FISCAL AUTONOMY
1. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY V. CA
DOCTRINE: Under Sec. 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code, which governs the legal relation and status of govt units,
agencies and offices within the entire govt machinery, MIAA is a govt instrumentality
and not a govt-owned or controlled corporation. Under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC,
MIAA as a govt instrumentality is not a taxable person because it is not subject to
"[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind" by local govts. The only exception is when
MIAA leases its real property to a "taxable person" as provided in Sec. 234(a) of the
LGC, in which case the specific real property leased becomes subject to real estate
tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings leased to taxable persons
like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of Parañaque.
FACTS:
 Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under EO No.
903
o As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the
land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex
o MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares
of land
 The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred
to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless
specifically approved by the Pres. of the Philippines
 the Office of the Govt Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion
No. 061 stating that the LGC of 1991 withdrew the exemption from
real estate tax granted to MIAA under Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter
 MIAA negotiated with Resp. City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax
imposed by the City and MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already
due
o MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency
from the City of Parañaque
o the City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices
of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings
 The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the
Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax
delinquency
 OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying OGCC Opinion No. 061 à Sec.
206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof
of exemption
 OGCC opined that Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA
is exempt from real estate tax
 MIAA filed with the CA an original petition for prohibition and injunction,
with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order which
sought to restrain the city of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on,
levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and
Buildings
 CA dismissed; MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day reglementary period
 the City of Parañaque posted notices of auction sale
 A day before the public auction, MIAA filed before this Court an Urgent
Ex-Parte and Reiteratory Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order to restrain the city from auctioning the airport lands and
buildings
ISSUE: WON the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate
tax under existing laws
RULING: Yes. MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax
imposed by local govts
 MIAA is not a govt-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality
of the National Govt and thus exempt from local taxation
o the real properties of MIAA are owned by the PH and thus
exempt from real estate tax
 There is no dispute that a govt-owned or controlled corporation is not
exempt from real estate tax BUT MIAA is not a govt-owned or controlled
corporation
 Sec. 2(13) of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a govt-owned or
controlled corporation as any agency organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs
whether govtal or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Govt
directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where
applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: x x x
 A GOCC must be "organized as a stock or non-stock corporation." à
MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation nor is it a stock
corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares
o MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares
 o under its Charter, MIAA does not have capital stock that is
divided into shares
o MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no
members1
 Sec. 88 of the Corporation Code provides that non-stock corporations are
"organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural,
recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar
purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and like chambers." MIAA is not
organized for any of these purposes
 MIAA is a public utility and is organized to operate an international and
domestic airport for public use
 MIAA is a govt instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform
efficiently its govtal functions. MIAA is like any other govt instrumentality,
the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
 When the law vests in a govt instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the govt
instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains
a govt instrumentality exercising not only govtal but also corporate powers.
 A govt instrumentality like MIAA falls under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC.2
o Sec. 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local govts cannot
tax the national govt, which historically merely delegated to local
govts the power to tax
o While the 1987 PC now includes taxation as one of the powers of
local govts, local govts may only exercise such power "subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide."
 When local govts invoke the power to tax on national govt
instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local govts
o Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is
resolved against taxation
o This rule applies with greater force when local govts seek to tax
national govt instrumentalities
1
A non-stock corporation must have members and even if we assume that the Govt is
considered as the sole member of MIAA, this will not make MIAA a non-stock corporation
 Non-stock corporations cannot distribute any part of their income to their members
 Thus, Sec. 133 of the LGC states that "unless otherwise provided" in
the Code, local govts cannot tax national govt instrumentalities.
2. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU V. PEZA
 These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-
Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately filed against the Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).
o In G.R. No. 184203, the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City) assails the
CA’ decision2 dated January 11, 2008 and resolution dated August
6, 2008, dismissing the City’s appeal for being the wrong mode of
appeal. The City appealed the RTC, Branch 111, Pasay City’s
decision finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real property
taxes.
o In G.R. No. 187583, the Province of Bataan (the Province) assails
the CA’ decision4dated August 27, 2008 and resolution5 dated
April 16, 2009, granting the PEZA’s petition for certiorari. The
CA ruled that the RTC, Branch 115, Pasay City gravely abused its
discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real property taxes to the
Province of Bataan.
 Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Pres. Decree No. 66 in 1972, declaring
as govt policy the establishment of export processing zones in strategic
locations in the Philippines.
o To carry such policy, the Export Processing Zone Authority was
created. The said decree declared that EPZA will be a non-profit
entity, and was also declared to be exempt from taxes.
 On March 25, 1998, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the
Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA PHP 32,912,350.08 in real property
taxes for the period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located
in the Mactan Economic Zone.
o The City pointed out that no provision in the Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995 specifically exempted the PEZA from payment
2 SEC. 133 Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of LGUs. – Unless otherwise provided
herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following.Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National
Govt, its agencies and instrumentalities and LGUs.
 of real property taxes, unlike Sec. 21 of Pres. Decree No. 66 that
explicitly provided for EPZA’s exemption.
o Since no legal provision explicitly exempted the PEZA from
payment of real property taxes, the City argued that it can tax the
PEZA.
 On September 11, 2002, the PEZA filed a petition for declaratory
relief2with the RTC of Pasay City, praying that the trial court declare it
exempt from payment of real property taxes.
 Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the National Govt, the trial court
ruled that the City had no authority to tax the PEZA under Secs. 133(o)
and 234(a) of the LGC of 1991
Issue: WON exhaustion of administrative remedies is needed?
 The proper remedy of a taxpayer depends on the stage in which the LGU
is enforcing its authority to collect real property taxes. For the guidance of
the members of the bench and the bar, we reiterate the taxpayer’s remedies
against the erroneous or illegal assessment of real property taxes.
 GR: Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the LGC is
necessary in cases of erroneous assessments where the correctness of
the amount assessed is assailed.
 Once an assessment has already been issued by the assessor, the proper
remedy of a taxpayer depends on whether the assessment was erroneous or
illegal.
o An erroneous assessment “presupposes that the taxpayer is
subject to the tax but is disputing the correctness of the amount
assessed.”
o With an erroneous assessment, the taxpayer claims that the local
assessor erred in determining any of the items for computing the
real property tax, i.e., the value of the real property or the portion
thereof subject to tax and the proper assessment levels.
o In case of an erroneous assessment, the taxpayer must exhaust
the administrative remedies provided under the LGC before
resorting to judicial action.
 In case of an illegal assessment where the assessment was issued
without authority, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
necessary and the taxpayer may directly resort to judicial action. The
taxpayer shall file a complaint for injunction before the RTC to enjoin the
LGU from collecting real property taxes.
3. MCIAA V. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU
 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by
Congress on July 31, 1990 under RA No. 6958 to “undertake the
economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of
the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug
Airport in Cebu City x x x and such other airports as may be established in
the Province of Cebu.”
o Upon its creation, Pet. enjoyed exemption from realty taxes under
Sec. 14 of RA No. 6958.
o In September 11, 1996, however, this Court rendered a decision
in MCIAA v. Marcos declaring that upon the effectivity of RA
No. 7160 (The LGC of 1991), Pet. was no longer exempt from
real estate taxes.
 Resp. City issued to Pet. a Statement of Real Estate Tax assessing the lots
comprising the Mactan International Airport in the amount of
P162,058,959.52.
o Pet. complained that there were discrepancies in said Statement
of Real Estate Tax.
o Resp. City amended its billing and sent a new Statement of Real
Estate Tax to Pet. in the amount of P151,376,134.66.
 Pet. paid Resp. City the amount of P4M monthly, which was later increased
to six million pesos P6M monthly. As of December 2003, Pet. had paid
Resp. City a total of P275,728,313.36.
 The Sec. of the DOJ issued Opinion No. 50, Series of 1998 which states
that
o “The query is resolved in the affirmative. The properties used for
airport purposes (i.e. airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on
which the runway and taxiway are situated) are owned by the PH.
it is our considered opinion that the properties used for airport
purposes, such as the airfield, runway and taxiway and the lots on
which the runway and taxiway are located, are owned by the
State or by the PH and are merely held in trust by the
MCIAA, notwithstanding that certificates of titles thereto may
have been issued in the name of the MCIAA.”
 Based on the above DOJ Opinion, the Dept. of Finance issued a 2nd
Indorsement to the City Treasurer of Lapu-Lapu recognizing MCIAA’s
 exemption from payment of real property tax on the property used for
airport purposes.”
 Resp. City Treasurer Elena T. Pacaldo sent Pet. a Statement of Real
Property Tax Balances up to the year 2002 reflecting the amount of
P246,395,477.20.
o Pet. filed a petition for prohibition with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu
City with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
o The petition for prohibition sought to enjoin Resp. City from
issuing a warrant of levy against Pet.’s properties and from selling
them at public auction for delinquency in realty tax obligations.
 The RTC issued an Order denying the motion for extension of the TRO.
o Thus, on December 10, 2003, Resp. City auctioned 27 of Pet.’s
properties. Resp. City forfeited and purchased said properties.
 RTC: granted Pet.’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
However, upon motion of Resp., the RTC lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction ruling that the Resp. City, in the course of the hearing of its
motion, presented to this Court a certified copy of its Ordinance No. 44
(Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Lapu-Lapu), Sec. 25 whereof
authorized the collection of a rate of one and one-half (1 ½) [per centum]
from owners, executors or administrators of any real estate lying within the
jurisdiction of the City of Lapu-Lapu, based on the assessed value as shown
in the latest revision.
 CA: Even if it is clear that Resp. City has the power to impose real property
taxes over Pet., it is also evident and categorical that, under RA No. 6958,
the properties of Pet. MCIAA may not be conveyed or transferred to any
person or entity except to the national govt.
Issue: WON PET. IS A GOVT INSTRUMENTALITY EXEMPT FROM
PAYING REAL PROPERTY TAXES
Held: YES, The Pet. is an instrumentality of the govt; thus, its properties
actually, solely and exclusively used for public purposes, consisting of the
airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which they
are situated, are not subject to real property tax and Resp. City is not justified
in collecting taxes from Pet. over said properties.
 The CA (Cebu City) erred in declaring that the 1996 MCIAA case still
controls and that Pet. is a GOCC. The 2006 MIAA case governs. In 2006,
the Court en banc decided a case that in effect reversed the 1996 Mactan
ruling. The 2006 MIAA case had, since the promulgation of the questioned
Decision and Resolution, reached finality and had in fact been either
affirmed or cited in numerous cases by the Court. The decision became
final and executory on November 3, 2006. Furthermore, the 2006 MIAA
case was decided by the Court en banc while the 1996 MCIAA case was
decided by a Division. Hence, the 1996 MCIAA case should be read in light
of the subsequent and unequivocal ruling in the 2006 MIAA case
 SC (2006 MIAA case): MIAA’s airport lands and buildings are exempt from
real estate tax imposed by local govts; that it is not a GOCC but an
instrumentality of the national govt, with its real properties being owned by
the PH, and these are exempt from real estate tax.
 Many govt instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do
not become stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary
condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a govt-owned or
controlled corporation.
o Examples: MIAA, PH Ports Auth. UP and BSP. All these govt
instrumentalities exercise corporate powers but they are not
organized as stock or non-stock corporations as required by Sec.
2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code.
These govt instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called govt
corporate entities
 (2006 MIAA case): ISSUE: WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA
are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws.
o When the law vests in a govt instrumentality corporate powers,
the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the
govt instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, it remains a govt instrumentality exercising not only
govtal but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the
govtal powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying
of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises“all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as
these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this EO.
 The Court in the 2006 MIAA case went on to discuss the limitation on the
taxing power of the local govts as against the national govt or its
instrumentality. When local govts invoke the power to tax on national govt
instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local govts. There
is no point in national and local govts taxing each other, unless a sound and
 compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds from one govt
pocket to another.
 There is also no reason for local govts to tax national govt instrumentalities
for rendering essential public services to inhabitants of local govts. The only
exception is when the legislature clearly intended to tax govt
instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public services for sound and
compelling policy considerations.
 The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they
are used by the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other
charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands
and Buildings as properties for public use. Properties of public dominion,
being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition
through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary
to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public
dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.
 Like in MIAA, the airport lands and buildings of MCIAA are properties of
public dominion because they are intended for public use. As properties of
public dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the PH, and are
outside the commerce of man. This, unless Pet. leases its real property to a
taxable person, the specific property leased becomes subject to real
property tax; in which case, only those portions of Pet.’s properties which
are leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real property
tax by the City of Lapu-Lapu.
 SC: adopt and apply to Pet. MCIAA the findings and conclusions of the
Court in the 2006 MIAA case.
 To summarize,
o MIAA is not a govt-owned or controlled corporation under
Sec. 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code because it is not organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation.
o Neither is MIAA a govt-owned or controlled corporation
under Sec. 16, Article XII of the 1987 PC because MIAA is
not required to meet the test of economic viability.
o MIAA is a govt instrumentality vested with corporate powers
and performing essential public services pursuant to Sec.
2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code. As a govt instrumentality, MIAA is not subject to any
kind of tax by local govts under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC.
o The exception to the exemption in Sec. 234(a) does not apply
to MIAA because MIAA is not a taxable entity under the
LGC. Such exception applies only if the beneficial use of real
property owned by PH is given to a taxable entity.
 Finally, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties
devoted to public use and thus are properties of public dominion.
Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or PH.
4. PIMENTEL, JR. V. OCHOA
Doctrine: Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central govt powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the LGC itself weighs
against it. The national govt is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the
formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where
it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned
- The Pets. assail the validity of certain provisions of RA 10147 or the GAA
(General Appropriations Act) which allotted and increased to P21 Billion,
the budget for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program spearheaded by
DSWD.
- Herein Pets. seek to enjoin Resp.s from implementing the said program on
the ground that it amounts to a recentralization of govt functions that have
already been devolved from the national govt to the LGUs. Since the
manner of implementation was primarily through a national agency lie
DSWD instead of the LGUs to which the responsibility and functions of
delivering social welfare and health care services devolved pursuant to Sect.
17 of RA 7160 in relation to Article 10.
- Pets. also assert that instead of allocating the entire 21M budget to the
LGUs, it is the DSWD has full control over the identification of
beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be delivered or the
conditions to be complied with.
Issue: WON the 21 budget allocation of CCT (conditional cash transfer) violates
Local Autonomy of the LGUs? – NO
Held: Every law has in its favor the presumption of Constitutionality, and to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the PC, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.23 Pets. have failed to discharge the burden of
proving the invalidity of the provisions under the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a
P21 billion budget for an intervention program formulated by the national govt itself
but implemented in partnership with the LGUs to achieve the common national goal
development and social progress can by no means be an encroachment upon the
autonomy of local govts.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national govt has not 5. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
completely relinquished all its powers over local govts, including autonomous V. DENR
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political - Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO. On April 29, 1998,
subdivisions xxx. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and MGB-RO denied Golden Falcon’s application for FTAA on for failure to
policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common secure the required area clearances from the Forest Management Sector and
national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the Pres. and Lands Management Sector of the DENR-RO. Golden Falcon appealed the
Congress. denial with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central Office (MGB-CO).
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of - On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO,
power. MCCS filed with the PENRO of Bulacan their applications for quarry
permit covering the same area subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA
DECENTRALIZATION OF DECENTRALIZATION OF application. MGB-CO finally denied Golden Falcon’s appeal on July 16,
ADMIN. POWER 2004.
There is decentralization of Decentralization of power, on the - AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration
administration when the central govt other hand, involves an abdication of permit covering the same subject area on September 13, 2004. Confusion
delegates administrative powers to political power in the [sic] favor of local of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC and the
political subdivisions in order to governments [sic] units declared to be persons applying for quarry permits – the contention was the date the area
broaden the base of govt power and in autonomous. In that case, the of Golden Falcon’s application became open to other permit applications
the process to make local govts more autonomous government is free to from other parties
responsive and accountable and ensure chart its own destiny and shape its - On October 19, 2004, upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog,
their fullest development as self-reliant future with minimum intervention DENR-MGB Director Ramos stated that the denial of Golden Falcon’s
communities and make them more from central authorities. According to a application became final on August 11, 2004, or fifteen days after Golden
effective partners in the pursuit of constitutional author, decentralization Falcon received the order of denial of its application. Hence, the area of
national development and social of power amounts to self-immolation, Golden Falcon’s application became open to permit applications
progress. since in that event, the autonomous only on that date.
government becomes accountable not - Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion
At the same time, it relieves the central
to the central authorities but to its on the issue, stating that the subject area became open for new
govt of the burden of managing local
constituency applications on the date of the first denial on April 29, 1998 (MGB-
affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. RO’s order of denial), as MGB-CO’s order of denial on July 16, 2004 was
a mere reaffirmation of the MGB-RO’s April 29 order; hence, the
reckoning period should be April 29.
