may involve restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification
for consequential damages.—Under the law, the civil liability of the petitioner may involve
restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.
Given that his obligation requires the payment of the amount misappropriated to the City of
Caloocan, the indemnification for damages is through legal interest of 6% per annum on the
amount malversed, reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment. Mesina vs.
People, 758 SCRA 639, G.R. No. 162489 June 17, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and PRECIOSA
GOMEZ y CAMPOS, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Illegal Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; The
illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.—It is settled that [a]ny objection to the
procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived. As we held in People v. Samson, 244 SCRA 146 (1995): [A]ppellant is now
estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the
quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to
his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court
by entering a plea of “not guilty” and by participating in the trial. At any rate, the illegal arrest
of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless
arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record
point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest
after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had
commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against
her.
Criminal Law; Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; Elements of.—The elements of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in
any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must
be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is committed
by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained
is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and
illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is also of
no moment and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present.
Same; Kidnapping; For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from
going home.—It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing
a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any
manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.
Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of
the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Out-of-Court Identification; Totality of Circumstances
Test; In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.—In People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995), the Court explained
the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such
identifications in this manner: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various
ways. It is done thru show ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness
for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a
group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on
out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test
where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Applying the totality-
of-circumstances test, we find Edward’s out-of-court identification to be reliable and thus
admissible. To recall, when the three individuals entered Edward’s office, they initially
pretended to be customers, and even asked about the products that were for sale. The three
had told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino “pulled out a gun” instead. After
Pepino’s companion had taken the money from the cashier’s box, the malefactors handcuffed
Edward and forced him to go down to the parked car. From this sequence of events, there was
thus ample opportunity for Edward — before and after the gun had been pointed at him — to
view the faces of the three persons who entered his office. In addition, Edward stated that
Pepino had talked to him “[a]t least once a day” during the four days that he was detained.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence
is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was
committed.—Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to
strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was
committed. As the Court held in People v. Esoy, 617 SCRA 552 (2010): It is known that the most
natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator
and to observe the manner in which the offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the
assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily
erased from a witness’s memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts
of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree
of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time. While this pronouncement should be
applied with great caution, there is no compelling circumstance in this case that would warrant
its non-application.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Custodial Investigations; Police Lineups; Right to Counsel;
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as
a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule, a police lineup is not
part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot yet be invoked at this stage.—The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is
intended to preclude the slightest coercion that would lead the accused to admit something
false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the accused. Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. As
a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by
counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused
during identification in a police lineup.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by
direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged
conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design
or purpose.—Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and
after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. Proof of the
agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement may be inferred from the
conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons
met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
Same; Penalties; Death Penalty; With the passage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, entitled “An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines” (signed into law on June
24, 2006), the death penalty may no longer be imposed. The Supreme Court (SC) sentenced
Gomez to the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No.
15-08-02-SC.—Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition of
the death penalty when the kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person. Ransom, as employed in the law, is so used in its
common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment
that releases one from captivity. In the present case, the malefactors not only demanded but
received ransom for Edward’s release. The CA thus correctly affirmed the RTC’s imposition of
the death penalty on Pepino and Gomez. With the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled
“An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines” (signed into law on
June 24, 2006), the death penalty may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence Gomez to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.
The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is more
favorable to him.
Same; Kidnapping for Ransom; Civil Indemnity; Moral Damages; Exemplary Damages; In the
case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Supreme
Court (SC) set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of
the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, as follows: (1)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed
to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an
example for the public good.—In the case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also for
kidnapping for ransom), the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts
warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346,
as follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the
victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts shall earn interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Court’s Resolution until fully
paid.
LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; View that premature media exposure of suspected
criminals affects the integrity of the identification made by a witness.—Premature media
exposure of suspected criminals affects the integrity of the identification made by a witness.
Law enforcers fail to prevent undue influence and suggestion when they present suspects to
the media before the actual identification by a witness. An irregular out-of-court identification
taints any subsequent identification made in court.
Same; Same; Same; Out-of-Court Identification; View that there are two (2) modes of out-of-
court identifications. One (1) mode of out-of-court identification is the police lineup where the
witness selects a “suspect from a group of persons lined up[.]” Another mode of identification
is the show up. In show ups, only one person is presented to the witness or victim for
identification.—There are two modes of out-of-court identifications. One mode of out-of-court
identification is the police lineup where the witness selects a “suspect from a group of persons
lined up[.]” Another mode of identification is the show up. In show ups, only one person is
presented to the witness or victim for identification. Show ups are less preferred and are
considered “an underhanded mode of identification for ‘being pointedly suggestive,
generat[ing] confidence where there was none, activat[ing] visual imagination, and, all told,
subvert[ing]” the reliability of the eyewitness. Both the lineup and the show up are referred to
as corporeal identification: the body of the suspect is there for identification. Out-of--court
identifications are not limited to corporeal identifications. Police can use photographs or mug
shots to identify the perpetrator.
Same; Same; Same; View that eyewitness identification is affected by “normal human
fallibilities and suggestive influences.”—Eyewitness identification is affected by “normal
human fallibilities and suggestive influences.” Courts use the totality of circumstances test to
ensure the reliability of any of the modes of out-of-court identification. The test was originally
used in the United States but was introduced in this jurisdiction in the 1995 case of People v.
Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54. In determining the validity of the out-of-court identification, the
following factors are considered: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time
of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Same; Same; Same; View that advances in cognitive psychology and studies on eyewitness
testimonies show that the degree of a witness’ attentiveness in perceiving an event is
influenced by various factors, including exposure time, frequency of exposure, level of violence
of the event, the witness’ stress levels and expectations, and the witness’ activity during the
crime.—Advances in cognitive psychology and studies on eyewitness testimonies show that
the degree of a witness’ attentiveness in perceiving an event is influenced by various factors,
including exposure time, frequency of exposure, level of violence of the event, the witness’
stress levels and expectations, and the witness’ activity during the crime. The level of violence
of the event tends to influence the witness’ stress levels. One area of continuous psychological
research is the effect of the presence of a weapon on the attention of an individual to an
incident. Since the 1970s, psychologists hypothesized that the presence of a weapon captures a
witness’ attention and reduces the witness’ ability to pay attention to peripheral details (such
as the facial features of the individuals brandishing the weapon). The research model often
involves two groups: a group that witnesses an incident where a gun is used, and another
group that sees the same incident but with no weapon used (usually a pencil or syringe is used
in lieu of a gun). Both groups are asked to identify the perpetrator in a lineup. Results would
show that the presence of a weapon makes a statistically significant difference in the accuracy
of eyewitness identification.
Same; Same; Same; View that a witness who is certain about seeing the crime but uncertain
about the facial features of its perpetrators may sound certain about both the crime and the
identity of the perpetrator during trial.—Certainty of the witness is often tested during cross-
examination. Thus, in many cases, this court finds a witness credible because of a straight and
candid recollection of the incident that remains unhampered by the rigors of cross-
examination. However, this circumstance should never be evaluated in a vacuum. A witness
who is certain about seeing the crime but uncertain about the facial features of its perpetrators
may sound certain about both the crime and the identity of the perpetrator during trial. This is
because by the time a witness takes the witness stand, he or she has already narrated the
incident to the police, the public prosecutor and, at times, private prosecutors and members of
the press. He or she becomes “certain” not because of the ability to perceive at the time of the
incident, but because he or she has become an experienced storyteller of the narrative and has
already confronted questions that may arise during cross-examination with rehearsed answers.
The ability of the witness to consistently identify the perpetrator throughout trial does not
necessarily mean that he or she correctly identified the perpetrator at the start of the
investigation.
Same; Same; Same; View that information acquired by the witness after the incident can
reconstruct the way the witness recalls the event.—Memory is not affected only by the mere
passage of time. It is also affected by the interactions of the witness with other individuals
relating to the event. Information acquired by the witness after the incident can reconstruct the
way the witness recalls the event. According to Elizabeth F. Loftus, a cognitive psychologist,
“[p]ost[-]event information can not only enhance existing memories but also change a witness’s
memory and even cause nonexistent details to become incorporated into a previously acquired
memory.”
