SGRAO Air Operator Requirements V1.1 November 2017

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Shell Aircraft
Shell Group Requirements for
Aircraft Operations (SGRAO)
Aircraft Operator Requirements

Version 1.1 November, 2017
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Table of Contents
Safety Requirements
SAF 00.00 Safety Management Systems 7
SAF 01.00 Safety Policy and Objectives 10
SAF 01.01 Leadership and Commitment 12

SAF 01.02 Organisation, Accountabilities and Resources 16
SAF 01.03 Competence 18
SAF 01.04 Emergency Response Management 20
SAF 01.05 Documented Procedures 22
SAF 01.06 Management Review 24
SAF 02.00 Safety Risk Management 27
SAF 02.01 Incident Reporting, Investigation and Learning 30

SAF 03.00 Assurance 33
SAF 03.01 Performance Monitoring 35

SAF 03.02 Management of Change 37
SAF 04.00 Safety Promotion 39
Flight Operations Requirements
FOP 01.01 Air Operator Certificate (AOC) 41

FOP 01.02 Organisation and Personnel 43
FOP 01.03 Aircraft Crew Member Duties and Responsibilities 45
FOP 01.04 Flight Crew Scheduling 47
FOP 01.05 Flight Preparation and Pre-Flight 49
FOP 01.06 Weather Minima 51
FOP 01.07 Adverse Weather 54
FOP 01.08 Minimum Flight Altitudes, Airport Usabiltiy and Operating Minima 56
FOP 01.09 Pre-Departure Fuel Policy, Weight and Balance, ATS and Operational
Flight Plans 58
FOP 01.10 Minimum Equipment List and Configuration Deviation List (MEL/CDL),
Aircraft Technical Log (ATL), Aircraft Pre-flight Inspections 60
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FOP 01.11 Refuelling With Passengers On Board 63
FOP 01.12 De/Anti-Icing 65
FOP 01.13 Airspace Rules 67

FOP 01.14 In-Flight Operations 69
FOP 01.15 FOP Bird Strike Avoidance 71
FOP 01.16 Use of Oxygen 73
FOP 01.17 Flight Following 74

FOP 01.18 Aircraft Documentation 76
FOP 01.19 Stabilised Approach 78
FOP 01.20 Aircrew and Passenger Survival Equipment Standards 81

FOP 02.01 Pilots and Other Flight Crew Qualifications and Experience Levels 84
FOP 02.02 Alternative to Time on Type Requirements 86
FOP 02.03 Use of Freelance Pilots 88
FOP 02.04 Pilots Flying More Than One Aircraft Type 90

FOP 02.05 Maximum Age Limits for Aircrew 92
FOP 02.06 Medicals 93
FOP 02.07 Flight Crew Training – General 94

FOP 02.07.01 Flight Crew1 Training – Proficiency Training 97
FOP 02.07.02 Flight Crew1 Training – Emergency and Safety Equipment Training 101
FOP 02.07.03 Flight Crew1 Training – Non Technical Training 103
FOP 02.07.04 Training – Other Training 110
FOP 02.07.05 Pilot Experience and Qualification Levels – Fixed Wing 113
FOP 02.07.06 Pilot Experience and Qualification Levels – Helicopters 116
FOP 02.07.07 Ab-Initio and Low Experience Pilot Training Helicopters 120
FOP 03.01 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) – General 124
FOP 03.02 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) - Organisation Structure 126
FOP 03.03 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) – Hardware 129
FOP 03.04 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) – Processes 134
FOP 03.05 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) - Training, Serviceability and Audit 139
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FOP 04.01 Fuel Requirements – Helicopters 142
FOP 04.02 Composition of Flight Crew – Helicopters 145
FOP 04.02.01 Two Pilot Operations – Helicopters 147

FOP 04.02.02 Single Pilot Operations 150
FOP 04.02.03 Maximum Flying Hours Limits – Helicopters 152
FOP 04.03 Maximum Flying Duty Periods (FDP) – Helicopter 154
FOP 04.04 Guarding of Flight Controls – Helicopters 156

FOP 04.05 Night Operations – Helicopters 158
FOP 04.06 Rotors Running Refuelling (RRRF) – Helicopters 160
FOP 04.07 Float Arming for Offshore Flights – Helicopters 162

FOP 04.08 Rotor Brake Serviceability for Offshore Operations – Helicopters 163
FOP 04.09 Helicopters Based Offshore 164
FOP 04.10 Ground Taxi on Offshore Helidecks – Helicopters 165
FOP 04.11 – Aircraft Operations - Helicopter Performance 167

FOP 04.12 Use of Offshore Alternates – Helicopters 169
FOP 05.01 Land Seismic and Heli-rig Operations 172
FOP 05.02 Specialist Roles – Marine Pilot Transfer – Helicopters 174

FOP 05.03 Specialist Roles – Airborne Geophysical Survey 177
FOP 05.04 Specialist Roles – Aerial Pipeline Inspections 181
FOP 6.01 Performance Requirements - Fixed-Wing Operations 184
FOP 06.02 Use of Single-Engine Aircraft 186
FOP 6.03 Fuel Requirements - Fixed-Wing Operations 188
FOP 06.04 Composition of Flight Crew - Fixed-Wing Operations 190
FOP 06.05 Maximum Flying Hour Limits – Fixed Wing 192
FOP 06.06 Maximum Flying Duty Periods (FDP) – Fixed-Wing 194
FOP 07.01 Passenger General Requirements 197
FOP 07.02 Cargo and Luggage 200
FOP 07.03 Manifests 203
FOP 07.04 Passenger Weights and Size 205
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FOP 07.05 Passenger Briefings 207
FOP 07.06 Passenger Marshalling Areas 210
FOP 08.00 Aircraft Equipment Standards 212
Engineering Requirements
ENG 01.01 Airworthiness Management 224
ENG 02.01 Continuing Airworthiness Organisation 226
ENG 02.02 Aircraft Maintenance Programme 229

ENG 02.03 Airworthiness directives and (Alert) Service Bulletins 231
ENG 02.04 Aircraft Technical Records 233
ENG 02.05 Contracted Maintenance and Services 235

ENG 02.06 Authorisations, Competence and Training (Continuing Airworthiness) 237
ENG 03.01 Maintenance Organisation Management 239
ENG 03.02 Maintenance Control and Release to Service 241
ENG 03.03 Duplicate and Independent Inspections 243

ENG 03.04 Tools and Equipment 246
ENG 03.05 Facilities 248
ENG 03.06 Identifying Organisational Weakness (IOW) 250

ENG 03.07 Staged Worksheets 253
ENG 03.08 Fitness for Work and Fatigue Management 255
ENG 03.09 Authorisations, Competence and Training (AMO) 257
ENG 03.10 Foreign Object Damage 260

ENG 03.11 Aircraft Stores 262
ENG 04.01 Aircraft Fuel 264
ENG 5.01 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) – General 267
ENG 5.02 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) – Equipment Fit Requirement 269
ENG 5.03 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) – OEM Support Agreement 271
ENG 5.04 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) – Required Serviceability 273
ENG 5.05 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) – Download and Line 275
Analysis Frequency
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ENG 5.06 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) - Second line analysis frequency 277
ENG 5.07 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) – Recording and Release to
Service 279
ENG 5.08 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) – Training 281
ENG 5.09 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) – Quality Assurance (QA) 283
ENG 5.10 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) – Groundstation 285
Other Requirements
OTH 01.00 – Security 287

OTH 02.00 – Search and Rescue Operations (SAR) 289
OTH 03.00 – Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) Operations 305
Aircraft Glossary Definitions 310
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SAF 00.00 Safety Management Systems 1
Shell Group Requirements for Restricted

Aircraft Operations
Version 1.1, November 2017
Air Operator Requirements
MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS
The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for Requirements 1-2:
1. Implement an effective Safety Management System (SMS), appropriate to the scale of the
organisation, in order to manage significant safety risks to levels As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP).
2. Demonstrate how SMS elements and relationships have been effectively implemented within
the organisation.
Means of Compliance for Requirements 1-2:
1. Safety Management System (SMS) components and elements that meet National Aviation
Authority (NAA) regulatory requirements, and SAF 00.00 through SAF 04.00, shall be
demonstrated, and;
1.1 The intent of ICAO Annex 19, 1st Edition July 2013 - Appendix 2 – Framework for a
SMS shall be demonstrated, including in those countries where national regulations for
SMS are not in place for the class of operation or activity.
2. The size and complexity of the aircraft operator will be reflected in the structure and
complexity of the elements of the SMS. The SMS will demonstrate interlinked processes that
allow safety information to circulate freely and system improvements to be made (see
Figure 1, overall MS and Figure 2, Hazard Management).
1 SAF sections follow ICAO Annex 19 1st Edition July 2013 - Appendix 2 – Framework for a SMS
with additional expectations described within each section where necessary. The term Safety
Management System (SMS) has been used for consistency, recognising that some
organisations may have elements of these requirements contained within a wider integrated
Management System (MS).
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Figure 1 (IOGP Report 590) Figure 2 (IOGP Report 590)
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
The purpose of each of the subsequent SAF sections is described below. Detailed requirements
and the associated means of compliance and are expanded in the individually numbered SAF
sections:
SAF 01.00 Safety Policy and Objectives
• To define the organisation’s safety policy based on a Just Culture that incorporates objectives
targets and plans.
SAF 01.01 Leadership and Commitment:
• To create and sustain a culture that drives commitment of no harm to people.
SAF 01.02 Organisation, Accountabilities and Resources:
• To establish and maintain an organisation that enables compliance with the Safety Policy and
objectives.
SAF 01.03 Competence:

• To manage and assure the competence of people working with safety risks.
SAF 01.04 Emergency Response Management:
• To plan and prepare for emergency responses to incidents that mitigate the consequences
and enable resumption of normal operations.
SAF 01.05 Documented Procedures:
• Documented, detailed procedures covering all activities and processes and more broadly
documented procedures for safety critical tasks related to aircraft operations, including flight
operations, aircraft maintenance and ground operations;
SAF 01.06 Management Review:
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• To review the effectiveness, adequacy and fitness for purpose of the MS and take action to
improve.
SAF 02.00 Safety Risk Management
• To establish a Hazard and Effects Management Process (HEMP) to identify safety hazards and
to reduce the Risks to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
SAF 02.01 Incident Reporting, Investigation and Learning:
• To log, investigate and learn from incidents.
SAF 03.00 Assurance
• To provide assurance that the MS requirements are implemented and effective.

SAF 03.01 Performance Monitoring
• To collect safety performance data including Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) that are
relevant, consistent, transparent, accurate and complete, for consolidation by leadership for
internal review.
SAF 03.02 Management of Change:

• To manage safety risks resulting from unforeseen consequences of changes.
SAF 04.00 Safety Promotion
• To establish a hierarchy of safety communication processes that enables an effective, two-

way flow of information throughout the company
LINKS (FOR DOWNLOAD)
Shell:
External:
1. ICAO Annex 19 1st Edition July 2013 - Appendix 2 – Framework for a SMS
2. UK CAA CAP 795 SMS Guidance for organisations – February 2015
RELATED INCIDENT
CORRESPONDING SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS
SHELL AIRCRAFT MODEL BOWTIE REFERENCE
IOGP REPORT 590 AMG DIFFERENCES
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SAF 01.00 Safety Policy and Objectives

Aircraft Operations
1. Provide a Safety Commitment and Policy Document, based on a Just Culture, with clear
responsibilities for safety management.
2. Establish safety objectives and performance standards for the organisation.

1. In addition to, or in lieu of National Aviation Authority (NAA) requirements, the Safety
Commitment and Policy shall:
1.1 Reflect the organisational commitment to safety;
1.2 Be signed by the accountable executive of the organisation;
1.3 Be communicated, with visible endorsement, throughout the organisation;
1.4 Actively encourage effective safety reporting by defining a Just Culture, which
describes the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable performance;
1.5 Include a clear statement on the commitment to provide the necessary resources for
the implementation of the safety policy;
1.6 State that safety is a primary responsibility for all staff and ensure that the policy is
implemented and understood at all levels in the organisation;
1.7 Be reviewed on a yearly basis to ensure it remains relevant and appropriate to the
company.
2 Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) are to be established that monitor and measure the
safety performance of the organisation and the effectiveness of the Management System
(Refer to SAF 03.01).
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ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Shell:
External:
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/Annex%20to%20ED%20Decision%202012-007-
R.pdf
RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 01.01 Leadership and Commitment

Aircraft Operations
Leaders1 within the Aircraft Operator are Accountable for Requirements 1-5:
1. Be mindful of the safety risks in their business;
2. Demonstrate visible and felt leadership through measurable actions;
3. Motivate, coach and develop staff to manage safety risks effectively;

4. Hold individuals accountable for their safety performance and behaviours;
5. Engage where appropriate with Joint Venture partners, sub-contractor management local
communities and authorities, industry associations on Safety.
Leaders shall be mindful of the safety risks in their business by:
1. Knowing the safety risks associated with their position and responsibilities in the company
and how they are managed;
1.1 Taking corrective action if they are not satisfied that the controls for a risk are
effective;
1.2 Communicating the Company's Safety Policies to their staff and relevant sub-
contractors.
2 Leaders shall demonstrate visible and felt leadership through measurable actions by:
2.1 Planning and making base visits to engage with their staff and relevant sub-
contractors about safety;
2.2 Leading, or actively participating in safety activities: team meetings and safety
programmes and campaigns;
2.3 Leading by example, by intervening during day-to-day activities whenever they feel
that safety requirements are not being met, including challenging business decisions.
3 Leaders shall motivate, coach and develop staff to manage safety risks effectively by:
3.1 Developing their own competence and that of their team in line with company
requirements;
1 The term “leaders” includes all management and supervisory positions in the organisation,
including the chief executive and senior management team, middle management regional and
base managers.
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3.2 Acting as a role model for safety compliance and reporting of safety issues and Near
Misses; encouraging their staff to do the same;
3.3 Providing constructive feedback to their staff on their safety behaviours and
performance and celebrate success;
3.4 Including safety behaviours and performance in decisions about performance

rewards, recruitment, staff development and promotions.
4 Leaders shall hold individuals accountable for their safety performance and behaviours by:
4.1 Monitoring and reinforcing compliance with the company’s procedures, applicable
laws and regulations and take appropriate action to correct deficiencies;
4.2 Applying Just Culture consequence management for those who break rules and those
who create the conditions for rule breaking.
5 No further requirements.
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ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
A key element of leadership commitment is visible leadership, commonly demonstrated by

workplace and site visits. These allow leaders to:
• Get to know people working at the workplace and demonstrate care
• Talk about work activities that matter to the people
• Have a focus and purpose when engaging people
• Focus on the behaviour of people during work site visits and recognise the right behaviours
Engaging in conversations with staff and asking authentic questions lets the workforce see the
genuine interest and commitment of their leaders and allows the leaders to gain a better insight
into their HSSE exposure. Examples are:
• Can you describe to me what you do day to day?
• What are the greatest HSSE hazards you face?

• How could you or someone else be hurt?
• Do you feel you can stop an activity because of a safety concern? / When was an activity last
stopped, or paused over a safety concern?
• Do you feel cared for? Do you feel treated fairly?
• Do you know what security risks you face and do you understand what you should do if the
event of a security incident, including where you should report an incident or suspicious
behaviour?
• Are there any HSSE issues here that we are not dealing with adequately?
• When are you able to perform at your best? What sometimes stops you perming at your best?
• What would have to be different for you to feel more confident that an incident at this site is
unlikely?
• Do people feel they need to take short cuts?
Leaders should strive to ensure that the receive regular feedback, and this means fostering an
environment where feedback is actively sought on HSSE performance through open and honest
conversations. It is easier for people to provide feedback on a leader’s HSSE behaviour if their
leader has already established a feedback culture.
Shell:
External:
RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 01.02 Organisation, Accountabilities and Resources

Aircraft Operations
1. Identify the Accountable Executive who, irrespective of other functions, has ultimate
responsibility on behalf of the organisation, for the implementation of the Management System
(MS).
2. Appoint a Safety Manager (See Additional Guidance).
3. Establish and maintain governance over the implementation of the Safety Management
System (SMS).
1. The Accountable Executive shall have:
1.1 Corporate authority for ensuring all activities can be financed and carried out to the
required standard;
1.2 Full authority for ensuring adequate staffing levels, to provide the organisaiton with
the capacity and capability to deliver all activities in line with the Safety Policy and
Objectives (SAF 2.00);
1.3 Final accountability for all safety issues.
2 The Safety Manager shall:
2.1 Have defined competence requirements, sufficient resources and safety structures to
manage the implementation and maintenance of the SMS;
2.2 Act as the focal point and be responsible for the development, administration,
maintenance and promotion of the SMS; and,
2.3 Have direct access to the Accountable Executive.
3 Establish and maintain governance over the implementation of the SMS by:
3.1 Establishing and maintaining the resources (people, equipment, materials, information
and time) needed to implement the SMS;
3.2 Clearly defining lines of safety accountability throughout the organisation, including a
direct accountability for safety on the part of all leaders;
3.3 Identifying the accountabilities of all members of management, irrespective of other

functions, as well as of staff, with respect to the safety performance of the SMS;
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3.4 Documenting and communicating roles, safety responsibilities and accountabilities in

job descriptions, individual tasks and targets and authorities throughout the
organisation;
3.5 Defining the levels of management with authority to make decisions regarding safety
risk tolerability and ensuring that the relevant department senior leader is involved
with line leadership in decisions affecting safety management and performance;
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
The Safety Manager should be a full-time employee although in a small complex or non-complex
organisation it may be a part time role shared with other duties. They may also be the Compliance
Monitoring / Quality Manager, but in such cases, there will need to be independent compliance
monitoring of the SMS.
The Safety Manager should be given appropriate status in the organisation to provide the
necessary degree of authority when dealing with safety matters.Left Bullet
Shell:
External:
RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 01.03 Competence

Aircraft Operations
Version 1.1, november 2017
1. Inform, instruct and train people such that they are competent to carry out their work safely.
2. Identify and record Safety Critical Positions in each reporting line across the organisation

1. The operator shall develop and maintain a safety training programme such that:
1.1 All operational staff, managers, supervisors, senior managers and the Accountable
Executive (as appropriate), are able to perform their duties within the Safety
Management System (SMS);
1.2 Everyone’s level of involvement in the SMS is taken into consideration including:
• Initial, induction training;
• Training to ensure continued maintenance of competence, including human and

organisational factors;
1.3 All Managers and supervisors understand the safety process, hazard identification, risk
management and the management of change;
1.4 Senior managers understand organisational safety standards and safety assurance
processes for their level in the organisation;
1.5 The Accountable Executive has an awareness of SMS roles and responsibilities, safety
policy, safety culture, SMS standards and safety assurance.
2. Safety Critical Positions shall be identified and recorded by the operator according to the size
of organisation and will include (if appropriate):
2.1. Frontline positions responsible for managing the effectiveness of critical safety barriers,
such as pilots, maintenance staff, ramp and refuelling personnel and essential
operational leadership positions;
2.2. Assessment of staff Competence against the requirements for each Safety Critical
Position, see also FOP 02 - Pilots & Other Flight Crew, ENG 02.06 Authorisations,
Competence and Training, and ENG 3.09 Authorisations, Competence and Training
(AMO);
2.3. Retention of records of the assessment and relevant training, including the result
(“competent” or “not yet competent”);
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2.4. The competence requirements for any Safety Critical Positions affected by Process
Changes, Procedural Changes or Organisational Changes shall be updated by the
operator;
2.5. When there are changes to incumbents in Safety Critical Positions, update the
Competence requirements for these staff;
2.6. Manage any Competence gaps through an agreed and documented plan.
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Shell:
External:
RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 01.04 Emergency Response Management

Aircraft Operations
1. Establish and maintain country, regional or global Emergency Response Plans (ERP) required
to meet the company needs and response objectives covering all Credible Emergency Scenarios1.
2. Establish an Emergency Response Organisation able to manage all Credible Emergency

Scenarios staffed with Emergency responders equipped and trained to a Competence level to
match their roles and responsibilities as outlined in the ERP.
3. Conduct Emergency Response process reviews and exercises on a scheduled basis.
4. Integrate this element so that it supports the effectiveness of the Hazard and Effect
Management Process (HEMP) as described in SAF 02.00.
1. Emergency Response Plans (ERP) shall contain:
1.1. Activation triggers to initiate an emergency response;
1.2. Details of roles and responsibilities, including Co-Coordinators, Duty Managers etc.;
1.3. A list of Emergency Contacts
1.4. Contacts and contact requirements for local Shell BU responsible managers;
1.5. Any integration requirements with local Shell BU.
2. The Emergency Response Organisation shall:

2.1. Demonstrate the required staffing levels;
2.2. Demonstrate that staff are trained and competent to hold the roles and responsibilities
outlined in the ERP.
3. The process for Emergency Response reviews/exercises shall:
3.1. List all the exercises carried out;

3.2. Schedule exercises, once yearly, on one of the following scenarios (if applicable), in
each operational base:
1 Credible Emergency Scenarios are generalised detailed descriptions of a hypothetical but

credible incident. This is the result of an imagined sequence of events that could plausibly lead to
an Incident requiring mitigation by emergency response.
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• Accident on arrival or departure;
• Overdue Aircraft;
• Fixed Wing – accident away from base;

• Helicopter accident on a remote helideck;
• Helicopter ditching in rescue range of a facility or vessel; and
• Any exercises or exercises required by regulation.
3.3. Include additional scenarios developed to fill out the remainder of the year’s exercise
schedule based on other Credible Emergency Scenarios, determined by the Risk
Assessment in the HEMP;
3.4. Detail the post Emergency Response reviews/exercises process and how all post
exercise review learnings are recorded and tracked to closure.
3.5. Confirm that the operator’s ERP is properly coordinated with the ERP’s of those
organisations it must interface with during the provision of its services.
4. No further requirements.
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
As part of the annual exercise set out in 3.2, Shell staff should be included as observers, and
include, where possible, an element of coordination with the Shell Business Unit emergency
response organisation.
Shell:
External:
1. UK CAA CAP 795 SMS Guidance for organizations – February 2015
2. EASA AMC1 ORO.GEN.200
RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 01.05 Documented Procedures

Aircraft Operations
1. Provide documented, detailed procedures covering all Safety Management System (SMS)
activities and processes;
2. Provide documented procedures for Safety Critical Activities related to aircraft operations,
including flight operations, aircraft maintenance and ground operations.
1. Develop and maintain SMS documentation appropriate to the size, nature, and complexity of
the organisation consisting of:
1.1 SMS manual(s) which must include all elements of the SMS (See Guidance) and can
be incorporated into existing documents;
1.2 SMS records (for example hazard logs, risk assessments, safety cases, meeting
minutes);
1.3 Records and document management process.

2. Safety Critical Activities related to aircraft operations will be listed in the SMS Manual.
However, full details can be part of an existing manuals or expositions.
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Typical contents for an SMS Manual include the following:

• Scope of the SMS;
• Safety policy and objectives;
• Safety accountabilities;
• Key safety personnel;
• Documentation control procedures;
• Hazard identification reporting and risk management schemes;
• Safety performance monitoring;
• Incident investigation and reporting;
• Emergency response planning;
• Management of change processes;
• Safety promotion;
• Contracted activities; and
• Just culture policy and supporting processes.
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External:
EASA AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) Management system
https://www.icao.int/safety/SafetyManagement/Documents/Doc.9859.3rd%20Edition.alltext.en.
pdf
RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 01.06 Management Review

Aircraft Operations
1. Maintain a management review process, based on a defined hierarchy of meetings that

provides all leaders visibility of the Safety Management System (SMS) activity.
2. Include safety reporting, hazard management, QA issues and assurance of the effectiveness
of the SMS within the management review process.
3. Integrate the Management Review process such that it clearly links to: Emergency Response
Management; Safety Risk Management process; Incident Reporting, Investigation and
Learning; Performance Monitoring; Management of Change; and Safety Promotion as
described in SAF 00.00.
1. The Aircraft Operator shall maintain a management review process which is based on a defined
hierarchy of meetings, appropriate to the size of the organisation, typically:
1.1 Meetings that review the operational effectiveness of safety risk management
processes at department level, covering, as appropriate:
• Resolution and mitigation of identified risks;
• Assessment of the safety impact of operational changes – Management of Change

Process (SAF 04.02);
• Review of Hazard Risk Management (SAF 03.01) processes and associated

Remedial Action Plan;
• Results and follow-up actions from audits, previous lower level safety meetings,
and preventive actions and corrective action plans;
• Corrective actions, including Assurance processes, are being achieved within agreed
timescales;
• The effectiveness of safety recommendations and safety promotion;
• Results of safety reporting and data analysis – Performance Monitoring (SAF

05.01);
• Allocation of resources.
1.2 A meeting attended by the Accountable Executive, to review:
• Output from the department level – or similar meetings;
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• Safety performance against the safety policy and objectives - Performance

Monitoring (SAF 04.01);
• Effectiveness of the Quality and Safety oversight of company activities and sub-
contracted organisations
• Corrective or mitigating actions, including Quality Assurance processes, are being

taken in a timely manner;
• Effectiveness of the organisation's SMS processes, including the Hazard and Effects
Management process.
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
The Departmental meeting may be established as a Safety Action Group (SAG), and the
Accountable Executive Meeting may be established as the Safety Review Board (SRB). Both are
ICAO definitions of these meetings.
The SAG, can be a standing group or an ad-hoc group to assist or act on behalf of the SRB.
The SAG reports to and takes strategic direction from the SRB. It is comprised of managers,
supervisors and staff from operational areas.
Membership of the SAG and frequency of meetings should be defined. The safety manager may
also participate in the SAG. In very large organisations more than one SAG may be established
that focus on specific areas.
In small organisations, the SAG and SRB may be combined.
Shell:
https://eu001-sp.shell.com/sites/AAAAA8432/CF/Web/Management_Review.aspx
https://eu001-
sp.shell.com/sites/AAAAA7146/CIResources/CI%20Site%20Pages/SG_RDS_CI_Maturity_Model
_and_Roadmap.aspx
External:
RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 02.00 Safety Risk Management

Aircraft Operations
1. Establish and Maintain an effective Hazard and Effects Management Process, (HEMP)
appropriate to the size and complexity of the organisation;
2. Document hazards and their effects on people, assets, reputation and the environment (where
applicable) in a Hazards and Effects Register, and;
3. Assess all the Risks of identified Hazards for Worst-Case Credible Scenarios using the
company’s Risk Assessment process, and document the assessment of all these Risks in the
Hazards and Effects Register;
4. Manage the Hazards assessed as Low Risk for continuous improvement through effective
implementation of the Management System;
5. Manage the Hazards assessed as Medium Risk in accordance with the hierarchy of controls;
6. Manage the Hazards assessed as High Risk by applying a Bow-Tie or equivalent analysis
method;
7. Provide a documented demonstration that all elements of the of the HEMP are managed to As
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP);
8. Establish and Maintain an effective HEMP review process.

1. The operator shall establish and maintain a HEMP which:

1.1 Identifies and addresses generic, mission specific and location specific hazards;
1.2 Identifies preventative and recovery controls, the safety critical activities that ensure
barrier effectiveness, and the safety critical role holders and safety critical equipment
that deliver the safety critical activities;
1.3 Is based on a combination of reactive, proactive and predictive methods of safety data
collection;
2. No further requirements;
3. Use a Risk Assessment process that compares the severity and likelihood of a hazard being
released, such as a Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) or similar;
4. No further requirements;
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5. Manage Risks that are assessed as medium in accordance with the hierarchy of controls, listed
below:
5.1. Where Reasonably Practicable Eliminate Hazards, or;
5.2. Substitute Hazards with ones having lower Risk, and;

5.3. Identify and implement Controls and Recovery Measures to reduce the Risks to ALARP;
5.4. Maintain a Hazards and Effects Register that includes a reference to the operator’s
documentation, legislation, regulation, or industry standards used to determine ALARP,
or a reference to the process by which ALARP is determined.
6. Manage Risks assessed as High as per Requirement 5, and in addition, apply a Bow-Tie or
equivalent analysis method to include the following:
6.1. Identification of Barriers and Escalation Factors to prevent the release of a Hazard and
to reduce the Consequences if the Hazard is released;
6.2. Linking these barriers and recovery measures to the Hazards;
6.3. Providing a document reference for the barriers and recovery measures;
6.4. Assigning a responsible individual/party to each barrier, and in all cases, the barriers
identified for location specific hazards are to be assigned local responsibility.
7. Provide a documented demonstration, within a format or software system that is appropriate

to the size and complexity of the organisation, that all elements of the HEMP are managed to
ALARP, with details of:
7.1. Hazards, Threats, Events, Consequences, Controls and Recovery Measures.
7.2. Monitoring and verification process that is tied to the Company Assurance Process (SAF
04.00) which validates the effectiveness of each barrier;
7.3. A Remedial Action Plan to close identified gaps.
8. Establish and Maintain an effective HEMP review process, which is demonstrably linked to the
operator's:
8.1. Management of Change Process (SAF 03.02);
8.2. Incident Reporting, Investigation and Learning processes (SAF 02.02);

8.3. Safety Promotion (SAF 04.00);
8.4. Management Review (SAF 01.06) and;
8.5. Includes a process where external accidents or incidents that are relevant to the
operation are included.
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ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Shell: https://eu001-sp.shell.com/sites/AAAAA8432/CF/Web/Managing_Risk.aspx
External:
RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 02.01 Incident Reporting, Investigation and Learning

Aircraft Operations
1. Establish safety reporting procedures covering all regulatory and non-regulatory reports,
including the reporting of lower level incidents or occurrences, including near-miss events.
2. Direct, encourage, and provide tools, to personnel to report any incident, occurrence, hazard,
error, or near-miss event they become aware of, as soon as possible.
3. Provide and apply an investigation process which generates recommendations and

systematically tracks them to closure.
4. Learn from Significant Incidents and High Potential Incidents through communication and
implementation of required actions.
5. Integrate this element such that it supports the effectiveness of the Safety Risk Management
and Management Review processes as described in SAF 01.00.
1. The reporting system shall be established to:

1.1 Proactively report errors, near-miss events and hazards;
1.2 Encourage proactive safety reporting for staff at all levels, supported by a "Just
Culture", and providing protection to the reporter, such as the option to make
anonymous reports;
1.3 Include an effective feedback process to the individual and to the wider organisation
where appropriate;
1.4 Assign a severity rating in line with the operator’s risk assessment process to any
report.
2. Report incidents to the designated Shell Contract Holder and allow access for investigation, in
line with contract requirements.
3. The scope of internal safety investigations shall:
3.1. Include occurrences that are not required to be reported to the National Aviation
Authority (NAA), including high-potential, near-miss, events;
3.2. Be undertaken by trained investigators, whenever possible;
3.3. Be of a scale suitable to determine why an event occurred and validate or identify the
underlying hazards;
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3.4. Have a scope proportional to the identified hazard and risk;
3.5. Take place as soon as possible after the event;
3.6. Have an objective to understand why an event happened and the contributing causes,
that is aligned with the organisation’s Just Culture policy;
3.7. Include, where appropriate:
• Review of documentation and processes;
• Operational data monitoring;
• Interviews;
• Root cause analysis;
• Data analysis.
3.8. Require Corrective Actions to be recorded in an appropriate system and tracked to

closure;
4. To Learn from Significant Incidents and High Potential Incidents an organisation shall have
procedures:
4.1. To communicate the results of any safety investigations;
4.2. When appropriate, to address any identified hazards;
4.3. To include both the Aircraft Operator’s events and similar events from the wider
industry.
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Though often of a minor nature, reports can be indicative of a potential hazard or trend that will
only be recognised through systematic investigation and data analysis.
Staff need to have confidence in the just culture and the reporting system. They must know that
confidentiality will be maintained and that the information they submit will be acted upon,
otherwise they will decide that there is no benefit in their reporting.
Shell : https://eu001-
sp.shell.com/sites/AAAAA8432/CF/Web/Incident_Investigation_Learning.aspx
External:
EASA GM1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) Management system
INTERNAL OCCURRENCE REPORTING SCHEME
EASA AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) Management system
COMPLEX OPERATORS - SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT
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RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 03.00 Assurance

Aircraft Operations
1. Develop, document and implement an Assurance system covering the Safety Management
System (SMS) and Safety Risk Management (SAF 02.00) processes, all flight operations,
maintenance activities and ground operations.
2. The Assurance system shall detail a programme of internal and external audits, using trained
staff, that monitors compliance with all the aircraft operator's published manuals and
activities.
1. The Aircraft Operator shall, in addition to, or in the absence of National Aviation Authority
(NAA) requirements, develop a process, such as a Quality Assurance, Quality Control or a
Compliance Monitoring system modelled after ISO9001:
1.1. Which is under the sole control of a Quality Manager (or equivalent) to whom the
management function has been assigned;
1.2. Which is described in an applicable manual describing departmental procedures,

duties, responsibilities and reporting relationships;
1.3. Which monitors and assess the effectiveness of the MS processes to enable continuous
improvement of the overall performance of the MS, and;
1.4. Continually seek to improve its safety performance, using tools such as:
• Proactive evaluation of day to day operations, facilities, equipment, documentation

and procedures, and;
• Through safety audits and surveys.
2. The programme of audits, shall monitor compliance with all the aircraft operator’s published
manuals including, but not limited, to:
2.1. The suite of Operations Manuals;
2.2. The Continuing Airworthiness Manual, or equivalent;
2.3. The Maintenance Organisation Manual, or equivalent;

2.4. Flight Data Monitoring (FDM), Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) and and
other specialised activities;
2.5. Any externally contracted operations or activities;
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2.6. By using trained and competency assessed auditors to carry out the activities, and;
2.7. Will utilise a functioning records/data management system which also tracks all audits
and non-compliances to closure.
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Shell:
External:
RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 03.01 Performance Monitoring

Aircraft Operations
1. Establish Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) that monitor and measure the safety policy,
objectives and the performance of the organisation including the effectiveness of the SMS.
2. Gather and record safety performance data including SPIs that are relevant, consistent,
transparent, accurate and complete, for consolidation and use these for internal review.
3. Confirm actual safety performance by reference to SPIs and safety performance targets.
4. Verify that data quality controls are in place to ensure that the data is accurate and complete.
5. Integrate this SMS element so that it supports the effectiveness of the Management Review
as described in SAF 01.06.
1. Develop and maintain SPIs appropriate to the size, nature, and complexity of the
organisation. (See Guidance).
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Typically, safety objectives need to have been considered established before setting SPIs. This
should allow the safety performance of the organisation to be measured against its safety policies
and objectives.
The following should be considered in setting safety objectives:

• Define what the organisation hopes to achieve;
• It should be a statement of a desired outcome;
• Safety objectives should be short, high-level statements of the safety priorities and should
reflect the organisation's safety policy;
• Safety objectives should address the organisation's most significant risks.
Typically, SPIs will require the monitoring of data from various sources such as;
• Occurrences and events;
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• Safety reports;
• Meeting attendance;
• Safety reviews including trend analysis;
• Audit closure rates;
• Internal safety investigations.
External:
https://www.casa.gov.au/education/standard-page/sms-resource-kit
https://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP795_SMS_guidance_to_organisations.pdf
RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 03.02 Management of Change

Aircraft Operations
1. Manage the risk associated with significant changes related to aircraft operations including
key personnel changes, through a documented Management of Change (MOC) process that
identifies external and internal changes affecting established operations, systems and
processes.
2. Identify changes that introduce new hazards, or impact the effectiveness of the existing risk
mitigations detailed in the organisations Hazard Register and Hazard and Effects
Management Process and apply the MOC process to these changes.
3. Select an individual to manage each MOC process and designate who is approved to sign off
the change as completed.
1. A documented MOC process shall be initiated, when appropriate, for the following;
1.1. Significant personnel and organisational changes;
1.2. Introduction of a new base;
1.3. Introduction of a new aircraft type;
1.4. Any other change that is deemed appropriate by the company through Risk Assessment.
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Shell: https://eu001-sp.shell.com/sites/AAAAA8432/CF/Web/Management_of_Change.aspx
External; https://www.casa.gov.au/education/standard-page/sms-resource-kit
https://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP795_SMS_guidance_to_organisations.pdf
RELATED INCIDENT
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SAF 04.00 Safety Promotion

Aircraft Operations
1. Maintain a range and hierarchy of safety promotion and communication processes to enable
an effective, two-way flow of information throughout the company.
2. Integrate this element so that it supports the effectiveness of the Management Review, and
Incident Reporting, Investigation and Learning processes as described in SAF 00.00.
1. The Aircraft Operator shall develop and maintain a formal means for safety promotion and
communication that:
1.1 Establishes formal Safety Meetings for all relevant Staff (SAF 01.06 Management
Review describes these processes);
1.2 Disseminates and conveys safety critical information using the following, as
appropriate:
• Safety policies and procedures;
• Newsletters, safety bulletins and notices;
• Presentations;
• Websites and e-mails; and

• Informal workplace meetings between staff and the accountable executive or senior
managers.
1.3 Explains why particular safety actions are taken;
1.4 Explains why safety procedures are introduced or changed;
1.5 Seeks feedback on safety issues or actions;
1.6 Contains a process for assessing the suitability of safety communication and its effect
on the organisation.
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ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
Shell:
External:
RELATED INCIDENT
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FOP 01.01 Air Operator Certificate (AOC)
Shell Aircraft Restricted

Version 1, January 2017
The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for requirements 1 through 4:

1. Maintain a valid Air Operator Certificate (AOC) issued in accordance with National
requirements.
2. Verify that the required AOC manuals are controlled documents and subject to Quality
Assurance audits.
3. Maintain an up to date AOC Operations Specifications.
4. Verify Air Transport operations are conducted in accordance with the AOC Operations
Specifications.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Requirements 1 through 4:

1. Verify that contracted operations are included in the AOC Operations Specifications. A copy
of the AOC and the AOC Operations Specifications should be made available on request.
2. All controlled documents should be read and understood by new employees and by all
employees when amended. Employees should sign as having read and understood the
documents both on joining and when amended.
3. The hierarchy of manuals may be issued in separate parts corresponding to specific aspects
of an operation. It shall include the instructions and information necessary to enable the
personnel concerned to perform their duties.
4. For Multi-Crew Aircraft operators shall establish and maintain a manual of Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) that enable crew members to operate the aircraft effectively
and within the limitations specified in the aircraft flight manual. In particular the operator
shall define the roles and responsibilities of the Pilot Flying (PF) and the Pilot Not Flying
(PNF).
5. For Single Pilot Aircraft operators should establish and maintain a manual of Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) that enables the pilot to operate the aircraft effectively and
within the limitations specified in the aircraft flight manual.
6. The Quality Assurance audit shall verify:
a. The document control process is effective; and
b. The staff acknowledgment process is effective.
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Additional Guidance:
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
• ICAO
SHELL AIRCRAFT GENERIC BOWTIE REFERENCE
TBC
IOGP AMG DIFFERENCES
IOGP does not specify an AOC as a minimum requirement.
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FOP 01.02 Organisation and Personnel


1. Specify the organization structure and identify reporting lines through to the accountable
manager.
2. Define the duties and responsibilities of personnel in Management and Operational
positions.
3. Assure and document the competence of personnel in Management and Operational
positions.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Mandatory Requirements 1 through 3:

1. The Aircraft Operator is staffed by managerial and operating personnel who meet the
qualifications specified and are capable of effectively carrying out the identified duties.
2. The following Management and Operational Positions shall be identified for requirements 1
through 3:
a. The Accountable Manager for the Air Operators Certificate;
b. A person with overall responsibility for managing the flight department;
c. A person responsible for managing the flying operations;
d. A person or third party responsible for managing aircraft maintenance; and
e. A person responsible for assurance of adequate control of flight safety including the
effectiveness of the Safety Management System (SMS).
3. The following Management and Operational Positions should be identified for requirements 1
through 3:
a. A person or third party responsible for airworthiness;
b. A person responsible for managing ground operations; and
c. A person responsible for managing training.
4. Where the organization has more than one operating base the management structure shall
address the required responsibilities at all locations.
5. One person may perform more than one role in small organisations.
6. An additional safety officer may be required, based on the complexity of the operations, to
assist the person responsible for assurance of adequate control of flight safety. The following
should be considered:
a. Size, in terms of staffing;
b. Number of operating bases;
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c. Type of operations, e.g. specialised operations;

d. Number and variety of aircraft types;
e. Number and type of contractors; and
f. Operating environment.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
• EASA AMC1-ORO.GEN.200(b)
• CAP 795
• CAP 1059
TBC
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
OGP AMG does not require an AOC but section 1.4 Setting an Aviation Policy states:
“Specific operational restrictions may be applied, taking account of the contractor and local
environment; amongst these will be the requirement to operate to public transport standards
and to meet published aircraft performance criteria.”
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FOP 01.03 Aircraft Crew Member Duties and Responsibilities


1. Ensure that the minimum aircraft crew shall consist of the number of qualified flight crew
as specified in the aircraft flight manual.
2. Establish that the minimum number of cabin crew members shall be in accordance with
national requirements.
3. Designate a Pilot-in-Command (PIC) for each flight; and where the crew includes two pilots
designate a First Officer (FO).
4. Document and assign specific responsibilities to all crew members.
5. Ensure that the cabin crew and other crew members assigned to perform duties on board,
shall be responsible to the pilot-in-command to carry out specified safety duties in the
event of an on-board emergency.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Mandatory Requirements 1 and 2:

1. Specific command responsibilities shall include:
a. The safe conduct of assigned flights;
b. Checking and assessing weather and all applicable NOTAMs where available;
c. Determining fuel, oil and oxygen requirements;
d. Determining the aircraft weight and balance;
e. Ensuring that all flight-planning requirements have been met;
f. Ensuring that the aircraft is certified as airworthy with a release to service, correctly
registered and that the required documentation are on-board the aircraft;
g. Ensuring an aircraft pre-flight inspection as per company, manufacturer and / or
regulator requirements, before each departure;
h. Ensuring the safety briefing of crew and passengers;
i. Operating the aircraft in accordance with operator procedures and aircraft limitations;
j. Completing all post flight duties as specified in the Company operations manual; and
k. Recording flight times and aircraft defects in the aircraft technical log.
2. Whilst procedures and terminology change from country to country the responsibilities
documented should include clear instructions for the “Pilot Flying” (PF) and the “Pilot Not
Flying” (PNF).
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Standard operating procedures (SOP’s) are universally recognized as basic to safe aviation
operations. Effective crew coordination and crew performance, two central concepts of crew
resource management (CRM), depend upon the crew’s having a shared mental model of each
task. That mental model, in turn, is founded on SOP’s. SOP’s should be clear, comprehensive,
and readily available in the manuals used by flight deck crewmembers.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
46
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FOP 01.04 Flight Crew Scheduling

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for requirement 1:

1. Establish a rostering process to ensure that flight crew will operate in compliance with the
following:
a. Flight crew qualification and experience requirements;
b. Crew composition requirements;
c. Flight and Duty time limitations; and
d. Fitness for duty.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Mandatory Requirement 1:

1. The requirements mentioned in 1 above shall be documented in the Operations Manual.
The prime objective of a flight time limitations scheme is to ensure that crew members are
adequately rested at the beginning of each flying duty period, and whilst flying be sufficiently
free from fatigue so that they can operate to a satisfactory level of efficiency and safety in all
normal and abnormal situations. Aircraft operators are expected to appreciate the relationship
between the frequency and pattern of scheduled flying duty periods and rest periods and time
off, and give due consideration to the cumulative effects of working long hours interspersed
with minimum rest.
It is the responsibility of the operator to prepare duty rosters sufficiently in advance to provide
the opportunity for crew to plan adequate pre-duty rest.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 01.05 Flight Preparation and Pre-Flight

The Air Operator is Accountable for requirements 1 through 4:

1. Document the requirement for flight crew to perform flight preparation before the
commencement of each flight which shall include a review of all pertinent pre-flight
planning data.
2. Prohibit the commencement of Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight unless planning weather
indicates that the meteorological conditions along the route, departure point and arrival
destination will be achieved above VFR weather minima for the planned flight.
3. Prohibit Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight where a destination aerodrome is required,
unless the available information indicates that conditions at the aerodrome of intended
landing, or at least one destination alternate will, at the estimated time of arrival, be at or
above the aerodrome operating minima.
4. Prohibit IFR flight to an aerodrome when no alternate destination aerodrome is required
unless applicable conditions are documented.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Mandatory Requirements 1 to 4:

1. he following shall be reviewed before flight:
a. The Operational Flight Plan;
b. Current maps and charts;
c. Weather at departure, destination and alternate airports;
d. NOTAMS;
e. Aircraft performance, weight and balance;
f. The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) or Configuration Deviation List (CDL) if there is a
deferred defect in the aircraft technical log; and
g. Fuel planning if the flight does not have an operational flight plan.
2. VFR weather minima is that defined in FOP 04.01.02 Fuel Planning – VFR Weather Minima.
3. In order to operate an IFR flight to an aerodrome when no alternate destination aerodrome
is required the following conditions shall apply:
a. A standard instrument approach procedure is prescribed for the aerodrome of intended
landing;
b. Available current meteorological information indicates that the following meteorological
conditions will exist from two hours before to two hours after the estimated time of
arrival;
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c. A cloud base of at least 300 m (1,000 ft) above the minimum associated with the
instrument approach procedure; and
d. Visibility of at least 5.5 km (3NM miles) or of 4 km (2NM miles) more than the minimum
associated with the procedure, whichever is greater.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
50
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FOP 01.06 Weather Minima


1. Define Visual Flight Rules (VFR) weather minima in the appropriate manuals for the
purpose of flight planning and in-flight re-planning to ensure that every flight shall carry
sufficient fuel for the planned operations and reserves to cover deviations from the planned
operations.
2. Use weather minima for Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) departures and approaches that are
specified in the standard instrument approach procedures approved for use by the
operator.
3. Specify a procedure in the appropriate manual for the determination of take-off minima
from runways where no take-off minima is specified.
4. Prevent through the operations manual, flights to continue towards the intended
destination unless the latest available meteorological information indicates that conditions
at that aerodrome, or at least one destination alternate aerodrome, will, at the estimated
time of arrival, be at or above the specified aerodrome operating minima.
5. Prevent through the operations manual, aircraft to continue its approach-to-land beyond a
point at which the limits of the aerodrome operating minima would be infringed.
6. Plan and conduct instrument approaches so as to ensure that aircraft adhere to the
minimum safe altitudes while in transition or on approach.
7. Prevent through the operations manual, flights in known or expected icing conditions
unless the aircraft is equipped and certified for flight in icing conditions.

