North American Philosophical Publications

Non-Intentional Actions
Author(s): David K. Chan
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 139-151
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical
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American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 32, Number 2, April 1995
NON-INTENTIONAL ACTIONS
David K. Chan
Il here is no doubt that there is such a
thing as intentional action, which is the
bringing about of events by agents who have
reasons foi bringing them about, and whose
performance of the actions of bringing about
those events are explained by those reasons.1
It is also fairly uncontroversial to claim that,
besides intentional actions, there are unin?
tentional actions.2 But are these all the ac?
tions there are? Is there not a further
category of actions that are neither inten?
tional nor unintentional?
To make a case for non-intentional action,
I must first explain what is meant by the in
tentionality of an action. This must be done
in such a way that the classification of action
as intentional and unintentional is one which
meshes with our intuitions as far as possible
while being philosophically defensible. I will
then have to show that the same grounds
used to classify types of action support the
case for classifying some behavior as "non-in?
tentional" action. This can be done by giving
examples of behavior which does not fit
neatly into a scheme where intentional action
and unintentional action together exhaust
the category of behavior that counts as ac?
tion. I will show that we are not entitled to
treat such behavior as either intentional or
unintentional action on the basis of the pre?
viously established criteria, and that we also
have grounds not to treat the behavior as
non-action behavior. In other words, I will ex?
pose a lacuna in the classificatory scheme
that has been independently defended.
I. Action:
INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL
There are three alternative ways that have
been proposed to account for the intention
139
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ality of an action. Two of these make refer?
ence to the reasons the agent has for acting.
Where they disagree is whether there is a
state of intending that is irreducible to rea?
sons and their relation to action. The third
alternative appeals to the notion of responsi?
bility.3 This alternative is a non-starter. If
there is any connection at all between inten?
tionally and responsibility, the dependency is
in the wrong direction for our purposes. For
we usually try to determine the agent's inten?
tion in acting before deciding on the question
of responsibility. Even so, the presence or ab?
sence of intention is not always decisive. We
may hold a person responsible for what he
accidentally brings about, for what he does
that are not actions at all, and even for what
someone else does. For instance, a leader is
responsible for his subordinates' actions un?
der certain unexceptionable circumstances.
Or a ship-captain who accidentally spills oil
is responsible even if the occurrence is out?
side his control.
Now it may be argued that there is more
than one sense of responsibility and what we
are after is not the sense that is tied to social
roles. But why make this distinction? Is it be?
cause we want a sense of responsibility that
is conceptually linked with a person's own ac?
tions? If so, we need a definition of action,
and for that, we are likely to fall back on the
concept of intentional action. Then we can no
longer, without circularity, account for inten?
tionally in terms of responsibility.
Even if the sense of responsibility we are
interested in is not socially-defined, we need
to find other ways of classifying action, not in
terms of intentionality, that are more suitable
for linking up with responsibility. For interest
in responsibility arises with the need to ap
140 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

portion blame. Yet there are cases where an agent's reason lead him to act intentionally
agent is not blameworthy for wrong actions without his forming an intention to so act?
he does intentionally. A person may not be To answer these questions, we need to dis?
blamed for intentional actions that he is co? tinguish between a reason causing an action
erced or blackmailed into doing.4 We do not qua cause and a reason causing an action qua
suffer a great conceptual loss in decoupling reason. There are many ways a reason can
intentionality from responsibility. As our ex? cause action where it is not the case that the
amples show, we in fact gain by leaving room action is intentional in the sense defined in
for both intentional action for which the (II). First, a desire can motivate behavior
agent is not morally responsible, and non-ac? without coming to consciousness. Second,
tion for which he is held responsible. one can be conscious that one has a desire
So intentionality should be accounted for that causes one to do something without see?
not in terms of responsibility, but in terms of ing the desire as a reason for doing it. Finally,
one can see a desire that causes one to do
the agent's mental state in acting. The obvi?
ous such mental state to consider is that of something as a reason for doing it but not
make it the reason one does it. In none of
having a reason for acting. If an agent has a
reason for acting and acts for that reason, these cases does the agent do what he does
then he acts intentionally. What does it mean for a reason. To make a reason for doing
to say that he acts for that reason? It is not something the agent's reason for doing it, the
enough that he had the reason and then reason must enter into a process of practical
acted. For he may have acted on impulse or reasoning.10 The outcome of this process is a
for some other reason and not for that rea? commitment to a course of action. Such a
son. So let us add that he reasoned about it, commitment goes beyond just having the rea?
son for acting: it is having an intention to act,
i.e., thought about how to act in the light of a distinctive mental state that leads one to
his reason, and then acted.5 But did he act
act, possibly after further practical reasoning.
because of the reason he had for so acting?
So the state of intending is always causally
Was the performance of the action the out?
relevant when the agent acts for a reason.
come of his reasoning? Well, we can turn the But what I would like to establish is the
reasoning around and explain the action in
terms of the reason. But how do we distin? following claim about intentional action:
guish a case where the reason genuinely ex? (12) If the events brought about in acting are
plains the action from a case where the caused in the appropriate way by the
reason occurred to him but something else agent's intention to so act, the action is
intentional.
motivated him to act? Thus, it seems that the
explanation by reason has to be a causal one That is, I want to say that acting for a reason
for it to work as an explanation.6 So: and acting to satisfy an intention are one and
the same thing, so that the antecedents in (II)
(II) If an action is the bringing about of events
appropriately caused by the agent's reason and (12) are interchangeable. So in addition
for so acting, the action is intentional. to showing that one cannot act for a reason
without forming an intention to so act that
No mention has been made so far of a state
then plays a causal role, I need to show that
of intending that is not reducible to belief, one cannot be acting to satisfy an intention
desire, and their relation to action. We are without having a reason that is one's reason
however neglecting the agent's commitment for doing the action in question.
