Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP) November 2001

European Cities Targeted for Nuclear Destruction:

Hungarian Documents on the Soviet Bloc War Plans, 1956-71 www.isn.ethz.ch/php
Edited by Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher
________________________________________________________________________________________________

Report of the Political Main Group Directorate of the Ministry of Defense on the
Activity of the Political Bodies of the Fifth Army and the Third Army Corps during
the War Game of the UAF Headquarters on June 12–18, 1967, 23 June 1967

Ministry of Defense TOP SECRET! Prepared in 3 copies

Political Main Group Directorate 1 copy: 8 pp
No. 00769 Copy No. 2
No. 69/j

Based on Ministry of Defense Decree 5/1996, the classification is annulled.

Budapest, 11 March 1999.

Subject: Report on the activity of the political bodies of the Fifth Army and Third Corps in the war game of
the Unified Armed Forces Headquarters between June 12 and 18, 1967.

The political divisions used the preparation period and the preceding exercises properly to prepare the
political work of the war game, to make their "M" plans more specific, and to clarify their assignments
expected during the war game.

On the part of the Political Main Group Directorate, two assignments were defined for the political divisions
for the period of the exercise:

I) Organization of political work among the personnel participating in the exercise.

II) Planning special propaganda activity and organization of some specific special propaganda tasks,
according to the operational situation evolving.

1) Political preparation of the personnel participating in the exercise took part at the appropriate level.
During various Party and Communist Youth League programs and conferences, personnel were brought to
understand the purpose and importance of the war game and the specific assignments of participants.
They received the appropriate ideas and plans for political work to be done during the war game. Most
attention was paid to:
- prevention of breaches of discipline and extraordinary incidents;
- looking after people from all aspects;
- maintaining alertness and secrecy;
- mobilization to execute assignments to a high standard and punctually.
The central political work of the effective force was organized in the spirit of preparation for the 7th
Congress of the Communist Youth League. During the war game, the plan concerning activity among the
effective force was implemented in an organized and consistent way. All this contributed to the fact that
participants worked to their utmost in a very responsible way to execute the war game successfully. During
the exercise, there were no extraordinary incidents or extreme breaches of discipline. Material and cultural
supplies, relaxation and political briefing of the force were ensured properly.

_______________________________________________________________________________________

Copyright 1999-2006 Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). All rights reserved
If cited, quoted, translated, or reproduced, acknowledgement of any document’s origin must be made as follows:
“Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), www.isn.ethz.ch/php, by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH
Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network.”

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Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP) November 2001
European Cities Targeted for Nuclear Destruction:
Hungarian Documents on the Soviet Bloc War Plans, 1956-71 www.isn.ethz.ch/php
Edited by Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher
________________________________________________________________________________________________

2) According to the instructions of the Political Main Group Directorate, the political divisions executed the
following specific tasks of special propaganda work:
- general economic, political, social and military-cum-political evaluation of Austria and North Italy, and
analysis of the morale and political features of the West German, Austrian and Italian military forces;
- based on the above evaluation and analysis and specific operational situation, to form conclusions about the
main contents, aim, methods and means of special propaganda activity, and elaborate on the part of the
instructions from the political division in connection with special propaganda work;
- elaboration of general plans for special propaganda activity for the period until the end of the first
operation;
- detailed planning and organization of leaflet action by air, radio program, loudspeaker program and a
propaganda-grenade action (only the last two in the army corps), taking into account the specific operational
situation that had evolved.
Evaluation of the special propaganda activity carried out:

The political divisions had the plans, documents, preliminary data, supplies and information about the target
countries they required to organize special propaganda work.

They carried out the economic, political, social analysis of target countries at the appropriate level. The
material devised by the political divisions is brief, clear, relevant and realistic and its conclusions are correct.
The executed analysis and the conclusion are appropriate for informing the commanders. They provide
enough help in making decisions, and offer a firm foundation for defining the contents, aim and methods of
the specific, special propaganda activity of operations for the head of the political division.

Based on the executed analysis of the situation and conclusions, the political divisions defined the aim,
contents, form and means of special propaganda activity in the correct way. The part of the instructions of
the head of the political division referring to the organization and execution of special propaganda activity
was prepared at the appropriate level, in due detail and with due attention to facts.

The general plan elaborated during the war game for organizing and executing special propaganda activity in
both political divisions contains the most important assignments whose execution should be expected during
the preparation and the first operation.

The plans pay due attention to the evolved operational situation, the forces and equipment at hand.

The planned assignments accord with the expected process of the operations and calculate the time factor in
the correct way. They divided the forces and equipment at their disposal among subordinates in a considered
and reasonable fashion. They determined the order and place of their location in the correct way.
They liaised on the planned activity with the chief of the service concerned.
They reckoned with and guaranteed the material and technical conditions and the time needed for preparing
and executing the majority of the actions.
The working documents devised deserve special attention from the point of view of expediency and
reasonability:

_______________________________________________________________________________________

Copyright 1999-2006 Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). All rights reserved
If cited, quoted, translated, or reproduced, acknowledgement of any document’s origin must be made as follows:
“Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), www.isn.ethz.ch/php, by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH
Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network.”