1. For Shell contracted flights the following VFR weather minima shall apply:
Flight Regime Minimum Cloud Base Visibility Requirements to fly

Operating (feet) (SM) 4 given these VFR
Height 1 weather minimums 2
Offshore - 500 Feet 3,4

600 Feet 3 SM 3,4
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Offshore helicopter
Day
interfield use only if visual
400 Feet 500 feet 1/2 SM
contact is maintained with
other facilities.
3 3
Overland - Day 500 Feet 600 Feet 3 SM
3 Twin-engine IFR certified

All Night Ops
Night Flights shall be flown using only IFR helicopter with dual IFR-
procedures and minima where available, otherwise night current crew. All
the VFR minimum shall be a cloud base of 1000 night flights shall utilize
feet with 100 feet of vertical cloud clearance and 3 IFR cockpit procedures for
SM visibility. take-offs and landings.
Notes:
1.1 The minimum operating height refers to the height Above Ground Level (AGL) for
overland flights, and the height Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL) for offshore flights;
1.2 VFR Flights shall not depart or continue if the weather conditions at departure, en-route
or the destination are below the above stated minimum;
1.3 Minimum operating height for Day VFR less than a ceiling to 600 feet (inclusion of 100
feet of cloud clearance) and visibility to 2 SM may be allowed if the procedures are
authorized by the Head of Aircraft Services or Aviation Focal Point;
1.4 When lower minima are used, only twin-engine IFR certified with a dual Pilot IFR
current crew shall be used.
2. Company flights shall operate IFR when weather conditions are below the VFR weather
minima.
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Refer to FOP 08.00 “Aircraft Equipment Standards” for aircraft anti icing requirements.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP / IOGP AMG DIFFERENCES
53
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FOP 01.07 Adverse Weather


1. Document a policy for the safe operation of aircraft in adverse weather.
2. Document a policy for flight crews to monitor weather information whilst en-route.
3. Document a policy for wind shear avoidance and recovery.

1. Operators contracted to Shell Companies shall have a safe system for utilising aircraft in
adverse weather. Company operations manual, base instructions and the flight manual can
be used to define operating limits.
2. Weather areas to be monitored shall include as a minimum the following:
a. Destination;
b. Destination Alternate (when applicable); and
c. En-route alternate (when applicable).
3. Policies for the Monitoring of weather information whilst en-route shall include instructions
to avoid and actions to recover from:
a. Thunderstorms and other adverse atmospheric conditions;
b. Icing;
c. Lightning avoidance;
d. Turbulence;
e. Wake Turbulence – where applicable
f. Micro burst;
g. Contaminated landing surfaces - including the effect of type and depth of contaminants
on performance;
h. Sea state – where applicable; and
i. Cold and hot weather operations.
4. Instructions and procedures for wind shear avoidance shall include use of predictive
equipment if fitted.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
55
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FOP 01.08 Minimum Flight Altitudes, Airport Usabiltiy and

Operating Minima

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for requirement 1 through 6:

1. Provide information to enable flight crew to determine whether airports and heliports of
intended use are acceptable.
2. Provide information to enable flight crew to determine operating minima for airports or
heliports of intended use.
3. Provide information on when Runway Visual Range (RVR) is necessary for operations and
shall not authorize aerodrome operating landing minima below 800 meters visibility unless
RVR is provided for aircraft landing operations.
4. Specify minimum RVR values for take-off and all authorized approaches that also consider
inoperative approach/runway lighting, inoperative transmissiometers, or inadequate visual
reference.
5. Prohibit flights to be conducted to or from an airport where, based on aircraft performance
computation, a multi-engined aircraft will be unable to meet required departure or missed
approach climb gradient criteria whilst one engine is inoperative (OEI), based on the
expected departure or approach procedure and planned fuel and payload; and shall have a
process to ensure that OEI departure and missed approach compliance is checked during
pre-flight planning.
6. Instruct the Pilot-in-Command (PIC) to determine if any significant obstacles exist in the
take-off and climb path prior to conducting a take-off; and if obstacles do exist, determine
by the use of the approved aircraft performance charts and related information, that the
aircraft will safely clear such obstacles.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Mandatory Requirement 1 through 6:

1. Information provided to aircrews to determine whether airports and heliports of intended
use are acceptable shall include but is not limited to:
a. Applicable performance requirements;
b. Runway or heliport characteristics;
c. Air Traffic Service and communications;
d. Nav aids and lighting;
e. Weather reporting; and
f. Emergency services, including temporary periods of reduced Rescue and Fire Fighting
(RFF).
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
57
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FOP 01.09 Pre-Departure Fuel Policy, Weight and Balance,

ATS and Operational Flight Plans


1. Document a pre-departure fuel policy and provide instructions to flight crew for calculation
of minimum dispatch/departure fuel.
2. Document requirements for the calculation or aircraft weight and centre of gravity limits,
and acceptance by the pilot-in-command.
3. Verify prior to take-off that fuel, oil and oxygen requirements are correct.
4. Describe the Air Traffic Service (ATS) Flight Plan and its use in the Operations Manual (OM)
or an appropriate document that is accessible to the flight crew during flight preparation.
5. Describe the Operational Flight Plan (OFP) or equivalent document and its use in the OM or
an appropriate document that is accessible to the flight crew during flight preparation.
6. Provide guidance in the OM to enable flight crews to establish suitable en-route alternates.

1. A departure fuel policy shall include at least taxi, trip, alternate (when applicable),
contingency and reserve fuel.
2. Operators may prepare and use standard load plans where applicable and approved by the
National Aviation Authority (NAA).
3. Operators may define a procedure for Last Minute Changes (LMC) to the Load sheet that
includes tolerance for maximum difference between planned and actual weights where
applicable and approved by the NAA.
4. The OFP shall include as a minimum the following:
a. Aircraft registration, type and variant;
b. Date of flight and flight identification;
c. Point of departure, STD, STA, destination;
d. Types of operation (ETOPS, IFR, Ferry flight, other);
e. Route and route segments with check points/waypoints, distances, time and tracks;
f. Planned cruising speed and flying times between waypoints/check points;
g. Planned altitude and flight levels;
h. Fuel plan including calculations and fuel on board when starting engines;
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i. Alternate(s) for destination and, when applicable, take off and en-route;
j. Take-off alternate airport if weather conditions at the airport of departure are at or
below the applicable airport landing minima or it would not be possible to return to the
airport of departure for other reasons; and
k. Relevant meteorological information.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 01.10 Minimum Equipment List and Configuration

Deviation List (MEL/CDL), Aircraft Technical Log (ATL),
Aircraft Pre-flight Inspections

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for requirement 1 to 5:

1. Describe in the relevant manual that is accessible to the flight crew their responsibilities
with regard to the use of MEL, CDL and ATL.
2. Prohibit the aircraft to depart with a defect that has not been processed in accordance with
the MEL/CDL.
3. Implement a process for the PIC to report after every flight, all known or suspected defects
affecting the aircraft in the ATL. Where there are no known defects the PIC shall certify in
the ATL that no new defects were observed.
4. Document a requirement for a member of the flight crew to perform an exterior aircraft
inspection prior to each flight ”Pre-Flight Inspection”.
5. Document a requirement for the flight crew (or a designated, qualified Cabin Crew
member) to perform an interior aircraft emergency equipment inspection.

1. Operators should document instructions for Pilots-in-Command (PIC) with respect to defects
that occur in flight when landing offshore.
2. When certifying that no new defects were observed simply entering the words “Nil Defects”
is acceptable.
3. When the aircraft lands offshore and remains Rotor’s Running it is in not mandated by the
Company that a pilot conduct an exterior inspection, however it is allowed if the Operator
requires it or the PIC decides to conduct one.
4. The exterior aircraft inspection prior to each flight shall include the following safety critical
items:
a. Pitot/static ports;
b. Locked or disabled flight controls (as applicable depending on aircraft type);
c. Presence of frost, snow or ice on critical surfaces; and
d. Aircraft structural integrity (damage).
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5. The interior aircraft inspection prior to each flight shall include the following safety critical
items:
a. Oxygen (where applicable); and
b. Medical and Emergency equipment (where applicable).
Continuing airworthiness tasks
1. With regard to the pre-flight inspection it is intended to mean all of the actions necessary to
ensure that the aircraft is fit to make the intended flight. These should typically include but
are not necessarily limited to:
a. a walk-around type inspection of the aircraft and its emergency equipment for condition
including, in particular, any obvious signs of wear, damage or leakage. In addition, the
presence of all required equipment including emergency equipment should be
established.
b. an inspection of the aircraft continuing airworthiness record system or the operators
technical log as applicable to ensure that the intended flight is not adversely affected by
any outstanding deferred defects and that no required maintenance action shown in the
maintenance statement is overdue or will become due during the flight.
c. a control that consumable fluids, gases etc. uplifted prior to flight are of the correct
specification, free from contamination, and correctly recorded.
d. a control that all doors are securely fastened.
e. a control that control surface and landing gear locks, pitot/static covers, restraint devices
and engine/aperture blanks have been removed.
f. a control that all the aircraft’s external surfaces and engines are free from ice, snow,
sand, dust etc.
2. Tasks such as oil and hydraulic fluid uplift and tyre inflation may be considered as part of
the pre-flight inspection. The related pre-flight inspection instructions should address the
procedures to determine where the necessary uplift or inflation results from an abnormal
consumption and possibly requires additional maintenance action by the approved
maintenance organisation or certifying staff as appropriate.
3. In the case of commercial air transport, an operator should publish guidance to maintenance
and flight personnel and any other personnel performing pre-flight inspection tasks, as
appropriate, defining responsibilities for these actions and, where tasks are contracted to
other organisations, how their accomplishment is subject to the quality system. It should be
demonstrated to the competent authority that pre-flight inspection personnel have received
appropriate training for the relevant pre-flight inspection tasks. The training standard for
personnel performing the pre-flight inspection should be described in the operator’s
continuing airworthiness management exposition.
RELATED INCIDENT
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Shell:
External:
DEROGATIONS
In all cases see MAN 6.2
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 01.11 Refuelling With Passengers On Board


1. Establish a procedure for fuelling with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking
that include provisions for ensuring passenger safety and egress after a spillage or fire.

1. A procedure for fuelling with passengers procedure shall include as a minimum the
following:
a. Two-way communication is maintained, either by the aircraft intercommunication system
or other suitable means, between the ground crew supervising the refuelling and
qualified personnel on board the aircraft;
b. There are a minimum of two designated exits from the aircraft;
c. The exits to be used have been designated by the Captain or by a procedure, prior to the
start of the refuelling operations; and
d. At least one qualified person trained in emergency procedures shall be positioned near
each designated exit door keeping a secondary exit route clear.
2. Emergency exits may be used as one of the minimum of two required exits during refuelling
operations provided that the exit area shall remain clear during fuelling operations;
3. An evacuation slide may also be used as one of the minimum of two required exits during
refuelling operations provided that the escape route on the apron is free from obstacles.
4. Refueling with wide cut gasoline type fuel (JET B, JP4 or equivalent) or when a mixture with
these types of fuel might occur, is not permitted with passengers boarding, on board or
disembarking.
5. The fire service should be alerted.
6. Ensure that no HF transmission (including HF transmission via the HF DATA LINK) is
performed during refuelling/defuelling operations.
Refueling operations can be hazardous and, therefore, require the constant attention of all
personnel involved. Fortunately, in commercial aviation, accidents associated with refueling
operations rarely occur. However, the absence of accidents should not result in complacency,
because refueling incidents, such as fuel spillage, frequently occur.
Teamwork is essential to accident prevention, particularly during aircraft refueling operations.
Airworthiness authorities have defined the basic regulations to be applied during refueling or
defueling operations with passengers on board, and the role of each applicable team member.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Since 1961, a total of 12 aircraft were damaged during refueling. The type of damage includes
cases of limited wing damage to cases of aircraft destruction.
• Injuries related to refueling are rare
• Each year, thousands of fuel spillage events occur worldwide.
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 01.12 De/Anti-Icing


1. Document policies and procedures that are readily accessible to the flight crew for De/Anti-
Icing.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Requirement 1:

1. The De/Anti-Icing policies as a minimum shall include:
a. Holdover time tables, readily accessible to the flight crew;
b. Requirements for a member of the flight crew to perform a visual check of the rotor
blades / wings and critical surfaces just before take-off if any contamination is
suspected;
c. Requirement for the aircraft not to commence take-off unless the critical surfaces are
clear of any deposits which might adversely affect the performance and/or controllability
of the aircraft; and
d. A statement that authorises the Pilot-in-Command (PIC) to obtain De/Anti-Icing
whenever he/she determines that it is necessary.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 01.13 Airspace Rules


1. Document a procedure and specific provisions for flights into and out of controlled airspace
and/or airports, or state in the OM that these type of flights are not authorised; and
2. Document the procedure, when authorised to conduct certain portions of the flight under
VFR.

1. Where applicable the operator shall provide flight crew with the procedural differences
between ICAO and local airspace rules.
a. The VFR procedure shall include as a minimum:
b. State specific provisions under which the VFR Clearance must be obtained (departures)
or cancelled (arrivals);
c. Provide instructions to flight crew regarding the proper use of standard ATC radio
phraseology, including clearance read-back and use of call sign;
d. Provide instructions to flight crews on the clarification and acceptance of ATC clearances,
particularly where terrain clearance is involved;
e. Require that flight crews maintain a radio listening watch, as applicable to the theatre of
operation; and
f. Maintain a radio listening watch that shall include monitoring of the following
frequencies:
i. Emergency frequency - 121.5 MHz;
ii. Appropriate frequency in airspace without ATC coverage;
RELATED INCIDENT
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Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 01.14 In-Flight Operations


1. Ensure that flight crew operate the aircraft at all times in accordance with the approved
Aircraft Flight Manual.
2. Provide instructions on monitoring navigation performance and verifying present position.
3. Document a collision avoidance policy.
4. Document a policy for flight crew to regularly check and record fuel status and the time
over waypoints on the Operational Flight Plan (OFP) or equivalent.
5. Document a sterile cockpit policy and procedures.
6. Document designated roles and responsibilities for the flight crew.
7. Document a procedure that requires a cross-check of critical flight crew actions.
8. Document a policy for “Standard Call-Outs” for each phase of flight unless a silent cockpit
policy is in place.
9. Establish a process to ensure that the database for ground proximity warning systems with
predictive terrain hazard warning is kept current and Pilots are trained in use of both TAWS
and ACAS.
10. Document an automation policy.
11. Document a requirement for flight crew to conduct departure and approach briefings.

1. A collision and avoid policy should include the following:
a. Use of ACAS; and
b. Maintaining an effective lookout whilst one crew member engaged on tasks inside the
cockpit.
2. A sterile cockpit shall include:
a. The restriction of activities to essential operational matters during critical phases of
flight;
b. Intra-cockpit and cabin/cockpit communication protocol during critical phases of flight;
c. Mandatory use of headsets and boom microphones during critical phases of flight for the
purposes of ATC communication;
d. Policy on the use of authorized devices, such as electronic flight bags; and
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e. Restriction of activities to essential operational matters during critical phases of flight.

This shall include all ground operations, take-off until the take-off phase is considered
complete and landing from when the landing phase commences. When these phases are
completed and commence should be documented by the operator.
3. Designated responsibilities between flight crews shall include policies on:
a. The use of checklists;
b. Pilot Flying (PF)/Pilot Not Flying (PNF) duties;
c. Manual and automatic flight.
4. Cross check of critical flight crew actions shall include:
a. Configuration changes;
b. Heading, altitude, altimeter and airspeed (bug) settings;
c. Transfer of controls;
d. Changes to Auto-Flight System (AFS) /Flight Management System (FMS) and radio
navigation aids during the departure or approach phase;
e. Performance calculations, including AFS/FMS entries.
5. An automation policy shall include:
a. Monitoring of the AFS / FMS by:
i. Cross-checking mode selection and the status;
ii. Observing the result of any change;
iii. Supervising the resulting guidance and aircraft performance.
b. The use of an appropriate level of automation for the task, including manual flying.
6. Departure and approach briefings shall include:
a. Aircraft technical status;
b. Normal and non-normal departure and approach considerations;
c. Jump seat/observer briefing.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 01.15 FOP Bird Strike Avoidance


1. Document a risk assessment or HSSE case detailing local bird concentrations and
migrations and implement measures to mitigate the likelihood of a bird strike in areas
where significant risk is deemed to exist. A significant risk shall be deemed to exist for all
coastal areas and for other areas of known bird concentrations.
2. Document a requirement that, other than for landing and take-off, transit levels shall be at
the highest practicable altitudes above those identified in the risk assessment.
3. Where flight is required, below 1000’ agl across coastal areas and for other areas of known
bird concentrations due to the operational task, implement additional mitigation measures
that reduce the consequence of a bird strike.
4. Conduct bird strike awareness training as part of the annual recurrent training program.

1. Operation Manual procedures related to avoiding a bird strike and minimising the impact
consequence when operating in regions where a significant risk is deemed to exist, these
shall include:
a. Pulsed landing lights to be on when transiting risk areas (if fitted);
b. For helicopters, and for aeroplanes able to safely operate at this speed, a reduction in
airspeed to <100kts when below 1000’; and
c. Pilots to wear helmets with visors for all single Pilot operations.
and should include:
d. Pilots to wear safety glasses for all flights if not wearing helmets with visors.
2. Flight Data Monitoring systems should be used by the operator to verify compliance with
bird strike prevention profiles.
3. Bird strike awareness training may be included in the recurrent ground training program or
as a simulator exercise.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Jan 2009 S76C++ Bird Strike w/ Fatalities, Louisiana.
External:
• Height Distribution of Birds Recorded by Collisions with Civil Aircraft

• UK CAA CAP772 Wildlife Hazard Management at Aerodromes
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 01.16 Use of Oxygen


1. Document and implement procedures so that each crew member shall wear an oxygen
mask and use supplemental oxygen for any part of the flight at cabin-pressure-altitudes
above 10,000 ft. (700 hPa) but not exceeding 13,000 ft. (620 hPa) that is more than 30
minutes in duration.
2. Document and implement procedures so that each person on board the aircraft shall wear
an oxygen mask and use supplemental oxygen at cabin-pressure-altitudes above 13,000
ft. (620 hPa).
3. Document and implement procedures so that the Pilot at the flight controls of an aircraft
flying above FL250 shall use an oxygen mask if the aircraft is not equipped with quick-
donning oxygen masks.

1. The Pilot at the flight controls of an aircraft should use an oxygen mask if the other Pilot
leaves the flight deck for any reason above FL 350.
RELATED INCIDENT
External:
• General Operating And Flight Rules
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 01.17 Flight Following


1. Flight Following is required for all flights that are not conducted under an Air Traffic radar
service that records aircraft position during the entire transit phase.
2. Such Flight Following must provide position reports at least every 15 minutes, using an
automated and monitored satellite/GPS flight tracking system, or where such a system is
not available by radio flight watch.
3. Where a radio flight watch is provided, the radio operators must be licensed, able to
communicate in English, be familiar with the Contractor’s and the Company’s emergency
and call-out procedures and must maintain a radio watch log with position reports at least
every 15 minutes whenever the aircraft is airborne.

1. The flight following policy and system shall be described in the operations manual, and
clear procedures published for all normal, abnormal and emergency response procedures
which shall be readily available, in a controlled manner, to staff involved in flight following
and other relevant staff. These procedures to be coordinated with the contract holder.
2. Any flight following system shall be continuously monitored when aircraft are airborne;
recording equipment should be provided.
3. Where an operator provides a centralised flight following function from a remote location
(e.g. as part of a regional operations centre), at least one additional ground station, or
access to a web-based system, shall be readily available at the base of operations for
continuous monitoring.
4. All personnel involved in flight following, whether full- or part-time, shall be trained on
respective parts of the OM, including company indoctrination training, specific flight
following content and the procedures to follow in the event of overdue or lost aircraft.
5. Flight Follower Training shall cover initial and annual recurrent training, including an
annual competence evaluation and relevant emergency response drills.
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The purpose of a flight following system is to keep the operator aware of the position and status
of each aircraft and its crew as well as to provide an overdue aircraft alert and trigger the
Emergency Response Plan should an aircraft become overdue. In addition, last known position,
fuel status, persons on-board and projected flight path information can be provided to search
and rescue authorities should their services be required.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
Text

OGP 390
A13.3.3 Flight following

Due to the hostile nature of the environment and the subsequent difficulty in locating and
recovering survivors from a downed aircraft, continuous flight following must be provided.
Preferred systems will vary according to location; in areas where full Air Traffic Control exists
then aircraft are tracked as a matter of routine. In more remote areas consideration should be
given to the use of automated satellite based systems which provide accurate, continuous
position information, automatic alerting systems, and in many cases satellite phone capability.
Any flight following system should be permanently monitored when aircraft are airborne and
recording equipment should be provided.
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FOP 01.18 Aircraft Documentation


1. Carry the Aircraft Documentation required by the AOC approving authority on board the
aircraft, with the operational documents accessible on the flight deck.

1. Aircraft documentation can be carried either in paper form or in an Electronic Flight Bag
conforming to EASA-OPS / AMC 20-25 or FAA Advisory Circular 120-76B, or other National
regulation agreed as suitable by the Company.
2. The required documents shall include the following:
a. Pertinent aeronautical charts;
b. Pertinent en-route, terminal area, and instrument approach procedure charts;
c. Aircraft performance data;
d. Aircraft checklists;
e. The approved Operations Manuals;
f. Standard Operating Procedures, where SOPs have been established for the aircraft;
g. The aircraft flight manual;
h. The aircraft Minimum Equipment List (MEL) for aircraft being operated in accordance
with a MEL;
i. Aircraft certificate of airworthiness or other flight authority and certificate of registration;
j. Aircraft radio licence;
k. Insurance certificate;
l. If Dangerous Goods are carried, the appropriate documentation, forms and guidance
material for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air;
m. Procedures for Pilots-in-command of intercepted aircraft and visual signals for use by
intercepting and intercepted aircraft, as contained in ICAO Annex 2; and
n. For international commercial air transport operations, a certified true copy of the
Air Operator Certificate including the authorizations, conditions and limitations relevant
to the aircraft type.
3. All controlled documents shall be up to date with the latest amendment.
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Guidance material on electronic flight bags is available from a number of sources including:
• EASA-OPS - AMC 20-25: Airworthiness and Operational Consideration for Electronic Flight
Bags (EFBs),and
• FAA Advisory Circular AC 120-76C - Guidelines for the Certification, Airworthiness, and
Operational Use of Electronic Flight Bag dated 05/09/2014.
RELATED INCIDENT
1. Does the air operator have documented requirements for aircraft documentation to be
carried on board the aircraft?
2. Does the air operator have a documented list of aircraft documents to be carried on board
the aircraft?
Bowtie 11 – Air Transport / Loss of control of aircraft maintenance activity.
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
No references on aircraft documentation other than section 9.2.3 – Hazardous materials

(Dangerous Goods), Documentation.
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FOP 01.19 Stabilised Approach


1. Document and implement a stabilised approach policy, procedures and criteria in
the Operations Manual. The policy shall include the requirement to go-around if the criteria
for a stable approach are not met.
2. Document and implement flight path monitoring and procedures to brief or announce
deviations from a stabilised approach using standard deviation criteria.
3. Implement monitoring procedures to validate adherence to, and effectiveness of, the
stabilised approach procedures.

Rotary Wing Aircraft
1. To meet the stabilised approach requirements for helicopters, the following criteria shall
apply:
a. The approach is stabilised by 1,000 feet height above touchdown (HAT) in IMC and by
500 feet HAT in VMC;
i. Where the transit height is less than 500 feet HAT the aircraft shall be stabilised by
300 feet HAT and airspeed shall not exceed 60 kts.
b. The aircraft is on the correct flight path and only requires small changes in heading,
attitude and power to remain on the correct flight path;
c. The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration and all briefings and checklists have
been conducted;
d. The power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration not below the
manufacturer’s minimum, if specified in the Aircraft Flight Manual or Flight Crew
Operating Manual;
e. The sink rate, unless otherwise recommended by the manufacturer, is no greater than
5001 feet per minute;
f. All instrument approaches are flown in accordance with published instrument
procedures;
g. ILS2 , LVP and LNAV/VNAV approaches are flown within one dot of the glideslope and
localiser (or course deviation indicator);
1
If conducting an onshore instrument approach at a speed that requires a higher rate of descent to
maintain the instrument approach glidepath then the higher rate of descent is permitted and a special brief
shall be conducted.
2
Category II or III ILS approach must be flown within the expanded localizer band.
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h. During circling approaches the aircraft is wings level on final by no later than 300 feet
HAT;
i. During Helicopter Airborne Radar Approaches, or similar IFR to VFR low-level offshore
transitions, the approach is stabilised prior to reaching the landing decision point, or
equivalent;
j. Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions which require a deviation from
stabilised approach criteria require a special briefing; and
k. Landings should only be made from a stabilised approach.
2. Unless not available for the aircraft type, Flight Data Monitoring should have specific event
sets and thresholds associated with the monitoring and effectiveness of stabilised helicopter
approaches, including onshore and, where applicable, offshore approaches.
Fixed Wing Aircraft
3. To meet the stabilised approach requirements for fixed wing aircraft, the following criteria
shall apply:
a. The approach is stabilised by 1,000 feet height above touchdown (HAT) in IMC and by
500 feet HAT in VMC;
b. The aircraft is on the correct flight path and only requires small changes in heading,
attitude and power to remain on the correct flight path;
c. The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration and all briefings and checklists have
been conducted;
d. The airspeed is not more than Vref + 20 kts indicated and not less than Vref;
e. The sink rate, unless otherwise recommended by the manufacturer, is no greater than
1,0003 feet per minute.
f. All instrument approaches are flown in accordance with published instrument
procedures;
g. ILS4, LVP and LNAV/VNAV approaches are flown within one dot of the glideslope and
localiser (or course deviation indicator);
h. During circling approaches the aircraft is wings level on final by no later than 300 feet
HAT;
i. Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions which require a deviation from
stabilised approach criteria require a special briefing; and
j. Landings should only be made from a stabilised approach.
4. Unless not available for the aircraft type, Flight Data Monitoring should have specific event
sets and thresholds associated with the monitoring and effectiveness of stabilised fixed wing
approaches.
1. Transit heights less than 500 HAT are typically associated with offshore helicopter
operations during in-field shuttle flights and with en-route let-down procedures (where
permitted by regulations).
2. For helicopters these criteria apply to the approach phase. When the approach phase is
complete and the helicopter is manouvering for a safe landing taking into account close in
obstacles, fly away obstacles and wind, heading changes as necessary for good airmanship
are not in the scope of this requirement.
3
If conducting an onshore instrument approach at a speed that requires a higher rate of descent to
maintain the instrument approach glidepath then the higher rate of descent is permitted and a special brief
shall be conducted.
4
Category II or III ILS approach must be flown within the expanded localizer band.
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RELATED INCIDENT
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 01.20 Aircrew and Passenger Survival Equipment

Standards


1. Implement a policy for aircrew and passengers to wear approved immersion suits at all
times for overwater flights, in both helicopters and survey aircraft when certain conditions
are met. The lifejackets shall meet the requirements of ETSO-2C504- Helicopter constant-
wear lifejackets for operations to or from helidecks located in a hostile sea area, or
demonstrated equivalents.
2. Implement a policy for aircrew and passengers to wear additional extra insulation or a
suitable Thermal Insulating Garment (TIG) or thermal liners, in addition to the immersion
suit, when the sea temperature is consistently at or below +10°C.
3. Provide fixed-wing aircrew and passengers with lifejackets approved for aircraft use, for all
over-water flights. They shall have a survivor locator light and each life jacket shall be
stowed in a position easily accessible from the seat or berth of the person for whose use it
is provided.
4. Provide aircrew with Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) for helicopter
operations with a total flight exposure of 100hrs or more per year, for single or combined
Shell Business Units.

1. Crew life jackets should be of the constant-wear type when conducting specialist
operations low level, over water.
2. In addition to the operator policies aircrew and passengers shall wear approved immersion
suits at all times for overwater flights, in both helicopters and survey aircraft when:
a. The expected rescue time (for all survivors), even in tropical conditions, in sea
temperatures of +15°C and above, exceeds the expected survival time; or
b. The sea temperature is consistently at or below +15°C.
3. The following shall be taken into account for approved immersions suits:
a. Immersion suits shall be of a type that remains totally sealed throughout the flight (i.e.
a dry suit) that meet the requirements of the following European Technical Standard
Orders (ETSO), or demonstrated equivalents;
b. ETSO-2C502 - Helicopter crew and passenger integrated immersion suits - for Shell
Operations the wording "and seal the suit within 10 seconds" in section 3.4, shall be
deleted;
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c. ETSO-2C503 - Helicopter crew and passenger immersion suits for operations to or from
helidecks located in a hostile sea area - for Shell Operations the wording "and seal the
suit within 10 seconds" in section 3.4, shall be deleted; and
d. The suits shall meet the compatibility with ETSO-2C504 - Helicopter constant-wear
lifejackets for operations to or from helidecks located in a hostile sea area, or
demonstrated equivalent.
4. When the sea temperature is consistently at or below +5°C or below and when operating
over broken ice. Enhanced TIGs, or enhanced immersion suits, may be required to meet
the expected rescue time.
5. The Overall Survival Equation (see SGRAO Part 2, Appendix 15) indicates the various
factors which impact estimated survival time and likely rescue time.
6. An emergency breathing system (EBS) should be worn for all offshore helicopter
operations Group-wide on the basis of its contribution to the Survival Equation as
determined by the local BU. EBS currently available are:
a. A re-breather, which allows a passenger to re-breathe his own air (in some models this
is supplemented by a very small low-pressure air-charge), thereby extending breathing
time from an average of 10 seconds to 45 seconds plus; and
b. A compressed air device called EBS Cat A, with a mouthpiece that can be purged of
water, when submerged, if required. Typical devices are described as Helicopter
Emergency Egress Device (HEEDS) or Helicopter Underwater Emergency Breathing
Apparatus (HUEBA) and are similar to scuba breathing systems.
Both systems require specialised training prior to use. All EBS must meet local regulatory
requirements and further information can be sought from Shell Aircraft on compliant
systems.
7. The use of pouch-type lifejackets for overwater flight is prohibited.
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When a helicopter ditches, there is a strong probability that it will invert and sink. The
passengers and crew must unstrap, make their way to an exit, operate the jettison mechanism
and make an escape. They must then deploy a lifejacket, enter a liferaft and await rescue.
Survival, however, is a matter of preparedness, combining the overall organisation of the right
aircraft equipment and personal survival aids, the right infrastructure for rescue, the right
training and the right confidence and determination on the part of both the survivor and the
rescuer. In our worst case ditching scenario, the victim, in order to be a survivor, must be
prepared in every way to successfully encounter:
• An inversion, accompanied by a “cold shock”;
• An underwater escape, along with a number of other survivors;
• A period of time in sea water, probably cold and rough;
• An entry into a liferaft;
• A transfer from the liferaft into a boat or aircraft;
• A transfer to a place of safety;
• A full recovery from any of the side effects of the ditching and immersion.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External: AAIB Reports 2-1993 as 332I Super Puma g tigh

AIBB Reports 2-1993 Super Puma Appendices
OGP 390 July 2008, update August 2013 9.13 Survival Equipment – slight difference.
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FOP 02.01 Pilots and Other Flight Crew Qualifications and

Experience Levels


1. Certify that the flight crew of an aircraft conducting flights for the company hold an in date
and valid licence, medical certificate and ratings (including radiotelephony licence unless it
is included in the pilot licence) required by national regulations.
2. Certify that the cabin crew of an aircraft has fulfilled the requirements of the NAA approved
operator's ground and flight training programme.
3. Certify that each crew member, other than a flight or a cabin crew member, who is
assigned duties on board an aircraft during flight time, has fulfilled the requirements of the
operator's ground and flight training programme.

1. Requirement 1 shall also include the following:
a. Meet the recency requirements of the NAA in order to exercise the privileges of a
licence;
b. Meet the licence, medical and rating requirements specified in Annex 1 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation when operations are conducted outside of the national
airspace of the State of issue of the flight crew licence; and
c. Demonstrate the ability to speak and understand the language used for radiotelephony
communications to at least ICAO level 4.
2. FOP 02.06.05 & FOP 02.06.06 – Pilot Experience and Qualification Levels for Fixed Wing and
Rotary Wing respectively stipulate the required flying experience and qualifications of pilots
before they can fly company or contractor(s) passengers, either on ad hoc charter or under
contract.
3. Where these requirements cannot be met dispensation based on mitigating factors shall be
sought from the contract holder. Where this is requested, full details of an individual’s
experience and qualifications under the headings shown FOP 2 shall be submitted for
assessment1.
1
Shell BU to contact Shell Aircraft for advice before any pilot is released to the contract with less than the
minimum experience.
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4. In some countries air taxi and helicopter pilots may not be entitled to an Air Transport Pilot’s
Licence (ATPL). If this is the case, a Commercial Pilot’s Licence (CPL) is considered
acceptable. Where possible, a ‘frozen ATPL’ is preffered (ATPL exams passed but experience
levels prevent the issue of the ATPL).
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
4.3.2 Alternatives to OGP recommended experience levels
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FOP 02.02 Alternative to Time on Type Requirements

There is no mandatory requirement.
As an alternative to mandatory pilot experience levels and in line with a move towards
competency-based training, it may be possible to replace the requirement for defined pilot
experience levels with suitable progression through a company approved operator’s
competency-based training management system.
In order for this to be achieved the following conditions shall be met:
1. Establish a formal modular competency-based progression scheme for pilots from basic (ab-
initio/new-hire/conversion) through to first command and for aircraft type conversion, which
will include elements for role specific training. Refer to FOP 02.06.07.
2. An “in depth” audit of the operator’s training system shall be conducted by Shell Aircraft to
include as a minimum the following:
a. Content of the training syllabus, to include comprehensive flight and ground training,
particularly for entry at the Commercial Pilot License (CPL) stage and a formal
progression scheme for pilots from basic (ab-initio) to command, based on the best
practice of both European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) training schemes;
b. Observation of Crew Resource Management (CRM) / Line Orientated Flight Training
(LOFT), preferably in a simulator;
c. Examination of training records with emphasis on a structured course, all relevant
competencies to be achieved and the associated competence checking process;
d. A review of base and line training staff against defined competencies, who themselves
are regularly checked;
e. Formal recording of the application from the Head of Aircraft Services (HAS) / Aviation
Focal Point (AFP), acceptable resolution of audit findings, approval and recurrent audit
requirements; and
f. An ongoing audit requirement to ensure continued compliance with the above.
3. The entry level for the competency-based training management system will normally be at
the ab-initio level, but can also be with a CPL providing the following conditions are met:
a. Aptitude testing is completed;
b. Full training records are held for the CPL training including records of stage and final
check flights and total hours are validated by the training organization;
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c. The training provider has been assessed and approved by the Helicopter Operator’s
Quality Assurance (QA) or training organization and the following factors have been
taken into account:
i. Instructor experience and oversight;
ii. Instructor competency check process; and
iii. The content of the CPL training (ground and flight).
4. The mandatory requirements are 100 hours on type for commanders and 50 hours on type
for co-pilots, which remain a requirement for operators with experience of a type. However,
when introducing new types into service or when changing to alternate types, it may be
necessary to reduce the total time on type requirement in consultation with Shell Aircraft.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
4.3.2 Alternatives to OGP recommended experience levels.
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FOP 02.03 Use of Freelance Pilots


1. Preclude the employment of freelance pilots and crew on company flights unless deemed
an operational necessity.

1. If it becomes an operational necessity to use freelance pilots the following conditions shall
apply:
a. The pilot or crewmember shall have received a formal company induction and line
training;
b. The pilot or crewmember are included as part of the company’s recurrent training
programme, including simulator training where it is a normal contract requirement;
c. The pilot or crewmember shall have a Licence Proficiency Check (LPC), company
Operator Proficiency Check (OPC) and a Line Check (or its equivalent), in accordance
with national regulations;
d. If time between engagements exceeds time between required OPCs, a training
programme applicable to all company pilots, being away from flying for whatever reason,
shall apply to the freelancer;
e. Freelance pilots and crew shall be formally endorsed by the senior management (this
shall include the Chief Pilot and Head of Training (or equivalent positions)) of the
company and must meet all Shell flying qualifications, experience level and training
requirements;
f. The freelance pilot training records must have documented evidence recording the
requirements listed.
RELATED INCIDENT
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Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 02.04 Pilots Flying More Than One Aircraft Type


1. Document and implement a policy that prohibits pilots to operate in command of two
aircraft types in the same duty period.

1. Other than training captains operating training flights, or in exceptional circumstances due
to aircraft availability, pilots shall operate only one type of aircraft in the same duty period.
2. Pilots operating two types shall have flown each type within a 28-day period, and have their
recency flying and type training monitored by a nominated member of the flying, training or
operations staff.
3. For the purposes of this requirement a type is defined as an entry to the pilots’ licence that
allows you to act as pilot on the type of aeroplane specified in the rating.
Shell’s preference is that a single type be flown, or scheduling in blocks of days on a particular
type.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
No Difference 4.3.4
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FOP 02.05 Maximum Age Limits for Aircrew

These mandatory requirements shall be met unless specifically precluded by

National legislation in which case National legislation applies.
The Air Operator is Accountable for requirements 1 and 2:
1. Prohibit pilots from acting as pilot-in-command of commercial air transport operations for
the company after their 60th birthday, unless the aircraft is operated with more than one
pilot and where the other pilot is younger than 60 years of age.
2. Prohibit the use of pilots or other flight crews of commercial air transport operations on
company flights who have reached 65 years of age.

1. None
According to International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Annex 1, section 1.2.5.2.1, once
an Airline Transport Pilot License (ATPL) (A or H) holder passes the age of 60, they must sit six
monthly medical examinations.
RELATED INCIDENT
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 02.06 Medicals


1. Prohibit any pilot from operating aircraft who does not hold a valid medical certificate
appropriate to their age and licence (e.g. CPL, ATPL) requirements.
2. Require that all pilots over the age of 60 on medical re-examination, shall include an
electrocardiography no less frequently than annually and, ideally, at intervals not
exceeding 6 months, for all commercial air transport operations for the company.
3. Require that other flight crew actively engaged on flying duties shall be subject to periodic
medical examinations appropriate to their duties.

1. The periodicity of medical examinations is determined by the local National Aviation
Authority and/or company policy.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 02.07 Flight Crew1 Training – General


1. * Document and provide NAA approved ground and flight training so that all flight crew
(whether employed or subcontracted) are trained to act as flight crew on a specific aircraft
type and/or in specific roles and operations.
2. * Document and provide NAA approved checks to assure the competence of all flight crew
(whether employed or subcontracted) to act as flight crew on a specific aircraft type and/or
in specific roles and operations.
3. * Require and verify that all Instructors, Examiners, Line Check Airmen (whether employed
or subcontracted) are qualified to NAA requirements and standardized to company
procedures for their assigned tasks.
4. * Maintain records of all training and retain records for 3 years, this includes training
carried out by third parties.
5. * Maintain a training manual approved by the NAA, to include training syllabi and checking
programmes.
6. Conduct recurrent training where a Synthetic Training Device (STD) is available for the
type to cover emergency and abnormal procedures that cannot be practised in the air at a
frequency of not more than 12 months for each type flown. Where an STD is not available,
undertake additional training on the actual aircraft variant after consultation with the
company2 on the syllabus.
7. * Require and verify that training facilities, devices and course materials reasonable reflect
the configuration of the fleet(s) for which the respective training is being provided.

1. Ground and Flight Training programmes shall include as a minimum:
a. Initial*;
b. Recurrent*;
c. Transition (conversion)*;
d. Re-qualification*;
e. Upgrade to Commander;
f. Recency*;
1
Flight Crew includes Cabin Crew and items * are to apply to Cabin Crew where this is applicable to the operation
2
Shell companies consulted for guidance are to contact Shell Aircraft for advice.
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g. Familiarization;
h. Differences or other specialized training*; and
i. TCAS ll and TAWS response training where appropriate.
2. Checks to assure the competence of Flight Crew shall include as a minimum:
a. Annual Aircraft Technical and Operations Manual;
b. Annual License Proficiency Check (or NAA equivalent);
c. Annual Operator Proficiency Check (or NAA equivalent);
d. Annual Instrument Rating Check (or NAA equivalent);
i. Procedures shall be flown under simulated or actual instrument conditions where the
pilot under check has no visual reference outside the cockpit.
e. Annual Line Check* (or NAA equivalent);
i. Carried out during a normal revenue flight to ensure continued operating standards
are maintained.
f. Annual Medical Check*; and
g. Annual Safety & Equipment Procedures (SEP) check*.
3. Checks should be conducted by a person who was not involved in providing training and able
to perform the check without inappropriate interference from management or external
organizations.
4. Training records shall include the following:
a. Name and licence number of crewmember, date and type of check*;
b. The type of Flight Training Device (FTD) or aircraft used for the check*;
c. The result of each check*;
d. The results of the most recent written examination for each type the individual is
qualified to fly; and
e. A master list of the certificates to be retained and copies of all certificates listed in the
master list*.
5. The Training manual shall be updated to reflect current procedures and be available to all
operations personnel, the syllabi shall include:
a. Ground Training*;
b. Simulator Training;
c. Aircraft Training*;
d. Examination and certification*;
e. Line Flying under supervision; and
f. Specialized training*.
6. * The Training Manual should include:
a. A process to support the introduction of new policies, rules, instructions and procedures;
and
b. A process to introduce new aircraft types, systems fleet modifications and upgrades.
c. A process to trend analyse training results to improve the programme.
7. Where significant3 differences exist between type variants the training is to take place on an
STD of the variant flown for the Shell contract.
3
Significant differences cover cockpit design and autopilots, other equipment differences can be briefed.
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8. * Smaller companies may not have the in-house capability to perform the required training
due to lack of facilities or a formal flight training approval. In this case third party training
facilities and training staff may be utilised. In such cases requirements 3 and 4 still apply
and records shall be made available for inspection.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 02.07.01 Flight Crew1 Training – Proficiency Training


1. Provide additional training and assure competence on items required by the contracting
Shell company if not already included in training required by the National Aviation
Authority (NAA).
2. Provide training in non-normal procedures, to include coordination among crew members,
and drills in the emergency evacuation from the aircraft.
3. * Include in the annual recurrent training for aircrew on long-term and repetitive short-
term contracts a minimum of 5 hours per pilot per year.
4. * Provide aircraft upset and abnormal/unusual attitude recovery training (where the
appropriate equipment is fitted).
5. * Conduct recency checks appropriate to the period of absence for any absence greater
than 28 days.
6. * Provide initial offshore deck landing training, both day and night, this shall be completed
in addition to the day and night line checks.
7. * Conduct at least 3 night take-offs and landings at a typical operational location every 90
days where there is a requirement to carry out routine (or emergency) flights at night.