to action and the roles played by such a com? There are two cases to consider. Why can?
mitment in further practical reasoning. These not I be acting to satisfy an intention without
roles cannot be attributed to beliefs or de? having a reason to do the action? There is a
sires. Thus, we have a case on functionalist trivial and a non-trivial answer to this. The
grounds for a state of intending in its own trivial answer is that an intention to do some?
right.9 Is the state of intending always present thing is also a reason for doing it. The non
when an agent acts for a reason? Or can the trivial answer is that one forms an intention

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against a background of reasons for acting,
since an intention is the outcome of previous
practical reasoning. The reasoning process
should lead one to commit to doing an action
that one has some reason for doing. If one
had no reason for doing the action, one is
unlikely to form an intention to do it. This
raises the possibility of a second type of case.
Suppose someone had no reason to do some
particular action rather than an alternative.
In what Michael Bratman calls a "Buridan
case," a person may have no reason to prefer
one route over another to get to his destina?
tion.12 He simply plumps for one of the
routes by forming an intention so that he can
get on with filling in the details of his plan to
get there. Will he not end up carrying out an
intention to take the chosen route to his des?
tination without having any reason to do that
action? But this is not a genuine counterex?
ample. The agent has a reason for taking
some route or other to get to his destination
even though he does not have a reason for
preferring the chosen route. In taking the
chosen route, the agent does act for the for?
mer reason, which is part of the background
against which he does his practical reasoning
and forms his intention. This example satis?
fies the antecedents of both (II) and (12), and
the action is intentional.
We can conclude that acting for or because
of a reason (in the sense explained earlier) is
the same as acting on an intention to perform
that action. In both cases, the action is inten?
tional. (II) and (12) define intentional action
in the same way.
How, on this account of intentional action,
do we accomodate unintentional actions?
Traditionally, these have been accounted for
in terms of intention as well.13 For an inten?
tion that is acted upon will not only be the
cause of the intended effects but also of myr?
iad other effects. The problem is to distin?
guish the bringing about of effects that count
as actions, albeit unintentional, and those that
do not count as actions at all. We do not here
have to resolve this problem, which is part
and parcel of the problem of the nature of
action. This is the problem of specifying what
more there is to action than the event
brought about in acting, an event which can
occur without there being an action of bring
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NON-INTENTIONAL ACTIONS / 141
ing it about.14 What can be agreed upon here
on the orthodox view is that an agent has to
be doing something intentionally when he
performs an unintentional action. What he
does unintentionally is not the action intended,
but the unintentional action has to be appro?
priately connected to an intentional one:
(U) An unintentional action is performed if an
intention that an agent acts upon causes an
unintended effect and the bringing about of
the latter effect counts as an action.
Suppose that what I have given here is the
complete account of the intentionality of ac?
tions.15 It would follow that intentional ac?
tions are always done for a reason. If all
actions were either intentional or uninten?
tional, then there must always be a reason
that a person acted for if he acted at all. If the
action was intentional, he acted for that very
reason, which explains his action. If it was un?
intentional, he acted in the course of doing
something else intentionally, i.e., for a reason,
but one which is not a reason that explains
his unintentional action. But if there are ac?
tions that are not done in the course of doing
something intentionally, i.e., for some reason,
then such actions are neither intentional nor
unintentional. In claiming that there are non
intentional actions, I am arguing the case for
there being such actions.
II. Non-Intentional Action
I shall now give two kinds of examples of
non-intentional action.16 The first example
concerns what has been called a person's
"mannerisms:"17
A public speaker may have acquired the man?
nerism of tugging at his ear-lobe once or twice
as he is giving a speech. And he may do this
fully conscious of the quirky action he is per?
forming. So, on a particular occasion, he know?
ingly raises his arm in order to tug at his ear.
But afterward, he tells us quite sincerely that
he was wholly indifferent to whether he
tugged at the ear. It is just something that he
now and then does.
My second set of examples is that of cases
of acting out of either routine or habit. Even
if there were initially reasons for developing
the routine or habit, i.e., for doing things in
142 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
that way, it is quite possible that these reasons
no longer apply. The person just acts in that
way because that is how he has always acted
in that kind of situation or role. Sometimes,
there may even be reasons to halt the routine
or give up the habit if the agent were to re?
consider. Yet the continuation of the behav?
ior does not show that he is no longer acting,
nor that his behavior is no longer under his
control.18 Typical habitual actions occur
when one sprinkles salt on one's food before What difference in kind is there, for instance,
eating, and when one is going through morn?
ing routines in the bathroom.
It is possible that our intuitions will not be There may indeed be no difference - if the
in agreement concerning the above examples. mannerism is something the person can
Some may think that neither mannerisms nor
habitual actions count as actions at all. Oth?
ers may accept them as actions, but count
them as intentional actions.19 So in what fol?
lows, I shall give arguments to show, first, that
the two kinds of examples are of actions
rather than of non-action behavior, and sec?
ond, that they are of actions that should not
count as either intentional or unintentional.
