Case Digest: Bayan vs. Dela Cruz Facts

Case Digest: Bayan vs.
Dela Cruz
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement
called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the
Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence
of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides
for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the
Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting State.”
ISSUE:
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
THE RULING:
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the
treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by
a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not
required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United
States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the
phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in
common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law,
the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA
as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is
indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Case Digest: Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Co vs. NLRC
Facts:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of
company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee. That employee, herein private
respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her
services was her having contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner
in its company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such
a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Issue:
WON the policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage is valid?
Held:
Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of
social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. Acknowledged as paramount in the
due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus,
an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an
individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a
valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one’s labor being regarded as
constitutionally protected property. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the
nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition
of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of marriage.”
In the case at bar, it can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by the branch
supervisor of the company, with the reminder, that “you’re fully aware that the company is not
accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you.” Again, in the termination
notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her
severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over
and on top of that, was her violation of the company’s policy against marriage (“and even told you that
married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.”
Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the
right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a
woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as
an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may
even be said that petitioner’s policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-
law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Case Digest: C & M Timber Corp vs. Alcala
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by which C & M Timber Corporation seeks the nullification of the
order dated February 26, 1993 and the resolution dated June 7, 1993 of the Office of the
President, declaring as of no force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued to
petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No. 106, with the expiry date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680
hectares of forest land in the municipalities of Dipaculao and Dinalongan in the Province of
Aurora and the Municipality of Maddela in Quirino province. 1
It appears that in a letter dated July 20, 1984 2 to President Marcos, Filipinas Loggers
Development Corporation (FLDC), through its president and general manager, requested a
timber concession over the same area covered by petitioner’s TLA No. 106, alleging that the
same had been cancelled pursuant to a presidential directive banning all forms of logging in the
area. The request was granted in a note dated August 14, 1984 by President Marcos who wrote,
as was his wont, on the margin of the letter of FLDC: "Approved." 3
Accordingly, on September 21, 1984, the Ministry of Natural Resources, as it was then called,
issued TLA No. 360, with the expiry date September 30, 1994, to FLDC, covering the area
subject of TLA No. 106. In 1985, FLDC began logging operations.
On June 26, 1986, then Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto M. Maceda suspended TLA No.
360 for FLDC’s "gross violation of the terms and conditions thereof, especially the reforestation
and selective logging activities and in consonance with the national policy on forest
conservation." 4 On July 26, 1986, Minister Maceda issued another order cancelling the license
of FLDC on the ground that "in spite of the suspension order dated June 26, 1986, said
concessionaire has continued logging operations in violation of forestry rules and regulations."
5
Learning of the cancellation of FLDC’s TLA, Petitioner, through its officer-in-charge, wrote
Minister Maceda a letter dated October 10, 1986, requesting "revalidation" of its TLA No. 106. 6
As FLDC sought a reconsideration of the order cancelling its TLA, petitioner wrote another letter
dated February 13, 1987, 7 alleging that because of the log ban imposed by the previous
administration it had to stop its logging operations, but that when the ban was lifted on
September 21, 1984, its concession area was awarded to FLDC "as a result of [FLDC’s] covetous
maneuvers and unlawful machinations." (Petitioner was later to say that those behind FLDC,
among them being the former President’s sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, were "very influential
because of their very strong connections with the previous Marcos regime." 8) Petitioner
prayed that it be allowed to resume logging operations.
In his order dated May 2, 1988, 9 Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., of the DENR, declared
petitioner’s TLA No. 106 as of no more force and effect and consequently denied the petition
for its restoration, even as he denied FLDC’s motion for reconsideration of the cancellation of
TLA No. 360. Secretary Factoran, Jr. ruled that petitioner’s petition was barred by reason of
laches, because petitioner did not file its opposition to the issuance of a TLA to FLDC until
February 13, 1987, after FLDC had been logging under its license for almost two years. On the
other hand, FLDC’s motion for reconsideration was denied, "since the findings on which the
cancellation order had been based, notably gross violation of the terms and conditions of its
license, such as reforestation and selective logging activities appear to be firmly
grounded."cralaw virtua1aw library
Both petitioner CMTC and FLDC appealed to the Office of the President. Petitioner denied that
it was guilty of laches. It alleged that it had sent a letter to the then Minister of Natural
Resources Rodolfo del Rosario dated September 24, 1984 protesting the grant of a TLA to FLDC
over the area covered by its (petitioner’s) TLA and, for this reason, requesting nullification of
FLDC’s TLA.
In a decision dated March 21, 1991, 10 the Office of the President, through then Executive
Secretary Oscar Orbos, affirmed the DENR’s order of May 2, 1988. Like the DENR it found
petitioner guilty of laches, the alleged filing by petitioner of a protest on September 24, 1984
not having been duly proven. The decision of the Office of the President stated: 11
As disclosed by the records, this Office, in a letter of June 1, 1989, had requested the DENR to
issue a certification as to the authenticity/veracity of CMTC’s aforesaid Annex "A" to enable it
to resolve this case judiciously and expeditiously. Said letter-request pertinently
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . C & M Timber Corporation has attached to its "Supplemental Petition For Review," dated
June 1, 1988, a xerox copy of (Annex "A") of its letter to the Minister of Natural Resources
Rodolfo del Rosario, dated September 24, 1984, prepared by its counsel, Atty. Norberto J.
Quisumbing, protesting against the award of the contested area to Filipinas Loggers
Development Corporation and requesting that it be annulled and voided.
"Considering that the aforementioned Annex "A" constitutes a vital defense to C & M Timber
Corporation and could be a pivotal factor in the resolution by this Office of the instant appeal,
may we request your good office for a certification as to the authenticity/veracity of said
document (Annex ‘A’) to enable us to resolve the case judiciously and expeditiously."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In reply thereto, the DENR, thru Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Romulo D. San Juan, in a
letter of July 7, 1989, informed this Office, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
"Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged aforementioned Annex ‘A’, no such
document could be found or is on file in this Office.
"This Office, therefore, regrets that it can not issue the desired certification as to the
authenticity/veracity of the document."cralaw virtua1aw library
On September 10, 1990, this Office requested an updated comment of the DENR on (a) the
duplicate original copy of Annex "A" ; (b) a xerox copy of Page 164, entry No. 2233, of the
MNR’s logbook tending to show that the original copy of Annex "A" was received by the MNR,
and (c) a xerox copy of Page 201 of the logbook of the BFD indicating that the original copy of
Annex "A" was received by BFD from the MNR.
On October 26, 1990, DENR Assistant Secretary San Juan endorsed to this Office the updated
comment of Director of Forest Management Bureau (FMB) in a 2nd endorsement of October
25, 1990, which pertinently reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Please be informed that this Office is not the addressee and repository of the letter dated
September 24, 1984 of Atty. Norberto Quisumbing. This Office was just directed by then
Minister Rodolfo del Rosario to act on the purported letter of Atty. Quisumbing and as directed,
we prepared a memorandum to the President which was duly complied with as shown by the