1. Additional Training to meet Shell company requirements shall include:
a. Ground Training, this shall include a written questionnaire covering all aspects of both
operational and technical knowledge and/or an oral discussion based on the flight and
operations manuals:
i. Aircraft Technical; and
ii. Contents of the Operations Manuals.
b. Procedures to correctly respond to Traffic Collision Avoidance Collision (TCAS), I and/or
ll, as applicable alerts;
c. Terrain Awareness procedures and the correct actions following a GPWS/EGPWS (TAWS)
Warning;
d. The avoidance of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT);
e. Adverse weather operations;
1
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f. Crew Resource Management (CRM) / Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) using specially
trained facilitators during initial and recurrent training (FOP 02.06.03 refers)*;
g. The recognition of Dangerous Goods (DG) if approved to carry DG*;
h. Include the content of the 6-monthly base check in the annual proficiency check where
the proficiency training term “base check‟ is not be recognised by the NAA;
i. Each pilot shall be VFR and, if appropriate, Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) base checked
every 6 months on all types of aircraft being flown by the pilot for the company with the
following additional items;
i. Where two types are operated, the two qualifying check rides may alternate every 6
months;
ii. Where there is a requirement for night flying, whether on a routine or emergency
only basis, then alternate base checks shall examine the pilot's proficiency in the
handling of aircraft emergencies at night or IFR (checked in the simulator);
iii. VFR base checks shall include normal operating drills with simulated emergencies
followed by a written questionnaire as detailed in 1a above;
iv. IFR base checks shall include single engine approaches and overshoots and other
suitable emergencies, including recovery from unusual attitudes;
j. Each Flight Crew shall be checked annually and include:
i. Instrument Rating Renewal procedures flown under simulated or actual instrument
conditions where the Pilot under check has no visual reference outside the cockpit;
ii. Line/Route Check carried out during a normal revenue flight to ensure continued
operating standards are maintained;
iii. Emergency and safety equipment checks to cover evacuation drills and knowledge
of safety equipment, (FOP 02.06.02 refers)*;
iv. For Visual Flight Rules (VFR) only operations an instrument check shall be
conducted to ensure a minimum ability to maintain height, heading and airspeed,
including during turning, tracking to and from a navigational aid, or maintaining a
Global Positioning System (GPS) track, and to recover from unusual attitudes
and/or inadvertent flight into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC); and
v. Questionnaire as detailed in 1a above.
vi. For single engine helicopters only2 – During annual training pilots of single engine
helicopters shall carry out one or more autorotations to the satisfaction of the
training captain.
2. Additional Training to meet Shell company requirements should include:
a. Command training on upgrade to Commander;
3. The operator shall have a procedure in place within its training planning process to ensure
that each Pilot covers the full range of in-flight emergency procedures, for the type or types
flown, over a set period not to exceed 2 years. It is expected that the more critical
emergencies for the type will be covered at a greater frequency. The full range of
emergency procedures can be covered using the combination of six monthly or annual
proficiency checks, instrument rating renewal and simulator training.
4. The annual recurrent training of 5 hours for aircrew per pilot should include:
a. 3 hours to cover base checks and instrument rating renewal;
b. A minimum of 2 hours line checking; and
c. A proportion of the training may be carried out in full motion/visual Simulation Training
Device (STD), where available.
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5. Recency checks may be carried out by any suitable Senior/Line Check Captain but
preferably, the Chief Pilot or Training Captain. For Captaincy the following table details the
limitations that should apply:
6. Some critical tasks, such as engine failure management to specific sites, particularly where
night operations are conducted, require practice to achieve the necessary high standards.
Supervisors should ensure that such techniques are practised after an absence of 28 days or
more.
7. The initial offshore deck landing training shall have include and been assessed as competent
in the following:
a. Go-around by sole reference to instruments, from the hover outside ground effect, or
slow-speed flight such as just prior to Landing Decision Point (LDP);
b. Transition, by sole reference to instruments, from the hover into forward flight;
c. Recovery from attitudes resulting from unintentional loss of airspeed.
8. In areas where there is a lack of available helidecks and/or their distance from land creates
a significant challenge and risk for crews to remain current in night deck landings, crews
should alternatively, at least 90 days intervals, practice night deck landings to offshore
helidecks in an appropriate Full Flight Simulator (FFS) which provides such capability (FFS
fidelity and visual package to allow effective training on Helideck landings). This alleviation
can only be exercised with contract holder approval, contract holder shall seek advice from
Shell Aircraft.
RELATED INCIDENT
Past helicopter accidents in the North Sea, Gulf of Mexico and other worldwide locations
illustrate the demanding nature of low-level helicopter operations in the vicinity of offshore
locations. As a result, it is imperative that helicopter pilot competencies in this environment are
maintained.
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Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 02.07.02 Flight Crew1 Training – Emergency and Safety

Equipment Training
There is no mandatory requirement.

1. * Conduct Emergency and Safety Equipment (ESE) training for all aircraft crew members
which shall include instruction on the location and operation of all emergency equipment.
Crew members shall undergo initial training during type conversion, and at least every 2
years thereafter.
2. * Conduct upon conversion to type for over-water operations, dry dinghy drills. Thereafter,
dry dinghy drill shall be carried out annually and wet dinghy drill on at least a 3 yearly
basis.
3. * Provide for helicopter crews, Helicopter Underwater Escape Training (HUET) using a
HUET trainer at intervals not exceeding 4 years by attending an OPITO (or industry
recognized equivalent) HUET course.

1. * ESE training shall be aircraft type specific and aircraft crew members shall perform the
function or action, or obtain a suitable demonstration by other means e.g. audio-visual, for
the following:
a. Fire in the air and on the ground;
b. Use of fire extinguishers;
c. Operation and use of emergency exits;
d. Passenger preparation for an emergency landing/ditching;
e. Emergency evacuation procedures;
f. Donning and inflation of life preservers (when equipped);
g. Removal from stowage, deployment, inflation and boarding of life rafts (when equipped);
h. Pilot incapacitation;
i. Unlawful interference, bomb threat and other security procedures;
j. Any special emergency procedures when the aircraft is used on Medical Evacuation
(MEDEVAC) operations including patient evacuation in emergency situations and
passenger health emergencies; and
k. First Aid.
1
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2. * Where used and/or required by regulations, breathing apparatus (or smokehood) training
should be conducted on at least a 3 yearly basis. Some civil aviation authorities require this
training to be completed annually;
3. * First Aid Training can be satisfied by completion of a typical first aid in the work-place
training programme as offered by the red-cross (or equivalent) or an approved OPITO
training centre. As applicable, training should include Automated External Defibrillator (AED)
training.
4. * In addition to the standard training requirement, and where required by the local
procedures, HUET may also include training in the use of a “re-breather” self-breathing
device, or a Compressed-Air Emergency Breathing System (EBS).
5. The HUET trainer should meet the following minimum requirements:
a. In regions where only one type of helicopter is flown, the dimensions of the interior of
the simulator are to be representative of the interior of the cabin. Ideally the simulator
should be capable of replicating the cabins of the commonly used offshore helicopter
types;
b. The cabin and cockpit sections are to be fitted with representative seats, harnesses and
emergency exits. Operating mechanisms for jettisonable doors and windows are to
replicate those fitted to the helicopter type and the force required to remove a push-out
window is also to be representative of the type of push-out window used;
c. The roll rate of the simulator is to be representative of the roll rate of the actual
helicopter such that the trainee is introduced to the feeling of disorientation associated
with being turned upside down during the in-rush of water; and
d. Where possible the emergency egress lighting fitted to the helicopter emergency exits
should also be fitted to the HUET simulator.
RELATED INCIDENT
• Sikorsky S92, Offshore Newfoundland, Canada, March 2009

• AS332L2, Sumbrough, UK, 2013
Shell:
External:
• UK CAA CAP 1145
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 02.07.03 Flight Crew1 Training – Non Technical Training


1. * Establish a Crew Resource Management training programme as appropriate:
a. For two pilot operations, an NAA approved Crew Resource Management (CRM)
training programme shall be required annually to cover the full syllabus at least
every 3 years.
b. For single pilot operations, an approved CRM training programme or an approved
airborne decision making training programme shall be required for all pilots at least
every 2 years.
c. For Cabin Crew, an approved Crew Resource Management (CRM) training programme
shall be required at least every 2 years. This can be combined with the program in
1a.
2. Undertake High Altitude Indoctrination (HAI) training for crew of aircraft operating above
10,000 ft Above Sea Level (ASL). HAI training shall cover at least the following:
a. Physiological phenomena in a low pressure environment, including respiration,
hypoxia, duration of consciousness at altitude without supplemental oxygen, gas
expansion and gas bubble formation;
d. For pressurized aircraft, phenomena associated with rapid or explosive loss of
pressurization including: most likely causes, noise, cabin temperature change; cabin
fogging, effects on objects located near the point of fuselage failure, actions of flight
crew members immediately following the event and the likely resultant mental
attitude.
3. Implement Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) where appropriate, the exercises for which
shall be developed between the aircraft and the simulator operators themselves to provide
“real time” exercises using simulated local operational, weather and environmental
conditions.

1. CRM Training shall have the positive support of senior management who should also attend
CRM training.
2. As a minimum the CRM program shall include:
a. Checklists to be in challenge and response format;
1
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b. Responsibilities of the aircraft commander and co-Pilot, handling and non-handling Pilot
are to be clearly defined and included in the Operations Manual;
c. Cockpit workload to be optimised between the handling and non-handling Pilot so that
each plays a fully active and integrated role;
d. Training to embrace discussion on the physiology of flight e.g. the effects of fatigue,
hypoxia, hypothermia and the recognition of subtle incapacitation. Such training shall
include how to deal with an incapacitated Crew member, and address Crew relationships
and differing personalities, to ensure that these do not interfere with correct decision
making.
3. Operator CRM / Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) facilitators shall attend an industry
recognised training course at a period not exceeding 2 years to ensure the application of
latest best practice.
1. Two-pilot operations:
a. CRM training should be conducted in the non-operational environment e.g. classroom
and computer-based and in the operational environment e.g. Flight Simulation Training
Device (FSTD) and aircraft. Tools such as group discussions, team task analysis, team
task simulation and feedback should be used;
b. Whenever possible, classroom training should be conducted in a group session away
from the pressures of the usual working environment, so that the opportunity is provided
for flight crew members to interact and communicate in an environment conducive to
learning;
c. Computer-based training should not be conducted as a stand-alone training method, but
may be conducted as a complementary training method;
d. Whenever practicable, parts of the CRM training should be conducted in FSTDs that
reproduce a realistic operational environment and permit interaction. This includes but is
not limited to LOFT scenarios;
e. CRM principles should be integrated into relevant parts of flight crew training and
operations including checklists, briefings, abnormal and emergency procedures;
f. As applicable, operators should provide combined training for flight crew, cabin crew and
technical crew during recurrent CRM training. The combined training should address at
least: effective communication, coordination of tasks and functions of flight crew, cabin
crew and technical crew; and mixed multinational and cross-cultural flight crew, cabin
crew and technical crew, and their interaction, if applicable;
g. Management system CRM training should address hazards and risks identified by the
operator’s management system;
h. If the operator chooses not to establish its own CRM training, another operator, a third
party or a training organisation may be contracted to provide the training in accordance
with an approved syllabus. In case of contracted CRM training, the operator should
ensure that the content of the course covers the specific culture, the type of operations
and the associated procedures of the operator. When crew members from different
operators attend the same course, the CRM training should be specific to the relevant
flight operations and to the trainees concerned;
i. Initial operator’s CRM training shall be provided to any crew-member who has not
previously completed an initial CRM training course with another operator;
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j. When the flight crew member undertakes a conversion course with a change of aircraft
type or change of operator, elements of CRM training should be integrated into all
appropriate phases of the operator’s conversion course;
k. Annual recurrent CRM training should be provided in such a way that all CRM training
elements specified for the annual recurrent training in Table 1 below are covered over a
period not exceeding 3 years;
l. Operators should update their CRM recurrent training programme over a period not
exceeding 3 years. The revision of the programme should take into account information
from the operator’s management system including the results of the CRM assessment;
m. Command course — CRM training: The operator should ensure that elements of CRM
training are integrated into the command course.
2. Single pilot operations:
a. For single-pilot helicopter operations training should cover the relevant CRM training, i.e.
initial operator’s training, the operator conversion course and recurrent training;
b. Relevant training elements should focus on the elements specified in Table 1 which are
relevant to single-pilot operations. Therefore, single-pilot CRM training should include,
among others: (i) situation awareness; (ii) workload management; (iii) decision-making;
(iv) resilience development; (v) surprise and startle effect; and (vi) effective
communication and coordination with other operational personnel and ground services;
c. Computer-based training may be conducted as a stand-alone training method.
3. The CRM training elements to be covered are specified in Table 1 below. The following
aspects should be addressed:
a. Automation and philosophy on the use of automation, including the application of the
operations policy concerning the use of automation as stated in the operations manual;
and system and human limitations associated with the use of automation, giving special
attention to issues of mode awareness, automation surprises and over-reliance including
false sense of security and complacency. If conducted in an FSTD, the training should
include automation surprises of different origin (system- and pilot-induced);
b. Flight Crew operation monitoring and intervention before, during and after flight,
together with any associated priorities. This CRM training should include guidance to the
pilot monitoring on when it would be appropriate to intervene, if felt necessary, and how
this should be done in a timely manner. Reference should be made to the operator
procedures for structured intervention as specified in the operations manual;
c. Resilience development CRM training, including mental flexibility and performance
adaptation;
d. Surprise and startle effect CRM training should address unexpected, unusual and
stressful situations. The training should cover: surprises and startle effects and
management of abnormal and emergency situations;
e. Cultural differences CRM training should cover cultural differences of multinational and
cross-cultural crews;
f. Operator’s safety culture and company culture CRM training should cover the operator’s
safety culture, its company culture, the type of operations and the associated procedures
of the operator. This should include areas of operations that may lead to particular
difficulties or involve unusual hazards;
g. CRM training should cover aircraft type-specific case studies, based on the information
available within the operator’s management system, including accident and serious
incident reviews to analyse and identify any associated non-technical causal and
contributory factors, and instances or examples of lack of CRM; and analysis of
occurrences that were well managed. If relevant aircraft type-specific or operator-
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specific case studies are not available, the operator should consider other case studies
relevant to the scale and scope of its operations.
4. CRM training syllabus: Table 1 below specifies which CRM training elements should be
covered in each type of training. The levels of training in Table 1 can be described as
follows: (1) ‘Required’ means training that should be instructional or interactive in style to
meet the objectives specified in the CRM training programme or to refresh and strengthen
knowledge gained in a previous training. (2) ‘In-depth’ means training that should be
instructional or interactive in style taking full advantage of group discussions, team task
analysis, team task simulation, etc., for the acquisition or consolidation of knowledge, skills
and attitudes. The CRM training elements should be tailored to the specific needs of the
training phase being undertaken.
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Table 1 – Flight Crew CRM Training

5. Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT):
a. Should not be used as a method of checking the performance of individuals. Instead, it is
a validation of training programmes and operational procedures;
b. Should not be interrupted except in extreme and unusual circumstances. Repositioning
the simulator and repeating problems is inconsistent with the principles of LOFT;
c. After completion of a LOFT session, a thorough debriefing should be made of all aspects.
This may be accomplished by an initial self-debriefing by the crew, followed by the LOFT
co-ordinator's (check pilot's, instructors) debriefing. This critique should consider the use
of such aids as voice and video recorders, as well as written notes";
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d. An individual or crew needing additional training after a LOFT session should be afforded
that opportunity immediately with no stigma or recrimination;
e. LOFT scenarios may be developed from many sources, but accident reports provide a
realistic and appropriate starting point.
6. CRM can be described as the effective utilisation of all available resources to achieve safe
and efficient operation. In many aviation incidents and accidents CRM related issues are a
major contributing factor. EASA significantly extended and modernised the existing CRM
training scheme in 2015. It is expected that with the amended provisions CRM-related core
competencies of crews will be further strengthened: communication, leadership and
teamwork, problem solving and decision making, situational awareness as well as workload
management. New or expanded items are, among others: surprise and startle effect,
resilience development, CRM training and management system, provisions for CRM trainers,
adapted CRM training for single-pilot and single cabin crew operations, as well as provisions
for the qualification and training of CAA inspectors.
7. LOFT can have a significant impact on aviation safety through improved training and
validation of operational procedures. LOFT presents to aircrews scenarios of typical daily
operations in their airline with reasonable and realistic difficulties and emergencies
introduced to provide training and evaluation of proper flight deck management techniques.
The result is an appreciation by the air carrier of operational shortcomings on the part of line
crews and an evaluation of the adequacy of flight deck procedures and instrumentation, as
well as over-all crew training effectiveness. Part of the benefit of LOFT is derived from an
individual or crew being able to quickly appreciate the results, either positive or negative, of
operational decisions.
8. A properly conducted LOFT programme can provide great insight into the internal workings
of an airline's operations and training programme for the following reasons:
a. If similar mistakes seem to be recurring among pilots, it may indicate a potentially
serious problem as a result of incorrect procedures, conflicting or incorrect manuals, or
other operational aspects;
b. It may reveal areas in aircrew training programmes which are weak or which need
emphasis;
c. It may reveal problems with instrument locations, information being presented to pilots,
or other difficulties with the physical layout of a particular flight deck;
d. Air carriers can use it to test and verify flight deck operational procedures.
RELATED INCIDENT
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Shell:
External:
• UK CAA, CAP 720 - Flight Crew Training: Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) and Line-
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT)
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 02.07.04 Training – Other Training


1. Ensure that all persons assigned duties on-board an aircraft during flight, have received an
adequate level of ground and/or flight training as documented in the operator's training
programmes manual.
2. Ground support crews shall be trained in accordance with an operators training manual and
shall have documented training records. Initial and annual recurrent training shall be
completed.
3. The operator may conduct the training courses, they shall be recorded formally and a
syllabus developed for reference.

1. It is sometimes expedient to carry "load masters", who are not trained Flight Crew, for the
control of passengers and freight during flight and while the aircraft is on the ground. These
personnel shall always be given basic training in the following subjects:
a. Safety equipment;
b. First Aid;
c. Aircraft knowledge;
d. Emergency procedures, including evacuation drills and smoke/fire in cabin and/or
baggage compartment;
e. Loading Procedures;
f. Dangerous Goods (DG) training; and
g. Where load masters are used to calculate and supervise the loading, they shall be
trained for load and balance on the aircraft type in use, however, in every case, the
captain remains responsible for checking and accepting the loading and Centre of Gravity
(CG) calculations.
These personnel should also be given basic training in the following subjects:
a. Authority of the pilot-in-command;
b. Means of communication;
c. A general description of the aircraft in which the person is to serve and the proper use of
cabin installed systems controls;
d. Procedures for the handling of normal, abnormal, and emergency situations including the
safe movement in the vicinity of the helicopter and safe movement to and from the
helicopter;
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e. Briefing and handling of passengers;

f. Securing of cabin;
g. Firefighting, including practical training;
h. Decompression, if applicable;
i. Passenger preparation for an emergency landing or ditching, and evacuation, including
practical training; and
j. Knowledge of the relationship of the procedures with respect to those of the other crew
members.
2. Ground support crew training shall include the relevant elements from the following:
a. Passenger and landing zone management;
b. Load preparation and handling;
c. Passenger and cargo manifests;
d. Dangerous Goods Awareness;
e. Operations of doors, cargo hatches, cargo securing etc.;
f. Helipad and drop zone preparation and maintenance;
g. Marshalling and communications with flight crews;
h. Training of standard phraseology for radio communications;
i. Managing static electricity;
j. Correct hook-up procedures and use of external cargo equipment;
k. Aviation hazards e.g. electrical lines, tress, foreign object damage, etc.;
l. Requirements for control under the aircraft, including actions in event of aircraft
emergency, positioning of load and numbers of people under the disk;
m. Required Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and correct use;
n. First aid and firefighting, not to exceed 3 years; and
o. Refuelling procedures.
3. A checking programme should be implemented to assess the competence of other crew-
members as appropriate to role.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 02.07.05 Pilot Experience and Qualification Levels –

Fixed Wing


1. Schedule pilots with the required flying experience and qualifications as specified according
to the Maximum Certified Take-Off Mass (MCTOM) of the aircraft.

1. The specifications for the minimum required flying experience and qualifications of fixed-
wing pilots are:
Piston
Over Turboprop
Engined
5,700kgs less than
less than
CTOM 5,700kgs
5,700kgs
& All Jets MCTOM
MCTOM
AIRCRAFT COMMANDER
Licences ATPL(A) CPL(A) CPL(A)
Type rating on contract aircraft Current Current Current
QUALIFICATIONS
Instrument rating on contract
Current Current Current(2)
aircraft(1)
Total hours 4,000 3,000 1,500
(3)
Total hours in command 2,500 1,500 1,000
Total hours in command - multi-

2,000 1,200 750
EXPERIENCE engined(3)
Not less than
Total hours in command of gas
500 500
turbine or jet aircraft(3)
Total hours in command on contract
100 100 100
type
CO-PILOT
Licences CPL(A) CPL(A) CPL(A)
Current Current Current(2)
QUALIFICATIONS aircraft(1)
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Total Hours 1,000 500 500

EXPERIENCE Total hours on multi - engined
Not less than 500 250 250
aircraft(3)
Total hours on gas turbine aircraft(3) 250 100
Total hours in command of multi-
150
engined aircraft(3)
Total hours in command(3) 100 100

(3)
Total hours on contract type 50 50 50
(4)
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
Licence 2nd Class
Total flight hours 2,000

(4)
NAVIGATORS
Licence 1st Class
Minimum navigator hours 1,000
Notes:
1. Instrument ratings are required to be tested at periods not exceeding 13 months (instrument base
checks should be at 6 monthly intervals);
2. Requirement for Instrument Rating (IR) in all cases, with proven and annual current instrument
competence including Unusual Attitudes and Inadvertent Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) recovery
training is required;
3. These hours to be fully on aeroplanes. Up to 10% may be achieved in a flight simulator approved
for the purpose by the regulatory authority;
4. Flight Engineer and Navigator experience requirements are applicable to all Former Soviet Union
(FSU) aircraft when flown in or outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
2. Relevant Role Experience

Where specialist activities are involved, such as pipeline aerial patrols, airborne pollution
control, top dressing, aero magnetic surveys, advice on specialist experience requirements
shall be sought from Shell Aircraft.
In such cases, the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) will normally be required to carry out the duties of
an Observer. Consequently, both pilots shall be Observer Qualified (OQ) in accordance with
company or NAA requirements as appropriate, and have received relevant training for the
same. See further details in FOP 5 “Offshore Operations and Other Specialist Roles”.
3. Co-Pilot Experience Requirements
In those cases where a co-pilot has no opportunity to accumulate 50 hours on the contract
type, then an allowable variation is that he/she has flown 15/20 hours on the contract type
as follows:
Hrs
Total hours on contract type which must include the following minimum hours under each
18
section
Type conversion plus Instrument flying training on type 15
Initial type test, day Base Check, night currency and IR on type 3
Simulator / procedural trainer if available 5
Third pilot in jump seat on representative routes & observing procedures & duties of first
20
officers in the normal area of operations
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The above shall be followed by further experience which may be gained during contract
revenue flights:
• A further 30 hours on line with type Training Captain; and
• A final P2 Line Check on achieving 50 hours on type before being rostered to fly with
other type.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
OGP Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 Appendix 5A shows no differences to the
SGRAO.
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FOP 02.07.06 Pilot Experience and Qualification Levels -

Helicopters


1. Comply with the minimum required flying experience and qualifications of helicopter pilots,
either on ad hoc charter or under contract, specified according to the Maximum Certified
Take-Off Mass (MCTOM) of the aircraft;
2. Offshore role experience:
a. The total time for operating to fixed and moving platforms shall be 500 hours (above
5,700 kg), or 300 hours (below 5,700 kg); and
b. To maintain proficiency in landing on offshore helidecks during the day, pilots shall
successfully complete at least 3 landings and take-offs from offshore helidecks as
handling pilot every 90 days or pass a proficiency check by a training captain.

1. The specifications for the minimum required flying experience and qualifications of helicopter
pilots are:
Single
Multi-
Engine
Multi-Engine Engine
Under
Over 5,700kgs Under
5,700kg
MCTOM 5,700kgs
s
MCTOM
MCTOM
AIRCRAFT COMMANDER
Licences ATPL(H) CPL(H) CPL(H)
QUALIFICATIONS
Instrument rating on contract Current(2
Current Current
aircraft(1) )
Total hours 3,000 2,000 1,500

Total hours in command(3) 1,500 1,000 1,000
EXPERIENCE
Total hours in command - multi-
Not less than 1,200 500
engined(3)
Total hours in command on contract
100 100 100
type(5)
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CO-PILOT
Licences CPL(H) CPL(H) CPL(H)(4)
QUALIFICATIONS Current Current Current(2)
aircraft(1)

Total hours 1,000 500 500
Total hours on multi-engined
500 250
EXPERIENCE aircraft(3)
Not less than
Total hours in command(3) 100 100 100
(3)(5)
Total hours on contract type 50 50 50
BOTH AIRCRAFT COMMANDER AND CO-PILOT QUALIFICATIONS
Medical certificate appropriate for

Current for all
license
Crew Resource Management (CRM)

or Aeronautical Decision Making Annual
(ADM)
QUALIFICATIONS
Dangerous Goods (DG) awareness Every 2 years
Helicopter linked life raft systems Annual
Helicopter Underwater Escape Every 4 years (all crew members

Training (HUET) operating offshore)
50 Hours in 90 days, 10 Hours in

EXPERIENCE Total Hours Previous 90 days
aircraft type
Not Less than
Night recency previous 90 Days 3 Cycles
FLIGHT ENGINEERS(6)
Licence 2nd Class
NAVIGATORS(6)
Licence 1st Class
Minimum navigator hours 1,000
Notes:
1. Instrument ratings are required to be tested at periods not exceeding 13 months (instrument base checks
should be at 6 monthly intervals);
2. Requirement for Instrument Rating (IR) depends on role or task. However, in all cases, proven and annual
current instrument competence including Unusual Attitudes and Inadvertent Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
recovery training is required;
3. These hours to be fully on helicopters. Up to 10% may be achieved in a flight simulator approved
for the purpose by the regulatory authority;
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4. A co-pilot is not required for non-hostile, Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Day only, operations such as
those approved for single engine and non IFR certified and equipped light twins;
5. For all types, dispensation can be given for total hours in command on contract type, when a pilot
has completed an Aircraft Type Conversion Course and endorsed by Shell Aircraft.
6. Flight Engineer and Navigator experience requirements are applicable to all Former Soviet Union
(FSU) aircraft when flown in or outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
2. Ab-Initio and low experience pilots shall not operate Shell company flights unless enrolled
on an ab-initio and low experience pilot training and progression program for multi-crew
offshore helicopter pilots and achieved stage 8. The program shall be approved by the
company. FOP 02.06.07 details the requirements of the program.
3. The following requirements shall be met for specific role qualifications and experience:
a. Land Seismic Operations - Total time required for seismic support shall be 300 hours
which, where relevant, shall include a minimum of 250 hours operation in Jungle areas.
See below for External Load/Helicopter Hoist Operations (HHO) requirements;
b. Offshore Role Experience - In addition to meeting Mandatory Requirement 2, pilots shall
comply with requirement FOP 04.04 “Night Operations”;
c. External Load/Long Line/Vertical reference Operations - Meet total time required for
Land Seismic Operations and Offshore Role Experience as specified above, and:
i. A formal training scheme of relevant underslung operations (i.e. shortline, long
line, vertical reference) shall have been completed and documented in the pilots
training records;
ii. A minimum of 200 hours total time on actual sling operations. 50 of the 200
hours must be relevant to the role to be flown on contract, i.e. short or long line
as appropriate; and
iii. At least 5 hrs practical application in preceding 6 months (10 hrs for Long
Line/Vertical Reference), otherwise a representative Base Check or External Load
Competency Check shall be carried out and documented prior to contract start.
iv. Although training and pilot under instruction (PUI) hours may form part of the
total requirement, pilot under instruction flying must not be undertaken within a
Shell contract.
d. HHO - See further details in FOP 5 “Offshore Operations and Other Specialist Roles”.
e. Aeromagnetic and Geophysical Survey Operations - See further details in FOP 5
“Offshore Operations and Other Specialist Roles”.
f. Mountain Flying Operations - A formal and recorded training scheme flying in mountain
operations shall have been undertaken plus a minimum of 6 months operations in
mountainous terrain.
g. Offshore Spraying / Pollution Control - Prior offshore experience is required and details in
each case shall be agreed with Shell Aircraft.
4. For all the above role requirements, recent experience is considered essential and, unless
specified in the appropriate section, pilots who have not operated under any of the relevant
categories for periods in excess of a year shall require refresher training. In all cases advice
shall be sought from Shell Aircraft.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Does the operator have a documented requirement for minimum qualification and experience
level for pilots?
Shell:
External:
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 02.07.07 Ab-Initio and Low Experience Pilot Training

Helicopters


1. Obtain Shell contracting company approval for the use of ab-initio and low experience
pilots under a program endorsed by Shell Aircraft.
2. Achieve at least Stage 8 – ‘Line Flying under supervision of a Line Training Captain’ before
flying Shell Company or Contractor(s) passengers.

1. The flight training school(s) and curriculum shall be to at least EASA or FAA standards,
approved by the National Aviation Authority (NAA) for ab-initio training and successfully
reviewed as suitable by Shell Aircraft.
2. Pilots may only be approved to enter the program with an existing Commercial Pilot License
(CPL) if their previous training program meets the mandatory requirements 1 through 4
(detailed below) and records are available to confirm it.
3. Operators may establish equivalent programs for onshore operations, including aeroplanes,
subject to acceptance by Shell Aircraft and as a minimum shall include the following
process;
Detailed pilot aptitude testing is This testing should include evaluation of language
1 required prior to enrolment in the skills, cognitive abilities, hand-eye coordination,
program. ability to apply theory, and team coordination, etc.
ATP Theory required for operations on Multi Pilot

CPL(H) training at an Approved
2 Helicopters
Flight Training School(1)
Total Experience 150 hours
IR(H) training at an approved 35 hours flight time.

3
Flight Training Organisation Total Experience 185 hours
Individual may pass the entry process for company

4 CPLH/IR(H) Ab-Initio program with CPL or can enter program with
CPL as result of structured recruitment
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a. Multi Pilot Type Rating Course 10hrs FS+2hrs A/C

b. Multi Crew Co-operation Course 12 hrs FS(2)
c. Type IR Course 5 hrs FS + 2 hrs A/C
d. Operator Conversion course (hrs included in (b)
and (c) above)
Company Approved Training
5 Total 27 hours (A/C and FS)
Program
Flight tests by different TRE

a. Combined VMC Licence Skill Test and OPC
b. Type IR Skill Test Total approx 3 hours
a. WDD & HUET Training

Non-revenue offshore deck
b. Minimum 5 day and 5 night deck landings
landing training by day and night
6 c. Competency check for release to Line Training
with TRE
Minimum 5 flight hours
a. GPS Training, Performance, Flight Planning.

b. Dangerous Goods Training
7 Line Training Ground Course
c. Simulator Line Flight or Jump Seat Line
Familiarization.
a. Minimum 10 offshore landings to normal and

small decks by day and night
Line Flying under supervision of a
8 b. 50 flight hours minimum
Line Training Captain (LTC)
c. Progress report required for all flights
Approx 3 flight hours
Line Check as co-pilot by different
9 Must include an offshore landing and take-off.
LTC
a. Ab-initio pilots and CPL(H) holders with less than

1000 hours - with any commander who has no
less than 500 hour PIC time including 100 hours
10 Released to Line
on type
b. Co-pilots are restricted to day operations unless
fully night qualified.
a. 2 Qualifying Flight Reports per month with a

Training Captain or LTC
b. Recurrent Training and OPC/LPC checks
Progressive monitoring on line as
11 c. 6 monthly progress reviews with Training staff
FO
d. Written records of above elements
e. After the co-pilot has 500 hours he can be
released to any PIC.
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Approx 2 year point - Promotion board or

management evaluation with CP, CTC SLTC
Monitoring continues as above
12 Promotion to SFO
Total Experience approx 1450 hours
depending on operational rate of
accumulation
Approx 4 year point

Minimum Requirements - ATPLH, 2000
hours helicopter including 1000 as PICUS
gained in accordance with the Operators
procedures
a. Technical Exam
b. RHS checks
13 Command Course
c. FS or FTD 3 Training and Assessment
d. CRM assessment
e. Command Line Training
f. Command Line Check by different LTC
g. A letter of recommendation should be
forwarded to the OGP member company
prior to assignment
Initially only qualified to fly in command

with co-pilots who have 500 hours total
14 Promotion to Command experience including 100 hours on type until
the new commander has accumulated 500
hours in Command
4. Detailed training records shall be maintained for all phases of the training program. These
records will reflect the results of each training session to include the standards to which the
pilot was able to complete the exercise or flight requirement.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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Does the operator have a documented requirement for minimum qualification and experience
level for pilots?
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
No difference
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FOP 03.01 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) - General


1. Establish and maintain a FDM program as part of their Safety Management System (SMS),
accident prevention and flight safety programme for both fixed and rotary
wing aircraft types contracted by the Company.
2. Include in the FDM programme a feedback loop that will allow timely corrective actions to
be taken where safety may be compromised by significant deviation from Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP).
3. Construct the FDM programme so as to:
a. Identify areas of operational risk and quantify safety margins;
b. Identify and quantify changing operational risks by highlighting when non-standard,
unusual or unsafe circumstances occur;
c. Manage FDM information on the frequency of occurrence combined with an
estimation of the level of severity, to assess the risks and to determine which may be
unacceptable if the discovered trend continues. Determine the frequency of
occurrence of similar events within the severity bands to determine trends. Risk
assess identified trends to determine any unacceptable trends;
d. Put in place appropriate risk mitigation techniques to provide remedial action once an
unacceptable risk, either actually present or predicted by trending, has been
identified; and
e. Confirm the effectiveness of any remedial action by continued monitoring.

1. The FDM programme shall be based upon a “just culture”, meaning a non-punitive approach
shall be taken unless criminal intent or wilful wrongdoing is evident, and containing
adequate safeguards to protect the source data from interference or deletion.
2. The FDM system shall enable an operator to compare its SOP’s with those actually achieved
in everyday flights. A feedback loop will allow timely corrective action to be taken where
safety may be compromised by significant deviation from SOP’s.
1. The Company requirements for an FDM program are designed to apply to operators and
FDM systems of varying complexity and size and are required except where an exemption is
stated in the Company minimum equipment requirements for low usage aircraft types.
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2. The Air Operator may propose a program covering specific aircraft tail numbers and pilots
where Company use is limited to a small sole use operation out of a larger aircraft fleet and
pilot pool. However the program coverage must include all pilots flying for the Company
including replacements and temporary assignments.
Additional guidance provided in the following documents;
• Global FDM Steering Group – Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring Industry Best Practices, 01
September 2011 (Contact SAI for a copy if links fail);
• CAP 739 – Flight Data Monitoring.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
1. Global HFDM Steering Group – FDM Industry Best Practices.

2. CAP 739
3. EASA FDM Practice and Oversight
4. ICAO Doc 9859 3rd Edition
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
Section 10.2.9 – Flight data analysis. Very brief and does recommend HOMP to be considered if
available for aircraft model.
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FOP 03.02 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) - Organisation

Structure


1. Identify the following roles as part of the FDM programme:
a. A person with overall responsibility for managing the FDM programme;
b. A person or persons responsible for Pilot Liaison;
c. A person or contractor competent in the use of the FDM system’s data analysis software;
and
d. An FDM Review Team.
2. Include all persons with allocated roles in the FDM programme, including those required to
have access to identified data, as signatories of any confidentiality agreement required to
protect the data.
3. Include documentation covering the following requirements:
a. Objectives of the system;
b. A confidentiality agreement and/or statement; and
c. A description of the system processes and procedures.

1. Pilot Liaison shall inform crews of threshold exceedance events, review and explain the data
using playback and analysis software and feedback crew responses to the analysis process.
2. Competence in the use of the FDM system’s data analysis software shall include use of the
system’s data analysis software to set event thresholds, analyse downloaded data,
determine event credibility and provide data in a format usable and easily understood for
Pilot debrief and for de-identified FDM reports.
3. The description of the system process and procedures shall include:
a. Data download procedures (including intended maximum time between downloads and
analysis of data);
b. Analysis procedures;
c. Event communication, Pilot liaison and review;
d. FDM review and report requirements;
e. KPI’s to identify systemic issues; and
f. Competence of the FDM personnel.
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4. The FDM Review Team shall be responsible for conducting periodic reviews of FDM
programme data and making recommendations to the post holders for Flight Operations,
Safety, Training and Maintenance based on consolidated data. For small operators, the FDM
review team may have to comprise personnel from outside the team or other management
post holders. In this case the review team shall only review de-identified data.
5. The actual FDM organisational structure and numbers of personnel involved, whether full
time or part-time, will depend on the operator’s size and the number of aircraft covered by
the FDM programme. However, it must take into account staff absence, leave and turnover
to provide sufficient cover.
6. The FDM program is primarily a Flight Operations function, with the Safety and Training
departments being customers of de-identified data. However, the roles of data downloading
and analysis can be completed by staff within those departments, provided those staff are
bound by the confidentiality agreement and that the identified data is not used or made
available for routine safety, quality or training department use.
7. The FDM system shall include documentation covering the confidentiality agreement and/or
statement:
a. This should define how the FDM data will be managed, how confidentiality will be
maintained, under what exceptional circumstances disciplinary action may be taken on
the basis of FDM data in the event of repetitive, deliberate violations of SOP’s and
limitations and/or unprofessional, reckless behaviour (cynical abuse); and
b. The confidentiality agreement/statement should also define how FDM data is protected in
the case of an accident investigation and/or criminal investigation by a third party and
what types and format of data that may be shared, subject to restrictions from other
legal agreements, with the clients, authorities other 3rd parties.
1. The FDM Programme Manager need not be a pilot in which case the manager must be
assisted by a data interpreter who is an experienced pilot, who is respected and trusted by
the pilot workforce and is not part of the core senior management team. In very small
organisations, this may be unavoidable.
2. The FDM Programme Manager is responsible for the classification of events, the completion
of follow up activity and for producing periodic FDM reports for distribution within the
organisation regarding fleet wide trending information.
3. Pilot Liaison should be experienced and trusted pilots(s) responsible for informing flight crew
of threshold exceedance events, reviewing and explaining the data using playback and
analysis software and feeding back pilot responses to the analysis process.
4. It is recommended that the Data Analysis capability is normally performed in house, to allow
customisation of the process to an individual operators mission and requirements, the data
analysis can be performed by a third party, providing it meets the mandatory requirements.
5. The FDM review team is responsible for recommending, based on agreed criteria that may
include gross negligence or repeat occurrences where no heed of warnings has been taken,
when the confidentiality may exceptionally be removed. Identified details would then be
passed outside the FDM system for normal management action;
6. In smaller operators where the FDM Manager is part of the core management team, that
individual may be restricted from access to the identified data, but retain overall
management responsibilities for the system and for the use of de-identified data;
7. Additional guidance provided in the following documents:
a. Global FDM Steering Group – Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring Industry Best Practices,
01 September 2011;
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b. CAP 739 – Flight Data Monitoring.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
1. CAA CAP739
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
Section 10.2.9 – Flight data analysis. Very brief but does recommend Helicopter Operations
Monitoring Programme (HOMP) to be considered if available for aircraft model.
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FOP 03.03 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) – Hardware


1. Obtain approval for all system installations in accordance with the applicable regulatory
authorities’ certification requirements.
2. Use hardware for the FDM system that is fit for purpose and meeting the following
requirements:
a. All hardware shall cause no detriment to the aircraft and the safety of its systems; and
b. The FDM installation shall cause no harm to the data storage within the FDR, if fitted.
3. Include the following hardware for the FDM system:
a. An on-board data recording system that is capable of storing sufficient data, relevant
to the aircraft and system type and the data transfer procedures of the operator, to
ensure all data from contiguous1 flights is processed and analysed; and
b. Recording devices shall be capable of transferring the data to a media storage device
without first holding it in any sort of buffering memory2 in case of potential data loss on
sudden or inadvertent power failure. Recording devices shall be fitted with some easy
method of transferring the recorded data to the ground station.
4. Install and maintain an FDM ground station at operating bases that shall be capable of
accepting data downloads and running the analysis software if the analysis is done on site.
Alternatively, it shall have the capability to transmit the data for offsite or third party
analysis.
5. Verify that the data analysis software has the following capabilities:
a. The ability to programme a range of alert detection thresholds to generate events
when parameters exceed pre-set values, covering aircraft flight manual limitations,
operator flight profile requirements and SOPs;
b. The capability for detailed analysis of the flight data; and
c. A review and playback process that shall have the capability to enable the effective
review and debrief of crews at all base locations, including permanent remote bases.
1
This means all flights between a data download and the next planned data download
2
CAP 739 recommends minimizing the time spent in a buffer to less than 10 seconds – systems that meet
this recommendation are acceptable.
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6. Requirements for FDM on owned aircraft and on long term or repetitive3 short term
contracts are detailed in the following table.
Aircraft Type FDM System
Integrated system recording data from the

(CV) FDR or the aircraft data bus.
FDR equipped or capable Fixed Wing (FW) and
Rotary Wing (RW) types The system used shall be capable of
meeting the event sets required for the
role.
Stand alone or hybrid systems which are
based on inertial reference or GPS data,
but also have the capability to record
Legacy analogue FW and RW types and light FW information from various avionic
and RW types without an FDR. bus/systems, including pitot/static.
The system used shall be capable of
meeting the event sets required for the
role.