Same; Same; Same; View that when the suggestiveness is principally due to a premature media
presentation of the accused coupled with the accusation by law enforcers, it is reasonable to
assume that the subsequent identification is already tainted.—Generally, suggestiveness in the
identification procedure should always be proven by evidence. If an allegation of
suggestiveness is not proven, this court often affirms the conviction. In People v. Pavillare, 329
SCRA 684 (2000), this court ruled that the appellant who argued the impropriety of the police
lineup should have presented during trial the police officers who conducted the lineup.
However, when the suggestiveness is principally due to a premature media presentation of the
accused coupled with the accusation by law enforcers, it is reasonable to assume that the
subsequent identification is already tainted.
Same; Same; Same; Out-of-Court-Identifications; View that irregularities in out-of-court
identifications are cured through in-court identifications.—This court have also held that
irregularities in out-of-court identifications are cured through in-court identifications. In
People v. Macam, 238 SCRA 306 (1994), despite finding the illegality of the lineup, this court
stated that since the appellants did not object during trial, the prosecution did not need to show
that the in-court identification was made independently from the invalid lineup.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Police Lineups; View that for a lineup to be truly fair, it should be
composed of individuals — including the suspect — who fit the description of the perpetrator
as provided by a witness.—Law enforcement agents must conduct their investigation properly
to avoid instances when the lineup bears doubtful validity due to the presence, of suggestive
influences. For a lineup to be truly fair, it should be composed of individuals — including the
suspect — who fit the description of the perpetrator as provided by a witness. If there is a high
probability that a random individual merely relies on the prior description of the eyewitness
to select a suspect from a lineup, this lineup is not fair. A lineup is only balanced if, in a lineup
of six individuals, the probability that the random individual identifies the suspect is not more
than 1/6.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that if there is more than one (1) suspect, they should be
subjected to separate lineups composed of different individuals in order to reduce
suggestiveness.—If there is more than one suspect, they should be subjected to separate lineups
composed of different individuals in order to reduce suggestiveness. If the police officers can
conduct only one lineup, members of the lineup must have decoys of the same race or color,
age range, gender expression, build, and appearance of the different suspects. The general rule
is that it should not be easy for the witness to single out a suspect.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the habit of presenting the accused to the media
immediately after arrest poses an equal threat to the personal liberty — which is protected by
our Constitution — of an individual who may be accused of committing a crime that he or she
did not do.—Prevalence of kidnapping instills fear among citizens, a type of fear that makes
citizens curtail their own personal liberties to provide for their own security. However, the
habit of presenting the accused to the media immediately after arrest poses an equal threat to
the personal liberty — which is protected by our Constitution — of an individual who may be
accused of committing a crime that he or she did not do. Police officers should improve their
standards and protocols in order to improve the proper prosecution of those accused of
committing deplorable crimes like kidnapping, as well as to balance the interests of victims
and of the accused. People vs. Pepino, 779 SCRA 170, G.R. No. 174471 January 12, 2016
SECTION 13.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of Innocence; In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.—In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by
the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after
trial to impose any punishment on the accused.
Same; Same; Bail; The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the trial court.—It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to
prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The
amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required,
but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts
as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional
liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence
at trial.
Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.—A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be
punished with death. The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of
any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt
is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights,
and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be
recognized.
Same; Same; Same; All criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.—All criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are
bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of
right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.
Same; Same; Same; The granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present.—The granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed
a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows: (a) That he is a
recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he
committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the
circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there
is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Same; Same; Same; For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.—For
purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong
in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in
Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 241 SCRA 84 (1995), “such discretion may be exercised only after
the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or
not he should be granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be
allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has
been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is
expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997).—In
resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply
with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997), to wit: 1. In all cases,
whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra) 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.
Same; Same; Same; This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well
as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2)
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.—This national
commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances. In our view, his social and political standing and
his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate
that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore
that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect
for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was
not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted
bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for
his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
Same; Same; Same; Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.—Bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial.
LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; View that bail is not a matter of right in cases
where the crime charged is plunder and the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.—This
Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The action of the Sandiganbayan in denying the
Motion to Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the crime charged is
plunder and the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. Neither was there grave abuse of
discretion by the Sandiganbayan when it failed to release accused on bail for medical or
humanitarian reasons. His release for medical and humanitarian reasons was not the basis for
his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail filed before the Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his
prayer for the grant of bail in this Petition on his medical condition.
Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special
accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan
or in the pleadings filed before the Supreme Court (SC).—The grant of bail, therefore, by the
majority is a special accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a ground never raised before
the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed before this court. The Sandiganbayan should not
be faulted for not shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is not the duty of an impartial
court to find what it deems a better argument for the accused at the expense of the prosecution
and the people they represent.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently
provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution.—The
majority’s opinion — other than the invocation of a general human rights principle — does not
provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. Bail for humanitarian
considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or
provision of the Constitution. This case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism of
granting a privilege ad hoc: only for one person — petitioner in this case.
Same; Same; Same; View that the mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of
bail when it is a matter of right. On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an
accused is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
only to fix the amount of bail but fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong.—The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail when it is a matter
of right. On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is charged with
a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of
bail but fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Same; Same; Same; View that petitioner did not ask that bail be granted because of his medical
condition or for humanitarian reasons; Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioner’s grant
of bail.—The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it failed to release
petitioner on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be
granted because of his medical condition or for humanitarian reasons. Neither petitioner nor
the prosecution as respondent developed their arguments on this point at the Sandiganbayan
or in this court to establish the legal and factual basis for this special kind of bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioner’s grant of bail.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Dissenting Opinions; The Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court (SC) allows one (1) week for the submission of a dissenting opinion.—The
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the submission of a dissenting
opinion. Thus, in Rule 13, Section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC: SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or
concurring opinion.—A Member who disagrees with the majority opinion, its conclusions, and
the disposition of the case may submit to the Chief Justice or Division Chairperson a dissenting
opinion, setting forth the reason or reasons for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the
result of the case, but based on different reason or reasons may submit a separate opinion; a
concurrence “in the result” should state the reason for the qualified concurrence. A Member
who agrees with the main opinion, but opts to express other reasons for concurrence may
submit a concurring opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring opinion must be
submitted within one week from the date the writer of the majority opinion presents the
decision for the signature of the Members. (Emphasis supplied) But this member endeavored
to complete his draft incorporating the ideas and suggestions of other dissenting justices within
two days from the circulation of the majority opinion.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; View that nowhere in the rules of procedure do
we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor’s certification.—In essence, the
majority now insists on granting bail merely on the basis of the certification in a Manifestation
and Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr. Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that
petitioner is suffering from numerous debilitating conditions. This certification was submitted
as an annex to a Manifestation before this court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of
flight of the accused not for the purposes of asking for bail due to such ailments. Nowhere in
the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor’s
certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away with
cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales’ findings on petitioner’s health in a
hearing whose main purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative detention is
possible.
Same; Same; Same; View that assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are relevant
issues for bail, the prosecution is now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence
that may rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical documents presented by
petitioner in this Court. Due process requires that we remand this matter for a bail hearing to
verify Dr. Gonzales’ findings and to ensure that that is still the condition that prevails at
present.—Petitioner’s medical ailments are not matters that are of public knowledge or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration. His illness is not a matter of general notoriety.
Assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is
now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may rebut the findings of Dr.
Gonzales or any other medical documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process
requires that we remand this matter for a bail hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales’ findings and to
ensure that that is still the condition that prevails at present. That we make factual
determinations ourselves to grant provisional liberty to one who is obviously politically
privileged without the benefit of the presentation of evidence by both the prosecution and the
accused, without the prosecution being granted the opportunity to cross-examine the evidence,
and without consideration of any rebutting evidence that may have been presented should a
hearing be held, casts serious doubt on our neutrality and objectivity.