entries in the logbook. Annex ‘A’, which is the main document of the letter-appeal of C & M
Timber Corporation is presumed appended to the records when it was acted upon by the BFD
(now FMB) and forwarded to the Secretary (then Minister). Therefore this Office is not in a
position to certify as to the authenticity of Annex ‘A’.
Clearly therefore, CMTC’s reliance on its Annex "A" is misplaced, the authenticity thereof not
having been duly proven or established. Significantly, we note that in all the pleadings filed by
CMTC in the office a quo, and during the hearing conducted, nothing is mentioned therein
about its letter of September 24, 1984 (Annex "A"). Jurisprudence teaches that issues neither
averred in the pleadings nor raised during the trial below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal (City of Manila v. Ebay, 1 SCRA 1086, 1089); that issues of fact not adequately brought to
the attention of the trial court need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal (Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 592, 595);
and that parties, may not, on appeal, adopt a position inconsistent with what they sustained
below (People v. Archilla, 1 SCRA 698, 700-701)
The Office of the President also declined to set aside the DENR’s order of July 31, 1986,
cancelling FLDC’s TLA No. 360, after finding the same to the fully substantiated.
Petitioner and FLDC moved for reconsideration. In its order dated January 25, 1993, 12 the
Office of the President, through Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It held that "even assuming that CMTC did file regularly
its letter-protest of September 24, 1984 with MNR on September 25, 1984, CMTC failed to
protect its rights for more than two (2) years until it opposed reinstatement of FLDC’s TLA on
February 13, 1987. Within that two (2) year period, FLDC logged the area without any
opposition from CMTC." In the same order, the Office of the President, however, directed the
reinstatement of FLDC’s TLA No. 360, in view of the favorable report of the Bureau of Forest
Development dated March 23, 1987. Later, the President’s office reconsidered its action after
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Angel C. Alcala, on February 15, 1993,
expressed concern that reinstatement of FLDC’s TLA No. 360 "might negate efforts to enhance
the conservation and protection of our forest resources." In a new order dated February 26,
1993, 13 the Office of the President reinstated its March 21, 1991 decision.
Petitioner again moved for a reconsideration of the decision dated March 21, 1991 and for its
license to be "revived/restored." Petitioner’s motion was, however, denied by the Office of the
President on June 7, 1993 14 in a resolution signed by Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs Renato C. Corona. The President’s office ruled:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The above Order of February 26, 1993 was predicated, as stated therein, on a new policy
consideration on forest conservation and protection, unmistakably implied from the President’s
handwritten instruction. Accordingly, this Order shall be taken not only as an affirmation of the
March 21, 1991 decision, but also as a FINAL disposition of the case and ALL matters incident
thereto, like CMTC’s motion for reconsideration, dated April 16, 1991.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that laches cannot be imputed to it because it did not
incur delay in asserting its rights and even if there was delay, the delay did not work to the
prejudice of other parties, particularly FLDC, because the cancellation of the FLDC’s TLA was
attributable only to its own actions. Petitioner also denies that its license had been suspended
by reason of mediocre performance in reforestation by order of then Minister of Natural
Resources Teodoro O. Peña. It says that it did not receive any order to this effect. Finally,
petitioner claims that the denial of its petition, because of "a new policy consideration on forest
conservation and protection, unmistakably implied from the President’s handwritten
instruction," as stated in the resolution of June 7, 1993 of the Office of the President, would
deny it the due process of law. Petitioner points out that there is no total log ban in the
country; that Congress has yet to make a pronouncement on the issue; that any notice to this
effect "must be stated in good form, not implied" ; and that in any case, any new policy
consideration should be prospective in application and cannot affect petitioner’s vested rights
in its TLA No. 106.
We find the petition to be without merit.
First. As already stated, the DENR order of May 2, 1988, declaring petitioner’s TLA No. 106 as no
longer of any force and effect, was based on its finding that although TLA No. 106’s date of
expiry was June 30, 1997 it had been suspended on June 3, 1983 because of CMTC’s "mediocre
performance in reforestation" and petitioner’s laches in falling to protest the subsequent award
of the same area to FLDC. There is considerable dispute whether there was really an order
dated June 3, 1983 suspending petitioner’s TLA because of "mediocre performance" in
reforestation, just as there is a dispute whether there indeed was a letter written on September
24, 1984 on behalf of petitioner protesting the award of the concession covered by its TLA No.
106 to FLDC, so as to show that petitioner did not sleep on its rights.
The alleged order of June 3, 1983 cannot be produced. The Office of the Solicitor General was
given until May 14, 1997 to secure a copy of the order but on May 7, 1997 the OSG manifested
that the order in question could not be found in the records of this case in which the order
might be. 15 Earlier, petitioner requested a copy of the order but the DENR, through Regional
Executive Director Antonio G. Principe, said that "based from our records there is no file copy of
said alleged order." 16
On the other hand, the alleged letter of September 24, 1984 written by Atty. Norberto J.
Quisumbing, protesting the award of the concession in question to FLDC cannot be found in the
records of the DENR either. The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the DENR certified that
"Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged [letter], no such document could be
found or is on file in this Office." 17 In a later certification, however, Ofelia Castro Biron of the
DENR, claimed that she was a receiving clerk at the Records and Documents Section of the
Ministry of Natural Resources and that on September 25, 1984 she received the letter of Atty.
Quisumbing and placed on all copies thereof the stamp of the MNR. She stated that the copy in
the possession of petitioner was a "faithful copy of the letter" in question. 18
The difficulty of ascertaining the existence of the two documents is indeed a reflection on the
sorry state of record keeping in an important office of the executive department. Yet these two
documents are vital to the presentation of the evidence of both parties in this case.
Fortunately, there are extant certain records from which it is possible to determine whether
these documents even existed.
With respect to the alleged order of June 3, 1983 suspending petitioner’s TLA No. 106 for
"mediocre performance" in reforestation, the Court will presume that there is such an order in
accordance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
inasmuch as such order is cited both in the order dated May 2, 1988 of the DENR, declaring as
of no force and effect TLA No. 106, and in the decision dated March 21, 1991 of the Office of
the President affirming the order of the DENR. It is improbable that so responsible officials as
the Secretary of the DENR and the Executive Secretary would cite an order that did not exist.
On the other hand, with respect to the letter dated September 24, 1984, there are
circumstances indicating that it existed. In addition to the aforesaid certification of Ofelia Castro
Biron that she was the person who received the letter for the DENR, the logbook of the Ministry
of Natural Resources contains entries indicating that the letter was received by the Bureau of
Forest Development from the MNR. 19 DENR Assistant Secretary Romulo San Juan likewise
informed the Office of the President that the Bureau of Forest Management prepared a
memorandum on the aforesaid letter of September 24, 1984, 20 thereby implying that there
was such a letter.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the premise that there was an order dated June 3, 1983, we find that after suspending
petitioner’s TLA for "mediocre performance" in reforestation under this order, the DENR
cancelled the TLA, this time because of a Presidential directive imposing a log ban. The records
of G.R. No. 76538, entitled "Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. v. Deputy Executive Secretary," the decision
in which is reported in 190 SCRA 673 (1990), contain a copy of the memorandum of then
Director Edmundo V. Cortes of the Bureau of Forest Development to the Regional Director of
Region 2, in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, informing the latter that pursuant to the instruction of the
President and the memorandum dated August 18, 1983 of then Minister Teodoro Q. Peña, the
log ban previously declared included the concessions of the companies enumerated in Cortes’
memorandum, in consequence of which the concessions in question were deemed cancelled.
The memorandum of Director Cortes stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
MEMORANDUM ORDER
TO : The Regional Director
Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan
FROM : The Director
DATE : 24 August 1983
SUBJECT : Stopping of all logging operations
in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
REMARKS :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Following Presidential Instructions and Memorandum Order of Minister Teodoro Q. Peña dated
18 August 1983, and in connection with my previous radio message, please be informed that
the coverage of the logging ban in Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya provinces include the following
concessions which are deemed cancelled as of the date of the previous notice:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
— Felipe Ysmael Co., Inc.
— Industries Dev. Corp.
— Luzon Loggers, Inc.
— C & M Timber Corporation
— Buzon Industrial Dev. Corporation
— Dominion Forest Resources Corp.
— FCA Timber Development Corp.

