Confusing the Political Compass:
Shifting From Uni-Polarity to Uni-
Multipolarity in the International System
Joshua A. Harmon
The world stands upon a precipice, poised
at the climax of a twenty-year hegemony.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the
bipolar international system it helped com-
prise, the United States of America has en-
joyed essentially unchallenged power at the
top of the current global political order
(Huntington 36, Tulchin 33). It has domi-
nated every sphere of influence -"economic,
military, diplomatic, ideological, technologi-
cal, and cultural"- even possessing the global
reach to promote its interests in every corner
of the earth (Huntington 36). It has gone far-
ther than any power in recorded history in
terms of international influence, and has fi-
nally reached its lofty peak. By its own hand,
the United States is gradually demoting itself
in a case of curious irony; the stable political
and economic environment it fostered during
its years of paternity has enabled weaker
states to flourish to the extent that they are
now chipping away at US power while simul-
taneously bolstering their own (Zakaria 4).
The current international system is in the last
throes of unipolarity; one can expect instead
uni-multipolarity twenty-five years from now,
5
a world in which the US maintains dominant
influence yet is rivaled by the countries just
below it in a new balance of power.
The story of why the United States enjoys
sole power is important to understand if one
is to analyze the future of the international
system. Why has no other country replaced
the Soviet Union as a major contender in the
past twenty years? The answer lies in many
places, yet can be boiled down to two basic
variables, both of which the US can fuel more
money to than anyone else: guns and butter.
France, the third largest possessor of nu-
clear weapons, has 9,100 fewer warheads
than the United States. What's more, the
Nonproliferation Treaty dissuades other na-
tions from developing such power in an at-
tempt to rival the US, while those that do
have them are reducing their stockpiles,
slowly, to "safe levels" (FAS). As if that were
not enough, the United States also spends
more on its military than any other nation in
the world, in 2009 nearly matching every
other country's defense expenditures com-
bined. China, the threat many Americans are
concerned will steal the crown from the US,
spent nine times less on its military (in US
dollars) than did the superpower in that same
year (Shah).
The immense Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of the US allows it to dominate the
world economically in addition to militarily.
In 2005, for instance, the GDP of the US -
even factoring in Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP)- was 22.5 percent of the world GDP.
China, the second place country, came in less
than half of the US at 9.7 percent, and which
must be shared by 1.3 billion people. Indeed,
while the average income in the US is
$46,300, the sheer number of people in
China holds theirs much lower, at $6,500
(World Bank, CIA) The vast amount of wealth
in the United States allows it to influence the
economy in ways that other countries cannot.
Even the fear that China will demand the debt
we owe it as a way to gain power is very
unlikely because it relies on the American
market for its exports.
Guns and butter, when combined, have an
instrumental effect on the level of power a
country has in the international system. Thus,
it is simple to see why the US has enjoyed he-
gemony since the collapse of the USSR. How-
ever, many nations have been progressing
rapidly during this time of relative world
peace, and are now beginning to undermine
the superiority of the US in virtually every-
thing except politico-military power, ushering
in what some call a "post-American
world" (Zakaria 4-5). Though the United
States will remain the single most powerful
6
actor for some time, one can expect a uni-
multipolar system by 2035 in which China,
Japan, India, and many European Union
(EU) states have substantial influence.
The countries that comprise the European
Union will play a different role in the shifting
of power than that of their Asian contempo-
raries. Germany accounted for 4.6 percent of
the world's GDP in 2005, the UK for 3.5 per-
cent, and France for 3.4 percent, while other
nations made up smaller, yet still sizable con-
tributions (World Bank). Individually, these
numbers will not shake the international sys-
tem, especially when populations are decreas-
ing and annual GDP growth is around 1 per-
cent for most EU countries (World Bank,
CIA). Instead, it is the EU itself that will be-
come an influential player through combining
the strengths of all its parts. It is the largest
trading bloc in the world, and similar issues
unite the EU's members in ways that the UN
will never be able to achieve (Zakaria 4). Thus
Europe, while not progressing at the rate of
China or India, will continue to have a major
say in international politics through collu-
sion. However, it is important to note that the
EU cannot replace the US because its mem-
ber states still maintain sovereignty, and
therefore it will not be able to consistently act
uniformly in politics or, given that it has no
standing army, in military matters.
Japan, accounting for 7.0 percent of the
world's GDP in 2005, is remarkably powerful
given its size and continues to be a major
source of technological innovation (World
Bank, CIA). However, it is still trying to re-
cover from a long bear market throughout the
1990's, as well as the lingering recent global
recession. A very poor market, coupled with
an declining population will continue to hin-
der Japan, though it will no doubt continue to
be an influential actor in the future interna-
tional system (World Bank).
India, on the contrary, is preparing to en-
ter the international stage with pomp and cir-
cumstance, boasting not only a 4.3 percent
share of the world GDP, but a seven percent
annual growth rate, as of 2005. What is most
remarkable, however, is India's vast increase
in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). $3.6 bil-
lion was invested in the year 2000, and just
seven years later that number had swelled
over 600 percent to 22.9 billion dollars, put-
ting India's economy on the fast track to de-
velopment (World Bank). India too will take
time to reach its potential, however, and will
not be nearly as powerful as the US by 2035,
especially because the country is still develop-
ing its infrastructure and society.