(i) Why non-intentional actions are
actions
Of my two kinds of examples, the most ob?
vious target of criticism is the first. Manner?
isms, it may be objected, are behavior that
may be peculiar to individuals but are no dif?
ferent from involuntary movements such as
those a person makes while sleeping. Indeed,
if I am to make my case, I should be able to
show some important difference between
what I call non-intentional action, and behav?
ior that does not count as action at all. One
way to do this is to resolve the problem of the
nature of action. If I can give necessary and
sufficient conditions for something's being an
action, then I can point to the satisfaction or
not of such conditions to justify my class?
ifying a particular example as an action or a
non-action. But the problem of the nature of
action is a large problem, the solution of which
will be complicated and involve the considera?
tion of every type of behavior before drawing
general conclusions. Moreover, the question
of the existence of non-intentional action is
methodologically prior to that of the nature
of action in general. For we do not want our
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concept of action to be a philosopher's inven?
tion, and we do not want to resolve the ques?
tion of whether there are non-intentional
actions simply by fiat. It is rather our intui?
tions on various aspects of human behavior,
including the existence of actions that can be
described as non-intentional, that should be
our guide in formulating an account of what
an action is.
So how can I respond to the objection?
between a person's tugging at his ear-lobe
and his tossing around in bed while asleep?
never have the appropriate non-observa?
tional awareness of. What I am alluding to
here is something that we normally experi?
ence when acting. An agent is usually able to
tell immediately, without recourse to obser?
vation, that he is acting when he is. And if he
fails to act, he is still able to say if asked what
it was that he was trying to do. Compare, for
instance, a clear case of action, someone's
shrugging his shoulders in response to a ques?
tion he cannot answer, and a clear case of
non-action behavior that involves bringing
about the same bodily movement, someone's
shivering as a chilly wind hits him. Given that
the shivering is internally caused (although
triggered by the wind), the person has an im?
mediate awareness that he is shivering when
he is. But this awareness that he is shivering
is not the same as the awareness that he has
that he is acting when he performs an action
of shrugging his shoulders. In the latter case,
the agent not only knows non-observation
ally that he is shrugging his shoulders when
he is doing it, but has foreknowledge that he
will perform that particular action there and
then. This foreknowledge may be momentary,
but its presence can be established if we
imagine that the agent is prevented from act?
ing. The one who would have shrugged his
shoulders will be able to say what it was that
he was trying to do. Whereas if someone had
taken an anti-shivering drug, he will not say
that he was trying unsuccessfully to shiver,
and he cannot tell when it was that he would
have shivered had he not been prevented
from doing so.20 Some people may say that

they can feel a shiver coming on. By this they
mean that they have feelings that, from past
experience, they associate with the onset of
shivering. Such "foreknowledge" however
lacks the immediacy of the foreknowledge
that I have that I will try to shrug my shoul?
ders just when I do.21
I take it therefore to be a fact of ordinary
experience that distinctions are made, be?
tween behavior that is like shrugging and be?
havior that is like shivering, on the basis of
the kind of awareness a person has when he
is behaving. My example of a mannerism was
carefully chosen such that its subject could be
immediately aware that he is performing an
action as he is doing it. Thus, the mannerism
is similar to the action of shrugging one's
shoulders, rather than the non-action behav?
ior of shivering in cold weather. Note also
that we have established the similarity with?
out appeal to intentionality, thereby leaving
room for me to argue later that the mannerism,
unlike the action of shrugging one's shoulders
in reply to a question, is non-intentional.
It is easier to argue that habitual actions
are actions. For first, we could appeal to the
argument I have just given to show that man?
nerisms are actions. The person who does
something out of habit or routine can be im?
mediately aware that he is acting when he is
doing it, in the same way that someone shrug?
ging his shoulders can be aware. Secondly,
many who reject mannerisms as examples of
action are less reluctant to accept habitual ac?
tions. This is because habitual actions are
often quite complicated and involve many
coordinated steps. Accordingly, many have
taken such actions to be intentional. And
they sometimes are. What I am arguing here
is that they are not intentional when the
agent no longer performs them for reasons,
even though one must have reasons to form
habits in the first place. So I will be arguing
in the next sub-section that there are habitual
actions that are not done in the course of do?
ing anything for a reason.
Before that, I want to show that my crite?
rion for counting mannerisms and habitual
actions as actions is not overly inclusive.
There is also the possible objection that the
difference between my claim about actions as
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NON-INTENTIONAL ACTIONS / 143
a category that includes mannerisms and ha?
bitual actions, and an account of action that
denies that either or both count as actions, is
that I have merely described what people
take to be actions, whereas a philosophical
account should do some work in conceptual
clarification. As explained earlier, I appeal to
intuitions because the concept of action
should not be a philosopher's invention. But
I could still make my criterion for counting
mannerisms and habitual actions as actions
do some work by dismissing a class of behav?
ior that has often been confusedly called "ac?
tions." In so doing, I further clarify what I
take non-intentional actions to be by reject?
ing something that does not fit into the class
of actions that I have in mind.
The class of behavior that has been sug?
gested as examples of non-intentional action,
but which, on my account, do not count as
cases of action at all are so-called "spontane?
ous actions."22 If it were really the case that
something were done "spontaneously," then
the agent could not have had any non-obser?
vational forewarning that he was going to do
what he did just then. Had the "spontaneous
action" not occurred and he were asked to
report what he had been trying to do, he
would surely not have anything at all to re?
port. For he did what he did without trying.
He was in fact surprised to find himself doing
it. Thus, his experience of such behavior is closer
to his experience of shivering than his expe?
rience of shrugging. It is quite unlike the ex?
amples I gave earlier of non-intentional action.