— Kasibu Logging Corp.
— RCC Timber Company
— Benjamin Cuaresma
You are hereby reminded to insure full compliance with this order to stop logging operations by
all licensees above mentioned and submit a report on the pullout of equipment and inventory
of logs within five days upon receipt hereof.
ACTION
DESIRED : For your immediate implementation.
EDMUNDO V. CORTES
(Emphasis added)
It thus appears that petitioner’s license had been cancelled way back in 1983, a year before its
concession was awarded to FLDC. It is noteworthy that petitioner admits that at the time of the
award to FLDC in 1984 petitioner was no longer operating its concession because of a log ban
although it claims that the suspension of operations was only temporary. As a result of the log
ban, the TLA of petitioner, along with those of other loggers in the region, were cancelled and
petitioner and others were ordered to stop operations. Petitioner also admits that it received a
telegram sent on August 24, 1983 by Director Cortes of the BFD, directing it to "stop all logging
operations to conserve our remaining forests." 21 It is then not true, as Atty. Quisumbing stated
in protesting the award of the concession to FLDC, that "the logging ban did not cancel
[petitioner’s] timber license agreement."cralaw virtua1aw library
Now petitioner did not protest the cancellation of its TLA. Consequently, even if consideration
is given to the fact that a year later, on September 24, 1984, its counsel protested the grant of
the concession to another party (FLDC), this failure of petitioner to contest first the suspension
of its license on June 3, 1983 and later its cancellation on August 24, 1983 must be deemed
fatal to its present action.
Second. Except for the letter of its counsel to the Minister of Natural Resources, which it
reiterated in its letter to the President of the Philippines, petitioner took no legal steps to
protect its interest. After receiving no favorable response to its two letters, petitioner could
have brought the necessary action in court for the restoration of its license. It did not. Instead it
waited until FLDC’s concession was cancelled in 1986 by asking for the "revalidation" of its
(petitioner’s) on TLA No. 106.
Petitioner’s excuse before the DENR is that it did not pursue its protest because its president,
Ricardo C. Silverio, had been told by President Marcos that the area in question had been
awarded to the President’s sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, and petitioner was afraid to go against
the wishes of the former President. 22 This is a poor excuse for petitioner’s inaction. In Felipe
Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary, 23 a similar excuse was given that Ysmael
& Co’s license had been cancelled and its concession awarded to entities controlled or owned
by relatives or cronies of then President Marcos. For this reason, after the EDSA Revolution,
Ysmael & Co. sought in 1986 the reinstatement of its timber license agreement and the
revocation of those issued to the alleged presidential cronies. As its request was denied by the
Office of the President, Ysmael & Co. filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. On the basis
of the facts stated, this Court denied the petition: (1) because the August 25, 1983 order of the
Bureau of Forest Development, cancelling petitioner’s timber license agreement had become
final and executory. Although petitioner sent a letter dated September 19, 1983 to President
Marcos seeking reconsideration of the 1983 order of cancellation of the BFD, the grounds
stated there were different from those later relied upon by petitioner for seeking its
reinstatement; (2) because "the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse
to have the earlier administrative actions [cancelling its license and granting another one
covering the same concession to respondent] reviewed by the court through a petition
for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause." Such special civil action of certiorari should have been
filed within a "reasonable time." And since none was filed within such period, petitioner’s
action was barred by laches; and (3) because executive evaluation of timber licenses and their
consequent cancellation in the process of formulating policies with regard to the utilization of
timber lands is a prerogative of the executive department and in the absence of evidence
showing grave abuse of discretion courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
This case is governed by the decision in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive
Secretary.
Third. It is finally contended that any "policy consideration on forest conservation and
protection" justifying the decision of the executive department not to reinstate petitioner’s
license must be formally enunciated and cannot merely be implied from the President’s
instruction to his subordinates and that, at all events, the new policy cannot be applied to
existing licenses such as petitioner’s.
The President’s order reconsidering the resolution of the Presidential Legal Adviser (insofar as it
reinstated the license of FLDC) was prompted by concerns expressed by the then Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources that "said reinstatement [of FLDC’s license] may negate
our efforts to enhance conservation and protection of our forest resources." There was really
no new policy but, as noted in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., a mere reiteration of a policy of
conservation and protection. The policy is contained in Art. II, §16 of the Constitution which
commands the State "to protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." There is therefore no
merit in petitioner’s contention that no new policy can be applied to existing licenses.
As to petitioner’s contention that the cancellation of its license constitutes an impairment of