The Pres. exercises general supervision - Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsed the
over them, but only to ensure that local applications for quarry permit, now apparently converted to
affairs are administered according to applications for small-scale mining permit, to the Gov. of Bulacan.
law. He has no control over their acts PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Gov. the approval of said
in the sense that he can substitute their applications. Eventually, the Gov. issued the small-scale mining permits.
judgments with his own. AMTC appealed to the DENR Sec.
 - The DENR Sec. decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and cancelled
the Gov.’s issuance of small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-
MGB Director Ramos that the area was open to mining location only on
August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO denial). Hence, the
applications for quarry permit filed on February 10, 2004 were null as these
were filed when the area was still closed to mining location. On the other
hand, AMTC filed its application when the area was already open to other
mining applicants, hence, its application was valid. The small-scale mining
permits were also issued in violation of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond
the authority of the Gov. pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area
was never proclaimed to be under the small-scale mining program.
- The Pet. League of the Provinces of the Philippines filed this petition saying
that that this is not an action of one province alone, but the collective action
of all provinces through the League, as a favorable ruling will not only
benefit one province, but all provinces and all local govts.
ISSUES
1. Whether DENR’s act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts
to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers
of all provinces, as the DENR Sec. substituted the judgment of the Provincial
Gov. of Bulacan. – NO
- The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Sec. was rendered in
accordance with the power of review granted to the DENR Sec. in the
resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 707651
and Sec. 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The decision of the
DENR Sec., declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of
AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-
Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Gov., emanated from
the power of review granted to the DENR Sec. under R.A. No. 7076
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
- The DENR Sec.'s power to review and decide the issue on the
validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the
Provincial Gov. as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial
function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and
what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the
matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.
- The DENR Sec. exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling
disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial
function of the DENR Sec. can neither be equated with "substitution of
judgment" of the Provincial Gov. in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor
"control" over the said act of the Provincial Gov. as it is a determination of
the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
2. WON Sec. 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC and Sec. 24 of the Small-Scale Mining
Act, which confer upon DENR and the DENR Sec. the power of control are
unConstitutional, as the PC states that the Pres. (and Exec Depts) has the
power of supervision only, not control over acts of LGUs. – NO
- In this case, Resp. DENR Sec. has the authority to nullify the Small-
Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Gov. of Bulacan, as
the DENR Sec. has control over the PMRB, and the implementation
of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by Resp.
DENR. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 2, Article XII of the PC provides that "the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State.”
- Under said provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise
the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the
country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale
mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and
review of the DENR under the LGC, while the People’s Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program is to be
implemented by the DENR Sec. in coordination with other concerned local
govt agencies. The Court has clarified that the Constitutional guarantee
of local autonomy in the PC Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative
autonomy of LGUs or the decentralization of govt authority. It does
not make local govts sovereign within the State.
- The LGC did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining
law to the provincial govt, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and
higher authority, of carrying out the State's Constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.
- Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and
coordinate branch of the Govt, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our
jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be
valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers
which enjoins upon the 3 coordinate Dept.s of the Govt a becoming
courtesy for each other's acts. This Court, however, may declare a law, or
portions thereof, unConstitutional where a Pet. has shown a clear and
 unequivocal breach of the PC, leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind
of the Court.
In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by Pet. to challenge the Constitutionality of Sec.
17 (b)(3)(iii) of the LGC of 1991 and Sec. 24 of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the
Constitutionality of the said provisions of law.
6. MANDANAS V. OCHOA
- The Pets. hereby challenge the manner in which the just share in the
national taxes of the LGUs (LGUs) has been computed.
- This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
assailing the manner the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for FY 2012
computed the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the LGUs. Certain
collections of NIRTs by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) — specifically:
excise taxes, value added taxes (VATs) and documentary stamp taxes
(DSTs) — have not been included in the base amounts for the computation
of the IRA.
ISSUE: WON Sec. 284 of the LGC3 is unConstitutional for being repugnant
to Sec. 6, Article X of the 1987 PC.4
HELD: Sec. 284 of the LGC deviates from the plain language of Sec. 6 of Article X
of the 1987 PC
- While Sec. 6 mentions national taxes as the source of the just share of the
LGUs, Sec. 284 ordains that the share of the LGUs be taken from national
internal revenue taxes instead.
o The phrase “national internal revenue taxes”5 engrafted in Sec.
284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes
written in Sec. 6. As such, Congress has actually departed from
the letter of the 1987 PC stating that national taxes should be the
base from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure
is impermissible.
- Congress can validly exclude taxes that will constitute the base amount for
the computation of the IRA only if a Constitutional provision allows such
exclusion.
3LGUs shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal
year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);
(b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and
o Although it has the primary discretion to determine and fix the
just share of the LGUs in the national taxes, Congress cannot
disobey the express mandate of the PC for the just share of the
LGUs to be derived from the national taxes.
o The intent of the framers in respect of Sec. 6 is really that the base
for reckoning the just share of the LGUs should include all
national taxes.
- The 1987 PC is unequivocal in ordering that the just share of the LGUs in
the national taxes shall be automatically released to them. With Congress
having established the just share through the LGC, it seems to be beyond
debate that the inclusion of the just share of the LGUs in the annual GAAs
is unnecessary, if not superfluous.
o Hence, the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall be
released to them without need of yearly appropriation.
o The term automatic connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory; LGUs are not required to perform
any act or thing in order to receive their just share in the national
taxes.
o To operationalize the automatic release without need of
appropriation, Sec. 286 of the LGC clearly provides that the
automatic release of the just share directly to the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, shall be
"without need of any further action.”
o As compared to the provisions of the 1987 PC on Judiciary,
Constitutional Commisions, Ombudsman, and the Commission
on Human rights which shares to aspects: The first relates to the
grant of fiscal autonomy, and the second concerns the automatic
release of funds. The common denominator of the provisions is
that the automatic release of the appropriated amounts is
predicated on the approval of the annual appropriations of the
offices or agencies concerned.
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).
4 LGUs shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them.
5

7. REPUBLIC V. PALAWAN
- The PH, through the Dept. of Energy, entered into Service Contract No.
38 with Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, as
Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of petroleum operations in the area
known as the “Camago-Malampaya” located offshore northwest of
Palawan. Exploration of the area led to the drilling of the Camago-
Malampaya natural gas reservoir about 80 kilometers from the main island
of Palawan and 30kms from the platform.
- The Service contract provided for a 60-40 share ratio where the 60% will
go to the Govt and 40 to the province of Palawan.
o Administrative Order No. 381
 Pres. Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 381 which, in part, stated that the Province
of Palawan was expected to receive about US$2.1 Billion
from the estimated US 8.l Billion total govt share from
the Camago Malampaya natural gas project for the 20-
year contract period.
 DoE Sec. Francisco L. Viray wrote Palawan Gov.
Salvador P. Socrates, requesting for the deferment of
payment of 50% of Palawan's share in the project for the
first seven years of operations, estimated at US$222.89
Million, which it would use to pay for the National
Power Corporation's Take-or-Pay Quantity (TOPQ)
obligations under the latter's Gas Sale and Purchase
Agreements with SPEX/OXY.
Palawan’s Claim
- The Provincial Govt of Palawan asserted its claim over forty percent (40%)
of the National Govt's share in the proceeds of the project.
- It argued that since the reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction,
it is entitled to said share under Sec. 290 of the LGC. The National Govt
disputed the claim, arguing that since the gas fields were approximately 80
kms from Palawan's coastline, they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the province and is within the national territory of the Philippines.
- Negotiations took place between the National Govt and the Provincial
Govt of Palawan but proved to be unsuccessful. After their demand to pay
was unheeded, the province of Palawan decided to institute legal action.
Civil Case No. 3779
- The Provincial Govt of Palawan filed a petition for declaratory relief before
the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa against the affected Dept.
Secretaries.
o It sought Judicial determination of its rights under A.O. No. 381
(1998), R.A. No. 7611 or the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP)
for Palawan Act, Sec. 290 of R.A. No. 716024 or the LGC of 1991
(LGC), and Provincial Ordinance No. 47425 (series of 2000). It
asked the RTC to declare that the Camago-Malampaya natural gas
reservoir is part of the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of
Palawan and that the Provincial Govt of Palawan was entitled to
receive 40% of the National Govt's share in the proceeds of the
Camago-Malampaya natural gas project.
- Commenting on the petition, PH maintained that Palawan was not entitled
to the 40% share because the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is outside its
territorial jurisdiction.· It postulated that Palawan's territorial jurisdiction is
limited to its land area and to the municipal waters within 15 km from its
coastline. It denied being estopped by the acts of govt officials who earlier
acknowledged Palawan's share in the proceeds of the project.
E.O. No. 683
- On December 1, 2017, Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 683
which authorized the release of funds to the implementing agencies
pursuant to a Provisional Implementation Agreement that allowed 50% of
the disputed 40% of the Net Govt Share in the proceeds of the Service
Contract No. 38 to be utilized for the immediate and effective
implementation of development projects for the people of Palawan.
ISSUE: WON Palawan may claim 40% of the share. [NO]
HELD: LGUs share in national wealth
- Under Sec. 25, Article II of the 1987 PC, "(t)he State shall ensure the
autonomy of local govts."
 - In furtherance of this State policy, the 1987 PC conferred on LGUs the
power to create its own sources of revenue and the right to share not only
in the national taxes, but also in the proceeds of the utilization of national
wealth in their respective areas.
Territorial jurisdiction refers to territorial boundaries as defined in the LGU's charter
- The LGC does not define the term "territorial jurisdiction." Provisions
therein, however, indicate that territorial jurisdiction refers to the LGU's
territorial boundaries.
- Under the LGC, a "province" is composed of cluster of municipalities, or
municipalities and component cities. A "municipality," in tum, is described
as a group of barangays, while a "city" is referred to as consisting of more
urbanized and developed barangays.
- In the creation of municipalities, cities and barangays, the LGC uniformly
requires that the territorial jurisdiction of these govt units be "properly
identified by metes and bounds" The intention, therefore, is to consider an
LGU's territorial jurisdiction as pertaining to a physical location or area as
identified by its boundaries. This is also clear from other provisions of the
LGC, particularly Secs. 292 and 294, on the allocation of LGUs' shares
from the utilization of national wealth, which speak of the location of the
natural resources.
- That "territorial jurisdiction" refers to the LGU's territorial boundaries is a
construction reflective of the discussion of the framers of the 1987 PC who
referred to the local govt as the "locality" that is "hosting" the national
resources and a "place where God chose to locate His bounty. " It is also
consistent with the language ultimately used by the Constitutional
Commission when they referred to the national wealth as those found
within (the LGU's) respective areas.
- In enacting charters of LGUs, Congress .is called upon to properly identify
their territorial jurisdiction by metes and bounds. Mariano, Jr. v.
COMELEC stressed the need to demarcate the territorial boundaries of
LGUs with certitude because they define the limits of the local govts'
territorial jurisdiction.
Area as delimited by law and not exercise of jurisdiction as basis of the LGU’s equitable share
- The Court cannot subscribe to the argument posited by the Province of Palawan
that the national wealth, the proceeds from which the State is mandated to share
with the LGUs, shall be wherever the local govt exercises any degree of
jurisdiction.
- An LGU's territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily co-extensive with its exercise
or assertion of powers.
- To hold otherwise may result in condoning acts that are clearly ultra vires.
It may lead to, in the words of PH, LGU s "rush[ing] to exercise its powers
and functions in areas rich in natural resources (even if outside its
boundaries) with the intention of seeking a share in the proceeds of its
exploration" a situation that "would sow conflict not only among the LGUs
and the national govt but worse, between and among LGUs.
- There is likewise merit in PH's assertion that Palawan's interpretation of
what constitutes an LGU's territorial jurisdiction may produce absurd
consequences. Indeed, there are natural resources, such as forests and
mountains, which can be found within the LGU's territorial boundaries,
but are, strictly speaking, under national jurisdiction, specifically that of the
Dept. of Environment and Natural Resources.
- To equate territorial jurisdiction to areas where the LGU exercises jurisdiction means
that these natural resources will have to be excluded from the sharing scheme
although they are geographically within the LGU's territorial limits. The
consequential incongruity of this scenario finds no support either in the language or
in the context of the equitable sharing provisions of the 1987 PC and the LGC.
- The Provincial Govt of Palawan argues that its territorial jurisdiction extends to the
Camago-Malampaya reservoir considering that its local police maintains peace and
order in the area; crimes committed within the waters surrounding the province have
been prosecuted and tried in the courts of Palawan; and the provincial govt enforces
environmental laws over the same area
- The Court notes, however, that the province's claims of maintaining peace and order
in the Camago-Malampaya area and of enforcing environmental laws therein have
not been substantiated by credible proof. The province likewise failed to adduce
evidence of the crimes supposedly committed in the same area or their prosecution
in Palawan's courts
- The province cites illegal fishing, poaching and illegal entry as the cases tried before
the courts of Palawan. As conceded by the parties, however, the subject gas reservoir
is situated, not in the marine waters, but in the continental shelf. The Province of
Palawan has not established that it has, in fact, exercised jurisdiction over this
submerged land area
- The LGU's authority to adopt and implement measures to protect the environment
does not determine the extent of its territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the LGU's statutory
obligation to maintain ecological balance is but part of the nation's collective effort
to preserve its environment as a whole.
- The extent to which local legislation or enforcement protects the environment will
not define the LGU's territory. In fine, an LGU cannot claim territorial jurisdiction
over an area simply because its govt has exercised a certain degree of authority over
it. Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local govt, but by the law that creates
it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical
boundaries as fixed in its charter.
- No law clearly granting the Province of Palawan territorial jurisdiction over the Camago
Malampaya Reservoir
- PH has enumerated the laws defining the territory of Palawan. As defined in its
organic law, the Province of Palawan is comprised of merely islands. The
continental shelf, where the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is located, was clearly
not included in its territory. Under Palawan’s charter, therefore, the Camago-
Malampaya reservoir is not located within its territorial boundaries.
LOCAL AUTONOMY
1. BATANGAS CATV V. CA
- On July 28, 1986, Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution no. 210,
granting Batangas CATV a permit to consult, install and operate a
Community Antenna Television (CATV) system in Batangas. Sec. 8 of the
provision provides that Batangas CATV is authorized to charged its
subscribers the maximum rates specified, provided that any increase of rates
shall be subject to approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
- On November 1993, Batangas CATV increased its subscriber rates from
P88 to P180/month. As a result, the Batangas City Mayor wrote them a
letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures approval from
Sangguniang Panlungsod.
- Batangas CATV filed with RTC a petition for injunction, alleging that
Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators because under EO 205, the NTC has the sole
authority to regulate the CATV operation in PH.
- RTC → ruled in favor of Batangas CATV; the sole agency of the govt
which can regulate CATV operation is the NTC, and that the LGUs cannot
exercise regulatory power over it without appropriate legislation.
- CA → reversed; although the CATV system is granted by NTC pursuant
to EO 205, this does not preclude the Sangguniang Panlungsod from
regulating the operation of the CATV in their locality under the powers
vested upon it by Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 [LGC of 1983], Sec. 177[1].
o Resolution No. 210 authorized the grantee to impose charges
which cannot be increased except upon approval of Sangguniang
Bayan. It further provided that in case of violation by grantee of
terms and conditions, the city shall have right to withdraw. Thus,
appellee’s action of increasing service rates breached Resolution
no. 210 which gives the right to withdraw the permit.
- Batangas CATV’s argument: While RA 7160 [LGC of 1991] extends to the
LGUs the general power to perform any act that will benefit their
constituents, nonetheless, it does not authorize them to regulate the CATV
operation. Pursuant to E.O. No. 205, only the NTC has the authority to
regulate the CATV operation, including the fixing of subscriber rates.
- Resp.’s argument: CA did not commit error. Resolution no. 210 was
enacted pursuant to Sec. 177 (c) and (d) of BP 337 which authorizes LGUs
to regulate businesses. The term businesses necessarily includes the CATV
industry. Second, Resolution No. 210 is in the nature of a contract between
Pet. and Resp.s, it being a grant to the former of a franchise to operate a
CATV system. To hold that E.O. No. 205 amended its terms would violate
the Constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.
ISSUE: WON a LGU may regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators within its territorial jurisdiction? NO.
HELD: On June 11, 1978, Marcos issued PD 1512 establishing a monopoly of the
CATV industry by granting Sining Makulay an exclusive franchise to operate the
system. It terminated all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV
system previously granted by local govts or by any instrumentality or agency of the
national govt and prescribed subscriber rates to be charged by Sining Makulay to its
customers.
- On July 21, 1979, Marcos issued LOI 894vesting upon the Chairman of the
Board of Communications direct supervision over the operations of Sining
Makulay. Thereafter, he issued EO 546, integrating the Board of
 Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau to form the
NTC which has for its functions:
o Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of
communications utilities and services, radio communications
systems, wire or wireless telephone or telegraph systems, radio
and television broadcasting system and other similar public
utilities;
o Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular
operators of public service communications; and determine and
prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such
public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges
or rates are established by international bodies or associations of
which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies
recognized by the Philippine Govt as the proper arbiter of such
charges or rates
- The exclusive franchise of Sining Makulay was cut because of the 1986
Revolution. During Aquino’s administration, she issued EO 205, opening
the CATV industry to all citizens of the Philippines. It mandated the NTC
to grant Certificates of Authority to CATV operators and to issue the
necessary implementing rules and regulations.