1. The system shall have the practical capability for pilots and/or line maintenance
personnel to download the data at the operating base at least on a daily basis, but
preferably between flights.
2. The download device shall be capable of storing at least the total data produced by that
aircraft system within the planned download period and ideally not less than 25 hours of
flight data from continuous flights.
3. Temporary remote base operations shall require, when operationally possible, the
capability to transmit downloaded data to the FDM processing system or direct to a third
party for analysis. Where it is not possible to transmit the data over the internet, an
alternative acceptable means of compliance shall be established.
4. The data analysis software shall include the following facilities for debriefing;
a. Using effective visualisation software, including instrument panel graphics and
displays of relevant aircraft systems;
b. Include relevant data depicted on plots, presentation of the data as cockpit
instrumentation relevant to the type flown; and
c. Show a graphical depiction of the aircraft and location.
1. An on-board data recording system:
a. A range of recording systems are available depending on the aircraft size and type;
b. In larger and more modern aircraft the FDR or CVFDR can be used or the data can be
acquired direct from a data bus;
c. In smaller and legacy aircraft, a standalone data unit, containing inertial reference
instruments may be fitted, which may also have the capability to receive additional data
from on-board systems; and
d. The range of data parameters recorded will directly affect the scope and complexity of
the monitoring that can be completed and the number and range of events that can be
monitored.
2. Data transfer capability:
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a. Various methods are available for this, including Quick Access Recorders (QAR’s) to
PCMIA and flash cards, wireless transfer (Wi-Fi) and direct cable link connections to a
laptop.
3. Data analysis system:
a. Some OEM supplied FDM systems (e.g. the system provided for the Sikorsky S92
helicopter) have a number of pre-assigned thresholds based on RFM limits. These do not
normally cover operation specific flight profiles and SOPs and so the operator will review
and where deemed applicable they will add these additional event thresholds. A generic
event list is detailed in table below.
Ground
All
High Lateral
OAT High - Operating Ground Taxi Speed - High Longitudinal
Acceleration (rapid
limits max Acceleration (rapid braking)
cornering)
Rotary Wing
Sloping Ground High Rotor Brake on at Excessive power

Pedal - max LH & RH taxi
Pitch Attitude excessive NR during ground taxi
Cyclic movement
Sloping Ground High Excessive yaw rate on
Air Taxi Speed - Max limits during taxi
Roll Attitude Ground in taxi
(pitch or roll)
Excessive Rate of Excessive Cyclic

Movement of Lateral Cyclic - closest Control with Yaw Rate in Hover or on
Longitudinal & Lateral to LH & RH Rollover Insufficient Collective ground
Cyclic on Ground Pitch on Ground
Inadvertent Lift off
Flight - Take off & Landing
All
Day or night Landing Landing or take off Excessive tail wind on take
Heavy/hard landing
or take off specific location off
Gear extension & Gear extension &

Excessive tail wind on
retraction - Airspeed retraction - Height
landing
limit limit
Rotary Wing
Cabin Heater On High Groundspeed Airspeed on Departure Downwind Flight Within 60

(take-off and landing) Prior to TD (<= 300ft) seconds of Take-Off
Downwind Flight
Excessive pitch on Excessive pitch on
Within 60 seconds of
transition flare
Landing
Fixed Wing
High Speed on lift Excessive pitch rate on Excessive pitch angle

Rejected take off
off/rotation rotation on take off
Early configuration
Low speed on landing Long flare Long landing distance
change on initial climb
Late configuration
High speed on landing Go around Touch and go
setting on landing
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Flight – Approach (Stabilised approach)
All
Heading Change below Angle of Bank at High speed/ IAS at Low speed/IAS at specified
specified heights specified heights specified heights heights
ROD at specified Stable Approach - late Premature Turn to Stable Approach Track
heights turn Final Change
Glideslope deviation Glideslope deviation Localiser deviation Localiser deviation below

above specified height below specified height above specified height specified height
Low Turn to Final
Rotary Wing
Pitch Attitude change

at specified heights
Fixed Wing
Speed high for specific

Pitch cycling during Height high 1 min Height low 1 min before
flap configurations
final approach before landing landing
(x3)
Windshear warning
Flight - Cruise
All
Airspeed –
High Airspeed - Low Low airspeed at
VNO/VMO/VNE speed
Altitude altitude
exceedances
Altitude Maximum Climb Rate - max
High positive vertical High negative vertical

High Rate of Descent Low Cruise
acceleration (g) acceleration (g)
Altitude alert during Excessive Pitch angle

Excessive Pitch Rate Excessive Roll/bank Attitude
cruise in flight.
Pilot Workload (e.g.

Excessive Roll Rate Excessive Yaw rate OEI - Air
Turbulence)
Pilot Event TCAS alerts Training Mode Active Fuel content low
Bleed Air system use

EGPWS alerts - Condition of Autopilot AP Engaged within specified
during take-off (e.g.
various in Flight time after Take-Off
Heating)`
Autopilot Engaged on Airspeed Hold Engaged Airspeed Hold Engaged ALT Mode Engaged -
Ground (post or pre) - Airspeed - Altitude Altitude
ALT Mode Engaged - HDG Mode Engaged - V/S Mode Active -

VS Mode Engaged - Altitude
Airspeed Speed Below spec speed
FD Coupled Approach Go Around Mode Flight without ASE channels

FD Engaged - Speed
or take off - Airspeed Engaged - Airspeed engaged
Engine operating limits

- various
Rotary Wing
Low Airspeed at High Airspeed - Power Minimum Altitude in Settling with Power (Vortex
altitude (High hover) Off Autorotation ring)
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Excessive Lateral Excessive Longitudinal Excessive Collective

Excessive Tail Rotor Control
Cyclic Control Cyclic Control Pitch Control
High/Low rotor speed -

Cross Controlling Quick Stop Torque Split
Power On
Excessive Pitch Attitude with

High/low rotor speed - Rotors Running
AVAD alert AP Engaged on Ground
Power Off Duration
(Offshore)
Gearbox/Torque Bird strike prevention

NG/NR operating limits
operating limits profiles
Fixed Wing
High vertical speed

before level off
4. Additional guidance provided in the following documents:

• Global FDM Steering Group – Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring Industry Best Practices,
01 September 2011;
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:

2. CAA CAP 739
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 03.04 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) - Processes


1. Download FDM data from all aircraft on a daily basis and when possible between flights.
2. Establish FDM event thresholds based on flight manual limitations, operator flight profiles
and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) reflecting the specific roles undertaken.
3. Analyse FDM data for threshold exceedance events on a daily basis (operational flight
days) for both operator in house data analysis and third party analysis services.
4. Document and implement a process to validate FDM events.
5. Store FDM data for a minimum period of 12 months and perform routine back-ups.
6. Set and assess at least three levels of severity of alert detection for each validated event
(low, medium and high).
7. Conduct crew contact for every validated and relevant Medium and High FDM event.
8. Conduct trend monitoring as a routine part of the FDM process to give advance warning of
developing issues in a flight operation.
9. Establish a process for communication and review of FDM data.

1. Data download requirements are subject to the following exceptions:
a. For fixed wing (FW) aircraft operating away from base for a short number of days1, the
data can be downloaded on the return to base; and
b. For FW and rotary wing (RW) aircraft operating from remote bases, a means of
downloading and transmitting the data on a daily basis shall be established.
2. Successful data download rate from the operators fleet shall be a measured as a KPI.
3. Data analysis requirements are subject to the following exceptions:
a. For FW aircraft operating away from base for a short number of days, the data can be
analysed on the return to base; and
b. For small operators, who have just one Pilot liaison/analyst, the analysis frequency may
have to reflect that individual’s work schedule. However, where practicable, redundancy
should be provided by a second Pilot liaison/analyst.
1
A short number of days are defined as up to and including three days.
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4. Severity of events shall be determined from the nature of the event, the magnitude of the
exceedance and/or the potential consequences. The severity levels in each case shall
determine the follow up action to be taken. A high risk event may be required to be
communicated to other departments. Any such communication shall abide by the
confidentiality agreements in place for the transmission of FDM data.
5. Crew Contacts shall include:
a. A process for crews to request analysis of a particular flight or event;
b. The most appropriate means practicable to communicate the event and its consequences
to the crew conducting remote operations from temporary bases where face to face
briefing with pilot liaison personnel and the full use of the analysis playback and review
capability may not be possible; and
c. For events assessed as High risk a more comprehensive contact may be required that
involves dialogue between the pilot liaison function and the crew involved. This contact
should include a review by the crew of the data for the event, using the playback
capability and a discussion with the pilot liaison.
6. Following the analysis of the FDM data and, when necessary, further investigation and crew
contacts, the results shall be recorded and stored in a format that enables future access for
reference and comparison. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) shall also be used to measure
the effectiveness of the FDM system when trend monitoring has been established.
7. Communication and review of FDM data shall comply with the operator’s confidentiality
agreement.
8. The person with overall responsibility for managing the FDM programme shall produce
regular FDM reports, summarising event activity within the organisation and highlighting
learnings from the analysis. These reports shall be made available and communicated to all
crews and relevant departments.
9. A group, usually consisting of the post holders shall meet at regular intervals (quarterly
recommended) to validate the report and make recommendations for suggested changes to
operational procedures or training syllabus. Track the implementation of those
recommendations and monitor to determine their effectiveness.
10. Include an overview of these actions, together with the KPI’s, as an agenda item in the
periodic Senior Management Reviews.
1. Data analysis:
a. Prior to applying the alleviations for FW and smaller operators, the option for third party
analysis to achieve the daily requirements, should be addressed;
b. Small operators should consider using a non pilot staff member, whose availability is
greater, to conduct a daily first look analysis of the data to establish whether any events
have been recorded. They can then communicate the need for further analysis to the
dedicated pilot liaison/analyst. This additional staff member would have to be party to
the confidentiality agreement; and
c. The key reasons for requiring daily analysis of FDM data is to ensure that any major,
high risk events are highlighted to the flying pilot(s) as soon as possible to prevent the
risk of recurrence and that more routine events can be communicated to pilots within a
period where they will be able to recall the flight with clarity and assist in the analysis
process. The risk of waiting a week or a month is that the pilot is unable to recall the
particular flight and so much of the benefit of the system is lost.
2. Data Storage and Back-up;
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a. If storing data for a longer period, consideration may be given to de-identifying all
the stored data after a defined period, to prevent future misuse by third parties.
3. Assess severity of events;
a. Events should be assigned a severity based on the nature of the event, the magnitude of
the exceedance and the potential consequences of the exceedance. The severity rating
will determine the follow up action.
4. Crew contact:
a. Crew contact is considered one of the most vital elements of the FDM system. If the only
information received by crews is de-identified, trended data in periodic reports, then a
significant proportion of the benefit of the system has been wasted. Individual feedback
enables individual accountability and has been shown to have the greatest impact in
changing behaviours;
b. Invalid events associated with training or maintenance check flights should be
discounted, but should enable crews to be alerted to even low risk events resulting from
minor departures from operating limits, so as not to normalise those departures.
Consider setting additional thresholds for these flights to avoid a ‘blanket’ disregard for
what might actually be inappropriate manoeuvring;
c. For those events assessed as Medium risk, crew contact can be just an advisory contact
by email or other means, to alert the pilots of the event, but does not require further
follow up action. This action could be completed by the individual performing the
analysis, subject to the confidentiality conditions; and
5. Communication and review of FDM data:
a. Typically the report should identify the top 10 recurring events per aircraft type or by
location. Individual events can also be highlighted if they provide valuable learning;
b. A common KPI used by many established FDM operators is “events per flight”; and
c. When considered appropriate by the operator, de-identified FDM information can also be
communicated to outside organisations such as ATC, airports, customers and aircraft
manufacturers, if required to initiate or inform safety investigations or changes of
procedures within that organisation. For example, the use of FDM data to support a
change in local air traffic procedures due to repeated events generated by Pilots
following ATC instruction or use of FDM data to inform an investigation into an aircraft
incident.
6. Generic FDM Process
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7. Additional guidance provided in the following documents;

8. Global FDM Steering Group – Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring Industry Best Practices, 01
September 2011;
9. CAP 739 – Flight Data Monitoring.
RELATED INCIDENT
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Shell:
External:
1. CAA CAP739.pdf
OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 03.05 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) - Training,

Serviceability and Audit


1. Provide training for all FDM personnel who have defined roles within the FDM Programme,
appropriate to their level of use.
2. Document a serviceability policy for both airborne and ground station equipment and
where approved by the Regulator include detailed requirements for the FDM system’s
airborne equipment in the aircraft’s Minimum Equipment List (MEL).
3. Include the FDM system within the internal audit QA process, using acceptable means that
do not risk the independence and security of the FDM program, especially in smaller
operations where some positions may be combined.

1. FDM personnel training shall include:
a. The person with overall responsibility for managing the FDM programme and the person
responsible for FDM data analysis shall be competent as defined in the competence
requirements documented for the position;
b. The person responsible for informing crews of threshold exceedance events shall have
the knowledge of the review/playback systems and must be able to interpret data
provided by the analyst; and
c. Maintenance staff required to test and assess the system’s serviceability status and carry
out associated maintenance.
2. The serviceability policy shall include:
a. The stated requirement for the data acquisition units, sensors and pick-offs and for the
recording and download system (QAR), unserviceability shall not exceed 25 flight hours
between data downloads;
i. For long haul fixed wing operations, operating away from the main base for a
short period, this may be extended to a Cat C (10 day item); and
ii. This does not preclude the operator from having a procedure to grant an
extension for its minimum departure standards, but shall require senior
Maintenance Management approval and shall include customer notification.
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b. In-month the overall reliability rate for data downloads shall be monitored and reported
as a KPI. 95% or better shall be targeted once the system is considered mature (after 1
year of operation); and
c. Take appropriate measures to assure the availability and functionality of the FDM
analysis system by means such as service agreements with the equipment and software
OEMs or the provision of back up equipment if necessary.
3. The Company requires the right to audit sufficient aspects of the FDM system to assure that
the process is working and adding to the advancement of safety. This will not give right of
access to all the data, especially that which is identifiable to an individual, unless the aircraft
operator specifically wants to use the data to demonstrate a specific problem.
1. Training:
a. Line Pilots, or in some circumstances line maintenance staff, are likely to need only
sufficient knowledge to download data.
b. The FDM program should be designed to have the support of all pilots and careful
consideration should be given to maintaining the integrity and value of the program.
2. System serviceability
a. If the FDM is to contribute to improved safety, it needs to be operational for the
maximum amount of time; a minimum serviceability standard therefore needs to be set.
3. Additional guidance provided in the following documents;
• Global FDM Steering Group – Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring Industry Best Practices,
01 September 2011;
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:

2. CAA CAP 739
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OGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 04.01 Fuel Requirements - Helicopters


1. Define a fuel policy for the purpose of flight planning and in-flight re-planning to ensure
that every flight shall carry sufficient fuel for the planned operations and, in addition,
reserves to cover deviations from the planned operations.

1. For IFR flights the minimum pre-departure usable fuel shall be sufficient for the following:
a. Taxi Fuel - The total amount of fuel expected to be used for start-up and taxi including
allowances for operation of ancillary equipment, local conditions at departure site, ice
protection systems and APU if applicable, and any foreseeable delays prior to take-off;
b. Trip Fuel - The flight to the destination including take-off, climb, cruise, descent,
approach and landing, taking into account departure and arrival routings, meteorological
conditions and foreseeable delays due to air traffic routing or other situations;
c. Contingency Fuel - Fuel sufficient for contingency allowance representing 10% of the trip
fuel;
d. Alternate Fuel - Fuel for missed approach from the applicable MDA/DA at destination
aerodrome to the missed approach altitude and transit to alternate , including climb,
cruise, descent and approach and landing at the alternate, taking into account departure
and arrival routings;
e. Final Reserve Fuel- Fuel to hold for of 30 minutes at holding speed at 1500ft above the
destination in ISA calculated with the estimated landing weights on arrival above the
destination or the alternate;
f. Extra fuel at the discretion of the aircraft commander.
g. Sufficient fuel shall be carried at all times to route to a suitable airfield, hold for 15
minutes at 1500 ft above airfield elevation in ISA and make an approach and landing, in
the event of failure occurring at the most critical point in the flight.
h. Additional fuel if the air operator’s fuel policy includes planning to an isolated aerodrome.
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2. For VFR flights the minimum pre-departure usable fuel shall be sufficient for the leg to
destination plus as described in the table below:
VFR flights in a non-hostile environment VFR flights in a hostile environment and

(excludes all offshore operations) all offshore operations
Additional fuel based on the rules of the State Additional fuel based on the rules of the State
of the operator but normally 5% of the of the operator but normally 10% of the
planned trip fuel 1, plus: planned trip fuel4 ,plus:
Fuel for a missed approach at destination, plus
Fuel for a missed approach at destination, transit and approach and landing at alternate.
plus transit and approach and landing at (NB. Plus 10% for helicopters operating to or
alternate, plus; from helidecks located in a hostile
environment), plus;
If operating by day with reference to visual
landmarks, 20 minutes fuel at best range Fuel to fly for 30 minutes at holding speed at
speed. If not, fuel for 30 minutes at holding 1500 feet above the destination, plus;
speed above the destination, plus;
Extra fuel, at the discretion of the commander Extra fuel, at the discretion of the commander
3. While parameters covering all circumstances cannot be clearly laid down, the above
mandatory requirements shall be used for fuel policy unless otherwise exceeded by relevant
regulations.
4. The requirements for fuel planning should be based on the rules of the State of the
Operator. If a difference exists between the Fuel Planning Requirements “1 (a) and (b)”
above, and those mandated by the State of the Operator the more restrictive requirements
shall be used.
1
Use of the lower of these requirements shall be justified only by a risk assessment based on an analysis of low fuel
incidents in the operating area
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
Text
Text
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FOP 04.02 Composition of Flight Crew - Helicopters


1. Conduct flights for the company with a minimum of two pilots for the following.
a. When operating a multi-engine helicopter of less than 5700 Kgs (12500lbs) Note 1; and
b. When operating a multi-engine helicopter of more than 5700 Kgs (12500lbs).
Note 1 - Exceptionally one Pilot may be utilised for “non-hostile 1
” operations provided the helicopter is certified for single pilot operations and
performance/requirements dictate.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Mandatory Requirement 1.

1. Where regulatory requirements are more stringent then these must be followed.
2. All cases of single pilot operation shall require approval by Shell Aircraft prior to use. (See
FOP 04.02.02)
1
EASA Define Hostile as:
1. An environment in which:
a. a safe forced landing cannot be accomplished because the surface is inadequate;
b. the helicopter occupants cannot be adequately protected from the elements;
c. search and rescue response/capability is not provided consistent with anticipated exposure; or
d. there is an unacceptable risk of endangering persons or property on the ground.
2. In any case, the following areas shall be considered hostile:
a. for overwater operations, the open sea areas North of 45N and South of 45S designated by the
authority of the State concerned; and
b. those parts of a congested area without adequate safe forced landing areas.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
Text
Text
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FOP 04.02.01 Two Pilot Operations - Helicopters


1. Conduct flights with a minimum of two pilots when required by the contracting Company.
2. Document in the Operations Manual procedures for:
a. Two pilot operations;
b. Pilot incapacitation;
c. Two “Captain” crew; and
d. Rostering procedures.

1. Two pilots shall be required in helicopters for:
a. IFR operations;
b. Operations into an “Hostile Environment1”;
c. Where the maximum approved passenger seating configuration is more than 9; and
d. When mandated by the regulatory authority.
________________________
1
EASA define Hostile Environment as:
1. An environment in which:
i. a safe forced landing cannot be accomplished because the surface is inadequate;
ii. the helicopter occupants cannot be adequately protected from the elements;
iii. search and rescue response/capability is not provided consistent with anticipated exposure; or
iv. there is an unacceptable risk of endangering persons or property on the ground.
2. In any case, the following areas shall be considered hostile:
i. for overwater operations, the open sea areas North of 45N and South of 45S designated by the
authority of the State concerned; and
ii. those parts of a congested area without adequate safe forced landing areas.
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Two pilot procedures

Wherever two pilots are stipulated as crew, operating procedures should recognise the
importance of the second pilot in their application and ensure that there are adequate
documented instructions for the assumption of command by the non-handling pilot where
appropriate.
Incapacitation
Procedures, including a suitable form of words, must be laid down to ensure positive and
unambiguous assumption of command by the non-handling pilot in the event of failure by the
handling pilot to respond or react to aircraft divergence from required flight path or to air traffic
control instructions. This must be emphasised and exercised by training staff during the training
process.
Two "Captain" Crew

If two captains are rostered as the crew of an aircraft then one must always be nominated as
the aircraft commander.
Rostering
Chief Pilots or Managers must always be aware of the possibility of personality clashes between
pilots when considering the pilot roster. However, this should be minimised, over time, with the
continual application of CRM principals into LOFT training.
The circumstances of two pilots with similar experience being assigned to fly together has
sometimes resulted in a reluctance on the part of the non-handling pilot to criticise the
performance of the handling pilot, despite situations potentially dangerous to the aircraft. These
considerations should be made clear to rostering officers, and the Chief Pilots should monitor
the rosters.
Monitoring of Handling Pilot:

In two-crew aircraft the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) pilot should be fully involved in the operation of
the aircraft and monitor the Pilot Flying (PF) as a matter of course. This aspect of flying duties
should be emphasised by training staff;
Check Lists for Two-Pilot Operations

Check Lists should always be used and the "Challenge and Response" system employed for all
checks.
Distractions during critical phases of flight

It is accepted that some of the paperwork involved in the operation of aircraft has to be
completed in-flight. Nevertheless, the PNF should not neglect flight crew duties during approach
and departure nor should there be any interruption, delay or degradation of his monitoring,
performance and participation in cockpit procedures which could have an impact on safety.
Helicopter crews should also be alert to the hazard of distraction by paperwork with rotors
running on the ground: controls should always be monitored by one pilot and a good lookout
maintained at all times.
Misuse of safety devices

Safety devices such as undercarriage warning horns, GPWS, radar altimeter alerts and low rotor
RPM audio warnings are fitted to alert pilots to errors or omissions, or to warn of hazards which
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might not otherwise be obvious. These devices, either through the limitations of their design or
through malfunction, may at times be intrusive and irritating. Nevertheless, disconnecting such
systems is improper and can result in accidents. Pilots should be clearly instructed not to
disconnect safety devices and this point re-emphasised during initial and recurrent training.
RELATED INCIDENT
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External:
Text
Text
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FOP 04.02.02 Single Pilot Operations


1. Conduct flights with a single pilot only when explicitly approved by the contract holder1.
2. The aircraft shall be certified for single pilot operations.

1. The factors to be considered and mitigated appropriately are:
a. Workload;
b. Weather Conditions;
c. Whether flights are conducted by day or night;
d. Whether flights are conducted under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR);
e. Traffic density;
f. Aircraft equipment (and the interface with approach and en-route aids) whether an
operative approved autopilot system is fitted;
g. Length and nature of intended flights, (maximum offshore is 50 Nm); and
h. Whether flights involve departure or arrival at major control zones.
2. It is common practice for aircraft used for pipeline inspection activities, seismic and helirig
campaigns to be flown single pilot in the interests of increasing the available payload. Such
operations shall be conducted in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC).
3. During single pilot operation, the controls of a helicopter shall never be left unattended
with engines running, or rotors turning. The practice of the pilot vacating the helicopter
before rotors have run down is strictly forbidden.
4. Checklists including emergency procedures shall be immediately available. To ensure
standardisation these checks should be called out and verified by the training captain
against the checklist during base checks.
5. Single Pilots shall be clearly instructed not to disconnect safety devices and this instruction
re-emphasised during initial and recurrent training.
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The requirements for the crew composition are described in FOP 04.02.00.
Safety devices such as undercarriage warning horns, GPWS, radar altimeter alerts and low rotor
RPM audio warnings are fitted to alert pilots to errors or omissions, or to warn of hazards which
might not otherwise be obvious. These devices, either through the limitations of their design or
through malfunction, may at times be intrusive and irritating. Nevertheless, disconnecting such
systems is improper and results each year in a number of accidents.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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FOP 04.02.03 Maximum Flying Hours Limits - Helicopters

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for requirements 1 through 4 :

1. Define the maximum flying hours limit and the process to record, track and prevent
exceedance. This shall be detailed in the Operations Manual (OM) and available to all crew
members and staff concerned with the preparation and day-to-day management of crew
schedules / rosters.
2. Calculate Flying hours on a rolling cumulative basis, based on consecutive days so that a
rolling cumulative total may be established at any time.
3. Prohibit pilots flying from exceeding either:
a. Shell flying hour limits; or
b. National Aviation Authority (NAA) flying hour limits
4. Maintain a daily record of each helicopter pilot's flying hours showing the cumulative totals
for the past periods of 24 hours, 7 days, 28 days, 3x28 days and per year.

1. Shell flying hour limits are:
a. 900 hours maximum per year;
b. 240 hours maximum in any 3 consecutive 28 day period;
c. 80 hours (Helicopters) maximum per 28 days;
d. 42 hours maximum per 7 days;
e. 7 hours maximum for single pilot operations per 24 hours period; and
f. 8 hours maximum for two pilot operations per 24 hour period.
2. Alternative flying hour limits may only be used with the agreement of Shell Aircraft.
3. The requirements for maximum flying hour limits should be based on the rules of the
National Aviation Authority (NAA). Where a difference exists between the maximum flying
hour limits stated above, and those mandated by the NAA the more restrictive limits shall be
used.
4. The maximum flying hours allowed are reduced for a pilot flying highly demanding
operations to 7 hours per day, with a 20 min break every 2 hours or 15 external load
lift/drop cycles, or landings. Such operations include seismic, helirig and long-line external
load operations, high frequency of landings, high ambient temperatures without effective
aircraft air conditioning and shuttling in night or IMC.
5. Pilots wearing immersion suits for continuous flying more than 4½ hours should have a 30
minutes break after 6 hours flying.
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Notes: Rotors running refuel (RRRF) shall not be considered a break. The 30 minutes allowed
for immediate post and pre-flight duties is not considered a break.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
Differences identified in OGP AMG 5.6.3 Maximum Flight Times.
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FOP 04.03 Maximum Flying Duty Periods (FDP) - Helicopter


1. Define the maximum flying duty period and the process to record, track and prevent
2. Implement FDP requirements to ensure that crews are not exposed to cumulative fatigue
while operating for the company.
3. Maintain a daily record of each crew members FDP showing the cumulative totals for the
past periods of 7 days, 14 days and 28.
a. Shell company FDP limits
b. National regulator FDP limits

1. FDP requirements shall include but not be limited to the following:
a. Limit the FDP to 12 hours and this shall be reduced for early morning or evening starts;
b. FDP shall include all flying done by a flight crew member regardless of where and for
whom the flying was conducted;
c. Rest periods shall be a minimum of 12 hours and shall provide at least 10 hours of
effective rest by limiting commuting travel to two hours;
d. Aircrew shall not work more than seven consecutive days between days off and shall
normally have not less than two consecutive days off in 14;
e. Aircrew shall have on average at least eight days off in each consecutive five-week
period averaged over three such periods; and
f. For split duties with less than two hours rest within the FDP no extension shall be
allowed and the following table indicates the maximum extension allowable.
Rest Period Extension Allowed

2 – 3 hours 1 Hour
3 - 10 hours 50% of the consecutive hours rest
shall not include the time for post and pre-flight
duties
> 6 hours suitable accommodation shall be provided
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2. Shell FDP limits are:
Crew 7 DAYS 14 DAYS 28 DAYS

Helicopter Pilot 84 - 200
Cabin Attendant (H) 84 105 210
3. FDP shall be those hours when a crew member is at work and includes time spent on
administrative duties including time spent in travel to a work site while on company payroll
(i.e. repositioning or deadheading).
4. Night Standby Duty;
The company often state a requirement for night stand-by duty and this will require
additional Pilots to be made available to fulfil what is likely to be a very occasional
commitment. The principles to be observed are:
a. The maximum FDP/Flying Hours specified in FOP 04.02.03 Flying Hours Maximum Limits
shall be observed; and
b. If the pilots nominated for night standby duty are not used for such, and achieve the
minimum daily rest period, then they may be considered available for duty on the
following day period. Otherwise, they will be due for 12 hours rest before recommencing
duty. Pilots shall not be rostered for a night duty following a day duty.
In addition to the above limitations, aircrew operating internationally must comply with flight
and duty limitations of the country in which they are operating if so required by that country’s
NAA.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
Text
Text
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FOP 04.04 Guarding of Flight Controls - Helicopters


1. Specify in the Operations Manual(s) that:
a. The controls of a helicopter shall never be left unattended while either the engines are
running or the rotors are turning;
b. During flight, when the aircraft is in a coupled mode, the pilot flying (PF) shall guard
the flight controls at all times when not carrying out other essential tasks; and
c. A pilot shall physically restrict the flight controls when the other pilot leaves or returns
to his seat when the rotors are turning.

1. Engines in the context of these requirements include APUs unless the Flight Manual allows
for the APU to be run unattended.
2. Guarding the controls is defined as having the hands resting in close proximity to, or lightly
on, the cyclic, collective and pedals.
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1. The guarding of flight controls when the auto-pilot is coupled is considered necessary as a
number of helicopter emergencies, or abnormal conditions require a rapid response time to
successfully deal with these events.
RELATED INCIDENT
1. Do the Operations Manual and/or SOPs include a clear policy and procedures on guarding, or
remaining at flight controls during in-flight and ground operations?
Shell:
External:
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FOP 04.05 Night Operations - Helicopters

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for requirements 1 and 2:

1. Conduct flights at night in compliance with Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) procedures using
IFR certified, multi-engine aircraft. For those operations where night can only be conducted
under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), the helicopter shall still be certified and equipped for IFR
flight.
2. Document CRM/Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) pertaining to night operations.

1. Flights flown at night shall be flown using two pilots, type rated on the helicopter type in use
and who hold valid and current instrument and night flying ratings.
2. The training requirements, qualification and experience described in FOP 02.00, FOP02.01,
FOP02.03 and FOP 02.06.00 through to FOP 02.06.07 shall apply.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
TBC
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FOP 04.06 Rotors Running Refuelling (RRRF) - Helicopters


1. Document a procedure that defines Rotors Running Refuelling (RRRF) operations.
2. Conduct and document a risk assessment for gravity refuelling taking into account
procedures for containment of fuel spillage.
3. Document the additional procedures necessary if RRRF is permitted while passengers are
embarking, on board or disembarking.

1. The procedure that defines RRRF shall include the following:
a. RRRF shall only be conducted by persons who are adequately trained;
b. RRRF shall be carried out in accordance with company documented procedures; and
c. Pressure (closed system) refuelling shall be used where such equipment and facilities are
available.
2. The additional procedures necessary for RRRF with passengers embarking, on board or
disembarking shall include the following:
a. Enable safe passenger egress after a spill or fire by positioning at least one qualified
person trained in emergency procedures near the boarding doors;
b. Maintain a secondary exit route clear; and
c. Maintain two-way communication between the ground crew supervising the refuelling
and the qualified personnel on board the aircraft.
3. Gravity refuelling may only be used on aircraft unable to accept pressure refuelling or where
the facility is not available offshore and where local legislation permits. In this case a
‘closed loop’ system, in which fuel vapour is not expelled from the fuelling point is preferred.
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Rotors running refuelling may be authorised for both on and off-shore operations. However,
local management should be aware of the additional risks involved and seek advice from Shell
Aircraft, giving sufficient notice to allow practical assistance to be rendered.
The risks can be minimised by using pressure (closed system) refuelling and following sound
procedures. Gravity refuelling may be used in an emergency, subject to local legislation, but
should be avoided where possible.
During rotors running refuelling on offshore helidecks, an additional fire guard is required,
wearing full fire protection clothing and equipped with a portable foam or dry powder
extinguisher. He should be positioned adjacent to the tank being filled, in readiness to knock
down any fire at the hose end, allowing sufficient time for the refueller to escape to safety, and
installation emergency procedures to be initiated.
Pilots will normally pass information regarding their fuel requirements over the radio prior to
their arrival at an installation. When fuel is required, the refuelling team should position
themselves for prompt deployment of the bonding lead, delivery hose and fire extinguisher(s).
It is vital that should a significant fuel spillage occur, the captain of the aircraft be informed and
requested to shut down the aircraft. Prior to any further operations taking place, the spillage
should be dispersed by hosing down with water. On offshore operations, care should be taken
when hosing down to ensure the aircraft is not sprayed with salt water.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
TBC
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FOP 04.07 Float Arming for Offshore Flights - Helicopters


1. Document in the Operations Manual the requirement for the Emergency Floatation System
to be armed for all offshore over-water departures and arrivals.

The instructions should include guidance on the avoidance of inadvertent deployment of the
flotation system.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
162
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FOP 04.08 Rotor Brake Serviceability for Offshore Operations

- Helicopters


1. Document a requirement that prohibits the helicopter departing without a serviceable rotor
brake for the following flights:
a. From Operating Base to offshore; and
b. Offshore in-field and inter-field.

Direct flights from offshore to the Operating Base are permitted in order to return the helicopter
back to base for rectification.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
TBC
163
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FOP 04.09 Helicopters Based Offshore


1. Apply the normal maintenance requirements, standards and practices for helicopters that
are based offshore.

For guidance on aircraft recovery from offshore, refer to OMA 6.18 “Helideck Aircraft
Maintenance Recovery”.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
Text
Text
162164
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FOP 04.10 Ground Taxi on Offshore Helidecks - Helicopters


1. Prohibit ground taxi on offshore helidecks for normal / routine operations.

1. Any repositioning to clear the tail rotor of the helicopter from access points or to align the
aircraft for passenger/cargo loading or refuelling shall normally be conducted in the hover,
using the aiming circle as a manoeuvre reference and observing any cross wind limitations.
2. In exceptional situations where there is an urgent need to manoeuvre the helicopter to allow
for another aircraft with a need to land, ground taxi may be permitted only if a normal
departure to clear the deck is not possible. In such situations the following requirements
shall be met:
a. There is no helideck landing net fitted;
b. The Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) has been notified;
c. A full stop (full down collective) has been completed; and
d. The crew must conduct a specific briefing that shall include:
i. Actual wind speed and direction;
ii. Cross wind limitations;
iii. Risk of dynamic roll over; and
iv. Obstacle clearance.
3. Ground manoeuvring of aircraft on a vessel or installation with a purpose-designed
helicopter parking area or hangar deck shall be performed in accordance with specific
documented procedures.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
Text
Text
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FOP 04.11 – Aircraft Operations - Helicopter Performance


1. Calculate and operate Helicopter resepecting OEM formal performance criteria, using RFM
data and graphs.
2. Conduct onshore departures and landings for the purpose of carrying passengers in
accordance with Performance Class 1 criteria, unless specific circumstances dictate the use
of Performance Class 2 criteria and only insofar as a 'safe forced landing' can be assured in
the event of a critical power unit loss.
3. Conduct onshore departures and landings for the purpose of carrying passengers in a
hostile or congested area in accordance with Performance Class 1 criteria.
4. Conduct offshore departures and landings in accordance with Performance Class 2
(enhanced) or Performance Class 2 without exposure to deck edge strike.
5. Prohibit performance Class 3 operations for the purpose of carrying passengers. Non-
passenger carrying activities shall not be conducted in a hostile environment.
6. 6. Conduct simulated OEI operations during training in actual aircraft (i.e. not in a
simulator) using Performance Class 1 criteria with restricted operating masses based on
the relevant RFM training RTOM data.

1. Helicopters operating in Performance Class 1 or 2 shall be certificated as Category A.
Helicopters that have been certified according to any of the following standards are
considered to satisfy the Category A criteria. Provided that they have the necessary
performance information scheduled in the AFM, such helicopters are, therefore, eligible for
performance class 1 or 2 operations:
a. certification as Category A under CS-27 or CS-29;
b. certification as Category A under JAR-27 or JAR-29;
c. certification as Category A under FAR Part 29;
d. certification as group A under BCAR Section G; and
e. certification as group A under BCAR-29.
2. In addition to the above, certain helicopters have been certified under FAR Part 27 and in
compliance with FAR Part 29 engine isolation requirements as specified in FAA Advisory
Circular AC 27-1. Helicopters meeting these additional requirements of CS29 are
considered equivalent to Category A.
Some OEMs do not formally use the expression Performance Class 2 (enhanced) or PC2e,
as it derives from European terminology and rule making. Where an RFM contains
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procedures and data to support elevated heliport operations with Category A performance,
or “without exposure” to deck edge strike and a forced landing, these may be considered
to meet PC2e criteria. Where an OEM defines Performance Class 1 procedures for offshore
helidecks they can also be considered as PC2e.
1. Typically, offshore helicopter operations depart and return to heliports and airports that
are relatively close to the coast, and in benign topographical environments. Consequently,
it is not uncommon to note that some operators do not adequately take into consideration
the following elements of performance planning:
• OEI climb gradient compatibility with SIDs, and alternative emergency procedures
to be followed in the event of a critical power unit failure in IMC on an IFR
departure.
• Similarly, OEI clim gradient capability in the event of a missed approach from an
instrument approach to DH/MAPt either with an existing engine shutdown or with a
failure at a critical phase of the missed approach.
• En-route OEI performance with regard to MSA/MEA and any drift-down
considerations required.
2. It is imperative that the correct graphs/data are used when conducting simulated OEI
training in aircraft and that training captains appreciate that there may be very limited
margins associated with critical manoeuvres close to RTOM. Where appropriate, additional
reductions in mass should be considered to increase these margins – see related links
below.
RELATED INCIDENT
Training:
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=137064
http://www.griffin-helicopters.co.uk/accidentdetails.aspx?accidentkey=3378
http://www.griffin-helicopters.co.uk/accidentdetails.aspx?accidentkey=3432
Offshore:
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=145393
Shell:
External:
ICAO Annex 6 Vol III
EASA AMC/GMC to Part CAT
1, 6 & 13OGP / IOGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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FOP 04.12 Use of Offshore Alternates - Helicopters

The Air Operator is Accountable for requirement 1:

1. Meet Shell company requirements when planning to use offshore alternates.
2. Receive authorization from the Shell contract holder 1 for operations and offshore facilities
identified as suitable alternates.
3. Publish procedures in the Operations Manual (OM) approved by the National Aviation
Authority (NAA) and as a minimum the OM shall include the following conditions:
i. Deck availability shall be guaranteed prior to reaching the PNR
ii. A Point of No Return (PNR) shall be calculated and an offshore alternate shall be used
only after passing the PNR. Prior to passing the PNR the following crew actions shall be
completed:
1. Confirm that navigation to the destination and offshore alternate can be assured;
2. Establish Radio contact with the destination and offshore alternate (or master
station);
3. Obtain and confirm the landing forecast at the destination and offshore alternate to
be above the required minima; and
4. Check the one engine inoperative landing requirements to ensure that they can be
met.
iii. One engine inoperative landing capability shall be attainable at both the destination
and alternate;
iv. use by multiple aircraft of the same alternate platforms shall be co-ordinated by the
dispatch authority.
v. Weather minima shall be established taking accuracy and reliability of meteorological
information into account. The area forecast shall indicate that, during a period
commencing one hour before and ending one hour after the expected time of arrival at
the destination and offshore alternate, the weather conditions will be at or above the
VFR weather minima specified.
1
Contract holder shall contact Shell Aircraft for advice.
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1. The reliance on offshore installations as alternates shall be avoided wherever possible and
shall only be acceptable when it is not possible to reach an onshore alternate after flying to
the destination.
2. Any spare payload capacity shall be used to carry additional fuel if it would facilitate the use
of an onshore alternate.
3. To address the event of an engine failure beyond the PNR will require the operator to
establish and document procedures for offshore OEI landings and include these procedures
in initial and recurrent pilot training. Procedures must include calculation and application of
minimum approach speeds based on arrival weight and conditions;
4. Deck availability applies for each proposed helicopter type to be used. In order to guarantee
availability the dimensions, configuration and obstacle clearance of individual helidecks, or
other sites, must be assessed, and the effect of the wind direction and strength, and
turbulence established, in order to establish operational suitability for use as an alternate;
5. To the extent possible the availability of the offshore alternate shall be guaranteed by the
duty holder (the operator in the case of fixed installations and the owner in the case of
mobiles) until landing at the destination, or the offshore alternate, has been achieved (or
until offshore shuttling has been completed). If the offshore alternate is mobile the operator
should determine additional barriers to ensure position accuracy and appropriate deck
movement limits to manage the risk that deck movement shall not be out of limits.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
No Difference – OGP AMG 5.4 Use of offshore alternates
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FOP 05.01 Land Seismic and Heli-rig Operations


1. Conduct all Land seismic and Heli-rig operations in accordance with the requirements
detailed in IOGP Report 420 “Helicopter Guidelines” for Land Seismic and Heli-rig
Operations, subject to the following conditions:
a. Where IOGP Report 420 uses the term “should”, the term “shall” is to be substituted;
and
b. Where reference is made in IOGP Report 420 to the IOGP “Air Management Guide”
(AMG, Report 590), reference instead shall be made to the appropriate section of the
AORs as detailed in the AMC table below.
2. Provide suitable crash equipment at the base camp or staging areas, in addition to
firefighting equipment.

1. The following table details those sections of IOGP 420 that are to be substituted with the
AORs, any queries on the application or interpretation should be directed to the contract
holder:
IOGP 420 Reference Subject AORs Reference
2.1 HSSE MS Requirements SAF 01.00 through SAF
11.00
3.1.1 Flight Crew and Engineer Qualification FOP 02.00, FOP 02.01 & ENG
and Experience requirements. 2.06
3.2.1 Flight Crew Training FOP 02.06.00 through FOP

02.06.07.
5.1.4/ 5.1.6 Helicopter performance and type SGRAO – Business Processes
5.4.1/ 5.4.2 Helicopter Equipment fit FOP 08.00
5.4.4 Minimum Equipment List FOP 01.10
9.3 Flight and Duty times for Flight Crews FOP 04.02.03, FOP 04.03,
FOP 06.06 & FOP 06.07
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2. Crash equipment should be kept in a crash box, suitable for rapid deployment in the vicinity
of the base camp / staging area (carted). Where more than one helicopter is in operation,
this same crash equipment should be available for rapid loading into one of the helicopters,
for transport to a remote crash site. Crash equipment should include:
a. Fireman type axe;
b. Large axe;
c. Heavy duty hacksaw with 4 spare blades;
d. Grab hook with long handle or 30 meters of 10 mm non plastic rope;
e. Harness knife with sheath;
f. Heavy duty crowbar of 1 meter length;
g. 24 inch (61 cm) bolt cutters;
h. 2 Pairs flameproof gloves;
i. 2 Torches (flashlights) with spare batteries;
j. 10 Inch adjustable spanner/wrench;
k. 2 Fire blankets;
l. Wire cutting pliers;
m. 1 set assorted screwdrivers;
n. Straight metal ladder (8 ft. minimum).
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External: IOGP Report 420 – Helicopter Guidelines for Land Seismic & Helirig Operations,
Version 1.1, June 2013
Only differences are tabulated in the AMC’s above.
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FOP 05.02 Specialist Roles – Marine Pilot Transfer -

Helicopters


1. Define the procedures for Marine Pilot Transfer in the Operations Manual (OM) or other
relevant manual and make available to all crew members.
2. Develop and document procedures to verify compliance with those described in the
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) guide, for the helideck, or hoisting area, along
with associated facilities such as manning, fire-fighting and emergency equipment,
passenger handling facilities and procedures, radio equipment, safety systems and
training. Conduct an audit prior to the first transfer and annually thereafter to ensure that
the required standards are maintained.
3. Conduct all marine pilot transfers to a landing area with adequate size and obstacle
clearance for the helicopter being used; if a landing cannot be performed on the vessel,
hoist operations shall be carried out to an approved landing or hoisting area using a
minimum crew of two Pilots and one hoist operator.
4. Conduct all marine pilot transfer hoist operations in accordance with Commercial Air
Transport (CAT) Helicopter Hoist Operations (HHO) requirements with an approval from
the competent authority. Aircraft conducting CAT-HHO shall be capable of sustaining a
critical engine failure with the remaining engine(s) at the appropriate power setting
without hazard to the suspended person(s)/cargo, third parties or property.
5. Provide a minimum standard of competence training to pilots and hoist operators.
6. Provide a full emergency briefing to passengers which shall include the wearing of and use
of survival equipment, in the 24 hours prior to a flight. If the transfer involves hoisting
then the briefing shall also include practice with donning and using the lifting harness, as
well as other hoisting procedures and crew signals.
7. Provide a minimum standard of helicopter and passenger safety and survival equipment
appropriate to the task and environment.
8. Hoists and all associated equipment shall be maintained under a documented maintenance
schedule prescribed in the Operators approved maintenance program.