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Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP) November 2001
European Cities Targeted for Nuclear Destruction:
Hungarian Documents on the Soviet Bloc War Plans, 1956-71 www.isn.ethz.ch/php
Edited by Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher
________________________________________________________________________________________________

- The operational map of the special propaganda sub-division (sector) contains, to the degree appropriate to
the activity, the location and order of battle of own and hostile troops, points of command, location of special
propaganda materials and participating bodies. It was continually revised.
- The graphic, operative plan of the special propaganda sub-division (sector) shows clearly and simply the
execution mechanism, sequence, and spatial and temporal relations of the activities of the executive and
participating bodies, from planning to conclusion.
- The documents prepared as supplements to the graphic operative plan (e.g. leaflet, text plan, etc.) ensure
effective, purposeful, punctual execution of actions.
The weaknesses of the analyses, documents and plans elaborated:
- The analysis of the armies of individual countries, their morale and political condition, the controversies
within the given army and the conclusions are not detailed or specific enough. They tell little about the
situation of the Italian army; they do not contain the necessary material and data about this. (For the army
corps instructors, Italy is not marked as a target country.)
- They have not differentiated or specified to the required extent the directions of larger towns and sectors
within the zone of the army and the army corps, either in the evaluation or when forming conclusions.
- They do not pay enough attention to the progressive forces of target countries. They ignore them in the
evaluation and the conclusions and do not make necessary plans for encouragement, mobilization or
activation of them.
- The planned continuous cooperation with all chiefs of the services concerned, to specify and continuously
complete data, supplies and information about the target countries and the hostile military forces (state,
mood of the population, character, contents, expected effect of hostile propaganda, etc.) is not satisfactory.
- They have not planned and organized the collection of the requirements for special propaganda of services
and service branches. As a consequence, they are unable to determine concretely enough the aims of the
special propaganda work, for example, to say whether they should mobilize the local population in the first
place in the given sector for the protection of its material, technical, health, cultural facilities and base.
[Handwritten note: This should be coordinated with the operational division within the limits of feasibility.]
- Some initial discouragement could be felt in launching certain assignments. People wanted to be too
certain. Sometimes they waited for approval of the commander's decision and successive new details of the
evaluation of the enemy, when they could have started organizing the implementation of the given
assignment.
- The political division of the army corps did not pay attention, either during the evaluation of the situation or
when defining conclusions and assignments, to the fact that a Soviet division was active in the zone and
under the command of the corps. The political division and its special propaganda section are not prepared
enough for such a situation.
Problems that have arisen during the war game—and need solving by the higher leadership:
- It is not unambiguously clear what the role and assignments of army corps, political divisions, front
political bodies and the HPA Political Main Group Directorate are in the planning, direction, coordination
and execution of special propaganda activity during the period of "M."
- It is not sufficiently clear whether, depending on changes in the operational assignment, the army corps
may use the civilian facilities assigned to it, what other facilities it may use, or what the fate of the facilities
assigned to it will be. (During the present war game, for example, the regrouping meant that the army could
not count on the Szombathely press assigned to it, it was only able to organize conditionally the use of
facilities in the zone it occupied only conditionally, while the corps did not utilize the relieved facilities in
Szombathely either).

_______________________________________________________________________________________

Copyright 1999-2006 Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). All rights reserved
If cited, quoted, translated, or reproduced, acknowledgement of any document’s origin must be made as follows:
“Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), www.isn.ethz.ch/php, by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH
Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network.”

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Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP) November 2001
European Cities Targeted for Nuclear Destruction:
Hungarian Documents on the Soviet Bloc War Plans, 1956-71 www.isn.ethz.ch/php
Edited by Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher
________________________________________________________________________________________________

- The question of relations with the political bodies of the border guards is not sufficiently clarified. Nor are
the possibilities and procedures for using their knowledge, facilities and bodies useful for special propaganda
activity.
- It is not sufficiently clear what contents and system of activity are to be carried out among prisoners of war,
or the mutual assignments and obligations of participants required in this sphere. (No station for collecting
prisoners of war has been set up in the "M" organization of the army corps.) [Handwritten note: Directive.]
- It is not adequately clarified what mutual obligations the special propaganda bodies and the various service
directorates have in peace and war. (Which service covers which technical facilities, for what assignments it
trains people, when, what data and matter it supplies, how the special propaganda bodies learn of the needs
of the services, how they fulfil the requirements, etc.) Consequently, the execution of assignments expected
in connection with special propaganda work cannot be considered guaranteed in some aspects. (For example,
there are no propaganda grenades in the ammunition stocks of the artillery. There is no corresponding
training for the artillery troops.) [Handwritten note: This is a central planning and supply assignment, it is
under progress. Directive and Rules (Army and Division) military rules.]
Conclusions:
- The political divisions are well prepared for the organization, execution and continuous direction of special
propaganda activity. They are able to organize purposefully and direct continuously the activity of the forces
and equipment assigned to them.
- They executed the assignments defined by the Political Main Group Directorate at the required level during
the war game, despite the deficiencies signified.
Proposals:
- The Agitation and Propaganda Group leader should evaluate in detail the experience of the war game for
the special propaganda workers of the corps, in the presence of two heads of political divisions. The full
force of the sixth division of the Political Main Group Directorate should participate in the evaluation.
- The sixth division of the Political Main Group Directorate should clarify the problems that have arisen and
require central measures. It should make proposals for sorting out the questions concerning other bodies.
- The comrade head of the Political Main Group Directorate should make an official commendation of
Lieutenant-Colonel Kálmán Bányai and to Captain István Szatai, the head of the Agitation and Propaganda
Group, for their successful work during the war game.

Budapest, June 23, 1967

Colonel Antal Halász
Lieutenant-Colonel Ferenc

[Archives: War History Archive, Ministry of Defense Political Main Group Directorate 1967 Unit
102/05/426 pp. 1–8]

_______________________________________________________________________________________

Copyright 1999-2006 Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). All rights reserved
If cited, quoted, translated, or reproduced, acknowledgement of any document’s origin must be made as follows:
“Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), www.isn.ethz.ch/php, by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH
Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network.”

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