- On September 9, 1997, Ramos issued EO 436which restated the NTC’s
regulatory powers, thus:
- SEC. 2. The regulation and supervision of the cable television industry in
the Philippines shall remain vested solely with the National
Telecommunications Commission(NTC).
- SEC. 3. Only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or
cooperatives, granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by
the Commission may install, operate and maintain a cable television system
or render cable television service within a service area.
- In light of the above laws and EO 436, NTC exercises regulatory power
over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
- It must be emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the regulatory
power shall be vested solely in the NTC, it pertains to the regulatory power
over those matters which are peculiarly within the NTC’s competence, such
as, the: (1) determination of rates, (2) issuance of certificates of authority,
(3) establishment of areas of operation, (4) examination and assessment of
the legal, technical and financial qualifications of applicant operators,
(5)granting of permits for the use of frequencies, (6) regulation of
ownership and operation, (7)adjudication of issues arising from its
functions, and (8) other similar matters.
- There is no dispute that Sangguniang Panlungsod, like other local legislative
bodies, has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions
under the general welfare clause of B.P. Blg. 337 and under RA 7160 based
on Sec. 16[2]and Sec. 458[3]. As such, the general welfare clause is the
delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs.
- Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs
under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV
system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses
public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of
constructing CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the
founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU
a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.
- While LGU’s power over general welfare clause is recognized, Resolution
no. 210 cannot be sustained as it violates the mandate of existing laws and
State’s deregulation policy over CATV industry. The apparent defect in
Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No. 436
insofar as it permits Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively
vested in the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by
CATV operators.
- Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing
it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically
covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts
to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of
the legislature, may be rendered invalid. Where the subject is of statewide
concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule,
its declaration is binding throughout the State.
- Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV
operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an
ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law. An ordinance
in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is
universally held to be invalid. LGUs must recognize that technical matters
concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of
the NTC.
 - On the assumption of a conflict between E.O. No. 205 and R.A. No. 7160,
the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect
to both by harmonizing them if possible. Thus, the NTC, under E.O. No.
205, has exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting CATV operation,
including specifically the fixing of subscriber rates, but nothing herein
precludes LGUs from exercising its general power, under R.A. No. 7160,
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of their constituents.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Resolution no. 210 also violated the State’s deregulation policy [Deregulation is the
reduction of govt regulation of business to permit free markets and competition].
Resp.s argue that EO 205 violates Constitutional prohibition against impairment of
contracts as Resolution 210 is a grant of franchise. There is no law authorizing LGUs
to grant franchises to operate CATV system. Whatever authority LGUs had before,
the same had been withdrawn by Marcos in PD no. 1512.Now, Sec. 3 of EO 426
provides that only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives
granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install,
operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable television service
within a service area.Thus, in the absence of Constitutional authorization,
municipalities have no power to grant franchises.
2. DISOMANGCOP V. DATUMANONG
- Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction(Petition) are the Constitutionality and validity of R.A. 8999: “An
Act Establishing An Engineering District in the First District of the Province of Lanao
del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefor,” and Dept. of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) Dept. Order No. 119 (D.O. 119)on the subject,
“Creation of Marawi Sub­District Engineering Office.”
- Secs. 1 and 15, Article X of the PC mandate the creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. Sec. 15 specifically
provides that “[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this PC and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the PH.”
- Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, R.A. 6734: “An Act Providing for An
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,” was enacted and
signed into law on 1 August 1989. This called for the plebiscite. Only four
(4) provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous region, namely:
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
- In accordance with R.A. 6734, then Pres. Corazon C. Aquino issued on 12
October 1990, E.O. 426: “Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the
Dept. of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Govt, and for other purposes.”
- ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. Pres. Cory Aquino
flew to Cotabato, the seat of the Regional Govt, for the inauguration.
Nearly 9 years later, on 20 May 1999, then Dept. of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) Sec. Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119on the
creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Officewhich shall have
jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the
DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.
- Almost 2 years later, on 17 January 2001, then Pres. Joseph E.
Estradaapproved and signed into law R.A. 8999: “An Act Establishing an
Engineering District in the 1stDistrict of the Province of Lanao Del Surand
Appropriating Funds Therefor.”
- Congresslater passed R.A. 9054: “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose RA
No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as Amended.” It, likewise, contains detailed provisions on the
powers of the Regional Govt and the retained areas of governance of the
National Govt.
- R.A. No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite on Aug. 14, 2001. Basilan and City
of Marawi voted to join ARMM. R.A. 6734 & R.A. 9054are collectively
referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.
- Pets. Arsadi M. Disomangcop (Disomangcop) and Ramir M. Dimalotang
(Dimalotang) addressed a petition to then DPWH Sec. Simeon A.
Datumanong, seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and the
non-implementation of R.A. 8999. No action, however, was taken on the
petition.
 - Pets. Disomangcop & Dimalotang filed the instant petition in their capacity
as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively for
the 1stEngineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur,
seeking:
o (1) to annul and set aside D.O. 119;
o (2) to prohibit Resp. DPWH Sec. from implementing D.O. 119
and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public works projects
intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions
of DPWH; and
o (3) to compel the Sec. of the Dept. of Budget and Management
(DBM) to release all funds for public works projects intended for
Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only;
and to compel Resp. DPWH Sec. to let the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works
projects within its jurisdictional area.
- They alleged that D.O. 119 was issued with GAD and it violates the
Constitutional autonomy of the ARMM, as the D.O. has tasked the Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Officewith functions that have already been
devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del
Sur.
- Resp.s, through the OSG, defended that the power of autonomous regions
did not diminish the legislative power of Congress; and that petitoners have
no legal standing.
ISSUE: WON R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are UNCONSTITUTIONAL
HELD: YES
[Jurisdiction] It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the creation of and appropriation of funds
to the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A. 8999 will
affect the powers, functions and responsibilities of the Pets. and the DPWH-ARMM.
As the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to
those of DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that
Pets. are in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and jobs. Their
material and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of
D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can
legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.
[R.A. No. 8999] While the ARMM Organic Acts are classified as statutes, they are
more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence,
the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999
in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
Also, R.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R.A. 9054. R.A. 9054 is anchored
on the 1987 PC. It advances the Constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the
powers of the ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one of
which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however,
ventures to reestablish the National Govt's jurisdiction over infrastructure programs
in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys
the latter law's objective.
[Regional Autonomy under R.A. 6734 & R.A. 9054] National laws are subject to
the PC one of whose state policies is to ensure the autonomy of autonomous regions,
as provided in Sec. 25, Article II of the 1987 PC.The idea behind the Constitutional
provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples
with distinctive cultures and traditions. These cultures, as a matter of right, must be
allowed to flourish.
However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of
a sovereignty distinct from that of PH, as it can be installed only "within the
framework of this PC and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of
the PH."
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the LGU vis-à-
vis the central govt. It refers to the granting of basic internal govt powers to the
people of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the
central govt
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization. Decentralization is a
decision by the central govt authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or
functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It is typically a delegated
power, wherein a larger govt chooses to delegate certain authority to more local
govts. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units that
have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right against
the central govt.
Decentralization comes in two forms:
DECENTRALIZATION OF DECENTRALIZATION OF E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM to
ADMIN. POWER the Autonomous Regional Govt (ARG) as provided in Secs. 1 and 2 of E.O. 426.
More importantly, Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the
When the central govt delegates Decentralization of power, on the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds for public works to
administrative powers to political other hand, involves an abdication of the ARG, as shown in Sec. 20, Art. VI, RA 9054.
subdivisions in order to broaden the political power in the [sic] favor of local
base of govt power and in the process govts [sic] units declared to be [D.O. 119] D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has
to make local govts more responsive autonomous. In that case, the jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is
and accountable and ensure their fullest autonomous govt is free to chart its violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The EO was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734—
development as self-reliant own destiny and shape its future with which initiated the creation of the Constitutionally-mandated autonomous regionand
communities and make them more minimum intervention from central which defined the basic structure of the autonomous govt. E.O. 426 sought to
effective partners in the pursuit of authorities. According to a implement the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the
national development and social constitutional author, decentralization ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Govt.
progress. of power amounts to self-immolation,
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the
since in that event, the autonomous
At the same time, it relieves the central Ministry of Public Works and Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring
govt becomes accountable not to the
govt of the burden of managing local the control and supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous
central authorities but to its Regional Govt. The latter statute specifically applies to DPWH-ARMM offices.
affairs and enables it to concentrate on
constituency
national concerns. Thus, E.O. 124 should give way to E.O. 426.
The President exercises general [GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION] Resp.s committed GAD for implementing
supervision over them, but only to RA 8999 despite being repealed, and for maintaining the DPWH Marawi Sub-
ensure that local affairs are District Engineering Office pursuant to D.O. 119 which has been rendered functus
administered according to law. He has officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
no control over their acts in the sense
WHEREFORE, considering that RA No. 9054 repealed RA No. 8999 and rendered
that he can substitute their judgments
DPWH Dept. Order No. 119 functus officio, the petition insofar as it seeks the writs
with his own. of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Accordingly, let a writ of prohibition
ISSUE commanding Resp.s to desist from implementing R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119,
and maintaining the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and the First
- Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur comprising the City of Marawi
functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the national and the municipalities within the First District of Lanao del Sur. However, the
office to the regional and local offices. It is also referred to decentralization petition insofar as it seeks a writ of mandamus against Resp.s is DENIED (because
of administration. funds cannot be released without a Regional Assembly Public Works Act).
- Devolution connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions LOCAL AUTONOMY AND DECISION-MAKING
from the central govt to LGUs. This is a more liberal form of 1. PROVINCE OF RIZAL V. EXEC. SEC.
decentralization since there is an actual transfer of powers and
responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to LGUs in cognizance - The case is a petition filed the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San
of their right to self-govt, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their Mateo, and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the
administrative and technical capabilities. It is also referred to Decision of the CA, denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition for
decentralization of power. certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
 restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and
Constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.
- At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs,
parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office
of the Pres. [Pres. Ramos], through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a
sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications.
- The Pets. opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of
dump site under the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of
their constituents. Moreso, the dump site is to be constructed in
theWatershed reservation.
- Through the concerted efforts of the officials and residents of the Province
of Rizal and Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However,
during the term of Pres. Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened.
- A TRO was then filed. Here, the Pets. did not raise the question that the
project was not consulted and approved by the appropriate Sanggunian but
the court took it into consideration since a mere MoA does not guarantee
the dump site’s permanent closure.
ISSUE: WON consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and
Municipality of San Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project
HELD:
- Yes, contrary to the averment of the Resp.s, Proclamation No. 635, which
was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the LGC,
which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.
- Sec. 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state-
"to require all national agencies and offices to conduct
6 particularly in populous centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of
1. Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs,
smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash
and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of
eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; [Sec. 447 (1)(vi)]
2. Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of
the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying
land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code,
enacting integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land
use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones,
periodic consultation with appropriate LGUs, non-govtal
and people's organization, and other concerned sectors of
the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdiction."
- Likewise Sec. 27 requires prior consultations before a
program shall be implemented by govt authorities and the
prior approval of the Sanggunian is obtained."
- Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Paño, Sec. 2 (c), requiring
consultations with the appropriate LGUs, should apply to
national govt projects affecting the environmental or
ecological balance of the particular community
implementing the project.
Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary
restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task
Force declared before the CA that they had conducted the required consultations.
- However, the ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore when at the
height of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of Pets. to
stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the
province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified
the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage
in their province.
- Moreover, Sec. 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of
the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other
things, “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.
16 of th(e) Code.” These include (see footnote) 6
buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Sec.
447 (2)(vi-ix)]
3. Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under Sec. 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities, …providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and
conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and
other similar forest development projects ….and, subject to existing laws, establishing and
providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to
supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the
construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs;
protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this
 - Briefly stated, under the LGC, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented:
- prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
- prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
- Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s
implementation is illegal.
2. BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. V. PROVINCE OF AKLAN
Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future,
respondent Province of Aklan planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay
Caticlan, Municipality of Malay. Thus, on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito Marquez to file
an application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to reclaim
the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year, the Province
deliberated on the possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of
2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its
resources.
After PRA’s approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of Environment
and Natural Resources-Environmental Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-
EMB RVI) issued to the Province Environmental Compliance Certificate-R6-1003-
096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the extent
of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port.
On May 17, 2010, the Province finally entered into a MOA with PRA which stated
that the land use development of the reclamation project shall be for commercial,
recreational and institutional and other applicable uses. It was at this point that the
Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of public consultation meetings.
On the other hand, the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan
of the Municipality of Malay and petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an
organization composed of some 160 businessmen and residents in Boracay,
purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the
drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir,
expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation project on environmental,
socio-economic and legal grounds.
Despite the opposition, the Province merely noted their objections and issued a
notice to the contractor on December 1, 2010 to commence with the construction
of the project. Thus, on June 1, 2011, BFI filed with the Supreme Court the instant
Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing
Mandamus. Thereafter, the Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO) and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the
petition.
The Petition was premised on the following grounds, among others:
a) the Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of the LGU
concerned;
b) the Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as
required by the Local Government Code (LGC).
The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the requirements of
DENR-EMB RVI and PRA that led to the approval of the reclamation project by
the said government agencies, as well as the recent enactments of the Barangay
Council of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay
favorably endorsing the said project, had “categorically addressed all the issues”
raised by the BFI in its Petition. It also considered the Petition to be premature for
lack of cause of action due to the failure of BFI to fully exhaust the available
administrative remedies even before seeking judicial relief.
ISSUES:
WON the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies before filing this case?
WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project?
RULING:
On the issue of prematurity due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies
conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water
service; and regulating the consumption, use or wastage of water.”[Sec. 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]
The Court held that the petition is not premature for failing to exhaust administrative
remedies and to observe the hierarchy of courts as claimed by the respondents.
The Court reiterated their ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals where they clarified
that the rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast
rule. It is not applicable where, among others, there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention such as in the instant case. The rule may also be
disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy or where
the protestant has no other recourse.
Meanwhile, the new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC, provides a relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is
a special civil action that may be availed of “to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law” and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO “as an
auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.”
The writ of continuing mandamus allows an aggrieved party to file a verified petition
in the proper court when any government agency or instrumentality or officer
thereof “unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty xxx in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, xxx and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Such proper court
may be the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the
actionable neglect or omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme
Court.
Here, the Court found that BFI had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law to determine the questions of unique national and local
importance raised that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection.
Moreover, the writ of continuing mandamus “permits the court to retain jurisdiction
after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the court’s decision” and, in order to do this, “the court may compel
the submission of compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as
well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision.”
On the issue of whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public
consultation for the project
The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation
for the project.
The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of national government
agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance and requires them to secure prior
public consultations and approval of local government units. In Province of Rizal v.
Executive Secretary, the Court emphasized that, under the Local Government Code,
two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental
and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior
consultation with the affected local communities, and (2) prior approval of the
project by the appropriate sanggunian. The absence of either of such mandatory
requirements will render the project’s implementation as illegal.
Here, the Court classified the reclamation project as a national project since it affects
the environmental and ecological balance of local communities. In one ruling, the
Court noted that such national projects mentioned in Section 27 of the LGC include
those that may cause pollution and bring about climate change, among others, such
as the reclamation project in this case.
Also, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides that project proponents should “initiate public
consultations early in order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns of
stakeholders are taken into consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of
the management plan”.
Thus, the law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRA’s power to reclaim
land in this case, to conduct prior consultations and prior approval. However, the
information dissemination conducted months after the ECC had already been issued
was insufficient to comply with the requirements under the LGC.
Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by
the subsequent endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay
of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan in 2012, which were both undoubtedly
achieved at the urging and insistence of the Province.
3. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. LIM
- On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by
oil companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell) and Dept. of Energy for the
creation of a Master Plan to address and minimize the potential risks and
hazards posed by the proximity of communities, business and offices to
Pandacan oil terminals without affecting security and reliability of supply
and distribution of petroleum products.
- On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted Ordinance
No. 8027 which reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its
adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial I.
- Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification
were given six (6) months from the date of effectivity to stop the operation
of their businesses. It was later extended until 30 April 2003.
- On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the
Supreme Court (SC) to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
- Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the RTC of Manila an
action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction.
The same was issued in favor of Chevron and Shell. Petron, on the other
hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004.
- On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119
entitled “An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use
Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration,
Enforcement and Amendment thereto”. This designates Pandacan oil
depot area as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone.