(ii) Why non-intentional actions are
neither intentional nor unintentional
Let us recall what was argued earlier about
the nature of intentional action. I put forward
an account of intentional action as the bring?
ing about of events for the reason the agent
had for acting, or, what I have argued is the
same thing, the causation in the right way of
those events brought about in acting by the
agent's intention to so act. In acting uninten?
tionally, an agent must have brought about
the unintended events in the course of doing
something intentionally. Assuming that this
account holds without exception, whether an
agent acts intentionally or unintentionally,
 144 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
there must be some reason for which he acts,
and he must have an intention that causes the
events he brings about in acting.
If someone performs an action of the kind
given in my examples, that I call "non-inten?
tional," does he not do something that he has
reason for doing? Here, the hard cases are
likely to be habitual actions rather than man?
nerisms. As I said before, many who accept
habitual actions as actions do so because they
think of them as intentional actions. How can
it be denied that habitual actions are done for
reasons?
My opponent may present me with a di?
lemma. Either a habitual action is intentional
or it is not an action at all. But my account of
"non-intentional action" requires that habit?
ual actions be actions. Hence they must in
fact be intentional. Although the grounds
that I gave for taking habitual actions to be
actions did not directly appeal to reasons or
intentions, my opponent asserts that I have in
fact covertly relied on such an appeal. For I
argued that someone who does something
out of habit could be immediately aware that
he is acting when he is doing it, and aware of
what it is that he is trying to do if he does not
succeed. Moreover, I conceded that habitual
actions are frequently complex and require
coordination. My opponent concludes his
case by attributing the functions of planning,
coordination, control, and awareness to a
state of intending that is the cause of the
events brought about in performing a habit?
ual action. Therefore, habitual actions are in?
tentional.
What I shall now argue is that those func?
tions attributed to intention need not all be
attributed to intention. In fact, there are ad?
vantages to distinguishing the roles proper to
intention from those that are fulfilled by
some other mental state of the agent. Once I
have made the distinction between roles, I
can argue that it is not necessary for the roles
proper to intention to be fulfilled in order
that an action be performed, and that the
roles that do have to be fulfilled can be ful?
filled by something other than an intention in
the case of non-intentional action.
What do I mean by a role or roles proper
to a mental state such as intention? This
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brings us back to the case, made by Bratman,
for the irreducibility of intention to other
mental states. Physical entities can in princi?
ple be distinguished from one another on the
basis of spatio-temporal criteria. Can we in?
dividuate mental types without committing
ourselves to either a type-identity theory of
the mind, or introducing mental stuff or sub?
stances? Bratman distinguishes intention
from other mental states using a functionalist
approach:23
The way to confront skepticism about [a men?
tal state] - in particular, future-directed inten?
tion - is to show that [the mental state] can be
embedded in . . .a web of regularities and
norms_We can also support the claim that
our commonsense framework sees [the mental
state] as a distinctive attitude ... by showing
how the nexus of regularities and norms in
terms of which we understand [the mental
state] differs in systematic and important ways
from those in terms of which we understand
[other mental states].
According to Bratman, dispositions and
regularities concerning reasoning are central
to our commonsense understanding of inten?
tion. What is distinctive about intentions are
the roles they play as inputs into practical
reasoning. Intentions are the constitutive ele?
ments of plans of action. As limited rational
agents, we formulate partial plans in order to
coordinate our activities intrapersonally and
interpersonally, and to increase the amount
of time available for deliberation that cannot
be left to the last minute. The role of prior
plans is to serve as a framework for further
reasoning. Prior intentions structure an
agent's practical reasoning in two ways: they
pose the problem of finding the means for
fulfilling the intentions; and they constrain
the admissibility of options for future action,
disallowing those that conflict with intended
courses of action.24 Thus, a rational agent has
to satisfy the demands for "means-end coher?
ence" and "strong consistency" between in?
tentions and beliefs, because by meeting
these demands a limited agent increases the
likelihood of getting what he wants.
It is clear that desires do not serve the
same roles as intentions and are not subject
to the same rational demands. There is noth
 NON-INTENTIONAL ACTIONS /145

ing irrational about not finding means to sat?
isfy a desire that one sincerely holds, nor is
there anything irrational in holding a set of
desires that cannot all be satisfied in a world
in which our beliefs are true. Thus, on the
functionalist approach, intention and desire are
mental states that are distinct from each other.
I will now show that there need not be any?
thing that satisfies the roles distinctive of in?
tention when a habitual action is performed.
Intentions serve as inputs into further practi?
cal reasoning. That is what makes them inten?
tions and not mere desires. But is there
practical reasoning prior to habitual action?
A distinction must be made between the rea?
soning done when the habit is first formed
and the reasoning done when the action is among those distinctive of the state of inten?
performed habitually. I deny only that any tion. But if these functions can be attributed
reasoning goes on when a habitual action is to another mental state, the existence of
performed. The forming of a habit occurs which is sufficient for the action to be inten?
through the intentional performance of the
action. But once the action has become ha?
bitual, it is non-intentional. For the action is
now done out of habit, and not for the rea?
sons that originally prompted the action
when it was intentional. The action will con?
tinue to be performed even when the original
reasons are no longer valid, or no longer sup?
port this course of action. In such a case, the
action would not be performed if the agent
had reasoned about whether to do it instead
of doing it out of habit. For example, a person
in the habit of adding salt to his food will do
so even when the food is tasty enough, and
he would agree that it is if asked about it.25
Because the action was intentional when
the habit was first formed, we have an expla?
nation of how a complex habitual action is
possible without reasoning at the time it is
performed. The planning needed to develop
a complex action involving sequences of
means and ends took place when the action
was first performed non-habitually. The abil?
ity to perform the same action non-intention
ally, i.e., as a habitual action, without con?
cerning oneself with how one does it, is ac?
quired through the practice of doing that ac?
tion intentionally over a period of time. Once
the ability is acquired, one can (although one
does not have to) perform the action without
the intention that formerly preceded it.