All of these nations will play important
roles in the coming uni-multipolar system,
though perhaps none as integral as China. Ac-
counting for 9.7 percent of the world GDP in
2005, China has the second-largest economy
in the world, and its blistering annual growth
rate, at over 9 percent for nearly thirty years,
is the fastest for any major economy in re-
corded history (Zakaria 89). It exports more
in a single day now than it did during the en-
tire year of 1978 (89). Correspondingly, the
average person's income has increased seven-
fold, allowing 400 million people to move out
7
of poverty, empowering them to get an educa-
tion and further fuel China's economic en-
gine. The proportion of population below $1
(PPP) per day has dropped from 60.2 percent
in 1990 to 15.9 percent just fifteen years later.
Even in social issues, such as the Gender Par-
ity Index in tertiary level enrollment, it has
made great progress, moving from .53 in 1991
to 1.01 in 2007 (CIA). With all of these num-
bers pointing blatantly towards Chinese in-
ternational dominance, why would it not re-
place the more stagnant US, whose annual
GDP growth rate is a mere one percent by
comparison?
While there are many things going very
well for China, it is a country that also has
many problems, and these problems will keep
it from replacing the US by 2035. First of all,
it is still developing its massive economy and
infrastructure, not to mention in a way,
(primarily coal as energy), that is highly detri-
mental to the environment. Eleven cities in
China have three times the air pollution as
Los Angeles, and highway traffic is increasing
26 percent per year (CIA). It will have to re-
think its development paths if it wishes for its
cities to be healthy. Also, the one child policy
has led to both the birth of more boys than
girls, and to what will soon become an aging
population. The median age was twenty in
1970 and will be nearly forty-five in 2035,
putting immense stress on the government to
provide healthcare services while far fewer
people are paying into the system (CIA). Fi-
nally, if historical trends persist, China's peo-
ple will eventually call for democracy, and the
transition may be difficult for the nation to
make smoothly. For all these reasons, China, MacLean, George A. "[Untitled]." Interna
while being a huge international player, will tional Journal 61.1 (2006): 274-76.
not replace the United States by 2035. JSTOR. Web. 25 Feb. 2010. <http://
www.jstor.org/stable/40204152>.
The reign of US hegemony is ending; uni-
polarity will give way to uni-multipolarity by Mohan, C. Raja. "Debating China's 'Peaceful
2035, as those once small countries take their Rise': The Rhyme of the Ancient Mari
place on the international stage either ner." Economic and Political Weekly
through growth or collusion. The US will still 39.33 (2004): 3699-702. JSTOR. Web.
be the most powerful single nation in the 25 Feb. 2010. <http://www.jstor.org/
world through its military, but the new bal- stable/4415413>.
ance of power will ensure that it will no "Quick Query Selected from the World Devel
longer be able to act indifferently to the opin- opment Indicators." The World Bank
ions of the rest of the world. Group. The World Bank Group. Web.
26 Feb. 2010. <http://ddp-
Works Cited ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/
"CIA - The World Factbook -- China." Central showReport.do?method=show Re
Intelligence Agency. Web. 26 Feb. port>.
2010. <https://www.cia.gov/library/ Shah, Anup. "World Military Spend
publications/the-world-factbook/ ing." Www.19.org. Web. 26 Feb. 2010.
geos/ch.html>. <http://www.19.org/index.php?
Global Purchasing Power Parities and Real aid=312>.
Expenditures 2005 International Com "Status of World Nuclear Forces." Federation
parison Program. Rep. Washington , of American Scientists. Web. 26 Feb.
D.C.: International Bank for Recon 2010. <http://www.fas.org/programs/
struction and Development/The World ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/
Bank, 2005. World Bank. Web. 25 Feb. nukestatus.html>.
2010. <http://siteresources.worldban
k.org/ICPINT/Resources/icp-final. Tiron, Roxana. "Senate OKs defense bill, 68-
pdf>. 29." TheHill.com. Capitol Hill Publish
ing Corp., 22 Oct. 2009. Web. 26 Feb.
Huntington, Samuel P. "The Lonely Super 2010. <http://thehill.com/homenews/
power." Foreign Affairs 78.2 (1999): 35 senate/64377-senate-to-vote-on- de
-49. JSTOR. Web. 26 Feb. 2010. fense-bill#,>.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/
pdfplus/20049207.pdf>. Tulchin, Joseph S. "Hemispheric Relations in
the 21st Century." Journal of In
teramerican Studies and World Affairs

8
 ing Corp., 22 Oct. 2009. Web. 26 Feb.
2010. <http://thehill.com/homenews/
senate/64377-senate-to-vote-on- de
fense-bill#,>.
Tulchin, Joseph S. "Hemispheric Relations in
the 21st Century." Journal of In
teramerican Studies and World Affairs
39.1 (1997): 33-43. JSTOR. Web. 25
Feb. 2010. <http://www.jstor.org/
stable/166494>.
Vasquez, John A. "Dispelling Multipolar
Nightmares." Mershon International
Studies Review 39.1 (1995): 161-63.
JSTOR. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <http://
www.jstor.org/stable/222707>.
Zakaria, Fareed. The Post-American World.
New York: W. W. Norton, 2008. Print.