- On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and directed
Mayor Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that
the objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack
on the Pandacan Terminals.
- The oil companies filed a MR (MR) on the 7 March 2007 Decision. The SC
later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027 is Constitutional and that it was not
impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 as there is no irreconcilable
conflict between them.
- SC later on denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.
- On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor
Lim), the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under
Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No.
8187 appended to the list a Medium and a Heavy Industrial Zone where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly allowed.
- Pets. Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Their
contentions are as follows:
- It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not promote the
general welfare of the people
- It is violative of Sec. 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 PC as well as health
and environment related municipal laws and international conventions and
treaties, such as: Clean Air Act; Environment Code; Toxic and Hazardous
Wastes Law; Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of
the Child
- The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance
No. 8119 when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027
o On the other hand, the Resp.s Mayor Lim, et.al. and the
intervenors oil companies contend that:
- The Pets. have no legal standing to sue whether as citizens, taxpayers or
legislators. They further failed to show that they have suffered any injury or
threat of injury as a result of the act complained of
- The petition should be dismissed outright for failure to properly apply the
related provisions of the PC, the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate remedy
available
- The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC only
exercises appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the Constitutionality or
validity of an ordinance under Sec. 5, Article VIII of the 1987 PC
- It is the function of the SP to enact zoning ordinance without prior referral
to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it may repeal
all or part of zoning ordinance sought to be modified
- There is a valid exercise of police power
o On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which
essentially amended the assailed Ordinance to exclude the area
where petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from the
Industrial Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor Lim.
ISSUES WON there are violations of environmental laws
None. The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied
in Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the procedure in
civil, criminal and special civil actions before the MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and
MCTCs, and the RTCs involving the enforcement or violations of environmental
and other related laws, rules and regulations such as but not limited to: R.A. No.
6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act; R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;
Provisions in C.A. No. 141; and other existing laws that relate to the conservation,
development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural
resources.
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are allegations
of violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral
attacks that would support the other position of the Pets. – the protection of the
right to life, security and safety.
However, the petitions at bar are of transcendental importance warranting a
relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Jaworski v.
PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375)
WON the principle of hierarchy of courts is violated
No. The SC held that it is true that the petitions should have been filed with the
RTC, it having concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over a special civil action for
prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
WON the Pets. have legal standing to sue
Yes. The SC referred to their Decision dated 7 March 2007 which ruled that the Pets.
in that case have a legal right to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 because
the subject of the petition concerns a public right, and they, as residents of Manila,
have a direct interest in the implementation of the ordinances of the city.
No different are herein Pets. who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the assailed
ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that concerns a public right.
In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the people is
indisputably a right of utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the Pets., as
residents of Manila, have the required personal interest to seek relief to protect such
right.
WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals
Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to
the continued stay of the oil depots, the SC followed the same line of reasoning used
in its 7 March 2007 decision, to wit:
“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting a sound
urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to
protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the
Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to
commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and
Urban Development of the City of Manila which recommended the approval of the
ordinance:
(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable
and highly volatile products which include petroleum gas, liquefied
petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil
among others;
(2) The depot is open to attack through land, water and air;
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace;
and
(4) In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could
spread to the neighboring communities.
The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all
the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived,
rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which means that it is a
terrorist target. As long as there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila
are not safe. It therefore becomes necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate
the threat.”
The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil
depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the
absence of any convincing reason to persuade the Court that the life, security and
safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil
depots, the SC holds that the Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another,
no matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some, the SC cannot allow the
right to life be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of
probability have no place in situations where the very life of not just an individual
but of residents of big neighbourhoods is at stake
DISPOSITIVE PORTION.
Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unConstitutional and invalid with respect to the
continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to cease and desist from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil
terminals out of the Pandacan area
The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days,
submit to the RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated comprehensive plan and relocation
schedule, which relocation shall be completed not later than six (6) months from the
date the required document is submitted
 1. MOSQUEDA V. PILIPINO BANANA
DOCTRINES:
1) A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of
the local govt and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the PC or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be
unreasonable.
2) A LGU is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if
it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the
State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first
requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the PC; the second, to the
Due Process Clause of the PC.
3) Tests when police power is invoked as the rationale for the valid
passage of an ordinance: The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the
rational relation test or rational basis test) demands that the classification
reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies
in cases involving economics or social welfare, or to any other case not involving
a suspect class. The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right
or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The Govt carries
the burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest, and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted an ordinance imposing a ban
against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within
Davao City. Pursuant to the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be
strictly enforced 3 months thereafter. The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association, Inc. (PBGEA) filed a petition in the RTC to challenge the
Constitutionality of the ordinance, alleging that the ordinance exemplified the
unreasonable exercise of police power and violated the equal protection clause. The
RTC declared that the ordinance is valid and Constitutional saying that the City of
Davao had validly exercised police power under the General Welfare Clause of the
LGC and that the ordinance was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. On
appeal, however, the CA reversed the judgment of the RTC.
ISSUE: Is the prohibition against aerial spraying a lawfully permissible method that
the LGU of Davao City may adopt to prevent the purported effects of aerial drift?
(No.)
HELD: To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass
a two-pronged test: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the
corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it is passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like
the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the PC and the statutes,
as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with
public policy).
I. Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application
within 3 months can readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected
plantations and the corresponding resources required therefor. To recall, even the
RTC recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-shift to other modes of spraying
within 3 months in view of the costly financial and civil works required for the
conversion.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone
will consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography and
geographical features of the plantations. As such, the conversion could not be
completed within the short timeframe of 3 months, requiring the Resp.s and other
affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the 3-month
period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police
power.
(As to the buffer zones: The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the
purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial spraying within and near the plantations.
Although Sec. 3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees within
the identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as
confiscatory requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be
entitled to compensation if the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all
economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The Resp.s cannot be said to
be permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings because they can still
cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer
zones.)
II. Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The ordinance violated the equal protection clause. The imposition of the ban is too
broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to be aerially
applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. Such imposition
becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relation to the purported
inconvenience, discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the
ordinance seeks to address. The burden will now become more onerous to various
entities, including those with no connection whatsoever to the intended purpose of
the ordinance.
We must emphasize that our ruling herein does not seek to deprive the LGUs their
right to regulate activities within their jurisdiction. They are empowered under Sec.
16 of the LGC to promote the general welfare of the people through regulatory, not
prohibitive, ordinances that conform with the policy directions of the National Govt.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 failed to pass this test as it contravenes the specific
regulatory policy on aerial spraying in banana plantations on a nationwide scale of
the National Govt, through the FPA.
Finally, the unConstitutionality of the ban renders nugatory Ordinance No. 0309-07
in its entirety. Consequently, any discussion on the lack of the separability clause
becomes entirely irrelevant.
2. CITY OF BATANGAS V. PILIPINAS SHELL
● Batangas City is an LGU constituting a political body corporate, endowed
with powers pertaining to a municipal corporation. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod is the legislative body of Batangas City.
● Resp. PSPC owns and operates a refinery situated in Tabangao, Batangas
City (Tabangao Refinery).
● Shell Philippines Exploration, B.V. (SPEX), a foreign corporation licensed
to do business in the Philippines, was tasked to explore and develop
possible petroleum sources in North Western Palawan
○ This exploration led to the discovery of an abundant source of
natural gas in the Malampaya field off the shores of Palawan.
○ The Malampaya Project required the construction of a 504-
kilometer offshore pipeline for the transport of natural gas from
Malampaya field to Batangas, for treatment in PSPC's Tabangao
Refinery.
● May 28, 2001: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas City enacted an
Ordinance which requiring heavy industries operating along the portions of
Batangas Bay to construct desalination plants for the use of seawater as
coolant for their industrial facilities.
○ This ordinance was approved by the mayor in June 2001.
○ Among the facilities affected by the ordinance was PSPC's
Tabangao Refinery.
● May 23, 2006: PSPC filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity praying that
the Ordinance be declared null and void.
○ PSPC averred that the Ordinance constitutes an invalid exercise
of police power as it failed to meet the substantive requirements
for validity.
■ PSPC argued that the Ordinance contravenes
jurisdiction of the NWRB to regulate and control the
Philippines' water resources.
○ PSPC alleged that the Ordinance unduly singles out heavy
industries, and holds them solely accountable for the loss of water
and destruction of aquifers without basis, resulting in the
deprivation of their property rights without due process of law
○ PSPC also assailed the non-publication of the Ordinance in a
newspaper of general circulation, and the lack of public hearings
or consultations on the matter.
● In response, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod maintained
that they have the power to enact the Assailed Ordinance pursuant to the
general welfare clause under the LGC.
○ According to them, the rationale of the Assailed Ordinance is to
stop PSPC and other industries similarly situated from relying
"too much" on ground water as coolants for their machineries,
and alternatively promote the use of seawater for such purpose.
○ Further, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod alleged
that the Ordinance had in fact been published in Dyaryo Veritas,
a newspaper of general circulation in the area, and that joint public
hearings on the matter had in fact been conducted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan, where
PSPC was duly represented.
● RTC rendered a Decision declaring the ordinance invalid for want of
necessity and for not conducting prior public hearing, and for violating the
 due process clause of the PC. The RTC also held that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod encroached upon the authority of the NWRB.
● On appeal, the CA dismissed the appeal filed by the City for lack of merit.
The CA further held that the police power of the Sangguniang Panglungsod
is subordinate to the Constitutional limitations that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. Hence, the instant recourse to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which declared the Ordinance
invalid.
HELD: The Ordinance is INVALID for being ultra vires, for being contrary to
existing law, and for lack of evidence showing the existence of factual basis for its
enactment.
● Time and again, the Court has ruled that in order for an ordinance to be
valid, the ordinance
○ must not contravene the PC or any statute;
○ must not be unfair or oppressive;
○ must not be partial or discriminatory;
○ must not prohibit, but may regulate trade;
○ must be general and consistent with public policy; and
○ must not be unreasonable
CREATION AND ALTERATION OF LGUS
● Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the State, it is
incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the will of their principal, the
State. Necessarily, therefore, ordinances enacted pursuant to the general
welfare clause may not subvert the State's will by contradicting national
statutes
○ There is no doubt that the Ordinance contravenes the provisions
of the Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to
control and regulate the use of ground water which, by virtue of
the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB.
○ By enacting the Ordinance, Batangas City acted in excess of the
powers granted to it as an LGU, rendering the Assailed Ordinance
ultra vires.
○ It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior
in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in
conflict with a state law of general character and statewide
application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is
frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities,
under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which
infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy
of the state.
● In any case, it bears emphasizing that the measure of the substantive validity
of an ordinance is the underlying factual basis for which it was enacted.
Hence, without factual basis, an ordinance will necessarily fail the
substantive test for validity.
○ To prohibit an act or to compel something to be done, there must
be a shown reason for the same. The purpose must also be cogent
to the means adopted by the law to attain it. In this case, as seen
in the "whereas clause," the purpose of the ordinance is to protect
the environment and prevent ecological imbalance, especially the
drying up of the aquifers of Batangas City
○ It would have been acceptable had there been a specific study or
findings that the local govt conducted (sic) and not just its reliance
on the complaints of some constituents who merely made its
conclusion that the drying up of wells or its salination was due to
the "heavy industries" use of groundwater
1. LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC

SUMMARY. An amendment to the requisites to convert a municipality to a city was
made by the Congress through RA 9009. This law increased the requirement from
P20M to P100M. Congress approved of the Cityhood Laws which converted several
municipalities into cities without conforming to the P100M requirement. The SC
ruled that the Cityhood Laws are unConstitutional for bypassing the LGC which is
the main law that must be followed in terms of creating cities.
DOCTRINE. The PC requires Congress to stipulate in the LGC all the criteria
necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a
city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
1. Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities during
the 11th Congress but did not act on 24 other municipalities.
2. It enacted RA 9009 during the 12th Congress, which took effect on June 30,
2001.
3. RA 9009 amended Sec. 450, LGC by increasing the annual income requirement
of a municipality into a city from P20M to P100M to restrain the rush of the
conversion.
4. According to Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, municipalities simply want to secure a
larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
5. The HoR of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 which sought
exemption of the P100M requirement for the 24 municipalities not approved
during the 11th session, without the approval of the Senate.
6. The HoR during the 13th Congress re-adopted Joint Resolution No.29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate, where it was not approved.
7. 16 Municipalities filed their bills containing a common provision on the
exemption of the P100M requirement.
8. HoR and Senate approved the Cityhood Bills which subsequently turned into
the Cityhood Law.
9. Pets. filed the present complaint, to declare the Cityhood Laws unConstitutional
for violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the PC and the equal protection clause, and
raised their concern on the matter that the share of existing cities will be reduced.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON the Cityhood Laws are valid – NO
The PC is clear. The creation of LGUs must follow the criteria established in the
LGC and not in any other law. There is only one LGC.18 The PC requires Congress
to stipulate in the LGC all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including
the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in
any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the LGC govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other
law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of
the PC is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the
same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC. Any derogation
or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the LGC violates Sec. 10, Article X of the
PC.
RA 9009 amended Sec. 450 of the LGC to increase the income requirement from
P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June
2001. Hence, from that moment the LGC required that any municipality desiring to
become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Sec. 450 of the
LGC, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income
requirement.
DECISION.
Petition granted. Pets. won. Cityhood Law was named unConstitutional.
NOTES.
RA 9009 An Act Amending Sec. 450 Of RA No. 7160, Otherwise Known As The
LGC Of 1991, By Increasing The Average Annual Income Requirement For A
Municipality Or Cluster Of Barangays To Be Converted Into A Component City
Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city
if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Dept. of Finance, of at least
Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants,
as certified by the National Statistics Office:
 Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need
not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
2. NAVARRO V. ERMITA
- Oct. 2, 2006: The PH Pres. approved into law R.A. No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Island). Dec. 3, 2006: COMELEC conducted the mandatory
plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Gov’t
Code (LGC). Plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes
- With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte
and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), The Pres. appointed the interim set
of provincial officials. Thereafter, Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial
official.
- Pets. Navarro, Bernal and Medina (former political leaders of Surigao del Norte),
filed before this Court a Pet. for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158)
challenging the Constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 -> DISMISSED. They filed
another petition for certiorari are taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao
del Norte for the same reason, alleging that the creation of Dinagat as a new
province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congres, and would
unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte a large chunk of the provincial
territory, Internal Revenu Allocation (IRA), and rich resources
- Further, they alleged that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12
square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Sec.
10, Article X of the PC and of Sec. 461 of the LGC.
- Court GRANTED the petition: declared R.A. No. 9355 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the
creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, the proclamation of Dinagat
& declaration of its officials were declared NULL & VOID.
- The decision also declared Art. 9(2) of the Rules & Regulations Implementing the
LGC (LGC-IRR) as NULL & VOID, for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of
the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.”
- PH, represented by the OSG, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Decision. However, the Court in Resolution dated May 12,
2010 DENIED.
- The movant-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to File and to Admit Intervenors’ MR of the Resolution. They alleged that the
COMELEC issued Reso. No. 8790 which provides that:
- If the Decision is reversed, the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of
Surigao del Norte remain as two (2) separate provinces;
- If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province
of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative
District, Surigao del Norte.
- If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Norte.
- As the elected officials of Surigao del Norte, their positions will be affected by the
nullification of the election results in the event that the Resolution is not reversed.
- If the Resolution is not reversed, Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as
part of the 1st Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have
to be conducted.
- The Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment stating that the decision had
become final & executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, this urgent motion to recall entry
of judgment as filed by movant-intervenors.
- The movants-intervenors raised 3 (3) main arguments to challenge the above
Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of
Congress amending Sec. 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial
contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the
exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that
the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
ISSUE: WON Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of
1991 stating, “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands,” is VALID – YES.
HELD
- The central policy considerations in the creation of LGUs are economic
viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their
constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and
land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. Economic viability is the
primordial criterion in the creation of LGUs, particularly of a province. This is
the clear intent of LGC framers.
- The requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a city, and a province
as provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR.
o For a Barangay: Sec. 386, LGC and Art. 14, LGC-IRR.
o For a Municipality: Sec. 442, LGC and Art. 13, LGC-IRR
o For a City: Sec. 450, LGC and Art. 11, LGC-IRR
o For a Province: Sec. 461, LGC and Art. 9, LGC-IRR.
- The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or
is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income
of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds.
- When the LGU to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt
from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Sec. 442 and Sec. 450
of the LGC if the LGU to be created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for
the creation of a province under Sec. 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly
stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
- Thus, it is logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Sec. 442 (for municipalities) and Sec. 450 (for component cities) of
the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Sec. 461 (for provinces). Thus, when
the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the
inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Sec. 461 of the
LGC—and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for
the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
- To make the province comply with the minimum land are criterion of 2,000
square kilometers even if it consists of several islands, it would be more difficult
and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered
because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a
contiguous land mass. It also defeats the purpose of local autonomy and
decentralization as enshrined in the PC.
- Pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood
into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law
when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat. Further,
the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted
upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress
definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that
exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a
province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in
the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the
enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
3. UMALI V. COMELEC
● The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution no. 183-
2011, requesting the Pres. to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from
the component city of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC).
● Aceding to the request, the Pres. issued Pres. Proclamation Series of 2012,
proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to ratification in a
plebiscite by qualified voters as provided in Sec. 453 of LGC.
● COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued Minute Resolution no. 12-0797,
stating that for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City
from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of
Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite. It based this resolution
on Sec. 453 of the LGC, citing jurisprudence whereby only the residents of the
city proposed to be converted were allowed to vote in the plebiscite.
● The Gov. of Nueva Ecija (Umali) filed a verified MR, arguing that the proposed
conversion will necessarily and directly affect the province of Nueva Ecija.
◦ Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec.
10, Art. X of the PC, arguing that while the conversion in question
does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing
 city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of
the LGU directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a
material change in their rights and responsibilities.
◦ phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should
then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly
affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city
proposed to be upgraded -->all registered voters are qualified
● Private Resp. City Mayor of Cabanatuan (Vergara) opposed on the ground that
Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions.
◦ a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched,allows only the
qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite
● COMELEC --> ruled in favor of Vergara
● Vergara maintained that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a
component city into an HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the
conversion will only be the city itself. In this instance, no political unit will be
created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU and no
boundaries altered.
◦ The conversion would merely reinforce the powers already exercised
by the city thus participation of the voters of the province in the
plebiscite won’t be necessary.
● COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9543, which adopted a calendar of
activities and periods of prohibited acts in connection with the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC.
● Dr. Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief which was
raffled to RTC, praying that Minute Resolution 12-0797 be declared
unConstitutional & that TC declare all qualified voters of the province of Nueva
Ecija be included in the plebiscite
● COMELEC suspended preparations, but plebiscite was rescheduled.
Thereafter, J.V. Bautista filed a case for mandamus, contending that since the
TRO issued by the RTC has already expired, the duty of the public Resp. to hold
the plebiscite has become mandatory and ministerial
● After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public Resp. issued Resolution No.
1353 scheduling the plebiscite to January 25, 2014. However, a TRO was issued
by this Court on January 15, 2014 in G.R. No. 203974 to suspend the conduct
of the plebiscite for Cabanatuan City’s conversion.
ISSUE: WoN qualified voters of Nueva Ecija should be included in the
plebiscite not only those in Cabanatuan City? YES.
HELD: While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of
the PC we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an
HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries. The phrase “substantial alteration of
boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a change in the geographical
configuration of a LGU or units. However, the phrase "boundaries" should not be
limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but
also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation
lines between political subdivisions, where the LGU’s exercise of corporate power
ends and that of the other begins”
The alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow Cabanatuan City’s conversion
in the same way that creations, divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot
take place without entailing the alteration. Thus, conversion to an HUC is substantial
alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X governs and prevails over Sec.
453 of the LGC. Thus, Vergara’s interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs afoul of
Sec. 10, Art. X of the PC which explicitly requires that all residents in the "political
units directly affected" should be made to vote.
The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directlyaffected by Cabanatuan City’s
conversion
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite,
what should primarily be determined is WON the unit or units that desire to
participate will be "directly affected" by the change.
In Tan v COMELEC, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation
of the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to
be altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the
plebiscite. It can be seen that the Constitutional provision makes it imperative that
there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the
unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there
is substantial alteration of the boundaries.
A. Impact on Economic Rights
In the case of Miranda, the changes that will result in the downgrading of an LGU
from an independent component city to a component city cannot be categorized as
insubstantial, thereby necessitating the conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification.
Often raised is that Cabanatuan City’s conversion into an HUC and its severance
from Nueva Ecija will result in the reduction of the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285 of the LGC.
Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction of its share in IRA once Cabanatuan
City attains autonomy. In view of the economic impact of Cabanatuan City’s
conversion, Pet. Umali’s contention, that its effect on the province is not only direct
but also adverse, deserves merit. His claim that the province will lose shares in
provincial taxes imposed in Cabanatuan City is well-founded based on Sec. 151.
To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs. 452(a) and 461(a)
of the LGC is in order. A component city’s conversion into an HUC and its resultant
autonomy from the province is a threat to the latter’s economic viability. The ensuing
reduction in income upon separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on the
province’s operations as there would be less funding to finance infrastructure
projects and to defray overhead costs.
B. Impact on Political Rights
Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of Nueva Ecija and
those of its residents will also be affected by Cabanatuan’s conversion into an HUC.
Notably, the administrative supervision of the province over the city will effectively
be revoked upon conversion. Secs. 4 and 12, Art. X of the PC read:
Sec. 4. The Pres. of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local govts.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall
be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province,
whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to
vote for elective provincial officials.
Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to Cabanatuan
City if it is converted into an HUC. This includes the right to be outside the general
supervision of the province and be under the direct supervision of the Pres.. An
HUC is not subject to provincial oversight because the complex and varied problems
in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater economic activity require greater
autonomy. Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to
vote for and be voted upon as provincial officials.In cutting the umbilical cord
between Cabanatuan City and the province of Nueva Ecija, the city will be separated
from the territorial jurisdiction of the province.
The entire province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Thus, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva
Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.
NOTES [rules]:
Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 PC (invoked in Tan). No province, city, municipality or
barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC, and subject to
the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Sec. 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.
(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office, and within the latest
annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (₱50,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as
highly urbanized cities.
Sec. 461. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Dept. of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
SUPERVISION OVER, AND DISCIPLINE OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
1. MIRANDA V. SB
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January
1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently,
Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
alleging that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of authority or
official functions for insisting to perform the functions of a mayor despite the
preventive suspension order by the Ombudsman.
Mayor Miranda asserted that reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in
good faith. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he received a
memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to
reassume the position. Notably, Mayor Miranda’s counter-affidavit also stated that
he left the mayoralty post after coercion by the Philippine National Police. He also
contends that under Sec. 63 (b) of the LGC, local elective officials could not be
preventively suspended for a period beyond 60 days.
On 28 Nov 2001, the prosecution filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to
suspend Miranda based on Sec. 13 of RA 3019. Miranda opposed the motion on the
ground that the offense of usurpation of authority or official functions under Art.
177 of RPC is not embraced by the former provision which only contemplates
offenses which involve fraud upon public funds or property.
Issue: WON Sandiganbayan committed GAD when it preventively suspended him
for 90 days.
Held: NO.
First, Sec. 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.—Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
or for any offense involving fraud upon govt or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any
law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been
separated from the service, has already received such benefits he shall
be liable to restitute the same to the Govt.
Sec. 13 covers 2 types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the govt; and
(2) any offense involving public funds or property. Contrary to the submission of the
Miranda, nothing in R.A. No. 3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit Sec. 13 only
to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. The phrase is clear and
categorical.
Second, Sandiganbayan did not committed GAD when it ruled that Miranda’s act
fell within the catch-all provision “x x x or for any offense involving fraud upon
govt.” Fraud is defined as “an instances of an act of trickery or deceit especially when
involving misrepresentation: act of deluding”. Thus, the subject phrase means “any
instance or act of trickery or deceit against the govt”. It is not restrictively equivalent
to malversation of funds which is covered by the 2nd type of offense.
The dissent opines that fraud upon govt is not necessarily an essential element of
the crime of usurpation of authority. However, the majority decision affirmed the
Sandiganbayan’s decision which state that Miranda committed fraud when he:
· Indirectly dealt with the city’s funds as persons he appointed will be
given their respective salaries, benefits and other monetary consideration
which will be paid wholly or mainly out of the city’s funds;
· Performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor, i.e.[,] approval
of vouchers, and payment of other expenses which is subject to proof, he
indirectly dealt with the funds of the city; and
· Performed functions as Mayor which caused chaos/confusion albeit
temporary as employees would not know whom to follow.
Third, Court does not believe that he was in good faith as his own affidavit states
that he refused to leave his position despite the memo of Sanchez and left only a few
days after receipt thereof due to the coercion of the PNP. This contradicts his
position that he immediately complied with the memo. Moreover, they should have
assailed the validity of suspension instead of taking the law into their own hands.
Fourth, it should be stressed that Pet. was suspended by the Sandiganbayan. Under Sec.
13 of R.A. No. 3019, this suspension is mandatory if the information is sufficient.
the Pet. has by his acts acquiesced to the validity and sufficiency of the Amended
Information as he did not file a motion to quash the Info or a motion for bill of
particulars before pleading.[1]
Assuming that the objection to the sufficiency of the Info was timely raised, Miranda
was still NOT deprived of his Constitutional right to be appraised of the nature &
cause of accusation, as argued by the dissenting opinion. The test is whether the
crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the
accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d’etre of the rule
is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. Applying such, it cannot be
said that the Amended Information failed to properly apprise the Pet. of the charge
against him. The information charged the Pet. with assuming the duties and
performing acts pertaining to the office of Mayor willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
under the pretense of official position. Moreover, it states some of the specific acts
which constitute usurpation of official functions.
Fifth, the issue before this Court is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of discretion in suspending the Pet. for 90 days. The validity of the
Ombudsman’s order of preventive suspension of the Pet. for 6 months is not the
one assailed in the case at bar.
Sec. 63[2] of the LGC was only meant as a cap in the discretionary power of the
Pres., Gov. and mayor to impose excessively long preventive suspensions. The
Ombudsman is not mentioned in the said provision was not meant to be governed
thereby. The Pres., Gov. and mayor are political personages. As such, the possibility
of extraneous factors influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is
not remote. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not subject to political pressure
given the independence of the office which is protected by no less than the PC.
The difference between suspensions by the Ombudsman and the Pres., Gov. and
mayor under the LGC are clear. The two provisions govern differently.
- In order to justify the preventive suspension by the Ombudsman, (1) the
evidence of guilt should be strong, and (2) that any of the following
circumstances are present: (a) the charge against the officer or employee
should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty; (b) that the charges should warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the Resp.'s continued stay in office would prejudice the
case filed against him.
- On the other hand, the LGC requirements for suspension (at any time after
the issues are joined), are that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that
the Resp. has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of
culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the
continuance in office of the Resp. could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
Citing Garcia v. Mojica: “Resp.s may be correct in pointing out the reason for the
shorter period of preventive suspension imposable under the LGC. Political color
could taint the exercise of the power to suspend local officials by the mayor, Gov.,
or Pres.’s office. In contrast the Ombudsman, considering the Constitutional origin
of his Office, always ought to be insulated from the vagaries of politics, as Resp.s
would have us believe. x x x It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month
preventive suspension under the Ombudsman Law is “much too repugnant” to the
60-day period that may be imposed under the LGC. But per J. Vitug, “the two
provisions govern differently.”
There is no reason to reverse this ruling. The Court’s above ruling is in accord with
the intent of the law. It bears emphasis that Senator Pimentel explained during the
Senate deliberations that the purpose of Sec. 63 of the Code is to prevent the abuse of the
power of preventive suspension by members of the executive branch,
Verily, Sec. 63 of the LGC does not govern preventive suspensions imposed by the
Ombudsman, which is a Constitutionally created office and independent from the
Executive branch of govt. The Ombudsman’s power of preventive suspension is
governed by RA No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), particularly Sec. 24.
In addition to the differences between the 6-month limit for the Ombudsman and
the 60-day limit for the executive officials is that the PC has endowed the
Ombudsman with unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political pressure.
Among these statutory protections are fiscal autonomy, fixed term of office and
classification as an impeachable officer.
2. PROVINCIAL GOVT OF CAM NORTE V. GONZALES
Doctrine: no vested right to public office, nor is public service a property right.
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of
Camarines Norte by then Gov. Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991. Her appointment
was on a permanent capacity. An administrative case was filed against her for gross
insubordination, this was later on captioned as Administrative Case No. 001. After
Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found her
guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Gov. Pimentel that she be
held administratively liable. On September 30, 1999, Gov. Pimentel adopted the Ad
Hoc Investigation Committees recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.
On appeal, the CSCmodified Gov. Pimentels decision finding Gonzales guilty of
insubordination and suspending her for six months. This decision was appealed by
Gov. Pimentel, which the CSC denied.
The CSC then issued Resolution No. 002245,which directed Gonzales reinstatement.
Gov. Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000,
but terminated her services the next day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a
letter to the CSC reporting his compliance with its order, and Gonzales subsequent
dismissal as a confidential employee.

The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008,which again directed Gonzales
reinstatement as provincial administrator. It clarified that while the Local Govt Code
of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA 7160) made the provincial administrator position
coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to
prejudice officials who were already issued permanent appointments as
administrators prior to the new laws effectivity. According to the CSC, Gonzales has
acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment as provincial administrator
and is entitled to continue holding this office despite its subsequent classification as
a coterminous position.
Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Gov. Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines Nortes
incumbent Gov., refused to reinstate her. The CSC responded with Resolution No.
061988,which ordered Gonzales reinstatement to the provincial administrator
position, or to an equivalent position. Thus, the petitioner, through Gov. Typoco,
filed a petition for review before the CA, seeking to nullify the CSCs Resolution No.
030008 and Resolution No. 061988.
The CA supported the CSCs ruling. Petitioner sought for reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence, this petition before the SC. In its present petition for review
on certiorari, the petitioner argues that the provincial administrator position has been
converted into a highly confidential, coterminous position by RA 7160. Hence,
Gonzales no longer enjoyed security of tenure to the position she held prior to RA
7160s enactment.
ISSUE: WON Gonzales should be reinstated as the provincial administrator or to
an equivalent position
HELD: No. CA decision reversed
Political Law- Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a
primarily confidential, non-career position
Congress reclassification of the provincial administrator position in RA 7160 is a
valid exercise of legislative power that does not violate Gonzales security of tenure.
Having established that Congress has changed the nature of the provincial
administrator position to a primarily confidential employee, the next question to
address would be its impact on Gonzales security of tenure. According to the
petitioner, Gonzales lost her security of tenure when the provincial administrator
position became a primarily confidential position. Gonzales, on the other hand,
retorted that the conversion of the position should not be retroactively applied to
her, as she is a permanent appointee.
Both the CA and the CSC ruled in favor of the latter, and gave premium to Gonzales
original permanent appointment under the old LGC. They posit that Gonzales
acquired a vested legal right over her position from the moment she assumed her
duties as provincial administrator. Thus, she cannot be removed from office except
for cause and after due hearing; otherwise such removal would amount to a violation
of her security of tenure.
The arguments presented by the parties and ruled upon by the CA reflect a
conceptual entanglement between the nature of the position and an employees right
to hold a position. These two concepts are different. The nature of a position may
change by law according to the dictates of Congress. The right to hold a position, on
the other hand, is a right that enjoys Constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may
itself change according to the nature of the position.
In the current case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the provincial
administrator position but significantly modified many of its aspects. It is now a
primarily confidential position under the non-career service tranche of the civil
service. This change could not have been aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she was
not the only provincial administrator incumbent at the time RA 7160 was enacted.
Rather, this change was part of the reform measures that RA 7160 introduced to
further empower local govts and decentralize the delivery of public service.
Thus, Gonzales permanent appointment as provincial administrator prior to the
enactment of RA 7160 is immaterial to her removal as provincial administrator. For
purposes of determining whether Gonzales termination violated her right to security
of tenure, the nature of the position she occupied at the time of her removal should
be considered, and not merely the nature of her appointment at the time she entered
govt service.
In echoing the CSC and the CAs conclusion, the dissenting opinion posits the view
that security of tenure protects the permanent appointment of a public officer,
despite subsequent changes in the nature of his position.
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee
shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after
due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change
in the nature of the office held. In other words, the CSC might have been legally
correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales right to security of tenure
when she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the
situation had since then been changed.
In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently
terminated under the law prevailing at the time of the termination of her service; i.e.,
she was then already occupying a position that was primarily confidential and had to
be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the
appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales termination for lack of confidence was lawful.
Thus, Gonzales termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer
be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other
comparable position. This conclusion, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales
entitlement to retirement benefits, leave credits, and future employment in govt
service.
PETITION GRANTED.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
1. LA CARLOTA V. ROJO
- On March 17, 2004, Atty. Rex Rojo resigned as member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental.
- The next day, he was appointed as Sangguniang Panlungsod Sec. by then-Vice-
Mayor Rex Jalandoon. The day after that, Vice-Mayor Jalandoon submitted
Rojo’s position papers to the Civil Service Commission Negros Occidental Field
Office (CSCFO) for attestation.
- CSCFO: Considered the appointment permanently recalled.
- Basis: The Chairman of the Personnel Selection Board and the Human Resource
Management Officer did not sign the certifications, the latter relative to the
completeness of the documents and to the publication requirement.
- Vice-Mayor Jalandoon appealed to the CSC Regional Office.