There is no evidence on functionalist
grounds for the presence of intention when a
habitual action is performed.26 On my earlier
account of intentionality, the absence of in?
tention entails that the action is not inten?
tional. This may now be challenged on the
grounds that habitual action is an example of
intentional action without the agent having
an intention to so act, showing hence that my
earlier account lacks generality. First,
Rosalind Hursthouse has argued for there
being intentional actions that are not done
for any reasons at all. Second, I have still to
account for the control and guidance an
agent has over his habitual action. I said ear?
lier that these functions need not be included
tional, then the absence of intention when a
habitual action is performed is not enough to
prove that the action is not intentional.
In what follows, I will first deal with the
second challenge before turning to a discus?
sion of Hursthouse's "arational actions."
Now Bratman seems to have suggested that
there is a kind of mental entity other than
intention that may guide action. He argues,
contrary to my view, that one can act inten?
tionally without having the intention to so
act. When one acts intentionally, what one
also does is endeavor to act. But one can en?
deavor to act and act intentionally without
intending to so act.27 The reason why Brat?
man draws a distinction between intending
and endeavoring is that the former is subject
to consistency requirements to which the lat?
ter is not. Bratman has an example in which
a person aims to perform each of two actions
even though he knows that he cannot suc?
ceed in doing both.28 It may be the best strat?
egy for success in doing one of the two
actions that one should try to do each. Yet
given what the agent knows, he cannot intend
to do both since such an intention is inconsis?
tent with his beliefs. Since rational intentions
are agglomerative, he cannot then intend to
do each of the two actions. Yet his behavior
in each case is guided by his goal in acting.
Bratman has set up his example so that the

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146 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
two actions are symmetrical. There is no
question of intending to do one of the actions
but not the other. As a solution, Bratman al?
lows that the agent endeavors, without in?
tending, to do each of the two actions. Since
endeavoring is not subject to the requirement
of consistency with the agent's beliefs, he can
endeavor to perform each of the actions even
though he knows that he cannot do both.
Bratman thinks that endeavoring without
intending is, when it produces the event
aimed at, sufficient for intentional action. For
to endeavoring can be attributed the role of
guiding one's behavior. But two senses of
guidance need to be distinguished. There is a
sense of guidance that is associated with
practical reasoning, which is how intention
guides behavior. If endeavoring involves this
kind of guidance, then it is like intention in
being subject to the demand for means-end
coherence. But in the case we considered ear?
lier of a habitual action, we found no mental
state that involves practical reasoning and
that is subject to the rationality constraints
distinctive of intention. What Bratman seems
to have in mind instead, when noticing the
guiding function involved in endeavoring, is
guidance in a teleological sense; i.e., an action
is directed at some object at which it aims:29
For me to endeavor [to act] is, in part, for me
to guide my conduct accordingly. In a normal
case this means that, other things equal, I will
be prepared to make adjustments in what I am
doing in response to indications of my success
or failure in [acting]. I will be prepared to ad?
just [my action] ... in ways believed by me to
promote that goal.
This kind of guidance is independent of the
roles that are distinctive of intention. I can
grant that it occurs when a habitual action is
performed. The hand motions that I make
when I brush my teeth may be done from
habit, but my hand has to respond to the ar?
rangement of the teeth in my mouth, the
length of my toothbrush, and so on. But given
that the action is habitual, there is no neces?
sity for practical reasoning to be involved as
it had when the habit was first formed. And
the fact of there being a goal to be promoted
by one's action does not by itself entail there
being an intention to be fulfilled. Even a non
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human creature that is not capable of plan?
ning may engage in goal-directed behavior,
and this may even count as action if the fur?
ther condition, of its potentially having imme?
diate awareness that it is acting, is satisfied.
Therefore it is not justified to take the ac?
tion one endeavors without intending to per?
form to be intentional. There is, on the one
hand, action that one intends to do that in?
volves practical reasoning. There is, on the
other hand, action that one merely endeavors
to do that involves only guidance in a tele?
ological sense. I see no advantage in taking
the actions performed to be intentional in
both cases, for doing so not only obscures an
important distinction between them, but
would also make it seem somewhat arbitrary
to deny intentional action to any system ca?
pable of goal-directed acts, whether it plans
or not. It is theoretically more satisfying to
take the actions that involve only guidance in
a teleological sense to belong to a category
of its own, that of non-intentional but volun?
tary action.
Finally, the immediate awareness that an
agent has, that he is acting when he is, should
not be attributed to intention either. The
agent does not have such an awareness until
he has actually commenced acting, even if he
had the intention all along. The awareness is
common to both the actions that one has an
intention to perform and those that one only
endeavors, without intending, to perform. So
the presence of such awareness does not
show the action to be intentional. Rather, it
seems to be a mark of action in general.
Let me turn now to the first of the two
challenges to my claim that absence of inten?
tion when a habitual action is performed en?
tails that the action is non-intentional.
According to Rosalind Hursthouse, there are
"arational actions" that are intentional but
not done for any reason at all. Her examples
are of actions done in the grip of an emotion,
not in order to express the emotion, but qua
expression of emotion.30 Do habitual actions
also belong to this category of actions? Since
Hursthouse does not cite them as examples,
we have to answer this question by under?
standing why Hursthouse considers emo?
tional actions arational and by examining the
implications for habitual actions.

