Leticia Ligon vs CA, INK, RD-QC
FACTS:
 Oct 19, 1990 respondent INK filed with the RTC a
complaint for specific performance with damages
against the Islamic Directorate of the Phil. (IDP)
 Respondent INK alleged in that by virtue of an
Absolute Deed of Sale dated April 20, 1989 IDP sold
to it two parcels of land located at QC, both of which
is IDP is the registered owner.
 The parties stipulated in the DOS that the IDP, shall
undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants
in the property within 45 days from the execution of
the contract.
 IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. INK prayed that
the TC order IDP to comply with its obligation of
clearing the subject lots of illegal occupants and pay
damages to INK
 IDP alleged that INK violated the contract by
delaying to pay the PP and prayed that the contract be
rescinded and revoked.
 June 1991 – INK filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the ground that there was actually no
genuine issue as to any material fact
 TC rendered partial judgment
 January 22 1992 – INK filed a motion in the same
case praying that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in
possession of the certificates of title over the
properties as mortgagee of IDP, be directed to
surrender the certificates of the RD for the registration
of the ADOS in its name
 INK alleged that the document could not be registered
because of the refusal and or failure of petitioner to
deliver the certificates of title despite repeated
requests.
 Jan 31, 1992 – petitioner ligon filed an opposition to
the motion on the ground that the IDP was not served
copy of the motion and the ownership of INK over the
property was still in issue since rescrission was sought
by the IDP.
 Petitioner then filed a Supplemental Opposition
questioning the jurisdiction of the TC because the
motion involved the registrability of the document of
sale and she was not made a party to the main case.
 March 2 1992 the TC granted the motion of INK and
ordered petitioner to surrender to INK the owners
copy and for the registration of the ADO in INK’s
name and the annotation of the mortgage executed in
favor of petitioner on the new transfer certificates of
title to be issued to INK.
 April 6, 1992 – on motion of petitioner Ligon, the TC
reconsidered its order by directing her to deliver the
certificates of title of the RD
 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of
the TC.
 Upon prior leave, the IDP intervened alleging that
prior to the issuance by the trial court of the order of
March 2 1992 its legal BOT filed a motion for
intervention informing said court that the sale of the
porperties was not executed by it but was made
possible by a fake BOT hence the sale is void
ISSUE: WON surrender by petitioner of the cert of title to
the RD as ordered by the TC will create any substantial
injustice to petitioner
SC: NO
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument
shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the
owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with
such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of
the court for cause shown. In case the person in possession
of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to surrender
the same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary
document may be registered and a new certificate issued,
Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states.
Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that
"Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts)
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of titles to lands, including
improvements and interest therein and over all petitions
filed after original registration of title, with power to hear
and determine all questions arising upon such applications
or petitions." The above provision has eliminated the
distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the
regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred
upon it by the former law when acting merely as a
cadastral court.
The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage
lien of petitioner appears in the certificates of title Nos.
26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the trial court
directing the surrender of the certificates to the Register
of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can
be registered, cannot in any way prejudice her rights and
interests as a mortgage of the lots.
It is clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the
certicates of title to the Register of Deeds as ordered by
the trial court will not create any substantial injustice to
her. To grant the petition and compel INK to 􀁆le a new
action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the
motion before the trial court is to encourage litigations
where no substantial rights are prejudiced.
Republic vs Carmen Galeno
FACTS:
 September 2, 2003 – respondent file a petition for
correction of the area, Dingle Cadastre (subject
property) before the RTC
 She alleged that she is one of the co-owners of the
subject property by virtue of a DOS
 The survey and subdivision of the subject property
was duly approved by the DENR
 Respondent alleged that when she and her co-owners
had the subject property resurveyed for the purpose of
partition, they discovered a discrepancy in the land
area of the subject property:
In OCT Certification issued by
the DENR
20,948 sqm. 21, 298 sqm
 She sought to correct the area of the subject property
in order to avoid further confusion and claimed to
have notified the adjoining owners.
 Oct. 13, 2006 – the RTC granted the petition upon a
finding that respondent was able to substantiate
allegations in her petition to warrant a correction of
the area of the subject property
 Petitioner Republic, through OSG, filed a motion for
recon claiming that the adjoining owners had not been
notified, stressing that such notice is a jurisdictional
requirement.
 RTC denied the motion
 Petitioner appealed to the CA, affirmed RTC. It found
that respondent by a preponderance of evidence, was
able to proved, based on the records of the proper
government authority, that it was the correct area as
approved in the plan.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in upholding the correction of the
area of the subject property in OCT.
SC: Petition is meritorious
 Respondent failed to prove based on a scrutiny of
evidence marked and formally offered, that there was
sufficient basis to allow the correction of the area of
the property from 20, 948 to 21,248 sqm.
 Respondent offered the following evidence:
1. Certification which states that the “true and
correct area is 21, 928 sqm
2. Technical description of the lot,
3. Approved subdivision plan
 Unfortunately, documentary evidence are not
sufficient to warrant the correction prayed for.
 SC cannot accord probative weight upon them in view
of the fact that the public officers who issued in the
same did not testify in court to prove the facts stated
therein.
In Republic v. Medida, the Court held that
certifications of the Regional Technical Director,
DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein, holding that:
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written of􀁆official acts, or records of the
of􀁆official acts of the sovereign authority, of􀁆official
bodies and tribunals, and public of􀁆officers, whether
of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public
except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents referred to in Section 19(a), when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
of􀁆official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the of􀁆officer having legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy x x x.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
"Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public of􀁆officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third
person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter."
the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other
public of􀁆officers who issued respondent's documentary
evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same
are bereft of probative value and cannot, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein.
At best, they may be considered only as prima facie
evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but
do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein
the contents of the certifications are hearsay because
respondent's sole witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea
Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the
veracity of their contents, as she did not prepare any of
the certi􀁆cations nor was she a public of􀁆cer of the
concerned government agencies.
it should be borne in mind that "hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless
the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule,"
The Court has explained that: HEITAD
The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not
admissible. However, the lack of objection to hearsay
testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence.
But one should not be misled into thinking that such
declarations are thereby impressed with probative value.
Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected
to or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative
value.
case law states that the "absence of opposition from
government agencies is of no controlling significance
because the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its of􀁆officials or agents. Neither is
the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting
the petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in
this case] if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on
record, such petition has no merit."
the Court holds that respondent did not present any
competent evidence to prove that the true and correct area
of the subject property is 21,298 square meters instead of
20,948 square meters to warrant a correction thereof in
OCT No. 46417. Accordingly, respondent's petition for
the correction of the said Certi􀁆cate of Title must be
denied, and the present petition be granted.
Petition granted
Paz vs. Republic
FACTS
 November 29, 2000 – Petitioner brought a petition for
the cancellation of OCT.
 The petition, ostensibly made under Section 108 PD
1529, impleaded Republic, FDC and FAI.
 Petition averred that the petitioner was the owner of
Parcels of land with a total area of 143, 102,167 sqm
or 14,310 hectares.
 The OCT was registered in the name of republic and
included that Lot 392 of the Muntinlupa Estate with
an area of 244 hectares
 Lot 392 was segregated resultin in the issuance of the
TCT also in the name of republic.
 FDC and FAI developed Lot 392 into a subdivision
based on their joint venture agreement with the
Govenrment
 Pursuant to the joint venture agreement, Lot 392 was
further subdivided, causing the cancellation of TCT
and the issuance of TCT for the resulting individual
subdivision lots in the name of republic and FAI and
then sold the subdivision lots to third parties
 A petition for cancellation prayed as follows that a
new cert of title be issued in the name of Luciano Pax
married to Elvira Joson
 Petitioner prays for other reliefs just and equitable to
the premises
 FCS and FAI moved to dismiss the petition for
cancellation on the ff grounds:
1. Serious and controversial dispute spawned by the
petition for cancellation of title is litigable in an
ordinary action outside the special and limited
jurisdiction of land registration courts.
The Petition is thus removed from the ambit of
Sec. 108 of the Property Registration Decree
which requires, as an indispensable element for
availment of the relief thereunder, either
unanimity of the parties or absence of serious
controversy or adverse claim. It authorizes only
amendment and alteration of certificates of title,
not cancellation thereof;
2. Lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the persons
of the respondents who were not validly served
with summons but only a copy of the Petition;
3. Docket fees for the Petition have not been paid.
4. The Petition does not contain the requisite
certificate of non-forum shopping.’’
 RTC granted FDC and FAI motion to dismiss
 CA denied petitioners motion for partial
reconsideration
ISSUE:
Asserting the applicability of Section 108 of PD 1529 and
insisting that his petition filed under Section 108 should
not be dismissed because it was exempt from the
requirements of paying docket feesm of service of
summons and of the certification against forum shopping
due to its not being an initatory pleading
against forum shopping (as required for all initiatory
pleadings). He ought to know that his taking such required
acts for granted was immediately fatal to his petition,
warranting the granting of the respondents' motion to
dismiss. IScaAE