- Argument: The Human Resource Management Officer refused to affix his
signature on Rojo’s appointment documents but nonetheless transmitted them
to the CSCFO. Such transmittal should be construed that the appointment was
complete and regular and that it complied with the requirements of a valid
appointment.
- The City of La Carlota (represented by the newly-elected mayor Jeffrey Ferrer)
and the Sangguniang Panlungsod (represented by the newly-elected vice-mayor
Demie Honrado) intervened.
Arguments
- Jalandoon is not the real party in interest in the appeal; rather, it is Atty. Rojo,
who, by his inaction, should be considered to have waived his right to appeal.
o The appointment was made during the election ban (March 26 to May
9, 2004).
o The resignation of Rojo as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod is
ineffective, having not complied with the provision on quorum under
Sec. 82(d) of R.A. No. 7160.
CSC Regional Office: Reversed the CSCFO.
1. Jurisprudence provides that the disapproval of an appointment affects the
discretionary authority of the appointing authority; hence, he alone may appeal the
disapproval of an appointment.
2. The appointment was made on March 18, 2004, which was outside the
election ban period.
3. Atty. Rojo’s resignation from the Sangguniang Panlungsod was valid. It was
tendered with the majority of the council members in attendance (7 out of the 13
councilors were present). Since the appointment of Rojo sufficiently complied with
the publication requirement, deliberation by the Personnel Selection Board,
certification that it was issued in accordance with the limitations provided for under
Sec. 325 of R.A. 7160, and that appropriations/funds are available for said position,
the regional office approved the appointment.
- Mayor Ferrer and Vice-Mayor Honrado appealed to the CSC, and subsequently to
the CA.
Argument: Vice-Mayor Jalandoon, as presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod at the time of the resignation, should not be counted in determining
WON a quorum exists. Excluding him, there were only 6 out of the 12 members
who were present. Since the required majority of 7 was not reached to constitute a
quorum, then no business, including the acceptance of Atty. Rojo’s resignation, could
have validly been transacted on that day.
CSC: Affirmed the CSC Regional Office.
CA: Affirmed the CSC Regional Office.
ISSUE: WON there was a quorum when Atty. Rojo had resigned as member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod?
HELD: Yes, there was a quorum.
- LGC, Sec. 457: The sangguniang panlungsod xxx shall be composed of the city
vice-mayor as presiding officer xxx.
- Black’s Law Dictionary defines “composed of” as “formed of” or “consisting
of.” The vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is therefore a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.
- Senate deliberations on the LGC also show the intent to treat the vice-mayor as
a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In these deliberations, Senator
Gonzales observed that the provincial Gov., the city mayor, the municipal
mayor, and the punong barangay are no longer members of their respective
sanggunian. The Supreme Court holds that, in the same way, the vice-Gov., the
city vice-mayor, and the municipal vice-mayor, as presiding officers of their
respective sanggunian, are members thereof.
- Zamora v. Gov. Caballero (2004): The entire membership must be taken into
account in computing the quorum of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. xxx
Legislation, which is the principal function and duty of the sanggunian, requires
the participation of all its members so that they may not only represent the
interests of their respective constituents but also help in the making of decisions
by voting upon every question put upon the body. The acts of only a part of the
sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions aforementioned
are legally infirm, highly questionable, and are, more importantly, null and void.
DILG Opinion No. 46, s. 2007 (which conformed to Zamora v. Gov. Caballero):
The vice-mayor is included in the determination of a quorum in the sanggunian.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied; CSC Regional Office decision affirmed.
Notes: J. del Castillo, in his dissenting opinion, cited Perez v. Hon. Dela Cruz,
wherein it was held that a city vice-mayor who serves as presiding officer of the local
legislative board cannot be considered a member thereof. This case, however, was
decided even before the enactment of the old LGC in 1983. Therefore, this case,
compared to the more recent case of Zamora v. Gov. Caballero, is inapplicable to
the present case.
2. VICENCIO V. VILLAR
- The City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon presided by
Hon. Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and approved City
Ordinance No. 15-2003 entitled “An Ordinance Granting Authority to the
7 (1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlungsod and sign all warrants drawn on the city
treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlungsod;
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of the
sangguniang panlungsod, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in this
Code;
(3) Assume the office of the city mayor for the unexpired term of the latter in the event of permanent
vacancy as provided for in Sec. 44, Book I of this Code;
City Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into
Contract for Consultancy Services for Consultants in the Sanggunian
Secretariat Tasked to Function in their Respective Areas of Concern”
- Arnold Vicencio was elected City-Vice Mayor of Malabon in 2004. By
virtue of this office, he also became the Presiding Officer of the SPM and
at the same time, the head of the Sanggunian Secretariat.
- Vicencio, representing the CIty Govt of Malabon City, entered into
Contracts for Consultancy Services.
- After the signing of their respective contracts, the 3 consultants rendered
consultancy services to the SPM. Thereafter, the 3 consultants were
correspondingly paid for their services pursuant to the contracts therefor.
- However, an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued
disallowing the amount for being an improper disbursement.
- Aggrieved by the disallowance, Vicencio appealed it the Adjudication and
Settlement Board of the COA, which subsequently denied it.
ISSUE: WON COA committed serious errors or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed ASB’s decision relative
to the disallowance of disbursement concerning the services rendered by hired
consultants for the SPM
ALT: WON the mayor was allowed to enter into such contracts
HELD: NO, under the LGC, the ff are the powers and duties of a city Vice
Mayor: (See Sec. 456. LCG)7
- Under this provision, there no inherent authority on the part of the city
vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the LGU, unlike that
provided for the city mayor.
- Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of
the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it.
(4) Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the city mayor in cases of temporary
vacancy as provided for in Sec. 46, Book I of this Code; andcralawlibrary
(5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by
law or ordinance.
- Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to
enter into contracts for consultancy services.
- As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-
Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a "continuing
authority" for any person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter
into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.
- Ordinance No. 15-2003 is clear and precise and leaves no room for
interpretation.
- It only authorized the then City Vice-Mayor to enter into
consultancy contracts in the specific areas of concern.
- Further, the appropriations for this particular item were limited to
the savings for the period June to December 2003. This was an
additional limitation to the power granted to Vice-Mayor Yambao
to contract on behalf of the city. The fact that any later
consultancy contract would necessarily require further
appropriations from the city council strengthens the contention
that the power granted under Ordinance No. 15-2003 was limited
in scope.
- Hence, Pet. was without authority to enter into the 2005
Consultancy Contracts.
- Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
- Thus, the ordinance should be applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead
to an injustice.
- In the instant case, there is no reason to depart from this
rule, since the subject ordinance is not at all impossible,
absurd, or unjust.
- Sec. 103 of P.O. 1445 declares that expenditures of govt funds or uses of
govt property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability
of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.
- The public official's personal liability arises only if the expenditure
of govt funds was made in violation of law.
- In this case, Pet.'s act of entering into a contract on behalf of the
LGU without the requisite authority therefor was in violation of
the LGC.
- While Pet. may have relied on the opinion of the City Legal
Officer, such reliance only serves to buttress his good faith. It
does not, however, exculpate him from his personal liability under
P.D. 1445.
- In sum, the COA's assailed Decision was made in faithful compliance with
its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred
on it by the PC.
- The COA was merely fulfilling its mandate in observing the policy that govt
funds and property should be fully protected and conserved; and that
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of
such funds and property should be prevented.
- Thus, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to the COA.
TERM LIMITS AND RECALL
1. LACEDA V. LIMENA
- Pet. Roberto Laceda, Sr., and private Resp. Randy L. Limena were
candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, West District,
Sorsogon City, during the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections. On October 23, 2007, Limena filed a petition for
disqualification and/or declaration as an ineligible candidate5 against
Laceda before the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had already served
as Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for 3 consecutive terms since
1994, and was thus prohibited from running for the fourth time under Sec.
2 of RA No. 9164 which provides:
- SEC. 2. Term of Office. - The term of office of all barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be 3 (3)
years. No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3 (3)
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term
of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected.
- Limena likewise attached the following certification from the Dept. of the
Interior and Local Govt:
 THIS IS TO CERTIFY that per records in this office HON. ROBERTO
LACEDA, SR., incumbent Punong Barangay of Panlayaan, West District,
Sorsogon City. 'was elected as Punong Barangay during the May 9, 1994,
May 12, 1997 and July 15, 2002 Barangay Elections. He resigned from office
on March 20, 1995 to run as Municipal Councilor. Hence, he is covered by
the 3-term rule of paragraph 2, Sec. 2 of RA 9164 which provides that: "No
barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3 (3) consecutive terms
in the same position: Provided, however, that the term of office shall be
reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of
office [for] any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was
elected."
- In his Answer, Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of
Panlayaan for 3 consecutive terms. However, he asserted that when he was
elected for his first two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that
when he served his third term, the Municipality of Sorsogon had already
been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit,
the City of Sorsogon, pursuant to RA No. 8806. Thus, he argued that his
third term was actually just his first in the new political unit and that he was
accordingly entitled to run for two more terms.
- Laceda likewise argued that assuming he had already served 3 consecutive
terms, Rep. Act No. 9164 which imposes the 3-term limit, cannot be made
to apply to him as it would violate his vested right to office. He alleged that
when he was elected in 1994 the prohibition did not exist. Had he known
that there will be a law preventing him to run for the fourth time, he would
not have run for office in 1994 as he was looking forward to the election in
2007.
- On January 15, 2008, the COMELEC declared Laceda disqualified and
cancelled his CoC.
- Laceda moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
COMELEC in a Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved, Laceda filed a
petition for certiorari before this Court.
- On June 10, 2008, this Court dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently
show that any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC
in rendering the assailed Resolutions of January 15, 2008 and May 7, 2008.
Hence, this MR.
- Laceda insists that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
basing its decision on the requisites enunciated in Lonzanida v. COMELEC
for the application of the 3-term prohibition in Sec. 43 of the LGC. Laceda
argues that said case is inapplicable since it involved the position of
municipal mayor while the instant case concerned the position of Punong
Barangay. He likewise insists that he served his third term in a new political
unit and therefore he should not be deemed already to have served a third
term as Punong Barangay for purposes of applying the 3-term limit.
Issue: WON COMELEC not commit any abuse of discretion when it declared
him disqualified and cancelled his CoC.
Ruling:
Laceda insists that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its
decision on the requisites enunciated in Lonzanida v. COMELEC12 for the
application of the 3-term prohibition in Sec. 4313 of the LGC.14 Laceda argues that
said case is inapplicable since it involved the position of municipal mayor while the
instant case concerned the position of Punong Barangay. He likewise insists that he
served his third term in a new political unit and therefore he should not be deemed
already to have served a third term as Punong Barangay for purposes of applying the
3-term limit.
For reasons hereafter discussed, the MR cannot prosper.
- Sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, like Sec. 43 of the LGC from which it was
taken, is primarily intended to broaden the choices of the electorate of the
candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political
arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term
of nine years. This Court has held that for the prohibition to apply, two
requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for
3 consecutive terms in the same local govt post and (2) that he or she has
fully served 3 consecutive terms.
- In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities
of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted into a city thereby
abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it
cannot be said that for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Sec. 2 of
Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,
Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local govt
post as that of the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon
City, is the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of
the barangay are the same. They are the same group of voters who elected
Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for 3 consecutive terms and over
 whom Laceda held power and authority as their Punong Barangay.
Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda's term.
- Latasa vs. COMELEC which involved a similar question, this Court held
that where a person has been elected for 3 consecutive terms as a municipal
mayor and prior to the end or termination of such 3-year term the
municipality has been converted by law into a city, without the city charter
interrupting his term until the end of the 3-year term, the prohibition
applies to prevent him from running for the fourth time as city mayor
thereof, there being no break in the continuity of the terms.
- Thus, conformably with the democratic intent of Rep. Act No. 9164 and
this Court's ruling in Latasa v. COMELEC, we hold that the prohibition in
Sec. 2 of said statute applies to Laceda. The COMELEC did not err nor
commit any abuse of discretion when it declared him disqualified and
cancelled his CoC.
2. RIVERAL III V. COMELEC
- May 2004: Marino Morales ran as a candidate for mayor of Mabalacat,
Pampanga.
- January 10, 2004: Atty. Rivera and Normandick De Guzman filed a petition to
cancel the COC of Morales on the ground that he was elected and had served 3
previous consecutive terms as Mayor of Mabalacat which is a violation of Sec.
8, Article X of the PC and Sec. 43(b) of the LGC.
- Morales admitted his election as mayor of Mabalacat for 3 terms but the second
term was only as a “caretaker of the office” because he was not validly elected
it being pronounced as void and that he was suspended by the Ombudsman for
an anti-graft case.
- May 6, 2004: COMELEC rendered a resolution disqualifying Morales to run for
the position of mayor and his COC was then canceled.
- March 14, 2005: His MR was granted.
- After the proclamation of Morales as the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat,
Anthony Dee, who was also a candidate for Mayor, filed with the RTC a petition
for quo warranto against Morales alleging that he is now ineligible to run for the
fourth time for having served as mayor for 3 consecutive terms. Same answers
were raised by Morales.
- November 22, 2004: RTC dismissed the petition of Dee on the ground that
Morales did not serve the 3-term limit since he was not the duly elected mayor
of Mabalacat, but Dee in the May 1998 elections.
- Dee appealed to the COMELEC but was dismissed.
- The MR was also denied.
ISSUE/S: WON Morales has already served for 3 consecutive terms. – YES.
HELD:
For the 3-term limit for elective local govt officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur,to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for 3 (3)
consecutive terms in the same local govt post, and (2) that he has fully served 3 (3) consecutive
terms.
Here, Resp. Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He
assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the
entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case
filed by Pet. Dee ousting him (Resp.) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre,
such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Sec. 8, Article X of the PC can not be more clear and explicit –
The term of the office of elected local officials x x x, shall be 3 years and no such
official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. x x x
Upon the other hand, Sec. 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the LGC) clearly provides:
No local official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position.
xxx
Resp. Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat
continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30,
2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.
The framers of the PC, by including this exception, wanted to establish some
safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive
terms.
Having found Resp. Morales ineligible, his CoC dated December 30, 2003 should be
cancelled.
As a consequence of Pet.’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office
has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Sec.
44 of the LGC, to wit:
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Gov., Vice-Gov., Mayor and Vice-
Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Gov. or mayor, the
vice-Gov. or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the Gov. or mayor. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591 is GRANTED. Resp. Morales’
CoC dated December 30, 2003 is cancelled. In view of the vacancy in the Office of
the Mayor in Mabalacat, Pampanga, the vice-mayor elect of the said municipality in
the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections is hereby declared
mayor and shall serve as such for the remaining duration of the term July 1, 2004 to
June 30, 2007. The petition in G.R. No. 170577 is DISMISSED for being moot.
3. DIZON V. COMELEC
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with
the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat
on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served 3 previous consecutive
terms in violation of Sec. 43 of the LGC. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal
mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed
to have filed his CoC on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as
mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998
elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC
declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998
elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His
term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for
his second term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It
took judicial notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007
where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and
2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then
proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated
the 3--term limit under Sec. 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a
candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a
gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.
Issues:
WON the period served by Morales in the 2004--2007 term (although he was ousted
from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term
- NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales
during his fourth term. We cancelled his CoC dated 30 December 2003. This
cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004
elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.
- Both Article X, Sec. 8 of the PC and Sec. 43(b) of the LGC state that the term
of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be 3 years,
and no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected
- There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the
disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for 3
consecutive terms in the same local govt post and (2) that he has fully served 3
consecutive terms.
- In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat
for four consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007.
We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because
of the 3-term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales’
proclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of
the continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because
the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry
of the 1998-2001 term.
- SC ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance
from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and
was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice
mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of
the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by
the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it
may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus,
Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June
2007. (4th term)
WON the 2007--2010 term of Morales is his 5th term
- Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO.
Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:
1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, 2004-2007.
- However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected
mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor
of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the
full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
 expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the position of mayor of
Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
computing the 3-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June
2007 served as a gap for purposes of the 3-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1
July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of
the 3-term limit rule
4. MONTEBON v COMELEC 2008
- Montebon, Ondoy, and Potencioso were candidates for Municipal Mayor of
Tuburan, Cebu in the May 2007 elections.
- Pets. and other candidates for Municipal Mayor filed a Petition for
Disqualification against Potencioso alleging that the latter had been elected and
had served 3 consecutive terms as Municipal Mayor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004,
and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running in the 2007 elections, as it
would be his 4th term.
- Potencioso admitted he was elected for 3 consecutive terms but claimed that the
service of his 2nd term was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded
as vice-mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice-Mayor Mendoza. He
therefore is not disqualified to run, the interruption not being voluntary.
- Pet.: It is a voluntary renunciation therefore not considered an interruption.
- COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc both ruled in favor of
Potencioso. It was an involuntary interruption, therefore not disqualified.
Important provisions:
1. Sec.8, Article X, 1987 PC: The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be 3 years and no such
officials shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
2. LGC
Sec. 43. Term of Office
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected.