1. The procedures for Marine Pilot Transfer shall contain as a minimum:
a. Responsibilities of crew members;
b. Equipment standards;
c. Pre-flight responsibilities;
d. Weather limitations;
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e. Communications;
f. Procedures at the hoisting area;
g. Approach and departure procedures; and
h. Emergency procedures.
2. The minimum standard of competence training to pilots and hoist operators shall include the
following:
a. 3 offshore transfers in the preceding 90 days;
b. HUET training from an approved training provider at least every 4 years;
c. A formal initial training course for Pilots and Hoist operators shall be completed and
include at least 50 hoist cycles, of which at least half must be offshore. They shall pass
annual competency checks and retain currency by having completed at least three
offshore transfers within the preceding 90 days or a line check prior to operations to
demonstrate hoisting proficiency; and
d. If night operations are approved, a minimum of 50 hoist cycles conducted offshore, of
which 20 cycles shall be at night if night operations are being conducted offshore, of
which 20 cycles shall be at night if night operations are being conducted, where a hoist
cycle means one down-and-up cycle of the hoist hook.
3. The minimum standard of helicopter and passenger safety equipment shall include:
a. Constant-wear lifejackets;
b. Emergency clothing and equipment as appropriate;
c. Liferaft with rated capacity 50% above the normal maximum number of passengers;
d. Specialist hoisting equipment including at least a helmet for person being deployed /
recovered, dispatcher harness for hoist operator, cable cutters to cut cable in emergency
and a leather glove to tend the hoist cable; and
e. Search lighting/illumination from helicopter for night operations.
4. Procedures and shipboard facilities should meet the standards laid down in the International
Chamber of Shipping (ICS) document entitled “Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations”.
5. The aircraft operator shall have an approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement outlining the
operation, limitations, and emergency procedures of the helicopter and hoist during hoisting
operations.
6. Hoisting to a bridge wing at night shall not be conducted. Hoisting to the bridge wing shall
only be conducted:
a. During daylight;
b. When no other suitably designated/marked landing or hoisting area is available; and
c. After completing a hazard and risk assessment and has been approved by Shell Aircraft,
the ship’s master and helicopter operator.
7. Aircraft Emergency equipment briefing should be completed by displaying a video with the
specifics of the emergency equipment or practice on the ground with the aircraft shut down.
8. Calculation of hover performance should include the following factors:
a. 100% of forecast wind <10 kts shall not be used;
b. 50% of forecast wind speed will be used when more than 10kts; and
c. 80% of reported wind can be used provided an approved and calibrated anemometer is
available.
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RELATED INCIDENT
N/A
Shell:
External:
CAP 437 – Standard for Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas, February 2013.
Guide to Helicopter / Ship Operations, International Chamber of Shipping, Fourth Edition, 2008.
N/A
No notable differences
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FOP 05.03 Specialist Roles – Airborne Geophysical Survey


1. Define the procedures for airborne geophysical survey which shall be detailed in the
Operations Manual (OM) or relevant manual and available to all crew members and staff
involved the preparation and execution of survey missions.
2. Develop and document a risk analysis appropriate for the mission and area of operation.
3. Comply with defined minimum survey speeds.1
4. Roster crews that comply with Shell company requirements in addition to those described
in FOP 02.06.05 and FOP 02.06.06.
5. Comply with Shell company pilot flight and duty time limitations in addition to those
described in "FOP 06.06" and "FOP 06.07".2
6. Document that a minimum fixed fuel reserve of 30 minutes flying time at cruise
consumption rate shall be required for all survey operations. If, during deployment to and
from the survey area a fixed wing aircraft is flown under IFR conditions, a variable reserve
of 10% shall be added to the fixed fuel reserve.
7. Verify that all portable refuelling units with a bladder or drum stock shall be fitted with
Go/No-Go filters. Water detector paste shall be used to test AVGAS from drum stock, and
"Shell Water Detector" capsules used for Jet A-1. Storage control, purity control,
grounding/earthing systems and security of fuel supply shall be documented in fuel
planning procedures;
8. Provide all occupants involved in geophysical flying operations with the appropriate
personal protective equipment.
9. Verify that provisions for Search and Rescue (SAR) during survey operations are properly
coordinated.

1. Minimum survey speeds fixed wing are:
a. 130% of clean stall speed (Vs);
1:
Minimum survey speed shall be observed even after “zoom” climbs and shall be
increased as necessary to account for local conditions such as turbulence and gusty
winds.
2:
In addition to requirement 5, crews operating internationally must comply with
flight and duty limitations of the country in which they are operating if so required by
that country’s aviation regulatory authority.
b. 110% of best single engine rate of climb speed (Vyse, if applicable); and
c. Minimum safe single engine speed (Vsse, if published).
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2. Shell company requirements to roster a crew for airborne geophysical surveys are:
a. Have successfully completed a geophysical training programme;
b. Where applicable have successfully completed a mountain flying course;
c. Have at least flown 300 hours in airborne geophysical operations of which at least 100
hours as a pilot in command or In Command Under Supervision (ICUS) in airborne
geophysical operations;
d. Flown 50 hours command or ICUS on geophysical survey in the contracted aircraft
type; and
e. Completed 10 hours command or ICUS in the contracted aircraft type conducting
geophysical operations within the preceding 90 day or successful completion of a
geophysical line check of at least two hours (excluding ferry time) within the preceding
90 days.
3. Shell company pilot flight and duty time additional limitations for airborne geophysical
surveys are:
a. Single pilot operations:
i. 5 hours per day on actual survey (transit time excluded); and
ii. 34 hours total in any consecutive 7 days (inclusive of transit time).
b. Two pilot operations:

i. 7 hours per day on actual survey (transit time excluded); and
ii. 34 hours total in any consecutive 7 days (inclusive of transit time).
4. The minimum crew for all airborne geophysical surveys should be of a pilot and a
geophysical operator. Single crew operations being the pilot as the sole occupant should
not be permitted unless survey equipment can be operated automatically without
significant inputs from the pilot during flight and this has been assessed and authorized by
SAI. If a Co-Pilot is carried he/she must have successfully completed a geophysical training
programme. Where applicable a mountain flying course shall be included and must
complete the following:
a. 10 hours on low level survey operations;
b. Manipulation of the flight controls at survey height by a co-pilot shall be restricted to
those flights where the aircraft captain is an approved check and training or
supervisory captain.
5. A risk analysis must be provided by the Aircraft Operator prior to the commencement of
any geophysical survey. The analysis must demonstrate satisfactory performance margins
related to the topographical area of operations, discuss minimum speeds and heights to be
used and provide an insight to all perceived areas of risk and should contain but is not
limited to the following:
a. Terrain relief and vegetation;
b. Aircraft type;
c. Aircrew flight and duty times;
d. Prevailing weather conditions;
e. Anticipated density altitude;
f. Pilot experience and recency;
g. Planned flight speed.
6. The International Airborne Geophysics Safety Association (IAGSA) provides a
comprehensive risk assessment tool specifically for geophysical survey purposes, a
satisfactory review using this tool would normally satisfy risk analysis requirements;
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7. Aircraft Operators contracted for geophysical survey flying should be members of IAGSA;
8. All non-standard modifications fitted to the aircraft shall be certified by the relevant
aviation regulatory authority and be acceptable to SAI;
9. The utilisation of a satellite/VHF automatic flight following system overcomes many of the
difficulties and limitations associated with conventional radio communications.
10. Personal protective equipment shall consist of at least:
a. A flying helmet meeting industry safety standards;
b. Non-synthetic or fire blocked/retardant trousers and shirt;
c. Cotton undergarments;
d. Appropriate work boots or shoes;
e. Life jackets and immersion suits depending on water temperatures if flight is outside
safe auto-rotative/gliding distance from land; and
f. A personal emergency locator beacon.
11. Provision SAR during survey operations shall be coordinated according to the following:
a. Radio contact with an appropriate organisation holding Search and Rescue (SAR)
responsibility shall be maintained during the operation;
b. A SAR plan shall be established, and daily SAR briefings shall be given prior to any
flying activity;
c. Where a base camp holding SAR for aircraft on survey is available a radio net shall be
established between the base camp and the aircraft on survey for the duration of the
exercise. Where terrain or geophysical equipment prevents constant radio contact,
provision shall be made for "ops normal" calls every 30 minutes. In the event that
flying a line is greater than 30 minutes in duration the call shall be made at the
completion of each line;
d. Where local flight service holding SAR for aircraft on survey is available, liaison
between the operator and flight service responsible for that area shall include an
outline of the intended area of operations, SAR times, and methods by which position
reports may be given. Details of the ground party supporting the operation, and
methods by which they may be contacted, shall be registered with Flight Service prior
to the operation.
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RELATED INCIDENT
N/A
Shell:
External:
N/A
No notable differences
180
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FOP 05.04 Specialist Roles – Aerial Pipeline Inspections


1. Define the procedures for Aerial Pipeline Inspection to all crew members and staff engaged
in these operations. These shall be detailed in the Operations Manual (OM).
2. Define the minimum crew required for the operation which shall never be less than a pilot
and a trained observer.
3. Assign crews that meet Shell company requirements for Aerial Pipeline Inspections as well
as the general experience and qualification levels as detailed in FOP 02.06.05 and FOP
02.06.06.
4. Develop and document a hazard risk analysis appropriate for the mission and area of
operation prior to commencing the inspection.

1. The procedures for Aerial Pipeline Inspection shall include as a minimum:
a. Cockpit procedures;
b. Crew responsibilities;
c. Sterile cockpit procedures;
d. Weather minima;
e. Procedures for inadvertent entry into cloud;
f. Procedures to perform “unplanned landings 1”;
g. Optimum operating heights;
h. Traffic deconfliction;
i. Use of transponder;
j. Low level operation and Restricted areas; and
k. Flight following.
2. When the observer is not a trained pilot subject to formal aircrew annual safety training and
testing a safety briefing shall be completed prior each flight and shall include the following
as a minimum:
a. Primary responsibility of the crewmember to act as an observer;
b. Crewmember when not occupied with survey duties shall maintain visual surveillance for
hazards and advise the flying pilot accordingly;
c. A map briefing pointing out all known hazards; and
d. The minimum altitude for the flight.
1
The procedures for “unplanned landings” are only applicable to helicopter operations.
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3. Additional Shell company requirements for Aerial Pipeline Inspections are:

a. Have completed successfully a pipeline route check for the route to be flown unless for a
newly established route;
b. Hold a valid instrument rating;
c. Have completed 50 hours in Command patrol survey time in the previous six months;
and
d. Have completed a minimum of 10 hours on the contracted aircraft type conducting
pipeline operations within the preceding 90 days, or has completed successfully a
pipeline line check within the preceding 90 days.
4. Sterile cockpit policy should contain guidance in the following elements;
a. key altitudes/flight phases;
b. Restriction of unnecessary conversation; and
c. Absence of paperwork completion.
5. Procedures following inadvertent entry into cloud should be included in the Operations
Manual and practised during pilots’ base checks.
6. Helicopter Operators shall have a section in the Operations Manual on unplanned landings
that includes guidance on the justification for such a landing, landing site selection,
helicopter performance class, informing base or ATC of the intention to land, and recording
the landing event. Pilot training and line-checking shall include both normal and emergency
procedures for unplanned landings.
7. The aircraft Operator should define the optimum operating height to be maintained during
the mission. Recommended optimum heights are between 500 and 700 feet AGL for
helicopters and 1000 feet for fixed wing aircraft, which is above the majority of military low-
level operations but low enough to conduct a thorough inspection.
8. Transponders shall always be turned on even if operating outside controlled airspace or in
remote areas.
9. For pipeline inspections that require to be flown below normal minimum operating altitudes
and through restricted areas, the aircraft operator shall obtain an exemption from the
regulatory authority to conduct low-level operations.
10. The Aircraft Operator should coordinate with other airspace users using a notification system
if available in the country of operation. As an example in the UK this can achieved through
the Centralised Aviation Data Service (CADS) from BAE systems.
11. The Aircraft Operator shall develop flight following procedures for the pipeline inspections
when the aircraft is flying outside positive primary or secondary recorded radar service.
Radio position reporting should be carried out minimally every 15 minutes. By using HF calls
to base, periodic climbs to a higher altitude to achieve VHF contact or the use of VHF FM to
speak to pumping or service stations along the route. The management of flight following
and overdue procedures is most easily achieved by the use of satellite-based automatic
flight following systems.
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RELATED INCIDENT
4th August 2016 – fatal accident in Louisiana, US. Single pilot in a Schweiser 300.
Shell:
External:
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FOP 6.01 Performance Requirements - Fixed-Wing

Operations


1. Conduct Fixed-Wing operations using Performance Class A (PC A) aircraft.

1. Where PC A aeroplanes are not available, PC B and PC C aeroplanes may be used but only
subject to an assessment of the risk and exposure for a particular operation.
2. Preference should be given to those aircraft types that offer higher margins of power and
performance.
3. Consult contract holder for the classification and assessment of particular aircraft types.
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RELATED INCIDENT
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/2-2001-cessna-404-titan-g-ilgw-3-september-1999
Shell:
External:
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FOP 06.02 Use of Single-Engine Aircraft


1. Prevent the operation of single-engine aircraft over water beyond a distance that would
exceed the gliding distance or autorotation distance from a place to carry out a safe forced
landing on land.
2. Prevent the operation of single-engine aircraft at night or in Instrument Meteorological
Conditions (IMC).

1. Modern single-turbine engine aircraft may be used in preference to twin-piston engine
aircraft provided the following mitigation factors are in place.
a. Day operation in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC);
b. Enhanced training to include action in the event of loss of engine power;
c. Enhanced mandatory equipment fit should include:
i. engine health monitoring;
ii. weather radar;
iii. radio altimeter; and
iv. Terrain Avoidance Warning System (TAWS).
d. Declaration and inspection of suitable landing sites.
e. Risk assessment must be conducted and endorsed by Shell Aircraft.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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FOP 6.03 Fuel Requirements - Fixed-Wing Operations

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for requirement 1.

Define a fuel policy for the purpose of flight planning and in-flight re-planning to ensure that
every flight shall carry sufficient fuel 1 for the planned operations and in addition, reserves to
cover deviations from the planned operations.

1. Fuel requirements for IFR flights shall be the sum of the following;
a. Taxi fuel - The total amount of fuel expected to be used prior to take-off, including
allowances for operation of ice protection systems and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), and
any foreseeable delays prior to take-off;
b. Trip Fuel - Include take-off, climb, cruise descent, approach and landing, taking into
account departure and arrival routings, meteorological conditions, foreseeable air traffic
routings and traffic delays, landing at a suitable aerodrome in the event of loss of cabin
pressurisation or, in the case of multi-engine aircraft, failure of any engine, at the most
critical point during the flight; and any other foreseeable conditions that could delay the
landing of the aircraft;
c. Contingency Fuel - Shall be 5% of the planned trip fuel, but not less than 10 minutes at
normal cruising speed, or, in the event of in-flight re-planning, 5% of the trip fuel for the
remainder of the flight but not less than 10 minutes at normal cruising speed;
Alternate Fuel - Include the missed approach procedure, climb, cruise 2, descent,
approach and landing at the alternate taking into account departure and arrival routings;
d. Final Reserve Fuel - Sufficient to hold for 30 minutes, jet or turbo-jet propeller aircraft,
or 45 minutes propeller aircraft powered by a reciprocating engine, at 1500 ft above
airport elevation in ISA calculated with the estimated landing weights on arrival at the
alternate; and
e. Extra Fuel at the discretion of the Pilot-in-Command.
2. Fuel requirements for VFR flights shall be sufficient for the proposed route plus, additional
fuel based on the rule of the State of the operator, or 10% of the route fuel, whichever is
higher plus, 30 minutes at the cruising speed consumption.
1
Sufficient fuel is in addition to unusable fuel as listed in the aircraft Flight Manual
2
Fuel computations for the leg to the alternate shall be calculated at the low altitude cruise fuel consumption if this is
likely to be the case
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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FOP 06.04 Composition of Flight Crew - Fixed-Wing

Operations


1. Conduct flights for the company with a minimum of two pilots for the following:
a. When operating a propeller 1 driven aircraft less than 5700 Kgs (12500lbs); and
b. When operating a jet and propeller aircraft more than 5700 Kgs (12500lbs).

1. Exceptionally one Pilot may be utilised where certified for single Pilot operations provided
the following risks are assessed as acceptable:
a. Potential for excessive pilot workload;
b. The air traffic environment is suitable for single pilot;
c. Potential for weather conditions to deteriorate below VFR minima;
d. The flight does not consist of multiple sectors or sectors of over 1½ hours in duration.
All cases of proposed single Pilot operations shall be referred to the contract holder 2.
1
Operation of single-engine aircraft at night or in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) is not permitted.
2
In all cases the contract holder shall seek advice from Shell Aircraft.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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FOP 06.05 Maximum Flying Hour Limits – Fixed Wing


1. Define the maximum flying hours limit and the process to record, track and prevent
2. Calculate Flying hours on a rolling cumulative basis, based on consecutive days so that a
rolling cumulative total may be established at any time.
a. Shell company flying hour limits; and
b. National Aviation Authority (NAA) flying hour limits.
4. Maintain a daily record of each fixed wing pilot's flying hours showing the cumulative totals
for the past periods of 24 hours, 7 days, 28 days, and per year.

1. Shell flying hour limits are:
a. 900 hours per year;
b. 100 hours per 28 days;
c. 42 hours maximum per 7 days;
d. 8 hours maximum for single pilot operations per 24 hours period; and
e. 10 hours maximum for two pilot operations per 24 hour period.
2. The requirements for maximum flying hour limits should be based on the rules of the NAA.
Where a difference exists between the maximum flying hour limits Requirements stated
above, and those mandated by the NAA the more restrictive limits shall be used.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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FOP 06.06 Maximum Flying Duty Periods (FDP) – Fixed-Wing


1. Define the maximum flying duty period and the process to record, track and prevent
members and those staff concerned with the preparation and day-to-day management of
crew schedules / rosters.
2. Implement FDP requirements to ensure that crews are not exposed to cumulative fatigue
while operating.
3. Maintain a daily record of each crew members FDP showing the cumulative totals for the
past periods of 7 days, 14 days and 28 days.
a. Shell company FDP limits; or
b. National Aviation Authority (NAA) FDP limits
Pilots 84 hrs 132 hrs 190 hrs

Cabin Attendant (A) 84 hrs 132 hrs 210 hrs

1. FDP requirements shall include but not be limited to the following;
a. Limit the FDP to 14 hours and this shall be reduced for early morning or evening starts;
b. Maximum daily FDP for a single pilot operations shall be 11 hours;
c. FDP shall include all flying done by a flight crew member regardless of where and for
whom the flying was conducted;
d. Rest periods shall be a minimum of 12 hours and shall provide at least 10 hours of
effective rest by limiting commuting travel to two hours;
e. Aircrew shall not work more than seven consecutive days between days off and shall
normally have not less than two consecutive days off in 14;
f. Aircrew shall have on average at least eight days off in each consecutive five-week
period averaged over three such periods; and
g. For split duties with less than two hours rest within the FDP no extension shall be
allowed and the following table indicates the maximum extension allowable.
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Rest Period Extension Allowed
2 – 3 hours 1 Hour
3 - 10 hours 50% of the consecutive hours rest
shall not include the time for post and pre-

flight duties
> 6 hours suitable accommodation shall be provided
2. Shell FDP limits are:

Fixed Wing Pilot 84 132 190
Cabin Attendant (A) 84 132 210
3. FDP shall be those hours when a crew member is at work and includes time spent on
administrative duties including time spent in travel to a work site while on company payroll
(i.e. repositioning or deadheading).
4. Night Standby Duty;
The company sometimes contracts for night stand-by duty and this will require additional
pilots to be made available to fulfil what is likely to be a very occasional commitment. The
principles to be observed are:
a. The maximum FDP/Flying Hours specified in FOP 06.06 Flying Hours Maximum Limits
shall be observed; and
b. If the pilots nominated for night standby duty are not used for such, and achieve the
minimum daily rest period, then they may be considered available for duty on the
following day period. Otherwise, they will be due for 12 hours rest before recommencing
duty. Pilots shall not be rostered for a night duty following a day duty.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
Text
Text
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FOP 07.01 Passenger General Requirements


1. Prohibit the carriage of personnel not on company business in company owned or chartered
aircraft.
2. Prevent boarding of any personnel on an aircraft when under the influence of alcohol or
drugs unless under medical supervision and restraint.
3. Train check-in staff to recognise the signs of substance abuse.
4. Prevent passengers from occupying either the co-pilot’s or jump seat positions, irrespective
of whether the aircraft is fitted with dual controls or not. Exceptionally, where aircraft are
certified for a single pilot operation and prior approval has been granted by Shell Aircraft
the co-pilot’s or jump seat positions may be occupied.
5. Prohibit the use of small (laptop / notebook) portable computers in helicopters.
6. Prohibit smoking in aircraft at all times.

1. Following a prevention to board, the flight manifest must be revised for any changes in
passenger and/or freight details and prior to departure; communicate the changes to a
responsible party with instructions to retain the manifest until the flight is completed.
2. The following conditions shall be met for every flight where a passenger occupies the co-
pilots seat or jump seat:
a. The aircraft commander is satisfied that no safety or security risk is involved;
b. The flight controls are either removed or safeguarded in such a way that the rudder/tail
rotor pedals or the control column/cyclic stick cannot inadvertently be knocked by the
passenger occupying the co-Pilot’s seat;
c. A separate briefing covering any items that may differ from the standard passenger
briefing is given. In particular, the passenger’s attention is to be drawn to the use of
Crew emergency exits, the hazards of interfering with the controls, and specific
reference should be made to any switches or controls that may be vulnerable to
interference.
d. In emergency situations, the co-pilot's or jump seat positions may be occupied by a
passenger at the aircraft commanders discretion, however, these conditions should still
be met.
3. Passengers may use non-transmitting small (laptop/notebook) PED in fixed wing aircraft if
agreed by the flight crew. Such devices are used in offline 'flight mode', switched off during
take-off and landing and securely stowed when not in use.
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4. The use of certain smaller portable electronic devices may be allowed when flying
helicopters subject to the following conditions:
• The device must be small enough as to allow storage in a passenger clothing pocket.
• The device must be off and secured in a clothing pocket during helicopter safety video
briefings, both on and offshore, and transiting to and from the aircraft at the heliport
and offshore helideck.
• The device must be capable of airplane mode and it shall be shut off and secured in a
clothing pocket or stowed in a seat pocket during ground taxi, takeoffs and landings and
in turbulent flight conditions where flight crew will direct passengers to shut off and
secure the PED.
• Use of these devices will only be permitted during cruise flight conditions and must be
secured at all times.
• Use of wired in-ear headphones is authorised in line with the use of PEDs (only worn
when PED use is authorised). Use of Bluetooth/wireless headphones is prohibited. The
complete set of headphone cables shall be secured in a clothing pocket at all timesthat
the PED also needs to be secured. Assure that cabin emergency PA announcement can
still be heard when using headphones.
5. Smoking includes the use of battery-powered portable electronic smoking devices (e.g. e-
cigarettes, e-cigs, e-cigars, e-pipes, personal vaporizers, electronic nicotine delivery
systems).
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013: Section 9.12 States No passenger should
occupy any aircraft seat where flight controls are installed, unless the passenger is thoroughly
briefed regarding precautions against inadvertent movement of the flight controls, use of crew
emergency exits, and specific reference should be made to any switches or controls that may be
vulnerable to interference.
Aeroplanes
If readily removable, the flight controls should be removed from pilot stations when occupied by
passengers.
Helicopters
No passenger should occupy the front seat of any helicopter, unless the conditions below are
met:
• the cyclic and collective sticks have been removed from that seat position; and
• the pedals have either been disconnected or blocked to prevent inadvertent control input;
and
• the passenger is thoroughly briefed regarding precautions against inadvertent movement of
the flight controls in the pilot’s position.
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FOP 07.02 Cargo and Luggage


1. Weigh and manifest all cargo and document each item separately.
2. Verify the contents of each piece of cargo by inspection of the manifest or cargo.
3. Prohibit the use of polythene bags as baggage containers.
4. Train and authorise personnel to secure and remove cargo and baggage.
5. Carry all checked-in luggage and cargo in the aircraft baggage hold; for those aircraft
without a baggage hold or if the cargo exceeds the baggage hold capacity, separate
conditions apply.
6. Prohibit carry-on luggage in helicopters.
7. Stow all carry-on luggage in fixed-wing aircraft allowing clear access to emergency exits.
8. Carry dangerous goods in accordance with ICAO Annex 18 "Safe Transport of Dangerous
Goods by Air" or IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations 1.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for requirements 1 through 8:

1. The procedures for the calculation of passenger and baggage weights are documented in the
appropriate Company manual.
2. The policy on the carriage of company restricted items are documented and communicated
to check in staff and passengers.
3. If Shell approval is given for checked in luggage and cargo to be carried in the passenger
compartment, it must be adequately secured using approved cargo nets, or tie-down straps,
and not obstruct normal or emergency exits. All exits, including push out windows must
remain available for use by passengers.
4. Dangerous goods may only be carried by air providing the operator has obtained the written
permission, approval or an exemption from the National Civil Aviation Authority
5. The procedures for all aspects of transporting dangerous goods shall be documented in the
relevant Company manual.
6. A Notice to Captain (NOTOC) shall be issued whenever dangerous goods or other special
load items are to be carried on aircraft.
1
Specific National Aviation Authority (NAA) regulations may also apply.
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Certain materials are forbidden or highly restricted due to their corrosive properties if allowed to
contaminate aircraft structures, and these materials (e.g. mercury) may not immediately strike
the consignor as a potential danger. It is therefore stressed that the appropriate personnel
should be adequately trained in the recognition and handling of all dangerous goods. Shell
Aircraft will be able to assist in the case of a planned requirement, but there is no substitute for
on-site vigilance by appropriately trained personnel of the right calibre.
Note: It is the responsibility of the consignor to declare the presence of the Dangerous Goods to
the aircraft operator.
Passengers, checking-in for flights should be shown the list of prohibited items. They should be
asked to declare any prescription medicines they may be carrying and make a verbal statement
to the effect that they are not knowingly carrying such articles in their baggage or on their
person. Where possible, authorised security staff should then carry out a thorough search of
personal baggage in the presence of the passenger, before moving it to the loading area. Body
searches should be made when the flight is called for boarding and prior to the issue of
immersion suits (offshore flights).
List of items prohibited for carriage on aircraft or to offshore installations, which should be
shown to each passenger:
Adhesives;
Aerosols;
Alcohol of any kind (offshore flights);
Canned drinks of any kind;
Cigarette lighters;
Drugs (save on prescription) See Note 1;
Explosives, fireworks;
Firearms/Ammunition;
Flammable gas or liquid, Tear Gas, CS Gas;
Magnetic materials;
Matches of any kind (offshore flights);
Oils and greases;
Paints and solvents;
Poisons, weed killers, pesticides and insecticides;
Radio-active materials;
Radio, cassette and disc players, unless batteries are removed;
Weapons - including knives with a blade longer than 3" See Note 2;
Wet Batteries;
Wet Fish.
Note 1: Prescription drugs may have to be surrendered at check-in for safe-hand carriage,
record and re-issue on installation; with a similar procedure for passengers returning onshore.
Note 2: Knives which are tools of trade (e.g. chefs and divers) must be declared at check-in,
and are not to be carried in hand carried bags on the aircraft.
RELATED INCIDENT
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Shell:
External:
Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 9.2.1 does not specify the requirement for
documented procedures for the calculation of passenger and baggage.
Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 - 9.2.2 does not require company approval for
carriage of cargo in passenger compartment.
Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 - 9.2.2 does not require policy on the carriage
of company restricted items.
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FOP 07.03 Manifests


1. Raise and complete passenger manifests for each flight.
2. Verify actual passenger names against the manifest.
3. Revise the manifest for any changes in passenger and/or freight details prior to departure.
4. In the event a manifest changes, the aircraft commander shall communicate the changes to
a responsible party with instructions to retain the manifest until the flight is completed.

1. A passenger manifest shall record as a minimum:
a. Aircraft registration;
b. Flight number;
c. Date of Flight;
d. Destination;
e. Passenger name;
f. Company affiliation;
g. Passenger actual weight 1;
h. Baggage weight of each passenger 2;
i. Weight of any freight; and
j. Any additional National Aviation Authority (NAA) requirements.
2. Manifests should be closed for changes with enough time for the crew to complete accurate
performance and centre of gravity calculations.
3. Pilots and/or designated personnel shall check the actual passenger names versus the pre-
planned listing of personnel to be transported to verify only authorised passengers are
carried.
4. In exceptional circumstances, where scales are not available, passenger declared weights
may be used. Both the Business Unit and the Air Operator shall be aware of the increased
risk during these operations and take mitigating actions as required.
5. Manifests shall be signed by a crew member.
6. The Minimum copies required should be three:
a. One to be filed and left at point of departure;
1
Where standard weights can be used this requirement is met with providing a breakdown of Males / Females and
Children.
2
Where standard weights can be used this requirement is met with providing the number of bags.
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b. One for crew in-flight reference; and

c. One to be left at destination.
RELATED INCIDENT
TBC
Shell:
External:
TBC
Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 9.3 – no significant difference.
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FOP 07.04 Passenger Weights and Size


1. Use actual weight values (including hand carried baggage and personal belongings) for
aeroplane and helicopters having a seating capacity of 19 or fewer seats.
2. Document control procedures for the use of standard masses on fixed wing aircraft and
helicopters having a maximum seating capacity of 20 or above.
3. Prohibit the carriage of passengers who are unable to pass through the exit window
template while dressed in the necessary flight equipment (survival suits, lifejacket etc.).
4. Prohibit the use of seat harnesses/seat belt extensions, unless certified by the aircraft
manufacturer.

1. Passenger weighing is conducted using calibrated scales, immediately prior to boarding, at
check-in.
2. All checked baggage are manifested at actual weight.
3. The following standard weights may be used when preparing a manifest, if authorised by the
National Aviation Authority (NAA):
a. Males 98kg (216lbs) Female 80kg (176lbs);
b. Hand baggage carried in the passenger cabin of fixed wing aircraft either as actual weight
or as 6kg per passenger;
c. The weight of survival suits as actual weight or as 7kg per passenger; and
d. The weight of lifejacket as actual weight or as 3Kg per passenger 1 .
4. When standard passenger weights are used, actual passenger weights shall be surveyed
routinely to check that the use of standard weights provides a safety margin over actual
weights. If a survey shows a lack of a safety margin, thenceforth, either actual weights are
used, or a realistic factor shall be applied to the standard weight.
5. Passenger check in facilities are to have available window templates, representative of the
actual push out windows of the contracted helicopter type in use, and these are to be
applied to any passenger assessed as being close to, or over the size of the available exit.
Some types may require a range of templates that will determine specific seat rows for a
particular passenger 2
6. Failure to pass through the template, when dressed in flight equipment (survival suits,
lifejacket etc) will result in the passenger being refused to fly 3
1
May not be required if included in the aircraft dry operating weight as aircraft equipment.
2
Where the National Aviation Authority (NAA) imposes different or additional requirements these take precedent.
3
Providing this does not contravene National law.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
IOGP Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013

9.4.1 Aeroplanes under 5700 kg & all Helicopters
For aeroplanes with a maximum gross takeoff weight (MGTOW) less than 5700kg, and all
helicopters regardless of MGTOW, actual body weights (including hand carried baggage) should
be used.
9.4.2 Aeroplanes over 5700kg at the discretion of the company and operator (if authorised to
do so by appropriate CAA), standard weights based on seasonal averages may be used when
preparing a manifest for aeroplanes having a maximum gross takeoff weight in excess of
5700kg.
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FOP 07.05 Passenger Briefings


1. Brief passengers on emergency procedures and other safety matters prior to flight, in the
language(s) appropriate to the passengers and crew.
2. Provide passenger briefings that comply with the requirements of the National Aviation
Authority (NAA) and the Company.
3. Use multi-language safety briefing cards with graphics and international symbols to convey
key information about safety equipment and emergency procedures to all passengers.

1. A passenger briefing shall include:
a. The danger areas of jet engines, turning propellers and helicopter main and tail rotors
as applicable;
b. Procedures for boarding and exiting the aircraft, including location and operation of
doors and emergency exits;
c. No smoking in or around the aircraft and apron area; location of non-smoking signs;
d. Location and use of seatbelts, including shoulder harnesses when fitted, and an
instruction that they shall be worn during landing and takeoff in fixed wing aircraft and
at all times in helicopters; location of fasten seat belt signs;
e. Proper stowage of any hand carried item;
f. Use of personal electronic devices (laptops, mobile phones etc.);
g. Passengers to remain seated until the crew tells them to disembark;
h. The location and use of oxygen masks, if applicable;
i. Location of emergency and lifesaving equipment such as fire extinguishers, first aid kit,
life vests, life rafts, survival gear and Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs) and
Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) if fitted;
j. Sterile cockpit procedures and means of communication between crew and passengers
in the event of an emergency;
k. Actions in the event of an emergency;
l. Brace position for emergency landing;
m. An instruction not to inflate life vests until outside the aircraft; and
n. Location of and instruction to read the briefing card.
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2. The following additional items shall be briefed for helicopter flight:

a. No disembarkation until instructed by the Pilot, Helideck Landing Officer (HLO) (or
Helideck Attendant), or other designated personnel;
b. Never approach a helicopter from the rear. Do not proceed any further aft of the
baggage compartment door than is necessary for the retrieval of baggage or freight;
c. Always approach and leave the helicopter from the side, within view of the Pilot or
Crew member;
d. Hand carry hats, glasses, and caps to prevent them from being blown away by the
main rotor wash;
e. Long objects over 1 metre shall be carried flat to avoid contacting the main rotor blade;
f. Under no circumstances shall passengers leave or approach a helicopter on the up-
slope (high) side when the aircraft is on sloping ground;
g. Under no circumstances shall personnel disembark from or approach a helicopter
during start-up or shutdown;
h. Only small, soft items such as a paperback book shall be carried inside the passenger
cabin of helicopters; hard-cased items that could be missile hazards or loose items that
could be blown away shall not be carried; and
i. Where applicable to wide body helicopters (1.8 metre cabin width or greater) the
method of egress in event of a roll-over accident by use of the under seat frame of the
transverse cabin seats as a ladder for egress should be included in the passenger
briefing.
3. The following additional items shall be briefed for offshore helicopter flights:
a. Use of survival suit, hoods, gloves and emergency breathing system (where
applicable);
b. If survival suits are worn, the need to have suits fully zipped with hood on (if equipped
with integral hood) during take-off and landing over water, when flying below 500 feet
over water and other times as advised by the Pilot-In-Command;
c. In the event of an emergency landing on the water, do not evacuate the helicopter until
the rotor has stopped, unless instructed otherwise by the Pilot in Command;
d. Location of emergency equipment such as life rafts, jettison procedures for the
emergency exits and pop out windows, and the deployment of life rafts outside the
helicopter;
e. The proper use of reference points for orientation during the event of a rollover
ditching;
f. Carriage of loose articles in the aircraft that could present Foreign Object Damage
(FOD) risk or impede egress in the event of ditching;
4. Passengers shall be provided with hearing protection and be instructed on its use.
5. The validity of the aircraft safety briefing is 24 hours, assuming that the type of aircraft
utilised remains the same type as originally briefed.
6. Where a video briefing has been provided by other than the Crew of the aircraft, the
passenger manifest is signed to certify that passengers have received the appropriate
briefing.
7. Where the briefing is conducted in the language not understood by the passengers means
of translation (translator, multi-language instructions/video, subtitle, etc.) are made
available.
8. If passenger transfer involves non-emergency winching/hoisting the passenger must be
briefed prior to each flight, on the ground, without time pressure. The briefing must cover
emergencies including the wearing of and use of survival equipment, winching/hoisting
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procedures and crew signals and must include practising donning and using the lifting
strop.
Briefings covering the use of survival suits when combined with the aircraft safety briefings
must not be so long that passengers lose concentration. Pre-flight video briefings must have
appropriate focus and balance of the content.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
IOGP Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 – 9.5 Passenger briefings: no
significant difference except:
9.5.5 Passengers who have completed helicopter underwater escape training (HUET) should
sit adjacent to exits and, if possible, assist non-HUET trained passengers in the event of a
ditching.
9.5.6 Additional float plane briefing items
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FOP 07.06 Passenger Marshalling Areas


1. Designate a secure waiting areas for aircraft passengers for long term dedicated
operations;
2. Display written and graphic material relative to aircraft safety and localized procedures in
designated passenger waiting areas; and
3. Designate clearly defined holding areas for both incoming and outgoing passengers and
freight.

1. The designated passenger waiting area may serve as a viewing room for video safety
briefings and provide an area to weigh and manifest all outgoing passengers, baggage and
freight on calibrated scales;
2. Designated secure passenger waiting area for short term operations should also be
considered; and
3. Passengers leaving the secured holding area undergo security screening again prior to re-
entering the holding area.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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FOP 08.00 Aircraft Equipment Standards


1. Comply with the minimum equipment required for helicopters listed in table 1A.
2. In addition to requirement 1, comply with the minimum equipment required for helicopters
listed in table 1B as described for the particular role.
3. In addition to requirement 1 and 2, comply with the minimum equipment required for
helicopters listed in table 1C as they apply to the particular helicopter type.
4. Comply with the minimum equipment required for fixed wing listed in table 2.

1. Table 1A - the minimum equipment required for helicopters:
Table 1A – MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR HELICOPTERS
Total flight
Total flight exposure
exposure to an
to an operator for
operator for single
single or combined
or combined Shell
APPROVED TYPES: Refer to Approved Aircraft Shell OUs
OUs
List
100hrs or more per

Less than 100hrs
year
per year
AVIONICS
Dual Pilot Controls and instrument panels GR (1) GR (1)
Gyro compass/stabilised direction indicator with

FAIL indicator and standby compass GR GR
OAT indicator GR GR
Clock GR GR
Altimeters (2) GR (1) GR (1)
Airspeed Indicators (2) GR (1) GR (1)
Pitot Heater GR GR
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Vertical Speed Indicators (2) GR (1) GR (1)
Caution warning system GR GR
Twin VOR/ILS & DME (IFR/Night ops) GR GR
VHF Homer for SAR or secondary SAR role GR GR
Transponder and Mode S
(Mode C acceptable for non TCAS II equipped

aircraft) (ADS-B compatible equipment required
when ADS-B available in area) GR GR
Radar Altimeter GR GR
TAWS (Terrain Awareness Warning System) GR (2)(3) R
ACAS (Airborne Collision Avoidance System).
TCAS II when available for aircraft type. (May

be exempt by risk assessment for low traffic
areas. Contact SAL) GR GR
GPS (IFR approved TSOC145a/146a or C129) GR(4) GR(4)
WX Radar (IFR and offshore operations) GR GR
Auto stabilisation GR GR
Auto-Pilot (IFR Ops) GR GR
COMMUNICATIONS AND FLIGHT TRACKING

Twin VHF Airband (Note 2) GR GR
As required for As required for

VHF FM tasking tasking

HF tasking tasking
ELT (with min. TSO C126 standard)/ADELT for

UK in crashworthy position GR GR
Crew EPIRB GR R
Satellite communication integrated with As required for As required for

headset. May be combined with flight tracking. tasking tasking
Satellite flight tracking system GR (5) R
MONITORING SYSTEMS
CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder) and FDR (Flight
Data Recorder) or CVFDR, when available for
aircraft type. GR R
FDM (Flight Data Monitoring) when available for

aircraft type. GR R
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HUMS (Health and Usage Monitoring System) GR R
AIRFRAME & CABIN

Single Action Mechanism for Door Jettison GR GR
Push Out Windows adjacent to all seats
(One window per 2 seats for offshore) GR GR
High Back Passenger Seats plus 4 point

Harnesses(UTR) (stressed to correct 'g' spec) GR R
HISL (High Intensity Strobe Lights) (May be

exempt by risk assessment for low traffic areas) GR R
PA System (Elec. Speaker or Headset for all

pax) GR GR
Survival Kit/First Aid Kits appropriate to region GR GR
Emergency cabin and exit lighting GR GR
Crew oxygen for ops above 10,000' GR GR
Cargo compartment securing system GR GR
Stretcher securing points and drip hanging As required for As required for
points for SAR and secondary SAR role tasking tasking

Hoist when required by role tasking tasking

External Cargo Hook when required by role. tasking tasking
Passenger briefing cards (To include location of

first aid and fire extinguishers and brace
position) GR GR
Cockpit and cabin air conditioning when

required by ambient temperatures GR GR
Anti icing modifications applicable to aircraft

type and operating temperatures. GR GR
KEY: GR= Group Requirement R= Recommended
Notes:
1.1 Dispensation may be given by the contract holder for specific single pilot day VFR
only operations. Contract holder to contact Shell Aircraft for advice.
1.2 Dispensation may be given by the contract holder for low altitude operations such
as pipeline surveillance or seismic support, until the TAWS equipment is available
and optimised for the relevant flight altitude. When the contract includes significant
positioning flights, TAWS is required, but may be muted or turned off for the low
level operations. Contract holder to contact Shell Aircraft for advice.
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1.3 Dispensation may be given by the contract holder for TAWS if the aircraft is
equipped with AVAD and is flown offshore with no significant overland flight.
Contract holder to contact Shell Aircraft for advice.
1.4 Dispensation may be given by the contract holder for VFR approved GPS for specific
day VFR only operations. Contract holder to contact Shell Aircraft for advice.
1.5 Satellite flight tracking is not required if the helicopter is maintained under positive
ATC control (primary or secondary radar) throughout the flight.
2. Table 1B = the minimum equipment required for helicopters as described for the particular
role.
Table 1b – ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR HELICOPTER ROLE

Total flight
exposure to an
APPROVED TYPES: Refer to Approved Aircraft to an operator for
operator for single
List single or combined
or combined Shell
Shell OUs
OUs
100hrs or more per Less than 100hrs

year per year
OFFSHORE
Beacon – Underwater Locator transmitter (e.g.
Dukane or integral with CVR) GR R
HEELS (Helicopter Emergency Egress Lighting

System) or equivalent GR GR
Liferafts (reversible) Minimum of 2, with

minimum of 1 externally mounted GR GR
Auto deployable flotation gear for medium and

heavy aircraft. Light helicopters may have cyclic
mounted manual deployment. Additional
external deployment mechanism required on all
types. GR GR
ONSHORE
Airframe mounted wire cutter for low level ops R R
Jungle escape rope, where relevant to terrain

and tree canopy GR GR
Skid shoes/bear paws where required by terrain GR GR
VERTICAL REFERENCE & LONG LINE OPERATIONS

Crew Helmets with visor GR GR
Cargo hook mirror or camera GR GR
Cockpit manual and electrical cargo hook

release and external release. GR GR
Bubble door window or floor panel to view load. GR GR
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Remote door or floor mounted gauges (To

include master caution, TQ and load meter) GR GR
Kodiak Flight Tracking System for land seismic

ops GR GR
PIPELINE SURVEILANCE
High visibility paint scheme R R

3. Table 1C - the minimum equipment required for helicopters as they apply to the particular
helicopter type.
Table 1C – ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY HELICOPTER TYPE

APPROVED TYPES:
APPROVED TYPES: Refer to Approved Aircraft to an operator for
Refer to Approved
List single or combined
Aircraft List
Shell OUs
SUPER PUMA AS332L SERIES

Enlarged rear passenger windows GR GR
Orientation bar under rear 3 seats GR GR
EUROCOPTER EC225 SERIES

Crashworthy (20g) cabin floor GR GR
SIKORSKY S76 SERIES

Enlarged rear opera windows and push out front
row windows. GR GR
Single action mechanism for door jettison GR GR
Glass cockpit windscreens GR GR
Throttle quadrant Mod – ASB 76-76-6 GR GR
PIPELINE SURVEILANCE
MGB Mods (refer to SAL) GR GR
Jettisonable windows within the 4 cabin

emergency exits – Sikorsky option No. 77005 GR GR
Crashworthy (20g) cabin floor GR GR
Passenger seat headrests GR GR
4 point passenger seat belts (Individual not loop

type) GR GR
3 or 5 bag flotation system, appropriate to

operating area. (3 bag tropical/non hostile only) GR GR
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4. Table 2 - the minimum equipment required for fixed wing
Table 2 – MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR FIXED WING AIRCRAFT