Hursthouse compares two actions done in
the grip of the emotion of fear.31 If one flees
in terror from a lion, a reason can be ascribed
for doing so. But if one burrows under the
bedclothes out of fear of ghosts or thunder, it
does not make sense to ascribe an analogous
reason because such an ascription would at?
tribute an absurd belief, i.e., that one would
be safe under the bedclothes. It is mysterious
why there should be a great disanalogy be?
tween the two cases. It cannot be denied, says
Hursthouse, that actions of the latter kind are
also intentional, "for they are clearly not un?
intentional, and to say they form a significant
class of actions that are neither intentional
nor unintentional is to admit that, within the
standard account, they present a formidable
problem."
Hursthouse does not say why she is against
introducing a class of actions that are neither
intentional nor unintentional. In fact, it seems
to me that the introduction of such a class of
actions has the advantage of resolving the
mystery of the "great disanalogy." For we can
then distinguish between two kinds of action
that one may be performing in fleeing from
a lion. In one case, one reasons about one's
situation and forms an intention to run. In
another (more typical) case, one does the in?
stinctive thing and simply runs away. This ac?
tion may be goal-directed but it is not guided
by an intention. Even if in the second case we
can attribute to the agent the same desire and
belief that constitute a reason for running in
the first case, he did not run for that reason.
The action is non-intentional just like the ac?
tion of hiding under the bedclothes. The mys?
tery of a disanalogy where there should not
be one is created by confusing the two cases
of running from the lion. There is indeed a
disanalogy between the case where the agent
forms an intention to run and that of hiding
under the bedclothes, an action which the
agent has no non-absurd reason to do. There
is however no disanalogy when the case we
are concerned with is that of running non-in
tentionally from the lion.
The important point to note here is that
the person who flees from the lion non-inten
tionally could have done the same action in?
tentionally, whereas the person who hides
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NON-INTENTIONAL ACTIONS /147
under the bedclothes could not, since there is
no available reason for doing so. But both
actions are equally non-intentional. Habitual
action is more like the first kind of non-inten?
tional action. Although I may habitually
sprinkle salt over my food without first tast?
ing it, I may now have read about how over
consumption of salt causes heart disease. I
may still do what I habitually do, but I will in
this instance reason about it and then form
an intention to sprinkle salt over my food.
There is a disanalogy between this action and
my previous habitual action that is worth not?
ing by classifying one action as intentional
and the other as non-intentional.
I conclude that there is no basis for class?
ifying emotional actions as intentional and
therefore arational, in preference to intro?
ducing a class of action that is neither inten?
tional nor unintentional, namely non
intentional action. I do not want to make fur?
ther claims about where emotional actions
belong in my classificatory scheme without
having examined the different types of such
actions in more detail. What I do claim is that
there is nothing in Hursthouse's argument
for arational actions that makes a persuasive
case for classifying habitual action (and other
actions not done for any reason) as inten?
tional. In fact, the introduction of the concept
of non-intentional action enables me to make
useful distinctions that are concealed by her
classificatory scheme. Having rejected the
wider extension that Hursthouse gives to in?
tentional action, I can amend my earlier more
cautionary criteria of intentionality as follows:
(II') An action is intentional iff it is the bringing
about of events appropriately caused by the
agent's reason for so acting.
(12') An action is intentional iff the events
brought about in acting are caused in the
appropriate way by the agent's intention to
so act.
Now that I have argued the case that ha?
bitual action is non-intentional, it is quite
straightforward to establish the same for
mannerisms. As I stated in my example of a
mannerism, an agent is "wholly indifferent"
to whether he performs it. Since he is not
committed to acting, he is not under any ra
 148 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
tional constraint to do the kind of practical
reasoning that typifies intention. But the ac?
tion nevertheless has to be guided in the tele?
ological sense. For the agent who tugs at his
ear has to direct his hand to the place where
his ear-lobe is located. A mannerism is like a
habitual action in requiring guidance that
does not involve practical reasoning. It is
therefore also a non-intentional action.
III. The Importance of
Non-Intentional Action
I have now set up a classificatory scheme
that distinguishes between intentional, unin?
tentional, and non-intentional action, which
rests on clear criteria derived from the way
the mental antecedents of action are distin?
guished from one another.32 To sum up, we
have the following definitions of each kind of
action:33
Intentional action: the action of bringing
about an event for the reason the agent had for
bringing about the event, or, equivalently, the
appropriate causation of the event brought
about in acting by the agent's intention to so
act.
Unintentional action: the action of bringing
about an unintended event in the course of
performing an intentional action.
Non-intentional action: the action of bringing
about an unintended event but not in the
course of performing an intentional action; i.e.,
an action in which the agent is not acting for a
reason when performing.
It may now be asked whether it matters so
much which scheme we use to distinguish be?
tween types of action? The answer is that the
conceptual distinctions suggested above can
be useful for addressing important questions
in philosophy. So there are costs involved in
neglecting this class of action. What I will do
in conclusion is to describe briefly one of the
National University of Singapore
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advantages of distinguishing non-intentional
actions from the other kinds of action.34
One of the important problems in moral
psychology is weakness of will or akrasia.
Traditionally, the possibility of acting against
one's better judgment has in effect been de?
nied. If a person does not do the thing that is
best for him to do, then he must have miscal?
culated his own best interest or he is acting
out of ignorance or under compulsion.35
More recently, recognition has been given to
the possibility of a form of akrasia that is due
to a self-deceptive failure by an agent to form
an intention that corresponds to his "all
things-considered" judgment in favor of a
course of action.36 No room is left however
for "last-ditch akrasia," the failure of an
agent to act on an intention correctly formed
at the conclusion of practical reasoning.37
It is quite likely that the possibility of last
ditch akrasia has been denied because it is
thought that an agent has to be doing some?
thing intentionally if his bringing about of an
event is to count as an action. So if he has an
intention that he forms as a result of practical
reasoning, his failure to carry out the inten?
tion is involuntary. If he does something else
instead, the behavior does not result from an
intention and hence is not an action. His in?
ability to do that which he intends to do is not
a case of acting against his better judgment.