Same; Same; Same; View that the majority has not set specific bases for finding that the medical
condition of petitioner entitles him to treatment different from all those who are now under
detention and undergoing trial for plunder.—It is unclear whether this privilege would apply
to all those who have similar conditions and are also undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear
whether petitioner’s incarceration aggravates his medical conditions or if his medical
conditions are simply conditions which come with advanced age. The majority has not set
specific bases for finding that the medical condition of petitioner entitles him to treatment
different from all those who are now under detention and undergoing trial for plunder. There
is no showing as to how grave his conditions are in relation to the facilities that are made
available to him. There is also no showing as to whether any of his medical ailments is actually
aggravating in spite of the best care available. If his health is deteriorating, there is no showing
that it is his detention that is the most significant factor or cause for such deterioration. Usually,
when there is a medical emergency that would make detention in the hospital necessary, courts
do not grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for the accused’s detention. There is now
no clarity as to when special bail based on medical conditions and modified arrest should be
imposed.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons.—Bail is
not a matter of right merely for medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald, 505 SCRA 573 (2006):
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside
the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now
is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also be an existing
proposition for the “selective decarceration of older prisoners” based on findings that
recidivism rates decrease as age increases.
Same; Same; Same; View that before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and
this dissent has dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that
he would report immediately for work. This strongly indicates that the majority’s inference as
to the existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may have been too speculative or
premature.—Before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this dissent has
dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he would
report immediately for work. This strongly indicates that the majority’s inference as to the
existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may have been too speculative or premature.
Significantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then can be
cancelled motu propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that motion to
cancel bail should be filed before the Sandiganbayan or before this court.
Same; Same; Same; View that the crime charged in petitioner’s case is one where the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be
granted after granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is strong.
The special grant of bail, due to medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and
exceptional.—The crime charged in petitioner’s case is one where the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be granted after
granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The special
grant of bail, due to medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional. To allow
petitioner to go about his other duties would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of the provisions
of the Constitution and our rules. In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of
provisional liberty on the basis of humanitarian considerations extends even after the medical
emergency has passed. Again, a case of a decision especially tailored for petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; View that the more prudent course of action would have been for the
Sandiganbayan, not the Supreme Court (SC), to exercise its discretion in setting the amount of
bail.—There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of P1,000,000.00 as the amount for
bail. The original proposal of the member in charge was P100,000.00. This was increased to
P500,000.00 in its revised proposal circulated on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of
one member who voted with the majority, it was then increased to P1,000,000.00. The rules
guide courts on what to consider when setting the amount of bail. The majority opinion is
sparse on the evidence it considers for setting this particular amount. Again, the Enrile vs.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division more prudent course of action would have been for the
Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in setting the amount of bail.
Same; Same; Same; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; View that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion, is a general declaration to
uphold the value and dignity of every person. It does not prohibit the arrest of any accused
based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of any person accused of crimes.—
There are no specific and binding international law provisions that compel this court to release
petitioner given his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied
upon in the majority opinion, is a general declaration to uphold the value and dignity of every
person. It does not prohibit the arrest of any accused based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit
the detention of any person accused of crimes. It only implies that any arrest or detention must
be carried out in a dignified and humane manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that even the Supreme Court (SC) in Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470 (2007), was wary to grant bail
without evidence presented that the accused was not a flight risk.—In any case, even this court
in Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470
(2007), was wary to grant bail without evidence presented that the accused was not a flight
risk. For this reason, it remanded the case to the trial court instead of applying the provisions
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and categorically stating that based on these
principles alone, the accused was entitled to bail. It is true that the Constitution is replete with
provisions on both the respect for human dignity and the protection of human rights. These
rights are applicable to those who, during the dark days of Martial Law, were illegally
detained, tortured, and even involuntarily disappeared. There is, of course, no reason for these
rights and the invocation of human dignity not to be applicable to Senators of our Republic.
Same; Same; Same; View that suspending the applicability of clear legal provisions upon the
invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of
how these provisions violate specific binding human rights norms.—The mere invocation of
the broadest concept of human rights is not shibboleth. It should not be cause for us to be
nonchalant about the existence of other constitutional and statutory provisions and the norms
in our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human rights does not mean that the Rule of
Law is suspended. It is not a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result that we want. Rather,
human rights are best entrenched with the Rule of Law. Suspending the applicability of clear
legal provisions upon the invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more conscious
and rigorous analysis of how these provisions violate specific binding human rights norms.
Same; Same; Same; View that those that read a decision which does not fully respond to the
legal issues outlined in this dissent may be tempted to conclude that the decision is the result
of obvious political accommodation rather than a judicious consideration of the facts and the
law.—Those that read a decision which does not fully respond to the legal issues outlined in
this dissent may be tempted to conclude that the decision is the result of obvious political
accommodation rather than a judicious consideration of the facts and the law. This case may
benefit one powerful public official at the cost of weakening our legal institutions. If it is pro
hac vice, then it amounts to selective justice. If it is meant to apply in a blanket manner for all
other detainees, then it will weaken the administration of justice because the judicial standards
are not clear.
Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous
text of the Constitution.—The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous
text of the Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we have our own opinions on or
predilections for how the balance of fundamental rights, liberties, and obligations should be.
It may be that, as citizens, such opinions are founded on our wealth of knowledge and
experience. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 767 SCRA 282, G.R. No. 213847 August
18, 2015
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented
by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR.
and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, respondents.
International Law; Extradition; Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this
jurisdiction.—Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of
whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
Same; Same; Bail; Human Rights; The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.—At first glance,
the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot
ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global
recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern
trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person
and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may
properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the
subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II
resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently,
under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show
that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; While on a treaty, the principles contained in the said
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are now recognized as customarily binding upon the
members of the international community; Fundamental among the rights enshrined in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are the rights of every person to life,
liberty, and due process.—On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international
organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December
10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person
were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus,
in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951), this Court, in granting bail to a prospective
deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part
of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental
among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due
process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While this Court in Government of the United States of
America v. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623 (2002), limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this
Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.—The Philippines, along with the other members of the
family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that
those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of
the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties
giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases—clearly, the right of a
prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights.—In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951) and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration, 90 Phil. 256 A(1951), this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no
formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order
of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration
of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation
cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there
is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the
right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light
of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign
power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime
within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to
the demanding state.—Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) defines “extradition” as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or
the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting
state or government.” Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power,
created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its
territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal,
an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,
even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence
wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted
of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by
the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and
(b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the machinery of criminal
law”—obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process.—But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the
machinery of criminal law.” This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) which mandates the “immediate arrest and temporary detention of the
accused” if such “will best serve the interest of justice.” We further note that Section 20 allows
the requesting state “in case of urgency” to ask for the “provisional arrest of the accused,
pending receipt of the request for extradition”; and that release from provisional arrest “shall
not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently.” Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears
all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a
prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but
the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; By any standard, detention for an extended period of more than two
(2) years is a serious deprivation of a potential extraditee’s fundamental right to liberty; While
our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.—Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to
bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted
of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation
of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which
prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide
Same; Same; Same; Same; Standard of Proof; An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the
for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in
civil cases—the potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing proof” that he is not
a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.—An
Same; Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The applicable standard of due process, however,
extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings—in the latter, the standard of due
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of
process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused, in the former, the
proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the
assumption is that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice; The prospective extraditee thus
standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
bail.—The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption
of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise
that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing
of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the
evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard
“temporary detention” is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this
risk and should be granted bail.
case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a
flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; While the time-honored principle of pacta sunt
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470, G.R.
servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty, it
No. 153675 April 19, 2007
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process; An extraditee should
not be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
JANET LIM NAPOLES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION),
satisfactorily met.—The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
respondent.
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in
our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Since this is a petition for certiorari under Rule
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, 65 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) review is limited to whether the
not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, issuing its assailed Resolutions denying Napoles’ application for bail.—Preliminarily, it should
provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. be emphasized that since this is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
this Court’s review is limited to whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Resolutions denying Napoles’
application for bail. The Court’s certiorari jurisdiction covers only errors of jurisdiction on the
part of the Sandiganbayan. It should be borne in mind that not every error in the proceedings,
or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Errors in
the appreciation of the parties’ evidence, including the conclusions anchored on these findings,
are not correctible by the writ of certiorari. In this regard, Napoles bears the burden of showing
that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of her bail application was capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or
despotic, so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. This Court is not a trier of facts. As such,
it must be established that there was a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an
evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Bail; While bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior
to the conviction of the accused, those charged with a capital offense is granted bail only when
the evidence of guilt is not strong; The trial court may also deny the application for bail when
the accused is a flight risk, notwithstanding the prosecution’s evidence on the guilt of the
accused.—While bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the conviction of
the accused, those charged with a capital offense is granted bail only when the evidence of
guilt is not strong: Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence
of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a) The trial court is thus
granted the discretion to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of the
accused. The trial court may also deny the application for bail when the accused is a flight risk,
notwithstanding the prosecution’s evidence on the guilt of the accused. In exercising this
discretion, the trial court should receive the parties’ evidence at a hearing duly scheduled for
this purpose. The prosecution and the accused are granted reasonable opportunity to prove
their respective positions: on the part of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong, and on the part of the defense, the opposite. The hearing is summary and
limited to the determination of the weight of evidence for purposes of granting or denying bail.