APPROVED TYPES: Refer to Approved Aircraft Total flight exposure APPROVED TYPES:
List to an operator for Refer to Approved
single or combined Aircraft List
Shell OUs
AVIONICS
Dual Pilot Controls and dual IFR instrument
panels GR (1) GR (1)
Twin VOR/ILS & DME GR GR
Transponder and Mode S
(Mode C acceptable for non TCAS II equipped

aircraft) (ADS-B compatible equipment required
when ADS-B available in area) GR GR
GPS GR GR
Radar Altimeter GR GR
TAWS (Terrain Awareness Warning System) GR (2) R
ACAS (Airborne Collision Avoidance System).
TCAS II when available for existing aircraft type

and required on new contract aircraft. (May be
exempt by risk assessment for low traffic areas.
Contact SAL) GR GR
WX Radar GR (1) GR (1)
Auto - Pilot GR (3) GR
Pitot heater failure indication warning GR R
COMMUNICATIONS AND FLIGHT TRACKING

Twin VHF Airband GR GR

VHF FM tasking tasking

HF tasking tasking
ELT (with min. TSO C126 standard) GR GR
Satellite communication integrated with As required for As required for

headset. May be combined with flight tracking. tasking tasking
Satellite flight tracking system GR (4) R (4)
MONITORING SYSTEMS
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CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder) and FDR (Flight

Data Recorder) or CVFDR when available for
aircraft type. GR R
FDM (Flight Data Monitoring) When available for

aircraft type. GR R
Engine monitoring system GR R
AIRFRAME & CABIN

Crew Headsets GR GR
Crew helmets with visors for all geophysical

survey operations GR GR
PA System GR GR
Survival Kit/First Aid Kits appropriate to region GR GR
Emergency cabin and exit lighting GR GR
Crew oxygen for ops above 10,000' GR GR
Passenger therapeutic oxygen available if

aircraft operating above 10,000’ GR R
Automated External Defribrillator (AED) R R
90 Deg opening passenger seat buckles R R
Side facing seats fitted with shoulder harness GR GR
Passenger briefing cards (To include location of

first aid and fire extinguishers and brace
position) GR GR
Life jackets for over water flight GR GR
Liferafts for over water flights GR GR
Anti-icing modifications applicable to aircraft

type and operating temperatures. GR GR
High visibility paint scheme for pipeline

surveillance and other low level activity. GR R
Laptop Fire Proof R R
Notes:
4.1 Dispensation may be given by the contract holder for specific single pilot day VFR
only operations. Contract holder to contact Shell Aircraft for advice.
4.2 Dispensation may be given by the contract holder for low altitude operations such
as pipeline surveillance or seismic support, until the TAWS equipment is available
and optimised for the relevant flight altitude. When the contract includes significant
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positioning flights, TAWS is required, but may be muted or turned off for the low
level operations. Contract holder to contact Shell Aircraft for advice.
4.3 Autopilots are "Recommended" for Viking De-Havilland Canada Twin Otter DHC-6
series and Beechcraft 1900 series aircraft, operating less than 200 hours per year.
However, the aircraft shall be operated by two pilots at all times. Contract holder to
contact Shell Aircraft for advice.
4.4 Satellite flight tracking is not required if the aircraft is maintained under positive
ATC control (primary or secondary radar) throughout the flight.
4.5 Where ad-hoc aircraft are brought onto the operation for short term use, e.g. to
replace temporarily unserviceable contract aircraft or to meet short term surge
requirements, they shall meet the full contract aircraft equipment requirements.
5. Where ad-hoc aircraft are brought onto the operation for short term use, e.g. to replace
temporarily unserviceable contract aircraft or to meet short term surge requirements, they
shall meet the full contract aircraft equipment requirements.
6. Details on the equipment listed in Table 1 & 2 and the rationale for its use is provided in
the following paragraphs:
a. Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT), with a satellite (406 MHz) signal transmission -
In some areas, such as offshore UK, an automatic deployment capability (ADELT) is
mandatory. ELTs should be located in an area where they can easily be deployed or
alternatively best protected in the case of an accident, e.g. dinghy packs and crew
lifejackets. If automatically deployed, features should include crash switches, immersion
switches, and the unit should be buoyant. If portable, they should have integral and
self-deployable aerials;
b. Underwater Location Beacons - Standard contract aircraft engaged on overwater flights
of more than 10 minutes’ duration from the shore shall be fitted with an underwater
locating beacon, this is also recommended for Ad hoc/Call off contracts. The aircraft
operator shall have reasonable access to receiving equipment and that this equipment
may be quickly dispatched to the accident site;
c. Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR) - CVR shall be fitted to all standard contract aircraft
certificated with a seating capacity of 10 seats or more. It is recommended for Ad hoc /
Call off contracted aircraft for which proven systems are available and should have a
minimum recording time of 2 hours;
d. Flight Data Recorders (FDR) - FDR shall be fitted to all standard contract aircraft
certificated with a seating capacity of 10 seats or more for which proven systems are
available. It is recommended for Ad hoc / Call off contracted aircraft. An underwater
location device shall be associated with the FDR;
e. High Intensity Strobe Lights (HISL) - HISL shall be fitted where low level VFR flying
takes place in and around built-up areas, and in medium and high traffic density areas
with poor ATC coordination. Restrictions shall be placed on their use on the ground;
f. Terrain Awareness Warning Systems (TAWS) - TAWS/GPWS shall be fitted to all
standard contract FW aircraft and helicopters for which proven systems are available. A
terrain awareness warning system shall provide, as a minimum, warnings of at least the
following circumstances:
• Excessive descent rate;
• Excessive altitude loss after take-off or go-around; and
• Unsafe terrain clearance.
Operators shall have a process to ensure that the database for terrain awareness
warning systems with predictive terrain hazard warning is kept current and pilots are
trained in use of the system. Clear instructions and procedural guidance for crews on
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their response to the various GPWS alerts shall be laid down in Operations Manuals
and/or Standing Operating Procedures.
For aircraft for which a proven system is not available, or for Ad Hoc/Call off contracts, a
radar altimeter, fitted with Automatic Voice Alerting, is an acceptable alternative
although risk analysis of particular operating areas may determine the need for GPWS.
g. Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) - An airborne collision avoidance system

shall be fitted to all sole use Shell contracts where modifications are available for the
type. For Ad hoc / Call off contracts an appropriate risk analysis shall be required to
determine the need for ACAS. When available for the aircraft type ACAS ll shall be the
minimum standard;
h. Passenger seats and seatbelts - Passenger seats shall be of a type approved by the
aircraft manufacturer and adequately secured to the aircraft structure, for each person
carried. The only exception is for actual emergency operations to save life (not practice
exercises) if the aircraft has the performance to carry more people than it has seats. All
aircraft shall be equipped with:
• A safety belt, having a metal-to-metal latching device, for each passenger (other
than infants) to a standard approved by the regulatory authority, which must be
fastened at all times when required by regulation or crew instructions;
• A shoulder harness on the forward side for each flight deck seat, sideways facing
seat and cabin crew member seat;
• A safety belt approved by the regulatory authority with a metal-to-metal latching
device and release lever with 90° of movement to unfasten, for each seat. The
practice of rotating buckles through 180° to prevent inadvertent release is
forbidden since it can inhibit release in the event of an emergency;
• An Upper Torso Restraint (UTR) 4-point harness for helicopter seats, if available for
the type, consisting of 4 straps; loop type straps present a snagging hazard and are
not to be used; and
• High visibility yellow and black markings on the seat support structures of
helicopters of 1.8 metre cabin width or greater (if allowed by the regulatory
authority and the aircraft manufacturer) to make them easier to use in exiting
during a rollover accident.
i. Survival kit - A survival kit, suitable for the area of operation, shall be carried on flights,
which are planned to over-fly hostile terrain, including offshore operations;
j. Hand held microphones - All aircraft shall be equipped with headsets and control column
mounted transmission switches for use during critical phases of flight. Hand held
microphones may be used during the cruise phase provided adequate radio monitoring
is maintained;
k. Materials used in upholstery and internal trim - Aircraft contracted to Shell Group
Companies shall embody only approved fire-blocking materials for all upholstery and
internal trim in their construction;
l. First aid kits - Suitable and comprehensive first aid kits for the area of operation shall
be carried on all aircraft. The kits shall be serviced as part of the aircraft role
equipment, ideally every 6 months, but not exceeding one year. Use of the kit shall be
reported through the normal defect reporting systems so that used items may be
replenished prior to the next flight;
m. Liferafts - Helicopters operating over water shall be fitted with at least two life rafts with
a total normal capacity, and an overload capacity based on loss of the largest raft,
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sufficient for all people carried. Both life rafts shall be of the reversible or self-righting
type;
Helicopters operating over water shall have at least one of the life rafts externally
mounted. Primary deployment of this life raft should be by a single action from the
normal crew positions; deployment should also be possible from the passenger
compartment with the cabin in an upright attitude and from outside the helicopter when
in either an upright or inverted attitude.
FW aircraft operating over water more than 30 minutes flying time or 100 NM from the
nearest shore shall have enough life rafts, each having a survivor locator light, a
pyrotechnic signalling device, a buoyant, water-resistant signalling device and a survival
kit, to accommodate all occupants of the aircraft. FW aircraft not operating over water
more than 30 minutes flying time or 100 NM from the nearest shore do not require
liferafts;
n. Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) - A Health and Usage Monitoring System
(HUMS) or a Generic Engine and Vibration Monitoring System (GEVMS) shall be fitted to
all standard contract helicopters.
For helicopters that are type-certificated for 10 seats or more the system shall meet the
full definition of HUMS. For helicopters certificated for 9 seats or less, and for which a
manufacturer supported HUMS is not available, a GEVMS is acceptable.
The HUMS or GEVMS programme management shall be in accordance with the
guidelines contained in UK CAA Publication CAP 753;
o. Helicopter flotation gear - Helicopters operating over the water shall be capable of
alighting on the surface of the water, either by virtue of inherent design features, e.g.
boat hull, fixed floats, etc. or with the aid of flotation gear.
All offshore helicopters shall be fitted with flotation gear which, for all standard
contracts and where a suitable modification is available, shall have flotation gear that
automatically inflates on contact with water.
Where variations in the flotation gear are offered for a particular type (e.g. S92) the
flotation gear shall be appropriate for the operating area (e.g. S92 3 bag system,
certified for SS4, only in tropical, non-hostile environments; 5 bag system, certified to
SS6, for all;
p. Cabin push-out windows, emergency lighting and seating layout - All apertures of size
430mm x 355mm (17in x 14in) or greater in passenger compartments shall be able to
be opened in emergency as a 'push-out' window and used as an emergency exit.
Emergency exit marking systems shall have emergency exit indicator systems (e.g.
'EXIS' or 'HEEL' path lighting) on 'push-out' windows that are automatically activated on
flooding of the cabin;
q. Life Preservers - FW aircraft shall have a life preserver with survivor locator light, for
each person carried, when beyond gliding distance from the nearest shore. FW aircraft
crew shall wear constant-wear type life jackets when conducting specialist operations
low level, over water.
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1. The equipment fit tables and equipment specification of all aircraft that are offered for the
company use will vary depending on the tasks for which the aircraft will be used and may
often exceed the requirements of the local regulatory authority. The equipment is normally
specified in the technical specification in the Invitation to Tender and subsequently in the
contract.
2. When several aircraft of the same type are contracted, the cockpit layouts should be
standardised wherever practically possible.
3. For the purposes of this standard, HUMS and GEVMS are defined as follows:
Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) means the equipment, techniques and/or
procedures by which incipient failure or degradation of the helicopter rotor and rotor drive
system components can be determined. The monitoring techniques shall include vibration
monitoring of the following, using a combination of spectrum analysis and advanced
diagnostic (proprietary signal processing) techniques. It includes a diagnostic capability for
every component in the drive train:
a. Engine to main gearbox input drive shafts;
b. Main gearbox shafts, gears and bearings;
c. Accessory gears, shafts and bearings;
d. Tail rotor drive shafts and hanger bearings;
e. Intermediate and tail gearbox gears, shafts and bearings;
f. Main and tail rotor track and balance;
g. Engine health.
Certification of the HUMS by the local regulator on a “no hazard”/”no credit” basis is
acceptable.
Generic Engine and Vibration Monitoring System (GEVMS) means the equipment,
techniques and/or procedures by which the following systems are monitored using simple
vibration monitoring and spectrum analysis techniques, and includes relevant exceedance
monitoring:
b. Main transmission;
c. Tail rotor drive shaft;
d. Tail rotor drive shaft bearing;
e. Main and tail rotor balance;
f. Engine health.
Certification of the EVMS by the local regulator on a “no hazard”/”no credit” basis is
acceptable.
RELATED INCIDENT
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Shell:
External:
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ENG 01.01 Airworthiness Management


1. Provide airworthy aircraft which meet national regulations.
2. Employ a person(s), approved by the NAA if applicable, with overall responsibility for
continuing airworthiness and aircraft maintenance, including both in–house and contracted
activities.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Requirements 1 and 2:

1. The Aircraft Operator shall demonstrate that continuing airworthiness and aircraft
maintenance are performed in accordance with national regulations and that the appropriate
organisational approvals and certificates are in place.
2. The Aircraft Operator shall employ, or verify the employment of the necessary competent
manager (Post-holder, Department Manager or equivalent) to manage its continuing
airworthiness and maintenance organisations or any contracted continuing airworthiness or
maintenance organisations.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External: https://www.easa.europa.eu/regulations
OGP / IGP AMG DIFFERENCES
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ENG 02.01 Continuing Airworthiness Organisation


1. Provide a Continuing Airworthiness (CA) organisation to perform the requirements of the
organisational manual.
2. Provide a top level organisational manual such as a Maintenance Management Manual
(MMM), approved by the NAA, describing the continuing airworthiness processes and
procedures for the aircraft types being operated.
3. Demonstrate that aircraft are maintained in accordance with type specific NAA approved
maintenance programmes which include OEM minimum requirements.
4. Maintain subscriptions with OEMs to receive revisions to all technical data and information
related to the maintenance of the aircraft or its components (examples include
Maintenance Manuals, Parts Catalogues and Bulletins).

1. Appropriately qualified and experienced staff shall be utilized in the management of the
operator's CA function. If required by the NAA, the head of the CA organisation shall be
approved as the CA Nominated Post Holder (NPH).
2. The NPH may be supported by suitably qualified and experienced specialist staff such as
Type Engineer(s) or Fleet Specialists for the operated aircraft type(s); plus further staff
manning other CA functions including the technical library and technical records.
3. The primary role of the specialist staff will be the management of the Aircraft Maintenance
Programme (AMP) and the technical review of all incoming data relevant to the aircraft type
they are responsible for.
4. The total number of CA staff shall be commensurate with the size and scope of the
company's operations.
5. CA management organizations providers (In-house or sub contracted) must demonstrate
that the MMM has processes which include:
a. The review and management of all airworthiness data and instructions including
Airworthiness Directives (AD) from applicable NAA and Service Bulletins (SB) from the
OEM;
b. Managing an AMP for each aircraft type operated;
c. Provision of technical data and maintenance programmes to the Approved Maintenance
Organisation (AMO);
d. The management of an aircraft technical records and maintenance forecasting system;
e. A system of control which allows only parts, meeting the aircraft maintenance
programme, to be fitted to company owned aircraft by the AMO; and
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f. A system by which maintenance instructions are provided to the AMO; and confirmation
received from the AMO that the work has been performed and appropriately certified.
6. If applicable - the Air Operator must issue Airworthiness Review Certificates (ARC) for its
aircraft, following a documented process using staff who:
a. Are listed within the MMM; and
b. Have been assessed for competency and hold authorisation to issue ARCs.
7. The current revision status (including temporary revision) of all applicable technical data and
documentation within the organisation shall be easily identifiable against the source
documents of the OEM. This includes all master copies and copies distributed to the AMO,
out stations or contractors.
The continuing airworthiness of an aircraft is the responsibility of the operator and is part of the
AOC.
It is the operator’s responsibility to take the airworthiness data from the OEM into the
organisation and process it in an approved documented and controlled manner.
The Top Level MMM within an operator can be known as the Continuing Airworthiness Manual
(CAM) or the Maintenance Control Manual (MCM).
Contained within the MMM/CAM/MCM are the processes which produce the Aircraft Maintenance
Programme (AMP).
The operator is responsible for providing the AMP to the AMO. The AMO does not own or control
the AMP.
The Top Level MMM within an AMO can be known as the Maintenance Organisation Exposition
(MOE) or the Maintenance Procedure Manual (MPM)
The AMO is required to provide the relevant or detailed maintenance records of all performed
maintenance to the operator. The maintenance records belong to the aircraft and the operator;
not the AMO.
Continuing airworthiness functions can be contracted out if this is an approved practice per NAA
AMP and formally stated within the approved MMM. (Refer ENG.02.03)
The MMM must state which AMO are permitted to perform maintenance on the aircraft and its
equipment.
RELATED INCIDENT
1. Is the MMM/CAM/MCM approved by the NAA?

2. When was the MMM last amended?
3. Does the MMM accurately reflect the organisations, its scope of work and its processes?
In house continuing airworthiness functions
1. Does the organisation have sufficient, experienced and competent staff to perform the
function?
2. Is there a corporate “computer system’’ used to manage data and records associated with
airworthiness?
3. Is continuing airworthiness included within the internal audit plan?
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Contracted continuing airworthiness functions

1. Is any part of the continuing airworthiness functions contracted out? If so, is it formally
stated and approved within the MMM? Are all contracted out functions visible, auditable and
traceable to the AOC?
2. Does the AOC employ provide regular QC and QA activities to determine that the contracted
functions are being correctly performed?
Maintenance
1. Is the MMM/MOE/MPM approved by the NAA?
2. When the MMM last was amended?
Shell:
External: EASA Annex 1to Decision 2016-011-R
https://www.faa.gov
https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/menu.htm
http://www.ncaa.gov.ng/
https://www.casa.gov.au/
Standards for Manuals, Documentation and records are not specifically defined within the OGP
AMG.
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ENG 02.02 Aircraft Maintenance Programme


1. Develop, document and implement an Aircraft Maintenance Programme (AMP) for each of
the aircraft types on the AOC. The AMP shall include, as a minimum, the mandatory
maintenance requirements from the OEM and shall be approved by the NAA.
2. Update the AMP on receipt of revised maintenance requirements from the OEM.
3. Review the AMP for effectiveness routinely through a reliability programme or equivalent,
and update the AMP accordingly.
1. The AMP must be owned by the operator. Management of the AMP can be in house or
contracted to a Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO) or equivalent
approved by the NAA.
2. The AMP must list those aircraft registrations to which it applies.
3. The AMP must show a direct link to the most recent OEM mandatory maintenance
information such as Airworthiness Limitations & Inspection Requirements (ALIR) or
equivalent.
4. The AMP shall specify maintenance requirements/life limitations for the aircraft, its engines
and components based on appropriate intervals including time in service, expected flying
hours, landings, cycles and calendar life.
5. Maintenance pre-flight, between flight, after-flight and/or any other regular inspections shall
be detailed within the AMP or an equivalent document.
6. The AMP must be reviewed for effectiveness and routinely updated to incorporate data from
reliability programmes or their equivalent and the latest available OEM requirements. The
MMM should document the review interval and data criteria for the effectiveness review.
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The Aircraft Maintenance Programme or AMP is also known as approved maintenance

programme, or approved aircraft maintenance programme.
An operator can have multiple AMP, however an aircraft can only be maintained to one AMP.
RELATED INCIDENT
For later date
Shell:
External:

The OMG APMG is less prescriptive however aligns broadly this AOR.
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ENG 02.03 Airworthiness directives and (Alert) Service

Bulletins


1. Comply with all Airworthiness Directives (ADs), Alert Service Bulletins, (ASBs), and Service
Bulletins (SBs) or equivalent, that are mandated by the appropriate Aviation Authorities or
recommended by the OEM.
2. Maintain a technical review process for all incoming directives and bulletins.
3. Embody any additional SBs that are requested by Shell Aircraft.

1. Air operators must show compliance with ADs issued by the state holding the Aircraft Type
Certificate in addition to the National Aviation Authority (NAA) of the country of registration,
or operation.
2. Compliance with ADs, ASBs and SBs includes the implementation of any actions that are
considered necessary, within the specified timescale, and in accordance with a procedure
acceptable to the State of Registry/NAA.
3. All ADs, ASBs and SBs shall be subject to technical review to assess the applicability and /or
suitability to the company's owned or operated fleet. Records shall be kept of the technical
reviews including decisions on SBs that the company chooses not to embody.
4. Regardless of whether any physical action is required, the review process records must
indicate the most current revision of the relevant ADs, ASBs and SBs.
5. Any proposed 'Alternative Method of Compliance' granted by the NAA for an AD shall be
reviewed by Shell Aircraft before use.
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RELATED INCIDENT
1) Is the AD, ASB and SB revision status current in accordance with the relevant OEM and/or
NAA release?
Shell:
External:

OGP AMG only specifically references airworthiness directives with reference to Aerial Pipeline
survey. In this context the OGP AMG broadly aligns with this AOR.
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ENG 02.04 Aircraft Technical Records


1. Provide a management system (Technical Records) to control the forecasting and recording
of aircraft and component maintenance as detailed within the Aircraft Maintenance
Programme (AMP).
2. Maintain a records system for the aircraft, engines and all other components subject to life
limits or other maintenance requirements.
3. Employ suitable staff to perform the regular updating of the system following documented
procedures.

1. The management system (Technical Records) shall:
a. Reflect the requirements of the current AMP for each aircraft type; and,
b. Have its data updated in a timely manner to maintain an accurate record of the
airframe, engines and all other components which are subject to life limits or
maintenance requirements normally tracked on individual OEM or company log cards,
or by other means as specified in the AMP; and,
c. Record compliance with all applicable Airworthiness Directives (ADs) and (Alert) Service
Bulletins (SB) for the aircraft and its components; and,
d. Detail required maintenance "due lists" in terms of flying hours, cycles, landings or
calendar intervals; and,
e. Receive and manage all completed maintenance paperwork including work orders, work
packages, aircraft technical log entries and component serviceability data to ensure an
auditable record; and
f. Include internal quality control (QC) procedures to ensure that all records of performed
maintenance from the AMO are complete and the aircraft is appropriately released to
service.
2. The staff engaged in updating the system must be able to demonstrate competency in
following the documented procedures.
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Retention/Transfer of the records is required so that the status of the aircraft and its
components can be readily established at any time.
In the case of contracted continuing airworthiness management tasks, records may be

maintained and kept by the subcontracted organisation on behalf of the Continuing
Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO), which remains the owner of these documents.
However, the CAMO should be provided with the current status of AD compliance and service
life-limited components in accordance with the agreed procedures. The CAMO should also be
granted unrestricted and timely access to the original records as and when needed. Online
access to the appropriate information systems is acceptable.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External: https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/Annex%20I%20to%20Decision%20201
6-011-R.pdf
AMG.
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ENG 02.05 Contracted Maintenance and Services


1. Document within its Maintenance Management Manual (MMM), or equivalent, any person(s)
or organisations that are contracted to perform aircraft maintenance or other related
services supporting the operation of the aircraft.
2. Detail the scope of contracted activity and the interfaces between the operator and the
contracted party.
3. Demonstrate that an assurance programme is in place and functioning for all contracted
service.

1. Whilst the general requirement for the person(s) or organisation performing contracted
maintenance on behalf of the operator shall be documented in the MMM; it is expected that
the contractual requirements can be outlined in a separate document. This document shall
outline the specific activities and contractual obligations of the contractor in the performance
of the activity and will also include detail in the manner in which surveillance of the
operation will be conducted as well as the safety and general HSSE expectations of the
contractor by the operator.
2. Surveillance of the contracted maintenance must be appropriate for the scale and scope of
work. If the activity is part of a long term contract then it is expected to include the
surveillance oversight within the QA audit processes/ annual audit plan etc.
3. If the contracted activity is a short term task e.g. an aircraft repair, an NDT inspection or an
aircraft weighing; then an appropriate level of oversight is required.
4. In all cases, the Air Operator's QA processes must determine that the contractor is suitably
approved and has the required certification for the task, prior to the contracted task being
awarded. Certification and authorisation are dependent on the type of task being contracted
but must be remain valid for the duration of contract.
5. The Air Operator shall have a supplier approval process.
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Relationships between air operators and maintenance organisations can be complicated and can
include both contracted and sub-contracted arrangements. It is crucial that relationships,
including individual company responsibilities are well documented and that robust systems are
in place by the air operator to monitor performance both against contractual obligations as well
as regulatory requirements.
RELATED INCIDENT
1. Does the air operator have a program for monitoring performance of contracted
maintenance?
2. Is the relationship between the air operator and the maintenance organisation documented
within the MMM or similar?
3. Are contractors included in the annual QA audit plan?
4. Consider which type of maintenance activity is often contracted out: Lifejackets; NDT;
Aircraft weighing; Aircraft Painting; Large maintenance checks; HUMS
5. How is a contractor working on an aircraft captured within the operator’s HEMP? Are
additional risk present which would require additional controls?
6. Make sure that the activity is contracted and documented correctly and that is not just
performed by a “sister company” with no formal assurance in place.
7. Check how the aircraft is released to service if a contractor has performed work on it.
8. Where is the contractor’s paperwork for the task held and is a copy within the aircraft’s
record?
Shell:
External:

Contracted Maintenance is not specifically defined within the OGP AMG.
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ENG 02.06 Authorisations, Competence and Training

(Continuing Airworthiness)


1. Employ, or contract, personnel to manage the operator’s Continuing Airworthiness (CA)
function that have the relevant competences to perform these tasks.
2. Provide a training programme that specifically addresses the initial and on-going training
elements required of personnel performing the CA function.
Acceptable Means of Compliance Mandatory Requirements 1 and 2:

1. In order to assure the on-going competence of CA staff, the Air Operator shall establish and
maintain training programs that are designed to ensure that personnel with technical
responsibilities have the knowledge and skills appropriate to the complexity of the
organisation’s operations and maintenance activities and have sufficient knowledge of
applicable regulations, standards, procedures and the operated aircraft types as described in
the company Maintenance Management Manual (MMM) or equivalent.
The documented training programme shall include at least the following elements:
a. Initial training; all new employees, either experienced or inexperienced hires shall be
subject to an induction training programme relevant to their intended role in the
company. When inexperienced personnel are selected to fulfil specific roles within the
CA organisation, the organisation shall document a specifically structured initial training
plan to address the minimum requirements as documented within the company’s
manuals; and
b. Aircraft Type Engineers shall receive valid NAA accredited training on the aircraft type
they are responsible for within the organisation. It is preferable that the Type Engineer
has sufficient experience of the aircraft and would be in a position to hold or have held
maintenance “Release to Service” authorisation. The company should consider type
training for other CA staff if deemed relevant.
2. Suitable management training should be provided for all managers and supervisors.
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Competence should be defined as a measurable skill or standard of performance, knowledge

and understanding, taking into consideration attitude and behaviour.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External: ICAO DOC 7192 D-1
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ENG 03.01 Maintenance Organisation Management

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for requirements 1 to 3:

1. Assign an accountable person to manage the Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) on
behalf of the Aircraft Operator.
2. Ensure aircraft maintenance is performed by an approved AMO acceptable to its NAA with
the facilities, capability and scope to maintain the aircraft types operated.
3. Provision of a top level manual describing how the aircraft maintenance is managed,
performed and assured.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Mandatory Requirement 1 to 3:

For all maintenance activities performed by the AMO whether it is "in house" or a contracted
organisation:
1. Appropriately qualified and experienced staff shall be utilised in the management of the
operator's maintenance function. In most cases, the head of the AMO must be deemed
suitable to be appointed as the Nominated Post Holder (NPH) by the NAA.
2. A top level Maintenance Organisation Exposition (MOE) or equivalent (MMM, MPM etc.) is
required which is approved (or deemed acceptable) by the NAA and contains the following:
a. Organisational charts detailing the structure and responsibilities of the maintenance
organisation and its staff. This includes the necessary personnel to manage, plan,
perform, supervise, inspect and certify the aircraft as "Released to service";
b. Documented maintenance procedures and practises which comply with the requirements
of the NAA;
c. Procedures documenting the prevention of any person performing maintenance on an
aircraft, engine or component, unless that person is authorised, trained and considered
competent;
d. Detailed descriptions that demonstrate the adequacy of maintenance facilities, data,
equipment, supplies and spares for all aircraft maintenance;
e. Documented quality assurance procedures to verify compliance with, and adequacy of
procedures, and to monitor that all maintenance and administration is properly
performed and continues to comply with regulatory requirements.
f. Documented list of current (sub) contracted organisations and suppliers, which describes
the type and scope of work, the types of aircraft, engines or components that will be
maintained and the approved locations for each organisation; and
g. For maintenance activities outsourced or contracted by the Air Operator a documented
process is required detailing the interface between the Aircraft Operator's Continuing
Airworthiness organisation and the AMO.
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RELATED INCIDENT
1. Is the MMM/CAM/MCM approved by the NAA?

In house continuing airworthiness functions
1. Does the organisation have sufficient, experienced and competent staff to perform the
function?
2. Is there a corporate computer system used to manage data and records associated with
airworthiness?
3. Is continuing airworthiness included within the internal audit plan?
Contracted continuing airworthiness functions
1. Is any part of the continuing airworthiness function contracted out? If so, is it formally
stated and approved within the MMM? Are all contracted out functions visible, auditable and
traceable to the AOC?
2. Does the AOC employ provide regular QC and QA activities to determine that the contracted
functions are being correctly performed?
Maintenance
1. Is the MMM/MOE/MPM approved by the NAA?
Shell:
External:
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/Annex%20II%20to%20Decision%202016-011-
R.pdf
AMG.
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ENG 03.02 Maintenance Control and Release to Service


1. Ensure that the Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) shall have procedures for maintenance
control and technical dispatch to ensure that aircraft are not “Released to Service” unless they are:
a. Airworthy;
b. Appropriately equipped, configured and maintained for their intended use; and
c. Have a valid Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA), Airworthiness Review Certificate (ARC, if
applicable) and Certificate of Release to Service (CRS, or equivalent).

1. The Air Operator and its AMO shall have a procedure(s) for ensuring that maintenance
releases are completed and certified; and that the work performed has been completed
satisfactorily and in accordance with the procedures described in the applicable MMM.
2. Maintenance personnel shall always have available for reference a Minimum Equipment List
(MEL) or a Minimum Departure Standard (MDS) that indicates which items may be
inoperative and the conditions under which flights must be operated. It shall aircraft type-
specific and approved by the NAA where required. Where the above documents are not
available, full equipment serviceability shall be required.
3. The Air Operator and its AMO shall have a process to make the aircraft commander aware of
all deferred defects that affect or may affect the safe operation of the aircraft. The aircraft
commander shall have the final decision on acceptance of the aircraft with deferred defects.
Provision shall be made to record:
a. reference to the original defect;
b. the original date of the occurrence;
c. brief details of the defect;
d. reference to the MEL/MDS & Configuration Deviation List (CDL, if applicable);
e. a due date for rectification/review; and
f. details of the eventual rectification.
4. The AMO shall ensure that the defect recording process includes a method to clearly
highlight recurring defects to flight crews and the maintenance organisation at all bases
where the aircraft is operated. The AMO is responsible for identifying and reporting recurring
defects, in order to avoid the duplication of unsuccessful attempts at rectification.
5. The Air Operator and its AMO shall incorporate remote location procedures in the
appropriate top level Maintenance Organisation Exposition (MOE) or equivalent document,
for managing any aircraft unserviceability at a location where maintenance support is not
routinely provided (for example – offshore installations).
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RELATED INCIDENT
1) Can the air operator produce the required documentation?

2) Is the air operator complying with MEL requirements? Own and regulatory?
Shell:
External:
The OMG APMG is less prescriptive however aligns broadly this AOR.
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ENG 03.03 Duplicate and Independent Inspections

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for requirements 1:

1. Mandate the Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) to provide within its Maintenance
Organisation Exposition (MOE) or equivalent document, detailed procedures on the
requirement, performance and certification of Duplicate Inspections. These must
document:
a. A list of maintenance critical tasks requiring duplicate inspections for each aircraft type;
b. Procedures detailing the recording and certification of duplicate inspections within the
aircraft’s technical paperwork.
c. The training, competence and authorisation for those staff capable of performing
duplicate inspections on the aircraft or components.

1. The OEM’s instructions for continued airworthiness should be followed when determining the
need for Duplicate Inspections.
2. In the absence of maintenance and inspection standards published by the OEM; Duplicate
Inspections shall be carried out on flight safety sensitive maintenance tasks.
3. Items which shall be subject to Duplicate Inspections include (but are not limited to):
a. the installation, rigging and adjustment of flight controls.
b. installation of aircraft engines, propellers, transmissions, drive shafts and rotors.
c. overhaul, calibration or rigging of components such as engines, propellers, transmissions
and gearboxes.
Consideration should also be given to:
d. previous experience of maintenance errors.
e. information arising from an ‘occurrence reporting system’
4. Duplicate Inspections shall be carried out by at least two authorised persons, approved by
the AMO to complete the task. An inspection is first made by an engineer holding “Certificate
of Release to Service (CRS)” authorisation who assumes full responsibility for the
satisfactory completion of the work. The work is subsequently inspected by a second
authorised person, who has not been involved in the performance of the task, who confirms
that no deficiencies have been found and that the work has been satisfactory completed.
(It is preferable if the second authorised person is an engineer holding a CRS authorisation.)
Certification of Duplicate Inspections shall contain the signatures of both persons before the
relevant CRS is issued
a. first authorised engineer signs for completion of the task;
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b. second authorised signatory signs for the duplicate inspection;

c. first engineer signs CRS for the task only after the duplicate inspection is certified.
5. The content and scope of a Duplicate Inspection check shall include (as applicable):
a. correct assembly and locking of all those parts that have been disconnected or disturbed
b. full and free movement of the system over the complete range.
c. cables should be tensioned correctly with adequate clearance at secondary stops.
d. the operation of the control system to ensure that the controls are operating in the
correct sense.
e. separate system checks if the control system is duplicated to provide redundancy
f. where different control systems are interconnected so that they affect each other, all
interactions should be checked through the full range of the applicable controls.
6. The AMO must detail the requirement for Duplicate Inspections during complex or lengthy
tasks such as engine or gearbox replacement. These must be performed at key stages
during the completion of the overall task; so that work is suitably inspected and certified
prior to it being covered by further assembly.
7. The AMO shall have procedures to demonstrate that the authorised signatories for duplicate
inspections have been trained and have gained experience on the specific control systems
being inspected. The training and authorisation process can be applied to aircrew when an
operational requirement exists and there is no alternative.
The second authorised person is not issuing a maintenance CRS therefore is not required to
hold CRS certification privileges. However, they must be suitably qualified by the AMO to
carry out the inspection.
8. The organisation shall retain records to demonstrate the training, competency assessment
and authorisation for all staff certifying Duplicate Inspections.
NOTE:
The principle of additional inspections on critical aircraft systems is now almost universally
understood and accepted. Through the various National Aviation Authorities, these
additional inspections have been given different titles; Duplicate Inspections by the UK CAA;
Independent Inspections by EASA and the UK military; Required Item Inspections (RII) by
the FAA.
The given title may be different but the intent is the same; this AOR defines the required
standard for Shell and uses the title Duplicate Inspections.
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Flight sensitive maintenance tasks involve the assembly or any disturbance of a control system
(see definition below) that, if errors occurred, could result in a failure, malfunction, or defect
endangering the safe operation of the aircraft.
A control system is an aircraft system by which the flight path, attitude, or propulsive force of
the aircraft is changed, including the flight, engine and propeller controls, the related system
controls and the associated operating mechanisms.
RELATED INCIDENT
1) Has the air operator documented their duplicate inspections requirements?

2) Does the list of critical inspections meet the minimum requirements?
Shell:
External:
The OMG APMG is not specific on the qualifications and disposition of the Engineer and
Inspector. Otherwise, this standard broadly aligns with the recommendations of the OPG AMG.
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ENG 03.04 Tools and Equipment


1. Ensure that the AMO maintains a system of control for all tools and equipment that are
used in the performance of aircraft maintenance.
Acceptable Means of Compliance for Mandatory Requirements 1:

1. An effective tool control system shall include the following:
a. All tools, owned by the AMO or belonging to maintenance staff, shall be secured when
not in use. This can be in locked tool kits or in a controlled tool store (which may be part
of the AMO’s stores system);
b. All tools shall be marked with a unique identifier such that they can be traced to their
owner and/or tool kit;
c. When tools are issued from the tool store, the AMO shall have in place a system for
tracking these tools;
d. All tool kits shall have a contents list. A regular QA inspection of the tool kit for contents
and serviceability against this check list should be carried out and recorded – any
unserviceable tools should be identified on this list;
e. Personal tool kits shall be arranged in such a manner that it is immediately obvious at
the end of a duty period if a tool is missing;
f. The AMO shall have in place a system to ensure that all tools are accounted for following
maintenance, at the end of a shift or day and prior to an aircraft being released for
service; and
g. The AMO shall ensure that any sub-contractors working on the AMO’s premises shall
comply with these tool control requirements.
2. Special Tools:
Only special tooling or test equipment specified by the aircraft or engine manufacturer, or its
equivalent, shall be used to perform maintenance on an aircraft unless the use of alternative
tooling is agreed by the NAA and documented.
3. Calibration of tools and equipment:
The AMO shall ensure that those tools and test equipment, which require in service
maintenance and checking, are controlled. The control will include registration, servicing and
calibration according to an officially recognised standard at a frequency to ensure
serviceability and accuracy. Records of such calibrations shall be retained by the AMO.
4. Equipment:
All equipment used in the performance of maintenance shall be inspected prior to use on
aircraft to ensure that they are serviceable and free from foreign objects.
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RELATED INCIDENT
1) Does the air AMO have a documented tool control system?

2) Is the tool control system effective and is it followed by maintenance staff?
3) How are tools accounted for prior to an aircraft being released to service?
Shell:
External:
Tool control is not defined in OGP AMG.
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ENG 03.05 Facilities


1. Verify that the AMO has adequate facilities and an appropriate working environment for the
maintenance tasks to be performed.

1. Appropriate facilities and office space should be provided for all planned maintenance. This
may require aircraft hangars that are both available and large enough for the planned
maintenance. Furthermore, the facilities shall meet the applicable regulatory HSSE and
building requirements.
2. Aircraft component workshops should be large enough to accommodate the components
that are planned to be maintained.
3. Protection from inclement weather means the hangar or component workshop structures
should be to a standard that prevents the ingress of rain, hail, ice, snow, wind and dust.
4. The working environment should be appropriate for the maintenance task being performed
such that the effectiveness of personnel is not impaired. The working environment should be
maintained such that:
a. Temperature should be maintained such that personnel can perform the required tasks
without undue discomfort;
b. Airborne contamination (e.g. dust, precipitation, paint particles, filings, insects, etc.)
should be kept to a minimum to ensure aircraft/components surfaces are not
contaminated, if this is not possible all susceptible systems should be sealed until
acceptable conditions are re-established;
c. Lighting should be adequate to ensure each inspection and maintenance task can be
performed effectively; and
d. Noise levels should not be allowed to rise to the level of distraction for inspection staff or
if this is not possible inspection staff should be provided with Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE) to reduce excessive noise.
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Contracting maintenance of aircraft or components to a third party does not preclude the air
operator from their accountabilities as detailed in requirement 1.
RELATED INCIDENT
1. Are the air operator’s maintenance facilities adequate for the level of maintenance being
conducted?
2. Is the air operator assessing, on a regular basis the appropriateness and condition of third
party maintenance organisations facilities?
Shell:
External:
Materials, housing and facilities are not defined within OGP AMG.
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ENG 03.06 Identifying Organisational Weakness (IOW)


1. Implement within the Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) a programme which
seeks to identify and rectify organisational weaknesses within the organisation, through
the use of formal, regular and documented observations of aircraft maintenance and its
supporting processes.

1. The IOW programme shall include as a minimum, the witnessing and assessment of one
different work process, per month per operational location (base). Therefore a minimum of
12 IOW per year (there is no upper limit).
2. The programme should seek to identify weaknesses and record these within an appropriate
system.
3. For each identified weakness the AMO should seek to explore, understand and rectify the
situation as far as practicable.
4. The IOW programme should involve maintenance staff at all levels; therefore engagement,
communication and staff “buy in” are all behaviours that need to be considered when an
IOW programme is launched.
5. The performance of the IOW should be included within the AMO’s Quality Assurance (QA)
programme.
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1. Description
The IOW programme involves an additional oversight of any work process within a
maintenance organization and is considered complementary to the normal supervision
activity. It is expected that this activity can be performed by supervisors or peers who
understand the task at hand and or have the experience with it. The IOW programme is
expected to contain the following elements:
Aim: Identify and mitigate the causal factors that encourage staff to ignore or work round
existing procedures and systems
Process: description of the IOW processes, procedures and forms in use
System Review: Determining the effectiveness with the opportunity to improve where
considered necessary.
RELATED INCIDENT
American Airlines Flight 191 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight operated by
American Airlines from O'Hare International Airport in Chicago to Los Angeles International
Airport. A McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 used for this flight on May 25, 1979, crashed moments
after take-off from Chicago. All 258 passengers and 13 crew on board were killed, along with 2
people on the ground. It is the deadliest aviation accident to have occurred in the United States.
Investigators found that as the jet was beginning its take-off rotation, engine number one, on
the left wing, separated and flipped over the top of the wing. The engine separation was
attributed to damage to the pylon rigging structure holding the engine to the wing, caused by
faulty maintenance procedures at American Airlines.
Maintenance issues and not the actual design of the aircraft were ultimately found responsible
for the crash. The investigation also revealed other DC-10s with damage caused by the same
faulty maintenance procedure. The faulty procedure was banned.
Comment – the faulty procedure involved maintainers not following a SB which required the
engines to be removed.
Observations from Shell Aircraft audits:
Observation: Staff were seen manually carrying main rotor blades on/off aircraft rather than
using the sling which is described in the AMM. On completion of the task, staff certified that the
task was completed iaw the AMM (crane used etc)
Root cause: There is no crane in the hangar and no alternate procedure for manual handling.
Cultural norm – “that’s the way we do it here”.
Potential remedial actions: Install a crane; go to alternate location which has a crane; develop a
manual handling procedure. Remind maintainers to only sign for tasks that have been
completed iaw Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM).
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Observation: Staff were shortcutting a 120 lbs/ft torque check procedure of tail blade spindles
by performing the task in situ rather than installing the spindles into a bench fixture. This was
possible using a locally manufactured alternate tool which was visible to all on the tool board.
Root cause: Cultural norm - procedural non-compliance to save time. Task and duplicate
inspections were certified iaw the AMM, despite no disassembly taking place. Management were
aware of the practice with no intervention.
Remedial action: Removal of alternate tooling until the procedure could be validated by the
continuing airworthiness department. The practice was immediately stopped.
Observation: Aircraft were towed with no wing walkers/team leader – which was a non-
compliance with internal procedures.
Root cause: there was insufficient staff on the line; a local norm had amended the process so
that a tractor driver and man on brakes would suffice; the full towing team was only used near
or in the hangar.
Remedial actions: A revised procedure was developed and implemented.
For a later date
Shell:
External:
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ENG 03.07 Staged Worksheets


1. Require the Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) to use Staged Work Sheets in the
performance of complex maintenance tasks as an integral part of its workcard system.

1. A workcard or worksheet system shall be used for all maintenance performed on the
operator’s aircraft. These must contain, or make precise reference to, the required
maintenance data and be safeguarded against unauthorised alteration.
2. The AMO shall determine the Staged Work Sheets (SWS) to be used for the performance of
“Complex” maintenance tasks and detail these within the MMM by aircraft type and model.
3. Complex maintenance tasks shall include, but are not limited to those tasks which: -
a. include multiple stages: removal, disassembly, test, inspection, repair and installation;
b. involves maintenance on multiple systems; or
c. requires more than one shift to complete; or
d. involves multiple trades; or
e. requires more than one person or discipline to complete.
As a minimum, complex maintenance tasks for which SWS shall be used include the removal
and installation of engines, propellers, gearboxes and rotor heads.
4. The SWS shall be designed to reduce the likelihood that steps within the complex task are
inadvertently missed. The complex maintenance tasks shall be transcribed onto the
workcards and sub-divided into clear stages to ensure a record of accomplishment of the
complete task.
5. The SWS shall specifically identify the point(s) at which duplicate inspections are required as
part of the task. These must be performed at key stages during the completion of the
overall task, so that work is suitably inspected and certified prior to it being hidden by
further assembly.
6. The SWS should seek to minimise the risk of maintenance error by including or identifying
“lessons learned” from previous maintenance error investigations.
7. The revision status of the SWS should remain aligned with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual
(AMM) at all times. As such, the SWS should identify and cross refer to the AMM revision in
use by the AMO. A pre–use check by the maintenance staff, is required to determine that
the SWS and AMM are aligned. If there is a discrepancy of dates then the AMO Nominated
Post Holder shall be informed.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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ENG 03.08 Fitness for Work and Fatigue Management

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for requirement 1 and 2:

1. Implement within the AMO a policy whereby maintenance personnel directly engaged in
aircraft maintenance are deemed to be medically fit for employment unless specifically
precluded by local legislation.
2. Ensure that the AMO has policies in place to minimise the risk of fatigue in aircraft
maintenance staff, with direct consideration given to shift workers.