the obligation of its contract, suffice it for us to quote what we held in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.
Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary: 24
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the
MNR, which were affirmed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy
considerations which effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar.
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to
develop and conserve the country’s natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department
evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under
the previous dispensation. . . .
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and

growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their
crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can
hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. . . .
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. . . . More so where, as in
the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public
at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses, permits
and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it
can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(33)
and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Case Digest: "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992"
TITLE, POLICY, PROGRAM AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992."chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Program Objectives. — It shall be the policy of the State
to undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a comprehensive and continuing Urban
Development and Housing Program, hereinafter referred to as the Program, which shall:
(a) Uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and in
resettlement areas by making available to them decent housing at affordable cost, basic
services, and employment opportunities;
chan robles virtual law library
(b) Provide for the rational use and development of urban land in order to bring about the
following:
(1) Equitable utilization of residential lands in urban and urbanizable areas with particular
attention to the needs and requirements of the underprivileged and homeless citizens and not
merely on the basis of market forces;
(2) Optimization of the use and productivity of land and urban resources;
(3) Development of urban areas conducive to commercial and industrial activities which can
generate more economic opportunities for the people;
(4) Reduction in urban dysfunctions, particularly those that adversely affect public health,
safety and ecology; and
(5) Access to land and housing by the underprivileged and homeless citizens;
(c) Adopt workable policies to regulate and direct urban growth and expansion towards a
dispersed urban net and more balanced urban-rural interdependence;
(d) Provide for an equitable land tenure system that shall guarantee security of tenure to
Program beneficiaries but shall respect the rights of small property owners and ensure the
payment of just compensation;
(e) Encourage more effective people's participation in the urban development process; and
(f) Improve the capability of local government units in undertaking urban development and
housing programs and projects.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Affordable cost" refers to the most reasonable price of land and shelter based on the needs
and financial capability of Program beneficiaries and appropriate financing schemes;
(b) "Areas for priority development" refers to those areas declared as such under existing
statutes and pertinent executive issuances.
(c) "Blighted lands" refers to the areas where the structures are dilapidated, obsolete and
unsanitary, tending to depreciate the value of the land and prevent normal development and
use of the area.chanrobles virtual law library
(d) "Consultation" refers to the constitutionally mandated process whereby the public, on their
own or through people's organizations, is provided an opportunity to be heard and to
participate in the decision-making process on matters involving the protection and promotion
of its legitimate collective interest, which shall include appropriate documentation and
feedback mechanisms;
(e) "Idle lands" refers to non-agricultural lands urban and urbanized areas on which no
improvements, as herein defined, have been made by the owner, as certified by the city,
municipal or provincial assessor; chan robles virtual law library
(f) "Improvements" refers to all types of buildings and residential units, walls, fences, structures
or constructions of all kinds of a fixed character or which are adhered to the soil but shall not
include trees, plants and growing fruits, and other fixtures that are mere superimpositions on
the land, and the value of improvements shall not be less than fifty percent (50%) of the
assessed value of the property; chan robles virtual law library
(g) "Joint venture" refers to the commitment or agreement by two (2) or more persons to carry
out a specific or single business enterprise for their mutual benefit, for which purpose they
combine their funds, land resources, facilities and services;
(h) "Land assembly or consolidation" refers to the acquisition of lots of varying ownership
through purchase or expropriation of the purpose of planned and rational development and
socialized housing programs without individual property boundary restrictions; chan robles
virtual law library
(i) "Land banking" refers to the acquisition of land at values based on existing use in advance of
actual need to promote planned development and socialized housing programs;
(j) "Land swapping" refers to the process of land acquisition by exchanging land for another
piece of land of equal value, or for shares of stock in a government or quasi-government
corporation whose book value is of equal value to the land being exchanged, for the purpose of
planned and rational development and provision for socialized housing where land values are
determined based on land classification, market value and assessed value taken from existing
tax declarations: Provided, That more valuable lands owned by private persons may be
exchanged with less valuable lands to carry out the objectives of this Act;
(k) "Land use plan" refers to the rational approach of allocating available resources as equitably
as possible among competing user groups and for different functions consistent with the
development plan of the area and the Program under this Act;
(l) "On-site development" refers to the process of upgrading and rehabilitation of blighted slum
urban areas with a view of minimizing displacement of dwellers in said areas, and with
provisions for basic services as provided for in Section 21 hereof;
(m) "Professional squatters" refers to individuals or groups who occupy lands without the
express consent of the landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate housing. The
term shall also apply to persons who have previously been awarded homelots or housing units
by the Government but who sold, leased or transferred the same to settle illegally in the same
place or in another urban area, and non-bona fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved
for socialized housing. The term shall not apply to individuals or groups who simply rent land
and housing from professional squatters or squatting syndicates;
(n) "Resettlement areas" refers to areas identified by the appropriate national agency or by the
local government unit with respect to areas within its jurisdiction, which shall be used for the
relocation of the underprivileged and homeless citizens;
(o) "Security of tenure" refers to the degree of protection afforded to qualified Program
beneficiaries against infringement or unjust, reasonable and arbitrary eviction or disposition, by
virtue of the right of ownership, lease agreement, usufruct and other contractual
arrangements;
(p) "Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program or SIR" refers to the program of the
National Housing Authority of upgrading and improving blighted squatter areas outside of
Metro Manila pursuant to existing statutes and pertinent executive issuances;
(q) "Small property owners" refers to those whose only real property consists of residential
lands not exceeding three hundred square meters (300 sq.m.) in highly urbanized cities and
eight hundred square meters (800 sq.m.) in other urban areas;
(r) "Socialized housing" refers to housing programs and projects covering houses and lots or
homelots only undertaken by the Government or the private sector for the underprivileged and
homeless citizens which shall include sites and services development, long-term financing,
liberalized terms on interest payments, and such other benefits in accordance with the
provisions of this Act;
(s) "Squatting syndicates" refers to groups of persons engaged in the business of squatter
housing for profit or gain;
(t) "Underprivileged and homeless citizens" refers to the beneficiaries of this Act and to
individuals or families residing in urban and urbanizable areas whose income or combined
household income falls within the poverty threshold as defined by the National Economic and
Development Authority and who do not own housing facilities. This shall include those who live
in makeshift dwelling units and do not enjoy security of tenure; chan robles virtual law library
(u) "Unregistered or abandoned lands" refers to lands in urban and urbanizable areas which are
not registered with the Register of Deeds, or with the city or municipal assessor's office
concerned, or which are uninhabited by the owner and have not been developed or devoted
for any useful purpose, or appears unutilized for a period of three (3) consecutive years
immediately prior to the issuance and receipt of publication of notice of acquisition by the
Government as provided under this Act. It does not include land which has been abandoned by
reason of force majeure or any other fortuitous event: Provided, That prior to such event, such
land was previously used for some useful or economic purpose; chan robles virtual law library
(v) "Urban areas" refers to all cities regardless of their population density and to municipalities
with a population density of at least five hundred (500) persons per square kilometers;
(w) "Urbanizable areas" refers to sites and lands which, considering present characteristics and
prevailing conditions, display marked and great potential of becoming urban areas within the
period of five (5) years; and
(x) "Zonal Improvement Program or ZIP" refers to the program of the National Housing
Authority of upgrading and improving blighted squatters areas within the cities and
municipalities of Metro Manila pursuant to existing statutes and pertinent executive issuances.
ARTICLE II
COVERAGE AND EXEMPTIONS
Sec. 4. Coverage. — The Program shall cover all lands in urban and urbanizable areas, including
existing areas for priority development sites, and in other areas that may be identified by the
local government units as suitable for socialized housing.chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 5. Exemptions. — The following lands shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act:
(a) Those included in the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law;
(b) Those actually used for national defense and security of the State;
(c) Those used, reserved or otherwise set aside for government offices, facilities and other
installations, whether owned by the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or-controlled corporations, or by the local government units:
Provided, however, That the lands herein mentioned, or portions thereof, which have not been
used for the purpose for which they have been reserved or set aside for the past ten (10) years
from the effectivity of this Act, shall be covered by this Act;
(d) Those used or set aside for parks, reserves for flora and fauna, forests and watersheds, and
other areas necessary to maintain ecological balance or environmental protection, as
determined and certified to by the proper government agency; and
(e) Those actually and primarily used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes, cultural
and historical sites, hospitals and health centers, and cemeteries or memorial parks.
The exemptions herein provided shall not apply when the use or purpose of the
abovementioned lands has ceased to exist.chanrobles virtual law library
ARTICLE III
NATIONAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING FRAMEWORK
Sec. 6. Framework for Rational Development. — There shall be a National Urban Development
and Housing Framework to be formulated by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board under
the direction of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council in coordination with
all local government units and other concerned public and private sectors within one (1) year
from the effectivity of this Act.chanrobles virtual law library
The framework shall refer to the comprehensive plan for urban and urbanizable areas aimed at
achieving the objectives of the Program. In the formulation of the Framework, a review and
rationalization of testing town and land use plans, housing programs, and all other objectives
and activities of government agencies and the private sectors which may substantially affect
urban land use patterns, transportation and public utilities, infrastructure, environment and
population movement shall be undertaken with the concurrence of the local government units
concerned.chanrobles virtual law library

ARTICLE IV
LAND USE, INVENTORY, ACQUISITION AND DISPOSITION
Sec. 7. Inventory of Lands. — Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, all city and
municipal governments shall conduct an inventory of all kinds and improvements thereon
within their respective localities. The inventory shall include the following:
(a) Residential lands;
(b) Government-owned lands, whether owned by the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or-controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; and chan robles virtual law library
(d)Other lands.
In conducting the inventory, the local government units concerned, in coordination with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and with the assistance of the appropriate government
agencies, shall indicate the type of land use and the degree of land utilization, and other data or
information necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.chanrobles virtual law library
For planning purposes, the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council shall be
furnished by each local government unit a copy of its inventory which shall be updated every
three (3) years.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 8. Identification of Sites for Socialized Housing. — After the inventory the local
government units, in coordination with the National Housing Authority, the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board, the National Mapping Resource Information Authority, and the Land
Management Bureau, shall identify lands for socialized housing and resettlement areas for the
immediate and future needs of the underprivileged and homeless in the urban areas, taking
into consideration and degree of availability of basic services and facilities, their accessibility
and proximity of jobs sites and other economic opportunities, and the actual number of
registered beneficiaries.chanrobles virtual law library
Government-owned lands under paragraph (b) of the preceding section which have not been
used for the purpose for which they have been reserved or set aside for the past ten (10) years
from the effectivity of this Act and identified as suitable for socialized housing, shall
immediately be transferred to the National Housing Authority subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines or by the local government unit concerned, as the case may be, for
proper disposition in accordance with this Act.cralaw
Sec. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. — Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in
the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program
sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been
acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been
acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where open-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the

beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government
units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands.chanrobles
virtual law library
Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. — The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act
shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated
purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only
when other models of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further, That where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted
for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be
reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in
Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.chan robles virtual law library
For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be
acquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primary through
negotiated purchase: Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the
land shall be given the right of first refusal.cralaw
Sec. 11. Expropriation of Idle Lands. — All idle lands in urban and urbanizable areas, as defined
and identified in accordance with this Act, shall be expropriated and shall form part of the
public domain. These lands shall be disposed of or utilized by the Government for such
purposes that conform with their land use plans. Expropriation proceedings shall be instituted
if, after the lapse of one (1) year following receipt of notice of acquisition, the owner fails to
introduce improvements as defined in Section 3(f) hereof, except in the case of force majeure
and other fortuitous events. Exempted from this provision, however, are residential lands
owned by small property owners or those the ownership of which is subject of a pending
litigation.cralaw
Sec. 12. Disposition of Lands for Socialized Housing. — The National Housing Authority, with
respect to lands belonging to the National Government, and the local government units with
respect to other lands within their respective localities, shall coordinate with each other to
formulate and make available various alternative schemes for the disposition of lands to the
beneficiaries of the Program. These schemes shall not be limited to those involving transfer of
ownership in fee simple but shall include lease, with option to purchase, usufruct or such other
variations as the local government units or the National Housing Authority may deem most
expedient in carrying out the purposes of this Act.cralaw
Consistent with this provision, a scheme for public rental housing may be adopted.cralaw
Sec. 13. Valuation of Lands for Socialized Housing. — Equitable land valuation guidelines for
socialized housing shall be set by the Department of Finance on the basis of the market value
reflected in the Zonal valuation, or in its absence, on the latest real property tax
declaration.cralaw
For site already occupied by qualified Program beneficiaries, the Department of Finance shall
factor into the valuation the blighted status of the lands as certified by the local government
unit or the National Housing Authority.cralaw
Sec. 14. Limitations on the Disposition of Lands for Socialized Housing. — No land for socialized
housing, including improvements or rights thereon, shall be sold, alienated, conveyed,
encumbered or leased by any beneficiaries as determined by the government agency
concerned.cralaw
Should the beneficiary unlawfully sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of his lot or any right
thereon, the transaction shall be null and void. He shall also lose his right to the land, forfeit the
total amortization paid thereon, and shall be barred from the benefits under this Act for a
period of ten (10) years from the date of violation.cralaw
In the event the beneficiary dies before full ownership of the land is vested on him, transfer to
his heirs shall take place only upon their assumption of his outstanding obligations. In case of
failure by the heirs to assume such obligations, the land shall revert to the Government for
disposition in accordance with this Act.
ARTICLE V
SOCIALIZED HOUSING
Sec. 15. Policy. — Socialized housing, as defined in Section 3 hereof, shall be the primary
strategy in providing shelter for the underprivileged and homeless. However, if the tenurial
arrangement in a particular socialized housing program is in the nature of leasehold or usufruct,
the same shall be transitory and the beneficiaries must be encouraged to become independent
from the Program within a given period of time, to be determined by the implementing agency
concerned.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 16. Eligibility Criteria for Socialized Housing Program Beneficiaries. — To qualify for the
socialized housing program, a beneficiary:
(a) Must be a Filipino citizen;

(b) Must be an underprivileged and homeless citizen, as defined in Section 3 of this Act;
(c) Must not own any real property whether in the urban or rural areas; and
(d) Must not be a professional squatter or a member of squatting syndicates.
Sec. 17. Registration of Socializing Housing Beneficiaries. — The Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council, in coordination with the local government units, shall
designed a system for the registration of qualified Program beneficiaries in accordance with the
Framework. The local government units, within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act,
shall identify and register all beneficiaries within their respective localities.

Sec. 18. Balanced Housing Development. — The Program shall include a system to be specified
in the Framework plan whereby developers of proposed subdivision projects shall be required
to develop an area for socialized housing equivalent to at least twenty percent (20%) of the
total subdivision area or total subdivision project cost, at the option of the developer, within
the same city or municipality, whenever feasible, and in accordance with the standards set by
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and other existing laws. The balanced housing
development as herein required may also be complied with by the developers concerned in any
of the following manner:
(a) Development of new settlement;

(b) Slum upgrading or renewal of areas for priority development either through zonal
improvement programs or slum improvement and resettlement programs;
(c) Joint-venture projects with either the local government units or any of the housing agencies;
or
(d) Participation in the community mortgage program.
Sec. 19. Incentives for the National Housing Authority. — The National Housing Authority,
being the primary government agency in charge of providing housing for the underprivileged
and homeless, shall be exempted from the payment of all fees and charges of any kinds,
whether local or national, such as income and real taxes. All documents or contracts executed
by and in favor of the National Housing Authority shall also be exempt from the payment of
documentary stamp tax and registration fees, including fees required for the issuance of
transfer certificates of titles.chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 20. Incentives for Private Sector Participating in Socialized Housing. — To encourage
greater private sector participation in socialized housing and further reduce the cost of housing
units for the benefit of the underprivileged and homeless, the following incentives shall be
extended to the private sectors:
(a) Reduction and simplification of qualification and accreditation requirements for

participating private developers;
(b) Creation of one-stop offices in the different regions of the country for the processing,
approval and issuance of clearances, permits and licenses: Provided, That clearances, permits
and licenses shall be issued within ninety (90) days from the date of submission of all
requirements by the participating private developers;
(c) Simplification of financing procedures; and
(d) Exemption from the payment of the following:
(1) Project-related income taxes;
(2) Capital gains tax on raw lands used for the project;
(3) Value-added tax for the project contractor concerned;
(4) Transfer tax for both raw completed projects; and
(5) Donor's tax for lands certified by the local government units to have been donated to
socialized housing purposes.
Provided, That upon application for exemption, a lien on the title of the land shall be annotated
by the Register of Deeds: Provided, further, That the socialized housing development plan has
already been approved by the appropriate government agencies concerned: Provided, finally,
That all the savings acquired by virtue of this provision shall accrue in favor of the beneficiaries
subject to the implementing guidelines to be issued by the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council.
Appropriate implementing guidelines shall be prepared by the Department of Finance, in

consultation with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, for the proper
implementation of the tax exemption mentioned in this section within one (1) year after the
approval of this Act.chanrobles virtual law library
Property owners who voluntarily provide resettlement sites to illegal occupants of their lands
shall entitled to a tax credit equivalent to the actual non-recoverable expenses incurred in the
resettlement, subject to the implementing guidelines jointly issued by the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council and the Department of Finance.chanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 21. Basic Services. — Socialized housing or resettlement areas shall be provided by the
local government unit or the National Housing Authority in cooperation with the private
developers and concerned agencies with the following basic services and facilities:
(a) Potable water;
(b) Power and electricity and an adequate power distribution system;
(c) Sewerage facilities and an efficient and adequate solid waste disposal system; and
(d)Access to primary roads and transportation facilities.
The provisions of other basic services and facilities such as health, education, communications,
security, recreation, relief and welfare shall be planned and shall be given priority for
implementation by the local government unit and concerned agencies in cooperation with the
private sector and the beneficiaries themselves.chanrobles virtual law library
The local government unit, in coordination with the concerned national agencies, shall ensure
that these basic services are provided at the most cost-efficient rates, and shall set as
mechanism to coordinate operationally the thrusts, objectives and activities of other
government agencies concerned with providing basic services to housing projects.chanrobles
virtual law library
Sec. 22. Livelihood Component. — To extent feasible, socialized housing and resettlement
projects shall be located near areas where employment opportunities are accessible. The
government agencies dealing with the development of livelihood programs and grant of
livelihood loans shall give priority to the beneficiaries of the Program. chan robles virtual law
library
Sec. 23. Participation of Beneficiaries. — The local government units, in coordination with the
Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor and concerned government agencies, shall afford
Program beneficiaries or their duly designated representatives an opportunity to be heard and
to participate in the decision-making process over matters involving the protection and
promotion of their legitimate collective interest which shall include appropriate documentation
and feedback mechanisms. They shall also be encouraged to organize themselves and
undertake self-help cooperative housing and other livelihood activities. They shall assist the
Government in preventing the incursions of professional squatters and members of squatting
syndicates into their communities.cralaw
In instances when the affected beneficiaries have failed to organized themselves or form an
alliance within a reasonable period prior to the implementation of the program of projects
affecting them, consultation between the implementing agency and the affected beneficiaries
shall be conducted with the assistance of the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor and
the concerned nongovernment organization.cralaw
Sec. 24. Consultation with Private Sector. — Opportunities for adequate consultation shall be
accorded to the private sector involved in socialized housing project pursuant to this Act.
ARTICLE VI
AREAS FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT, ZONAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM SITES AND SLUM
IMPROVEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS SITES
Sec. 25. Benefits. — In addition to the benefits provided under existing laws and other related
issuance to occupants of areas for priority development, zonal improvement program sites and
slum improvement and resettlement program sites, such occupants shall be entitled to priority
in all government projects initiated pursuant to this Act. They shall also be entitled to the
following support services:
(a) Land surveys and titling at minimal cost;