The denial or refusal must be supported by a summary of the prosecution’s evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the
imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua, she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of
her guilt is strong.—Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the
imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua, she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of
her guilt is strong. This was the burden that the prosecution assumed in the subsequent
hearings that followed the filing of Napoles’ Petition for Bail before the Sandiganbayan. As a
trial court, the Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the jurisdiction to hear and weigh the
evidence of the prosecution and the defense. At that stage of the proceedings, the bail hearings
are limited to the determination of whether there is a strong presumption of Napoles’ guilt. It
is merely a preliminary determination, and the Sandiganbayan may deny admission to bail
even when there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Napoles.
Same; Same; Same; As a lesser quantum of proof than guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
Sandiganbayan may deny the application for bail on evidence less than that required for the
conviction of Napoles.—As a lesser quantum of proof than guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
Sandiganbayan may deny the application for bail on evidence less than that required for the
conviction of Napoles. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan “does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence
may be therein offered and admitted.” It should not be forgotten that the purpose of the bail
hearing is to determine whether the accused is entitled to provisional liberty before conviction.
To require more from the prosecution, as well as from the trial court, effectively defeats the
purpose of the proceeding.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Plunder; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently ruled that the
conspiracy among the accused to commit the crime of Plunder is usually an agreement or
connivance to secretly cooperate in doing the unlawful act.—The charge of Plunder against
Napoles in this case alleges a conspiracy among former Senator Enrile and Reyes, as public
officers, and Napoles, Lim, and De Asis, as private individuals. On this point, this Court has
consistently ruled that the conspiracy among the accused to commit the crime of Plunder is
usually an agreement or connivance to secretly cooperate in doing the unlawful act. Even
Congress, in its Explanatory Note to the proposed bill criminalizing Plunder, recognized that
this crime, by its very nature, is committed through a series or combination of acts done “in
stealth and secrecy over a period of time.”
Same; Same; As long as the prosecution was able to prove that two (2) or more persons aimed
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, the conspiracy
may be inferred even if no actual meeting among them was proven.—Seeing as it would be
difficult to provide direct evidence establishing the conspiracy among the accused, the
Sandiganbayan may infer it “from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole.” It was therefore
unnecessary for the Sandiganbayan to find direct proof of any agreement among Napoles, indispensability of the participation of Napoles in the scheme to misappropriate public funds
former Senator Enrile and Reyes. The conspiracy may be implied from the intentional for the benefit of select individuals, by using the non-government Organizations (NGOs) as
participation in the transaction that furthers the common design and purpose. As long as the conduits for the Priority Development Assistant Fund (PDAF) projects of former Senator
prosecution was able to prove that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the Enrile.—Arguably, there is no documentary evidence directly linking Napoles to the NGOs
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, used as conduits for the PDAF-funded projects of former Senator Enrile. However, her ties to
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness the officers of the NGOs involved in this case reveal otherwise. Napoles’ participation in the
of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, the conspiracy may be inferred even if conspiracy was established through testimonial evidence, not only from one of her former
no actual meeting among them was proven. employees, but from four (4) witnesses — all of whom corroborate each other on material
points. More importantly, they testified on the minute details of the scheme that only those
Same; Same; Implied Conspiracy; The individuals involved in this case performed different
privy to the conspiracy would be able to provide. Notably, Napoles did not even refute their
criminal acts, which contributed, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation, and
claims that they were her former employees, relying instead on singling out inconsequential
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Consistent with the doctrine on implied conspiracy, these
details in their testimonies. Even the testimony of Ruby Chan Tuason, the middleperson who
actions on the part of Napoles and her co-accused are sufficient to prove the existence of a
received the rebates of former Senator Enrile on his behalf, confirmed that Napoles oversaw
“concurrence in sentiment,” regardless of any proof that an actual agreement took place.—
the implementation of the scheme to divert the disbursements of the PDAF. She personally met
Napoles had access to the bank accounts of the NGOs because as Sula, Luy, and Suñas testified
with Napoles to negotiate the respective shares of the conspirators, and received the amount
during the bail hearing, they were required to sign blank withdrawal slips, which were turned
on behalf of former Senator Enrile, which she subsequently turned over to Reyes. Since the
over to Napoles together with the corresponding passbook for these accounts. Thus, in the
whistleblowers personally received instructions from Napoles to incorporate the NGOs,
ultimate scheme of things, Napoles received the amounts allocated for the PDAF-funded
prepare the requirements for the release of the PDAF, prepare and deliver the rebates to the
projects of former Senator Enrile, which she later on apportioned according to the agreed upon
middlepersons, and fabricate the liquidation documents, they were competent witnesses on
share of the legislators. With respect to the actual delivery of the PDAF-funded projects to its
the subject of their respective testimonies. Clearly, the prosecution witnesses and the
intended beneficiaries, Sula, Luy, Suñas, and Baltazar admitted that they fabricated the
documentary evidence supply interlocking pieces of information that when taken together,
liquidation documents. This was done by forging the receipts and the signatures of the
provide a complete picture of the indispensability of the participation of Napoles in the scheme
beneficiaries, making it appear that the project was indeed implemented. Again, this supported
to misappropriate public funds for the benefit of select individuals, by using the NGOs as
the findings of the COA Special Audit Team and the FIO on the fictitious projects funded by
conduits for the PDAF projects of former Senator Enrile. The directions and instructions she
the PDAF of former Senator Enrile. It is plain from the foregoing that Napoles and her co-
gave to her former employees constitute a clear evidence of her active participation, not mere
accused, as well as the former employees of Napoles who were eventually admitted as State
acquiescence or presence, in the conspiracy.
witnesses, had a common design and objective — to divert the PDAF of former Senator Enrile
from its lawful purpose and to their own personal accounts. The individuals involved in this
case performed different criminal acts, which contributed, directly or indirectly, in the
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Testimonial Evidence; The mere fact that the whistleblowers
amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Consistent with the doctrine on
were conspirators themselves does not automatically render their testimonies incredible and
implied conspiracy, these actions on the part of Napoles and her co-accused are sufficient to
unreliable.—Napoles nonetheless challenged the credibility of the whistleblowers, arguing
prove the existence of a “concurrence in sentiment,” regardless of any proof that an actual
that their testimonies should have been received with “grave suspicion,” coming as they were
agreement took place.
from “polluted source[s].” However, as this Court earlier discussed, the testimonies of these
prosecution witnesses were consistent, clear, and corroborative of each other. Other testimonial
and documentary evidence also substantiated the veracity of the whistleblowers’ statements
Same; Same; Same; Clearly, the prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence supply
during the bail hearing. In any case, a careful perusal of the assailed Sandiganbayan
interlocking pieces of information that when taken together, provide a complete picture of the
Resolutions reveals that it considered the prosecution’s other testimonial and documentary
evidence, and discussed it in relation to one another. Among the documents that the
Sandiganbayan considered were the letters requesting for the release of former Senator Enrile’s
PDAF, the incorporation documents of the NGOs, the liquidation documents for the PDAF-
funded projects, the SAROs itself, and the DVs issued by the implementing agencies to the
NGOs under the control of Napoles. In other words, the Sandiganbayan did not rely solely on
the testimonies of the whistleblowers. Seeing as there were other available evidence lending
credence to their testimonies, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
considered the testimonies of the whistleblowers in denying Napoles’ bail application, despite
their participation in the conspiracy itself. The mere fact that the whistleblowers were
conspirators themselves does not automatically render their testimonies incredible and
unreliable.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Bail; It is elementary that the factual findings of the trial
court, especially on the assessment or appreciation of the testimonies of witnesses, are accorded
great weight and respect. In this case, it is the Sandiganbayan that had the opportunity to
observe the deportment and behavior of the witnesses during the bail hearing.—At this point
it should be emphasized that this Court is not the proper forum to weigh the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. It is elementary that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on
the assessment or appreciation of the testimonies of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect. In this case, it is the Sandiganbayan that had the opportunity to observe the
deportment and behavior of the witnesses during the bail hearing. It was in a better position
to pass judgment on the credibility of these witnesses and the weight of their respective
testimonies. At any rate, Napoles was unable to establish any motive on the part of her former
employees, which would compel them to falsely testify against her and her co-accused.