Pet.: Voluntary renunciation therefore not considered interruption.
Resp.: Involuntary therefore an interruption.
Issue: WON Potencioso’s succession as Vice-Mayor can be considered a
voluntary renunciation of office which cannot be considered an interruption
therefore making him disqualified to run in the 2007 elections?
Held: No.
- Lonzanida vs. COMELEC:
2 conditions must concur to be disqualified:
- Official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the
same local govt post.
- He has fully served 3 consecutive terms.
- Borja Jr. vs. COMELEC:
- Term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official
has been elected 3 consecutive times; he must also have served 3
consecutive terms in the same position.
Succession in local govt offices is by operation of law. Under Sec. 44 LGC, if a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest-ranking
Sanggunian Member shall become Vice Mayor. There is no way could it be
considered voluntary renunciation. The legal successor is not given any option under
the law to accept or not.
SC quoting COMELEC ruling: Succession by law to a vacated govt office is
characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by
a govt official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible
administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the
performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory
rather than voluntary.
5. BOLOS, JR. V. COMELEC

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years, and no such official shall serve for
more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.
- For 3 consecutive terms, Pet. was elected to the position of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in 1994, 1997 and
2002.
- In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking,
Pet. ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office
as Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He
served the full term of the Sangguniang Bayan position, which was until June 30,
2007.
- Thereafter, Pet. filed his CoC for Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis,
Bohol in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
- Resp. Rey Angeles Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and candidate
for the same office, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of Pet. as candidate on the ground that he had already served
the 3-term limit. Hence, Pet. is no longer allowed to run for the same position.
- Cinconiegue contended that Pet.’s relinquishment of the position of Punong
Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it
was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14, 2004
National and Local Elections. He added that Pet. knew that if he won and
assumed the position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as
Punong Barangay.
- In his Answer, Pet. admitted that he was elected as Punong Barangay of Barangay
Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the last 3 consecutive elections of 1994, 1997 and 2002.
By reason of his assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member, his
remaining term of office as Punong Barangay, which would have ended in 2007,
was left unserved. He argued that his election and assumption of office as
Sangguniang Bayan member was by operation of law; hence, it must be considered
as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term of service.
- In 2008, COMELEC First Div. disqualified Bolos, stating that his assumption
of office as Municipal Councilor in 2004 was a voluntary renunciation of the
Office of Punong Barangay.
ISSUES & RATIO: WON Bolos’ assumption of office as Municipal Councilor
was a voluntary renunciation of the office of the Punong Barangay—YES
The 3-term limit for elective local officials is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the PC,
which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years, and no such official shall serve for more
than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Socrates v. COMELEC held that the rule on the 3-term limit, embodied in the PC
and the LGC, has two parts:
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more
than 3 consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms
count in determining the 3-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt
the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents
the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to
form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After 3 consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term.
Lonzanida v. COMELEC, the Court stated that the second part of the rule on the
3-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the PC to bar any attempt to
circumvent the 3-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same
time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term.
-
2wo conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:
o that the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in
the same govt post; and
o that he has fully served 3 consecutive terms
In this case, it is undisputed that Pet. was elected as Punong Barangay for 3 consecutive
terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification.
What is to be determined is whether Pet. is deemed to have voluntarily renounced
his position as Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as
Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed said office.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was voluntary renunciation by Pet.
of his position as Punong Barangay.
As conceded even by him, Resp. (Pet. herein) had already completed two consecutive
terms of office when he ran for a third term in the Barangay Elections of 2002. When
he filed his CoC for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan of Dauis, Bohol, in the May
10, 2004 [elections], he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending
his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness
to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for
it was very unlikely that Resp. had filed his CoC for the Sangguniang Bayan post,
campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then
after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his
election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the position he held,
and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.
6. ALDOVINO, JR. V. COMELEC
- Resp. Asilo was an elected council for Lucena City for 3 consecutive terms
(1998-2001, 2001-2004, 2004-2007)
- During his 2004-2007 term of the office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation to a criminal case he then faced
- SC subsequently lifted such suspension, thus he resumed performing the
functions of his office and finished his term.
- In 2007, Asilo filed his CoC for the same position.
- Pets. sought to deny due court Asilo’s CoC or to cancel it on the ground that he
had been elected and served for 3 terms. Hence, violating the 3 term limit rule.
- COMELEC 2nddivision: favor Asilo.
o It reasoned out that the 3-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed
to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the
suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
o Preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders
the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for
the full term, thus the term should not be counted for the purpose of
the 3 term limit rule
Issue: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption
of his term of office for purposes of the 3 term limit rule?
Held:
Preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public official,
has been mentioned as an example in Borja v. COMELEC. Doctrinally, however,
Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with
the application of the 3-term rule on the term that an elective official acquired by
succession
3 term limit rule
a. In relation to the PC provision Article X Sec. 8
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Sec 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the PC provision.
As worded, the Constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and
limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than 3 consecutive terms. This is
the first branch of the rule embodied in Sec. 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision
refers to a term as a period of time 3 years during which an official has title to office
and can serve.
As mentioned in the case of Appari vs. CA, term in a legal sense means a fixed and
definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office
The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative
no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. The limitation refers
to the term
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public
office. Basically, it is the voluntary renunciation of the office that is not considered
as an interruption.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect continuity
of service for a full term for purposes of the 3-term limit rule.
The word renunciation carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce
is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign. renunciation, as mentioned under the second
branch of the Constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting
short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. It is a loss of title to office by conscious choice
Based on the Constitutional deliberations, the framers intent apparently was to close
all gaps that an elective official may seize to defeat the 3-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary
renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the 3-term limit
rule
This examination of the wording of the Constitutional provision and of the
circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to
make term limitation a high priority Constitutional objective whose terms must be
strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less
than equal Constitutional worth. We view preventive suspension vis--vis term
limitation with this firm mindset.
b. Interruption
The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the 3-term limit rule
is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official
must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an
effective interruption to occur.
This has to be the case if the thrust of Sec. 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be
faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more
than 3 consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example and standard
of what does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term.
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions
of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective
interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least
an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is
simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by
law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the
right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service.
The latter occurs during an office holders term when he retains title to the office but
cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term
failure to serve cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to
hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Sec. 8, Article X both by
structure and substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in
office to 3 consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing
voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision should be
read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full
continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The voluntary renunciation
it speaks of refers only to the elective officials voluntary relinquishment of office and
loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary cessation of the exercise
of power or authority that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension
being only one of them
c. In relation to the nature of preventive suspension
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled
conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the
individual office holder.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an
elective officials service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned
above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people
being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power
of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official
has served his 3 terms in office without any break. Preventive suspension, by its nature, is
a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation,
interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.
d. Preventive suspension and intent of 3 term limit rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the 3-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials
stay in office beyond 3 terms. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office
is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.
e. Preventive suspension and voluntary renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a
voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that
he may have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against
him. From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of
voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies
Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of
voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual
delivery of service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that
they are, by nature, different and non-comparable
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to
render service, is disallowed by the PC as an effective interruption of a term. It is
therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the 3-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a
term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the 3-term limitation. It can pose
as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective
interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to
Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon, Magarao, Bombon,
undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss
of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated Tinambac, Siruma Calabanga
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has
been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective
interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary 4th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Caramoan, Garchitorena,
renunciation that the PC expressly disallows as an interruption. Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua Goa, Lagonoy,
f. Conclusion Presentacion, Sangay, San
Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac,
preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an
elective officials term. Siruma

7. NAVAL V. COMELEC 5th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Bato,

● From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served Buhi, Bula, Nabua
as a member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.
● Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form
● October 12, 2009: RA 9716 was enacted, reapportioning the legislative districts the present Third District.
in Camarines Sur in the following manner:
● In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the
Sanggunian, Third District and served until 2013.
District Pre- RA 9716 Post-RA 9716 ● In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the
Sanggunian, Third District.
● Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur
1st Libmanan,Minalabac,Pamplona, Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi, for 3 consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the
Pasacao, San Fernando, Del district he had been elected from.
Sipocot, Cabusao
Gallego,
● Naval alleges that the First, Second and Third Legislative Districts of Camarines
Ragay, Lupi, Sipocot,Cabusao Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of new sets of municipalities.
With the separation of Gainza and Milaor from the other eight towns which
2nd Naga City, Pili, Ocampo, Libmanan, Minalabac, used to... comprise the Second District, the voters from the Third Legislative
Camaligan, District are no longer the same ones as those who had elected him to office in
Pamplona, Pasacao, San the 2004 and 2007 elections.
Canaman,Magarao, Bombon,
Fernando, Gainza, Milaor ISSUE: WON the reapportionment of the districts led to the refreshing of
Calabanga, Gainza, Milaor
Naval’s 3-term limit as member of the Sangguinan.
3rd Caramoan, Garchitorena, Naga City, Pili, Ocampo, HELD:
Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion, Camaligan, Canaman, ● Reapportionment is "the realignment or change in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
Constitutional requirement of equality of representation."
 ● R.A. No. 9716 indicates the intent of the lawmakers to create a single new
Second District from the merger of the towns from the old First District
with Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Sec. 3(c) of R.A.
No. 9716 used the word "rename."
○ Although the qualifier "without a change in its composition" was
not found in Sec. 3(c), unlike in Secs. 3(d) and (e), still, what is
pervasive is the clear intent to create a sole new district in that of
the Second, while merely renaming the rest.
● Thus, a complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion
other than that the lawmakers intended the old Second District to be merely
renamed as the current Third District.
○ While Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members
are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district
which elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one
which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.
● Therefore, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed
for by Naval.
● Further, sustaining Naval's arguments would... practically allow him to hold
the same office for 15 years. These are the circumstances the PC explicitly
intends to avert.
● Certainly, the Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting
public, the real sovereign, so to speak. However, let all the candidates for
public office be reminded that as citizens, we have a commitment to be
bound by our PC and laws. Side by side our privileges as citizens are
restrictions too.
8. ARATEA V. COMELEC
- Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 elections.
- Lonzanida filed his COC on Dec 1 2009, and on Dec 8, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo
(Rodolfo) filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida or cancel his COC under Sec.
78 of the Omnibus Election Code on the ground that Lonzanida was elected
and had served as mayor for 4 consecutive terms prior to the term for the May
2012 elections.
- Rodolfo asserted that there were false material representation in Lonzanida’s
COC when he certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought
election.
- Sec. 8, Article X of the 1987 PC and Sec. 43(b) of the LGC both prohibit a local
elective official from being elected and serving for more than 3 consecutive
terms for the same position.
- COMELEC 2nd Div: cancelled Lonzanida’s COC. An M/R was filed before
the COMELEC En Banc and the same remained pending during the May 2010
elections, where Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of votes
for Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
- Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before RTC Judge Viray and
wrote the DILG for an opinion on whether as Vice Mayor, he was legallu
required to assime the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s
disqualification.
- DILG Legal Opinion No. 111, S. 2010 stated that Lonzanida was dq-ed to hold
office by reason of his criminal conviction thus leaving the Office of the Mayor
permanently vacant. Aratea could therefore assume said office in an acting
capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution on the M/R.
- Aratea again wrote DILG to allow him to take his oath of office as Mayor of
San Antonio, where DILG Sec. Jesse Robredo allowed him to do the same as
permanent Municipal Mayor, without prejudice to the outcome of the pending
cases with COMELEC.
- COMELEC En Banc: issued a resolution dq-ing Lonzanida based on two
grounds, first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more
than 3 consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been
convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised
Penal Code.
- [AUG 25 2010] Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Attached Petitionin Intervention.15 She claimed her right to be proclaimed as
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate
when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010
Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his CoC and the striking out of his name
from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 2010 elections.
- [JAN 26 2011] Aratea, in a Comment asserted that Antipolo could not be
proclaimed the winning candidate because Antipolo only received the 2 nd
highest number of votes.
- COMELEC En Banc: issued an Order. The Resolution was pertaining to
 how to fill the vacancy resulting from the disqualification. (CHECK NOTES)
ISSUES & RATIO.
WON Antipolo or Aratea is the rightful occupant of the Office of the Mayor
– ANTIPOLO.
SC: Antipolo, the alleged “second placer,” should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanida’s CoC was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at
all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
Mayor.
WON the disqualification of Lonzanida is valid under Sec. 68 – NO
A petition for disqualification under Sec. 68 clearly refers to “the commission of
prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country.”
All the offenses mentioned in Sec. 68 refer to election offenses under the
Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is
absolutely nothing in the language of Sec. 68 that would justify including violation
of the 3term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification
under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under
Sec. 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia, this Court ruled:
[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal
and not administrative in nature. x x x
Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the 3term limit rule, or his conviction
by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code,
does not constitute a ground for a petition under Sec. 68.
WON there was false material representation in violation of Sec. 78 - YES
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Sec. 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which
means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Sec. 74 requires him to state under oath in his CoC. As this Court
held in Fermin v. COMELEC, the false material representation may refer to
“qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers from perpetual special
disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from
perpetual special disqualification files a CoC stating under oath that “he is eligible
to run for (public) office,” as expressly required under Sec. 74, then he clearly
makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Sec.
78.
WON the 3-Term Limit Rule is a ground for Ineligibility – YES
(Latasa, Rivera, & Ong)
Sec. 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he
seeks election. Thus, Sec. 74 states that “the CoC shall state that the person
filing x x x is eligible for said office.” The 3term limit rule, enacted to prevent
the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of
choice, is found both in the PC and the law. After being elected and serving for 3
consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for
the same office in next regular election32 because he is ineligible. One who has
an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not “eligible for [the] office.” As
used in Sec. 74, the word “eligible”33 means having the right to run for elective
public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to
run for the public office.
In Latasa v. COMELEC, Pet. Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the
Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality
of Digos was converted into the City of Digos during Latasa’s third term. Latasa
filed his CoC for city mayor for the 2001 elections. Romeo Sunga, Latasa’s
opponent, filed before the COMELEC a “petition to deny due course, cancel
CoC and/or disqualification” under Sec. 78 on the ground that Latasa falsely
represented in his CoC that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa
argued that he did not make any false representation. In his CoC, Latasa inserted
a footnote after the phrase “I am eligible” and indicated “Having served 3 (3)
term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor.”
The COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasa’s CoC for violation of the 3term
limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court affirmed the
COMELEC En Banc’s denial of Latasa’s MR.
SC cancelled Marino Morales’ CoC in Rivera III v. COMELEC (Rivera). We
held that Morales exceeded the maximum 3term limit, having been elected and
served as Mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms (1995 to 1998, 1998 to
2001, 2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We declared him ineligible as a candidate
for the same position for the 2007 to 2010 term. Although we did not explicitly
rule that Morales’ violation of the 3term limit rule constituted false material
representation, we nonetheless granted the petition to cancel Morales’ CoC under
Sec. 78. We also affirmed the cancellation of Francis Ong’s CoC in Ong v.
Alegre, where the “petition to disqualify, deny due course and cancel” Ong’s CoC
 under Sec. 78 was predicated on the violation of the 3term limit rule.
When possession of a Disqualifying Condition is NOT a ground for
P/for Disqualification – Loong, Fermin, and Munder
It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in
the grounds for eligibility and ineligibility visavis qualifications and disqualifications.
For example, a candidate may represent that he is a resident of a particular Philippine
locality when he is actually a permanent resident of another country. In cases of such
overlap, the Pet. should not be constrained in his choice of remedy when the
Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available multiple remedies. Sec. 78 allows
the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a CoC before the election,
while Sec. 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the election. Despite
the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification
using grounds enumerated in Sec. 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel
a CoC under Sec. 78.
The distinction between a petition under Sec. 68 and a petition under Sec. 78 was
discussed in Loong v. COMELEC with respect to the applicable prescriptive
period. Resp. Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under Sec. 78 to disqualify Pet.
Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional ViceGov. of the Autonomous Govt of
Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to his age. The petition was filed 16
days after the election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day period from the last
day of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalum’s petition was
one based on false representation under Sec. 78, and not for disqualification under
Sec. 68. Hence, the 25day prescriptive period provided in Sec. 78 should be strictly
applied.
Fermin v. COMELEC
- The issue of a candidate’s possession of the required oneyear residency
requirement was raised in a petition for disqualification under Sec. 68 instead
of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a CoC under Sec.
- Despite the question of the oneyear residency being a proper ground under
Sec. 78, Dilangalen, the Pet. before the COMELEC in Fermin, relied on Sec.
5(C)(1) and 5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 43 and filed the
petition under Sec. 68. In Fermin, we ruled that “a COMELEC rule or
resolution cannot supplant or vary legislative enactments that distinguish the
grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the
appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds.” 44 A petition for
disqualification can only be premised on a ground specified in Sec. 12 or 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code or Sec. 40 of the LGCThus, a petition questioning
a candidate’s possession of the required oneyear residency requirement, as
distinguished from permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign
country, should be filed under Sec. 78, and a petition under Sec. 68 is the wrong
remedy.