It is not a case of acting at all.
The denial of last-ditch akrasia goes, I
think, against our intuitions about and our
experience of the phenomenon. So the recog?
nition of the possibility of non-intentional ac?
tion enables us to give a more realistic
account of akrasia. If the main obstacle to an
account of last-ditch akrasia is the refusal to
accept that one can act without doing any?
thing intentionally, then it counts in favor of
my proposed classificatory scheme that it
leaves room for such action.38
Received October 6,1994
 NON-INTENTIONAL ACTIONS / 149

NOTES

1.1 leave aside for the time being the question of whether there are intentional actions that are not done
for any reason at all, of the kind suggested by Rosalind Hursthouse, "Arational Actions," The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 88 (1991), pp. 57-68.
2. For a skeptical view, see J.W. Meiland, "Are There Unintentional Actions?" The Philosophical Review,
vol. 72 (1963), pp. 377-81.
3. Michael Bratman, who makes a good case for an irreducible state of intending, nevertheless uses the
notion of responsibility to account for intentionality in action. This is because he rejects what he calls the
Simple View, which takes having an intention to perform an action as a necessary condition for the
intentionality of the action performed. See Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge:Harvard
University Press, 1987), Chapter 8.1 present a solution to the problem Bratman raises for the Simple View
in another paper, "Intention and Belief (unpublished). Here I simplify matters by ignoring Bratman's
objection to the Simple View and concentrating instead on rejecting his alternative account of intention?
ality in terms of responsibility.
4. The fact that the action is not freely chosen is not sufficient for ruling out its intentionality.
5. The distinction here is between having reasons for acting and those reasons being the agent's reasons for
acting. I am suggesting that, for the latter to be the case, the reasons must operate by way of the agent's
practical reasoning.
6. Thus Donald Davidson argued in "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" in Essays on Actions and Events
(Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1980).
7. An anonymous referee has suggested that I "loosen" (II) to read "If an action involves the bringing
about of events appropriately linked to the agent's reason for so acting, the action is intentional." I believe
first that describing an action as the bringing about of events is neutral enough and leaves open the
possibility that the action includes the events brought about. While the point about not unnecessarily
taking a stand on the causal account of reasons explanation is well taken, I have decided to leave the main
text as it is while clarifying here that my case for non-intentional actions can be made without the
particular theoretical commitments implicit in my definition. The reason for my decision is that I am
writing in the context of a tradition in the philosophy of action in which a strong case can be made for
non-intentional actions. But given the referee's point, it should be simple enough to articulate the case for
non-intentional actions in non-Davidsonian traditions by adapting what I say here.
8. Davidson (ibid.) argues that a primary reason for action is constituted of a belief-desire pair with the
appropriate contents.
9. Bratman, Chapters 1-3, argues on such grounds for intention to count as a mental state in its own right,
to be distinguished from belief and desire.
10. There is a normative element to practical reasoning. However, I am not insisting that the agent be
perfectly rational, only that he does some reasoning and forms an intention taking into account his reasons
for acting. His reasoning need not be "right" by some criterion of practical rationality. By the same token,
some agents may do more reasoning in that they take more reasons into account or consider more
alternative courses of action or work out more detailed plans. Again, I do not insist that for the agent to
make a reason his reason for acting, he match up to some ideal of completeness or thoroughness in
practical reasoning. Finally, I do not insist that every stage of the agent's reasoning be consciously carried
out. The agent may have developed short-cuts in reasoning, and some of these steps can become pro?
grammed into his brain and be carried out automatically.
11. There is always the possibility of deviant causality in which an intended event is caused by the intention
but not in a way that will render it appropriate for us to call it intentional, or an action at all. I leave the
specification of "appropriateness" aside since I am interested only in what makes an action intentional,
given that it is intentional.
12. Bratman, p. 11.
13. See for instance, Davidson, "Agency" in Essays, p. 46.

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 150 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

14.1 will have to touch on the problem of the nature of action when I give reasons for taking non-inten?
tional actions to be actions rather than non-action behavior. But I do not have to answer the question
regarding unintentional action that is raised here. For non-intentional actions as I shall define them are not
actions that are done in the course of acting intentionally. So they do not fall into any grey area between
the bringing about of effects that counts as acting unintentionally, and the bringing about of effects that
does not count as acting at all.
15. The challenge that I am postponing discussion of is that posed by Hursthouse's "arational actions,"
supposedly intentional actions that are not done for any reason (p. 59). I will argue in Section II(ii) that it
is theoretically more satisfying to treat the cases that she considers to be examples of such actions as
instead instances of non-intentional action. To do that, I have to first make it clearer what I take
non-intentional actions to be and give some examples, which is what I will proceed to do next.
16.1 do not by any means think that there are no other kinds of examples, but I have selected examples that
I think will appeal to the reader's intuition. The examples I give here have also been noticed by others
writing about action.
17. I borrow this example from George M. Wilson, The Intentionality of Human Action, rev. edn.
(Stanford.Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 192. Similar examples include "twiddling" one's fingers (this
example courtesy of Michael Bratman) and chewing on the end of one's pencil. Wilson, who gives a
teleological account of the intentionality of action, takes his example to be of an intentional action. I will argue
that goal-directedness is a characteristic not just of intentional action but of non-intentional action as well. The
non-intentional mannerisms I have in mind need not be "knowingly" done as in Wilson's example.