Criminal Law; Plunder; Plunder is a deplorable crime that unfairly exploits the trust that the
public reposed in its officials. It is inherently immoral not only because it involves the
corruption of public funds, but also because its essence proceeds from a rapacious intent.—The
core issue, therefore, of whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of Napoles, was
resolved by the Sandiganbayan in accordance with the relevant laws, rules, and jurisprudence.
Plunder is a deplorable crime that unfairly exploits the trust that the public reposed in its
officials. It is inherently immoral not only because it involves the corruption of public funds,
but also because its essence proceeds from a rapacious intent. This Court’s ruling in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001), is a constant reminder of the magnitude of this offense.
Same; Same; Capital Punishment; Bail; It is precisely the enormous gravity of this offense that
capital punishment is imposed on those who are found guilty of Plunder. As a necessary
consequence, provisional liberty is not easily granted to those accused of this offense, especially
when the prosecution more than amply established that the evidence of guilt is strong.—It is
precisely the enormous gravity of this offense that capital punishment is imposed on those
who are found guilty of Plunder. As a necessary consequence, provisional liberty is not easily
granted to those accused of this offense, especially when the prosecution more than amply
established that the evidence of guilt is strong. This is a matter of judicial discretion on the part
of the trial court, which this Court may nullify only when the exercise of this discretion is
tainted with arbitrariness and capriciousness that the trial court failed to act within the
contemplation of law. Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 844 SCRA 244, G.R. No.
224162 November 7, 2017
EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Information; The Information must allege clearly and accurately the
elements of the crime charged; The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts
constituting the offense charged is sufficient.—The acts or omissions complained of must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The
Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definition and elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the requirement of alleging all
the elements of the crime in the Information is to inform an accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare for his defense. Another purpose
is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the
offense charged is sufficient.
Same; Same; Matters of evidence need not be alleged in the Information.—It is not necessary
to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the same
is evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of evidence need not be alleged in the.
Information.
Same; Preliminary Investigations; Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion
in the conduct of preliminary investigations.—Case law has it that the Court does not interfere
Same; Same; The determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the
with the Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro
prosecutor.—Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other
vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled: “x x x. In the performance of his task to determine
officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said
probable cause, the Ombudsman’s discretion is paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero,
officer’s finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence
this Court said: ‘x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-
of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the investigating
that petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes
Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint resolution
sufficient evidence as will establish ‘probable cause’ for filing of information against the
dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.
supposed offender.’ ”
Same; Bail; The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on
his petition for bail.—The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of
Same; Same; Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is
the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against petitioner for plunder.—Petitioner is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait
burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their resolution and joint resolution,
Same; Same; When bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even
respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse
prior to arraignment.—For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be
of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding probable cause
granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application
against petitioner for plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying
for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be
petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in the amended Information.
heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the
Same; Same; The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted
a right conferred by statute.—It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be
not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute. The absence of a “authorized” under the circumstances.
preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render
the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the Information. Same; Same; Court finds no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for
bail and his filing of a motion to quash.—The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists
Same; Same; The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a
between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person
security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a
accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.—The purpose of a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set
preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been committed and
forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person
whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably
charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his appearance at
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. As the Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, “[a] finding
the trial. As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. On the other hand, a motion to quash
been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear
an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.”
are apparent in the face of the Information. An accused may file a Motion to quash the
Information, as a general rule, before arraignment.
Same; Same; The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions
for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the
trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.—There is
no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different
accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the
case against the other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two
or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition
jointly with the trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown,
the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
Same; Same; Court finds that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering that
the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held
jointly.—While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is empowered
“to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly
proceedings and speedy termination of the case,” the Court finds that it gravely abused its
discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial of former President
Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged
in its May 4, 2001 Order the “pre-eminent position and superiority of the rights of [petitioner]
to have the matter of his provisional liberty resolved . . . without unnecessary delay,” only to
make a volte face and declare that after all the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose
“Jinggoy” Estrada and the trial as against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be held
simultaneously.
Same; Same; A person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the opportunity
to obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the judgment of his case.—A person charged with
a capital offense is not absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail
pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of right but
is discretionary upon the court. Had the rule been otherwise, the Rules would not have
provided for an application for bail by a person charged with a capital offense under Rule 114,
Section 8.
Same; Same; Upon an application for bail by the person charged with a capital offense, a
hearing thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an opportunity
to discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong; When
the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right.—There must be a showing
that the evidence of guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong for the
court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an application for bail by the person charged with a capital
offense, a hearing thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an
opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of guilt against an accused is
strong. The prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present all the evidence it may
deem necessary for this purpose. When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of
guilt is strong, it is the court’s duty to deny the application for bail. However, when the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right.
Same; Same; Even in cases where the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to
an application for bail by an accused charged with a capital offense, the trial court is still under
duty to conduct a hearing on said application; Rationale for such requirement explained in
Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz.—The Court has previously ruled that even in cases where the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an accused
charged with a capital offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing on said
application. The rationale for such requirement was explained in Narciso vs. Sta-Romana-Cruz
(supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo: “When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has
the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly
be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion
is directed to the weight of the evidence and since everything cannot properly be weighed if
not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having
the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.”
Constitutional Law; Habeas Corpus; In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be
granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest
or his voluntary surrender; Writ issued where the deprivation of liberty while initially valid
under the law had later become invalid.—As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not
issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional circumstances,
habeas corpus, may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained
pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as
“the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action” due to “its ability to cut through the barriers of form and procedural
mazes.” Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while
initially valid under the law, had later become invalid, and even though the persons praying
for its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty. Same; Same; Court finds no basis
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner.—The Court finds no basis for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas
corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies,
because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended
information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily
surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his
arrest had been issued.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Distinct and separate conspiracies do not, in contemplation of law,
become a single conspiracy merely because one man is a participant and key figure in all the
separate conspiracies.—There exists a distinction between separate conspiracies, where certain
parties are common to all the conspiracies, but with no overall goal or common purpose; and
one overall continuing conspiracy with various parties joining and terminating their
relationship at different times. Distinct and separate conspiracies do not, in contemplation of
law, become a single conspiracy merely because one man is a participant and key figure in all
the separate conspiracies.
Same; Same; When certain persons unite to perform certain acts and some of them unite with
others who are engaged in totally different acts, it is error to join them in an information.—
When certain persons unite to perform certain acts, and some of them unite with others who
are engaged in totally different acts, it is error to join them in an information. Otherwise stated,
defendants charged with two separate conspiracies having one common participant are not,
without more, properly joined, and similarity of acts alone is insufficient to indicate that series
of acts exist. Joinder may be permitted when the connection between the alleged offenses and
the parties is the accused’s awareness of the identity and activity of the other alleged
participants. There must be a showing of one overall common goal to which the participants
bind themselves.
Same; Plunder; The essence of the law on plunder lies in the phrase “combination or series of
overt or criminal acts.”—The essence of the law on plunder lies in the phrase “combination or
series of overt or criminal acts.” The determining factor of R.A. No. 7080, as can be gleaned
from the Record of the Senate, is the plurality of the overt acts or criminal acts under a grand
scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth. Thus, even if the amassed wealth equals or
exceeds fifty million pesos, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if he
performs only a single criminal act.
