Modes of Execution

a. By Motion

Villareal, Jr. vs. MWSS

Doctrine: The five-year prescriptive period reckoned from the entry of judgment mentioned in Section
6, Rule 39 of the Rules, should be observed both by the winning party who filed the motion, i.e. ,
judgment obligee/creditor, and the court that will resolve the same. Simply put, the winning party may
le the motion for execution within the five-year period; and the court should issue the actual writ of
execution pursuant to the motion within the same period. After the lapse of the five-year period, any
writ issued by the court is already null and void, since the court no longer has jurisdiction over the
issuance of the writ.

Facts:
MeTC Quezon City dismissed a case filed by Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (MWSS)
against Orlando Villareal for Unlawful Detainer for being prematurely filed and for lack of cause of
action.

On appeal, RTC reversed MeTC’s judgment. On December 15, 2002, the RTC Clerk of Court issued an
Entry of Judgment having the RTC Decision become final and executory. Within a period of 2 years or on
May 17, 2004, MWSS filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with the MeTC. On July 2, 2004,
Orlando filed his opposition praying that the motion be held in abeyance pending compliance by MWSS
with RA No. 7979 also known as the Urban Development & Housing Act of 1992.

More than 10 years from the filing of MWSS’ motion for execution, MeTC issued an Order granting the
motion and issued the Writ of Execution.

On April 20, 2016 , Daniel Villareal, Jr. (on behalf of Orlando) filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
challenging the Writ of Execution. He argued that the 5-year period under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court was violated since the execution was done more than 10 years from the finality of the RTC
decision. MWSS countered that the 5-year period run only against the judgment obligee and not the
court that will resolve it.

Issue: Whether or not the the issuance of the Writ of Execution after 10 years is proper.

Ruling:

No. Execution may be either through motion or an independent action. The two modes of execution
under the Rules are available, depending on the timing when the prevailing party invoked his right to
enforce the court's judgment.

"Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5)
years from the date of its entry." This is a matter of right. "On the other hand, execution by independent
action is mandatory if the five-year prescriptive period for execution by motion had already elapsed."
"[T]he said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a
complaint in a regular court." "[T]he action must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations
which, under the Civil Code, is ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment." Corollary, "[a] final and
executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years or by action for revival of judgment
within ten years reckoned from the date of entry of judgment ." The date of entry, in turn, is the same as
the date of finality of judgment.

By jurisprudence, for execution by motion to be valid, the judgment creditor must ensure the
accomplishment of two acts within the five-year prescriptive period, as follows: (a) the filing of the
motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and (b) the court's actual issuance of the writ. Here, the
RTC Decision dated September 27, 2002 became final and executory on December 15, 2002. By
operation of law, December 15, 2002 is likewise the date of entry of judgment. Consequently, the five-
year prescriptive period for the execution of the RTC decision by mere motion must be reckoned from
December 15, 2002. MWSS fuled a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of the RTC Decision on May
17, 2004. This is within five years from December 15, 2002 — the date when the decision became final
and executory. Thus, the first act was accomplished. There is, however, non-compliance with the second
act.

In Arambulo vs. CFI Laguna, it was held that the jurisdiction of a court to issue a writ of execution by
moion is only effective within the 5-year period from the entry of judgment. Outside this 5-year period,
any writ of execution issued pursuant to a motion filed by the judgment creditor, is null and void. If no
wirt of execution was issued by the court within the 5-year period, even a motion filed within such a
prescriptive period would not suffice. A writ issued by the court afte rthe lapse of the 5-year period is
already null and void. The judgment creditor’s only recourse then is to file an independent action, which
must also be within the prescriptive period set by law for the enforcement of judgments.

In this case, More than a year after the grant, or on October 26, 2015, the MeTC issued the Writ of
Execution. Reckoned from the entry of judgment on December 15, 2002, more than 12 years have
elapsed after the actual writ of execution was nally issued by the MeTC. This is clearly beyond the ve-
year prescriptive period within which the court may issue the writ of execution. By then, the MeTC was
already stripped of its jurisdiction. Thus, the writ of execution it issued on October 26, 2015 is null and
void.

b. By Independent Action

Sps. Davis vs. Sps. Davis

Doctrine:

Nonetheless, this Court held that there had been many instances where it allowed execution by motion
even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common
denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is
incurred for his benefit or advantage.

Facts:

Sps. Larry and Flora Davis (Petitioners), as vendees and Sps. Florencio and Lucresia Davis (Respondents),
as vendors entered into a Contract to Sell over a 500 – square meter lot in Meycauaya, Bulacan for a
consideration of P500K.
Petitioners paid P200k as downpayment while the balance was made payable in 12 monthly
installments. After full payment, respondents failed and refused to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against the respondents with RTC
Malolos, Bulacan. In a Decision dated February 13, 1998, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On
Appeal, the CA affirmed and the decision became final and executory on October 2, 2004.

On May 11, 2005, Petitioners moved for the execution of the February 13, 1998 Decision of the RTC,
which was granted. A writ of execution was subsequently issued. However, this writ was not
implemented because the respondents already sold the property to other persons. A new title has been
issued to the latter. As such, the petitioners file an action for annulment of title and document against
these new registered owners. Fortunately, the court ruled in petitioners' favor, which ruling became
final and executory on July 23, 2012. Petitioners consequently moved for its execution resulting in the
cancellation of the title in the names of the new registered owners and the restoration of the title in the
names of the respondents. Chronologically speaking, the motion for execution filed on July 13, 2016 was
almost 12 years after the decision became final and executory. Petitioners, however, maintain that the
period during which it was compelled to file another action involving the subject property just to enable
a complete and effective relief in their favor should not be taken into account in the computation of the
five-year period.

Issue: Whether or not the Decision of the RTC can be enforced by a mere motion or by an action for
revival of judgment notwithstanding that 10 years had already lapsed from the time it became final.

Ruling:

Yes. Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a "judgment may be executed within five (5) years
from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time,
and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action."
Nonetheless, this Court held that there had been many instances where it allowed execution by motion
even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common
denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or
is incurred for his benefit or advantage. Here, the decision sought to be enforced became final and
executory on October 2, 2004. Upon the petitioners' motion, a writ of execution was issued in 2005,
which was well within the said five-year period. The writ, however, was repeatedly returned unserved
and unimplemented.

Considering that the delay was not due to the fault of the petitioners but of the respondents, who
deliberately sold the subject property to another to avoid the outcome of the case led against them, and
which delay incurred to their benet/advantage, it is only logical, just, and equitable that the period
during which an action for annulment of title and document was being litigated upon shall be deemed to
have interrupted or tolled the running of the ve-year period for enforcement of a judgment by mere
motion. Otherwise, the respondents were rewarded for escaping the fullment of their obligation.
Therefore, in computing the time limited for suing out an execution, the time during which execution is
stayed should be excluded, and the time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor. It
bears stressing that the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or
actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Moreover, the statute of limitations has not
been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so for causes beyond their control. In the case
under consideration, there has been no indication that the petitioners had ever slept on their rights to
have the judgment executed by mere motions within the reglementary period.