The petition for review is devoid of merit. The dismissal WHEREFORE, the PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
of the petition for certiorari by the CA was proper and CERTIORARI is DENIED
correct because the RTC did not abuse its discretion, least
of all gravely. Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 reads as
follows:

cate of title under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 is

applicable in seven instances or situations, namely:
(a) when registered interests of any description, whether
vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have
terminated and ceased;
(b) when new interests have arisen or been created which
do not appear upon the certi􀁆cate;
(c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in
entering a certi􀁆cate or any memorandum thereon or on
any duplicate certi􀁆cate;
(d) when the name of any person on the certi􀁆cate has
been changed;
(e) when the registered owner has been married, or,
registered as married, the marriage has been terminated
and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby
be affected;
(f)when a corporation, which owned registered land and
has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within
three years after its dissolution; and
(g) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or
alteration of title

We agree with both the CA and the RTC that the

petitioner was in reality seeking the reconveyance of the
property covered by OCT No. 684, not the cancellation of
a certi􀁆cate of title as contemplated by Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529. Thus, his petition did not fall under any of
the situations covered by Section 108, and was for that
reason rightly dismissed.

Moreover, the 􀁆ling of the petition would have the effect

of reopening the decree of registration, and could thereby
impair the rights of innocent purchasers in good faith and
for value. To reopen the decree of registration was no
longer permissible, considering that the one-year period
to do so had long ago lapsed, and the properties covered
by OCT No. 684 had already been subdivided into smaller
lots whose ownership had passed to third persons.

Accordingly, he should perform jurisdictional acts, like

paying the correct amount of docket fees for the 􀁆ling of
an initiatory pleading, causing the service of summons on
the adverse parties in order to vest personal jurisdiction
over them in the trial court, and attaching a certi􀁆cation