Same; Same; What determines the “nature and cause of accusation” against an accused is the
crime described by the facts stated in the information or complaint and not that designated by
the fiscal in the preamble thereof.—It is a jurisprudentially-embedded rule that what
determines the “nature and cause of accusation” against an accused is the crime described by
the facts stated in the information or complaint and not that designated by the fiscal in the
preamble thereof. In the recent En Banc ruling in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, citing the 1954
case of People vs. Cosare, and People vs. Mendoza, this Court held: “The factor that
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts. The real nature of the criminal charge
is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.” Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA
443, G.R. No. 148468, G.R. No. 148769, G.R. No. 149116 January 28, 2003
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893. February 19, 2018.*
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 15-2773-MTJ
TEODORA ALTOBANO-RUIZ, complainant, vs. HON. RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY,
Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Metropolitan Trial Court, Parañaque City, respondent.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; Section 17(a) of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 governs the approval of bail bonds for criminal
cases pending outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction.—Section 17(a) of Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which governs the approval of bail
bonds for criminal cases pending outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction is instructive, to
wit: Section 17. Bail, where filed.—(a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court
where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any
regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial
judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional
Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. x x x The foregoing provision
anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused is arrested in the same province, city or
municipality where his case is pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or
municipality other than where his case is pending. In the first situation, the accused may file
bail in the court where his case is pending or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge
thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city. In the second
situation, the accused has two (2) options. First, he may file bail in the court where his case is
pending or, second, he may file bail with any regional trial court in the province, city or
municipality where he was arrested. When no regional trial court judge is available, he may
file bail with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.
Same; Same; Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; In Judge Español v. Judge Mupas, 442 SCRA
13 (2004), the Supreme Court (SC) held that judges who approve applications for bail of
accused whose cases are pending in other courts are guilty of gross ignorance of the law.—In
Judge Español v. Judge Mupas, 442 SCRA 13 (2004), the Court held that judges who approve
applications for bail of accused whose cases are pending in other courts are guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. In Lim v. Judge Dumlao, 454 SCRA 196 (2005), the Court held that: x x x
The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a judge may
grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and
that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the law is straightforward
and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the
order of release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with
before he can approve [the accuseds] bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved
is rudimentary that it leaves little room for error.
Administrative Proceedings; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Incompetence; Bail; Since
Judge Pichay presides over Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)-Br. 78 in Parañaque City, his
territorial jurisdiction is confined therein. Therefore, to approve bail applications and issue
corresponding release orders in a case pending in courts outside his territorial jurisdiction,
constitute ignorance of the law so gross as to amount to incompetence.—It must be emphasized
that rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the
wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the law. Judges should ensure strict
compliance therewith at all times in their respective jurisdictions. Judge Pichay cannot excuse
himself from the consequences of his action by invoking good faith. As a judge, he must have
the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain professional competence
at all times. Since Judge Pichay presides over MeTC-Br. 78 in Parañaque City, his territorial
jurisdiction is confined therein. Therefore, to approve bail applications and issue
corresponding release orders in a case pending in courts outside his territorial jurisdiction,
constitute ignorance of the law so gross as to amount to incompetence.
Same; Same; Same; Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC characterizes gross ignorance of the law and procedure as a grave offense.—Section 8, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC characterizes gross ignorance of
the law and procedure as a grave offense. The penalties prescribed for such offense are: (1)
Dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations, Provided, however, That the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine
of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Altobano-Ruiz vs. Pichay, 856 SCRA 1,
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 15-2773-MTJ) February 19, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MANUEL ESCOBAR, respondent.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; Bail is the security given for the temporary release of
a person who has been arrested and detained but “whose guilt has not yet been proven” in
court beyond reasonable doubt.—Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a
person who has been arrested and detained but “whose guilt has not yet been proven” in court
beyond reasonable doubt. The right to bail is cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed
innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald, 505 SCRA 573 (2006): The right to bail emanates from the
[accused’s constitutional] right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the
custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he [or she] enjoys, be
allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his [or her] appearance before
any court, as required under specified conditions.
Same; Same; Same; The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment” before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — “regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution” — and when evidence of one’s guilt is not strong, then the accused’s prayer for
bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court.—Bail may be a matter of right or judicial
discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment” before conviction by the Regional Trial Court.
However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment — “regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution” — and
when evidence of one’s guilt is not strong, then the accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the
discretion of the trial court. In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is
death, reduced to reclusion perpetua. Escobar’s bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion,
provided, that the evidence of his guilt is not strong.
Same; Res Judicata; The res judicata doctrine bars the re-litigation of the same claim between
the parties, also known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment.—In its literal meaning,
res judicata refers to “a matter adjudged.” This doctrine bars the relitigation of the same claim
between the parties, also known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment. It likewise
bars the relitigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same parties, also known
as issue preclusion or conclusiveness of judgement. It “exists as an obvious rule of reason,
justice, fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity.”
Same; Same; Escobar’s Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not
recognized in criminal proceedings.—Escobar’s Second Bail Petition is not barred by res
judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in criminal proceedings. Expressly applicable in civil
cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute between the parties or their successors-in-
interest. Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415 (2007), declares that res judicata,
as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and “has no
bearing on criminal proceedings.” Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
states: Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases.—The
provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and
in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases
insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule. Indeed,
while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases, Rule
39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Same; Same; An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal
in nature, does not give rise to res judicata.—An interlocutory order denying an application
for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does not give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad
v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415 (2007), even if we are to expand the argument of
the prosecution in this case to contemplate “res judicata in prison grey” or double jeopardy,
the same will still not apply. Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or
acquitted or that the case against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his
express consent. Here, while there was an initial ruling on Escobar’s First Bail Petition, Escobar
has not been convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.
Same; Same; Elements of Res Judicata.—Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following
elements: 1. The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; 2. The decision must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; 3.
The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and 4. There must be between
the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. In
deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or an interlocutory order.
A final judgment “leaves nothing else to be done” because the period to appeal has expired or
the highest tribunal has already ruled on the case. In contrast, an order is considered
interlocutory if, between the beginning and the termination of a case, the court decides on a
point or matter that is not yet a final judgment on the entire controversy.
Same; Same; Res Judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case;
it cannot be availed of an interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed.—An
interlocutory order “settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an
action”; in other words, something else still needs to be done in the primary case — the
rendition of the final judgment. Res judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the
merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not
appealed.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Bail; A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral
matter — whether accused is entitled to provisional liberty — and is not a final judgment on
accused’s guilt or innocence.—A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral
matter — whether accused is entitled to provisional liberty — and is not a final judgment on
accused’s guilt or innocence. Unlike in a full-blown trial, a hearing for bail is summary in
nature: it deliberately “avoid[s] unnecessary thoroughness” and does not try the merits of the
case. Thus: Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. The
course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential
to the purpose of the hearing.
Same; Same; Judgments; A judgment or order may be modified where executing it in its present
form is impossible or unjust in view of intervening facts or circumstances.—Rules of procedure
should not be interpreted as to disadvantage a party and deprive him or her of fundamental
rights and liberties. A judgment or order may be modified where executing it in its present
form is impossible or unjust in view of intervening facts or circumstances: [W]here facts and
circumstances transpire which render [the] execution [of a judgment] impossible or unjust and
it therefore becomes necessary, “in the interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to
harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances.”
Same; Same; Bail; An accused may file a second petition for bail, particularly if there are sudden
developments or a new matter or fact which warrants a different view.—Appellate courts may
correct “errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of
final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.” Thus, an accused may
file a second petition for bail, particularly if there are sudden developments or a “new matter
or fact which warrants a different view.” Rolando’s release on bail is a new development in
Escobar’s case. The Court of Appeals has pointed out that the other alleged coconspirators are
already out on bail: Rolando, in particular, was granted bail because Cubillas’ testimony
against him was weak. “[Escobar] and [Rolando] participated in the same way, but [Escobar]’s
bail was denied.” Escobar’s fundamental rights and liberty are being deprived in the
meantime.