(b) Liberalized terms on credit facilities and housing loans and one hundred percent (100%)
deduction from every homebuyer's gross income tax of all interest payments made on
documents loans incurred for the construction or purchase of the homebuyer's house;
(c) Exemption from the payment of documentary stamp tax, registration fees, and other fees
for the issuance of transfer certificate of titles;
(d) Basic services as provided for in Section 21 of this Act; and
(e) Such other benefits that may arise from the implementation of this Act. chan robles virtual
law library
ARTICLE VII
URBAN RENEWAL AND RESETTLEMENT
Sec. 26. Urban Renewal and Resettlement. — This shall include the rehabilitation and
development of blighted and slum areas and the resettlement of Program beneficiaries in
accordance with the provisions of this Act. On-site development shall be implemented
whenever possible in order to ensure minimum resettlement of the beneficiaries of the
Program from their existing places of occupancy shall be undertaken only when on-site
development is not feasible and after compliance with the procedures laid down in Section 28
of this Act.
Sec. 27. Action Against Professional Squatters and Squatting Syndicates. — The local
government units, in cooperation with the Philippine National Police, the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), and the PCUP-accredited urban poor organization in
the area, shall adopt measures to identify and effectively curtail the nefarious and illegal
activities of professional squatters and squatting syndicates, as herein defined.chanrobles
virtual law library
Any person or group identified as such shall be summarily evicted and their dwellings or
structures demolished, and shall be disqualified to avail of the benefits of the Program. A public
official who tolerates or abets the commission of the abovementioned acts shall be dealt with
in accordance with existing laws.chanrobles virtual law library
For purposes of this Act, professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates shall be
imposed the penalty of six (6) years imprisonment of a fine of not less than Sixty thousand
pesos (P60,000.00) but not more than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000), or both, at the
discretion of the court.cralaw
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged.
Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks, and playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.chanrobles virtual law library
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless

citizens, the following shall be mandatory:
(1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of
eviction or demolition;
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated
representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas where
they are to be relocated;
(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or
demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays
and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;
(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of
concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first
line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of
eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless
citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the
National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five
(45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said
order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the
said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage
multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local government
unit concerned.
This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
to carry out the above provision.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 29. Resettlement. — Within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, the local
government units, in coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall implement the
relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and in other public places as sidewalks,
roads, parks, and playgrounds. The local government unit, in coordination with the National
Housing Authority, shall provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and
facilities and access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the basic
needs of the affected families.
Sec. 30. Prohibition Against New Illegal Structures. — It shall be unlawful for any person to
construct any structure in areas mentioned in the preceding section.chanrobles virtual law
library
After the effectivity of this Act, the barangay, municipal or city government units shall prevent
the construction of any kind of illegal dwelling units of structures within their respective
localities. The head of any local government unit concerned who allows, abets or otherwise
tolerates the construction of any structure in violation of this section shall be liable to
administrative sanctions under existing laws and to penal sanctions provided for in this Act.
ARTICLE VIII
COMMUNITY MORTGAGE PROGRAM
Sec. 31. Definition. — The Community Mortgage Program (CMP) is a mortgage financing
program of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation which assists legally organized
associations of underprivileged and homeless citizens to purchase and develop a tract of land
under the concept of community ownership. The primary objective of the program is to assist
residents of blighted or depressed areas to own the lots they occupy, or where they choose to
relocate to, and eventually improve their neighborhood and homes to the extent of their
affordability.
Sec. 32. Incentives. — To encourage its wider implementation, participants in the CMP shall be
granted with the following privileges or incentives:
(a) Government-owned or -controlled corporations and local government units, may dispose of
their idle lands suitable for socialized housing under the CMP through negotiable sale at prices
based on acquisition cost plus financial carrying costs;
(b) Properties sold under the CMP shall be exempted from the capital gains tax; and
(c) Beneficiaries under the CMP shall not be evicted nor dispossessed of their lands or
improvements unless they have incurred arrangements in payments of amortizations for three
(3) months.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 33. Organization of Beneficiaries. — Beneficiaries of the Program shall be responsible for
their organization into associations to manage their subdivisions or places of residence, to
secure housing loans under existing Community Mortgage Program and such other projects
beneficiaries to them. Subject to such rules and regulations to be promulgated by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, associations organized pursuant to this Act may
collectively acquire and own lands covered by this Program. Where the beneficiaries fail to
form an association by and among themselves, the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation shall initiate the organization of the same in coordination with the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor and the local government units concerned. No person who is
not a bona fide resident of the area shall be a member or officer of such association.chanrobles
virtual law library chan robles virtual law library
ARTICLE IX
RELATED STRATEGIES
Sec. 34. Promotion of Indigenous Housing Materials and Technologies. — The local
government units, in cooperation with the National Housing Authority, Technology and
Livelihood Resource Center, and other concerned agencies, shall promote the production and
use of indigenous, alternative, and low-cost construction materials and technologies for
socialized housing.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 35. Transport System. — The local government units, in coordination with the
Departments of Transportation and Communications, Budget and Management, Trade and
Industry, Finance, and Public Works and Highways, the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation,
and other concerned government agencies, shall device a set of mechanisms including
incentives to the private sector so that a viable transport system shall evolve and develop in the
urban areas. It shall also formulate standards designed to attain these objectives:
(g) Smooth flow of traffic;

(b) Safety and convenience of travel;
€ Minimum use of land space;
(d) Minimum damage to the physical environment; and
€ Adequate and efficient transport service to the people and goods at minimum cost.
Sec. 36. Ecological Balance. — The local government units shall coordinate with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources in taking measures that will plan and
regulate urban activities for the conservation and protection of vital, unique and sensitive
ecosystems, scenic landscapes, cultural sites and other similar resource areas.chanrobles virtual
law library
To make the implementation of this function more effective, the active participation of the
citizenry in environmental rehabilitation and in decision-making process shall be promoted and
encouraged. The local government units shall recommend to the Environmental and
Management Bureau the immediate closure of factories, mines and transport companies which
are found to be causing massive pollution.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 37. Population Movements. — The local government units shall set up an effective
mechanism, together with the appropriate agencies like the Population Commission, the
National Economic and Development Authority and the National Statistics Office, to monitor
trends in the movements of population from rural to urban, urban to urban, and urban to rural
areas. They shall identify measures by which such movements can be influenced to achieve
balance between urban capabilities and population, to direct appropriate segments of the
population into areas where they can have access to opportunities to improve their lives and to
contribute to national growth and recommend proposed legislation to Congress, if necessary.
The Population Commission, the National Economic and Development Authority, and the
National Statistics Office shall likewise provided advanced planning information to national and
local government planners on population projections and the consequent level of services
needed in particular urban and urbanizable areas. This service will include early-warning
systems on expected dysfunctions in a particular urban area due to population increases,
decreases, or age structure changes.cralaw
Sec. 38. Urban-rural Interdependence. — To minimize rural to urban migration and pursue
urban decentralization, the local government units shall coordinate with the National Economic
and Development Authority and other government agencies in the formulation of national
development programs that will stimulate economic growth and promote socioeconomic
development in the countryside.
ARTICLE X
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
Sec. 39. Role of Local Government Units. — The local government units shall be charged with
the implementation of this Act in their respective localities, in coordination with the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council, the national housing agencies, the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor, the private sector and other nongovernment organizations.
They shall prepare a comprehensive land use plan for their respective localities in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 40. Role of Government Housing Agencies. — In addition to their respective existing
powers and functions, and those provided for in this Act, the hereunder mentioned housing
agencies shall perform the following:
(a) The Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council shall, through the key housing
agencies, provide local government units with necessary support such as:
(1) Formulation of standards and guidelines as well as providing technical support in the
preparation of town and land use plans;
(2) In coordination with the National Economic and Development Authority and the National
Statistics Office, provide data and information for forward-planning by the local government
units in their areas, particularly on projections as to the population and development trends in
their localities and the corresponding investment programs needed to provide appropriate
types and levels of infrastructure, utilities, services and land use patterns; and
(3) Assistance in obtaining funds and other resources needed in the urban development and
housing programs in their areas of responsibility.chanrobles virtual law library
(b) The National Housing Authority, upon request of local government units, shall provide
technical and other forms of assistance in the implementation of their respective urban
development and housing programs with the objective of augmenting and enhancing local
government capabilities in the provision of housing benefits to their constituents;