18. It is not a necessary condition for a habitual action to be non-intentional that the original reason be no
longer applicable. Examples in which the original reason for developing the habit no longer applies are
meant to bring out the non-intentional nature of the action. An action could be non-intentional even when
the reason still applies, as long as it is done out of habit and the agent does not have an intention that he
acts on when he does it.
19. The kind of examples I give here, especially of habitual actions, have been recognized as cases of action
that is not done for a reason by, e.g., Lawrence H. Davis, Theory of Action (Englewood Cliffs :Prentice
Hall, 1979), pp. 7-8; Myles Brand, The Nature of Human Action (Glenview:Scott, Foresman & Company,
1970), p. 14; and Bernard Gert and Timothy J. Duggan, "Free Will as the Ability to Will," Nous, vol. 13
(1979), p. 208. Brian O'Shaughnessy, The Will, Vol. 2 (Cambridge?Cambridge University Press, 1980)
recognizes bodily mannerisms when he mentions the actions of "idle tongue movings" (p. 15) and
"stroking [one's] chin simplicit?r" (p. 18).
20. Another way of establishing the difference between the two cases is to note how the person who does
not succeed in shrugging is immediately surprised. Someone who fails to shiver may also be surprised, but
only after observing that it is chilly and inferring that such weather normally causes him to shiver.
21.1 do not of course attribute to the agent foreknowledge that he will act. (The world may end before he
succeeds in acting.) Nor do I attribute to the agent infallible authority as to what it is that he is trying to do.
(A devilishly clever neuroscientist may have rewired his nervous system without his knowledge.) The
point though is that it is one thing for a neuroscientist fiddling about in the brain to make a person think
that he is about to act in a certain way (e.g., shrug his shoulders), and quite another thing to make a person
think he is about to be struck with some involuntary behavior (e.g., shivering). The kind of knowledge he
needs to induce is different, and this is why a person can tell immediately that he is acting when he is.
22. Carl Ginet, On Action (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 3, cites a spontaneous action
as an example of what he calls an action done "for no particular reason". Michael Bratman, p. 126, gives an
example of "spontaneously" catching a ball unexpectedly thrown at one, which he says could be a
non-intentional action.
23. Bratman, pp. 9-10.
24. Ibid.,pp.31-33.
25. It has been suggested to me that habitual actions are done in the course of doing something intentional
that one does have reason to do. For example, one adds salt to one's food in the course of having a meal.
But adding salt to one's food is not a mere unintended side-effect that accompanies one's having a meal.
Rather, it is a further course of action that has to be initiated separately by the agent. My point is that it is
not initiated by an intention to add salt to one's food nor is it initiated by an intention to have a meal.

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 NON-INTENTIONAL ACTIONS /151

26. For the functionalist, it does not make sense to attribute to a rational agent intentions that do not play
their normal roles in practical reasoning. But a person who acts from habit is not necessarily criticizably
irrational. A referee has asked whether I am conceding that only functionalists are bound to deny the
presence of intention when a habitual action is performed. The answer is affirmative, but this concession is
not damaging to me because it has proved difficult for non-functionalists to make a plausible case for a
distinctive state of intention, even where clearly intentional actions are concerned.
27. Ibid., p. 129. There are in addition the so-called "double-effect" cases, where an expected but unwanted
side-effect is brought about in carrying out one's intention. Bratman argues that the agent neither intends
nor endeavors to bring about this side-effect (p. 142), but the action of bringing it about is intentional in
that the agent may be held responsible for doing it (p. 124). Since I have already argued against defining
intentionality of action in terms of responsibility, I only have to consider cases where intention is absent
but there is endeavoring.
28.This is Bratman's much discussed "video-games example" in ibid.,pp. 113-5.
29. Ibid.,p. 129.
30. Hursthouse, p. 61.
31./Wd., pp. 63-4.
32. Aubrey Townsend suggested the following objection to my classificatory scheme: whereas, following
Davidson, the classification of actions as intentional or unintentional is description-relative, I am suppos?
ing there to be a description-independent class of non-intentional actions, which is characterised only by
the absence of intention. I do not think I am committed to this supposition. Although there is no intention
to specify a description of the goal of a non-intentional action, it remains that one endeavors or tries to
attain a goal under some description. For instance, when I non-intentionally tug at my earlobe, I do not also
non-intentionally raise my hand above the table (assuming Davidson's theory of individuation so that this
is a redescription of the same action). The first is a mannerism of mine which I aim at doing, not the second.
33. Note that since I am not giving a definition of action in general here, there is nothing circular in the
definiens of intentional, unintentional, and non-intentional action, even though reference is made to the
concept of action.
34. Besides my example from moral psychology, I also see applications for my classificatory scheme in
thinking about the motivational psychology of action and the nature of action.
35. Both Plato and Aristotle gave such accounts of akrasia.
36. This is the interpretation that David Pears gives of Davidson's account in "How is Weakness of the Will
Possible?" in Essays, pp. 21-42. For Pears' interpretation, see his "Motivated Irrationality," Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement, vol. 56 (1982), pp. 157-78.
37. The expression "last-ditch akrasia" originated from Pears, ibid.
38. An earlier version of this paper was read at philosophy colloquia at the National University of
Singapore and at Monash University in Australia. I thank all of those who helped me with their comments
on these occasions, not all of whose views I may have accommodated to their satisfaction. I also thank the
anonymous referee who gave me useful suggestions for improving the paper.

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