Same; Same; Same; A grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts . . . from making a final
assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits.—No part of this Decision should
prejudice the submission of additional evidence for the prosecution to prove
Escobar’s guilt in the main case. “[A] grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts . . . from
making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits.” As the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled: [T]his determination is only for the purpose of bail[;] it is without prejudice for
the prosecution to submit additional evidence to prove [Escobar]’s guilt in the course of the
proceedings in the primary case. People vs. Escobar, 833 SCRA 180, G.R. No. 214300 July 26,
2017
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
REYNOLAN T. SALES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Division), OMBUDSMAN,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THELMA BENEMERITO, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; To deny the accused’s claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.—As this
Court pointed out in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, “[t]he purpose of a preliminary investigation
or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open
and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is
also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. While
the right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due
process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before
being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or
some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the
accused’s claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of
his right to due process.”
Same; Same; A preliminary investigation is a judicial proceeding; An act becomes a judicial
proceeding when there is an opportunity to be heard and for the production of and weighing
of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.—Although a preliminary investigation is not
a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The
officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission
of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be
prepared against the accused. Indeed, preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced
so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an
acquittal. A preliminary investigation has been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial
proceeding. An act becomes a judicial proceeding when there is an opportunity to be heard
and for the production of and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.
Same; Same; While the investigating officer, strictly speaking, is not a “judge” by the nature of
his functions, he is and must be considered to be a quasi-judicial officer because a preliminary
investigation is considered a judicial proceeding; A preliminary investigation should therefore
be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can
be protected from any material damage.—The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer
duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than a
municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly
speaking, is not a “judge” by the nature of his functions, he is and must be considered to be a
quasi-judicial officer because a preliminary investigation is considered a judicial proceeding.
A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material
damage.
Same; Same; Filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary
investigation proper.—The filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the
preliminary investigation proper. There is no dispute that the Information was filed without
first affording petitioner-accused his right to file a motion for reconsideration. The denial
thereof is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.
Same; Warrant of Arrest; The task of determining probable cause for purposes of issuing a
warrant of arrest is a responsibility which is exclusively reserved by the Constitution to
judges.—In the order of procedure for criminal cases, the task of determining probable cause
for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is a responsibility which is exclusively reserved by
the Constitution to judges. People v. Inting clearly delineated the features of this constitutional
mandate, viz: 1.] The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the
provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this
determination; 2.] The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It
merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, if any, and all other supporting documents
behind the prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the judge in his
determination of probable cause; and 3.] Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be
held for trial or be released. Sales vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 293, G.R. No. 143802
November 16, 2001
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ, petitioners, vs. REYNALDO P.
VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Parties; The public respondent should have granted
petitioners’ motion to expunge, and treated De Castro’s motion as a mere scrap of paper with
no legal effect, as it was filed by one who is not a party to that case.—Petitioners are correct in
pointing out that the Motion to Reinstate the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest was filed by
one Levita De Castro who is not a party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records show that De
Castro is not even a private complainant, but a mere witness for being the owner of the vehicles
allegedly used by petitioners in defrauding and convincing private respondents to part with
their P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted petitioners’ motion to
expunge, and treated De Castro’s motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect, as it was
filed by one who is not a party to that case.
Same; Same; Arraignment; In Samson v. Judge Daway, 434 SCRA 612 (2004), the Court
explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of
sixty (60) days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused
or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.—In Samson v. Judge Daway, 434 SCRA 612 (2004),
the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension
of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period
of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused
or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
Same; Same; Same; With more than eleven (11) years having elapsed from the filing of the
petition for review and petitioners have yet to be arraigned, it is now high time for the
continuation of the trial on the merits in the criminal case below, as the sixty (60)-day period
counted from the filing of the petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) had
long lapsed.—With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July 16,
2003, the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their
arraignment, pending the final resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ. The Court
believes that the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the time petitioners
filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to September 14, 2005 when
the trial court finally set their arraignment, was more than ample time to give petitioners the
opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition. In fact, the public respondent had been very
liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits
the suspension of arraignment to a 60-day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with
more than eleven (11) years having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and
petitioners have yet to be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the
merits in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted from the filing of the petition
for review with the DOJ had long lapsed.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.—
Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete preliminary
investigation as part of their right to due process. After all, “[d]ue process simply demands an
opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where an
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process.”
Same; Right to Speedy Trial; Petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right to speedy trial
because Section 9(3) of Circular No. 38-98 excludes in computing the time within which trial
must commence the delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders,
such as their petitions before the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Supreme Court (SC).—
Considering that this case had been held in abeyance long enough without petitioners having
been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case to the trial court for trial on the merits
with strict observance of Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998, or the “Implementing the
Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, entitled ‘An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All Criminal
Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.’” In this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners
cannot invoke violation of their right to speedy trial because Section 9(3) of Circular No. 38-98
excludes in computing the time within which trial must commence the delay resulting
from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the
CA and the Court.
Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; In order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are
reminded that the pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or
petition for review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued
because the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only take place upon the finding that no
probable cause exists.—In order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition for review
is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because the quashal of a
warrant of arrest may only take place upon the finding that no probable cause exists. Moreover,
judges should take note of the following: 1. If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or
motion for reinvestigation of the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may suspend
the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of
the accused and direct the public prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of the motion
on or before the period fixed by the court, which in no instance could be more than the period
fixed by the court counted from the granting of the motion to suspend arraignment, otherwise
the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay. 2. If there
is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may suspend the proceedings upon
motion by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct
the DOJ to submit the resolution disposing of the petition on or before the period fixed by the
Rules which, in no instance, could be more than sixty (60) days from the filing of the Petition
for Review before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the arraignment as
scheduled and without further delay. Aguinaldo vs. Ventus, 752 SCRA 461, G.R. No. 176033
March 11, 2015
G.R. No. 171381. October 12, 2009.*
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Public Officers; Forfeiture Proceedings; Unexplained Wealth; Plunder; Jurisdiction; The
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, albeit
the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature—the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise
from the commission of a criminal offense.—And in response to what she suggests in some of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 7080 did not repeal Republic Act No. 1379—
her pleadings, let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture
nowhere in Republic Act No. 7080 is there a provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly
under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. We said so in Garcia v.
or impliedly, of Republic Act No. 1379.—Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that
Sandiganbayan, 460 SCRA 600 (2005), involving no less than petitioner’s husband questioning
would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which,
certain orders issued in Forfeiture I case.
at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance
with members of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it
Same; Same; Same; Same; A forfeiture case under Republic Act No. 1379 arises out of a cause
does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount
of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of
of property manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379
plunder absorbs the forfeiture case.—It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case
aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired
under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus
by the officer. It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal
negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the
and all efforts should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the
forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the
same subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be harmonized. The Court
commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the
perceives no irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the
language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is “sufficient
other.
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth].” On the
other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA
Courts; Jurisdiction; Summons; It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for
1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being
the latter to be bound by its decision or orders.—It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor
over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by
General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not
whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court
proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer
acquires jurisdiction over a person.
leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.

Summons; Requirements for Substituted Service.—In Mano-toc v. Court of Appeals, 499 SCRA
Same; Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers
21 (2006), we broke down the requirements to be: (1) Impossibility of prompt personal service,
to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes
i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be
two separate criminal prosecutions.—Given the foregoing considerations, petitioner’s thesis
served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time.
on possible double jeopardy entanglements should a judgment of conviction ensue in Crim.