€ The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation shall administer the Community Mortgage
Program under this Act and promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act; and
(d) The Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation shall design an appropriate guarantee scheme to
encourage financial institutions to go into direct lending for housing.chanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 41. Annual Report. — The Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council and the
local government units shall submit a detailed annual report with respect to the
implementation of this Act to the President and the Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines.chanrobles virtual law library

ARTICLE XI
FUNDING
Sec. 42. Funding. — Funds for the urban development and housing program shall come from
the following sources:
(g) A minimum of fifty percent (50%) from the annual net income of the Public Estate
Authority, to be used by the National Housing Authority to carry out its programs of land
acquisition for resettlement purposes under this Act;
(b) Proceeds from the disposition of ill-gotten wealth, not otherwise previously set aside for any
other purpose, shall be applied to the implementation of this Act shall be administered by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation;
€ Loans, grants, bequests and donations, whether from local or foreign sources;
(d) Flotation of bonds, subject to the guidelines to be set by the Monetary Board;
€ Proceeds from the social housing tax and, subject to the concurrence of the local government
units concerned, idle lands tax as provided in Section 236 of the Local Government Code of
1991 and other existing laws;
(f) Proceeds from the date or disposition of alienable public lands in urban areas; and
(g) Domestic and foreign investment or financing through appropriate arrangements like the
build-operate-and-transfer scheme.
Sec. 43. Socialized Housing Tax. — Consistent with the constitutional principle that the
ownership and enjoyment of property bear a social function and to raise funds for the Program,
all local government units are hereby authorized to impose an additional one-half percent
(0.5%) tax on the assessed value of all lands in urban areas in excess of Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000).

ARTICLE XII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Sec. 44. Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition. — There shall be a moratorium on the
eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units for
a period of three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the moratorium shall
not apply to those persons who have constructed their structures after the effectivity of this
Act and for cases enumerated in Section 28 hereof.chanrobles virtual law library

ARTICLE XIII
COMMON PROVISIONS
Sec. 45. Penalty Clause. — Any person who violates any provision of this Act shall be imposed
the penalty of not more than six (6) years of imprisonment or a fine of not less than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000) but not more than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000), or both,
at the discretion of the court: Provided, That, if the offender is a corporation, partnership,
association or other juridical entity, the penalty shall be imposed on the officer or officers of
said corporation, partnership, association or juridical entity who caused the
violation.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 46. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act shall be
included in the annual budget of implementing agencies in the General Appropriations Act of
the year following its enactment into law and every year thereafter.chanrobles virtual law
library

Sec. 47. Separability Clause. — If for any reason, any provision of this Act shall be included in
the annual budget of implementing agencies in the General Appropriations Act of the year
following its enactment into law and every year thereafter.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 48. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and
regulations, and other issuances, or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 49. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation. Chan robles virtual law library
Approved: March 24, 1992

Case Digest: Limbonas vs. Magelin
Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through
the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the
house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in
defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the
Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a
case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should
have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that
the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What
is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?
Held:
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns.
The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec.
15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects
and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we
noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in
the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that
the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of
the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they
were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618,
in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity
of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the
other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that
under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned
except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the
respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called
the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the
invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a
plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it
does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead,
they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground
of good faith.
Case Digest: Judge Dadole vs. COA
FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in
provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly
allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the
amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the
President.
RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local
autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the
President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power
of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As
such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local
governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by
statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions
changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so
long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only
interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law.
This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs
Case Digest: Legaspi vs. CSC
Facts
Citizen Valentin Legaspi requested from the Civil Service Commission information on the civil service
eligibilities of sanitarian employees in the Health Department of Cebu City. The Commission rejected the
request, asserting that Legaspi was not entitled to the information. Legaspi instituted an action for
mandamus from the Court to require that the information be provided (pg. 1).
Decision
The Court began by noting that both the 1973 (Art. IV, Sec. 6) and 1987 (Art. III, Sec. 7) constitutions
recognize the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Further, they specify that
information shall be provided, subject only to limitations provided by law (pg. 1). While the Solicitor
General interposed a procedural objection challenging the requester’s standing in this petition for
mandamus, the Court ruled that, in this case, the people are regarded as the “real party in interest” and
the requester, as a citizen interested in the execution of the laws, did not need to show any legal or
special interest in the result (pg. 2). Further, government agencies have no discretion to refuse
disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern because the Constitution guarantees access to
information of public concern, a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information
in a democracy (pg. 3-4). That is, the government agency denying information access has the burden to
show that the information is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the information has
been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee (pg. 5).
Here, the information was of a public concern because it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by eligible persons, and the
Civil Service Commission failed to cite any law limiting the requester’s right to know (pg. 5). Thus, the
Court ordered the Civil Service Commission to provide the information (pg. 6).
Case Digest: Valmonte vs. Belmonte
FACTS :
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their
right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of
the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who
were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish
petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June
20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves
free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE :
WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on
behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD :
Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare
what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues
are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people
themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not
succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were
holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that
because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially
those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The
"transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a
contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing
proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced
that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the
right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.
Case Digest: Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato
FACTS :
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the
board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a
review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either
banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato
on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as
reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and
completely private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting
of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17)
members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which
rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter,
respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much
later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as
confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the
members.
ISSUE :
WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid
HELD :
The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or
interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or
community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification
board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created to serve
public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and the individual
voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions,
and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are,
therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental
law of the land
Case Digest: Delima vs. Ampatuan
FACTS:
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals
with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. One Kenny Dalandag, was admitted
into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ and was later on listed as one of the prosecution
witness. On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel request the inclusion of Dalandag in the
information for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations. Petitioner reiterated the request twice more on
October 22, 201019 and November 2, 2010. But Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila
seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases
undergoing trial in the QC RTC. The RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference and issued a pre-trial
order. The respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for
mandamus. Petitioner opposed.
On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777
dismissing the petition for mandamus. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused

for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ.
HELD:
No. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose
principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to
prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and
whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best
appreciated by the public prosecutors.
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in
order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot
be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised,48or to compel the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.49
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner,
but may not be compelled to act in a certain way such as to grant or deny such letter-request.
FALLO:
Petition is denied
Case Digest: Camilio Sabio vs. Gordon
FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked
Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG
members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.
RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and
the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct
conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses
can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where
it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being
a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry
is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section
21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot
be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The
Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies
created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even
abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it
creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect
violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent
with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle
of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right
of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the
absence of any constitutional basis.
Case Digest: Atty. Virgilio Alconera vs. Pallanan
Facts:
Complainant was the counsel for Morito Rafols, the defendant in Civil Case No. 5967-2, an
unlawful detainer case entitled Cua Beng a.k.a. Manuel Sy and Ka Kieng v. Morito Rafols, et al.,
filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
After trial, the MTCC ruled against Rafols and his co-defendants
Therefrom, Rafols, through complainant Alconera, appealed the case to the RTC
Pending appeal, the court issued an Order dated February 18, 2011 granting Cua Beng's motion
for execution she filed in Civil Case No. 5967-2, the unlawful... detainer case. Alconera sought
reconsideration but the motion was denied
On March 17, 2011, a troubled Evelyn Rafols, Rafols' daughter-in-law, called up Alconera, who
at that time was in Manila, to report that the sheriff, respondent Pallanan, was about to
implement the adverted writ of execution. Evelyn Rafols informed Alconera that respondent...
sheriff arrived along with the lawyer of the opposing party and 30 other men to enforce the
writ. Respondent sheriff then allegedly demanded payment of PhP 720,000 to settle Rafols'
obligation to which the latter protested on the ground that the amount is too exorbitant
when... they have been religiously depositing monthly rentals in court to satisfy the judgment.
Evelyn Rafols passed her phone to respondent sheriff. Over the phone, a verbal disagreement
between the two ensued. Alconera claims that he has a pending motion for reconsideration on
the issuance of the writ of execution, but the... respondent said that the motion has already
been denied. And since no Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) has been issued enjoining the
implementation, respondent claimed that he is legally mandated to perform his ministerial duty
of enforcing the writ. Complainant countered that... he has not yet received a copy of the
denial of the motion, rendering the execution premature and, at the same time, preventing him
from securing a TRO from the higher courts. Nevertheless, respondent still pushed through with
the execution of the judgment.
On March 18, 2011, complainant returned to General Santos City and, at his law office, found a
copy of the Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration, which was only served that very
same day. The RTC ruled that there was no pending Motion to Approve Supersedeas Bond
filed... with it. Instead, what was filed not with the RTC but with the MTCC was a "NOTICE OF
APPEAL and MOTION TO APPROVE PROPERTY SUPERSEDEAS BOND," which was not granted.
Alconera went to RTC Br. 36 with his daughter to confront respondent sheriff. The face-off
escalated into a heated argument
Alconera filed a Complaint-Affidavit[3] against the respondent sheriff for grave misconduct
before this Court on April 6, 2011. The case was referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA)... respondent filed his comment.[4] In it, he averred that the duty of a
court sheriff in enforcing a writ of execution is ministerial, and without a TRO enjoining it, a
sheriff is duty bound to implement... it.
On July 14, 2011, respondent filed his own Affidavit of Complaint[5] against herein complainant
for Grave Misconduct and for violating the Code of Ethics. Respondent alleged that during the
enforcement of the writ, a second phone conversation took place.
Complainant allegedly called up Evelyn Rafols who put him on loudspeaker for the respondent
to hear his words. Alconera then allegedly made a threat that there will be bloodshed if
respondent's party pushes through with the implementation of the writ. Respondent likewise
claimed... that complainant berated him at his office on March 18, 2011 and that the incident
was orchestrated by the complainant.
After due proceedings, the investigating judge submitted a report, styled as Order[7] dated
August 6, 2013, with the following recommendation:
Based on the findings and evaluation, the herein Executive Judge hereby recommends the
respondent Sheriff be ADMONISHED.
Issues:
the controversy stems from the propriety of the implementation of the writ of execution
Ruling:
the case at bar traces its roots to an unlawful detainer case wherein the MTCC ruled against
Rafols, complainant's client. In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately
executory and can only be stayed via compliance with Section 19,... Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has
been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas... bond,
approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents,
damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent...
due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court.
Clearly then under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is
made immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor. The defendant in
such a case may have such judgment stayed only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a...
supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation
for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal.[9] The failure of
the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a... ground for the outright execution
of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. Hence,
if the defendant-appellant has perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the
immediate execution of the judgment would... automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a
supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not
perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the
perfection of the appeal.
In the case at bar, complainant lost his client's case and appealed to the RTC. His client has also
been periodically depositing rental with the court for the use of the property pending appeal.
However, as ruled by the RTC, the bond filed did not meet the legal requirements... because
first and foremost, the bond posted was a property bond, not cash nor surety. Furthermore,
Rafols did not own the property he posted as bond and besides, it was also not issued in favour
of the plaintiff in the ejectment case. Because of the non-compliance with the... requirements
under the above-quoted rule, the execution of the judgment was not effectively stayed.
Given the above circumstances, there was no legal impediment preventing respondent sheriff
from performing his responsibility of enforcing the writ of execution. Since Rafols failed to
comply with the requirements under the Rules, Cua Beng who prevailed in the unlawful
detainer... case is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the court's
judgment both as to the restoration of possession and the payment of the accrued rentals or
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises.
Well-settled is that the sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to
execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the
judgment or not. When the writ is placed in his hands, it is his duty, in the... absence of any
instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement
it in accordance with its mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the order is
executed without undue delay.[13] This holds... especially true herein where the nature of the
case requires immediate execution. Absent a TRO, an order of quashal, or compliance with Sec.
19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, respondent sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ.
Immediacy of the execution, however, does not mean instant execution. The sheriff must
comply with the Rules of Court in executing a writ. Any act deviating from the procedure laid
down in the Rules of Court is a misconduct and warrants disciplinary action. In this case, Sec.
10(c), Rule 39 of the Rules prescribes the procedure in the implementation of the writ. It
provides:
Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. The officer shall demand of the person against whom
the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming
rights under him to peaceably vacate the property within three (3) working days,... and restore
possession thereof to the judgment obligee, otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons
therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and employing such
means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the... judgment obligee
in possession of such property.
Based on this provision, enforcement in ejectment cases requires the sheriff to give notice of
such writ and to demand from defendant to vacate the property within three days. Only after
such period can the sheriff enforce the writ by the bodily removal of the defendant in the...
ejectment case and his personal belongings.[14] Even in cases wherein decisions are
immediately executory, the required three-day notice cannot be dispensed with. A sheriff who
enforces the writ without the required notice or before the expiry of the... three-day period is
running afoul with the Rules.
In the present controversy, the Order denying the motion for reconsideration was allegedly
served, according to the respondent, on the same day the writ was executed on March 17,
2011. Complainant, however, avers that his office was only able to receive the denial the day
after... the execution or on March 18, 2011. At first blush, one might hastily conclude that the
three-day notice rule was apparently not observed. This Court, however, is not prepared to
make such a finding. We are mindful of the possibility that a demand to vacate has already
been... given when complainant and Rafols were first served the Order granting the issuance of
a writ of execution, before the motion for reconsideration was filed. More importantly,
complainant failed to allege con-compliance with Sec. 10(c) of Rule 39.
Thus far, no deviation from the Rules has been properly ascribed to respondent. As an officer of
the court, he is accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. The
burden was on complainant to adduce evidence that would prove the respondent's...
culpability, if any. Without evidence of any departure from well established rules, any unlawful
behaviour, or any gross negligence on his part, the presumption remains applicable and
respondent cannot be held administratively liable for the offense of grave misconduct.

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Was the VFA unconstitutional?

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

We find the petition to be without merit.

TO : The Regional Director

Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan

FROM : The Director

DATE : 24 August 1983

SUBJECT : Stopping of all logging operations

in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino

REMARKS :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

— Felipe Ysmael Co., Inc.

— Industries Dev. Corp.

— Luzon Loggers, Inc.

— C & M Timber Corporation

— Buzon Industrial Dev. Corporation

— Dominion Forest Resources Corp.

— FCA Timber Development Corp.

— RCC Timber Company

DESIRED : For your immediate implementation.

As to petitioner’s contention that the cancellation of its license constitutes an impairment of

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

TITLE, POLICY, PROGRAM AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

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(a) Residential lands;

Where open-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the

(a) Must be a Filipino citizen;

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(a) Development of new settlement;

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(a) Reduction and simplification of qualification and accreditation requirements for

Appropriate implementing guidelines shall be prepared by the Department of Finance, in

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(a) Land surveys and titling at minimal cost;

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In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless

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(g) Smooth flow of traffic;

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Approved: March 24, 1992

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

This case involves the application of a most

WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid

Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused

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