Munder v. COMELEC
- Pet. Alfais Munder filed a CoC for Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur on 26
November 2009.
- Resp. Atty. Tago Sarip filed a petition for Munder’s disqualification on 13
April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder misrepresented that he was a registered
voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he was eligible to register as a voter
in 2003 even though he was not yet 18 years of age at the time of the voter’s
registration. Moreover, Munder’s CoC was not accomplished in full as he failed
to indicate his precinct and did not affix his thumbmark.
- The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Sarip’s petition and declared that
his grounds are not grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68 but for denial
or cancellation of Munder’s CoC under Sec. 78.
- Sarip’s petition was filed out of time as he had only 25 days after the filing of
Munder’s CoC, or until 21 December 2009, within which to file his petition.
- The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the
COMELEC Second Division, the COMELEC En Banc did not rule on the
propriety of Sarip’s remedy but focused on the question of whether Munder
was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court reinstated the
COMELEC Second Division’s resolution. This Court ruled that the ground
raised in the petition, lack of registration as voter in the locality where he was
running as a candidate, is inappropriate for a petition for disqualification. We
further declared that with our ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected the claim
that lack of substantive qualifications of a candidate is a ground for a petition
for disqualification under Sec. 68. The only substantive qualification the
absence of which is a ground for a petition under Sec. 68 is the candidate’s
permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country.
WON COMELEC has a legal duty to enforce perpetual special
disqualification- YES
- Even without a petition under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from
perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to
the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public
 office. The law itself bars the convict from running forpublic office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment
of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other
govt agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
- WON the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement
the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on
disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC
because under the PC the COMELEC is duty bound to “enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.” The
disqualification of a convict to run for elective public office under the Revised
Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the
enforcement and administration of “all the laws” relating to the conduct of
elections.
What is the effect of a void COC –A cancelled CoC void ab initio cannot give rise
to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
Ergo, since Resp. Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of]
San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
9. TALAGA V. COMELEC
- Ramon Talaga and Philip M. Castillo respectively filed their certificates of
candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City for May 10, 2010
elections. Ramon, the candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD, declared in his CoC
that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to.
- Castillo filed with COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel CoC of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as
Mayor for Having Already Served 3 Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of
Lucena.
- Ramon countered that Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from
office during his second and third term and that 3-term limit did not apply to
him as an involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of
continuity of service.
- In Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC , SC held that preventive suspension, being a
mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the
3- term limit rule. Ramon filed COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to
Resolve taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino.
- COMELEC First Division issued Resolution disqualifying Ramon.
- Ramon filed Verified MR on April 19 but he filed Ex-parte Manifestation of
Withdrawal of the Pending MR on May 4. On the same day, Barbara Ruby filed
her won COC for Mayor in substitution of Ramon attaching Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD.
- COMELEC en banc declared Comelec First Division’s resolution final and
executory.
- On election day, name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes
were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby and was credited with 44,099 votes as
against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.
- Castillo filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the
suspension of Barbara Ruby's proclamation.
- COMELEC en Banc gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC and CONA
included her in certified list of candidate. CBOC proclaimed her as newly elected
mayor.
- Castillo filed Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with COMELEC as Ruby
cannot be considered a candidate as COMELEC en Banc approved her
substitution 3 days after election hence votes cast for Ramon should be
considered stray.
- Roderick Alcala, duly-elected Vice Mayor, sought to intervene alleging that he
should assume the post Mayor as Ruby’s substitution had been invalid and
Castillo had clearly lost the elections.
- COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s petition-
in-intervention holding that no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon
as candidate for mayor of Lucena City, the counting of the votes of Ramon in
favor of Ruby is proper. The proclamation of Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena
City is in order.
- Comelec en banc reversed and held that (a) Resolution of 1st division did not
attain finality for being issued without a hearing as a mere incident of the
COMELEC's ministerial duty to receive the COCs of substitute candidates; (b)
it was based on the wrong facts; and (c) Ramon's disqualification was resolved
with finality only on May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc concluded that
Barbara Ruby could not have properly substituted Ramon but had simply
become an additional candidate who had filed her COC out of time; and held
that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed to the position pursuant to Sec. 44 of
the LGC.
ISSUES:
1. WON Barbara Ruby’s substitution was valid
2. Who among the contending parties should assume the position
HELD:
  Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid
substitution
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement
for any person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is
clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed
herein.
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral
race. One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition
to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can
be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not
be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all
a candidate.
 Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence,
he was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted.
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves
a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material
representation that is false. The false representation under Section 78 must likewise
be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made
with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s
qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses
cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation
where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the
electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily
follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate
who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in
both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the 3-term limit) is enforced both
by the Constitution and statutory law. The objective of imposing the 3-term limit
rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office."
To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely
precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth
consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for
containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to
run.
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation
with Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to
render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the
COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he
was no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute.
Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to a
permanent vacancy in the office
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is
when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation
covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification
becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second
sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms
Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. On
the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from
assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid
candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility.
A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such
vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of
the LGC, to wit:
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Gov., Vice-Gov., Mayor, and
Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Gov. or mayor, the
vice-Gov. or vice-mayor concerned shall become the Gov. or mayor.
10. ABUNDO B. COMELEC
- Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both
the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning
mayoralty candidateand accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor.
- In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers
initiallyproclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time,
performed the functions of the office of mayor.
- Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way
forhis assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007
term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
- May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his CoC for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral
contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run,
thecorresponding petition, predicated on the 3-consecutive term limit rule.
ISSUE: WON Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has
consecutively served for 3 terms despite the fact that he only served the
remaining one year and one month of the second term as a result of an election
protest
HELD: The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s 3
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term
when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and
occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have
been the rightful choice of the electorate.
The 3-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in
Sec. 8, Article X of the 1987 PC, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more
than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied.) and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of
RA No. (RA) 7160, or the LGC (LGC)
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the PC as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any
length of time shall NOT, in determining service for 3 consecutive terms, be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated
the observation that the law "does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is
the only actual interruption of service that does not affect ‘continuity of service for
a full term’ for purposes of the 3-term limit rule."
As stressed in Socrates v. COMELEC,33 the principle behind the 3-term limit rule
covers only consecutive terms and that what the PC prohibits is a consecutive fourth
term term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his third
consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term,34albeit he is allowed
to seek a fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have
sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official
after his or her third term.
An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term,
immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a
"voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected."
This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending
to skirt the 3-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends.
This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which
may be brought about by certain events or causes.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the 3-term limit rule has engendered a host
of disputes resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who
were elected and served for 3 terms or more, but whose terms or service was
punctuated by what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a,
but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary
interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or
assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the
defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed
candidate as the losing party in an election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate
as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official by operation of law, and
other analogous causes.
11. ALBANIA V. COMELEC
- May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections: Resp. Edgardo A. Tallado and Jesus
O. Typoco were both candidates for the position of Gov. in Camarines Norte.
- After the counting and canvassing of votes, Typoco was proclaimed as
the winner.
 - Tallado questioned Typoco's proclamation by filing with the
COMELEC, a petition for correction of a manifest error.
- The Petition was decided in Tallado's favor on March 5, 2010 and the
latter assumed the position of Gov. of Camarines Norte from March
22, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the end of the 2007-2010 term.
- Tallado ran again in the 2010 and 2013 National and Local Elections where he
won and served as Gov. of Camarines Norte, respectively.
- On October 16, 201 , Tallado filed his CoC as Gov. of Camarines Norte in the
May 9, 2016 National and Local elections.
- On November 13, 2015, Albania, a registered voter of Poblacion Sta. Elena,
Camarines Norte, filed a petition for Resp.'s disqualification from running as
Gov. based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 on two grounds:
- He violated the 3 term limit rule under Sec. 43, LGC; and
- Tallado's suspension from office for one year without pay, together
with its accessory penalties, after he was found guilty of oppression
and grave abuse of authority in the Ombudsman's Order dated
October 2, 2015.
- Tallado argued that
- On procedural matters8
- On the substantive issues, he denied violating the 3-term limit
rule as he did not fully serve 3 consecutive terms since he only
served as Gov. for the 2007 elections from March 22, 2010 to June
30, 2010.
- On April 22, 2016, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for
being filed out of time.
- It ruled that a violation of the 3-term limit rule and suspension from
office as a result of an administrative case are not grounds for
disqualification of a candidate under the law.
- Pet. filed a MR with the COMELEC En Banc, which dismissed the same in a
Resolution dated August 24, 2016. The COMELEC En Banc echoed the
- 8sincethe petition was primarily based on his alleged violation of the 3-term limit rule, the
same should have been filed as a petition to deny due course to or cancel CoC under Rule 23
of COMELEC Resolution 9523, in relation to Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the
ground cited affected a candidate's eligibility;
Division's findings that the grounds relied upon by Pet. are not proper for a
petition for disqualification but one for denial of due course to or cancellation
of Tallado's COC, which was filed out of time.
- It then continued to rule on the merits finding that Resp. did not serve
the full 2007-2010 term as Gov. of Camarines Norte, thus, cannot be
considered as one term for purposes of counting the 3-term threshold.
ISSUE: WON Resp. Tallado violated the 3 term limit rule under LGC
HELD: NO.
- The SC held that 2 conditions must concur for the application of the
disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the 3-term limit rule, which
are:
1. That the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms
in the same local govt post, and
2. That he has fully served 3 consecutive terms.
- Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC
- As worded, the Constitutional provision fixes the term of a local
elective office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more
than 3 consecutive terms.
- Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time - 3
years - during which an official has title to office and can serve.
- Appari v. CA,
- The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of
time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office.
- According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which
an office may be held.
- Upon expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to
holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso
facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent
- that based on Sec. 23, the petition should had been filed on November 10, 2015, but the
petition was filed only on November 13, 2015, hence, the same had already prescribed and
must be dismissed.
- His suspension from office is also not a ground for a petition for disqualification.
 method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration
of the terms for which he was elected or appointed.
- Gaminde v. Commission on Audit
- Term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office
as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another
- In this case, while Resp. ran as Gov. of Camarines Norte in the 2007
elections, he did not win as such.
- It was only after he filed a petition for correction of manifest error that he
was proclaimed as the duly-elected Gov..
- He assumed the post and served the unexpired term of his opponent
from March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010.
- Consequently, he did not hold the office for the full term of 3 years to
which he was supposedly entitled to.
- Thus, such period of time that Resp. served as Gov. did not constitute a
complete and full service of his term. The period when he was out of office
involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his service as Gov..
- As he had not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and had not been elected
for 3 consecutive terms as Gov., there was no violation of the 3-term limit
rule when he ran again in the 2016 elections.
12. GOH V. BAYRON
DOCTRINE: Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the
conduct of recall elections in the 2014 GAA, we see no reason why the COMELEC
is unable to perform its Constitutional mandate to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of x x x recall."
- Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition against Mayor Bayron due to
loss of trust and confidence brought about by "gross violation of pertinent
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of
pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials, Incompetence, and other related gross inexcusable
negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional immaturity
as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City."
- COMELEC: promulgated Resolution No. 9864 which found the recall petition
sufficient in form and substance, but suspended the funding of any and all recall
elections until the resolution of the funding issue
- Mayor Bayron filed with the COMELEC an Omnibus MR and for Clarification
which prayed for the dismissal of the recall petition for lack of merit
- Goh opposed with Motion to Lift Suspension which prayed for the
COMELEC's denial of Mayor Bayron's Omnibus Motion, as well as to direct
COMELEC's authorized representative to immediately carry out the publication
of the recall petition against Mayor Bayron, the verification process, and the
recall election of Mayor Bayron
- COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9882:
o The power of recall for loss of confidence is exercised by the registered
voters of a LGU to which the local elective official subject to such
recall belongs
- The exercise of this power is subject to the following limitations provided for
by law: (a) any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only
once during his term of office for loss of confidence; and (b) [n]o recall shall
take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office
or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election
- The conduct of recall is one of several Constitutional mandates of the
Commission. Unfortunately, it cannot now proceed with the conduct of recall
elections as it does not have an appropriation or legal authority to commit public
funds for the purpose.
ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 9864 is valid insofar as the same directed the
suspension of further action on the instant Recall Petition and WON in the
ANNULMENT AND REVERSAL of Resolution No. 9882, on the ground
that in their issuance, the Resp. Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
RULING: Yes. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882.
- The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC
to perform its Constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections
- There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to
conduct recall elections for 2014
- Despite Resolution No. 9882's statement about the alleged failure of the 2014
GAA to provide for a line item appropriation for the conduct of recall elections,
we hold that the 2014 GAA actually expressly provides for a line item
appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections.
- COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has "a line
item for the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and
plebiscites.'
- This admission of the COMELEC is a correct interpretation of this specific
budgetary appropriation à To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific
amount and a specific purpose but the purpose may be specific even if it is
broken down into different related sub-categories of the same nature
- Resolution No. 9882 proposed alternative sources for funding recall elections
- There is no clash between the COMELEC and Congress. We reiterate that the
2014 GAA provides a line item appropriation for the COMELEC's conduct of
recall elections.
- Since the COMELEC now admits that it does not have sufficient funds from
its current line item appropriation for the "Conduct and supervision of x x x
recall votes xx x" to conduct an actual recall election, then there is therefore an
actual deficiency in its operating funds for the current year.
- The COMELEC, in Resolution No. 9882, admitted the existence of a line item
appropriation for the "Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x":
- A careful review of the Commission's budget under the 2014 GAA reveals that
it does not have any appropriation or line item budget (line item) to serve as a
contingency fund for the conduct of recall elections.
- contrary to the COMELEC's assertion, the appropriations for personnel ser-
Vices and maintenance and other operating expenses falling under "Conduct
and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites" constitute a
line item which can be augmented from the COMELEC's savings to fund the
conduct of recall elections in 2014
- The conduct of recall elections requires only operating expenses, not capital
outlays. The COMELEC's existing personnel in Puerto Princesa are the same
personnel who will evaluate the sufficiency of the recall petitions. and conduct
the recall elections
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
1. SEMA V. COMELEC
 In 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces under
Sec. 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act
201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao.
- MMA Act 201 provided that the eight municipalities shall be separated
from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and
independent province (Shariff Kabunsuan).
- Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its
second legislative district.
- Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is
not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
- The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a
plebiscite
- The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view
of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular
province” under MMA Act 201.
- The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 dated March 6, 2007
"maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.”
- However, in preparation for the May 2007 elections, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first
legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the
enactment of MMA Act 201
- COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, amending Resolution No. 07-
0407 by renaming the first legislative district as “Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City).”
- Sema, who was a candidate in the May 2007 elections for Representative of
“Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City,” prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, treating Cotabato City as part of the
legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, and the exclusion
from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office.
- Sema claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped
Congress’ power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
- COMELEC contended that
o Sema’s prayer for the writ of prohibition became moot with the
proclamation of Resp. Didagen P. Dilangalen as representative of
the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City.
- Respodent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
Constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff
 Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but
merely renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district.
- Resp. Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not
reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to make Cotabato City
its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies
exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet
the minimum population requirement under Sec. 5 (3), Article VI of the PC
for the creation of a legislative district within a city.
Issues:
Whether Sec. 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, is Constitutional; -NO
- No. Sec. 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for
being contrary to Sec. 5 of Article VI and Sec. 20 of Article X of the PC, as
well as Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the PC.
- Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts,
a power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Article VI of the PC and
Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the PC.
- Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a
national office like the office of a district representative of Congress
because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate
only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 20, Article X of the
PC.
- MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Whether the COMELEC resolution is Constitutional. - YES
Yes. COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative
district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely
complies with Sec. 5 of Article VI and Sec. 20 of Article X of the PC, as well as Sec.
1 of the Ordinance appended to the PC.
2. KIDA V. SENATE
- Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that
established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26,
2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
- Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been
held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
- In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including
the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned
from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments
to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the
second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on
the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-
separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to
the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the
effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but
also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2]
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has
passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form
and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a
law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House
and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM
is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress
in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim
[in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent]
elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those
elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013]
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint
OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized
elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of
office of the incumbent ARMM officials
SC: Hold over option violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution: The term
of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms.
- Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution;
they cannot extend their term through a holdover.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the
occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all
laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an
act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover –
whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress
could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we
have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had
the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No.
9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that
is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on
its own, has no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o
elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President,
Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act
 of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have
delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the
execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the
scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other
local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the
exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other
elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act
to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court
is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our
power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not
to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the
exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is
at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the
interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure –
RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law –
as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint.
These are:
1. the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public
ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
2. all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
3. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
4. officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153,
it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint
pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs
under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that
the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the
constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose
non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally
defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is
more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to
be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM
positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic
law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-
charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is
far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No.
10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the
interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No.
10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is
purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.