Reasonable time being “so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably
Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of
prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should
punishment for the same offense, suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate
be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.”
criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary
Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service
corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal offense.
of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates. (2) Specific details in the return, i.e.,
Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the
the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding
defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.
the attempted personal service. (3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and
discretion residing at defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, who are all of legal age. In fact, the ponencia failed to state any
defendant’s office or regular place of business. basis for vicariously relating Clarita’s grounds to her children and co-defendants. The ponencia
inexplicably extended to Clarita’s children the benefits arising from Clarita’s invocation of lack
Same; Criminal Procedure; Motion to Dismiss; A defendant who files a motion to dismiss,
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Lack of jurisdiction over the person, being
assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised
subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can
therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court.—A defendant who files
thereby waive it by silence. By failing to come to this Court to raise the matter of a purely
a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other
personal defense, non-petitioning Clarita’s children and co-defendants have relinquished their
grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the
right to avail of the present remedy.
rule on voluntary appearance—the first sentence of the above-quoted rule—means is that the
voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is
deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper
Same; An appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the
service of summons.
court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person.—In
Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, 458 SCRA 454 (2005), this Court ruled that an appearance in
whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is
Same; Same; Same; Special Appearance; A special appearance before the court––challenging
a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. A defendant may, e.g., appear by
its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other
presenting a motion and unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of
grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to
the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Garcia vs.
jurisdiction over his person, and, such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the
Sandiganbayan, 603 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 170122, G.R. No. 171381 October 12, 2009
jurisdiction of the court.—The leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78
(1994), applies to the instant case. Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that
a special appearance before the court—challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a
motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds—is not tantamount to estoppel or G.R. Nos. 210141-42
a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not
constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. CESAR MATAS CAGANG, Petitioner
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
CARPIO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

DECISION

Jurisdiction; Lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense
which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence—by failing to go
to the Supreme Court to raise the matter of a purely personal defense, the non-petitioning
children and co-defendants have relinquished their right to avail of the present remedy.—I
disagree with the ponencia in extending the dismissal of Forfeiture II case, on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, to Clarita’s non-petitioning children and
co-defendants. Clarita is the lone petitioner in the present cases. Clearly, here is no reason to
apply by extension Clarita’s arguments in favor of her children and co-defendants Ian Carl,
LEONEN, J.:
x-----------------------x
Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Inordinate
delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will result in the
dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not determined through mere
mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of
how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the
complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her constitutional
rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver
of right.
JOSE “JINGGOY” E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION),
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
Criminal Law; Plunder; Conspiracy; The gravamen of the conspiracy charge is that each of
them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of illgotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.—In
the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the
case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality—to help
the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d)
in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed
to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the
tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself
from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts,
agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
Same; Same; Same; When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiracy and all the
elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information.—To reiterate, when
conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must
be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of “conspiracy to commit
treason” is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy
war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and
decide to commit it.
Same; Same; Same; Manner by which conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense
may be alleged.—Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege
conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by
use of the word “conspire,” or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive,
collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a
person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as
would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts.
Same; Same; Same; The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with
the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it.—The allegation of conspiracy in the
information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove
it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement,
a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the
felony and actually pursue it. A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information.
Same; Same; Crime of Plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.—The crime of Plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section
12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Same; Bail; The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses
hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong.—The
constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue
of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court
conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient
opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution
to show strong evidence of guilt.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Court has declared the anti-plunder law constitutional for
being neither vague nor ambiguous on the thesis that the terms “series” and “combination”
are not unsusceptible to firm understanding.—The Supreme Court in Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan has declared the anti-plunder law constitutional for being neither vague nor
ambiguous on the thesis that the terms “series” and “combination” are not unsusceptible to
firm understanding. “Series” refers to two or more acts falling under the same category of the
enumerated acts provided in Section 1(d) of the statute; “combination” pertains to two or more
acts falling under at least two separate categories mentioned in the same law.
Same; Plunder; Conspiracy; It is utterly unacceptable, neither right nor just, to cast criminal “connivance,” which is the same term used in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, this does not make it
liability on one for the acts or deeds of plunder that may have been committed by another or less a conclusion of law. The terms “connivance” and “conspiracy” are thus superfluous and
others over which he has not consented or acceded to, participated in, or even in fact been should not be considered as written in the information.
aware of.—The government argues that the illegal act ascribed to petitioner is a part of the
chain that links the various acts of plunder by the principal accused. It seems to suggest that a
mere allegation of conspiracy is quite enough to hold petitioner equally liable with the YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Separate Dissenting Opinion:
principal accused for the latter’s other acts, even if unknown to him, in paragraph (a) of the
indictment This contention is a glaring bent. It is, to my mind, utterly unacceptable, neither
right nor just, to cast criminal liability on one for the acts or deeds of plunder that may have
Criminal Law; Plunder; Criminal Procedure; Conspiracy; There is nothing in the amended
been committed by another or others over which he has not consented or acceded to,
information nor in the Ombudsman’s comment to explain that conspiracy was committed.—
participated in, or even in fact been aware of. Such vicarious criminal liability is never to be
There is nothing in the amended information nor in the Ombudsman’s comment to explain
taken lightly but must always be made explicit not merely at the trial but likewise, and no less
that conspiracy was committed. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
important, in the complaint or information itself in order to meet the fundamental right of an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The usual
accused to be fully informed of the charge against him. It is a requirement that cannot be
phraseology employed to characterize conspiracy includes concurrence of wills, unity of action
dispensed with if he were to be meaningfully assured that he truly has a right to defend
and purpose, common and joint purpose and design, previous concert of criminal design or
himself.
united and concerted action.

KAPUNAN, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Criminal Law; Plunder; Criminal Procedure; The nature and character of the crime charged is
determined not by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated
but by the facts alleged in the indictment.—While Section 8 requires that the complaint or
information state the designation of the offense given by the statute or, if there be no such
designation, make reference to the section or subsection to the statute punishing it, such
designation or reference is not controlling. The nature and character of the crime charged is
determined not by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated
but by the facts alleged in the indictment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There can be no conspiracy in a crime where a combination or series
of criminal acts is essential.—Petitioner Jose Estrada is not included in the misappropriation of
the tobacco excise tax share of Ilocos Sur nor in the Belle Corporation scandal nor in the fourth
accusation of having unexplained wealth. There is absolutely no insinuation that he committed
any specific act with closeness and coordination under Paragraphs (b), (c) and (d), of the
amended information. There is no unmistakable indication of a common purpose or design to
commit the three offenses under these latter paragraphs which would make him a co-
conspirator in the crime of plunder. And since he committed only one alleged act of illegal
gambling, there can be no conspiracy in a crime where a combination or series of criminal acts
is essential.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy; To allege that the accused “con-spired” or “connived” with
one another or, that they acted, in “connivance/conspiracy,” is to make a conclusion of law,
not a statement of fact.—To allege that the accused “conspired” or “connived” with one
Criminal Law; Plunder; Criminal Procedure; Conspiracy; The essence of the law on plunder
another or, that they acted, in the words of the subject information, in
lies in the phrase “combination or series of overt or criminal acts”; A person cannot be
“connivance/conspiracy,” is to make a conclusion of law, not a statement of fact. While it may
prosecuted for the crime of plunder if he performs only a single criminal act.—Taking into
be argued that the information sufficiently charges conspiracy since it uses the term
consideration the provisions of R.A. No. 7080 vis-à-vis the Amended Information, there can be
no crime of plunder insofar as petitioner is concerned. The essence of the law on plunder lies
in the phrase “combination or series of overt or criminal acts.” The determining factor of R.A.
No. 7080, as can be gleaned from the Record of the Senate, is the plurality of the overt acts or
criminal acts under a grand scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth. Thus, even if the
amassed wealth equals or exceeds fifty million pesos, a person cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of plunder if he performs only a single criminal act.

Same; Same; Same; Same; What determines the nature and cause of accusation against an
accused is the crime described by the facts stated in the information or complaint and not that
designated by the fiscal in the preamble thereof.—The statement in the accusatory portion of
the Amended Information cumulatively charging all the accused of the crime of plunder
cannot be given much weight in determining the nature of the offense charged. It is a
jurisprudentially-embedded rule that what determines the “nature and cause of accusation”
against an accused is the crime described by the facts stated in the information or complaint
and not that designated by the fiscal in the preamble thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Same; What controls is the description of the said criminal acts and not the
technical name of the crime supplied by the public prosecutor.—In the event that the
appellation of the crime charged as determined by the public prosecutor, does not exactly
correspond to the criminal acts described in the information to have been committed by the
accused, what controls is the description of the said criminal acts and not the technical name
of the crime supplied by the public prosecutor. Here, while the crime being charged under the
Amended Information is plunder, however, the recital of facts constituting that crime under
paragraph (a) indicates that petitioner is being accused of bribery, not plunder.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner should not have been charged with the serious crime of
plunder in the amended information considering that his participation is limited only to
paragraph (a) thereof alleging a single crime of bribery.—In fine, petitioner should not have
been charged with the serious crime of plunder in the Amended Information considering that
his participation is limited only to paragraph (a) thereof alleging a single crime of bribery.
Indeed, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have sustained the validity of the Amended
Information as against petitioner. Certainly, this is grave abuse of discretion on its part. Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 538, G.R. No. 148965 February 26, 2002