1. The AMO shall be encouraged to adopt a policy that requires the periodic medical
examination, including eyesight and hearing tests, of all staff engaged in maintenance
activities.
2. All maintenance staff upon reaching 60 years of age shall be subject to annual medical
examinations, unless precluded by local legislation.
3. Air operators shall ensure that within the AMO the following minimum standards are applied
to prevent fatigue in all engineering staff;
a. The total work periods shall not exceed 12 hours in any 24-hour period. Where,
exceptionally, it is essential that the working period is extended, the Competent Manager
should approve it on a case by case basis, taking into account the nature of the work
and the airworthiness implications.
b. Where shifts are regularly rostered with a heavy maintenance workload to be completed
through the night, the length of the duty period shall be reduced from 12 hours to a
maximum of 10 hours. The bulk of work shall be completed by the shifts on duty up to
midnight with the residue completed by a swing shift covering the period from
approximately 2300 to 0700 hrs.
c. Each full working shift shall be followed by a minimum 8-hour rest period.
d. Maintenance staff should receive a minimum of 7 days off per month of which at least 4
should be in a minimum of 2-day periods; when the location or climate is arduous then
this should be increased to minimise fatigue. This may be relaxed by written agreement
with the local Aviation Focal Point for operations where personnel are working a back to
back roster, e.g.; a 4 on/4 off working cycle.
e. On locations where it is not feasible to provide other than the bare accommodation
necessities, a regular “time on site, time off site” routine shall be set up to ensure that
maintenance personnel working under these conditions do not stay in the field for
prolonged periods. The minimum acceptable ratio of time on site to time off site shall be
2:1 with a maximum period on site not to exceed 2 months.
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f. It is the responsibility of the individual concerned to ensure that he/she does not report
for duty or certify if he is genuinely unfit. Issues associated with mental and physical
fitness, fatigue, stress, medication, alcohol and drug use may all have a bearing on
“fitness to work”.
g. Other than any specific local labour laws, maintenance personnel are not regulated by
duty hour limitations. It is incumbent on the management and supervisors of the AMO to
locally manage their staff with due consideration to fatigue and the potential for human
factors provoking errors in maintenance.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External: CAA CAP716 Appendix P
TBC
TBC
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ENG 03.09 Authorisations, Competence and Training (AMO)


1. Ensure that the Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) establishes and maintains
training programmes for its staff which as a minimum meets the requirements of the NAA.
2. Provide continuation training to all maintenance and support staff on a two yearly basis.
3. Ensure the AMO has a competence assessment programme for all staff engaged in the
performance of aircraft maintenance and the supporting functions.
4. Ensure that the AMO has an authorisation process for all staff performing and certifying
maintenance tasks on aircraft and/or components.
5. Ensure that the AMO maintains a records system supporting the training and authorisation
processes.
6. Provide appropriate organisational training prior to the promotion of staff into a supervisory
role.

1. The AMO shall document the training requirements for its maintenance and management
staff in the relevant Maintenance Organisation Exposition (MOE), or equivalent document
such or a bespoke Training Manual.
2. The training programme shall provide staff with appropriate initial and continuation training
as defined by their roles and responsibilities. This can include specific aircraft type training
as well as general organisational training on SMS, company procedures and internal
systems/programmes linked to aircraft maintenance and any individual roles.
3. The training programme should include details of the accepted training providers, training
syllabi and persons/organisations responsible for training.
4. All staff engaged in aircraft maintenance or support functions within the AMO shall receive
continuation (including Human Factors) training on a two yearly basis. It should be of
sufficient duration in each 2-year period and may be split into a number of separate
elements to ensure the scope is fully covered.
5. Continuation training is a two-way process to ensure that certifying staff remain current in
terms of procedures, human factors and technical knowledge and that the organisation
receives feedback on the adequacy of its procedures and maintenance instructions.
6. Continuation training should include:
a. changes in the organisations procedures;
b. modification standard of the aircraft and components maintained;
c. human factors issues identified by accident/incident investigation; and
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d. relevant findings from Quality Assurance audits and the Identifying Organisational
Weaknesses (IOW) process;
It should also address instances where:
a. staff failed to follow procedures; and
b. the reasons why particular procedures are not always followed.
7. The AMO shall detail how aircraft maintenance and workshop staff are assessed as
competent prior to being authorised for tasking.
8. The authorisation process shall meet the requirements of the National Aviation Authority
(NAA).
9. The authorisation process may include a system of local approvals whereby the AMO
systematically approves the individual to exercise the privileges granted by the licence,
endorsements or certification held on the range of equipment operated or maintained by
that organisation.
10. The AMO shall maintain a training and authorisation record for each of its certifying staff
including as a minimum:
a. The person's name and, where applicable, personnel NAA licence number and company
authorisations;
b. The dates on which the person successfully completed relevant training;
c. Course certificates for all relevant training; and
d. The expiry and renewal dates for the authorisations granted.
11. Prior to promotion to a more senior position, maintenance personnel shall receive formal
instruction in company procedures and responsibilities applicable to the new position. They
should also receive management training appropriate to their own level.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
259
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ENG 03.10 Foreign Object Damage


1. Require the Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) to implement procedures for the
prevention of FOD during maintenance activities, engine ground running and flight line
activities.

1. The Operator shall have in place procedures for the control of FOD during maintenance
activities, engine ground running and flight line activities. These procedures shall include,
but not be limited to:
2. Ensuring the flight line is kept clear of loose and blown articles during engine running and
other flight line activities;
3. Ensuring that all components not fitted to aircraft shall be fitted with blanks and covers
where appropriate;
4. During maintenance any components, pipes and electrical connectors are fitted with covers
or blanks when on aircraft and exposed;
5. Ensuring that work areas including ground running and flight line areas are maintained in a
clean and tidy condition;
6. Determining that during and after maintenance, all tools, blanks, covers, cleaning materials
etc. are accounted for; and
7. All equipment, tools and components shall be inspected prior to use on aircraft to ensure
that they are free from foreign objects.
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Foreign Object Damage (FOD) is defined as any damage caused to aircraft or its components by
any substances or assemblies that have been allowed to invade the aircraft or aircraft
components.
RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:

Foreign object damage is not defined in OGP AMG
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ENG 03.11 Aircraft Stores


1. Ensure that the Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) maintains a controlled aircraft
stores facilities which as a minimum meets the requirements of the relevant NAA.

1. The AMO shall have:
a. Documented procedures covering all aspects of the aircraft stores section;
b. A specific “Goods Inwards” process to determine that all new, used or maintained
parts meet the applicable standards of airworthiness prior to fitment to an aircraft or
aircraft equipment. This shall be supported by a records system providing traceability
of each item to its source provider;
c. Suitably trained and authorised staff to inspect and accept the relevant parts per the
“Goods Inward” or “Receiving Inspection” process and perform other roles within the
aircraft stores;
d. Suitable facilities for the storage of parts, equipment, tools and material which are
secure and prevent the deterioration and damage of stored items. Where stated the
storage conditions shall meet the manufacturer’s instructions;
e. A dedicated suitable storage area for flammable and/or explosive material;
f.A control programme for items that require a shelf-life limit;
g. A separate and secure quarantine area for unserviceable parts awaiting disposition as
well as parts not meeting the “Goods Inwards” criteria. A register shall be maintained
for all items in the quarantine area; and
h. The stores procedures should demonstrate the control of any components which due
to their size must be held in a location outside of the locked store.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:

Materials, housing and facilities are not defined within OGP AMG
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ENG 04.01 Aircraft Fuel


1. Document procedures for the performance of both Quality Assurance and Quality Control
for aviation fuel up to the point the aircraft is fuelled.
2. Carry out documented Quality Control (QC) checks to identify any (contaminants or water)
contamination of the fuel within the aircraft fuel system.
3. Implement procedures to minimise the risk inherent in aircraft refuelling.

1. Air Operators shall, to the extent that it is reasonably practical to do so, ensure that
adequate fuel quality control procedures are established in the logistics chain immediately
prior to the point at which fuel is received and by default the point at which the aircraft
operator becomes the owner of that fuel.
2. Fuel Quality shall be assured prior to delivery to the aircraft by compliance with the
procedures expressed in the following Shell Aviation manuals:
a. Shell Airport Operations Manual (SAOM); and
b. Shell Aviation Quality System Manual (SAQSM).
Equivalent manuals based on Joint Inspection Group (JIG) may be used.
3. The provision of fuel through in house or contracted suppliers shall be subject to either the
air operator’s internal audit programme or be included within the audit programme of 3rd
party suppliers. The audit scope shall include QC, Health, Safety< security and Environment
(HSSE) requirements including Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and staff competency.
4. Air operators shall determine the absence of contaminants and water in the aircraft fuel
through daily sample checks. These shall be taken from a sufficient number of fuel tank
drain points to provide representative samples of each distinct fuel group and retained for
24 hours or until the next sample is taken. Sample jars shall be clearly labelled such that
the aircraft, the drain point and the date the sample was taken are clearly identified. Fuel
samples shall be inspected and tested for water and contaminants using Shell Water
Detector capsule kits or equivalent aids. Fuel sample water detection aids are subject to
shelf-life limitations, and these shelf-life limits shall be observed.
5. The following procedures apply when refuelling with passengers on-board:
a. The Air Operator shall have a procedure for fuelling with passengers embarking, on
board or disembarking that includes provisions for ensuring passenger safety and egress
(if necessary) after a spillage or fire. At a minimum, the procedure shall require that:
i. Two-way communication is maintained, either by the aircraft intercommunication
system or other suitable means, between the ground crew supervising the refuelling
and qualified personnel on board the aircraft;
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ii. There are a minimum of two designated exits from the aircraft;
iii. The exits to be used have been designated by the Captain or by a procedure, prior to
the start of the refuelling operations; and
iv. At least one qualified person trained in emergency procedures shall be positioned
near each designated exit door.
b. Emergency exits may be used as one of the minimum of two required exits during
refuelling operations provided that:
i. The exit area shall remain clear during fuelling operations.
ii. When equipped, an evacuation slide is allowed provided that the escape route on the
apron is free from obstacles.
c. Rotors Running Refuelling may be authorised for both on and offshore operations.
However, the Air Operator should be aware of the additional risks involved and shall seek
Shell Aircraft advice, giving sufficient notice for comment or to render practical
assistance. For all helicopter operations using the process; specific Rotors Running
Refuelling procedures must be written which shall:
i. Include a risk assessment;
ii. Include both onshore and offshore fuelling;
iii. Detail the control and containment of any potential fuel spillage;
iv. Identify and train all staff involved in the process;
v. Seek to minimise risks by using pressure refuelling;
vi. Specifically prevent the use of fuel delivery nozzles which can be fixed open through
ratchets or equivalent devices.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
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ENG 5.01 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) -

General

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for requirements 1,2 and 3:

1. Establish maintenance procedures by which degradation or incipient failure of the helicopter
rotor and rotor drive system components can be monitored and determined.
2. Maintain documented HUMS procedures within its maintenance manuals or relevant
documents.
3. Establish documented processes that reflect the HeliOffshore Best Practice Guide V1.

1. The rotor and rotor drive system components to be monitored shall include as a minimum,
diagnostic capability for the following parameters:
b. Main gearbox shafts, gears and bearings;
c. Accessory gears, shafts and bearings;
d. Tail rotor drive shafts and hanger bearings;
e. Intermediate and tail gearbox gears, shafts and bearings;
f. Main and tail rotor track and balance;
g. Engine health.
2. Other systems used to monitor the degradation of critical components include; Vibration
Monitoring Systems (VMS) and Vibration Health Monitoring (VHM) with engine Usage
Monitoring Systems (UMS).
3. Monitoring techniques shall include vibration monitoring of those parameters listed in
requirement 1 using a combination of spectrum analysis and advanced diagnostic
(proprietary signal processing) techniques.
4. As part of reviewing data output from HUMS, the normal data gathering process is capable
of detecting differing situations:
a. Component replacements;
b. Mechanical component out, with maintenance limits, or tending towards failure;
c. Maintenance interventions (e.g. bearing greasing, rotor balancing, etc.); and
d. Instrumentation.
5. Compliance with these requirements typically relies on thresholds set within HUMS to
prompt HUMS authorised personnel whenever action is required. These are normally set by
the HUMS OEM but, depending on the aircraft type, reliability statistics, and aircraft history,
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there may be areas of the drive train that have operator/ regulator applied limitations.
These would be more restrictive than the OEM set threshold.
6. Guidance detailed in the manuals shall cover the following areas in the HeliOffshore HUMS
Best Practice Guide V1:
• Acronyms – Typical HUMS processes etc;
• Definitions – Including personnel typically authorised to review, analyse and certify
HUMS data;
• Scope – Clarification of terms etc;
• Download and Primary Analysis – Excepting areas above where additional SAI
requirements are provided;
• Communication – Internal, External etc;
• AAD and Web Portals – Interconnectivity, System Use, OEM Instructions;
• System Performance Reports - Original Equipment Manufacturer/Overhaul Facility
Support, Defect Trending Reports;
• Responsibilities and Process Descriptions – HUMS Staff responsibilities, Process
descriptions etc;
• Management Oversight - Corporate Oversight, Departmental Oversight, Line Level
Oversight.
ENG 5 HUMS requirements apply to helicopters only.
RELATED INCIDENT
N/A
N/A
Shell: N/A
External: HeliOffshore HUMS Best Practice Guide
N/A
OGP Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 Section 10.3 no differences from SGRAO
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ENG 5.02 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) –

Equipment Fit Requirement


1. Provide contracted helicopters that are fitted with a HUMS or Vibration Monitoring System (VMS).

1. The helicopter equipment fit shall be in accordance with the following:
2. For FAR/JAR/CS 29 helicopters, a full HUMS; and
3. For FAR/JAR/CS 27 helicopters, VMS with engine monitoring.
4. Where available, preference should be given to Aircraft Original Equipment Manufacturer
(OEM) supplied and supported HUMS.
5. A secondary HUMS monitoring system, such as Advanced Anomaly Detection (AAD) or
equivalent capability shall be implemented for full HUMS-equipped aircraft, where available
for the aircraft type and supported by the OEM.
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RELATED INCIDENT
Shell:
External:
Text
OGP Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 Section 10.3.1 Helicopter fit does not
have a difference in exposure hrs.
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OEM Support Agreement


1. Maintain a Service Level Agreement (SLA), contract or equivalent with the Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) that defines the support agreement for the company HUMS
system.

1. The agreement shall contain the following elements:
a. The requirement to pass aircraft data to the aircraft OEM;
b. Contact methods;
c. Defined communication protocols; and
d. Threshold setting and amendment protocols.
2. For aftermarket systems, an agreement shall be in place with the System OEM for the
systems installed, that mirrors those for aircraft OEM installed systems.
3. Operators shall establish in collaboration with the OEM an appropriate response time for
HUMS related queries. These should be consistent with operational requirements.
4. All personnel responsible for dealing with, and responding to, HUMS related issues, shall
have access to OEM approved maintenance data.
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RELATED INCIDENT
N/A
Shell:
N/A
OGP Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 Section 10.3 does not cover OEM support.
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Required Serviceability


1. Document a serviceability policy for the on-board HUMS system, which limits the operation
of the aircraft when the system or any of its components is unserviceable or not available.
2. Document a process to confirm that the HUMS system is collecting data.

1. A document, such as a Minimum Equipment List, (MEL), Minimum Departure Standard
(MDS) or similar shall be in place to detail the HUMS equipment that may be temporarily
unserviceable, and include associated operating conditions, limitations, or procedures as
applicable.
2. System unserviceability and subsequent deferment of unserviceable channels shall be based
upon the following:
a. The main system processing unit (i.e. Data Acquisition Unit (DAU), Data Acquisition
Processing Unit (DAPU), Bearing Monitor (BMU), or similar) shall be serviceable;
b. When the full HUMS data cannot be downloaded for technical reasons, such as a card
failure or similar, an entry shall be made in the aircraft paperwork (technical log or
similar) to allow one further flight to be completed; and
c. The unserviceability or unavailability of any other single component of the system,
including individual accelerometers, shall be:
i. Failure while Close Monitoring - 0 (Zero) Flying Hours;
ii. Failure while Close Monitoring - 10 Flying Hours.
3. The deferment period for individual channels shall be tracked as separate defects.
4. In all other circumstances, when released to operate with a yellow, amber or intermediate
HUMS threshold exceedance or when a specific component is placed under close monitoring
for other reasons, full serviceability or availability shall be required on the relevant HUMS
components, including individual accelerometers.
Data Collection
1. The HUMS shall be capable of generating a warning that indicates no data has been acquired
on any parameter for a period of ≥ five hours of elapsed flying time. If a specific system
does not have this feature or equivalent functionality, the operator shall have a process to
confirm the required data has been collected.
2. If the aircraft has not been in the required flight regime for a sufficient time, it is acceptable
to have collected a partial HUMS data set. However, a complete HUMS data set must be
collected within a period not exceeding 15 hours of cumulative elapsed flying time.
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RELATED INCIDENT
N/A
N/A
Shell:
N/A
OGP Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 Section 10.3.1 Technical requirements are
different to the requirements in the SGRAO as they do not include limitation hours of operation.
All other aspects are compliant with SGRAO.
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Download and Line Analysis Frequency


1. Establish a process for the download and initial line analysis of HUMS data with defined
periodicities for Offshore, Onshore and Search and Rescue (SAR) operations.

1. The download and initial line analysis of HUMS data to review threshold alerts and trends
shall be conducted within the following periodicities:
For Offshore Flights
a. On every return to an operating base (bases shall be defined in Shell Contracts) whether
for passenger or crew change or for shut down;
b. For operations where the aircraft routinely returns to the original operating base at a
high frequency, due to short sector lengths, the download frequency can be extended
out to a period not exceeding 5 hours of elapsed flying time; and
c. Where aircraft are based offshore or in remote locations, arrangements shall be made
using portable ground stations and platform Internet connections to provide an
equivalent capability.
For Onshore Flights
d. The system shall be downloaded daily as a minimum, but where practicable on every
return to the operating base; and
e. For flights over hostile onshore terrain, the offshore requirement of download on every
return to base should be adopted.
For SAR operations
f. Local procedures should be documented to allow for authorisation at senior management
level (e.g. Operations Director, Technical Director etc.) of extension of these periodicities
where life may be endangered by any delays caused by HUMS downloads.
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RELATED INCIDENT
N/A
N/A
Shell:
N/A
OGP Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 Section 10.3 does not cover include any
requirements for download and line analysis frequency.
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ENG 5.06 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) -

Second line analysis frequency


1. Establish procedures for second line analysis of HUMS data for each aircraft, on a daily
basis, by HUMS Analysts who have received specialist training.

1. The procedures and analysis shall cover as a minimum, the following:
a. Second Line HUMS Analysis – HeliOffshore Best Practice Guide Version 1.0 Section 5,
Paragraph 5:7;
b. HUMS Specialist Support – HeliOffshore Best Practice Guide Version 1.0 Section 5,
Paragraph 5:8 – Trending; and
c. AAD or equivalent capability, were available for the aircraft type and supported by the
OEM.
2. Where a Secondary Analysis process is carried out, clear instructions on the actions to be
taken for clearly rising trends that may not have breached a threshold, including criteria to
initiate close monitoring, shall be in place.
3. The HUMS Procedures Manual, or equivalent, shall include procedures to record defects,
warnings, out of tolerance conditions and rising trends that have been referred for detailed
analysis by Company HUMS specialists or the OEM support organisation.
4. Personnel carrying out second level analysis shall receive specialist training in accordance
with ENG 5.08 – Training.
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RELATED INCIDENT
N/A
N/A
Shell:
N/A
OGP Report No. 390 July 2008, updated August 2013 Section 10.3 does not cover this SGRAO
requirement.
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Recording and Release to Service


1. Record and certify the results of the HUMS download and initial analysis in the aircraft
technical log, or similar document before releasing the aircraft to service.

1. The procedure for dispatching aircraft for flight after the download and initial analysis of
HUMS data shall include the following requirements:
a. Where there are no HUMS alerts the aircraft can be cleared for dispatch with no further
action.
b. With a yellow, amber or intermediate HUMS alert the dispatch of an aircraft with an
extant alert shall be subject to maintenance action, which is recorded and certified; or
to a control process (such as close monitoring) within the operators continued
airworthiness organisation; a record of which shall be in the aircraft approved
documentation.
c. With a red or high level HUMS alert the aircraft is not to be dispatched until a full
analysis and, where necessary, maintenance investigation has been completed and any
subsequent action has been certified.
Note: Serviceability of the system shall be in line with the requirements detailed in ENG 5.04
HUMS – Required Serviceability
2. The documented procedures shall include clear instructions on the actions to be taken for
clearly rising trends that may not have breached a threshold, including criteria to initiate
close monitoring as well as the provision of an auditable record of actions and decisions,
with references to maintenance work cards where relevant.
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RELATED INCIDENT
N/A
N/A
Shell:
External: N/A
N/A
requirement.
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Training


1. Provide initial and recurrent HUMS training for all maintenance and HUMS Analysis staff, relevant to
the competency level required for their particular role.

1. The HUMS training programme shall include initial, aircraft type specific and recurrent
training and shall be in accordance with HeliOffshore Best Practice Guide Version 1.0–
Section 10.
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RELATED INCIDENT
N/A
N/A
Shell: N/A
External: HeliOffshore Best Practice Guidance
N/A
requirement.
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Quality Assurance (QA)


1. Include the HUMS processes, including both line and second line analysis, in the operator’s
QA programme.

1. The QA processes for the assurance of the HUMS procedures shall be in accordance with the
HeliOffshore Best Practice Guide – Section 12 (Quality Assurance) and Appendix 2 (HUMS
Audit Guide) and be detailed in the relevant manual.
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RELATED INCIDENT
N/A
N/A
Shell: N/A
N/A
requirement.
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Groundstation


1. Provide a HUMS Groundstation to support the download and analysis of the aircraft
system.

1. The HUMS Ground Station shall be a "stand-alone" tool and can be supplied by the OEM or
procured by the operator as a "Commercail Off the Shelf" (COTS) item;
2. Only authorised Field Loadable Software shall be installed on a controlled Ground Station;
3. Ground Stations shall be controlled in a similar manner to special tool control systems and
software changes shall be tracked;
4. No more than one HUMS Ground Station System (GSS) application type shall be installed on
any single operating system environment.
5. Full availability of data transfer and HUMS Ground Station analysis equipment is to be
ensured through the provision of backup equipment at operating bases.
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GSS and Data Management refer to HeliOffshore BPG V1 Section 4
RELATED INCIDENT
N/A
N/A
Shell: N/A
External: HeliOffshore Best Practice Guidance
N/A
requirement.
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OTH 01.00 – Security


1. Establish, maintain and carry out a security programme that is proportionate to the threat
against the Operator, its personnel, aircraft, facilities and passengers.

1. The security programme shall:
a. Meet National Aviation Authority (NAA) or other national Security requirements;
b. Include a process to assess threats and vulnerabilities;
c. Document preventive measures designed to reduce vulnerabilities and deter and
prevent the commission of unlawful acts;
d. Describe responsive measures to be taken when an unlawful act has been committed
against the operator; and
e. Describe appropriate training and testing of personnel involved.
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1. Operators should consider aligning their security programme with standards and
recommended practices published by ICAO in Annex 17 –Security and ICAO DOC 8973 –
Aviation Security Manual.
2. If operating from public airports, operators should establish interfaces with Airport Security
Plans and regularly participate in meetings with relevant authorities / stakeholders to
coordinate programmes, plans and exercises.
RELATED INCIDENT
1. Does the operator have a documented Aviation Security Programme to assess, categorize,
rank and mitigate potential threats against the Operator, its personnel, aircraft, facilities and
passengers?
2. Has the operator established if it is subject to national / international Aviation Security
Requirements?
3. Does the operator have interfaces with security programmes from the business unit, airport
operators and/or any other applicable stakeholders?
4. Does the Operator’s Security programme include contingency and response procedures, and
are these regularly tested, validated and amended?
Shell:
External:
ICAO ANNEX 17 - Security

ICAO Doc 8973 – Aviation Security Manual
IOGP / IGP AMG DIFFERENCES
IOGP Report 390 does not publish specific content to address Security.
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OTH 02.00 – Search and Rescue Operations (SAR)

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable to meet the requirements listed below in

APPENDIX 11: SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) STANDARD
SCOPE
This standard is intended to address the majority of the elements necessary for the safe
operation of onshore and/or offshore-based Shell contracted SAR helicopter operations. It is
not intended to act as a comprehensive SAR manual. Additionally, this Standard is not
intended to address every contingency that may be present within a SAR operation, nor every
rule of flight safety and good practice. It is intended to provide global Shell safety practices
standardisation for SAR operations; however, any National Regulation with more restrictive
guidance shall take precedence. The requirements in this Standard are to be used in addition
to and complement the full aviation requirements in the Shell Group Requirements for Aircraft
Operations (SGRAO).
Successful operations require the exercise of good judgment and common sense at all levels of
an organisation. When the need arises, special instructions, waivers or advice regarding this
Standard shall be sought from Shell Aircraft International (SAI). This Standard is not intended
to cover contracted public transport for marine pilot transfer operations.
Any helicopter operator contracted to provide SAR service shall have previous SAR experience.
The requirements contained in this document include guidance from SGRAO, Shell HSSE&SP
Control Framework, UK CAP 999 “UK Helicopter Search and Rescue (SAR) – National Approval
Guidance”, EU No. 965/2012, “Air Operations Regulation” (EASA Ops), 14 CFR FAR Part 135
and IMO/ICAO Doc 9731-AN/958, “International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
Manual” (IAMSAR).
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
AOC Air Operator Certificate
AFCS Automatic Flight Control System
CAT Commercial Air Transport
Distress Situation in which life, limb or property is imperilled.

Incident
EO-IR Electro Optic – Infrared Imaging equipment. E.g.: FLIR (Forward

Looking Infrared)
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EMS Emergency Medical Services. Advanced lifesaving medical treatment

provided during a SAR or MEDEVAC mission by technical crew in the
back of the helicopter.
FMS Flight Management System
FDP Flying Duty Period – Those duty hours when a crew member is at work
and includes time spent on administrative duties including time spent
on travel to a work site while on company payroll (i.e. repositioning or
deadheading).
FTL Flight Time Limitations
HHO Helicopter Hoist Operations
IAMSAR International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
LIMSAR Limited SAR - A SAR service performed by a dedicated rescue helicopter

and crew, where one or more SAR systems (auto hover, FLIR, search
radar, long range radio, double hoist system) are temporarily
inoperative or degraded, or when a crewmember is temporarily missing.
LVO Low Visibility Operations Approval – A regulatory approval allowing to

Approval conduct operations using specific procedures in reduced visibility.
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation – The “Rescue” of a person from a “Distress

Incident”. (See definitions of “Rescue” and “Distress Incident”)
MEL Minimum Equipment List
MER Medical Emergency Response
NAA National Aviation Authority
NVIS Night Vision Imaging System
NVD Night Vision Device
PLB Personal Locator Beacon
Rescue An operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial

medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety.
Search and The performance of distress monitoring, communication, coordination

Rescue and search and rescue functions, including the provision of medical
(SAR) advice, initial medical assistance, or medical evacuation, through the
Service use of public and private resources, including cooperating aircraft,
vessels and other craft and installations.
SAR Duty Period: duty hours when a crew member is at work and includes
Readiness time spent on administrative duties, immediate readiness or standby
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readiness.
Immediate Readiness: A duty period when crewmembers are to be in
close proximity to the operating base and be able to normally take off
safely within 30 minutes of receipt of an authorised instruction.
Standby Readiness: A duty period throughout which crewmembers are
to be continuously contactable and in a state of readiness such that a
flight may normally commence within 60 minutes of an authorised
instruction.
SAR Tasking An emergency mission to search for, locate and rescue a person (or
persons) in an abnormal environment, and whose life is, or may be,
threatened if not removed to a place of safety or provided with
immediate protection or assistance.
SAR Training A dedicated flight to improve crew proficiency and achieve currency in
SAR related procedures. Can be further broken down (including
emergency procedures where appropriate) to include;
Dry training: SAR procedures/Hoisting to overland scenarios
Wet training: SAR procedures/Hoisting to overwater scenarios

(including life rafts) with no fixed hover reference
Deck training: SAR procedures/Hoisting to vessels/platforms either

stationary or moving
SAR AFCS training: SAR procedures/Hoisting utilising the aircraft AFCS

system
Visual/Radar/EO-IR/Homer training: on-board search sensors procedure

training
Search An operation, normally coordinated by a rescue coordination centre or

rescue sub-centre, using available personnel and facilities to locate
persons in distress.
Secondary Other tasking performed by the SAR aircraft. May include patient
Tasking transfer (hospital to hospital), aid to Civil Authority, Disaster Relief,
Counter-Pollution operations, under slung loads, airborne surveillance,
etc. The aircraft’s primary task will, by its very nature, take priority
over Secondary Tasking, and the ultimate responsibility for prioritising
shall remain with the controlling authority.
Survivor A person, other than a member of the helicopter flight- or technical

crew who is to be transferred by hoist or otherwise recovered into the
aircraft.
Technical Suitably qualified, current and competent dedicated members of a SAR

Crew aircraft crew, excluding Flight Crew (pilots), instrumental to the mission
or task. This may include all or a combination of hoist operator,
winchman, helicopter (para) medic, and survival specialist (rescue
swimmer).
SAFETY
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SAR operations shall be formally hazard/ risk assessed as part of the aircraft operator’s Safety
Management System (SMS). Additionally, safety controls for SAR operations, identified
through the hazard/ risk assessment processes, shall be included in the operator’s internal
Quality Assurance (QA) program.
SAR PROCEDURES DOCUMENTATION

The Air Operator Certificate (AOC) holder shall be approved by the local National Aviation
Authority to conduct Search and Rescue (SAR) activities if such an approval is issued in the
country of operation. A Supplement in the Operations Manual forms part of the AOC, which is
the “license” to perform the activities. Essentially, this supplement covers any modifications or
additions to the Operations Manual that may be needed to specifically address licensing,
airworthiness, technical, operational and training issues.
The SAR procedures shall be documented and include the following sections;
Administration & control Radio & Visual communications
Authorisation & call out procedures SAR response criteria
Crew experience & qualifications Weather minima & limitations for SAR
Training & Recency requirements SAR Operations; Normal & Emergency

Procedures
Duties & responsibilities SAR Hoisting; Normal & Emergency

Procedures
Pre-flight preparation & briefing Emergency care protocols (where applicable)
Search procedures Recording of hoist cycles and SAR Reports
SAR equipment
Minimum Equipment List (MEL)
Minimum Mission Essential Equipment List
(MMEEL)
Performance criteria Aircraft specification & role equipment
Fuel planning Approved exemptions from National

Regulations
5. CREW COMPOSITION
The minimum crew composition for SAR shall be no less than two pilots, one hoist operator and
one winchman/survival specialist (rescue swimmer). Consideration should be given to providing
a second rescue swimmer in case the first swimmer in the water is disabled during actual SAR
operations.
National regulations may specify the level of medical licensing required for the technical crew.
Where no regulations are in place, Shell Health shall be consulted to determine the level of
medical competency required for technical crew
6. TRAINING
6.1 CHECKING AND TRAINING
Checking and training shall be conducted in accordance with a detailed syllabus approved by the
National Aviation Authority, if available, or in accordance with the requirements detailed in this
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document. Flight crews and technical crews shall be assessed during an annual day proficiency
check or night proficiency check where night SAR/ HHO are approved.
Helicopter SAR is a highly specialised role for helicopter pilots & technical crewmembers. A SAR
crew will require a substantial amount of training in order for them to carry out the multitude of
tasks effectively. SAR crew training shall include a comprehensive initial and continuation
training program. Initial training shall include a comprehensive program that incorporates a
ground and flight training syllabus that progresses a pilot, co-pilot, winchman and hoist
operator through day onshore, offshore and night onshore and offshore SAR procedures.
Continuation training shall be conducted using a comprehensive training syllabi that includes
day and night training (when night SAR is possible) for all SAR crews.
Realistic training within the bounds of safe propriety is essential to the successful completion of
aviation missions. Pilots and aircrew must maintain sound knowledge of operational hazards,
emergency procedures, and aircraft systems, along with a high level of psychomotor skills to
operate complex aircraft and systems safely and successfully. Such skills deteriorate rapidly if
not exercised regularly. Pilots shall be provided with realistic training opportunities in aircraft
simulators to experience demanding situations that would not otherwise be feasible due to the
risks. Pilots and aircrews shall be afforded other training opportunities in-flight (e.g., hoisting,
air drops, instrument approaches) and on the ground (e.g., egress and survival). Effective and
focused use should be made of structured training time to maximise benefit to both individual
and crew performance. The operator shall provide a detailed risk based training plan for review
and approval by the Shell business unit aviation staff or SAI.
A nominated “safety cover” boat shall be underway or a SAR-capable helicopter with effective
two-way communications shall be airborne or in an immediate readiness duty status in a
location that enables it to render assistance in a timeframe that is appropriate to the local
conditions and survival times for all rotary wing over water training flights that include the
following maneuvers:
• Prolonged over water hovering or hoist training;

• Night approaches to the water that descend below 200 feet, including fully automated and
manual approaches;
• Rescue swimmer/live wet training.
Continuous visual contact with the operation shall be established by the cover boat prior to
deploying the winchman/rescue swimmer to the water.
If a helicopter provides cover it shall have a hoist fitted to the aircraft and be capable of
recovering the persons in the water if necessary. If a cover boat is provided it shall be able to
pull an incapacitated person from the water without causing further injury.
Before starting any of the training operations mentioned above, the type of training, location
(lat/long), and the number of persons aboard the helicopter will be passed to and acknowledged
by the vessel or helicopter providing cover.
SAR hoist operations shall be conducted in a helicopter capable of sustaining an engine failure
with the remaining engine at the appropriate power setting to provide the aircrew with the
ability to transition from a hover to safe forward flight without hazard to the aircraft, suspended
person(s)/cargo, third parties or property.
The ability to transition safely from a hover to forward flight after an engine failure shall be
supported by approved OEM performance graphs for the atmospheric conditions in which
hoisting is to be conducted.
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For SAR hoist operations, once established in the operating area, the aircraft commander shall
verify and update the pre-flight performance planning taking into consideration the actual
atmospheric and aircraft operating conditions and confirm the ability to transition from a hover
to safe forward flight following an engine failure.
Exceptions to the OEI performance requirements listed above may only be considered if
authorised by the National Aviation Authority, with approved procedures, through an Ops Spec
or by regulation and the operator has established risk mitigation measures for hoisting without
OEI performance that have been accepted by SAL
6.2 PILOTS
6.2.1 Experience
The minimum experience levels for SAR shall not be less than the local regulatory requirements
for public transport category hoist operations or equivalent. In the absence of any National
Regulations with more stringent requirements the following guidelines shall apply:
Minimum Requirements
Captain Co-Pilot
Total hours – In accordance with the requirements Total hours – In accordance with the
of the SGRAO Pt. 1; App. 1A for Captains. requirements of the SGRAO Pt. 1; App.
1A for Co-Pilots.
Only aircrew with at least one year & 500 hrs Previous SAR experience is preferred,
previous maritime SAR experience shall be but not mandatory.
acceptable.
Hold a valid line check certificate as a SAR Hold a valid line check certificate as a
Commander. SAR Co-Pilot.
Hold any valid specialist competency certificate as Hold any valid specialist competency
a SAR Commander appropriate to the certificate as a SAR Co-Pilot
location/contract (i.e. External Load competency, appropriate to the location/contract
etc.) (i.e. External Load competency, etc.)
Aircrew shall be dedicated to a SAR unit for a minimum period of 6 months.
Successful completion of a formal SAR training course or previous SAR experience, that has
been reviewed and endorsed by Shell Aircraft International, that includes at least 50 hoist
cycles** conducted offshore. 20 hoist cycles** shall be at night if night operations are being
conducted offshore.
**A hoist cycle means one down-and-up cycle of the hoist hook.
6.2.2 Proficiency Training

All SAR pilots conducting hoist operations shall complete a minimum of 14 hoist cycles within
the previous 90 days, including transitions to and from the hover. In order to minimise overall
risk exposure and incorporate SAR-specific emergency response procedures into flight/
approach proficiency training, the use of a Shell-approved flight simulator that is of the same
type, model, and series as the aircraft on-contract is recommended. The table below shows the
summary of proficiency training required for maritime SAR operations:
Operational Training Criteria
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Deck Training 6 hoist cycles (one of each to be completed at night

unless seasonal limitations preclude night training (high
(Every 90 days) latitudes) - to include (minimum);
- 2 - High/trail line
- 2 - Vessel Dead in the Water*
- 2 - Vessel Underway
* Can be substituted with Vessel Underway if HOGE OEI

performance requirements cannot be achieved due to
atmospheric conditions.
Wet training (Every 90 days) 8 hoist cycles (one of each to be completed at night
latitudes). – to include (minimum);
2 - dummy/drum lifts*
2 - live lifts**
2 - basket lifts (where appropriate***)
2 - free fall rescue swimmer deployments (where

appropriate***)
* Can be substituted with live or basket lifts
** Where survivors face a hypothermia threat,

lifting/hoisting hypothermic survivors shall be practiced.
*** If these devices/ deployment methods are not used,

it is expected that the operator will conduct four
additional Wet lifts with other rescue devices for
proficiency.
Approaches to the water 6* – FMS to Flight Director/ Auto Pilot fully coupled
(Every 90 days) patterns to a hover. 3 to be completed at night (unless
seasonal limitations preclude night training (high
latitudes)).
6* - Manual approaches to hover (where approved/

appropriate). 3 to be completed at night (unless seasonal
limitations preclude night training (high latitudes)).
* No more than 50% of the required approaches to the

water may be completed in a Shell-approved simulator
within a 90-day period.
Night/Simulated IMC At least 3 hours’ night/simulated IMC SAR training to

include all SAR coupled modes and hoisting shall be
(Every 90 days) conducted.
Whenever possible (if night ops are not seasonally

limited) training shall be conducted at night and not under
simulated conditions.
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Instrument Flying Instrument flying proficiency shall be of a higher level

than normal.
A further one hour of general instrument flying practice

during the previous 60 days (actual or simulated). To
include 2 precision/non-precision approaches.
Low level SAR Instrument Flight handling (below 200 ft.)

within the previous 30 days.
General 2x - Radar to EO-IR/FLIR homing searches.
(Every 90 days) 2x* - Beacon (e.g. PLB) homing searches, as appropriate.
2x - NVIS flights (when NVIS are approved) in the aircraft

or approved full flight simulator.
2x - Search techniques using on-board sensors/FMS and

NVD’s as appropriate (when NVD’s are approved).
2x - Dual hoist hook changeover. (when approved in the

RFM).
2x - Emergencies and equipment malfunctions, as

required.
2x -Confined Area Landing (CALs) if onshore SAR is

contracted.
Mountain flying & hoisting operations – amount &

frequency to be defined in the SAR procedures
documentation where appropriate.
*2x - Beacon (e.g. PLB) homing searches. May be

completed in a Shell-approved flight simulator.
6.3 TECHNICAL CREW

6.3.1 EXPERIENCE
Only experienced and competent technical crew, preferably with past SAR experience, shall be
used. Each crewmember shall successfully complete a formal training course that has been
reviewed and endorsed by Shell Aircraft International. Each crewmember shall also pass annual
competency (role and line) checks.
Minimum Requirements
Hoist Operator Rescue Swimmer/ Winchman

Completed a formal training course or previous Completed a formal training course or
experience that included at least 50 hoist cycles* previous experience that included at
conducted offshore. 20 hoist cycles* shall be at least 50 hoist cycles* conducted
night if night operations are conducted offshore. offshore. 20 hoist cycles* shall be at
night if night operations are conducted
offshore.
Hold a valid Line check certificate as a hoist Hold a valid Line check certificate as a
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operator. rescue swimmer/winchman.
Technical Crew shall be dedicated to a SAR unit for a minimum period of 6 months.
At least one of the SAR technical crewmembers shall hold at least a basic Emergency
Medical Technician (EMT) or equivalent certification/ approved by the appropriate regulatory
agency unless a stand-alone EMT or medical equivalent is serving as an additional member
of the crew.
*A hoist cycle means one down-and-up cycle of the hoist hook.
6.3.2 PROFICIENCY TRAINING

All technical crew shall complete the minimum operational training outlined in the following
table.
Operational Training) Criteria

Deck Training 6 deck hoist circuits (One of each to be completed at night
(Every 90 days) latitudes) - to include;
- 2 high/trail line
- 2 stretcher/basket lifts
- 2 Crew Hover Trim (where appropriate) *
* If not appropriate, it is expected that two additional

hoists with other rescue devices will be conducted.
Wet Training 8 hoist evolutions (One of each to be completed at night

(Every 90 days) latitudes) – to include (minimum);
2 dummy/drum lifts*
2 live lifts**
2 basket lifts (where appropriate***)
- 2 free fall rescue swimmer deployments (where

appropriate***)
* Can be substituted with live or basket lifts
** Where survivors face a hypothermia threat,

lifting/hoisting hypothermic survivors shall be practiced
*** If these devices/ deployment methods are not used it

is expected that the operator will conduct four additional
Wet lifts with other rescue devices for proficiency.
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General 2x - Search techniques using on-board sensors (e.g. EO-

IR/FLIR), and NVG’s as appropriate.
(Every 90 days)
2x - NVIS flights (when NVIS are approved) either in the
aircraft or approved full flight simulator.
2x - Dual hoist hook changeover. (when approved in the

RFM)
2x - Emergencies and equipment malfunctions, as

required.
2x -Confined Area Landing (CALs) if onshore SAR is

contracted. *
*Mountain flying & hoisting operations – amount &

frequency to be defined in the SAR procedures
documentation where appropriate.
7. HELICOPTERS, EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONS

The Shell Group has established specific requirements to ensure any aircraft contracted for SAR
activity shall be a late generation model with the performance, range and experienced crew
composition to enable safe SAR operations.
It is recognised that some Operations do not permit helicopter rescue from the water due to
various limitations such as: limited helicopter performance, national restrictions or contractual
requirements. In this case, the role of any Shell contracted helicopter shall be limited to
“search” activities whilst directing marine rescue vessels or other SAR assets to the scene of
incident.
7.1 HELICOPTERS
When selecting a suitable SAR helicopter, the following shall apply:
• The SAR helicopter shall be a late generation twin-engine aircraft with the equipment fit
identified in Section 7.2 and shall be operated in accordance with the requirements stated in
Section 6;
• Range and endurance of the SAR helicopter shall be able to cover the area of operations;
and
• The helicopter shall be of a size and weight to be able to land to many helidecks within the
area of operations and be able to hoist to all the helidecks within the area of operations.
7.2 EQUIPMENT
High specification communications, navigation and search aids are fundamental to helicopters
operating in a search, rescue and recovery role. Therefore, they must carry equipment that
enables the flight crew to communicate with all of the agencies and resources involved in an
incident, comprehensive navigation equipment, and specialist search aids to locate and rescue
survivor’s/recover casualties from the sea. The table below provides the minimum equipment
approved for use and required for a SAR helicopter.
Equipment
Equipment Item Outline Specification
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• Twin Engine with Single-Engine HOGE capability.

• Meets the minimum Shell Group requirements for
offshore helicopters equipment fit on long-term
contracts.
• Bubble windows located at each side of the fuselage
Airframe (where available).
• Automatic Flight Control System
• 4 Axis Auto pilot (Auto Hover System)
• Dual RADALT
• Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) with
Localizer Performance with Vertical guidance (LPV)
capability / GPS
• Dual, permanently mounted, electrically powered

• Variable speed unit
• Load capability of at least 600 lbs (272 kg)
Primary Rescue Hoist • Cable length of at least 290 ft. (85 m)
• Hoist speeds with a minimum of 150 ft./min
• Hoist fitted with guillotine (cable shear function)
operable from the hoist operator and pilot’s positions
• Rotatable landing/search lights

• Fixed winch area flood lights
External lighting • Manually operated search light at winching position
• Door/Hoist mounted hoist operator hand lamp
• Satellite communications, may be a part of the

satellite tracking system
• Multi-channel VHF (AM) Air Band
Communication Equipment for • Multi-channel VHF (FM) Marine Band
SAR Role • Multi-channel UHF (if appropriate to area of
operations)
• Winchman’s waterproof radio for communicating with
flight crew throughout SAR operation
• Multi-frequency homing, equipment on VHF (AM), VHF

Homing Equipment (FM) 406 MHz and UHF.
• Capable* of detecting a 6-10-person life raft in wave

heights of 2-5 ft.
• Capability is based on the table for “Sweep Widths for
Forward-Looking Airborne Radar” in the US National
Search Radar Search and Rescue Supplant to IAMSAR. In wave
heights >6 ft. the Sweep Width is 0 for a 6-10-person
life raft. Sweep Width is defined as: A measure of the
effectiveness with which a particular sensor can detect
a particular object under specific environmental
conditions.
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• Suitable Electro Optic – Infrared sensors

Search Sensor
• Helmet mounted NVIS for Pilot, Co-pilot and hoist

Night Vision Imaging System operator. (Optional, if not approved by the local
Regulator)
• Area Navigation System – with multi sensor inputs

including GPS and VOR/DME
Navigation Equipment • Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator (E-HSI)
• Offshore precision approach capability (OSAP, NDB-
ARA, etc.)
• One pair bolt croppers or similar equipment

• 2x Dispatcher harness for crew restraint
• 3x Single lift strops and static line
• Stretchers as appropriate to the operating
Miscellaneous Equipment environment
• FM Marine Band hand held radios
• Side facing passenger/survivor seats. When required
by type of operation, must be approved by the OEM
and meet FAR/JAR 29, CS-29 requirements
• The type of medical equipment to be carried is to be

Medical Equipment directed by local National Regulation and based on
level of medical support/ accreditation of the medical
persons on-board the aircraft.
7.3 OPERATIONS
The standards for SAR crew readiness, flying duties and rest periods shall meet the Shell Group
minimum requirements (see 7.3.4) and shall be clearly stated in the SAR procedures
documentation. There shall be sufficient numbers and type of personnel to provide 24 hours,
365 days/year coverage and the total number assigned shall be consistent with the SAR
operations schedule. This can either be delivered through 12 or 24-hour shift rotations but the
corresponding FTL and rest period minimums shall be adhered to and not mixed. These
provisions are only to be used by flight and technical crew employed on dedicated SAR
operations.
Maintenance and Operations support and services shall be designed to support and cover the
operation for 24-hours and attend to all routine and call-out flight coordination and planning,
flight inspections, fault diagnosis, scheduled & unscheduled maintenance, etc.
In the event that the primary SAR helicopter is not available to meet the readiness state, a
replacement or back-up helicopter should be provided within one hour from the time of the
unserviceability being declared. If a replacement or back-up helicopter is not available or is
available with reduced capability, the Shell Business Unit shall develop a risk/ exposure
reduction plan to continue operations with reduced SAR coverage.
7.3.1. Weather Minima
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Weather requirements for SAR operations will be implemented in accordance with National
Regulations and the operators’ SAR Approval. If no such weather minima are provided, all SAR
operations (training and operational flights) shall be conducted in accordance with either the
national requirements for CAT operations or Shell weather minima documented in the SGRAO
Part 1, the more conservative weather minima (higher ceiling and visibility) will apply. Night
flights shall be flown using only IFR procedures and minimums where available and authorised
by the National Aviation Authority, otherwise the night weather requirements in SGRAO Part 1
shall apply.
7.3.2. Low Visibility Operations (LVO)
LVO operations shall be approved and conducted in accordance with National Regulations and
operator’s SAR approvals. Where National Regulations are silent on the subject, EASA Air
Operations, Annex V, PartSPA, Subpart E shall be used.
7.3.3. Night Vision Imaging Systems (NVIS)
The use of NVIS shall be approved and conducted in accordance with National Regulations.
Where National Regulations are silent on the subject EASA Air Operations, Annex V, PartSPA,
Subpart H shall be used. Where NVIS are used, an annual proficiency check is required for both
flight and technical crews in the aircraft or in a Shell-approved full flight simulator. Where NVIS
are used during SAR, a proficiency check is required in the aircraft to demonstrate proficiency
during hoist operations.
7.3.4. Continuous 24 Hour Duty Period
If a crew member is rostered for a continuous 24-hour duty period, the following provisions
shall apply:
• SAR crews assigned to 24-hour duty where allowed by National Regulation and where only
training and currency flights are conducted shall have no less than 12 hours of on-call rest
per 24-hour period which is reducible to 11 hours where accommodation is close to the
place of work. When reducing the required 12 hour on-call rest period to 11 hours, the place
of accommodation shall be no more than 30 minutes from the place of work under normal
conditions. These requirements apply to both pilots and technical crew.
• Where SAR Technical Crew are drawn from Maintenance or Operations staff, they shall only
conduct tasks directly associated with their responsibilities as a SAR crewman for the SAR
aircraft whilst on duty.
• Consideration should be given to conducting SAR training flights after the on-call rest period
and at the beginning of the standby period.
• The duty period shall be followed by a minimum off duty period of 24hrs.
• A crew room with comfortable seating and facilities for meals and refreshments shall be
available for the immediate readiness period.
• The SAR procedures shall clearly state if, when, and how these regulations can be adjusted
in exceptional circumstances in order to maintain operational SAR readiness. It shall also
include an auditable management information, authorisation and reporting process to record
any adjustment, including a recorded assessment by the individual and/or crew SAR
Commander of fatigue level, weather and/or nature of tasking as appropriate before
accepting any change.
• If the crew have been called out from a period of standby readiness, then only distress/SAR
operations or flights required to maintain an operational SAR state shall be flown in the
remainder of that duty period. The SAR procedures documentation shall cover this topic in
detail.
7.3.5 12 Hour Standby
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The current Commercial Air Transport Flight Time Limits documented in SGRAO Part 1, Section
5 shall be followed with the following provisions.
A SAR Commander, having taken into consideration the circumstances of the crew, may
exercise his discretion to extend an FDP in order to continue urgent SAR operations. If an FDP is
extended, then the subsequent rest period shall be a minimum of 12 hrs. Any such extension
shall be recorded and audited in accordance with published SAR procedures documentation.
8. SAR/MEDEVAC/CAT OPTIONS
8.1 PRIMARY SAR
This is a specialist helicopter providing SAR support including offshore day and night hoisting
capabilities. This aircraft would be dedicated to the SAR task and require a high level of
recurrent crew training with sufficient crew numbers to allow 24 hr availability for day and night
operations. As a dedicated resource, the aircraft is available at very short notice with mission
availability of 100%.
A second standby SAR aircraft may also be available. This should be a SAR modified aircraft but
its primary role can be passenger transport. As a secondary task it should be capable of
providing the same level of SAR support as a Primary SAR aircraft. Normally when called upon
to conduct SAR, the aircraft would have to be fitted with all of the specialist SAR equipment
which includes hoist, FLIR, etc. SAR crew operating the second standby aircraft shall meet the
same qualification and recency requirements as Primary SAR crew.
8.1.1 Limited SAR (LIMSAR)

Primary SAR can be temporarily downgraded to LIMSAR, as stated in the Glossary, in the event
of either;
a. An aircraft that does not fully meet the equipment fit standards or when one or more SAR
systems (auto hover, FLIR, search radar, long range comms, double hoist system) are
temporarily inoperative or degraded. The lack of complete SAR equipment/system fit on the
aircraft may require weather limits to be increased, sea state limits to be reduced, or entire
procedures, e.g. hoisting at night, to be prohibited.
b. SAR team is temporarily missing one SAR technical crewmember.
Enhanced Operational Control (EOC) procedures shall be developed to launch a LIMSAR aircraft
into conditions beyond its documented capabilities.
8.2 MEDEVAC
Response to a SAR request and an associated request for a MEDEVAC shall be risk based. By
definition, a MEDEVAC is the rescue of a person in a distress incident in which life, limb or sight
is imperilled. Therefore, a MEDEVAC for a person in a distress incident shall be conducted as a
SAR mission in accordance with the operator’s SAR or MEDEVAC approval and the alleviations
permitted by the Regulator. However, the transport of persons not in distress (when a medical
professional determines that an illness or injury does not warrant an immediate evacuation)
shall be conducted under National/EASA CAT requirements even if the mission is conducted by a
contracted SAR operator capable of operating to the alleviations in their SAR or MEDEVAC
approval. The final determination if a person is in distress and in need of an immediate
MEDEVAC shall be made by a suitable medical professional through the process documented in
the Company’s SAR/ MEDEVAC call-out procedures.
Where aircraft operators are only approved to conduct a “MEDEVAC” using CAT requirements by
the National Aviation Authority under a “MEDEVAC approval”, they may do so for both persons
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in distress and non-distress, however, in both cases the flights shall be operated to CAT
requirements. Aircraft that conduct MEDEVACs shall be suitably equipped for the task.
8.3 COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT HELICOPTER HOIST OPERATIONS (CAT HHO)

Helicopters shall only be operated for the purpose of CAT HHO if the operator has been
approved by the competent authority. All CAT HHO aircraft shall comply with National or EASA
CAT regulations or the requirements of this document when they are more conservative
(training requirements, crew experience and qualification, etc.). This can be a dedicated SAR
aircraft and crew in this case, however, the aircraft does not fully meet the equipment fit
standards and the crew may not be fully trained or proficient in all SAR manoeuvres, therefore
limiting their SAR response capabilities. The lack of specialised equipment on the aircraft and
training by the crew may require weather limits to be increased, sea state limits to be reduced
or entire procedures, i.e. hoisting at night, to be prohibited. Except where authorised by a SAR
approval during an operational distress mission (MEDEVAC), CAT HHO shall be capable of
sustaining a critical engine failure with the remaining engine(s) at the appropriate power setting
without hazard to the suspended person(s)/cargo, third parties or property. A thorough
assessment of the operators CAT HHO capabilities shall be conducted prior to contracted
operations. Response limitations shall be documented in the organisations ERP and call-out
procedures. Enhanced Operational Control (EOC) procedures shall be developed for a launch of
an HHO aircraft into conditions beyond its documented capabilities.
9. RESPONSE TO OFFSHORE MEDICAL EMERGENCIES

MEDEVACs shall be conducted in accordance with the guidance in Section 8.2 of this document.
The Shell Group’s Emergency Response Management Manual requires each business unit (BU)
to “Establish and maintain a medical Emergency Response Procedure as part of the overall
Emergency Response Plan The HSSE&SP Control Framework Emergency Response Management
Specification requirement details the required medical response times. In all cases, BU’s shall
comply with Section 11.6.2 of this manual. Additionally, as stated in the requirement, “When
response times above cannot be met, perform a Risk Assessment and provide medical
Emergency Response Risk Mitigation measures to verify that the Risks are As Low As
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Remote health care will be evaluated in the ALARP
assessment”. This Risk Assessment shall also address the requirements documented in Sec 11.8
of this manual.
10. CENTRAL SAR COORDINATION

Formalised, documented procedures shall exist to provide a SAR authorisation process including
‘authorisation to launch’. This process shall be integrated within the wider BU’s Emergency
Response Plan taking care that all search and rescue facilities such as; Rescue Coordination
Center (RCC), local or national assets and contracted marine vessels are included in the
interface arrangements. The method by which coordination is achieved may vary depending on
the location of the activity.
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Shell:
External:
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OTH 03.00 – Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)

Operations


1. Comply with Shell company requirements prior to commencing any RPAS operations.
2. Implement a Safety Management System (SMS) 1, which covers a detailed operational risk
assessment, incident and accident tracking and a quality assurance process.
3. Implement an Emergency Response Plan (ERP) to cover all emergencies, loss of control of
the RPAS, lost link procedures and actions required if the RPAS flies beyond its range of
reception or control.
4. Prevent the overflight of persons, vessels, vehicles and structures not under the control of
the pilot and described in the risk assessment.
5. Permit any line-of-sight operation only to occur in daylight/visual conditions.
6. Document in the appropriate manual all phases of the operation including pre-flight, launch
and recovery, and all normal and emergency flight operations.
7. Ensure that pilots meet minimum training requirements.
8. Ensure that pilots meet minimum competence requirements.
9. Have a maintenance programme approved by the National Aviation Authority (NAA, if
applicable), or in conjunction with the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).
10. Ensure that the RPAS is inspected and deemed airworthy by a qualified technician prior to
each flight.
11. Record formally all maintenance actions, defects, flight records and duty times.

1. Shell company requirements for RPAS operations are:
a. Have appropriate licences, permits and authorisations required by the cognisant
National Aviation Authority (NAA);
b. All required operational permits acquired;
c. Completed and documented a risk assessment, which should involve as a minimum:
1
It is recognised that the size and complexity of the Operator will be reflected in the structure and complexity of the
elements of the SMS.
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i. The Operator;
ii. The asset owner or representative:
• Subject matter experts on any safety-critical or operations critical infrastructure
or assets within the flight area; and
• Health and Safety management.
iii. Shell Aircraft representative (or designate).
d. Have adequate levels of insurance in order to meet operator liabilities in the event of an
incident or accident; and
e. Notifications shall be issued to ensure all manned aircraft within the operating area have
been notified of the activity.
2. The Safety and Quality system should cover as a minimum:
a. An established hazard register and hazard identification process. A hazard analysis
should be completed prior to beginning flight operations in a new location, or when a
new RPAS is employed at an existing location. All risks should be evaluated according to
a Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM), and the results of any risk controls should be
evaluated through a Gap Analysis process;
b. An incident reporting system that tracks and reports all mishaps, potential mishaps,
control link events, and near misses. This system should provide for analysis and
improvements made as a part of the operator's SMS. All mishaps, incidents and
anomalies should be tracked and reported to the appropriate NAA when necessary; and
c. A quality system that covers all elements of the operation.
3. As a minimum, the ERP should address the following considerations:
a. Lost Link Procedures; There are many acceptable approaches to satisfy lost link
requirements. The intent of any lost link procedure is to ensure airborne operations
remain predictable;
b. Lost Link Procedures shall comply with regulatory requirements and the lost link solution
shall comply with the last Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearance (if applicable);
c. The appropriate ATC facility shall be notified immediately (if applicable);
d. An incident response checklist, approved as part of the flight operations manual, should
be followed in the event of an incident or accident;
e. Lost Link Procedures should avoid flight over any populated areas and hazards, as well
as any frequently travelled flight paths;
f. The time and duration of each lost link event should be recorded by the operator and
reported through the incident reporting process; and
g. The designated return site should be clear of any personnel and hazards in the event of
an immediate lost link return to base and landing.
4. As a minimum, the Operations Manual should include:
a. Checklist information for pre-flight, in-flight, post-flight, emergency procedures, and
limitations;
b. RPAS systems and performance;
c. Flight Duty period (FDP) - A maximum limit of 12 hours FDP shall be required;
d. Rest Periods - A formal schedule for rest periods shall be laid down;
e. Crew rest and crew mission day requirements, including consecutive days worked;
f. Flight Duty period (FDP) - A maximum limit of 12 hours FDP shall be required. This
should be reduced in the case of early morning or evening starts;
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g. Maximum cumulative flying hours - No Pilot In Command (PIC) or reserve pilot should
be at the controls of an RPAS for more than 8 hours in one day, to include no longer
than 3 hours in succession;
h. Rest Periods - RPAS crews should have the opportunity of no less than 12 hours of
uninterrupted rest prior to flight operations. This may be reduced to 11 hours where
accommodation is close to the place of work; and
i. Crew rest and crew mission day requirements, including consecutive days worked. They
should not normally work more than 7 consecutive days between days off and should
normally have not less than 2 consecutive days off in 14.
5. Notification to other potential users of the airspace and appropriate regulatory authorities
should be issued with ample time for those operators/regulators to plan appropriately.
Ensure no simultaneous operations between RPAS and manned aircraft are planned in the
same area. The following should take place prior to operations:
a. File Notice to Airmen (NOTAM);
b. Notify local airspace users (in addition to NOTAM). Include at least:
i. Date and time range;
ii. Precise location;
iii. Altitude range;
iv. RPAS type and description (what to look for);
v. Frequencies monitored and call sign; and
vi. Contact information to coordinate, de-conflict and exchange other information.
6. The minimum training and competence requirements are:
a. RPAS pilots shall meet applicable NAA licensing, training and testing requirements for
each class or type of RPAS they will operate (if applicable);
b. The licensing shall be appropriate and as required by RPAS system type certification or
determination of airworthiness (if applicable);
c. Be operationally trained and competency assessed on the specific type and model;
d. Be licensed or otherwise certified/approved by the relevant NAA (if applicable) to
operate the specific type and model;
e. Operate the RPAS in accordance with all relevant NAA regulations (if applicable), and
any locally mandated requirements;
f. Be responsible for maintaining a safe distance from any other aircraft;
g. Complete a dedicated training programme, with appropriate medical requirements;
h. The training programme should be appropriate for each role, the environment and
mission the operator is expected to perform;
i. The training programme at a minimum should cover currency, evaluation, emergency
procedure proficiency, systems knowledge and specialised tasks;
j. All training programmes should comply, or be consistent with manufacturer's
recommended training programmes; and
k. The Operator should have a training/briefing programme for all allocated persons onsite
that are part of the RPAS operation (e.g. Safety Observers), who are not employed by
the operator.
7. The maintenance programme should, at a minimum:
a. Have a maintenance policy and a procedures manual;
b. Be in line with the aircraft manufacturers recommendations;
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c. Include a pre-flight and post-flight inspection of the aircraft and have an associated
logbook to track inspections;
d. Include a pre-flight and post-flight inspection of the ground control station;
e. Incorporate a logbook to track flight hours and any inspection replacement times and
life limited items (e.g. batteries, rotors);
f. Document software and hardware changes as part of the maintenance procedures;
g. Maintain a record of malfunctions (e.g. loss of link), anomalies and damaged parts; and
h. Maintenance training and evaluation program for each operated system.
8. Batteries should have:
a. Maintenance procedures that include a process to assess battery capacity and track the
details;
b. All RPAS operators should have a battery safety program that includes:
i. Documentation with appropriate Safety Data Sheets included in the RPAS flight
manual, battery tracking systems and battery log books;
ii. Battery storage plans that include storage and charging in fire proof containers;
iii. Battery inspection procedures and requirements;
iv. Procedures for thermal runaway, determination of battery pack capacity; and
v. Recommended procedures for safe transportation of the batteries that are compliant
with applicable regulations and work site requirements.
9. A Minimum Essential Subsystem List (MESL) or similar list should be established for the
entire system. The MESLs lay the ground work for reporting the status of RPAS system,
ground control station and communications link availability. They list the minimum essential
systems and subsystems that should work on a RPAS, ground control station and
communications. The MESL should include required equipment necessary for the specific
mission and could include items such as ground control stations, sensors, back‐up power
supplies, lighting systems, transponder, and back-up antennas.
10. Ensure any RPAS used for the company meets specific company requirements:
a. An airworthiness certificate or otherwise be certified as airworthy by the appropriate
NAA (if applicable);
b. Adequate security to protect the system from unauthorised modification, interference,
corruption or control/command action;
c. A back-up power supply system for the ground station to provide continued operation
should the main power system fail;
d. An approved airborne collision avoidance system for use in beyond visual line of sight
operations when available;
e. Functionality to provide the pilot with appropriate information to monitor and control its
operation. Provision shall be made for the pilot to be able to intervene and override the
system (e.g. abort take-off, go-around);
f. Ergonomic standards that ensure the pilot works in an environment that is fit for
purpose, does not create distractions and provides an environment that will allow pilots
to maintain alertness throughout a shift period; and
g. A battery maintenance and transport programme.
1. CAP 722, Unmanned Aircraft System Operation in UK, Airspace - Guidance
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2. HSAC RP UASRP 15-1, Unmanned Aerial Systems Guidelines

3. ICAO Circular 328-AN/190, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
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External:
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Aircraft Glossary Definitions
Ad Hoc:
For the avoidance of doubt, within this document, the term ad hoc shall be interpreted to
mean “for a special, particular purpose only”, and cannot be applied to routine or frequently
recurring, scheduled use. Ad hoc use may not extend beyond three months unless the total
usage is less than 10 hours per month.
Aerial Work:
An aircraft operation in which an aircraft is used for specialised services such as agriculture,
construction, photography, surveying, observation and patrol, search and rescue, aerial
advertisement, etc.
Aerodrome operating minima:
The limits of usability of aerodrome for:
a. Take-off, expressed in terms of runway visual range and/or visibility and, if necessary,
cloud conditions;
b. Landing in precision approach and landing operations, expressed in terms of visibility
and/or runway visual range and decision altitude/height (DA/H) as appropriate to the
category of the operation; and
c. Landing in non-precision approach and landing operations, expressed in terms of
visibility and/or runway visual range, minimum descent altitude/height (MDA/H) and, if
necessary, cloud conditions.
Aircraft:
Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air, other
than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.
Aircraft Operating Manual:

A manual, acceptable to the State of the Operator, containing normal, abnormal and
emergency procedures, checklists, limitations, performance information, details of the
aircraft systems and other material relevant to the operation of the aircraft.
Note - The aircraft operating manual is part of the operations manual.
Aiming Circle:
Described in other publications as “landing circle” or “touch down marking”; the aiming
point for normal landing, so designed that the pilot’s seat can be placed directly above it in
any direction with assured main and tail rotor clearances.
Air operator Certificate (AOC):

A certificate authorising an operator to carry out specified commercial air transport
operations.
Alternate Aerodrome:
An aerodrome to which an aircraft may proceed when it becomes either impossible or
inadvisable to proceed to or to land at the aerodrome of intended landing. Alternate
aerodromes include the following:
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Take-off alternate. An alternate aerodrome at which an aircraft can land should this become
necessary shortly after take-off and it is not possible to use the aerodrome of departure.
En-route alternate. An aerodrome at which an aircraft would be able to land after
experiencing an abnormal or emergency condition while en route.
ETOPS en-route alternate. A suitable and appropriate alternate aerodrome at which an
aeroplane would be able to land after experiencing an engine shut-down or other abnormal
or emergency condition while en route in an ETOPS operation.
Destination alternate. An alternate aerodrome to which an aircraft may proceed should it
become either impossible or inadvisable to land at the aerodrome of intended landing.
Note: The aerodrome from which a flight departs may also be an en-route or a destination
alternate aerodrome for that flight
Alternate Heliport:
A heliport specified in the flight plan to which a flight may proceed when it becomes
inadvisable to land at the heliport of intended landing.
Note: An alternate heliport may be the heliport of departure.
Approach and Landing Phase - Helicopters:

That part of the flight from 300m (1,000 ft) above the elevation of the FATO, if the flight is
planned to exceed this height, or from the commencement of the descent in the other
cases, to landing or to the balked landing point.
AVAD:
A device that provides automatic voice alerts in respect of Radio Altimeter (RadAlt) “bug”
settings.
Category A:
With respect to rotorcraft, means a multi-engined rotorcraft designed with engine and
system isolation features specified in FAR/JAR-27 / FAR/JAR-29 and capable of operations
using take-off and landing data scheduled under a critical engine failure concept which
assures adequate designated surface area and adequate performance capability for
continued safe flight or safe rejected take-off in the event of engine failure.
Category B:
With respect to rotorcraft, means a single-engine or multi-engine rotorcraft which does not
meet Category A standards. Category B rotorcraft have no guaranteed capability to continue
safe flight in the event of an engine failure, and unscheduled landing is assumed.
Commercial Air Transport Operation:

An aircraft operation involving the transport of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration
or hire.
Controlled Company(Ies):
A Company is any company in which Royal Dutch Shell holds a controlling interest, either
directly or indirectly, including holding companies, service companies, operating companies
and Joint Venture companies. Joint Ventures that are considered Controlled Companies
include Joint Ventures Under Operational Control (UOC), and Joint Ventures where Shell
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holds a Controlling Interest, under Joint Operational Control (JOC), under Other Participant
Operational Control (OPOC), or Self-Directed. See the Group HSSE Control Framework -
HSSE Management System - Joint Venture HSSE Requirements for more information.
Congested Area:
In relation to a city, town or settlement, any area which is substantially used for residential,
commercial or recreational purposes.
Contract Types:
Aircraft Services;
Ad hoc/Call off;
One Time Charter.
Dangerous Goods:
Articles or substances which are capable of posing significant risk to health, safety or
property, when transported by air.
Decision Altitude (DA) or Decision Height (DH):

A specified altitude or height in the precision approach at which a missed approach must be
initiated if the required visual reference to continue the approach has not been established.
Note 1: Decision altitude (DA) is referenced to mean sea level and decision height (DH) is
referenced to the threshold elevation.
Note 2: The required visual reference means that section of the visual aids or of the
approach area, which should have been in view for sufficient time for the pilot to have made
an assessment of the aircraft position and rate of change of position, in relation to the
desired flight path. In category III operations with a decision height the required visual
reference is that specified for the particular procedure and operation.
Note 3: For convenience where both expressions are used they may be written in the form
“decision altitude/height” and abbreviated “DA/H”.
Dry Lease:
When the aircraft is being operated under the AOC of the lessee.
D-Circle:
A circle, usually imaginary unless the helideck itself is circular, the diameter of which is the
D-Value of the largest helicopter the helideck is intended to serve.
D-Value:
The largest overall dimension of the helicopter when rotors are turning. This dimension will
normally be measured from the most forward position of the main rotor tip path plane to
the most rearward position of the tail rotor tip path plane (or the most rearward extension
of the fuselage in the case of Fenestron or Notar tails).
Elevated heliport:
A heliport located on a raised structure on land.
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Emergency locator transmitter (ELT): A generic term describing equipment which broadcast
distinctive signals on designated frequencies and, depending on application, may be
automatically activated by impact or be manually activated. An ELT may be any of the
following:
Automatic Fixed ELT (ELT/(AF)):

An automatically activated ELT, which is permanently attached to an aircraft.
Automatic Portable ELT (ELT(AP)):

An ELT which is rigidly attached to an aircraft and which is automatically deployed and
activated by impact, and, in some cases, also by hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is
also provided.
Automatic deployable ELT (ELT (AD)):

An ELT which is rigidly attached to an aircraft and which is automatically deployed and
activated by impact, and, in some cases, also by hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is
also provided.
Survival ELT (ELT(S)):

An ELT which is removable from an aircraft, stowed so as to facilitate its ready use in an
emergency, and manually activated by survivors.
En-route phase: That part of the flight from the end of the take-off and initial climb phase of
the commencement of the approach and landing phase.
Note: Where adequate obstacle clearance cannot be guaranteed visually, flights must be
planned to ensure that obstacles can be cleared by an appropriate margin. In the event of
failure of the critical power-unit, operators may need to adopt alternative procedures.
Final Approach and Take-Off Area (FATO):

A defined area over which the final phase of the approach manoeuvre to hover or landing is
completed and from which the take-off manoeuvre is commenced. Where the FATO is to be
used by performance Class 1 helicopters, the defined area includes the rejected take-off
area available.
Flight duty period: The total time from the moment a flight crew member commences duty,
immediately subsequent to a rest period and prior to making a flight or a series of flights, to
the moment the flight crew member is relieved of all duties having completed such flight or
series of flights.
Flight Manual:
A manual, associated with the certificate of airworthiness, containing limitations within
which the aircraft is to be considered airworthy, and instructions and information necessary
to the flight crew members for the safe operation of the aircraft.
Flight Plan:
Specified information provided to Air traffic services units, relative to an intended flight or
portion of a flight of an aircraft.
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Flight Recorder:
Any type of recorder installed in the aircraft for the purpose of complementing
accident/incident investigation.
Flight Time:
The total time from the moment an aircraft first moves under its own power for the purpose
of taking off until the moment it comes to rest at the end of the flight.
Note 1: Flight time as here defined is synonymous with the term “block to block” time or
“chock to chock” time in general usage which is measured from the time an aircraft moves
from the loading point until it stops at the unloading point.
Note 2: Whenever helicopter rotors are engaged, the time will be included in the flight time.
Frequency of occurrences:
“Reasonably Probable” means unlikely to occur often during the operation of each aircraft of
the type but which may occur several times during the total operational life of each aircraft
of the types in which the engine may be installed. Note: Where numerical values are used
this may normally be interpreted as a probability in the range 10-3 to 10-5 per hour of flight
“Remote” means unlikely to occur to each aircraft during its total operational life but may
occur several times when considering the total operational life of a number of aircraft of the
type in which the engine is installed. Note: Where numerical values are used this may
normally be interpreted as a probability in the range 10-5 to 10-7 per hour of flight
“Extremely Remote” means unlikely to occur when considering the total operational life of a
number of aircraft of the type in which the engine is installed but nevertheless, has to be
regarded as being possible.
Note: Where numerical values are used this may normally be interpreted as a probability in
the range 10-7 to 10-9 per hour of flight.
Helideck: A landing area on an offshore installation or vessel.
Heliport: An aerodrome or a defined area on a structure intended to be used wholly or in
part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of helicopters.
Heliport Operating Minima:

The limits of usability of a heliport for:
a. Take-off, expressed in terms of runway visual range and/or visibility and, if necessary,
cloud conditions;
b. Landing in precision approach and landing operations, expressed in terms of visibility
and/or runway visual range and decision altitude/height (DA/H) as appropriate to the
category of the operation; and
c. Landing in non-precision approach and landing operations, expressed in terms of
visibility and/or runway visual range, minimum descent altitude/height (MDA/H) and, if
necessary, cloud conditions.
HEMP:
Hazard and Effects Management Process, more commonly referred to as “Bow Ties”.
Human Factors Principles:

Principles which apply to aeronautical design, certification, training, operations and
maintenance and which seek safe interface between the human and other system
components by proper consideration to human performance.
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Instrument Approach and Landing Operations:

Instrument approach and landing operations using instrument approach procedures are
classified as:
Non-precision approach and landing operations: An instrument approach and landing which
does not utilise electronic glide path guidance.
Precision Approach and Landing Operations:

An instrument approach and landing using precision azimuth and glide path guidance with
minima as determined by the category of operation.
Categories of precision and landing operations:
Category I (CATI) Operation:

A precision instrument approach and landing with a decision height not lower than 60m
(200ft) and with either a visibility not less than 800m or a runway visual range not less than
550m.
Category II (CAT II) Operation:

A precision instrument approach and landing with a decision height lower than 60m (200ft),
but not lower than 30m (100ft), and a runway visual range not less than 300m.
Category IIIA (CAT IIIA) Operation:

A precision instrument approach and landing with:
a. Decision height lower than 30m (100ft) or no decision height; andb)a runway visual
range not less than 200m.
Category IIIB (CAT IIIB) Operation:

a. Decision height lower than 15m (50ft) or no decision height; and
b. Runway visual range less than 200m but not less than 75m.
Category IIIC (CAT IIIC) Operation:

A precision instrument approach and landing with no decision height and no runway visual
range limitations.
Note: Where decision height (DH) and runway visual range (RVR) fall into different
categories of operation, the RVR will determine in which category the operation is to be
conducted.
Hostile Environment:
An environment in which:
1. A safe forced landing cannot be accomplished because the surface is inadequate; or
2. The helicopter occupants cannot be protected adequately from the elements; or
3. Search and rescue response/ capability is not provided consistent with anticipated
exposure; or
4. There is an unacceptable risk of endangering persons or property on the ground.
In any case, the following areas shall be considered hostile:

1. All over-water flights; and
2. Those parts of a congested area without adequate safe forced landing areas.
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Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC):

Meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling,
less than the minima specified for visual meteorological conditions.
Landing Decision Point (LDP):

The point used in determining landing performance from which, a power-unit failure
occurring at this point, the landing may be safely continued or a balked landing initiated.
Note: LDP applies to performance Class I helicopters.
Limited Obstacle Sector:

The 150° sector within which obstacles may be permitted, provided the height of the
obstacles is limited.
Maintenance:
Tasks required to ensure the continued airworthiness of an aircraft including any one or
combination of overhaul, repair, inspection, replacement, modification or defect
rectification.
Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL):

A list established for a particular aircraft type by the organisation responsible for the type
design with the approval of the State of Design containing items, one or more of which is
permitted to be unserviceable at the commencement of a flight. The MMEL may be
associated with special operating conditions, limitations or procedures.
Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) or Minimum Descent Height (MDH):

A specified altitude or height in a non-precision approach or circling approach below which
descent must not be made without the required visual reference.
Note 1: Minimum descent altitude (MDA) is referenced to mean sea level and minimum
descent height (MDH) is referenced to the aerodrome elevation or to the threshold elevation
if that is more than 2m (7ft) below the aerodrome elevation. A minimum descent height for
a circling approach is referenced to the aerodrome elevation.
Note 2: The required visual reference means that section of the visual aids or of the
approach area which should have been in view for sufficient time for the pilot to have made
an assessment of the aircraft position and rate of change of position, in relation to the
desired flight path. In the case of a circling approach the required visual reference is the
runway environment.
Note 3: For convenience when both expressions are used they may be written in the form
“minimum descent altitude/height” and abbreviated “MDA/H”.
Minimum Equipment List (MEL):

A list which provides for the operation of aircraft, subject to specified conditions, with
particular equipment inoperative, prepared by an operator in conformity with, or more
restrictive than, the MMEL established for the aircraft type.
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Night:
The hours between the end of evening civil twilight and the beginning of morning civil
twilight or such other period between sunset and sunrise, as may be prescribed by the
appropriate authority.
Note: Civil twilight ends in the evening when the centre of the sun’s disc is 6 degrees below
the horizon and begins in the morning when the centre of the sun’s
Non-Hostile Environment:
An environment in which:
1. A safe forced landing can be accomplished; and
2. The occupants can be protected from the elements; and
3. Search and rescue response/ capability is provided consistent with the anticipated
exposure.
In any case, water landings in other than float planes are not considered to provide a safe
forced landing due to the risk of capsize; and
Those parts of a congested area with adequate safe forced landings areas shall be
considered non-hostile.
Obstacle Clearance Altitude (OCA) or Obstacle Clearance Height (OCH):

The lowest altitude or the lowest height above the elevation of the relevant runway
threshold or the aerodrome elevation as applicable, used in establishing compliance with
appropriate obstacle clearance criteria.
Note 1: Obstacle clearance altitude is referenced to mean sea level and obstacle clearance
height is referenced to the threshold elevation or in the case of non-precision approaches to
the aerodrome elevation or the threshold elevation if that is more than 2m (7ft) below the
aerodrome elevation. An obstacle clearance height for a circling approach is referenced to
the aerodrome elevation.
Note 2: For convenience when both expressions are used they may be written in the form
“obstacle clearance altitude/height” and abbreviated “OCA/H”.
Obstacle Free Sector:

The 210° sector, extending outwards to a distance of 1000 metres within which no
obstacles above helideck level are permitted, except the following items which shall not
exceed the height of the landing area by more than 0.25m:
• Guttering/Kerb Edging;
• Helideck Lighting;
• Outboard Edge of Safety Nets;
• Foam Monitors;
• Handrails (when folded).
Operational Control:
The exercise of authority over the initiation, continuation, diversion or termination of a flight
in the interest of the safety of the aircraft and the regularity and efficiency of the flight.
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Operational Flight Plan:

The operator’s plan for the safe conduct of the flight based on considerations of aircraft
performance, other operating limitations and relevant expected conditions on the route to
be followed and at the airfields/heliports concerned.
Operations Manual:
A manual containing procedures, instructions and guidance for use by operational personnel
in the execution of their duties.
Operator:
A person, organisation or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft
operation.
Performance Class I helicopter:

A helicopter with performance such that, in case of critical power-unit failure, it is able to
land on the rejected take-off area or safely continue the flight to an appropriate landing
area, depending on when the failure occurs.
Performance Class 2 helicopter:

A helicopter with performance such that, in case of critical power-unit failure, it is able to
safely continue the flight, except when the failure occurs prior to a defined point after take-
off or after a defined point before landing, in which cases a forced landing may be required.
Performance Class 3 helicopter:

A helicopter with performance such that, in case of power-unit failure at any point in the
flight profile, a forced landing must be performed.
Perimeter D Marking:
In relation to helidecks, the marking in the perimeter line in whole numbers; i.e. the D-
Value rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.
Pilot Flying:
The pilot who, for the time being is in charge of the controls of the aircraft.
Pilot Not Flying:

The pilot who is assisting the “Pilot flying” in accordance with the multi-crew co-operation
concept, when the required flight crew is more than one.
Pilot-In-Command:
The pilot responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight time.
Rest period: Any period of time on the ground during which a flight crew member is relieved
of all duties by the operator.
RPAS:
Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) and all of the associated support equipment,
ground control station, data links, telemetry, communications and navigation equipment
necessary to operate the unmanned aircraft.
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Run-Off Area:
An extension to the Landing Area designed to accommodate a parked helicopter.
Runway Visual Range (RVR):

The range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the centre line of a runway can see the
runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or identifying its centre line.
Safe Forced Landing:

Unavoidable landing or ditching with a reasonable expectancy of no injuries to persons in
the aircraft or on the surface.
Safe Landing Area:

The area bounded by the perimeter line and perimeter lighting.
N.B. The construction of the OFS and LOS segments should ensure that the main rotor will
not risk conflict with obstacles when the nose of the helicopter is butted-up to, but not
projecting over, the perimeter line. Thus the pilot, when landing in unusual circumstances,
has confidence that he can touch down provided that all wheels are within the SLA and the
nose of the helicopter is not projecting over the nearest perimeter line ahead. It must be
noted, however, that only correct positioning over the aiming circle (see “Aiming Circle”
above) will ensure proper clearance with respect to physical obstacles and provision of
ground effect and provision of adequate passenger access/egress.
Scheduled Airline:
Air Operator’s offering scheduled services, as published in the OAG Flight Guide.
State of Registry:
The State on whose register the aircraft is entered.
Synthetic Training Device (STD):

A training device which is either; a Flight Simulator (FS), a Flight Training Device (FTD) or,
a Flight & Navigation Procedures Trainer (FNPT).
Flight Simulator (FS):

A full size replica of a specific type or make, model and series helicopter flight deck/cockpit,
including the assemblage of all equipment and computer programmes necessary to
represent the helicopter in ground and flight operations, a visual system providing an out of
the flight deck/cockpit view, and a force cueing motion system. It is in compliance with the
minimum standards for Flight Simulator qualification.
Flight Training Device (FTD):

A full size replica of a specific helicopter type's instruments, equipment, panels, and controls
in an open flight deck/cockpit area or an enclosed helicopter cockpit/flight deck, including
the assemblage of equipment and computer programmes necessary to represent the
helicopter in ground and flight conditions to the extent of the systems installed in the
device. It does not require a force cueing motion or visual system. It is in compliance with
the minimum standards for a specific FTD Level of Qualification.
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Flight and Navigation Procedures Trainer (FNPT):

A training device which represents the flight deck/cockpit environment including the
assemblage of equipment and computer programmes necessary to represent a helicopter in
flight conditions to the extent that the systems appear to function as in a helicopter. It is in
compliance with the minimum standards for a specific FNPT Level of Qualification.
A basic instrument flight trainer, which is equipped with appropriate instruments, and which
simulates the flight deck environment of an aircraft in flight in instrument flight conditions.
Take-Off and Initial Climb Phase:

That part of the flight from the start of take-off to 300m (1,000ft) above the elevation of
the FATO, if the flight is planned to exceed this height, or to the end of the climb in the
other cases.
Take-Off Decision Point (TDP):

The point used in determining take-off performance from which, a power-unit failure
occurring at this point, either a rejected take-off may be made or a take-off safety
continued.
Note: TDP applies to performance class 1 helicopters.
Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC):

Meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling,
equal to or better than specified minima.
These minima should be defined in the appropriate Operations Manual as specified by the
National Aviation Authority (NAA), however, should not be less than those specified in ICAO
Annex 2, Chapter 4.
Wet Lease:
When the aircraft is being operated under the AOC of the lessor.
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Aircraft Operator Requirements

SAF 01.00 Safety Policy and Objectives 10

SAF 01.01 Leadership and Commitment 12

SAF 01.05 Documented Procedures 22

SAF 01.06 Management Review 24

SAF 02.00 Safety Risk Management 27

SAF 02.01 Incident Reporting, Investigation and Learning 30

SAF 03.01 Performance Monitoring 35

Flight Operations Requirements

FOP 01.01 Air Operator Certificate (AOC) 41

FOP 01.11 Refuelling With Passengers On Board 63

FOP 01.12 De/Anti-Icing 65

FOP 01.13 Airspace Rules 67

FOP 01.17 Flight Following 74

FOP 01.20 Aircrew and Passenger Survival Equipment Standards 81

FOP 02.04 Pilots Flying More Than One Aircraft Type 90

FOP 02.07 Flight Crew Training – General 94

FOP 02.07.03 Flight Crew1 Training – Non Technical Training 103

FOP 02.07.04 Training – Other Training 110

FOP 02.07.06 Pilot Experience and Qualification Levels – Helicopters 116

FOP 03.01 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) – General 124

FOP 03.02 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) - Organisation Structure 126

FOP 03.03 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) – Hardware 129

FOP 03.04 Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) – Processes 134

FOP 04.01 Fuel Requirements – Helicopters 142

FOP 04.02 Composition of Flight Crew – Helicopters 145

FOP 04.02.01 Two Pilot Operations – Helicopters 147

FOP 04.04 Guarding of Flight Controls – Helicopters 156

FOP 04.07 Float Arming for Offshore Flights – Helicopters 162

FOP 04.11 – Aircraft Operations - Helicopter Performance 167

FOP 05.02 Specialist Roles – Marine Pilot Transfer – Helicopters 174

FOP 6.01 Performance Requirements - Fixed-Wing Operations 184

FOP 06.02 Use of Single-Engine Aircraft 186

FOP 6.03 Fuel Requirements - Fixed-Wing Operations 188

FOP 06.04 Composition of Flight Crew - Fixed-Wing Operations 190

FOP 06.05 Maximum Flying Hour Limits – Fixed Wing 192

FOP 06.06 Maximum Flying Duty Periods (FDP) – Fixed-Wing 194

FOP 07.01 Passenger General Requirements 197

FOP 07.02 Cargo and Luggage 200

FOP 07.03 Manifests 203

FOP 07.04 Passenger Weights and Size 205

FOP 07.05 Passenger Briefings 207

FOP 07.06 Passenger Marshalling Areas 210

FOP 08.00 Aircraft Equipment Standards 212

ENG 01.01 Airworthiness Management 224

ENG 02.01 Continuing Airworthiness Organisation 226

ENG 02.02 Aircraft Maintenance Programme 229

ENG 02.05 Contracted Maintenance and Services 235

ENG 03.03 Duplicate and Independent Inspections 243

ENG 03.06 Identifying Organisational Weakness (IOW) 250

ENG 03.10 Foreign Object Damage 260

OTH 01.00 – Security 287

OTH 03.00 – Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) Operations 305

Aircraft Glossary Definitions 310

SAF 00.00 Safety Management Systems 1

Shell Group Requirements for Restricted

The Aircraft Operator is Accountable for Requirements 1-2:

Means of Compliance for Requirements 1-2:

Figure 1 (IOGP Report 590) Figure 2 (IOGP Report 590)

SAF 01.00 Safety Policy and Objectives

SAF 01.01 Leadership and Commitment:

• To create and sustain a culture that drives commitment of no harm to people.

SAF 01.02 Organisation, Accountabilities and Resources: