G.R. No.
180086 July 2, 2014
AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM [AFP-RSBS], Petitioner, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
On July 10, 1997, the Armed Forcesof the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System
(AFP-RSBS) filed an application for original registration of parcels of land (designated as Lot Nos. 2969-
A, 2969-B, and 2969-C) consisting of 48,151 square meters in Silang, Cavite.
These were allegedly acquired from Narciso Ambrad, Alberto Tibayan, and Restituto Tibayan on March
13, 1997. It was also alleged that their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
properties since June 12, 1945.
In July 28, 2001, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court approved AFP-RSBS’s application for original
registration.
The Republic of the Philippines moved for the reconsideration but was denied.
On March 14, 2003, the Republic appealed the decision and order of the trial court, alleging improper
identification of the properties, noncompliance with SC Administrative Circular No. 7-96 dated July 15,
1996 requiring that copies of a list of lots applied for be furnished to the Bureau of Lands, non-
submission of a tracing cloth plan, and lack of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
certification showing that the properties were already declared alienable and disposable at the time of
possession by the predecessors-in-interest.
On January 10, 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed AFP-
RSBS’s application.
The Court of Appeals found that the properties had no pending land application and that there were no
overlapping lots. Hence, no person needed to be notified of the land registration proceedings. The Court
of Appeals also found that AFP-RSBS complied with the requirement to submit a tracing cloth plan.
However, according to the Court of Appeals, since Lot 2969 was declared alienable and disposable only
on March 15, 1982, the period of possession of the predecessors-in-interest before that date should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Hence, AFPRSBS’s and its predecessors-
in-interest’s possessions could not ripen into ownership.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that AFP-RSBS, as a private corporation or association, may not own
alienable lands of the public domain pursuant to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution.
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the period of possession before the declaration that land is alienable and disposable
agricultural land should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession for purposes of
original registration?
HELD: NO. We rule for petitioner.
The requirements for the application for original registration of land based on a claim of open and
continuous possession of alienable and disposable lands of public domain are provided in Section 14(1)
of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. It provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally orthrough their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupationof alienable and disposable
lands of the public domainunder a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(Emphasis supplied)
(2)
A similar provision can be found in Commonwealth Act No. 141 or Public Land Act:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
....
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupationof agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073) (Emphasis supplied)
Based on these provisions, an applicant for original registration based on a claim of exclusive and
continuous possession or occupation must show the existence of the following:
1) Open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, of land;
2) The land possessed or occupied must have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land
of public domain;
3) The possession or occupation was under a bona fide claim of ownership;
4) Possession dates back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.
On one hand, petitioner argued that its and its predecessors-ininterest’s possession before the
declaration that the property was alienable and disposable agricultural land in1982 should be included
in the computation of the period of possession for purposes of registration. On the other hand,
respondent holds the position that possession before the establishment of alienability of the land should
be excluded in the computation.
Republic v. Naguit involves the similar question. In that case, this court clarified that Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree should be interpreted to include possession before the declaration of the
land’s alienability as long as at the time of the application for registration, the land has already been
declared part of the alienable and disposable agricultural public lands. This court also emphasized in
that case the absurdity that would result in interpreting Section 14(1)as requiring that the alienability of
public land should have already been established by June 12, 1945. Thus, this court said in Naguit:
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
However, in the later case of Republic v. Herbieto that was cited by respondent, this court ruled that the
period of possession before the declaration that land is alienable and disposable cannot be included in
the computation of the period of possession. This court said:
Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any
period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as
alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is very
apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession required by
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject
Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized. This court clarified the role of the date, June 12, 1945,
in computing the period of possession for purposes of registration in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic of the Philippines. In that case, this court declared that Naguit and not Herbieto should be
followed. Herbieto "has [no] precedental value with respect to Section 14(1)." This court said:
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit.
The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the
provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and
disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fideclaim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguitinterpretation allows more possessors under a bona fideclaim of ownership to avail
ofjudicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than whatwould be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing
fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach ofSection
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioner was, therefore, able to prove all the requisites for the grant of an original registration of title
under our registration laws.
G.R. No. 156205, November 12, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
REGION IV, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, Petitioner, v.MARJENS INVESTMENT CORPORATION AND PATROCINIO P.
VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
Petitioner Republic, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources - Region IV
(DENR) filed a petition before the Court of Appeals for annulment of judgment, cancellation of title, and
reversion against the respondents including the R egister of Deeds for the Province of Batangas
(Tanauan, Batangas), and the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), alleges that respondents Marjens and
Villanueva appear as registered owners of a land identified as Lot 1 (LRC) Pcs-943, which is a portion
of Lots 1 and 2, plan Psu-114430 LRC (G.L.R.O.) Record No. N-3454, with an area of five thousand
(5,000) square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-18592 issued on April 7,
1976 by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas.
In Land Registration Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 3454, the then Court of First Instance of Batangas
rendered a Decision dated March 30, 1951 granting the application for registration of several parcels of
land in favor of the applicants therein, Hammon H. Buck, et al. It was established that the lands
described in Plans Psu-118922 and 114430 were originally owned by Rita Vda. de Ilustre since 1890.
The OSG among others alleges that the land in question cannot be the subject of disposition or
registration, and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over said property, much less to decree the
same as private property. Therefore, the registration proceedings, the judgment in the subject case, the
OCT No. O-669 issued pursuant thereto, and all subsequent titles are null and void. The land covered
by TCT No. T-18592, not having been legally registered, remains and forms part of the public domain of
the State.
Respondents claim that their titles, their predecessors' titles, and their mother title are issued in
accordance with law, and that the property was registered and brought under the Torrens system.
Respondents contend that the subject property was already private property even before the Spanish
Crown ceded sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to the United States of America. They assert that
the government has lost its rights by laches and estoppel to question the validity of the OCT No. 0-669,
the proceedings in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-3454, and the corresponding decree
(Decree 6610) issued after almost 50 years have lapsed.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition applying the case of Cariho v. Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, which recognized private ownership of lands already possessed or held by
individuals under claim of ownership as far back as testimony or memory goes and therefore never to
have been public land that Spain could bequeath to the United States of America.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the subject property covered by TCT No. T-18592 is a private property or part of the
public domain.
HELD: It is a private property.
The records did not categorically state that Rita Vda. de Ilustre had Spanish title over the subject
property. But by virtue of her long continued, open, public, adverse possession and cultivation of the
property in the concept of owner as against the whole world she is deemed to have acquired ownership
over the subject property.
As for respondents, it is undisputed that the property covered by TCT No. T-18592 traces its title to the
property originally owned by Rita Vda. de Ilustre since 1890. From her it passed on to several hands
until it was transferred to Hammon H. Buck, who successfully registered it in his name on February 18,
1952. From 1890, respondents' predecessors in interest had been in peaceful, open, continuous,
exclusive, adverse, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner of the subject property
including the portion covered by TCT No. T-18592. Following the Cariño ruling, the subject property had
been a private land and excluded from the public domain since 1890 prior to the signing of the Treaty of
Paris on December 10, 1898. Therefore, it is not part of the public domain that passed on from Spain to
the United States of America.

For the same reason, it is also not part of the unclassified public forest as petitioner claims. In Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Cosalan,29 the Court held that "[d]espite the general rule that forest lands
cannot be appropriated by private ownership, it has been previously held that 'while the Government
has the right to classify portions of public land, the primary right of a private individual who possessed
and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and should
not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated...Government in the first
instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry
land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made'"
The map (LC Map No. 3013), which is the basis of petitioner's claim, is inexistent at the time Hammon
H. Buck was issued an original certificate of title. Therefore, the subject property had been a private
property before it was classified. Thus, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals' findings and upholds
the private character of the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is barred by laches and estoppel.
HELD: YES.
Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time
to do that which, by observance of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert his right either has abandoned or declined to assert
it."31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The following elements must be present in order to constitute laches: (a) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in
asserting complainant's rights after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and after he has had the
opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right
on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is
accorded to the complainant.
We find it unnecessary to discuss further this issue in view of our ruling that Decree No. 6610, OCT No.
0-669, and TCT No. T-18592 registered in the name of respondents were validly issued.
G.R. No. 203384 January 14, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. SPS. JOSE CASTUERA PERLA CASTUERA, Respondents.
Andres Valiente sold his 3,135-square meter land in Barangay Siminublan, San Narciso, Zambales to
respondents Jose and Perla Castuera (Spouses Castuera) in 1978. On 21 May 2003, the Spouses
Castuera filed with the RTC an application for original registration of title over the property.
The Spouses Castuera presented:
 three witnesses: (1) former barangay captain and councilman Alfredo Dadural, (2) Senior Police
Officer 2 Teodorico Cudal, and (3) Perla Castuera. All witnesses testified that the Spouses
Castuera owned the property.
 documentary evidence: tax receipts and an advance plan 6 with a notation"Checked and verified
against the cadastral records on file in this office and is for registration purposes. This survey is
within the Alienable and Disposable land proj. No. 3-H certified by Director of Forestry on June 20,
1927 per LC Map No. 669 Sheet 1."
The Office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application for original registration.
The RTC granted the application for original registration based on the preponderance of evidence of
lawful ownership.
Petitioner appealed and the Spouses Castuera attached a CENRO (Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office) stating that the land is alienable and disposable.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. The CA applied PD 1529, Sec. 14 (1) “that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.”
ISSUE: Whether the advance plan and the CENRO certification are sufficient proofs of the alienable
and disposable character of the property?
HELD: NO. The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and
disposable character of the property. The Spouses Castuera, as applicants for registration of title, must
present a certified true copy of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary’s
declaration or classification of the land as alienable and disposable.
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into
alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such
copy of the DENR Secretary's declaration or the President's proclamation must be certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of such official record. These facts must be established to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.
G.R. No. 176020 September 29, 2014
HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO, namely, ANITA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, SONIA J. TOLENTINO and
RODERICK JULAO, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and MORENITA DE
JESUS, Respondents.
Sometime in the 1960's, Telesforo Julao (Telesforo) filed before the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Baguio City, two Townsite Sales Applications (TSA), TSA No. V-2132 and
TSA No. V-6667.Upon his death on June 1, 1971, his applications were transferred to his heirs by virtue
of DENR order on March 15, 1996.
On April 30, 1979, Solito Julao (Solito) executed a Deed of Transfer of Rights, transferring his
hereditary share in the property covered by TSA No. V-6667 to respondent spouses Alejandro and
Morenita De Jesus. In 1983, respondent spouses constructed a house on the property they acquired
from Solito. In 1986, Solito went missing.
On March 2, 1999, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, a Complaint or
Recovery of Possession of Real Property, against respondent spouses alleging that despite demand
(through a letter) the respondents have encroached on the 70 square meters of their property.
Respondent spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss due to prescription and alleged that they acquired the
said property from Solito.
During the trial, petitioners disputed the validity of the Deed of Transfer of Rights executed by Solito.
They presented evidence to show that Telesforo submitted two applications, TSA No. V-2132 and TSA
No. V-6667. The first one, TSA No. V-2132, resulted in the issuance of OCT No. P-2446 in favor of the
heirs ofTelesforo, while the second one, TSA No. V-6667, was dropped from the records. They also
presented evidence to prove that Solito had no hereditary share in the estate of Telesforo because
Solito was not Telesforo's biological son, but his stepson, and that Solito 's real name was Francisco
Bognot.
On August 10, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners.1âwphi1 The RTC found that
although petitioners failed to prove their allegation that Solito was not an heir of Telesforo. And since
what Solito transferred to respondent spouses was his hereditary share in the parcel of land covered by
TSA No. V-6667, respondent spouses acquired no right over the subject property, which was derived
from a separate application, TSA No. V-2132.
On December 4, 2006, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. The CA found the Complaint dismissible
on two grounds: (1) failure on the part of petitioners to identify the property sought to be recovered; and
(2) lack of jurisdiction. The CA noted that petitioners failed to pinpoint the property sought to be
recovered. In fact, they did not present any survey plan to show that respondent spouses actually
encroached on petitioners' property.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling that the petitioners failed to prove the identity of
the property in question?
2. Whether the trial court acquire jurisdiction?
HELD: 1.NO. In an action to recover, the property must be identified.
Moreover, Article 434 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim." The plaintiff, therefore, is duty-bound to clearly identify the land sought to be
recovered, in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of ownership. It bears stressing
that the failure of the plaintiff to establish the identity of the property claimed is fatal to his case.
In this case, petitioners failed to identify the property they seek to recover as they failed to describe the
location, the area, as well as the boundaries thereof. In fact, as aptly pointed out by the CA, no survey
plan was presented by petitioners to prove that respondent spouses actually encroached upon the 70-
square meter portion of petitioners' property. Failing to prove their allegation, petitioners are not entitled
to the relief prayed for in their Complaint.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for
failing to identify the property sought to be recovered.
2. NO. for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must exceed
₱20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject
property, the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had
jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be
determined which trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Furthermore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised by
respondents in their Appellant's Brief and the fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal is of no
moment. Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, defenses not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, res
judicata, and prescription, which must be apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In
other words, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even for the first time on appeal. In fact, the court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint at
any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that lack of jurisdiction exists.
G.R. No. 185092 June 4, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. CORAZON C. SESE and FE C. SESE, Respondents.
Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese (respondents) filed with the MTC an application for original
registration of land over a parcel of land, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Pulilan, Bulacan; alleging that
they acquired, through a donation inter vivos from their mother, Resurreccion L. Castro (Resurreccion),
the subject agricultural land; that they, through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of
the subject property; and that the property was not within a reservation.
Respondents submitted different documents including Survey plan of Lot 11247, CAD 345, Pulilan
Cadastre, approved by the Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Service, Region III, of
the DENR, stating that the land subject of the survey was alienable and disposable land, and as
certified to by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or military reservation.
On the lower portion of the plan, there was a note stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject
property was executed by a certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in favor of
Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others, that: "This survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry
on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation."
Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10,
2002, setting the case for hearing with the corresponding publication. After compliance with all the
requirements of the law regarding publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of the
application followed.
The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.
On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision, ordering the registration of the subject property in
the name of respondents.
The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the subject lots had been in open,
continuous, adverse, and public possession, either by the applicants themselves or their predecessor-
in-interest. Such possession since time immemorial conferred an effective title on the applicants,
whereby the land ceased to be public and became private property. It had been the accepted norm that
open, adverse and continuous possession for at least 30 years was sufficient.
On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-GR. CV No.
81439. In its brief, the OSG presented the following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of the
public domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a period of at least thirty (30) years is
entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed to prove specific acts of possession.
On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the judgment of the MTC.
ISSUE: Whether respondents are entitled to the registration of land title under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, or pursuant to Section 14(2) of the same statute. Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1073?
HELD: NO. SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land title must establish and prove:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that
the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.10 Compliance with the foregoing requirements is indispensable for an
application for registration of land title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to validly prosper. The
absence of any one requisite renders the application for registration substantially defective.
Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to establish the disposable and alienable
character of the subject land through a survey plan, where on its lower portion, a note stated, among
others, as follows: "This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC
Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military
reservation." The said plan was approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office
III, San Fernando, Pampanga on December 3, 1998. The annotation in the survey plan, however, fell
short of the requirement of the law in proving its disposable and alienable character.
In Republic v. Espinosa,11 citing Republic v.Sarmiento12and Menguito v. Republic,13
the Court
reiterated the rule that that a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed
was alienable and disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the property from
the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the
presumption that the property was inalienable. Thus:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the conversion and subdivision plan
approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this
survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on
January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation to prove that the lot is
alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption
that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: ‘This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry
on January 3, 1968,’ appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State..."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that
the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has
no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain
is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. The
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; or a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable.14
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.15 declared that a CENRO certification was insufficient to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show
sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land in
question as alienable and disposable. Thus, the present rule is that an application for original
registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records.16
Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the disposable and alienable character of
the subject land was an annotation by a geodetic engineer in a survey plan. Although this was certified
by the DENR, it clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration.
With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation of a parcel of
land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or
earlier.17 A mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more, by itself, is not
sufficient.18
In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings of this case will reveal, the
earliest that respondents and their predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and occupation of
the subject land was only in the year 1950,when their mother, Resurreccion, acquired the subject land
from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. Evidently, their possession of the
subject property commenced roughly five (5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date expressly
provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, their application for registration of land title was
legally infirm.
The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives: (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.1avvphi1 The case of Malabanan v. Republic19 gives a definitive clarity to the
applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In the said case, the Court laid down the following rules:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows: (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode
of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial
property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the
public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and, thus,
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President
is duly authorized by law.20
Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate
against the State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The
applicant must be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared
through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject
land is no longer retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the
State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by
virtue of prescription.21 The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the
Civil Code. It is still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. 22
G.R. No. 202414 June 4, 2014
JOSEPHINE WEE, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD MARDO, Respondent.
Respondent Felicidad Gonzales, married to Leopoldo Mardo, was granted a registered Free Patent No.
(IV-2) 15284, dated April 26, 1979, covering Lot No. 8348, situated in Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.
On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner, Josephine Wee, through a Deed of
Absolute Sale, a portion of the said lot (Lot No. 8348-B) for a consideration of ₱250,000.00.
Respondent, however, refused to vacate and turn over the subject property claiming that the alleged
sale was falsified.
On December 22, 1994, petitioner filed an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land
located at Barangay Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite, known as Lot No. 8349. Said application was
amended on September 19, 1996, this time covering a parcel of land known as Lot 8348-B situated in
Barangay Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite. Petitioner claimed that she is the owner of the said unregistered
land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.
On September 19, 1997, respondent filed her Opposition to the Amended Application alleging 1] that
she is the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land which is the subject of the amended application;
and 2] that petitioner’s deed of absolute sale is surreptitious.
On October 28, 2000, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Application alleging that the land
described in the application was different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion was,
however, denied.
On September 4, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision granting the application of petitioner, Josephine
Wee, as qualified to register the subject land in her name, and the Administrator of LRA is hereby
directed to issue the corresponding decree in her name based on the plan and technical description of
said land as submitted by the applicant and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to issue title
in her name.

On June 26, 2012, the CA handed down a Judgment reversing and setting aside the RTC decision. The
CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of possession and
occupation under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her admission that the subject lot was not physically
turned over to her due to some objections and oppositions to her title suggested that she was not
exercising any acts of dominion over the subject property, an essential element in the requirement of
possession and occupation contemplated under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the right to register the subject land?
HELD: NO. The petition deserves no merit.
P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Decree, governs the original registration
proceedings of unregistered land. The subject application for original registration was filed pursuant to
Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, which provides the condition necessary for registration. Thus:
SEC 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.(Emphasis supplied)
Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must sufficiently
establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.4
The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she could not have complied with the
requirement of possession and occupation under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 considering that she had
admitted that it was not physically turned over to her. As she was not in actual and physical possession,
she could not have exercised any acts of dominion over the subject property which was essential to the
requirement of possession and occupation contemplated under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.
A more important consideration, however, is that the subject land is already registered under OCT No.
OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-03-6111) of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, under the name of
respondent Felicidad Gonzales.
In the case of Republic vs. Umali,5 this Court ruled that once a patent is registered and the
corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of public domain and becomes
private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public land
patent, when registered in the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens title, and
becomes as indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof. Said
title, like one issued pursuant to a judicial decree, is subject to review within one (1) year from the date
of the issuance of the patent. This rule is embodied in Section 103 of PD 1529, which provides that:
Section 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents. – Whenever public land is by the Government
alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation
of this Decree. After due registration and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed
to be registered land to all intents and purposes under this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, respondent’s registered patent in the corresponding Registry of Deeds is a veritable
Torrens title and becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title upon the expiration of one (1) year from the
date of its issuance.6
For said reason, the order of the RTC directing the Administrator of LRA to issue a corresponding
decree in petitioner’s name is null and void. A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second
decree for the same land would be null and void, since the principle behind the original registration is to
register a parcel of land only once.
Verily, once a title is registered, as a consequence either of judicial or administrative proceedings, the
owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court sitting in the mirador
de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. The certificate of title cannot be defeated by
adverse, open and notorious possession. Neither can it be defeated by prescription. As provided under
Sec. 47 of PD 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Petitioner argued that the rule on indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. In this case, she alleged that the respondent fraudulently registered the subject
property under her name after she (respondent) had already sold a portion thereof to her (petitioner). By
virtue of the deed of sale, petitioner insists that she is considered to be the real owner of the subject
parcel of land.
The Court finds no merit in petitioner’s argument. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the issue of the
validity of title can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.9 A certificate of
title cannot be attacked collaterally. This rule is provided under Section 48 of PD 1529 which states that:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. ― A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
In Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, it was stated that it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether
title was procured by falsification or fraud as advanced by petitioner can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after
the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral
proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or
diminished in a collateral proceeding.
In this case, the petitioner is contesting the indefeasibility of title on the ground of fraud and
misrepresentation. Applying the abovementioned doctrine, even assuming that the petitioner’s
allegations are true, the same are considered as collateral attacks, and such must be raised in an action
expressly instituted for such purpose and in a proper proceeding.
Thus, in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that an application for registration of an already titled On January 14, 1992, Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed in the RTC a
land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. The title may be challenged only in a proceeding complaint for recovery of property and damages (with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
for that purpose, not in an application for registration of a land already registered in the name of another injunction) against Anacleto and Elenette.
person. After one year from its registration, the title is incontrovertible and is no longer open to review.
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when Raymundo died in 1939, his properties were inherited
G.R. No. 163362 July 8, 2015 by his son Nicolas alone "as it was during the period of the old Civil Code, where the spouse could not
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO ALCORIZA, PEDRO ARADO, inherit but only a share of the usufruct, which was extinguished upon the death of the usufructuary;" that
HEIRS: JUDITHO ARADO, JENNIFER ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY ABAD, when Nicolas died in 1954 without issue, half of his properties were inherited by his wife, Florencia, and
ANTONIETA ARADO, NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL ARADO, NICETAS VENTULA, and NILA the other half by his mother, Joaquina; that Florencia was, in turn, succeeded by her siblings Sulpicio,
ARADO, PEDRO ARADO, TOMASA V. ARADO, Petitioners, Braulia and Veronica; that during the marriage of Nicolas and Florencia, the former had an affair with
vs. ANACLETO ALCORAN and LENETTESUNJACO, Respondents. Francisca, from which affair Anacleto was born, but it was unknown whether he was the spurious son of
Nicolas; that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child during Nicolas' lifetime; hence,
Anacleto was not entitled to inherit from Nicolas; that nonetheless, Anacleto claimed entitlement to the
Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado (Joaquina), and their marriage properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina; that the will was void for
produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran (Nicolas). not having been executed according to the formalities of the law, and the same did not reflect the true
intention of Joaquina; that the supposed testator did not acknowledge the will, which was not submitted
Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan (Florencia) but had no child. for probate; that they were the rightful heirs to the properties; that notwithstanding their repeated
demands for the return of the properties, the defendants persistently refused; that a writ of preliminary
Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to respondent mandatory injunction should issue to prevent the defendants from further violating their rights in the
Anacleto Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13, 1951. properties; and that the defendants should be ordered to reconvey the properties.
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died in 1954. Likewise, Florencia died in 1960, and Joaquina in On January 15, 1997, the RTC pined that Anacleto established that he was really the acknowledged
1981. illegitimate son of Nicolas. It cited the certificate of birth of Anacleto (Exhibit 4) and Page 53, Book 4,
Register No. 214 of the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong (Exhibit 3 ), which proved that
Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan. Nicolas had himself caused the registration of Anacleto' s birth by providing the details thereof and
indicating that he was the father of Anacleto.
Joaquina had four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado.
On February 28, 2003, the CA affirmed the judgment.
Nemesio had six children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who
was married to Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria;11 and (6) Felicisima. Hence, this case: ISSUES:
During the pendency of the case, Pedro died, and was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1) (a) Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran; and
Juditho and his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse, Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil and his (b) Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.
spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her spouse, Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.
HELD: (a) YES. Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas had duly
Raymundo Joaquina SIBLINGS
acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son. The birth certificate of Anacleto appearing in the
Celedonia, Nemesio, Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental (Exhibits 3, 3-A) showed that Nicolas
Melania, had himself caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing was by means of the name of
Alejandra,
(1) Jesusa, who Nicolas appearing in the column "Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of
was married to Births. Based on the certification (Exhibit 3-B) issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Victoriano
Alcoriza; Bacong, Negros Oriental, the column in the Register of Births entitled "Remarks" (Observaciones) was
(3) Teodorico; (4) the space provided for the name of the informant of the live birth to be registered. Considering that
Josefina; (5)
Gliceria; (6) Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on the
Felicisima birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully warranted.
(2) Pedro, who
was married to
Tomasa Arado; Anacleto's baptismal certificate (Exhibit 7) was of no consequence in determining his filiation. We have
already held in Cabatania v. Court of Appeals that "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a
Francisca Nicolas Florencia Sulpicio, Braulia
public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
and Veronica specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity;" and that baptismal
Anacleto certificates were "per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation," and thus "cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation]." Hence, we attach no probative value to the
baptismal certificate as proof of the filiation of Anacleto.

The weight accorded by the R TC and the CA to the picture depicting the young Anacleto in the arms of
Joaquina as she stood beside the coffin of the departed Nicolas (Exhibit 5) was also undeserved. At
best, the picture merely manifested that it was Joaquina who had acknowledged her filiation with
Anacleto. Cautioning against the admission in evidence of a picture of similar nature, we have pointed
out in Solinap v. Locsin, Jr. that:
[R]espondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not
constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and
sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others
and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
The school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6), which evinced that Joaquina was the guardian of Anacleto in
his grade school years, and the marriage contract between Anacleto and Elenette (Exhibits 8 to 8-C),
which indicated that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's marriage, did not have the evidentiary
value accorded by the RTC and the CA. Joaquina's apparent recognition of Anacleto mattered little, for,
as we stressed in Cenido v. Apacionado, the recognition "must be made personally by the parent
himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a
voluntary declaration by the parent, of if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the
paternity or maternity of children born outside wedlock."
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative evidence notwithstanding,
Anacleto 's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate child remained beyond question in view of the showing
that Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
(b) YES but the collateral heirs have the right to inherit also subject to partition.
Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose estate included the first eight of the
subject properties that had previously belonged to Raymundo Anacleto became a co-owner of said
properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954.44 Likewise, Joaquina succeeded to, and became a
pro indiviso co-owner of, the properties that formed part of the estate of Nicolas. When Joaquina died in
1981, her hereditary estate included the two remaining properties, as well as her share in the estate of
Nicolas. Inasmuch as Joaquina died without any surviving legitimate descendant, ascendant,
illegitimate child or spouse, Article 100345 of the Civil Code mandated that her collateral relatives
should inherit her entire estate.
As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina, they are the ones entitled to inherit
from her estate.
Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties did not establish that the estates of
Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been respectively settled with finality through the appropriate
testate or intestate proceedings, and partitioned in due course. Unless there was a proper and valid
partition of the assets of the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina, whether
extrajudicially or judicially, their heirs could not adjudicate unto themselves and claim specific portions
of their estates, because, as we have declared in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals:
Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the
inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a co-
heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. Upon the death of a
person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part
or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the
co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.
Without the showing that the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been
previously partitioned, the Court concludes and holds that none of the parties herein can lay claim over
any of the disputed specific properties. The petitioners cannot contend, therefore, that they were the
rightful owners of the properties of the late Joaquina to the exclusion of Anacleto. Thus, we uphold the
dismissal of the petitioners' complaint for recovery of such properties.
G.R. No. 183448 June 30, 2014
SPOUSES DOMINADOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA, Petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by MANSUETO ABALON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183464
HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by MANSUETO ABALON, Petitioners,
vs. MARISSA ANDAL, LEONIL AND AL, ARNEL AND AL, SPOUSES DOMINDOR PERALTA AND
OFELIA PERALTA, and HEIRS of RESTITUTO RELLAMA, represented by his children ALEX,
IMMANUEL, JULIUS and SYLVIA, all surnamed RELLAMA.
The civil case before the RTC of Legaspi City involved a parcel of land registered under the name of
Bernardina Abalon and fraudulently transferred to Restituto Rellama and who, in turn, subdivided the
subject property and sold it separately to the other parties to this case – Spouses Dominador and Ofelia
Peralta; and Marissa, Leonil and Arnel, all surnamed Andal. Thereafter, Spouses Peralta and the
Andals individually registered the respective portions of the land they had bought under their names.
The heirs of Bernardina were claiming back the land, alleging that since it was sold under fraudulent
circumstances, no valid title passed to the buyers. On the other hand, the buyers, who were now title
holders of the subject parcel of land, averred that they were buyers in good faith and sought the
protection accorded to them under the law.
On April 14, 2005, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees and ordered the
restoration of OCT No. (O) 16 in the name of Abalon and the cancellation of the titles issued to the
defendants-appellants. The fact that only a xerox copy of the purported deed of sale between Rellama
and Abalon was presented before the Register of Deeds for registration and the absence of such xerox
copy on the official files of the said Office made the court a quo conclude that the said document was a
mere forgery. On the other hand, the court a quo noted that the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in the
hands of the plaintiffs-appellees bears [sic] the perforated serial number B 221377, which it held is a
convincing proof of its authenticity and genuineness. It thus stated that "Miscellaneous Cadastral Case
No. 10648 is a (mere) strategem [sic] fraudulently concocted ... for the issuance of a fabricated (second)
owner’s duplicate certificate of Oct No. (O) 16" since the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 has
not been lost at all. It said that any subsequent registration procured by the presentation of such forged
instrument is null and void.
On 30 May 2007, the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed judgment
setting aside the RTC Decision. The CA ruled that the circumstances surrounding the sale of the
subject property showed badges of fraud or forgery against Rellama. It found that Abalon had not
parted with her ownership over the subject property despite the claim of Rellama that they both
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. As proof, the CA pointed out the existence of a notarized contract of
leasehold executed by Abalon with Ruperta Bellen on 11 June 1976. The genuineness and due
execution of the said leasehold agreement was uncontroverted by the parties. On this basis, the
appellate court concluded that Abalon could not have leased the subject parcel of land to Bellen if the
former had parted with her ownership thereof.
ISSUE: Whether a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, even if the true owner thereof has been in possession of the genuine title, which is
valid and has not been cancelled?

HELD: NO. The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the
exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles
from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here is that there must be
a complete chain of registered titles. This means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful
owner to the innocent holder for value – and that includes the transfer to the forger – must be duly
registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee. Contrary to what the Abalons would
like to impress on us, Fuleand Torresdo not present clashing views. In Fule, the original owner
relinquished physical possession of her title and thus enabled the perpetrator to commit the fraud, which
resulted in the cancellation of her title and the issuance of a new one. The forged instrument eventually
became the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. The new title under the
name of the forger was registered and relied upon by the innocent purchaser for value. Hence, it was
clear that there was a complete chain of registered titles.
On the other hand in Torres, the original owner retained possession of the title, but through fraud, his
brother-in-law secured a court order for the issuance of a copy thereof. While the title was in the name
of the forger, the original owner annotated the adverse claim on the forged instrument. Thus, before the
new title in the name of the forger could be transferred to a third person, a lien had already been
annotated on its back. The chain of registered titles was broken and sullied by the original owner’s
annotation of the adverse claim. By this act, the mortgagee was shown to be in bad faith.
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the chain of registered titles was broken in the case of the
Andals. Neither were they proven to have knowledge of anything that would make them suspicious of
the nature of Rellama’s ownership over the subject parcel of land. Hence, we sustain the CA’s ruling
that the Andals were buyers in good faith. Consequently, the validity of their title to the parcel of the land
bought from Rellama must be upheld.
As for Spouses Peralta, we sustain the ruling of the CA that they are indeed buyers in bad faith. The
appellate court made a factual finding that in purchasing the subject property, they merely relied on the
photocopy of the title provided by Rellama. The CA concluded that a mere photocopy of the title should
have made Spouses Peralta suspicious that there was some flaw in the title of Rellama, because he
was not in possession of the original copy. This factual finding was supported by evidence.
The CA pointed out Spouses Peralta’s Answer to the Complaint of the Abalons in Case No. 9243 in the
RTC of Legaspi City, Branch 5. In their Answer, they specifically alleged as follows:
2- These defendants [Spouses Peralta] acquired lot No. 1679-A by purchase in good faith and
for value from Restituto Rellama under Doc. No. 11212, page No. 26, Book No. 60, Series of
1996 of Notary Public Atty. Otilio Bongon, Legaspi City on March 2, 1995 copy of which is
attached as and made part of this answer as Exhibit "1;"
3- That these defendants were handed over by Rellama xerox [sic] copy of the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42103 issued by the Register of Deed of Legaspi City on the 2nd day of
August 1995 copy attached and made integral part as Exhibit "1-A" and also Original
Certificate of Title No. (O) 16 as Exhibit "1-B"
We have no reason to disturb this factual finding of the CA because it is supported by the evidence on
record. Spouses Peralta filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, which allows only
questions of law to be raised. It is a settled rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in this kind of
appeal. Under Rule 45, Section 1, "petitions for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth."32 A question of fact arises when there is "as to the truth or falsehood
of facts or when there is a need to calibrate the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation
to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation." 33 It is further pointed out that "the
determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue, which generally is outside the
province of this Court to determine in a petition for review."
G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION FELIANO, Respondents.
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Rizal,
Sogod, Southern Leyte to his surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco,
Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to Dr.
Cayetano Corrompido for ₱2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3)
siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each getting a share of ₱666.66.
On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered their
payment of ₱666.66 each to Dr. Corrompio. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale
with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his "vale"
of ₱300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the
subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for ₱8,000.00; wherein in
its last paragraph stated that “at the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX
PESOS (P2,286.00) corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to Rito Cabales
who are still minors upon the execution of this instrument are held in trust by the VENDEE and to be
paid and delivered only to them upon reaching the age of 21.”
In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the Spouses Feliano representing his share from
the proceeds of the sale of the property. It was only in 1988, that Nelson learned of the sale from his
uncle, Rito. He signified his intention to redeem the property in 1993 but it was only in 1995 that he filed
a complaint for redemption against the Spouses Feliano. The respondent Spouses averred that the
petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1) Rito already received his share; and (2)
Nelson, failed to tender the total amount of the redemption price.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground that Nelson was no longer
entitled to the property since, his right was subrogated by Saturnina upon the death of his father,
Alberto. It also alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem since Saturnina, being his legal guardian
at the time of the sale was properly vested with the right to alienate the same.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court stating that the sale made by Saturnina in
behalf of Rito and Nelson were unenforceable.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petitioners have a right over the subject property?
(2) May petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-spouses?
HELD:(1) NO. With regards to Rito… As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as
correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to
the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother
shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians
under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under his or her parental authority without need of giving a bond in case
the amount of the property of the child does not exceed two thousand pesos. Corollary to this, Rule 93,
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically designates the
parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any judicial appointment in case the latter’s
property does not exceed two thousand pesos, thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two
thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be
his legal guardian
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito’s legal guardian without necessity of court appointment considering
that the amount of his property or one-seventh of subject property was ₱1,143.00, which is less than
two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1 provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. – A guardian appointed shall have the care and custody
of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as
the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of all the
estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in which such guardian was
appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. It does
not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal
guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal
authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito was unenforceable.
However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito
effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
YES. With regards to NELSON
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at
the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with
judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian
and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property. She did not.
Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondents-
spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which
pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained
ownership over their undivided share of subject property.
(2) NO. It is clear that the period of redemption has expired.
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or co-owners who did not part with his
or their pro-indiviso share in the property held in common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the
undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986. As a
result, he lost his right to redeem subject property.
However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Nelson and his mother
was not valid such that they were not divested of their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem
the subject property from respondents-spouses. But they must do so within thirty days from notice in
writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In reckoning this period, we held in Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Courtthus:
we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the
intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. While we may not read into the law a purpose that
is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we
defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker’s will.
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for that matter) seeks to ensure that the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time
of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a
general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate the problem of alleged
delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.1awph!1
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sale was made in
1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected.
Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was informed of
the sale of subject property. Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that petitioner Nelson was
likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention to redeem subject property during a
barangay conciliation process. But he only filed the complaint for legal redemption and damages on
January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty days from learning about the sale.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance of the sale of subject
property in 1978. To require strict proof of written notice of the sale would be to countenance an obvious
false claim of lack of knowledge thereof, thus commending the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the
notification of redemptioners.
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day
redemption period commenced in 1993, after petitioner Nelson sought the barangay conciliation
process to redeem his property. By January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for legal
redemption and damages, it is clear that the thirty-day period had already expired.
G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998
CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and
ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.
On 18 April1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad. In their
petition, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of their brother as he had allegedly died a
bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Petitioners
amended their petition by alleging that the real properties listed as belonging to the decedent were
actually only administered by him and that the true owner was their late mother, Lucila de Mesa.
The trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de
Mesa Abad. Petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late mother Lucila de
Mesa in their favor.
On 07 July 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad
Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria
Empaynado had been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven (27) years before his
death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during this period, their union had produced two (2) children,
Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. They also disclosed the existence of
Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As
the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, they
charged petitioners with eliberately concealing the existence of said children in order to deprive the
latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three (3) children were entitled to inherit?
HELD: Yes. Evidence presented by private respondents overwhelmingly proved that they are the
acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. They were able to prove that he stated in his
individual income tax returns as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie
Abad. He insured his daughters on a 20 year endowment plan. He opened a trust fund account for his
daughters.
Finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners should have
been precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother on the basis of the following Civil Code
provisions:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the
illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles
Petitioners contested the filiation of the children by submitting that the husband of Honoria Empaynado,
Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were born. It was undisputed that prior to
her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose Libunao. But while private
respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in
1971.
The evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 was inconclusive. The
evidence presented was an enrolment form wherein there was failure to indicate that Jose was
“deceased”. Such proof did not necessarily prove that said parent was still living during the time the
form was being accomplished. The records of Loyola Memorial Park also showed that a certain
Jose BautistaLibunao was indeed buried there in 1971. Such person was different from the husband
whose full name was Jose Santos Libunao.
G.R. No. 116775 January 22, 1998
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN URIARTE, MADRILYN and LOURDES
URIARTE, and FELOMINA BUNIEL URIARTE, and HEIRS OF PRIMITIVA ARNALDO and HEIRS OF
GREGORIO ARNALDO, represented herein by FELISA ARNALDO SULLANO and LUPECINO
ARNALDO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENEDICTO ESTRADA, respondents.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro
Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she
had another daughter, the decedent Justa. Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of
Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, who are grandchildren, the relatives
within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte and those within
the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of
the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa
as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares
by purchase.5 Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the
latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as
Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest. 6 He contended that
Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land
which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. In their answer, the
heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa but the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land.
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their
great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a
holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908. Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and
Juan, one-third. The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her
lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest
from it. They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not
an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of the property.
The trial court sustained petitioners' contention.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial court's finding, the appellate court found
that the 0.5 hectares had been acquired by Justa's parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during their
marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica, private respondent was held to be
entitled to share in the estate of Justa.
ISSUE:Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the estate?
HELD: YES.
It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up during the trial of a case cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. With more reason, therefore, should such a question be disallowed when raised for
the first time on appeal to this Court.
It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of Appeals, petitioners admitted that private
respondent is Justa's nephew, his mother, Agatonica, being Justa's half-sister. Apparently they are now
questioning private respondent's filiation because, as explained by the Court of Appeals, private
respondent is the nearest relative of Justa and, therefore, the only one entitled to her estate.
Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Justa's parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her father's (Juan
Arnaldo's) share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares. In
addition, Justa inherited her mother's (Ursula Tubil's) share consisting of 0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2
hectares which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the
2.7 — hectare land. This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by private respondent Benedicto Estrada as
Justa's nearest surviving relative. As the Court of Appeals held:
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes
the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with
respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division
between paternal and maternal lines.
The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided by Articles 963 — 966 of the Civil
Code. They provide:
Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each generation forms a
degree.
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. A direct line is that
constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and
descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person
with those from whom he descends.
Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the
progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the child is one degree removed from
the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person
with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother,
three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of
Justa. On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justa's cousin.
They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The
fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.
Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother
being Ursula's daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case,
private respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate.
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated,
private respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew
is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the
decedent. 23 That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not
disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The
determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the
extent of the share of the survivors."
Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and fourth grounds of the petition for review
must fail.
G.R. No. 192896 July 24, 2013
DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Incumbent President,
GREG SERIEGO, Petitioner, vs. BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to represent more than
2,000 families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City
(portion of Fort Bonifacio) since 1985 "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and
notoriously."
The lot used to be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban (Maricaban), owned by Dolores Casal y Ochoa
and registered under a Torrens title, (OCT) No. 291, issued on October 17, 1906 by the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal.
Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of the United States of America (USA) early in
the American colonial period, to be converted into the military reservation known as Fort William
Mckinley, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 192 was issued in the name of the USA to cancel OCT
No. 291. On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing from
sale or settlement the tracts of land within Fort William Mckinley, now renamed Fort Bonifacio, and
reserving them for military purposes.
On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 declaring certain
portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable.
On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA) to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Subic military reservations and
their extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, O’Donnell Transmitter Station, San
Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas Relay Station) to productive civilian uses. Section 8
of the said law provides that the capital of the BCDA will be provided from sales proceeds or transfers of
lots in nine (9) military camps in Metro Manila, including 723 has. of Fort Bonifacio. The law, thus,
expressly authorized the President of the Philippines "to sell the above lands, in whole or in part, which
are hereby declared alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and
regulations.
The Petitioner charged the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting
its members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions among the residents.
On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint by filing an Amended Petition in the
COSLAP praying for the declaration of the subject property as alienable and disposable.
On the basis of the DENR’s verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved that Dream Village lies
outside of BCDA, and particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus directed the LMB of the DENR
to process the applications of Dream Village’s members for sales patent, noting that in view of the
length of time that they "have been openly, continuously and notoriously occupying the subject property
in the concept of an owner, x x x they are qualified to apply for sales patent on their respective occupied
lots pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730 in relation to the provisions of the Public Land Act."
The CA in its Decision dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the
complaint because the question of whether Dream Village is within the areas declared as available for
disposition in Proclamation No. 172 is beyond its competence to determine, even as the land in dispute
has been under a private title since 1906, and presently its title is held by a government agency, the
BCDA.
ISSUE: whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by prescription?
HELD: NO.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was
enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila
became alienable and disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands did not thereby
become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express reservation that they are to be sold in
order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court
noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of national
wealth" under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the public
dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The Court then explained that it is only
upon their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law that they become private
property and cease to be property of the public dominion:
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable,
it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth."
Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there
is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before acquisitive prescription can commence,
the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable, it must
also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Absent
such an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public dominion.
Since the issuance of Proclamation No. 423 in 1957, vast portions of the former Maricaban have been
legally disposed to settlers, besides those segregated for public or government use. Proclamation No.
1217 (1973) established the Maharlika Village in Bicutan, Taguig to serve the needs of resident Muslims
of Metro Manila; Proclamation No. 2476 (1986), as amended by Proclamation No. 172 (1987), declared
more than 400 has. of Maricaban in Upper and Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan as
alienable and disposable; Proclamation No. 518 (1990) formally exempted from Proclamation No. 423
the Barangays of Cembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo and Pitogo,
comprising 314 has., and declared them open for disposition.
The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion of the
State, because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth, in this case, for the conversion of military reservations in the
country to productive civilian uses. Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream
Village has not even begun to run.
G.R. No. 186639 February 5, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ, Respondent.
On February 28, 2003, respondent Emmanuel C. Cortez (Cortez) filed with the RTC an application for
judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Pateros described as Lot No. 2697-B of the
Pateros Cadastre.
As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of General Default and Cortez was allowed to
present his evidence ex-parte.
On February 7, 2006, the RTC granted Cortez’ application for registration because it was established by
competent evidence that the possession of the land being applied for by the applicant and his
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, uninterrupted, and adverse possession, under claim
of title and in the concept of owners, all within the time prescribed by law, the title of the applicant
should be and must be AFFIRMED and CONFIRMED.
The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed
to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application for registration despite the failure of
Cortez to comply with the requirements for original registration of title. The petitioner pointed out that,
although Cortez declared that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject
parcel of land since time immemorial, no document was ever presented that would establish his
predecessors-in-interest’s possession of the same during the period required by law.
On February 17, 2009, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision, dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and
affirmed the RTC Decision dated February 7, 2006.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated February 7, 2006, which granted the
application for registration filed by Cortez?
HELD: YES.
At the outset, the Court notes that the RTC did not cite any specific provision of law under which
authority Cortez’ application for registration of title to the subject property was granted. On the other
hand, the CA assumed that Cortez’ application for registration was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529. Nevertheless, Cortez, in the application for registration he filed with the RTC, proffered that
should the subject property not be registrable under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, it could still be
registered under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), or the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073 in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the Court deems it
proper to discuss Cortez’ application for registration of title to the subject property vis-à-vis the
provisions of Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with the
legal requirements for the registration of the subject property under Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No.
1529.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
public land acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. "Under
Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that
the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier."
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, Cortez adduced in evidence a survey plan Csd-00-
000633 with an annotation: “This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Project No. 29, classified as
alienable & disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on Jan. 3, 1968.”
However, Cortez’ reliance on the foregoing annotation in the survey plan is amiss; it does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject property remains part of the
inalienable public domain. In Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation, the Court clarified that,
the applicant must at the very least submit a certification from the proper government agency stating
that the parcel of land subject of the application for registration is indeed alienable and disposable.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative
act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied
for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was
certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical
correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and
character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish the
same.1âwphi1 Cortez failed to present any evidence to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Cortez was only able to present oral and documentary
evidence of his and his mother’s ownership and possession of the subject property since 1946, the year
in which his mother supposedly inherited the same.
Other than his bare claim that his family possessed the subject property since time immemorial, Cortez
failed to present any evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest indeed possessed the
subject property prior to 1946; it is a mere claim and not factual proof of possession. "It is a rule that
general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing
and cannot suffice. An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law
to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the
alleged ownership and possession of the land."
Further, the earliest tax declaration presented by Cortez was only in 1966. Cortez failed to explain why,
despite his claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
property since time immemorial, it was only in 1966 that his predecessors-in-interest started to declare
the same for purposes of taxation.
That Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for fifty-
seven (57) years at the time he filed his application for registration in 2003 would likewise not entitle him
to registration thereof under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands acquired by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws. "As Section 14(2) [of P.D. No. 1529] categorically provides, only
private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code,
only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the development of
national wealth, are considered private."
The Court finds no evidence of any official declaration from the state attesting to the patrimonial
character of the subject property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to run
against the State, much less that he has acquired title to the subject property by virtue thereof. It is of no
moment that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property
for 57 years at the time he applied for the registration of title thereto. "[l]t is not the notorious, exclusive
and uninterrupted possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the
mandated periods that converts it to patrimonial. The indispensability of an official declaration that the
property is now held by the State in its private capacity or placed within the commerce of man for
prescription to have any effect against the State cannot be overemphasized. "
G.R. No. 191109 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY
(PRA), Petitioner, vs. CITY OF PARANAQUE, Respondent.
By virtue of its mandate, PRA (Philippine Reclamation Authority formerly Public Estates Authority)
reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay, including those located in
Parañaque City, and was issued Original Certificates of Title (OCT Nos. 180, 202, 206, 207, 289, 557,
and 559) and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT Nos. 104628, 7312, 7309, 7311, 9685, and 9686) over
the reclaimed lands.
On February 19, 2003, then Parañaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo (Carabeo) issued Warrants
of Levy on PRA’s reclaimed properties (Central Business Park and Barangay San Dionisio) located in
Parañaque City based on the assessment for delinquent real property taxes made by then Parañaque
City Assessor Soledad Medina Cue for tax years 2001 and 2002.
On March 26, 2003, PRA filed a petition for prohibition.
On January 8, 2010, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing PRA’s petition. In ruling that PRA was
not exempt from payment of real property taxes, the RTC reasoned out that it was a GOCC under
Section 3 of P.D. No. 1084. It was organized as a stock corporation because it had an authorized
capital stock divided into no par value shares. In fact, PRA admitted its corporate personality and that
said properties were registered in its name as shown by the certificates of title. Therefore, as a GOCC,
local tax exemption is withdrawn by virtue of Section 193 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 Local
Government Code (LGC) which was the prevailing law in 2001 and 2002 with respect to real property
taxation. The RTC also ruled that the tax exemption claimed by PRA under E.O. No. 654 had already
been expressly repealed by R.A. No. 7160 and that PRA failed to comply with the procedural
requirements in Section 206 thereof.
Hence, PRA filed this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is liable for real property tax?
HELD: NO. The Court finds merit in the petition.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not
necessarily become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but
also corporate powers.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become stock or
non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a
GOCC. Examples are the Mactan International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, the
University of the Philippines, and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. All these government instrumentalities
exercise corporate powers but they are not organized as stock or non-stock corporations as required by
Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. These government
instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called government corporate entities. They are not, however,
GOCCs in the strict sense as understood under the Administrative Code, which is the governing law
defining the legal relationship and status of government entities.
In the case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It
cannot be considered as a stock corporation because although it has a capital stock divided into no par
value shares as provided in Section 7 of P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to distribute dividends,
surplus allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no provision whatsoever in P.D. No. 1084 or in
any of the subsequent executive issuances pertaining to PRA, particularly, E.O. No. 525, E.O. No.
654 and EO No. 798 that authorizes PRA to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to its
stockholders.
Clearly, respondent has no valid or legal basis in taxing the subject reclaimed lands managed by PRA.
On the other hand, Section 234(a) of the LGC, in relation to its Section 133(o), exempts PRA from
paying realty taxes and protects it from the taxing powers of local government units.
Sections 234(a) and 133(o) of the LGC provide, as follows:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax – The following are exempted from payment of the real
property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except
when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following:
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
and local government units.
Further, the Court agrees with PRA that the subject reclaimed lands are still part of the public domain,
owned by the State and, therefore, exempt from payment of real estate taxes.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part, as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
Similarly, Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates properties belonging to the State:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
Here, the subject lands are reclaimed lands, specifically portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay. As such, these lands remain public lands and form part of the public domain. In the case of
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and AMARI Coastal Development Corporation, the Court held that
foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belonged to the public domain and were inalienable unless
reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition and further declared no longer needed for
public service. The fact that alienable lands of the public domain were transferred to the PEA (now
PRA) and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA’s name did not automatically make such
lands private. This Court also held therein that reclaimed lands retained their inherent potential as areas
for public use or public service.
G.R. Nos. 175806 and 175810 October 20, 2010
MANUEL ALMAGRO joined by his spouse, ELIZABETH ALMAGRO, Petitioners,
vs. SALVACION C. KWAN, WILLIAM C. KWAN, VICTORIA C. KWAN, assisted by her husband, JOSE
A. ARBAS, and CECILIA C. KWAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175849
Petitioners, vs.
WILLIAM C. KWAN, SALVACION C. KWAN, VICTORIA C. KWAN, assisted by her husband, JOSE A.
ARBAS, and CECILIA C. KWAN, Respondents.
MARGARITA PACHORO, DRONICA ORLINA, PIO TUBAT, JR., ANDRES TUBAT, EDUVIGIS KISKIS,
ELSA BIÑALBER, NOELA TUBAT, ELSA TUBAT, and ROGELIO DURAN,
This case involves Lot No. 6278-M, a 17,181 square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-11397.
Lot No. 6278-M is located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and is registered in the name of spouses
Kwan Chin and Zosima Sarana. Respondents are the legitimate children of spouses Kwan Chin and
Zosima Sarana, who both died intestate on 2 November 1986 and 23 January 1976, respectively, in
Dumaguete City. Upon the death of their parents, respondents inherited Lot No. 6278-M through
hereditary succession. However, a big portion of the lot (TCT No. T-11397) is submerged under the sea
and only a small portion remain as dry land, while the remaining portion has buildings or houses
constructed by the defendants.
On 18 September 1996, respondents filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) an action for recovery of
possession and damages against spouses Rogelio and Lourdes Duran, et. al. Subsequently, spouses
Manuel Almagro and Elizabeth Almagro intervened as successors-in-interest of spouses Delano
Bangay and Maria Bangay.
In its Judgment dated 11 May 2001, the MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the remaining
dry portion of Lot No. 6278-M has become foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain.
The term "foreshore" refers to that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and
left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides. "Foreshore lands" refers to the strip of land that lies between
the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The
term "foreshore land" clearly does not include submerged lands.
From these definitions, it is safe to conclude that the remaining dry portion of Lot No. 6278-M is now
"foreshore land." A big portion of the said lot is presently underwater or submerged under the sea.
When the sea moves towards the estate and the tide invades it, the invaded property becomes
foreshore land and passes to the realm of public domain. The subject land, being foreshore land, should
therefore be returned to the public domain. Besides, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 420. The following thin[g]s are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which reversed and set aside the judgment.
Plaintiffs-appellants have the right to recover possession of the remaining small dry portion of the
subject property in question. It is further ordered to remand this case to the court of origin for the
reception of further evidence to determine who among the defendants-appellees are builders or
possessors in good faith and who are not and once determined, to apply accordingly the pertinent laws
and jurisprudence on the matter.
Petitioners filed separate petitions for review with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification
the RTC decision (ordered to vacate the premises and/or remove the houses and/or cottages
constructed on Lot No. 6278-M within thirty (30) days from finality of judgment,).
ISSUE:Whether the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is still private land or has become foreshore
land which forms part of the public domain?
HELD: YES.
Although the MTC concluded that the subject land is foreshore land, we find such conclusion contrary to
the evidence on record.
It is undisputed that the subject land is part of Lot No. 6278-M, which is covered by TCT No. T-11397,
registered in the name of respondents' parents, Kwan Chin and Zosimo Sarana. In fact, as found by the
Court of Appeals, even the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) declared in
May 1996 that Lot No. 6278-M is a private property covered by a Torrens Title and that petitioners
should vacate the disputed property or make other arrangements with respondents.
Furthermore, from the report of Engr. Suasin, the geodetic engineer designated by the court and the
parties as joint commissioner to conduct the survey, it can be clearly gleaned that the contested land is
the small portion of dry land of Lot No. 6278-M. Even in his testimony, Engr. Suasin was adamant in
stating that the remaining portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore because "it is already dry land" and
is "away from the shoreline."
Because of this apparent contradiction between the evidence and the conclusion of the MTC, the RTC
conducted ocular inspection twice, during low tide and high tide, and observed that the disputed portion
of Lot No. 6278-M actually remained dry land even during high tide. Thus, the RTC concluded that the
said land is not foreshore land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals adopted the findings and conclusion of
the RTC that the disputed land is not foreshore land and that it remains as private land owned by
respondents.
We are in accord with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the RTC that the disputed land is not
foreshore land. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and
low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.23 The land's proximity
to the waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land.
Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that although the two corners of the
subject lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot be considered as foreshore land since it has not been proven
that the lot was covered by water during high tide.
Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry even during high tide.
Indeed, all the evidence supports the conclusion that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not
foreshore land but remains private land owned by respondents.
G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996
ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner, vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES,
AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA
ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.
The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential lot (identified to be
Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre. Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales,
seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption over the subject property and traces her title to the late
Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos (son of Macaria by first marriage),
namely, his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner
Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. In a duly
notarized deed of sale, dated 14 November 1982, it would appear, however, that the lot was sold for
only P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that the second deed was intended merely to save on the tax on
capital gains.
Socorro sought the intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa of Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the
redemption of the property. Zosima refused to accept the amount for being much less than the lot's
current value of P80,000.00.
The trial court ruled that private respondents' right to redeem the property had already lapsed.
The appellate court, in its decision of 22 April 1993, reversed the court a quo.
ISSUE: Whether a daughter in law has the capacity to redeem the property although not considered as
a co-heir in the intestate proceeding?
HELD: YES
We rule that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by
affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro's right to the property is not
because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband,
David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her
estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-
owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included
his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her
co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate,
without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under
article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon
became co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption
arose in favor of private respondents; thus:
Art. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or
by any other transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.
Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other
co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive,
the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private respondents. Concededly, no
written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners required under
Article 1623 of the Civil Code —
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
safe shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales
sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from
the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987,
before the trial court.
1. REYES v. ASUNCION
FACTS: Petitioner were the owners parcel of land (subject land), which is also a sugarcane plantation .
According to petitioner, in order to prevent the BCDA from converting her property into a resettlement
site, she and respondent executed a contract antedated on June 15, 1993, transferring her rights over
the subject land to the respondent.
Petitioner claimed to have remained the absolute owner and possessor of the subject land and
presently occupies the same as a sugarcane plantation and even mills the sugarcane harvested at the
Central Azucarera de Tarlac for her own benefit.
Respondent filed a Complaint for Estafa against petitioner before the Office of the Prosecutor in Tarlac
City, Tarlac alleging that petitioner failed and/or refused to give respondent his share of the total
harvests on the subject land for the years 1993-1999, using their contract as basis.
Petitioner filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the subject contract.
RTC, on January 17, 2007, rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. It ruled that there is no legal
basis to nullify the contract. Petitioner appealed the case to the CA, and on July 9, 2010, the latter
dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
DONATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND IS VALID EVEN IF NOT MADE AND ACCEPTED IN A PUBLIC
DOCUMENT.
RULING: This Court finds no merit in the petition.
It is petitioner's contention that the subject contract is purely simulated, since it purports a transfer of
rights over the subject land in favor of the respondent. However, when petitioner executed the contract,
it was never her intention to transfer her rights over the subject land as the primordial consideration was
to prevent the BCDA from taking over the property. She also asserts that she and the respondent
agreed to make the said false appearance in the contract. However, the RTC and the CA found no
other evidence to support the said allegations and the self-serving averments of the petitioner. This
Court is in agreement with the RTC and the CA as to the insufficiency of evidence to prove that there
was indeed a simulation of contract.
Lacking, therefore, in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and
enforceable contract. Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his
creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and
control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. The burden of proving the alleged
simulation of a contract falls on those who impugn its regularity and validity.
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. If
the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail.
Such intention is determined not only from the express terms of their agreement, but also from the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
Finding of the CA is correct when it ruled that petitioner failed to present evidence to prove that
respondent acted in bad faith or fraud in procuring her signature or that he violated their real intention, if
any, in executing it.
Petitioner insists that the subject contract is in the nature of a simple donation, and even
assuming arguendo that the same was meant to be a remuneratory donation, it is still invalid because
the donation was not notarized.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person gratuitously disposes of a thing or a right in favor of
another who accepts it.18 Once perfected, a donation is final; its revocation or rescission cannot be
effected, absent any legal ground therefor.19 A donation may, in fact, comprehend the entire property of
the donor.20 At any rate, the law provides that donors should reserve, in full ownership or in usufruct,
sufficient means for their own support and that of all their relatives
The subject contract in this case is seemingly a remuneratory donation as all the elements for such are
present. The CA “A painstaking review of the contract reveals that it is a remuneratory donation. First,
appellant expressed in the contract that "sa loob ng sampling taon namin[g] pagsasama[,] nakita namin
na naging matapat siya sa kanyang obligations bilang taga pamahala [sic] ng aming tubuhan at sa mga
[k]ontratista at higit sa lahat ay marunong siya makisama sa aming mga kasama at siya [ay]
mapagkakatiwalaan lalo na sa pera. Clearly, she gave the subject land to appellee to remunerate his
ten (10) years of faithful service to her. More importantly, appellant stated that "napagkasunduan namin
na kami ang bahala sa finances, sa kasunduan na kami ang magpapakabyaw ng tubo sa pangalan ko,
hanggang gusto ko. This is a profit sharing agreement where appellant finances the planting, harvesting
and milling of sugarcane on the subject land donated to appellee under appellant's name.
Unmistakably, it is a charge or burden on the donation.”
However, as pointed out by the CA, the contract, as well as the evidence presented during the trial, are
silent as to the value of the burden, hence, instead of the law on donations, the rules on contract should
govern the subject contract because the donation is onerous as the burden is imposed upon the donee
of a thing with an undetermined value. Furthermore, the CA is also right in ruling that it is not necessary
that the contract be in a public instrument if it involves immovable property, properly citing Pada-Kilario
v. Court of Appeals23 which states that the requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which
have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property, must appear in a public document, is only for convenience, non-compliance with
which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves.
Petitioner Milagros C. Reyes is DENIED for lack merit, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
July 9, 2010, is AFFIRMED in toto.
2. HATVI v. JM TUASON
FACTS: The Quezon City Council passed Ordinance, directing all subdivision owners to turn over to the
city government the open spaces in city subdivisions which were required to be equivalent to 6% of the
total land area being developed. In compliance with said ordinance, J.M. Tuason, through Araneta,
executed in favor of the city government a Deed of Donation and Acceptance (Deed of Donation) over
its subdivisions' open spaces which included, among others, Block 494 (subject lot). Accompanied by a
Certification issued by Araneta authorizing one Luis Ma. Araneta to donate the open spaces listed, the
Deed of Donation which had yet to be notarized was submitted to the city government thru
Araneta's letter dated 16 April 1969. Although the Deed of Donation was, however, referred for
comment and recommendation to the City Engineer in an Indorsement dated 21 April 1969 issued by
the Office of the Quezon City. Mayor, no record or document exists to show that the donation was,
indeed, accepted.
There is no dispute regarding the fact that Block 494 became the site of the Talayan
Village BarangayHall, a multi-purpose hall, basketball, tennis and football courts and a children's
playground which were developed at the expense of Homeowners Association of Talayan Village, Inc.
(HATVI) and the Quezon City government. For failure of J.M. Tuason to pay its realty taxes, however,
Block 494 was scheduled for a tax delinquency sale by the city. In letters dated 20 and 29 May 1996
addressed to the Quezon City Sangguniang Panglungsod and then Mayor Ishmael Mathay (Mayor
Mathay), the Barangay Captain and the homeowners of Talayan Village made known their
opposition/objection to the impending sale. Aside from the fact that no replies to said letters were
received, the tax delinquency sale pushed through and Block "494 was sold to J.M. Tuason, the highest
bidder, for the aggregate sum of Php641,651.93, representing the total amount of the unpaid taxes and
penalties due thereon.
HATVI filed against J.M. Tuason the complaint before the Regional Trial Court Quezon City and styled
one for annulment of sale, cancellation of titles and mortgage, acceptance of donation and damages.
Contending that it had no knowledge of the delinquency sale and that its members purchased their
respective home lots on the belief that Block 494 was an open space for use — as in fact it was used -
as a public park, HATVI argued that the subject parcel is beyond the commerce of man. J.M. Tuason
moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground, among others, that the donation was not
accepted and that, as a consequence, Block 494 remained a private property. This was denied by the
RTC.
Reiterating the arguments raised in their motion to dismiss, J.M. Tuason maintained that no donation
was perfected and that, if at all, the right under said contract pertained to the Quezon City government.
They insisted that it was Block 503 and not Block 494 which was the designated open space for
the Talayan Village. RTC ruled that Block 494 is not an open space and that the Deed of Donation
J.M. Tuason executed over the same was null and void due to non-acceptance and non-notarization.
CA upheld the ruling of the RTC as to the validity of the donation.
ISSUE: WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT BLOCK 494 REMAINED A
PRIVATE PROPERTY BECAUSE OF QUEZON CITY'S FAILURE TO ACCEPT THE DEVELOPER'S
DONATION.
RULING: NO. HATVI insists that the subject lot is an open space on account of its reservation as such
and the execution of a Deed of Donation over the same by J.M. Tuason which allowed its exclusive use
as a park/open space over the years. That aside from the fact that the non-acceptance of the donation
supposedly did not alter the nature of the subject land, HATVI posits that the rights of its members
should not be prejudiced by the Quezon City government's mistake in conducting a tax delinquency sale
over the same.
SC EXPLANATION: Rather than Block 494, said subdivision plan significantly designated Block 503 as
the park/open space for said subdivision. That J.M., Tuason donated Block 494 to the Quezon City
government in compliance with the latter's ordinances also did not operate to divest the property of its
private character. In addition to the fact that the donation was not embodied in a public document as
provided under Article 749 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the record is entirely bereft of showing
that said donation was duly accepted in accordance with Article 745 of the same Code. The purpose of
the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly
communicated to the donor. Since the donation is considered perfected only upon the moment the
donor is apprised of such acceptance, it has been ruled that lack of such acceptance, as expressly
provided under the law, renders the donation null and void.
Unlike Block 503 which was specifically identified as such under Subdivision Plan PSD-52256, there
was, for starters, no operative reservation of Block 494 as the designated open space for Talayan
Village, Although there is no dispute regarding the fact that J.M. Tuason later endeavored to donate
Block 494 to the Quezon City government, the transfer was not efficacious not only for lack of
notarization of the document embodying the same but, more importantly, for failure of the donee to
accept the donation. Not having been thus segregated and/or transferred, it necessarily follows that
Block 494 was not removed from the commerce of man. *so valid daw yung forfeiture ng government at
yung mga subsequent sale.
3. BASCARA v. JAVIER
FACTS: Respondent Evangeline C. Pangilinan (Pangilinan) filed an ex parte petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession. Essentially, the petition alleged that Rosalina P. Pardo (Pardo) executed in favor
of Pangilinan a real estate mortgage (REM) over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 135066 as a security for the payment of a loan in the amount of P200,000.00; that Pardo
failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the promissory note with REM; that the mortgaged
property was sold at public auction to Pangilinan as the highest bidder; that the one-year redemption
period already elapsed without Pardo exercising the right to redeem the subject property; that the title
over the lot was consolidated and transferred in the name of Pangilinan as evidenced by TCT No.
147777; and, that Pardo, her agents, and persons claiming rights under her failed and refused to vacate
the subject premises despite several demands.
The trial court granted the petition. The Notice to Vacate and Surrender Possession was issued by
respondent Sheriff Rolando G. Javier (Javier) pursuant to the writ of possession issued by the court.
Petitioner Claiming as the true, lawful and absolute owner of the subject property that is in his
possession, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim and a Motion to Recall Writ of Possession.
Petitioner alleged that:
a. He is the nephew and ward of the late ROSALINA P. PARDO, who owned a certain
parcel of land, with improvements thereon
b. During her lifetime, PARDO executed a duly notarized deed of DONATION MORTIS
CAUSA donating the Subject Property to and in favor of petitioner;
c. Four years later, or on May 20, 2003, PARDO, a widow, age 78, died intestate, and
without issue and that
PARDO having passed away intestate and without issue and by virtue of the
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA, petitioner now became the owner of the Subject
Property. He and his family have since taken possession thereof and are residing
there up to now;
d. That the petitioner has a Boarder in his house name Evangeline Calcada who
represented herself as having the capacity to have the title transferred to petitioner’s
name, was able to gain the complete confidence of the latter, and he, in all his
layman’s utter vulnerability, entrusted her not only with the owner’s duplicate of TCT
No. 135066 for purposes of transferring the Subject Property to his name but the
same was never realized. (ina-allege niya na si CALCADA daw yung pumeke at
pumirma dun sa alleged REM)
e. Petitioner later discovered the annotation of the Real estate mortgage allege to have
been entered into by PARDO; In response to the said Petition of Pangilinan (ex parte
proceeding for the issuance of the writ of execution; yung nasa pinaka taas),
petitionerx x x filed an OPPOSITION AND MOTION TO DISMISS;
f. That PARDO could not have entered into or to have signed the REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE as she had long been dead;
Pangilinan, in her comment/opposition, insisted that the trial court has the ministerial duty to issue a writ
of possession, which cannot be stayed by an injunction or by a pending action for annulment of the real
estate mortgage. The trial court ruled in favor of pangilinan and denied petitioner’s motion to recall the
writ of possession and directed respondent sheriff to implement the same. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the the alleged interest of the petitioner as DONEE would render the issuance of a writ of
possession not to be a ministerial function
RULING: NO
As a RULE, upon expiration of the period to redeem and no redemption was made, the purchaser, as
confirmed owner, has the absolute right to possess the land and the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes a ministerial duty. The EXCEPTION in the said rule is under sec. 33 of rule 39 of ROC, the
possession of property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner UNLESS a third party is
claiming a right adverse to that of the judgment debtor/mortgagor (no longer exparte and ministerial).
We repeatedly emphasize though that the exception provided under Section 33 contemplates a
situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right vis-a-vis the judgment
debtor or mortgagor, such as that of a co-owner, agricultural tenant or usufructuary, who
possesses the property in his or her own right, and is not merely the successor or transferee of
the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. (emphasis supplied)
In this case, while it is undisputed that petitioner was in possession of the subject property, it cannot be
said that his right to possess the same is by virtue of being a co owner, agricultural tenant or
usufructuary; nor is the claim to his right of possession analogous to the foregoing situations. What is
clear is that he allegedly acquired the property from Pardo by reason of a donation mortis causa. He is,
therefore, a transferee or successor-in-interest who merely stepped into the shoes of his aunt. He
cannot assert that his right of possession is adverse to that of Pardo as he has no independent right of
possession. Consequently, under legal contemplation, he cannot be considered as a “third party who is
actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.” The trial court had the ministerial duty
to issue, as it did issue, the possessory writ in favor of respondent Pangilinan. As it appeared, there was
no reason for it to order the recall of the writ already issued.
The execution of Pardo of donation mortis causa in favor of petitioner does not immediately transfer title
to the property to the latter. Considering that the alleged donation is one of mortis causa, the same
partake of the nature of testamentary provision. As such, said deed must be executed in accordance
with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil
Code; otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect. Unless and until the alleged
donation is probated, i.e., proved and allowed in the proper court, no right to the subject property has
been transmitted to petitioner.
4. CARINAN v. CUETO
FACTS: The respondents alleged that sometime in May 1986, Esperanza and her husband, Jose
Carinan (Jose), acquired from one Roberto Ventura (Roberto) the rights over a parcel of land formerly
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-129128 under the name of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS).
Their transaction was covered by a Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights with Assumption of
Obligations. Esperanza and Jose were to assume the payment of the applicable Topic: Donation. If
donation of personal property exceeds 5,000 pesos, the same must be in writing.
The respondents alleged that sometime in May 1986, Esperanza and her husband, Jose Carinan
(Jose), acquired from one Roberto Ventura (Roberto) the rights over a parcel of land formerly covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-129128 under the name of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS).
Their transaction was covered by a Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights with Assumption of
Obligations. Esperanza and Jose were to assume the payment of the applicable monthly amortizations
for the subject land to the GSIS.
Several amortizations remained unpaid by Esperanza and Jose, resulting in an impending cancellation
in 2005 of GSIS’ conditional sale of the subject property to Roberto. It was then that Esperanza, then
already a widow, sought financial assistance from her brother, Gavino. The respondents then paid from
their conjugal savings Esperanza’s total obligation of P785,680.37 under the subject deed of
assignment.
The respondents alleged that Esperanza and Jazer undertook to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of the respondents once the title over the subject property was transferred to their names, subject
to the condition that they would be given the first option to buy it back within three years by reimbursing
the expenses incurred by the respondents on the property. Besides satisfaction of the unpaid
amortizations to GSIS, the respondents paid for the transfer of the subject property from Roberto to
Esperanza, and the renovation of the residential house erected on the subject land, resulting in
additional expenses of P515,000.00. TCT No. T-636804 already under the name of Esperanza was
surrendered to the respondents.
Respondents demanded from Esperanza and Jazer the fulfillment of their (ALLEGED) commitment to
transfer the subject property to the respondents’ names through the execution of a deed of sale. When
Esperanza and Jazer failed to comply despite efforts for an amicable settlement, the respondents filed
with the Regional Trial Court.
Esperanza and Jazer disputed these claims. They argued that there was neither a written or verbal
agreement for the transfer of the disputed property to the respondents’ names, nor a promise for the
repayment of the amounts that were paid by the respondents. Esperanza believed that Gavino paid her
outstanding balance with the GSIS out of sheer generosity and pity upon her. She denied having
borrowed the respondents’ money because given her financial standing, she knew that she could not
afford to pay it back.
RTC ruled that the money paid by the respondents for Esperanza’s arrears could not have been given
gratuitously, but was intended as a loan that demanded a repayment. This arrangement was also
bolstered by the fact that Esperanza surrendered possession of the subject land’s TCT to the
respondents. Had the parties intended a donation, then Esperanza should have kept possession
of the title (sabi ng RTC). Esperanza and jazer appealed to CA. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the payment made by respondent sps. Cueto is a donation as alleged by esperanza
RULING: NO
Esperanza’s claim that the expenses and payments in her behalf were purely gratuitous remained
unsupported by records. As the CA correctly observed:
Indeed, the absence of intention to be reimbursed is negated by the facts of this case. [The
respondents’] conduct never at any time intimated any intention to donate in favor of [Esperanza and
Jazer]. A donation is a simple act of liberality where a person gives freely of a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it (Article 725, New Civil Code, as amended). But when a large amount of money
is involved, as in this case, this [c]ourt is constrained to take [Esperanza and Jazer’s] claim of
generosity by [the respondents] with more than a grain of salt.
In order to sufficiently substantiate her claim that the money paid by the respondents was actually a
donation, Esperanza should have also submitted in court a copy of their written contract evincing such
agreement. Article 748 of the New Civil Code (NCC), which applies to donations of money, is explicit on
this point as it reads:
Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the
right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the
acceptance shall be made in writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void.
As the Court ruled in Moreño-Lentfer v. Wolff, a donation must comply with the mandatory formal
requirements set forth by law for its validity. When the subject of donation is purchase money, Article
748 of the NCC is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money as well as its acceptance should be in
writing. Otherwise, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by
law.
5. VILLANUEVA v. BARNOCO
FACTS: Petitioner Villanueva, here represented by his heirs, sued respondents, spouses Froilan, in the
RTC to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property
through purchase in July 1971 from Vere, who, in turn, bought the Property from Rodrigo. Petitioner
declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it.
In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through
purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965.
The two-page deed of donation (Deed).
The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the Property.
CA, imputing error in the trial court’s interpretation of the Deed as a testamentary disposition instead of
an inter vivos donation, passing title to Rodriguez upon its execution.
In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial court’s ruling. Alternatively,
petitioner claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive prescription, having allegedly
occupied it for more than 10 years.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s title over the Property is superior to respondents’.
RULING: Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a
Perfected Donation
We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it passed title to Rodriguez upon its
execution or is effective only upon Rodrigo’s death – using principles distilled from relevant
jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically –
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will,
ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
Further –
[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates
that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;]
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the
effect that the donation is “to take effect at the death of the donor” are not
controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the rest of
the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor[;] [and]
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the
property subject of the deed.
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that “if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property]
will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez,” signaling the
irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This
transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the
dispositionwhich, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965.
Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only
donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title
over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that “the donor,
may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x”or used words
to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases
her.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from
Rodriguez’s undertaking to “give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her
lifetime. Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that “the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my
demise,” taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was
unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it.
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s love
and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless
“corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers.”
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as
proof of her retention of ownership. Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the
Property to Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo “cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said
property in favor of another.”Thus, Rodrigo’s post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere.
As Vere’s successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand,
respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter’s title which they may invoke
against all adverse claimants, including petitioner.
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property
Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received
the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. Although Vere and petitioner
arguably had just title having successively acquired the Property through sale, neither was a good faith
possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the
Property “in the concept of an owner” since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo’s donation
in 3 May 1965 and seven years before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against
interest binds Rodrigo and all those tracing title to the Property through her, including Vere and
petitioner. Indeed, petitioner’s insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982, when
she started paying taxes, finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the Property from
Rodrigo in 1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being a
buyer in good faith.
Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by
prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the Property for 30 years.
Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this requirement.
6. DEL ROSARIO v. FERRER
FACTS: This case pertains to a gift, otherwise denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in reality
is a donation inter vivos made effective upon its execution by the donors and acceptance thereof by the
donees, and immediately transmitting ownership of the donated property to the latter, thus precluding a
subsequent assignment thereof by one of the donors.
Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled “Donation
Mortis Causa” in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini
(daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) in equal shares. The deed of donation reads:
It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected
by the surviving spouse.
It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales will continue to
occupy the portions now occupied by them.
It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any
other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate
and where ever situated.
Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will,
the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees,
however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few months later or on December
19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in
subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972.
In 1998 Jarabini filed a “petition for the probate, After trial, the RTC rendered a decision
finding that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos. CA, rendered a decision reversing that of the
RTC.
ISSUE: whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and
Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.
RULING: That the document in question in this case was captioned “Donation Mortis Causa” is not
controlling.
“Irrevocability” is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis
causa, where “revocability” is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the
following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
(Underscoring supplied)
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express “irrevocability” of the donation is the
“distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos.” Here, the donors plainly
said that it is “our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the
surviving spouse.” The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso
that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in
reality a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the “right, ownership, possession, and
administration of the property” and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has
consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply
means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the
donated property while they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the
deed required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos,
since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the
form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case of doubt, the
conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and
final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned
of the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the
property donated.
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldo’s
subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as
void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat
quod non habet.
7. HEIRS OF MARAMAG v. MARAMAG
FACTS: The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto, while
respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the
killing of the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from
Insular Life and Grepalife; (3) the illegitimate children of Loreto—Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angelie—were entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the proceeds
released to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were inofficious and
should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied
first.
Petitioners alleged, among others, that part of the insurance proceeds had already been
released in favor of Odessa, while the rest of the proceeds are to be released in favor of Karl Brian and
Trisha Angelie, both minors, upon the appointment of their legal guardian.
In answer, Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa,
Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they filed their claims for the
insurance proceeds of the insurance policies; that when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of
Loreto, it disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and
Trisha Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released Odessa’s share as she
was of age, but withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending
submission of letters of guardianship. Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance
policies designating the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the
Insurance Code.
Grepalife alleged that Eva was not designated as an insurance policy beneficiary; that the
claims filed by Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were denied because Loreto was ineligible for
insurance due to a misrepresentation in his application form that he was born on December 10, 1936
and, thus, not more than 65 years old when he signed it in September 2001; and that the law on
succession does not apply where the designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear.
The trial court issued a Resolution in favor of Insurace company. CA dismissed the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action involved a pure question of law.
ISSUE: Whether members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the insurance for the
concubine?
RULING: In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are
the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by
Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a
suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and
that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds
of the policies.
It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable
judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts
shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states—
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of
the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the
policy
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds
are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the
maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was
intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or
indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus,
are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal
obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in
one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that the designation
of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no
legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the
shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on
donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the
insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to
the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or
when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, the insurance policy
proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
8. ARANGOTE v. MAGLUNOB
FACTS: Elvira T. Arangote, herein petitioner married to Ray Mars E. Arangote, is the registered
owner of the subject property, Respondents Martin (Martin II) and Romeo are first cousins and the
grandnephews of Esperanza Maglunob-Dailisan (Esperanza), from whom petitioner acquired the
subject property.
The Petition stems from a Complaint filed by petitioner and her husband against the respondents
for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Ownership and Possession, Damages with Preliminary Injunction,
and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order before the MCTC.
The Complaint alleged that Esperanza inherited the subject property from her uncle Victorino
Sorrosa by virtue of a notarized Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985, executed by the latter’s
heirs.
The Complaint further stated that Esperanza executed a Last Will and Testament bequeathing
the subject property to petitioner and her husband, but it was never probated. Esperanza executed
another document, an Affidavit, in which she renounced, relinquished, waived and quitclaimed all her
rights, share, interest and participation whatsoever in the subject property in favor of petitioner and her
husband.
In 1989, petitioner and her husband constructed a house on the subject property. However,
respondents, together with some hired persons, entered the subject property on 1994 and built a hollow
block wall behind and in front of petitioner’s house, which effectively blocked the entrance to its main
door.
As a consequence thereof, petitioner and her husband were compelled to institute Civil Case.
Respondents averred that they co-owned the subject property with Esperanza. Esperanza and her
siblings, Tomas and Inocencia, inherited the subject property, in equal shares, from their father Martin
Maglunob (Martin I). When Tomas and Inocencia passed away, their shares passed on by inheritance
to respondents Martin II and Romeo, respectively. Hence, the subject property was co-owned by
Esperanza, respondent Martin II (together with his wife Lourdes), and respondent Romeo, each holding
a one-third pro-indiviso share therein. Thus, Esperanza could not validly waive her rights and interest
over the entire subject property in favor of the petitioner.
Respondents also asserted in their Counterclaim that petitioner and her husband, by means
of fraud, undue influence and deceit were able to make Esperanza, who was already old and illiterate,
affix her thumbmark to the Affidavit wherein she renounced all her rights and interest over the subject
property in favor of petitioner and her husband.
The RTC adjudged respondents, as well as the other heirs of Martin Maglunob, as the lawful
owners and possessors of the entire subject property. Court of Appeals rendered a Decision denying
the Petition for Review of petitioner and her husband and affirming the RTC Decision
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid donation?
RULING: 1. The records disclosed that the subject property was part of a parcel of landsituated in
Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan, consisting of 7,176 square meters and commonly owned in equal shares by the
siblings Pantaleon and Placida. Upon the death of Pantaleon and Placida, their surviving and legal
heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate in July 1981, however, the
Deed was not notarized. Considering that Pantaleon died without issue, his one-half share in the parcel
of land he co-owned with Placida passed on to his four siblings (or their respective heirs, if already
deceased), namely: Placida, Luis, Martin I, and Victoria, in equal shares.
It is clear from the records that the subject property was not Esperanza’s exclusive share,
but also that of the other heirs of her father, Martin I. Esperanza expressly affixed her thumbmark
to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of July 1981 not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other
heirs of Martin I. Though in the Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985 Esperanza affixed her
thumbmark without stating that she was doing so not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other
heirs of Martin I, this does not mean that Esperanza was already the exclusive owner thereof. The
evidence shows that the subject property is the share of the heirs of Martin I.
2. In this case, the petitioner derived her title to the subject property from the notarized Affidavit
executed by Esperanza, wherein the latter relinquished her rights, share, interest and participation over
the same in favor of the petitioner and her husband.
A careful perusal of the said Affidavit reveals that it is not what it purports to
be. Esperanza’s Affidavit is, in fact, a Donation. Esperanza’s real intent in executing the said Affidavit
was to donate her share in the subject property to petitioner and her husband.
As no onerous undertaking is required of petitioner and her husband under the said
Affidavit, the donation is regarded as a pure donation of an interest in a real property covered by Article
749 of the Civil Code.Article 749 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it
must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated
and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall
be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.
From the aforesaid provision, there are three requisites for the validity of a simple donation
of a real property, to wit: (1) it must be made in a public instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which
acceptance may be made either in the same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and
(3) if the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified in an authentic form,
and the same must be noted in both instruments.
This Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the Affidavit executed by
Esperanza relinquishing her rights, share, interest and participation over the subject property in favor of
the petitioner and her husband suffered from legal infirmities, as it failed to comply with the aforesaid
requisites of the law.
In Sumipat v. Banga,this Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from
the donor to the donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a
public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very
same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be
made in another. Where the Deed of Donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice
of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in
the Deed of Donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of Donation, met the first
requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a public instrument. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the
aforesaid second and third requisites. The acceptance of the said donation was not made by the
petitioner and her husband either in the same Affidavit or in a separate public instrument. As there was
no acceptance made of the said donation, there was also no notice of the said acceptance given to the
donor, Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her
husband is null and void.
 The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance dated 23 September 2000, as well as the
noticeof such acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not cure the defect.
It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime
of the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on
appeal, there is still need for proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the
donor and noted in both the Deed of Donation and the separate instrument embodying the
acceptance. At the very least, this last legal requisite of annotation in both instruments of donation and
acceptance was not fulfilled by the petitioner. Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance bears
the fact that Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the donation by petitioner. For this reason,
even Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject property cannot be adjudicated to the petitioner.
3. The next issue to be resolved then is whether the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals,
erred in declaring OCT No. CLOA-1748 in the name of petitioner and her husband null and void.
Again, this Court answers the said issue in the negative.
Section 48 of Presidential decree No. 1529 states:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such
proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action
to obtain a different relief, an attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof. Such action to attack a certificate of title may be an original action or a counterclaim, in
which a certificate of title is assailed as void.
A counterclaim is considered a new suit in which the defendant is the plaintiff and the
plaintiff in the complaint becomes the defendant. It stands on the same footing as, and is to be tested
by the same rules as if it were, an independent action.
It is clear, thus, that respondents’ Answer with Counterclaim was a direct attack on
petitioner’s certificate of title. Furthermore, since all the essential facts of the case for the determination
of the validity of the title are now before this Court, to require respondents to institute a separate
cancellation proceeding would be pointlessly circuitous and against the best interest of justice.
Esperanza’s Affidavit, which was the sole basis of petitioner’s claim to the subject property,
has been declared null and void. Considering that Esperanza died without any compulsory heirs and
that the supposed donation of her one-third share in the subject property per her Affidavit dated 9 June
1985 was already declared null and void, Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject property passed on
to her legal heirs, the respondents.
4. As petitioner’s last-ditch effort, she claims that she is a possessor in good faith and, thus,
entitled to the rights provided for under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
The Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as follows:
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode
of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom
he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.
Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor by extraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Every
possessor in good faith becomes a possessor in bad faith from the moment he becomes aware that
what he believed to be true is not so.
9. ALUAD v. ALUAD
FACTS: Petitioners’ mother, Maria and respondent Zenaido were raised by the childless spouses
Matilde and Crispin.
Crispin was the owner of six lots located in Capiz.
Matilde executed a document entitled “Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in
favor of petitioners’ mother Maria[ covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband
Crispin. The Deed of Donation provided:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE
[Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR, by these
presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above-
described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE
should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further
force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them
who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of land
herein donated.
Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent. Matilde executed a last will and testament,
devising 4 lots Maria, and her “remaining properties” including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.
Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint, for declaration and recovery of
ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent.
The trial court, by Decision held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot
Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of
Donation. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation
was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the
formalities of a will.
ISSUE: Whether there is Donation inter vivos
RULING: The Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother one of mortis causa, it having the following
characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of
a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the death of
the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during her (Matilde’s) lifetime.
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading “anytime during the lifetime of the
DONORor anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or
even all the parcels of land herein donated” means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and
reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations
than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. The phrase in the Deed of Donation “or
anyone of them who should survive” is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated
that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the
donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase does not refer to the donee, thus:
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed paragraph
should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was the only surviving spouse at the time
the donation was executed on 14 November 1981, as her husband – Crispin Aluad [–] had long been
dead as early as 1975
As the Court of Appeals observed, “x x x [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is fortified by
Matilde’s acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which remained
under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents for which OCTs were issued
under her name.”
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed
but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of
the Civil Code.
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the
formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even assuming
arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676
was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and
testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be probated. With respect
to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26,
1991.
TEODORO ACAP vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND EDY DE LOS REYES
GR NO. 118114 December 7, 1995
TOPIC: WAIVER OF HEREDITARY RIGHTS
The title to Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental was registered in the
name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. After both spouses died, their only son
Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto executed a duly notarized document entitled "Declaration
of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of Cosme Pido.
Since 1960, petitioner Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the said land. When ownership
was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, petitioner continued to be the registered tenant
thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon Pido's death, to his widow
Laurenciana.
When Pido died intestate in1981, his surviving heirs executed a notarized document denominated as
"Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot No. in favor of private respondent, EDY DE LOS
Reyes.
Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor, private respondent Edy de
los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claim against the
original certificate of title.
In 1988, private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioner, alleging in the main that as his leasehold tenant, petitioner refused and failed to pay the
agreed annual rental despite repeated demands.
Petitioner claimed that he had no knowledge about any transfer or sale of the lot to private respondent
and contends that the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is not one of the recognized modes
of acquiring ownership under Article 712 of the Civil Code. Neither can the same be considered a deed
of sale so as to transfer ownership of the land to private respondent because no consideration is stated
in the contract (assuming it is a contract or deed of sale).
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP AND WAIVER OF
RIGHTS IS A RECOGNIZED MODE OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT
OVER THE LOT IN QUESTION?
HELD: NO. An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical
act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title
must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are
acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the
actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into two
(2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or
intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a
result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).
There is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The
first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is,
technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of
other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the
succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis
of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other
derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
 Consequently, while the transaction between Pido's heirs and private respondent may be binding on benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s
both parties, the right of petitioner as a registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily forfeited on sole remaining beneficiary.
a mere allegation of private respondent's ownership without the corresponding proof thereof.
CONSUELO V. PANGASINAN v. CRISTINA DISONGLO-ALMAZORA
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
Petitioners are barred by laches
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as beneficiary
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or
claim for death benefits.
sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of
inequitable situation. The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a
John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as
litigant whose claim or demand has become "stale," or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length
John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s
of time, or who lias not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or
minority.
inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for peace of society, the discouragement of claims
ISSUES:
grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right
1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the
which has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.
parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.
The four (4) elements of laches, as first prescribed by this Court in Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho are as
follows:
HELD:
(i) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to
FIRST ISSUE: Yes.
the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in
(ii) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or
the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in
notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute
favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
a suit;
personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to
(iii) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
care for the minoradopted child if the adopter passed away?
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
(iv) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant,
provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of
or the suit is not held to be barred.
the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for In the case at bench, the CA correctly held that all the elements of laches were present. First, Aurora
rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, and her family entrusted to Conrado the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of the subject
while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, property in 1945. In their complaint, petitioners even admitted that Conrado's family had been staying in
ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age. the subject property since 1912.[30] Second, it took five decades, from 1945 to 1996, before Aurora and
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession petitioners decided to enforce their right thereon. Third, respondents who lived all their lives in the
tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of disputed property apparently were not aware that Aurora would one day come out and claim ownership
an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on thereon. Fourth, there was no question that respondents would be prejudiced in the event that the suit
legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those would be allowed to prosper.
by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights
still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, The contention of petitioners that they were not in delay in claiming their rights over the subject property
include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of is specious. For 50 years, Aurora and her heirs did not take any legal step to uphold their claim over the
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. subject property, despite being fully aware that Conrado and his family were occupying the same for a
SECOND ISSUE: Yes. very long time. Even petitioner Consuelo Vivar-Pangasinan testified that Conrado had been using the
The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of property for 30 years and that Aurora had never shown her any evidence of ownership of the property.
the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s
untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death A person, endowed with properties and entitlements, but chose to lie quietly as decades passed by,
watching his property wither away, allowing innocent bystanders to pick the fruits of his unguarded
trees, instead of safeguarding his rights through the accessibly and necessary legal means, does not
deserve the protection of equity. The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
The action has prescribed
On the basis of prescription of actions, the pending petition must also be denied. Petitioners argue that
prescription shall not lie against their action because a registered land under Section 47 of P.D. No.
1529 cannot be acquired through prescription. The argument is patently erroneous.
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition
of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106. Acquisitive prescription is also
known as adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights
and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article
1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription
should not be interchanged.
In a plethora of cases, the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 529 covers acquisitive
prescription. A registered land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession. In the case at
bench, however, it was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which barred the action
of petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must fail, not because respondents adversely
occupied the property, but because petitioners failed to institute their suit within the prescriptive period
under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription, the nature and circumstances of the case
should be considered. According to petitioners, the owner's duplicate certificate of title was given to
Conrado for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad faith when he drafted the
Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land on January 9, 1949, and transferred the
title of the land to his name with the issuance of TCT No. 35282 on June 17, 1965; and because of the
purported fraud committed by Conrado against petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by
operation of law, with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.
Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice
and prevent unjust enrichment. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property
through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner
of the property. It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or
mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to
Article 1144.[43]The prescriptive period to enforce the constructive trust shall be counted from the
alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The ten-
year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely applicable because Conrado and his family, not
petitioners, were in possession of the property. The subject property was registered in the name of
Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this should be the starting point of the ten-year period. Petitioners, thus,
had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust and assert their claim over the land. As properly
held by the CA, petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial claim over the land on May 9, 1996. Indeed,
with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an action, petitioners could no longer seek relief from the
courts.
CONSUELO V. PANGASINAN v. CRISTINA DISONGLO-ALMAZORA
Petitioners are barred by laches
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or
sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
inequitable situation. The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a
litigant whose claim or demand has become "stale," or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length
of time, or who lias not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or
inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for peace of society, the discouragement of claims
grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right
which has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.
The four (4) elements of laches, as first prescribed by this Court in Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho are as
follows:
(i) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(ii) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or
notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute
a suit;
(iii) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(iv) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant,
or the suit is not held to be barred.
In the case at bench, the CA correctly held that all the elements of laches were present. First, Aurora
and her family entrusted to Conrado the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of the subject
property in 1945. In their complaint, petitioners even admitted that Conrado's family had been staying in
the subject property since 1912.[30] Second, it took five decades, from 1945 to 1996, before Aurora and
petitioners decided to enforce their right thereon. Third, respondents who lived all their lives in the
disputed property apparently were not aware that Aurora would one day come out and claim ownership
thereon. Fourth, there was no question that respondents would be prejudiced in the event that the suit
would be allowed to prosper.
The contention of petitioners that they were not in delay in claiming their rights over the subject property
is specious. For 50 years, Aurora and her heirs did not take any legal step to uphold their claim over the
subject property, despite being fully aware that Conrado and his family were occupying the same for a
very long time. Even petitioner Consuelo Vivar-Pangasinan testified that Conrado had been using the
property for 30 years and that Aurora had never shown her any evidence of ownership of the property.
A person, endowed with properties and entitlements, but chose to lie quietly as decades passed by,
watching his property wither away, allowing innocent bystanders to pick the fruits of his unguarded
trees, instead of safeguarding his rights through the accessibly and necessary legal means, does not
deserve the protection of equity. The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
The action has prescribed
On the basis of prescription of actions, the pending petition must also be denied. Petitioners argue that
prescription shall not lie against their action because a registered land under Section 47 of P.D. No.
1529 cannot be acquired through prescription. The argument is patently erroneous.
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition
of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106. Acquisitive prescription is also
known as adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights
and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article
1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription
should not be interchanged.
In a plethora of cases, the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 529 covers acquisitive
prescription. A registered land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession. In the case at
bench, however, it was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which barred the action
of petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must fail, not because respondents adversely
occupied the property, but because petitioners failed to institute their suit within the prescriptive period
under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription, the nature and circumstances of the case
should be considered. According to petitioners, the owner's duplicate certificate of title was given to
Conrado for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad faith when he drafted the
Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land on January 9, 1949, and transferred the
title of the land to his name with the issuance of TCT No. 35282 on June 17, 1965; and because of the
purported fraud committed by Conrado against petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by
operation of law, with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.
Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice
and prevent unjust enrichment. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property
through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner
of the property. It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or
mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to
Article 1144.[43]The prescriptive period to enforce the constructive trust shall be counted from the
alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The ten-
year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely applicable because Conrado and his family, not
petitioners, were in possession of the property. The subject property was registered in the name of
Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this should be the starting point of the ten-year period. Petitioners, thus,
had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust and assert their claim over the land. As properly
held by the CA, petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial claim over the land on May 9, 1996. Indeed,
with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an action, petitioners could no longer seek relief from the
courts.
CONSUELO V. PANGASINAN v. CRISTINA DISONGLO-ALMAZORA
Petitioners are barred by laches
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or
sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
inequitable situation. The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a
litigant whose claim or demand has become "stale," or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length
of time, or who lias not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or
inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for peace of society, the discouragement of claims
grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right
which has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.
The four (4) elements of laches, as first prescribed by this Court in Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho are as
follows:
(i) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(ii) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or
notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute
a suit;
(iii) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(iv) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant,
or the suit is not held to be barred.
In the case at bench, the CA correctly held that all the elements of laches were present. First, Aurora
and her family entrusted to Conrado the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of the subject
property in 1945. In their complaint, petitioners even admitted that Conrado's family had been staying in
the subject property since 1912.[30] Second, it took five decades, from 1945 to 1996, before Aurora and
petitioners decided to enforce their right thereon. Third, respondents who lived all their lives in the
disputed property apparently were not aware that Aurora would one day come out and claim ownership
thereon. Fourth, there was no question that respondents would be prejudiced in the event that the suit
would be allowed to prosper.
The contention of petitioners that they were not in delay in claiming their rights over the subject property
is specious. For 50 years, Aurora and her heirs did not take any legal step to uphold their claim over the
subject property, despite being fully aware that Conrado and his family were occupying the same for a
very long time. Even petitioner Consuelo Vivar-Pangasinan testified that Conrado had been using the
property for 30 years and that Aurora had never shown her any evidence of ownership of the property.
A person, endowed with properties and entitlements, but chose to lie quietly as decades passed by,
watching his property wither away, allowing innocent bystanders to pick the fruits of his unguarded
trees, instead of safeguarding his rights through the accessibly and necessary legal means, does not
deserve the protection of equity. The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
The action has prescribed
On the basis of prescription of actions, the pending petition must also be denied. Petitioners argue that
prescription shall not lie against their action because a registered land under Section 47 of P.D. No.
1529 cannot be acquired through prescription. The argument is patently erroneous.
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition
of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106. Acquisitive prescription is also
known as adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights
and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article
1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription
should not be interchanged.
In a plethora of cases, the Court has held that Section 47 of P.D. No. 529 covers acquisitive
prescription. A registered land therein can never be acquired by adverse possession. In the case at
bench, however, it was extinctive prescription, and not acquisitive prescription, which barred the action
of petitioners. As the CA correctly held, the action must fail, not because respondents adversely
occupied the property, but because petitioners failed to institute their suit within the prescriptive period
under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
To determine the applicable period of extinctive prescription, the nature and circumstances of the case
should be considered. According to petitioners, the owner's duplicate certificate of title was given to
Conrado for safekeeping in 1945. Allegedly, Conrado employed fraud and bad faith when he drafted the
Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land on January 9, 1949, and transferred the
title of the land to his name with the issuance of TCT No. 35282 on June 17, 1965; and because of the
purported fraud committed by Conrado against petitioners, an implied constructive trust was created by
operation of law, with Conrado as trustee and Aurora as cestui que trust.
Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice
and prevent unjust enrichment. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property
through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner
of the property. It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or
mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to
Article 1144.[43]The prescriptive period to enforce the constructive trust shall be counted from the
alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The ten-
year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
In this case, the ten-year prescriptive period is squarely applicable because Conrado and his family, not
petitioners, were in possession of the property. The subject property was registered in the name of
Conrado on June 17, 1965, and this should be the starting point of the ten-year period. Petitioners, thus,
had until June 17, 1975 to enforce the implied trust and assert their claim over the land. As properly
held by the CA, petitioners belatedly instituted their judicial claim over the land on May 9, 1996. Indeed,
with the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an action, petitioners could no longer seek relief from the
courts.
Heirs of Feliciano Yambao vs Heirs of Hermogenes Yambao G.R No. 194260
A parcel of land located in Barangay Bangan, Botolan, Zambales, which was originally possessed by
Macaria de Ocampo. Macaria’s nephew, Hermogenes Yambao, acted as an administrator of the
property and paid realty taxes therefor. After Hermogenes died, it was claimed that all of his heirs were
free to pick and harvest from the fruit-bearing trees on the subject property. Eleanor one of the
daughter of the Heirs, even constructed a house. However, sometime in 2005, the communal and
mutual use of the property ceased when the heirs of Feleciano, herein petitioners, prohibited them from
entering the property and even ejected Eleanor from the subject property. Hence, a complaint filed with
the RTC for partition, declaration of nullity of title/documents and damages against the heirs of
Feliciano.
Ruling of the RTC The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes. RTC opined that the heirs of that the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that the subject
property is owned by Macaria stating that tax declarations and receipts in Macaria’s name are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. The RTC further held that even if Macaria owned the subject
property, the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that he has the right to succeed over the estate of
Macaria.
Ruling of the CA On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The CA pointed out
that:
Feliciano’s application for free patent, he acknowledged that the source of his claims of
possession over the subject property was Hermogene’s possession of the real property in peaceful,
open, continuous, and adverse manner and more importantly, in the concept of an owner, since 1994.
Feliciano’s claim of sole possession in his application for free patent did not therefore extinguish the fact
of co-ownership as claimed by the children of Hermogenes.
Issue:Whether or not the subject property is indeed co-owned by the heirs of Hermogenes and the heirs
if Feleciano.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
A co-ownership is a form of trust with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual
possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession was adverse because a
co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in
favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible and each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property.
Presricption may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open continuous and
exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the other co-owner/s. In order to that a co-owners
possession may be deemed adverse the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owners; (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Heirs of Feliciano Yambao vs Heirs of Hermogenes Yambao G.R No. 194260
A parcel of land located in Barangay Bangan, Botolan, Zambales, which was originally possessed by
Macaria de Ocampo. Macaria’s nephew, Hermogenes Yambao, acted as an administrator of the
property and paid realty taxes therefor. After Hermogenes died, it was claimed that all of his heirs were
free to pick and harvest from the fruit-bearing trees on the subject property. Eleanor one of the
daughter of the Heirs, even constructed a house. However, sometime in 2005, the communal and
mutual use of the property ceased when the heirs of Feleciano, herein petitioners, prohibited them from
entering the property and even ejected Eleanor from the subject property. Hence, a complaint filed with
the RTC for partition, declaration of nullity of title/documents and damages against the heirs of
Feliciano.
Ruling of the RTC The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes. RTC opined that the heirs of that the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that the subject
property is owned by Macaria stating that tax declarations and receipts in Macaria’s name are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. The RTC further held that even if Macaria owned the subject
property, the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that he has the right to succeed over the estate of
Macaria.
Ruling of the CA On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The CA pointed out
that:
 Feliciano’s application for free patent, he acknowledged that the source of his claims of
possession over the subject property was Hermogene’s possession of the real property in peaceful,
open, continuous, and adverse manner and more importantly, in the concept of an owner, since 1994.
Feliciano’s claim of sole possession in his application for free patent did not therefore extinguish the fact
of co-ownership as claimed by the children of Hermogenes.
Issue:Whether or not the subject property is indeed co-owned by the heirs of Hermogenes and the heirs
if Feleciano.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
A co-ownership is a form of trust with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual
possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession was adverse because a
co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in
favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible and each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property.
Presricption may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open continuous and
exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the other co-owner/s. In order to that a co-owners
possession may be deemed adverse the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owners; (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Heirs of Feliciano Yambao vs Heirs of Hermogenes Yambao G.R No. 194260
A parcel of land located in Barangay Bangan, Botolan, Zambales, which was originally possessed by
Macaria de Ocampo. Macaria’s nephew, Hermogenes Yambao, acted as an administrator of the
property and paid realty taxes therefor. After Hermogenes died, it was claimed that all of his heirs were
free to pick and harvest from the fruit-bearing trees on the subject property. Eleanor one of the
daughter of the Heirs, even constructed a house. However, sometime in 2005, the communal and
mutual use of the property ceased when the heirs of Feleciano, herein petitioners, prohibited them from
entering the property and even ejected Eleanor from the subject property. Hence, a complaint filed with
the RTC for partition, declaration of nullity of title/documents and damages against the heirs of
Feliciano.
Ruling of the RTC The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes. RTC opined that the heirs of that the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that the subject
property is owned by Macaria stating that tax declarations and receipts in Macaria’s name are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. The RTC further held that even if Macaria owned the subject
property, the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that he has the right to succeed over the estate of
Macaria.
Ruling of the CA On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The CA pointed out
that:
Feliciano’s application for free patent, he acknowledged that the source of his claims of
possession over the subject property was Hermogene’s possession of the real property in peaceful,
open, continuous, and adverse manner and more importantly, in the concept of an owner, since 1994.
Feliciano’s claim of sole possession in his application for free patent did not therefore extinguish the fact
of co-ownership as claimed by the children of Hermogenes.
Issue:Whether or not the subject property is indeed co-owned by the heirs of Hermogenes and the heirs
if Feleciano.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
A co-ownership is a form of trust with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual
possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession was adverse because a
co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in
favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible and each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property.
Presricption may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open continuous and
exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the other co-owner/s. In order to that a co-owners
possession may be deemed adverse the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owners; (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Heirs of Feliciano Yambao vs Heirs of Hermogenes Yambao G.R No. 194260
A parcel of land located in Barangay Bangan, Botolan, Zambales, which was originally possessed by
Macaria de Ocampo. Macaria’s nephew, Hermogenes Yambao, acted as an administrator of the
property and paid realty taxes therefor. After Hermogenes died, it was claimed that all of his heirs were
free to pick and harvest from the fruit-bearing trees on the subject property. Eleanor one of the
daughter of the Heirs, even constructed a house. However, sometime in 2005, the communal and
mutual use of the property ceased when the heirs of Feleciano, herein petitioners, prohibited them from
entering the property and even ejected Eleanor from the subject property. Hence, a complaint filed with
the RTC for partition, declaration of nullity of title/documents and damages against the heirs of
Feliciano.
Ruling of the RTC The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes. RTC opined that the heirs of that the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that the subject
property is owned by Macaria stating that tax declarations and receipts in Macaria’s name are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. The RTC further held that even if Macaria owned the subject
property, the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that he has the right to succeed over the estate of
Macaria.
Ruling of the CA On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The CA pointed out
that:
Feliciano’s application for free patent, he acknowledged that the source of his claims of
possession over the subject property was Hermogene’s possession of the real property in peaceful,
open, continuous, and adverse manner and more importantly, in the concept of an owner, since 1994.
Feliciano’s claim of sole possession in his application for free patent did not therefore extinguish the fact
of co-ownership as claimed by the children of Hermogenes.
Issue:Whether or not the subject property is indeed co-owned by the heirs of Hermogenes and the heirs
if Feleciano.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
A co-ownership is a form of trust with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual
possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession was adverse because a
co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in
favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible and each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property.
Presricption may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open continuous and
exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the other co-owner/s. In order to that a co-owners
possession may be deemed adverse the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owners; (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Heirs of Feliciano Yambao vs Heirs of Hermogenes Yambao G.R No. 194260
A parcel of land located in Barangay Bangan, Botolan, Zambales, which was originally possessed by
Macaria de Ocampo. Macaria’s nephew, Hermogenes Yambao, acted as an administrator of the
property and paid realty taxes therefor. After Hermogenes died, it was claimed that all of his heirs were
free to pick and harvest from the fruit-bearing trees on the subject property. Eleanor one of the
daughter of the Heirs, even constructed a house. However, sometime in 2005, the communal and
mutual use of the property ceased when the heirs of Feleciano, herein petitioners, prohibited them from
entering the property and even ejected Eleanor from the subject property. Hence, a complaint filed with
the RTC for partition, declaration of nullity of title/documents and damages against the heirs of
Feliciano.
Ruling of the RTC The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes. RTC opined that the heirs of that the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that the subject
property is owned by Macaria stating that tax declarations and receipts in Macaria’s name are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. The RTC further held that even if Macaria owned the subject
property, the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that he has the right to succeed over the estate of
Macaria.
Ruling of the CA On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The CA pointed out
that:
Feliciano’s application for free patent, he acknowledged that the source of his claims of
possession over the subject property was Hermogene’s possession of the real property in peaceful,
open, continuous, and adverse manner and more importantly, in the concept of an owner, since 1994.
Feliciano’s claim of sole possession in his application for free patent did not therefore extinguish the fact
of co-ownership as claimed by the children of Hermogenes.
Issue:Whether or not the subject property is indeed co-owned by the heirs of Hermogenes and the heirs
if Feleciano.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
A co-ownership is a form of trust with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual
possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession was adverse because a
co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in
favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible and each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property.
Presricption may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open continuous and
exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the other co-owner/s. In order to that a co-owners
possession may be deemed adverse the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owners; (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
SSS vs Azote
In 1994, Edgardo submitted his SSS Form E-4 with his wife Edna and their children as
beneficiaries. When he died in 2005, Edna tried to claim the death benefits as the wife of a deceased
member but it was denied. It appears from the SSS records that Edgardo had another set of SSS Form
E-4 in 1982 where his former wife Rosemarie and their child were designated as beneficiaries. Edna
did not know that Edgardo was previously married to another woman. She then filed for a petition
before the SSS, and notice was sent to Rosemarie but she made no answer. The SSC dismissed
Edna’s petition because the SSS Form E-4 designating Rosemarie and her child was not revoked by
Edgardo, and that she was still presumed to be the legal wife as Edna could not proved that Edgardo’s
previous marriage was annulled or divorced.
Issue: W/N Edna is entitled to the SSS benefits as the wife of a deceased member
Held: No. The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k)
thereof, only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s
SS benefits. Here, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another
individual as evidenced by their marriage contract.
Since the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated when the Family Code was already in
force. Edna, pursuant to Art 41 of the Family Code, failed to establish that there was no impediment or
that the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to
Edgardo. Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either
annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her
marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that
Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify
under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.
Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages, it is required by
Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 828229 to examine available statistical and economic data to ensure that
the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries.
TEEKAY SHIPPING PHILS., INC.,and/or TEEKAY SHIPPING CANADA, Petitioners, v. RAMIER C.
CONCHA Respondent.
FACTS: Ramier C. Concha was hired as an Able Seaman by petitioners under an employment contract
for a period of eight (8) months. He was deployed to Canada. While he was removing rusty fragments
during his deck assignment, a foreign particle accidentally entered his left eye, then the designated
medical officer on board administered first aid treatment. As there was no improvement, he requested
for a medical check-up in the hospital where he was diagnosed with Left Eye Acute Iritis.
After being deployed only for less than a month, private respondent was repatriated to the Philippines.
He then underwent medical treatment. He was assessed to be unfit to work as a seafarer and thus he
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which was dismissed by the Labir Arbiter. He then filed another
complaint in the NLRC.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for being time-barred. Relying on Article 291 of the Labor
Code, they maintained that all money claims premised on, or arising from one’s employment should be
brought within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued, which was dismissed by the
Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the LA's decision was reversed by the NLRC. Petitioners filed an appeal in
the CA which dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that private respondent’s claims have not yet prescribed?
HELD: Citing Section 30 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, petitioners maintained that all
claims arising therefrom prescribes in three (3) years. Petitioners argue that since the aforesaid
provision specifically set the prescription to three (3) years, the period provided under Article 1146 of
the Civil Code cannot be made to apply.
Petitioners contend that even if private respondent’s claims are well-founded, the latter's cause of action
accrued on or before 6 December 2000. Thus, his complaint should have been instituted within three (3)
years from 6 December 2000 or before 6 December 2003. They further contend that even assuming
that the running of the period of prescription began only on 28 May 2001, the date when private
respondents first complaint was dismissed without prejudice, his claims would have prescribed on 28
May 2004. Since private respondent filed his complaint only on 13 December 2004, the same had
clearly prescribed.
In Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc., this Court ruled that actions based on injury to rights prescribe
in four (4) years under Article 1146 of the Civil Code rather than three (3) years as provided for the
Labor Code. An action for damages involving a plaintiff separated from his employment for alleged
unjustifiable causes is one for injury to the rights of the plaintiff, and must be brought within four (4)
years. Private respondent had gone to the Labor Arbiter on a charge, fundamentally, of illegal dismissal,
of which his money claims form but an incidental part. Essentially, his complaint is one for injury to
rights arising from his forced disembarkation. Thus, Article 1146 is the applicable provision. It provides:
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
Records reveal that after his disembarkation from the vessel MV Kyushu Spirit on 6 December 2000,
private respondent filed on 28 May 2001 a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch
of the NLRC. Since the filing of his first complaint on 28 May 2001 tolled the running of the period of
prescription, both the NLRC and the CA were correct in ruling that the filing of respondents second
complaint with money claims on 13 December 2004 was clearly filed on time.DENIED.
G.R. No. 196023 April 21, 2014
JOSE JUAN TONG, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. GO TIAT KUN, ET AL., Respondents.
FACTS: Juan Tong and Sy Un had 10 children. In 1957, Juan Tong informed his children of his
intention to purchase Lot 998 for the family’s lumber business. Since he was a Chinese citizen he was
disqualified from acquiring said lot, the title to the property will be registered in the name of his eldest
son, Luis, Sr., who at that time was already of age and was the only Filipino citizen among them. On
May, 1957 Juan Tong bought the land and was registered in the name of Luis, Sr. Years later, Sy Un
and Juan Tong both died intestate.
On May 30, 1981, Luis, Sr. died and his heirs (Go Tiat Kun and children) claimed ownership over Lot
998 by succession alleging that no trust exists and it was Luis, Sr. who bought Lot 998. They subdivided
the land and sold ½ (Lot 998-B) to third persons. On August 1995, petitioners discovered the breach of
trust committed by respondents resulting in their filing for annulment of sales. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners which was affirmed by CA and Supreme Court.
On February 2001, Go Tiat Kun executed a Deed of Sale over Lot 998-A in favor of her children.
Petitioners filed for nullification of titles claiming they are owners of Lot 998-A.
Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners saying that Luis, Sr., was a mere trustee and not the owner of Lot
998. Therefore respondents can not appropriate the property among themselves. Thus all previous titles
and documents of reconveyance are null and void.
CA reversed the decision saying that an express trust was created because there was a direct and
positive act from Juan Tong to create a trust. It also ruled that petitioners are still barred by prescription
because said resulting trust was terminated upon death of Luis, Sr. and was converted into constructive
trust. Thus this petition for review.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not there was an implied resulting trust constituted over Lot 998 when Juan
Tong purchased the property and registered it in the name of Luis, Sr.
(2) Whether or not the petitioners’ action barred by prescription, estoppel and laches.
HELD: (1) There was an implied trust as already decided in a previous case involving Lot 998-B. Trial
court already found that said lot was held in trust by Luis, Sr., in favor of his siblings by a vrtue of an
implied trust which was affirmed by SC. Although Lot 998 was titled in the name of Luis, Sr., the
circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the subject property eloquently speak of the intent that the
equitable or beneficial ownership of the property belong to the Juan Tong family. SC also ruled that the
direct and positive act of Juan Tong created an implied resulting trust.
(2) No, petitioners’ action is not barred by prescription, estoppel and laches. Implied resulting trust do
not prescribe except when trustee repudiates trust. Further, the action to reconvey does not prescribe
as long as property stands in the name of the trustee. Considering that the implied trust has been
repudiated through the death of Luis, Sr., Lot 998 cannot be included in his estate except only insofar
as his undivided share is concerned. Therefore, petitioners are not estopped from claiming ownership
thereof.
G.R. No. 196023 April 21, 2014
JOSE JUAN TONG, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. GO TIAT KUN, ET AL., Respondents.
FACTS: Juan Tong and Sy Un had 10 children. In 1957, Juan Tong informed his children of his
intention to purchase Lot 998 for the family’s lumber business. Since he was a Chinese citizen he was
disqualified from acquiring said lot, the title to the property will be registered in the name of his eldest
son, Luis, Sr., who at that time was already of age and was the only Filipino citizen among them. On
May, 1957 Juan Tong bought the land and was registered in the name of Luis, Sr. Years later, Sy Un
and Juan Tong both died intestate.
On May 30, 1981, Luis, Sr. died and his heirs (Go Tiat Kun and children) claimed ownership over Lot
998 by succession alleging that no trust exists and it was Luis, Sr. who bought Lot 998. They subdivided
the land and sold ½ (Lot 998-B) to third persons. On August 1995, petitioners discovered the breach of
trust committed by respondents resulting in their filing for annulment of sales. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners which was affirmed by CA and Supreme Court.
On February 2001, Go Tiat Kun executed a Deed of Sale over Lot 998-A in favor of her children.
Petitioners filed for nullification of titles claiming they are owners of Lot 998-A.
Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners saying that Luis, Sr., was a mere trustee and not the owner of Lot
998. Therefore respondents can not appropriate the property among themselves. Thus all previous titles
and documents of reconveyance are null and void.
CA reversed the decision saying that an express trust was created because there was a direct and
positive act from Juan Tong to create a trust. It also ruled that petitioners are still barred by prescription
because said resulting trust was terminated upon death of Luis, Sr. and was converted into constructive
trust. Thus this petition for review.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not there was an implied resulting trust constituted over Lot 998 when Juan
Tong purchased the property and registered it in the name of Luis, Sr.
(2) Whether or not the petitioners’ action barred by prescription, estoppel and laches.
HELD: (1) There was an implied trust as already decided in a previous case involving Lot 998-B. Trial
court already found that said lot was held in trust by Luis, Sr., in favor of his siblings by a vrtue of an
implied trust which was affirmed by SC. Although Lot 998 was titled in the name of Luis, Sr., the
circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the subject property eloquently speak of the intent that the
equitable or beneficial ownership of the property belong to the Juan Tong family. SC also ruled that the
direct and positive act of Juan Tong created an implied resulting trust.
(2) No, petitioners’ action is not barred by prescription, estoppel and laches. Implied resulting trust do
not prescribe except when trustee repudiates trust. Further, the action to reconvey does not prescribe
as long as property stands in the name of the trustee. Considering that the implied trust has been
repudiated through the death of Luis, Sr., Lot 998 cannot be included in his estate except only insofar
as his undivided share is concerned. Therefore, petitioners are not estopped from claiming ownership
thereof.
Vitug v. CA G.R. No. 82027, March 29, 1990
Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship agreement with the Bank of American
National Trust and Savings Association. The said agreement contained the following stipulations:
(1) All money deposited and to be deposited with the Bank in their joint savings current account shall be
both their property and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of them
during their lifetime; and
(2) After the death of one of them, the same shall belong to and be the sole property of the
surviving spouse and payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor
Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix. Romarico later filed a motion asking
authority to sell certain shares of stock and real property belonging to the estate to cover
his advances to the estate which he claimed were personal funds withdrawn from their savings account.
Rowena opposed on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from the savings
account were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate. Hence, there should be
no reimbursement. On the other hand, Romarico insists that the same are his exclusive property
acquired through the survivorship agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of the savings account subject of the survivorship agreement
were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate
No. The Court ruled that a Survivorship Agreement is neither a donation mortis causanor a donation
inter vivos. It is in the nature of an aleatory contract whereby one or both of the parties reciprocally bind
themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the
happening of an event which is to occur at an indeterminate time or is uncertain, such as death. The
Court further ruled that a survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law and thus is valid unless its
operation or effect may be violative of a law such as in the following instances: (1) it is used as a mere
cloak to hide an inofficious donation; (2) it is used to transfer property in fraud of creditors; or (3) it is
used to defeat the legitime of a compulsory heir. In the instant case, none of the foregoing instances
were present. Consequently, the Court upheld the validity of the survivorship agreement entered into by
the spouses Vitug. As such, Romarico, being the surviving spouse, acquired a vested right over the
amounts under the savings account, which became his exclusive property upon the death of his wife
pursuant to the survivorship agreement. Thus, the funds of the savings account are
not conjugal partnership properties and not part of the estate of the deceased Dolores.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. APOLONIO BAUTISTA, JR G.R. No. 166890, June 28, 2016
After acquiring in Subic, Zambales from Mario Jardin on February 15, 1971 and Cornelia Villanueva on
May 25, 1973, Apolonio, Sr. had the property declared for taxation purposes. He had been the sole and
exclusive possessor and occupant from the time of acquisition until his death, with no party questioning
his possession and ownership, or staking any adverse claim against him thereon. He died in 1987, and
was succeeded by his children, namely: respondent Apolonio, Jr. and his siblings. Apolonio, Sr.'s
children executed an extra-judicial settlement of their father's estate, whereby Apolonio, Jr.'s brothers
and sisters waived their rights in his favor. Thus, the property later on was declared for taxation
purposes in Apolonio, Jr.'s name.
On October 21, 1996, Apolonio Jr. commenced a Case in the MTC. He later on testified that his father
had been in actual possession since 1969, and had eventually acquired the land from Jardin and
Villanueva through the notarized Deeds of Absolute Sale and that his father had paid taxes on the land.
The Government did not interpose any timely objection to the testimony and the documentary evidence
presented by Apolonio, Jr.
In due course, the MTC granted Apolonio, Jr.'s application, and declared him as the owner in fee simple
of the land.
The Government appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA. The CA pointed out that the
Government did not present evidence against the claim of Apolonio Jr.; and that the Government did
not timely object to his testimony on the ground of its being hearsay.
In this appeal, the Government reiterates that the testimony of Apolonio, Jr. on possession, being
hearsay, had no probative value; that the alienation of public land should always undergo careful
scrutiny.
The Government points out that Apolonio, Jr. had given only general statements pertaining to the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of his father since 1971; that such statements were
mere conclusions of law, and did not prove the alleged possession; and that because the application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title was filed on October 21, 1996, the applicable law was Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073;
that, accordingly, the required period of possession must be "since June 12, 1945 or earlier,"
ISSUE 1. WON the applicable law in this case Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public
Land Act), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073;
RULING Yes. The Government has correctly insisted that the requisite period of possession of the
property should conform to that provided for in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, which has limited the right to apply for judicial confirmation to citizens of
the Philippines "who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure.
The provision is reprised by Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), adopting the length of possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
We note that in its amendment of the Public Land Act that took effect on January 25, 1977, Presidential
Decree No. 1073 changed the length of the requisite possession from "thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945, or earlier."
It should stress that only the title of those who had possessed and occupied alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain within the requisite period could be judicially confirmed. Indeed, alienable
public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by
the mere lapse or completion of the period. Thus, the Court DISMISSES the application of respondent
Apolonio Bautista, Jr. for the judicial confirmation of his imperfect title.
TEOFILO ALOLINO v. FORTUNATO FLORES AND ANASTACIA MARIE FLORES, G.R. No. 198774,
April 04, 2016
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land situated at Taguig, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title. lolino initially constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980,
he added a second floor to the structure. He also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his
property. There are terraces on both floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three
(3) on the ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor.
In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their house/sari
saristore on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's
house. Since they were constructing on a municipal road, the respondents could not secure a building
permit. The structure is only about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's house,
covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and
ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road
through the rear door of his house.
Alolino demanded that the respondent spouses remove their structure but the latter refused. Thus, he
complained about the illegal construction to the Building Official of the Municipality of Taguig. He also
filed a complaint with the Barangay of Tuktukan.
Acting on Alolino's complaint, the Building Official issued a Notice of Illegal Construction against the
respondents on February 15, 1995, directing them to immediately stop further construction.4
Sometime in 2001 or 2002, the respondents began constructing a second floor to their structure, again
without securing a building permit. This floor was to serve as residence for their daughter, Maria Teresa
Sison. The construction prompted Alolino to file another complaint with the Building Official of Taguig.
The building official issued a second Notice of Illegal Construction against the respondents on May 6,
2002, directing the respondents to desist from their illegal construction.5
On May 17, 2002, the Office of the Barangay Council of Tuktukan issued a certification that no
settlement was reached between the parties relative to Alolino's 1994 complaint. 6
The respondents did not comply with the directive from the building official. This prompted Alolino to
send them a letter dated January 23, 2003, demanding the removal of their illegally constructed
structure.
Despite receipt of the demand letter, the respondents refused to comply. Thus, on February 14, 2003,
Alolino filed a complaint against the respondents with the RTC praying for: (1) the removal of the
encroaching structure; (2) the enforcement of his right to easement of light and view; and (3) the
payment of damages. Alolino claimed that the respondents' encroaching structure deprived him of his
light and view and obstructed the air ventilation inside his house.
In their answer,7 the respondent spouses denied that Alolino had a cause of action against them. They
alleged that they had occupied their lot where they constructed their house in 1955, long before the
plaintiff purchased his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that plaintiff only has himself to blame
because he constructed his house up to the very boundary of his lot without observing the required
setback. Finally, they emphasized that the wall of their house facing Alolino's does not violate the
latter's alleged easement of light and view because it has no window.
The RTC found that Alolino had already previously acquired an easement of light and view and that the
respondents subsequently blocked this easement with their construction. It held that the respondents'
illegal construction was a private nuisance with respect to Alolino because it prevented him from using
the back portion of his property and obstructed his free passage to the barrio/municipal road. The court
farther held that the respondents' house was a public nuisance, having been illegally constructed on
a barrio road - a government property - without a building permit.
The CA concluded that the Government had already abandoned the barrio road pursuant to the 2004
Sanggunian resolution. It further held that the respondents' property could not be demolished, citing
Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act.12
ISSUE: 1. WON Alolino is at fault for constructing his house up to the edge of his property line without
observing the setbacks required in Article 670 of the Civil Code and Section 702 of the National Building
Code.
2. WON Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over the
respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on
RULING: 1. YES. There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari sari store on government
property. Properties of Local Government Units (LGUs) are classified as either property for public use or
patrimonial property.13 Article 424 of the Civil Code distinguishes between the two classifications:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.14 (emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, the barrio road adjacent to Alolino's house is property of public dominion devoted to
public use.
To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the LGU to enact an ordinance,
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian members, permanently closing the road.
In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely passed a resolution. The difference
between an ordinance and a resolution is settled in jurisprudence: an ordinance is a law but a resolution
is only a declaration of sentiment or opinion of the legislative body. 16
Properties of the local government that are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under
the absolute control of Congress.17 Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate the use of these properties
unless specifically authorized by Congress, as is the case with Section 21 of the LGC.18 In exercising
this authority, the LGU must comply with the conditions and observe the limitations prescribed by
Congress. The Sanggunian's failure to comply with Section 21 renders ineffective its reclassification of
the barrioroad.
As a barrio road, the subject lot's purpose is to serve the benefit of the collective citizenry. It is outside
the commerce of man and as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable or disposable; 19 (2) it is not subject
to registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the subject of a Torrens title;20 (3) it
is not susceptible to prescription;21 (4) it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a
contract;22 (5) it is not subject to attachment and execution;23 and (6) it cannot be burdened by any
voluntary easements.24
2. NO. An easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons
to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.25Continuous and apparent easements may be
acquired by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years. 26 Meanwhile, continuous but non-apparent
easements and discontinuous ones can only be acquired by virtue of a title.27 Used in this sense, title
refers to a juridical justification for the acquisition of a right. It may refer to a law, a will, a donation, or a
contract.
We must distinguish between the respondents' house and the land it is built on. The land itself is public
property devoted to public use. It is not susceptible to prescription and cannot be burdened with
voluntary easements. On the other hand, the respondents' house is private property, albeit illegally
constructed on public property. It can be the object of prescription and can be burdened with voluntary
easements. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the respondents have not voluntarily burdened their
property with an easement in favor of Alolino.
An easement of a right of way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired through prescription.28 On the
other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription counting from the time
when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from blocking the view
of a window located within the dominant estate.29
Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the respondents
prior to their construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement of light and view
through prescription. Thus, only easements created by law can burden the respondents' property.
The provisions on legal easements are found in Book II, Title VII, Chapter 2 of the Civil Code whose
specific coverage we list and recite below for clarity and convenience.
Section 3 (Articles 649-657) governs legal easements of right of way. Article 649 creates a legal
easement in favor of an owner or any person entitled to use any immovable, which is landlocked by
other immovables pertaining to other persons without an adequate access to a public highway. Article
652creates a legal easement in favor of an isolated piece of land acquired by sale, exchange, partition,
or donation when it is surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner, or
donor. Article 653 grants the same right of way. in favor of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner, or donor
when his property is the one that becomes isolated. Article 656 grants the owner of an estate, after
payment of indemnity, a right of way to carry materials through the estate of another when it.is
indispensable for the construction or repair of a building in his estate. Finally, Article 657 governs right
of way easements for the passage of livestock.
None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino's property with respect to the barrio road where the
respondents' house stands on.
We agree with the respondents that Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an
easement of right of way over the respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on. This does not
mean, however, that the respondents are entitled to continue occupying the barrio road and blocking
the rear of Alolino's house.
Every building is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or possessor from committing
nuisance.30 Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, the respondents' house is evidently a nuisance:
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything
else one of which is if Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water. The invoked provision itself allows the demolition of illegal structures on
public roads and sidewalks because these nuisances are injurious to public welfare. Evidently, the
respondents have no right to maintain their occupation and permanent obstruction of the barrio road.
The interests of the few do not outweigh the greater interest of public health, public safety, good order,
and general welfare. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondents, and all persons
claiming rights under them, are ORDERED to remove and demolish their illegal structure.
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY vs. DARAB, et.al., G.R. No. 100091, October 22, 1992
The petitioner, the CMU is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the estate located in
the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilag, Bukidnon, in early 1910,
in response to the public demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao. In the early 1960's, it was
converted into a college until it became what is now known as the CMU, but still primarily an agricultural
university. On January 16, 1958 the late Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 467, withdrawing
from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the
future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares was surveyed and
registered and titled in the name of the petitioner.Several tribes belonging to cultural communities,
opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal
reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school
was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares. In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160,
adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources
of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written
contract. The faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU
provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to
cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice projects. Each group pays the CMU a service fee
and also a land use participant's fee. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship
existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as
a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train
people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunity
within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries. Among
the participants in this program were
Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and
other complainants (respondents).
Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice
project. In 1986, the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-
Business Management and Training Project was discontinued due to losses incurred while carrying on
the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this
project was discontinued. The CMU later launched a self-help project called CMU-Income
Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit
of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and
augment the income of the faculty and the staff. The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988.
Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to
vacate. The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can project,
the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school
authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.
ISSUES: Whether or not Obrique, et. Al are tenants who qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.
RULING: NO. In their complaint, docketed as DAR Case No. 5, filed with the DARAB, complainants
Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a
part or portion of the CMU situated at Sinalayan, Valencia, Bukidnon and Musuan, Bukidnon, consisting
of about 1,200 hectares. We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under
the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program called
"Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship
existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not
receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected
was a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance
given to the participants by the CMU. Again, the agreement signed by the participants under the CMU-
IEP clearly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed, and that the participants are not share
croppers nor lessees, and the CMU did not share in the produce of the participants' labor.
In the same paragraph of their complaint, complainants claim that they are landless peasants. This
allegation requires proof and should not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not a landless
peasant. The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible position was
separated from the service on account of certain irregularities he committed while Assistant Director of
the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the moment, own no land in
Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of origin. No proof whatsoever
appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.
The evidence on record establish without doubt that the complainants were originally authorized or
given permission to occupy certain areas of the CMU property for a definite purpose — to carry out
certain university projects as part of the CMU's program of activities pursuant to its avowed purpose of
giving training and instruction in agricultural and other related technologies, using the land and other
resources of the institution as a laboratory for these projects. Their entry into the land of the CMU was
with the permission and written consent of the owner, the CMU, for a limited period and for a specific
purpose. After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their
continued stay was unauthorized and their settlement on the CMU's land was without legal authority. A
person entering upon lands of another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title
of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to
the land, is a squatter. Squatters cannot enter the land of another surreptitiously or by stealth, and
under the umbrella of the CARP, claim rights to said property as landless peasants. Under Section 73 of
R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify
as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. Any such
person who knowingly and wilfully violates the above provision of the Act shall be punished with
imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court.
In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants,
cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.
REPUBLIC v. SOGOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION GR No. 175760, Feb 17, 2016
On December 9, 1999, Sogod filed an application for registration and confirmation of land title situated
in Municipality of Sogod, Province of Cebu. The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No.
016-SO. Sogod claimed that it purchased the land "from Catalina Rivera per deed of absolute sale
dated October 28, 1996. It also averred that "by itself and through its predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12,
1945
On February 11, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground
that Sogod was disqualified from applying for original registration of title to alienable lands pursuant to
Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
The trial court issued an Order dated June 15, 2000 pronouncing a "general default against all persons
except against the Solicitor General.
On September 19, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Region VII, Banilad, Mandaue City filed an Opposition on the ground that the land was
previously forest land and "was certified and released as alienable and disposable only on January 17,
1986. Thus, it could not be registered without violating Section 48, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940
Sogod also presented witnesses. According to their testimonies, the land "was originally in the
possession of Ignacia Rivera, the mother of Catalina. Catalina inherited this land from her mother. On
October 28, 1996, Catalina sold the land to Sogod. A was issued in the name of [Sogod]
On May 10, 2001, the trial court rendered the Decision granting the application. The Decision stated, in
The Office of the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals.[26] According to the Office of the
Solicitor General, the trial court erred in allowing the titling of Lot No. 2533 because:
(1) Sogod failed to prove its open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier;[27]
(2) The tax declarations presented by Sogod "are of recent vintage"[28] and are "not accompanied by
proof of actual possession . . . since June 12, 1945
(3) The land was only declared alienable and disposable on January 17, 1986, pursuant to Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4- 1611,[30] "making it impossible for [Sogod] and its predecessors- in-interest
to have possessed the land in concept of an owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier[;]"[31] and
(4) "Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution disqualifies private corporations from applying for
original registration of title to alienable lands
On August 25, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
The Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration. Hence, the present Petition for Review
was filed. I
ISSUE: whether or not the occupation of forest land prior to its classification as alienable and
disposable land may be considered for purposes of complying with the requirements for judicial
confirmation of title;whether or not [respondent] and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the
property in the manner and length of time required by law.
RULING: NO. Respondent's possession would allegedly be short of the length of time required by
law.[53] The earliest tax declaration presented by respondent is 1947, which was "short of the June 12,
1945 requirement of [the] law."[54]
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
A similar provision is found in Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, which reads:
SECTION 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic[71] has clarified that the fixed date of June 12, 1945
qualifies possession and occupation, not land classification, as alienable and disposable.[72] The
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of
the time of the application, provided the applicant's possession and occupation of the land dates back to
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
However, the court ruled that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should
best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession
and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June
12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written
by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed
no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant's imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the
property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain
determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it. Alienable public land held
by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the
public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law,
as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for this
reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of
possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the
presumption that the land is inalienable.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.[78]
Although adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner is a
conclusion of law to be determined by courts, it has more to do with a person's belief in good faith that
he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying. It is unrelated to the declaration that
land is alienable or disposable. A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore, be a possessor in
the concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and disposable
agricultural land. His or her rights, however, are still to be determined under the law.
1. YES. As a rule, factual findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding on
this court. Petitioner did not show the existence of any exceptions for us to depart from this
rule.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that respondent applicant had sufficiently proved its and
its predecessors-in-interest's continuous possession of the land tracing back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Possession since 1945 was established through testimonies of respondents' witnesses, the unbroken
chain of tax declarations in the name of Catalina Rivera, the person from whom respondent bought the
property in 1996, and a certification from the municipal treasurer that all previous taxes had been paid.
Tax declarations or realty tax payments constitute at least proof that the holder has a sincere and
honest claim of title over the property. Moreover, witness Bonifacia Sugarol, the owner of the adjoining
land, stated that the land was owned by Ignacia Rivera and inherited by Catalina; and the land was
planted with corn and had many tenants.
As can be gleaned from the face of this evidence, the land was already devoted to the planting of corn,
maguey and the rest was pastureland. Also, i[t] appears that TD 04024 cancelled the previous tax
declaration with number TD 1417. A testimony was also adduced by the same witness that the previous
tax declarations covering the property cannot be produced anymore because all of their records prior to
the Second World War were destroyed.
Thus, respondent had established (by itself and through its predecessor-in-interest) its possession in
the concept of owner of the property since 1945. It is further undisputed that the property was declared
alienable and disposable in 1986 prior to respondent's filing of its application in 1999.[91] The Court of
Appeals, therefore, did not err in affirming the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Decision granting
respondent's application for original registration of title.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 25, 2005 and
Resolution dated November 7, 2006 are AFFIRMED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDREA TAN February 10, 2016.G.R. No. 199537
Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080, Cad. 545-D situated in Consolacion
Cebu. "He alleged that she is the absolute owner of the parcel of residential land she purchased from a
certain Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992. Land registration court granted Tan’s application. The
court confirmed that her title over the subject lot and ordered its registration. The republic appealed the
case, arguing that Tan failed to prove that she is a Filipino and has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the lot, in the concept of an owner, since June 1945, or
earlierimmediately preceding the filing of her cpplication. The court noted that before, the land of the
public domain can be acquired by prescription, it must have been declared alienable and disposable
agricultural land. The Court pointed to the certification issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO) as evidence that the land was classified as alienable and disposable in
Deptermber 1965 pursuant to Land Classification project number 28. It concluded that Tan had actually
acquired the land by prescription.
ISSUE; Whether or not the CENRO and Tax Declarations were suffiecint to prove that the land is no
longer intended for public use.
RULING: In the present case, respondent Tan's application is not anchored on judicial confirmation of
an imperfect title because she does not claim to have possessed the subject lot since June 12, 1945.
Her application is based on acquisitive prescription on the claim that: (1) the property was declared
alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965; and (2) she had been in open continuous, public, and
notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.
In our 2009 decision and 2013 resolution[23] in Malabanan, we already held en banc that a declaration
that property of the public dominion is alienable and disposable does not ipso facto convert it into
patrimonial property. We said:
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President
is duly authorized by law.
While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in an
application for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not suffice for the
purpose of prescription under the Civil Code.[25] Before prescription can even begin to run against the
State, the following conditions must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial property:
The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of
Article XII of the Constitution;
The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable;
There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no longer intended for
public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property.
Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and peaceful possession of the
subject lot in the concept of an owner.
In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been declared alienable and
disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from public use or public service. Without this,
prescription cannot begin to run because the property has not yet been converted into patrimonial
property of the State. It remains outside the commerce of man and the respondent's physical
possession and occupation thereof do not produce any legal effect. In the eyes of the law, the
respondent has never acquired legal possession of the property and her physical possession thereof,
no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,v. JOSE ALBERTO ALBA, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT, MANUEL C. BLANCO, JR G.R. No. 169710, August 19, 2015
The respondent was the purchaser for value of the parcel of land known as Lot No. 9100 situated in
Barangay Rizal, Municipality of Nabas, Province of Aklan, and subdivided into 5 parts, with an area of
28,037 square meters, more or less. He applied for the original registration of title over the parcels of
land in the MCTC.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, opposed the
application for original registration of title, contending that the respondent and his predecessors-in-
interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
lands in question since June 12, 1945.4
After trial, the MCTC rendered judgment GRANTING the application for registration of the parcel of land
designated in the approved Survey Plan. The OSG appealed the judgment to the CA upon the following
errors
That the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the application for registration due to the following:
a. applicant-appellee's failure to show that the land subject of the application falls under
the jurisdiction of the MCTC;
b. applicant-appellee's failure to adduce the Official Gazette as
evidence;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
c. applicant-appellee's failure to submit the original tracing cloth plan of the land subject
of the application; and Later on, CA ordered its dismissal.
ISSUE:WON Respondent established his required possession
RULING:YES. The CA upheld the finding of the MCTC that the respondent had established his title
through documentary evidence like the tax declarations and the deed of sale from his predecessors-in-
interest; and through evidence showing possession in the concept of an owner for over 50 years. It
observed that although the tax declarations or realty tax payments relevant to the lands were not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they were good indicia of his possession in the concept of owner, for
"no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession."
The OSG counters that the CA should not have upheld the application for registration on the basis of
mere tax declarations and the testimonies of respondent's attorney-in-fact Manuel Blanco and Atty.
Gideon de Pedro; and that their testimonies of possession since time immemorial did not meet the
standard required by law to warrant the grant of the application.27 Essentially, the OSG contends that in
order for the respondent as the applicant for the original registration of title to prove possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law that was open, exclusive and uninterrupted,28 he
should not simply declare such possession as his and that of his predecessor-in-interest;29 that general
statements or phrases were nothing more than conclusions of law that were not evidence of
possession;30 that instead the respondent as the applicant should present specific acts showing the
nature of the alleged possession;31 and that, accordingly, he did not discharge his burden of
substantiation of his application.32
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
There are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of PD
1529, namely: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2)
that the applicant by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. In short, the right to file the application for original
registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership dating back to June 12, 1945, or earlier, by
reason of the claimant's open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Anent the aforecited requisites, the OSG controverted only the second, that is, that the respondent did
not sufficiently prove his and his predecessors-in-interest's open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands.
The respondent did not satisfactorily demonstrate that his or his predecessors-in-interest's possession
and occupation were of the nature and character contemplated by the law. None of his witnesses
testified about any specific acts of ownership exercised by him or his predecessors-in-interest on the
lands. The general statements of his witnesses on the possession and occupation were mere
conclusions of law that did not qualify as competent and sufficient evidence of his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. As we see it, the OSG has correctly observed that
his witnesses did not testify on the specific acts of possession of the respondent or of his predecessors-
in-interest.
In Republic v. Alconaba,33 this Court has explained that the intent behind the law's use of the terms
possession and occupation is to emphasize the need for actual and not just constructive or fictional
possession, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction
and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together
with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a
land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.
The Court reverses the CA. The respondent did not competently account for any act of occupation,
development, cultivation or maintenance of the lands subject of his application, either on his part or on
the part of his predecessors-in-interest for the entire time that they were supposedly in possession of
the lands. Witnesses Manuel Blanco and Atty. Gideon de Pedro only testified of their possession since
time immemorial but did not offer any details of specific acts indicative of possession and occupation.
To prove possession, the offer of general statements or phrases is a merely self-serving,
unsubstantiated assertion. Atty. de Pedro alleged that his uncle, Basilio de Pedro, had once possessed
the lands that were cogonal, and used them for pasture and planting of coconut trees, but did not
adduce any specific details indicating such activities as manifestations of ownership or possession that
could be ultimately attributed to the respondent. That the lands were cogonal or planted with coconut
trees did not conclusively disclose that the lands had been actively and regularly, not merely casually or
occasionally, cultivated and maintained.
The respondent's claim of ownership on the basis of the tax declarations alone did not also suffice. In
Cequeña v. Bolante,35 the Court has pointed out that only when tax declarations were coupled with
proof of actual possession of the property could they become the basis of a claim of ownership.36
Indeed, in the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes did not prove ownership.37 It is well-settled that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
possession or ownership, and their submission will not lend support in proving the nature of the
possession required by the law.
In sum, the respondent did not prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous,
exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners. Hence, his
application for original land registration fails.WHEREFORE, the Court; DISMISSES the application for
land registration of the respondent;
HEIRS OF RAFAEL GOZO REPRESENTED BYCASTILLO GOZO AND RAFAEL GOZO, JR. v.
PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTHDAY ADVENTIST CHURCH
(PUMCO), SOUTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF SDA (SPUMCO) AND DAY ADVENTIST
CHURCH AT SIMPAK, LALA, LANAODEL NORTE REPRESENTED BY BETTY PEREZ G.R.No.
195990, August 05, 2015
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Spouses Gozo. The respondents claim that they own a 5,000
square-meter portion of the property. The assertion is based on the 28 February 1937 Deed of Donation
in favor of respondent Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist (PUMCO-
SDA).On the date the Deed of Donation is executed in 1937, the Spouses Gozo were not the registered
owners of the property yet although they were the lawful possessors thereof. The land in question was
part of the inalienable public domain
ISSUE: WON the donation is valid.
RULING: No. When the Deed of Donation was executed by the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937,
the subject property was part of the inalienable public domain. It was only almost after two decades
later or on 5 October 1953 that the State ceded its right over the land in favor of the Spouses Gozo by
granting their patent application and issuing an original certi±cate of title in their favor. Prior to such
conferment of title, the Spouses Gozo possessed no right to dispose of the land which, by all intents
and purposes, belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land
or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, all
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated
to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public domain. As already well-settled in
jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show
that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order,
an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the land applied for is
alienable and disposable
On the other hand, Homestead over alienable and disposable public agricultural land is granted after
compliance by an applicant with the conditions and requirements laid down under Title II, Chapter IV.
However these reuirements has not been fulfilled. It is clear under the law that before compliance with
the foregoing conditions and requirements the applicant has no right over the land subject of the patent
and therefore cannot dispose the same even if such disposal was made gratuitously. It is an established
principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet.29 It is true that
gratuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing or a right but the term right must be understood in
a "proprietary" sense over which the possessor has jus disponendi.30 This is because in true donations
there results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his assets.
The lack of respondents' right over the property was confirmed when the Spouses Gozo had the entire
property, including the portion occupied by the church, surveyed and patented, and covered by their
homestead patent. Further, after a certificate of title was issued under their names, the Spouses Gozo
did not effect the annotation thereon of the supposed donation. Registration is the operative act that
gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.37 Indeed it has been ruled that where there
was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon
its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the
Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory.39 The public shall then be denied
of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act.40
Just as significantly, the homestead application of the Spouses Gozo over the entire area of the
property including that occupied by respondents and the issuance in their favor of the corresponding
title without any complaint or objection from the respondents, remove the case of the petitioners from
the operation of the doctrine of laches.
And, further than the issuance of an original title, the entire property was made subject of an
extrajudicial partition of the property by the Gozo heirs resulting in the issuance of TCTs in their names
in 1954. Again, in no instance during the partition did the respondents make known their claim over the
property.
Clearly from the facts, the petitioners asserted their rights repeatedly; it was the respondents who kept
silent all throughout about the supposed donee's rights. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
LA TONDEÑA, INC., v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 194617, August 05, 2015
La Tonde 164a, Inc. (La Tondeña) applied for registration of a 14,286- square-meter parcel of land, with
La Tondeña alleging acquisition and possession even before the Second Wor1d War. It argues the
inadmissibility of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office's (DENR-CENRO) Report on the land's classification as alienable and
disposable only on January 21, 1987 as this Report was not formally offered as evidence before the trial
court.
This case involves an application of Section 14(1) of Property Registration Decree in relation to Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, on the requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
On September 28, 2004, La Tondeña, through its Vice President Rosendo A. Bautista,8 filed an
Application9 for the registration of a 14,286- square-meter parcel of land in Central West, Bauang, La
Union.
La Tondeña alleged obtaining title or ownership by purchase from one Pablo Rimorin and attached the
following documents with its application: "(a) original tracing plan together with its print copies; (b)
technical description of the land; (c) certification, in lieu of lost Surveyor's Certificate for registration; (d)
certificate of tax assessment from 1948 up to the present; (e) copy of Tax Declaration No. 27726; and
(f) copy of the Secretary's Certificate authorizing Rosendo A. Bautista.
DENR-CENRO Land Investigator Wilfredo Valera submitted a Report dated May 31, 2005 to the trial
court, stating that the land was declared alienable and disposable only on January 21, 1987.20 The trial
court summarized the Report's contents in its Decision:
In the investigation report submitted by Special Investigator Wilfreda B. Valera of the DENR, CENRO,
San Fernando City, La Union, the land is covered by Survey Plan No. AP-01-004436 approved by the
Regional Land District/Land Management Bureau, Region I, pursuant to P.D. No. 239 dated September
1973; that it consists of 14,286 square meters and is located in Brgy. Central West, Bauang, La Union;
that the entire area is within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project No. 9, LC No.
3330 and released as well as certified as such on January 21, 1987; that this parcel of land is not within
any civil or military reservations, and is outside of any forest zone and watershed reservations.
La Tondeña alleged that this Report was not presented and formally offered during the proceedings,
and it only learned of its existence during appeal.
The Municipal Trial Court, in its Decision dated December 15, 2005, approved La Tondeña's
application for registration
The Republic of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal24 before the Court of Appeals alleging that the
land cannot be the subject matter of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 that requires possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Assuming the land was only reclassified on January 21, 1987, La Tondeña argues that it acquired a
vested right over the land under the 1935 Constitution that allows a private corporation to acquire
alienable and disposable land of public domain:
ISSUE: 1. WON petitioner La Tondeña, Inc. complied with all the requirements for land registration
under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, in relation to Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529;
2. WON petitioner La Tondeña, Inc. acquired a vested right under the 1935 Constitution that allows a
private corporation to acquire alienable and disposable land of public domain; and
RULING: NO. Commonwealth Act No. 141 known as The Public Land Act covers matters such as "what
lands are open to disposition or concession[.]"53 Section 48(b), as amended, governs judicial
confirmation of imperfect title
SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 known as the Property
All conflicting claims of ownership and interest in the land subject of the application shall be determined
by the court. If the court, after considering the evidence and the reports of the Commissioner of Land
Registration and the Director of Lands, finds that the applicant or the oppositor has sufficient title proper
for registration, judgment shall be rendered confirming the title of the applicant, or the oppositor, to the
land or portions thereof. The parties' arguments on the admissibility of the Report dated May 31, 2005
as evidence on when the land was classified as alienable and disposable are mooted by this court's
ruling in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic.59redarclaw
Heirs of Mario Malabanan clarified that the June 12, 1945 reckoning point refers to date of possession
and not to date of land classification as alienable and disposable.
This court held that "the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant's possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioner filed the application for registration on September 28, 2004. All dates claimed as dates of
classification of the land as alienable and disposable-August 12, 1934 as stated in the survey plan
notation that petitioner relies upon; January 21, 1987 as stated in the Report dated May 31, 2005 that
petitioner argues to be inadmissible; and March 5, 1930 as stated in the "Plan of Private Land as
Surveyed for Pablo Rimorin" that petitioner would like to present as additional evidence if the court
remands the case-were all prior to the September 28, 2004 application date, in compliance with the
Heirs of Mario Malabanan ruling.
2. No. Petitioner's vested-right argument based on the 1935 Constitution that allows a private
corporation to acquire alienable and disposable land of public domain62 must also fail.
Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations can still acquire public agricultural lands within the
limited area prescribed.
Petitioner has not shown any proof of its purchase of the land, alleging that all records of this
transaction were burned.68 Without evidence on the exact acquisition date, or the character of its
predecessor's occupation or possession of the land,69 no proof exists that the property was already
private land at the time of petitioner's acquisition.
Survey notations are not considered substantive evidence of the land's classification as alienable and
disposable.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Petitioner's contention-that it acquired a vested right over the land in 1972 since Republic Act No. 1942
was enacted on June 22, 1957 shortened the required possession to 30 years, thus, until 1972 or prior
to the 1973 Constitution and Presidential Decree No. 1073, the required possession for judicial
confirmation is at least 30 years or at least from 194271-also fails to convince.
The 30-year-period rule in Republic Act No. 1942 was repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073 in
1977, thus, only applications for registration filed prior to 1977 may invoke Republic Act No. 1942.72
Since petitioner only filed for registration on September 28, 2004, the June 12, 1945 reckoning date
under Presidential Decree No. 1073 applies.
NOVAI VS REPUBLIC GR 1771168 AUGUST 3, 2015
TCT was issued in NOVAI's name, covers a 475,009 square-meter parcel of land (the
property)6 situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) in Taguig,
Metro Manila.
The property previously formed part of a larger 15,812,684 square-meter parcel of land situated at the
former Fort William McKinley, Rizal, which was covered by TCT No. 61524 issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 4237 "reserving for military
purposes certain parcels of the public domain situated in the municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, province of Rizal, and Pasay City," which included the 15,812,684 square-meter parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 61524.
On September 29, 1965, then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 4618 which
excluded from Fort McKinley "a certain portion of land embraced therein, situated in the municipalities of
Taguig and Parañaque, Province of Rizal, and Pasay City," with an area of 2,455,310 square meters,
and declared the excluded area as "AFP Officers' Village" to be disposed of under the provisions of
Republic Act Nos. 2749 and 730.10cralawrednad
Barely a month after, or on October 25, 1965, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation No.
47811"reserving for the veterans rehabilitation, medicare and training center site purposes" an area of
537,520 square meters of the land previously declared as AFP Officers' Village under Proclamation No.
461, and placed the reserved area under the administration of the Veterans Federation of the
Philippines (VFP).
The property is within the 537,520 square-meter parcel of land reserved in VFP's favor.
On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Sale 12between the Republic of
the Philippines, through former Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., (Dir.
Palad) and petitioner NOVAI. The deed of sale was subsequently registered and from which TCT
No. T-15387 was issued in NOVAI's name.
In 1993, the Republic sought to cancel NOVAFs title based on the following grounds: (a) the land
covered by NOVAFs title is part of a military reservation; (b) the deed of sale conveying the property to
NOVAI, which became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15387, is fictitious; (c) the LMB has no
records of any application made by NOVAI for the purchase of the property, and of the NOVAFs alleged
payment of P14,250,270.00 for the property; and (d) the presidential proclamation, i.e., Proclamation
No. 2487, claimed to have been issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino in 1991 that authorized
the transfer and titling of the property to NOVAI, is fictitious.
In its answer (which was later amended) to the Republic's complaint, NOVAI counter-argued that the
property was no longer part of the public dominion, as the land had long been segregated from the
military reservation pursuant to Proclamation No. 461.
ISSUE: WON the property in question was part of the FBMR, and hence, inalienable;
RULING: YES. The property is non-disposable land of the public domain reserved for public or quasi-
public use or purpose. Court agree with the CA that the property remains a part of the public domain
that could not have been validly disposed of in NOVAI's favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of
proving that the property was withdrawn from the intended public or quasi-public use or purpose.
The classification and disposition of lands of the public domain are governed by Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, the country's primary law on the matter.
Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, from time to
time, classifylands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands,
and transfer these lands from one class to another for purposes of their administration and disposition.
Under Section 7 of C.A. No. 141, the President may, from time to time, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and for purposes of the administration and disposition
of alienable and disposable public lands, declare what lands are open to disposition or concession
under the Acts' provisions.33cralawrednad

Section 8 of C.A. No. 141 sets out the public lands open to disposition or concession and the
requirement that they have been officially delimited and classified, and when practicable, surveyed.
Section 8 excludes (by implication) from disposition or concession, public lands which have been
reserved for public or quasi-public uses; appropriated by the Government; or in any manner have
become private property, or those on which a private right authorized and recognized by the Act or any
other valid law may be claimed. Further, Section 8 authorizes the President to suspend the concession
or disposition of lands previously declared open to disposition, until again declared open to disposition
by his proclamation or by act of Congress.
Lands of the public domain classified as alienable and disposable are further classified, under Section 9
of C.A. No. 141, according to their use or purpose into: (1) agricultural; (2) residential, commercial,
industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (3) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(4) reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses. Section 9 also authorizes the
President to make the classifications and, at any time, transfer lands from one class to another.
Section 83 of C.A. No. 141 defines public domain lands classified as reservations for public and
quasi-public uses as "any tract or tracts of land of the public domain" which the President, by
proclamation and upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
may designate "as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, or
of the inhabitants thereof or "for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires
it."34 Under Section 88 of the same Act, these "reserved tract or tracts of lands shall be non-
alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease or other disposition until
again declared alienable under the provisions of [CA No. 141] or by proclamation of the
President."
As these provisions operate, the President may classify lands of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, mineral or timber land, and transfer such lands from one class to another at any time.
Within the class of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the President may further
classify public domain lands, according to the use or purpose to which they are destined, as agricultural:
residential, commercial, industrial, etc.; educational, charitable, etc.; and reservations for townsites and
for public and quasi-public uses; and, he may transfer such lands from one class to the other at any
time.
Thus, the President may, for example, transfer a certain parcel of land from its classification as
agricultural (under Section 9 [a]), to residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar purposes (under
Section 9 [b]) and declare it available for disposition under any of the modes of disposition of alienable
and disposable public lands available under C.A. No. 141, as amended.
Once these parcels of lands are actually acquired by private persons, either by sale, grant, or other
modes of disposition, they are removed from the mass of land of the public domain and become, by
operation of law, their private property.
With particular regard, however, to parcels of land classified as reservations for public and quasi-public
uses (under Section 9 [d]), when the President transfers them to the class of .alienable and disposable
public domain lands destined for residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar purposes (under
Section 9 [b]), or some other class under Section 9, these reserved public domain lands become
available for disposition under any of the available modes of disposition under C.A. No. 141, as
provided above. Once these re-classified lands (to residential purposes from reservation for public and
quasi-public uses) are actually acquired by private persons, they become private property.
In the meantime, however, and until the parcels of land are actually granted to, acquired, or purchased
by private persons, they remain lands of the public domain which the President, under Section 9 of C.A.
No. 141, may classify again as reservations for public and quasi-public uses. The President may also,
under Section 8 of C.A. No. 141, suspend their concession or disposition.
If these parcels of land are re-classified as reservations before they are actually acquired by private
persons, or if the President suspends their concession or disposition, they shall not be subject to
occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared open for disposition by
proclamation of the President pursuant to Section 88 in relation with Section 8 of C.A. No. 141.
Thus, in a limited sense, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses under
Section 9 (d) of C.A. No. 141 are still non-alienable and non-disposable, even though they are, by the
general classification under Section 6, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. By specific
declaration under Section 88, in relation with Section 8, these lands classified as reservations are non-
alienable and non-disposable.
In short, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses: (1) are non-alienable
and non-disposable in view of Section 88 (in relation with Section 8) of CA No. 141 specifically declaring
them as non-alienable and not subject to disposition; and (2) they remain public domain lands until they
are actually disposed of in favor of private persons.
Hence, the court find - based on the facts, the law, and jurisprudence - that the property, at the time of
the sale, was a reserved public domain land. Its sale, therefore, and the corresponding title issued in
favor of petitioner NOVAI, is void.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEFINO O. ALORA and OSCAR O. ALORA, G.R. No.
210341 July 1, 2015
On 6 May 1969, spouses Pedro and Rafaela Alora sold a parcel of land with an area of 12, 710 square
meters, located in Barangay San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna to their sons Josefino 0. Alora and Oscar
0. Alora (respondents) for ₱5,000.00. 2The parties to the sale executed a Deed of Conveyance dated.
On 6 June 2010, respondents filed a verified application for registration of title before the RTC. Oscar,
who was in the United States, authorized his brother Josefino to represent him in the proceedings,
under a Special Power of Attorney dated 26 November 2010.
In the application, respondents claimed that they purchased the parcel of land, and that they had no
knowledge of any mortgage or encumbrance or any person having any interest over the same
property. 4 they further claimed that they had been planting crops on the parcel of land from 1969 to
2010.
The approved plan showed six lots which respondents in tended to develop as a commercial property. 5
The respondents further claimed that they paid all taxes on the property and registered the Deed of
Conveyance with the Registry of Deeds and Assessor’s Office, and had traced back the tax
declarations of their predecessors-in-interest from 1935. The parcel of land originally belonged to
Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and was transferred to Pedro Salandanan. Subsequently, Salandanan
conveyed the property to Pedro Alora, respondents’ father.
In order to prove that the parcel of land was disposable and alienable, respondents submitted the
evidence such as the Certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) which stated that the
parcel of land is part of "Alienable and Disposable (A & D) land and a Certified copy of the polyester film
copy (SEPIA) of approved Plan Psu-119876 dated 20 April 1949.
On the otherhand, Respondents were also able to present the following documents such as the
Certified photocopies of Tax Declaration ; Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property executed by Colegio de
San Jose, Inc. in favor of Pedro Salandanan and N.V. Sinclair; and Certified copy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Pedro Salandanan in favor of Pedro Alora
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. It stated that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State. Thus, the applicant bears the burden of proving "through
incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable based on a
positive act of the government."17
The RTC also cited Sections 14 and 48 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 which provide that an
application for land registration must fulfill three requisites:
(1) The land is alienable public land;
(2) The applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and
(3) the applicant’s possession must be under a bona fide claim of ownership. 18
The RTC held that while Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc .19 clearly stated that "the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records," the applicable doctrine is that in
Republic v. Serrano :
The RTC also held that the applicants had satisfactorily shown that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, adverse, and notorious pos session of the property
under a bona fide claim of ownership for the period required by the Property Registration Decree. 22
ISSUE:
WON the RTC is correct in ruling that applicants had satisfactorily shown that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, adverse, and notorious possession of
the property under a bona fide claim of ownership for the period required by the Property Registration
Decree
RULING: YES. To reiterate, under Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree:
Section 14. Who May Apply — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, applicants for registration must prove the following:(1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
In order to prove that the parcel of land is part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain, respondents rely on the certification issued by the CENRO. The issue is whether this is
sufficient evidence to show that the subject parcel of land falls within the disposable and alienable lands
of the public domain.
Petitioner claims that the CA and the RTC should have applied our ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc., which was promulgated on 26 June 2008.1âwphi1 In that case, we held that applicants
for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. If this standard were to be
applied in the instant case, the CA decision should be overturned because respondents failed to
present a certified classification from the DENR Secretary. Petitioner argues that the standard in
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. has been applied in more recent decisions of this Court.
The CA, however, did not follow the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. Instead, it followed
Republic v. Serrano (decided on 24 February 2010) and Republic v. Vega (decided on 17 January
2011). In Republic v. Serrano, we allowed the approval of a land registration application even without
the submission of the certification from the DENR Secretary. As this ruling presented an apparent
contradiction with our earlier pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we sought to
harmonize our previous rulings in Republic v. Vega. We then said that the applications for land
registration may be granted even without the DENR Secretary’s certification provided that the
application was currently pending at the time Republic v. Vega was promulgated. Since respondents’
application was pending before the RTC at the time Republic v. Vega was promulgated, the CA ruled in
favor of the respondents, despite the lack of certification from the DENR Secretary.
Admittedly, we declared in Republic v. Vega that trial courts may grant applications for registration
despite the absence of a certification from the DENR Secretary. It should be emphasized, however, that
Republic v. Vega applies on a pro hac vice basis only. After Republic v. Vega, we pointed out in
Republic v. San Mateo 27 that:
In Vega, the Court was mindful of the fact that the trial court rendered its decision on November 13,
2003, way before the rule on strict compliance was laid down in T.A.N Properties on June 26, 2008.
Thus, the trial court was merely applying the rule prevailing at the time, which was substantial
compliance. Thus, even if the case reached the Supreme Court after the promulgation of T.A.N
Properties, the Court allowed the application of substantial compliance, because there was no
opportunity for the registrant to comply with the Court's ruling in T.A.N Properties, the trial court and the
CA already having decided the case prior to the promulgation of T.A.N Properties.
In the case here, however, the RTC Decision was only handed down on November 23, 2010, when the
rule on strict compliance was already in effect. Thus, there was ample opportunity for the respondents
to comply with the new rule, and present before the RTC evidence of the DENR Secretary's approval of
the DENR-South CENRO Certification. This, they failed to do.
In the instant case, the ruling in Republic v. San Mateo, the rule requiring certification from the DENR
Secretary should be applied. It is important to emphasize that the more recent case of Republic v.
Spouses Castuera,28 decided on 14 January 2015, applied the rule in Republic v. T.A.N Properties, Inc.
without any qualification.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
CASES IN WILLS AND SUCCESSION:
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF TUGUEGARAO v. FLORENTINA PRUDENCIO, NOW
DECEASED, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY: EXEQUIEL, LORENZO, PRIMITIVO,
MARCELINO, JULIANA, ALFREDO AND ROSARIO, ALL SURNAMED DOMINGO; AVELINA
PRUDENCIO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND VICTORIANO DIMAYA; ERNESTO PENALBER* AND
RODRIGO TALANG; SPOUSES ISIDRO CEPEDA AND SALVACION DIVINI, NOW DECEASED,
SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY: MARCIAL, PEDRO AND LINA, ALL SURNAMED
CEPEDA, G.R. No. 187942, September 07, 2016
Felipe Prudencio (Felipe) married twice during his lifetime. With his first wife, Elena Antonio (Elena), he
begot five (5) children, namely: Valentina, Eusebia, Paula, Florentina and Avelina. With his second wife,
Teodora Abad (Teodora), he had two (2) children namely: Felipe Prudencio, Jr. (Prudencio, Jr.) and
Leonora.5
During the marriage of Felipe and Elena, they acquired a 13.0476 hectares (or 130,476 sq. m.) parcel of
land located at Sitio Abbot, Barrio Imurung, Baggao, Cagayan (Cagayan lot), covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1343.6 When Elena died, Felipe and their children became co-owners of the
property.
Felipe then died intestate during his second marriage. Upon his death, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and
Leonora executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of the late Felipe with Waiver of
Rights in favor of Teodora (Extra-Judicial Partition). While the Extra-Judicial Partition acknowledged that
the Cagayan lot was acquired during the marriage of Felipe and Elena, it stated that Felipe and Elena
did not have any children who could inherit the property; hence, Teodora and her children with Felipe
are the only living heirs by operation of law.7 The Extra-Judicial Partition also provided that Prudencio,
Jr. and Leonora waived their rights over the Cagayan lot in favor of their mother Teodora. 8 It was
published in the Daily Mirror on October 22 and 29, 1969 and November 5, 1969. 9 Accordingly, title to
the Cagayan lot was transferred to Teodora's name under TCT No. 14306.10
On May 16, 1972, Teodora sold the Cagayan lot to respondents Spouses Isidro Cepeda and Salvacion
Divini (Spouses Cepeda). TCT No. 14306 was therefore cancelled, and TCT No. 184375 was issued in
favor of Spouses Cepeda.11
On August 25, 1972, Spouses Cepeda sold the Cagayan lot to petitioner for P16,500.00. 12 Thereafter,
petitioner was issued TCT No. T-20084.13
On September 15, 1972, respondents-appellees filed a Complaint for Partition with
Reconveyance14against petitioner, Spouses Cepeda and Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora before
the RTC. They alleged that they are the children and grandchildren 15 of Felipe by his first marriage.
They asserted that upon the death of Elena, they became the owners of Elena's conjugal share on the
Cagayan lot, while the other undivided half remained with Felipe.16 Upon the death of Felipe,
respondents-appellees then became owners as well of Felipe's conjugal share in the property, together
with Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora.
Respondents-appellees posited that they were fraudulently deprived of their rightful shares in the estate
of Felipe and Elena when the Extra-Judicial Partition declared Teodora as the sole owner of the
Cagayan lot.18 Thus, they prayed that they be declared the owners pro indiviso of the undivided portion
of 10.2512 hectares of the Cagayan lot, and that this portion be reconveyed to them. They also sought
payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 19
Petitioner filed an Answer with Cross Claim.20 It countered that Spouses Cepeda were in possession of
the Cagayan lot at the time they offered it for sale. It denied knowledge of the existence of any defect
over Spouses Cepeda's title.21 Petitioner stated that in fact, Atty. Pedro R. Perez Jr. (petitioner's
lawyer), verified the title and ownership of Spouses Cepeda before it purchased the Cagayan
lot.22 Thus, it averred that it was an innocent purchaser for value. Nevertheless, petitioner insisted that
Spouses Cepeda should be held liable for the value of the 10.2562 hectares of the Cagayan lot plus
interest and damages, or for the rescission of the sale with reimbursement of the purchase price plus
interest and damages,23 in case the claim for reconveyance of respondents-appellees is successful. It
contended that the Deed of Sale between petitioner and Spouses Cepeda expressly stated that the
latter shall answer for any claim of any other possible heir who might be deprived of their lawful
participation in the estate of the original registered owner. 24
Spouses Cepeda maintained that their title over the Cagayan lot was clean and that they had no
knowledge that other persons had interest on it because Teodora's title over the property was
clean.25cralawredThey asserted that like petitioner, they were purchasers for value and in good faith.
Therefore, petitioner has no cause of action against them.26
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents-appellees declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial Partition of the
Estate of Felipe Prudencio with Waiver of Rights as null and void; Declaring that the Sale with respect
to the 99,924.6 sq. meters conveyed by Teodora Abad to defendants Isidro Cepeda and Salvacion
Divini and later to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao is declared null and void.
The RTC held that it was impossible for Teodora and her children to not know that Felipe had
children/heirs by his first marriage. It observed that the real property taxes on the Cagayan lot, from
1963 to 1968, were actually paid by respondent-appellee Ernesto Penalber, the grandson of Felipe by
her daughter Valentina.29 Therefore, the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition was done in bad faith.
In excluding the children of Felipe with Elena, the partition is invalid and not binding upon them. 30
The RTC therefore ruled that Teodora can only sell 33,550 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot to Spouses
Cepeda. In turn, Spouses Cepeda can only sell that much to petitioner, for a person cannot give what
he does not own.31 Hence, the sale of the Cagayan lot to Spouses Cepeda and subsequently to
petitioner is valid only as to the 33,550 sq. m. share of Teodora. The sale of the remaining 99,924.6 sq.
m., which properly belongs to the respondents-appellees, was void. Petitioner was ordered to reconvey
99,924.6 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot to respondents-appellees.32
Both petitioner and respondents-appellees appealed to the CA. However, respondents-appellees'
appeal was dismissed outright for failure to file an appellant's brief.33
ISSUE:
1. WON the issued Extra Judicial Partition is void.
2. WON sale of Teodora to Spouses Cepeda are void
the excluded heirs could recover what is rightfully theirs from persons who are innocent purchasers for
value.
RULING: 1. Yes. In this case, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora declared in the Extra-Judicial
Partition that they are the only living heirs of Felipe by operation of law. They claimed that Felipe had no
child with his first wife Elena, in effect depriving respondents-appellees of their rightful shares in the
estate of their parents. They arrogated upon themselves not only the share of Felipe in the Cagayan lot
but also the shares belonging to respondents-appellees.
Considering that respondents-appellees have neither knowledge nor participation in the Extra-Judicial
Partition, the same is a total nullity. It is not binding upon them.
Thus, the Extra-Judicial Partition is void under Article 1409 (1) or those whose cause, object or purpose
is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. As a consequence, it has no
force and effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into and it cannot be validated either
by time or ratification.50
2. No. Sale is only valid insofar as the share of Teodora is concerned. The nullity of the Extra-Judicial
Partition does not automatically result in the nullity of the sale between (1) Teodora and Spouses
Cepeda, and that of (2) Spouses Cepeda and petitioner.
Respondents-appellees and Teodora (as the surviving heirs of Felipe) are co-owners of the Cagayan
lot. As such, they have full ownership and rights over their pro indiviso shares. Article 493 of the Civil
Code defines the rights of a co-owner, to wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Teodora may therefore sell her undivided interest in the Cagayan lot, and such disposition shall affect
only her pro indiviso share. When she sold the entire property to Spouses Cepeda, the latter legally and
validly purchased only the part belonging to Teodora. The sale did not include the shares of
respondents-appellees, who were not aware of, and did not give their consent to such sale. Likewise,
when Spouses Cepeda sold the entire Cagayan lot to petitioner, the spouses only transferred to
petitioner Teodora's pro indiviso share. Our ruling in Vda. De Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla51 is on
point:
Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 to Hilaria and Felipa without the
consent of her co-owner Agripina, the disposition affected only Carolina's pro indiviso share, and the
vendees, Hilaria and Felipa, acquired only what corresponds to Carolina's share. A co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without
the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-owner/seller
are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Accordingly, the deed of sale executed by Carolina in favor of Hilaria and Felipa was a valid
conveyance but only insofar as the share of Carolina in the co-ownership is concerned. As
Carolina's successors-in-interest to the property, Hilaria and Felipa could not acquire any superior right
in the property than what Carolina is entitled to or could transfer or alienate after partition.
In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are
the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of
the vendor as co-owner.52 (Emphasis supplied.)
Simply put, the sale of the Cagayan lot to Spouses Cepeda, then to petitioner is valid insofar as the
share of Teodora is concerned. In effect, petitioner merely holds the share of respondents-appellees
under an implied constructive trust.53 This is true though the TCTs covering the entire Cagayan lot were
issued in the name of Teodora, Spouses Cepeda and then petitioner, by virtue of the subsequent sales.
The issuance of a certificate of title could not vest upon them ownership of the entire property; neither
could it validate their purchase of the same which is null and void to the extent of the shares of the
respondents-appellees.54 Registration does not vest title, for it is merely the evidence of such title. Our
land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. 55
As it stands, petitioner which merely steps into the shoes of Teodora, and respondents-appellees are
now the pro indiviso co-owners of the property.
Partition of the Cagayan Lot
Notably, each co-owner has the right to ask for the partition of the property owned in common as no co-
owner may be compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely.56 Here, respondents-appellees prayed
for the partition and reconveyance of the Cagayan lot and their rightful shares, respectively.
Before the partition of the Cagayan lot among the surviving heirs, the conjugal share of the surviving
spouse shall first be deducted from the conjugal property of the spouses because the same does not
form part of the estate of the deceased spouse. Under Article 175 57 of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is dissolved upon the death of either spouse. It shall then be subject to inventory and
liquidation, the net remainder of which shall be divided equally between the husband and the wife. 58
Here, the Cagayan lot is the conjugal property of Elena and Felipe. Upon the former's death, one-half
(1/2) of the Cagayan lot automatically goes to the latter as his conjugal share. The remaining one-half
(1/2) forms part of the estate of Elena and shall be divided equally between Felipe and his four (4)
surviving children with Elena, in conformity with Article 996 59 of the Civil Code. Thus, Felipe shall
receive one-half (1/2) or 65,238 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot as his conjugal share and one-fifth (1/5) or
13,047.6 sq. m. of the same lot as heir of Elena. Simply put, Felipe is entitled to a total of 78,285.6 sq.
m. of the Cagayan lot. Meanwhile, respondents-appellees shall receive one-fifth (1/5) or 13,047.6 sq. m.
each.
When Felipe obtained a second marriage, his 78,285.6 sq. m. share was brought into his marriage with
Teodora, such that the same formed part of their conjugal partnership. Upon Felipe's death, Teodora
became entitled to one-half (1/2) of the 78,285.6 sq. m. or 39,142.8 sq. m. The remaining half will
compose the estate of Felipe, which will be divided equally among Teodora, Prudencio Jr., Leonora and
respondents-appellees—each of them receiving one-seventh (1/7) of 39,142.8 sq. m. Teodora then
shall receive 44,734.63 sq. m. This is further increased by the waiver of Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora of
their rights over the estate of Felipe, such that the aggregate share of Teodora will now be equivalent
to 55,918.29 sq. m.
Petitioner, whose title over the Cagayan lot is ultimately derived from Teodora, is therefore entitled only
to 55,918.29 sq. m. Thus, petitioner should return to respondents-appellees the 74,557.72 sq. m. of the
Cagayan lot which corresponds to respondents-appellees' rightful share as heirs of Felipe and Elena.
Petitioner is ORDERED to reconvey to respondents-appellees an area of 74,557.72 square meters as
their pro indiviso share in the Cagayan lot; while petitioner shall retain the remaining area of 55,918.29
square meters. Spouses Cepeda are ORDERED to return to petitioner the amount paid corresponding
to the 74,557.72 square meters share of respondents-appellees, with legal interest at the rate of
12% per annum to be computed from the time petitioner filed its Answer with Cross-Claim dated
October 14, 1972 with the RTC until June 30, 2013.
HEIRS OF JOSE MA. GEPUELA
vs. BERNITA MENEZ-ANDRES, ET AL., G.R. No. 173636
G.R. No. 173770 HERNITA MENEZ-ANDRES and NELIA MEÑEZ CAYETANO, represented by their
duly-appointed Attorney-In-Fact ANGELITO MEÑEZ, Petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF JOSE MA. GEPUELA, Respondents.
The controversy arose from the redemption made by the late Jose Ma. Gepuela (Gepuela), petitioner in
G.R. No. 173636, and transferee of an aliquot portion of the property covered by TCT No. 95524, of the
36/72 pro indiviso share of Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz (Basilia). Hernita Meñez-Andres and Nelia
Meñez-Cayetano (Hernita, et al.), petitioners in G.R. No. 173770, assailed the redemption on the
ground that Gepuela had no legal personality to make the redemption.
Basilia was the widow of Pedro Cruz, with whom she had five children, namely, Perfecto, Alberto, Luz,
Benita and Isagani. Basilia executed a Huling Habilin,4 where she named her daughter Benita’s children
Hernita, Nelia, Rosemarie, Angel and Gracita as voluntary heirs to ten percent (10%) of the free portion
of her estate. Basilia’s Huling Habilin was admitted into ante-mortem probate on March 1, 1957.5 Her
daughter Luz Cruz Salonga (Luz) was appointed Administratrix of Basilia’s estate on August 18, 1976.6
When Basilia died, she left behind considerable properties, including a 36/72 pro indiviso share in a
5,492 square meter property in San Juan, then province of Rizal.
Perfecto and Flavia sold their interests (14/72 pro indiviso share) in the property to Severino Etorma
(Etorma), who later on sold the same to Gepuela and one Antonio Cinco (Cinco). These transactions
were annotated on TCT No. 95524 as Entry Nos. 12640 and 73035, dated November 13, 1964 and
November 18, 1971, respectively.8 In 1978, Cinco sold his share to Gepuela.9 This was likewise
annotated in the title as Entry No. 3904 dated May 20, 1988.10Luz also disposed, by way of a Sale of
Rights with Mortgage, her 12/72 pro indiviso share in the property to Gepuela in another transaction
registered as Entry No. 8536 dated May 8, 1989 on TCT No. 95524. 11
On July 29, 1986, Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share was sold in a public auction to satisfy the judgment
in Civil Case No. 32824, entitled "Benita Me[ñ]ez v. Luz Cruz Salonga as Administratrix of the Estate of
Basilia Austria Vda. [d]e Cruz." Benita, as judgment creditor in the case, emerged as the highest
bidder.12
On May 14, 1987, Gepuela redeemed Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share from Benita by paying the
auction price of Four Hundred Seventy-Four Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Seven Pesos
(P474,977.00), inclusive of interest and other legal fees. 13 This was inscribed on the title as Entry No.
022 dated May 14, 1987. Accordingly, Basilia’s estate, through Administratrix Luz, executed a Deed of
Sale14 and Waiver of Redemption15 over the share, subject to the following conditions: 1) Gepuela
should obtain court approval of the sale; and 2) Gepuela should inform all heirs of the sale formally in
writing.
After the expiration of the periods to redeem, Gepuela filed an action to consolidate his ownership over
the 36/72 pro indiviso share he acquired by way of redemption from Basilia’s estate. This was docketed
as LRC Case No. R-3855 and assigned to Branch 166 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. The other
registered co-owners Isagani, Perfecto, Jr., Pedrito, and Vito (Isagani, et al.) opposed this action,
raising Gepuela’s lack of standing to redeem given that he is not a co-owner of Basilia’s one-half
portion. In a Decision16 dated December 6, 1989, the trial court granted Gepuela’s petition, declared him
the owner of Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 95524 and
ordered the issuance of a new certificate of title to reflect this change in ownership.17
Aggrieved, oppositors Isagani, Perfecto, Jr., Pedrito, Vito and Alberto appealed the trial court’s Decision
to the CA. CA, however, affirmed the trial court’s findings. The CA’s Decision in CA G.R. CV No.
25605 was not appealed and became final and executory on February 26, 1992. 19 TCT No. 5033-R
was issued that same year, reflecting Gepuela’s ownership of the 36/72 pro indiviso share previously
owned by Basilia.20
The proceedings covering Basilia’s estate were, per motion of her heirs, ordered closed on February 15,
1996.21The record also shows that Gepuela filed a case, docketed as SCA No. 302 with Branch 159 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for the partition of the property covered by TCT No. 5033-R.22 The
lower court rendered a decision ordering the partition of the property. TCT No. 5033-R was cancelled
and several titles were issued covering the respective shares of Gepuela, Isagani, Perfecto and Pedrito,
and Vito Cruz in the property.23
In the meantime, or on October 10, 1995, Basilia’s grandchildren Hernita and Nelia filed a Complaint for
Redemption and Consignation with Damages. In their complaint, Hernita and Nelia alleged, among
others, that: 1) Gepuela’s redemption was null and void as he (not being an heir, legatee/devisee, co-
owner or creditor) did not have the legal personality to redeem the share; 26and 2) Hernita and Nelia sent
notices to Gepuela informing him of their intent to recover their interest in Basilia’s 36/72 pro
indiviso share and to tender payment of the redemption price paid by him, plus interest, which Gepuela
refused.27
The Trial Court hereby renders judgment in favor of plaintiffs HERNITA ME[Ñ]EZ ANDRES, NELIA
ME[Ñ]EZ CAYETANO, ROSEMARIE ME[Ñ]EZ PRONSTROLLER declaring that:
1. [T]he redemption made by defendant GEPUELA of the 36/72 portion of the Estate of Basilia
Austria Vda. [d]e Cruz as covered previously by TCT No. 95524 and at present by TCT No.
5033-R is NULL AND VOID only insofar as to the shares of plaintiffs which corresponds to Six
Percent (6%) thereof;
 2. [P]laintiffs are allowed to consign with the Court the redemption price of that portion which is
their share of the 36/72 pro indiviso share of the Estate of Basilia Austria Vda. [d]e Cruz with
interest at Twelve Percent 12% per annum from the institution of this action until fully paid;
3. [U]pon payment of the redemption price, and finality of this Decision the Register of Deeds
of San Juan, Metro Manila is ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5033-R and to
issue another Transfer Certificate of Title reflecting therein the names of plaintiffs as owners of
the pro indiviso share corresponding to six percent (6%) of the 36/72 pro indiviso share of
defendant Jose Ma. Gepuela;
Both parties filed their respective appeals before the CA. The CA rejected both appeals and affirmed
the trial court’s Decision, with certain modifications. At the outset, the CA noted that the validity of
Gepuela’s redemption has already been settled in LRC Case No. R-3855 and affirmed by the CA
in CA G.R. CV No. 25605. Since the Decision in said case had already become final and executory per
entry of judgment dated February 26, 1992, the CA declared that Hernita, et al. are barred from
assailing it again under the principle of res judicata.33
Despite this, the CA still proceeded to resolve the case on the merits. Rejecting Hernita, et al.’s claim
that Gepuela had no personality to redeem Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share, the appellate court held
that Gepuela was not a stranger to, but rather a co-owner of, the entire communal property "x x x
because the two estates are not separate and distinct properties but actually constitute one and the
same property owned in community and covered by the same TCT No. 95524." 34 Since redemption
inures to the benefit of the other co-owners, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision insofar as it
nullified the redemption in proportion to Hernita, et al.’s respective shares.35
The CA thereafter recomputed the corresponding shares as follows: Hernita, Nelia, and Rosemarie,
with their siblings Angel and Granito, are instituted heirs entitled to ten percent (10%) of the free portion
of Basilia’s estate, equivalent to two and a half percent (2.5%) share in the property. They are likewise
entitled to the five percent (5%) share corresponding to the legitime of their deceased mother Benita, to
which they are entitled to, by right of representation, as the latter’s heirs. The dispositive portion of the
CA’s Decision dated January 31, 2005 thus reads:
G.R. No. 173636
The Heirs of Gepuela maintain that the CA erred in nullifying his redemption of the 36/72 pro
indiviso share of Basilia. They argue that:
(1) By issuing the assailed Decisions, the CA indirectly disturbed and altered the judgment
rendered in LRC Case. No. R-3855 which had long attained finality;45
(2) Even assuming arguendo that the redemption inured to the benefit of the other co-owners,
the latter should have timely opposed the action for consolidation of ownership or filed an
annulment of the resulting judgment to protect their interest;46
(3) There is nothing more for Hernita, et al. to inherit as the 36/72 share was sold at auction
and the estate failed to redeem the same within the period provided by law; 47
(4) The Mariano case cited by the CA is inapplicable as there is no community of interest (for
the redemption to inure to the benefit of all co-owners) Gepuela not being a co-owner of
the 36/72 share which was the subject of the execution sale;48
(5) Hernita et al. cannot feign ignorance of the sale in Gepuela’s favor as the same was duly
annotated in the title;49 and
(6) Interest should be reckoned not from the finality of decision but from the time the
redemption was made.50
G.R. No. 173770
Hernita et al., on the other hand, insist that Gepuela’s redemption is null and void for the following
reasons:
1) Benita Meñez, who purchased the property, was a co-owner thereof and under Article 1620,
when a co-owner purchases the property, no stranger may redeem the same;
2) Gepuela is a complete stranger who could not redeem;
3) The portions of the property purchased by Gepuela were in custodia legis by a probate court
and could not have been purchased without court approval;
4) Gepuela will lose nothing if he is not able to redeem, his act was nothing but an illegitimate
act of expansion;
5) Gepuela is conclusively estopped from claiming that he became a co-owner of the property
because he admitted otherwise. He claimed that he was a co-owner in the estate of Pedro
Cruz and not in the estate of Basilia;
6) Gepuela deceived the other heirs and co-owners by not informing the latter about the court
proceedings initiated by him; and
7) As instituted heirs of Basilia, Hernita et al. had every right to redeem the property for
themselves and their co-heirs.51
Hernita, et al. also challenge the jurisdiction of the CA claiming that since Gepuela did not present any
evidence in the trial court, he and his successors-in-interest can only raise pure questions of law, over
which the appellate court has no jurisdiction.52
ISSUE WON Hernita et al. could still redeem their pro indiviso share.
RULING: No. As instituted heirs in the "Huling Habilin" of Basilia Austria Vda. [d]e Cruz, it is
indubitable that the plaintiffs are co-owners of the 36/72 pro-indiviso share of the estate of said
decedent in the property formerly covered by [TCT] No. 95524 and now covered by [TCT] No. 5033-
R and they are legally entitled to redeem the same pursuant to Article 1620 of the Civil
Code[.]70 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Given their limited participation in the estate, this Court is at a loss as to how Hernita, et al. can be
considered indispensable parties for purposes of LRC Case No. R-3855, an action to consolidate
Gepuela’s title over the property covered by TCT No. 95524. The claim all the more fails to persuade
especially when one considers that the estate itself, through its Administratrix, and all the
other registered co-owners of aliquot portions of the property (namely, Isagani, Perfecto Jr., Pedrito,
Vito and Alberto Cruz) appear to have been properly notified of and, in fact, actively participated in, the
proceedings in LRC Case No. R-3855.
In sum, inasmuch as both LRC Case No. R-3855 and Civil Case No. 65327 are anchored on the same
cause of action, based on identical facts, and even claim the same reliefs, we hold that the latter case is
barred by the decision in the former case. The CA therefore erred when, after declaring that the
Decision in LRC Case No. R-3855 had become final, executory and unappealable, it still modified the
terms of the case and awarded Hernita, et al. with portions of the property allegedly corresponding to
their shares as instituted heirs of Basilia’s estate.
Hernita, et al. cannot claim a stake over a specific property of the decedent.
Even assuming that res judicata would not bar Civil Case No. 65327, Hernita, et al.’s claim of a right to
redeem Basilia’s disputed share would still not prosper.
First. As instituted heirs only to a part of the free portion of Basilia’s estate, Hernita, et al. are entitled to
receive their share of the same, if any, only after payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow and inheritance tax. 75 Otherwise stated, their share would be
dependent on whether anything is left of the estate after payment of all its obligations.
In this case, the disputed 36/72 pro indiviso share was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment
claim of a creditor (Benita) of the estate.1âwphi1 When it was redeemed by Gepuela, no further
redemption was made. Upon expiration of the periods to redeem, Gepuela became entitled, as a matter
of right, to the consolidation of the ownership of the share in his name. The share no longer formed part
of the estate which can theoretically be distributed to Hernita, et al. as Basilia's voluntary heirs.
Second, and more importantly, as voluntary heirs to the free portion, Hernita, et al. have no right to
claim any specific property of the estate, such as the contested 36/72 pro indiviso share in the property,
until after the estate had been settled and distributed in accordance with law.
MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE SANTIAGO
C. DIVINAGRACIA, v. CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA,
CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, AND MAUDE NOBLEZA, G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a 313-square meter parcel of land located at Iloilo City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12255 (subject land). 6 During his lifetime, he
contracted two marriages: (a) the first was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2) children,
namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and (b) the second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he had
seven (7) children, namely, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, 7 and
Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three (3) illegitimate children, namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and
Ricardo.8 Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and was survived by his children Felcon, Landelin,
Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord. Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased his father and was
survived by his wife, Maude, and children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.9
According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in representation of
his father, Mateo, Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo
sold their respective interests over the subject land to Santiago for a consideration of P447,695.66, as
embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale 10 dated November 22,
1989 (subject document),11 which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their
respective shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his husband, Cebeleo,
Sr., and their children).12 On December 22, 1989, the same parties executed a Supplemental
Contract13whereby the vendors-heirs and Santiago agreed that out of the aforesaid consideration, only
P109,807.93 will be paid up front, and that Santiago will only pay the remaining balance of P337,887.73
upon the partition of the subject land.14 However, Santiago was not able to have TCT No. T-12255
cancelled and the subject document registered because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal to
surrender the said title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition the
subject land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint15 dated January 3, 1990 for judicial partition and for
receivership.16
For their part, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude maintained that Santiago had no legal right to file an
action for judicial partition nor compel them to surrender TCT No. T-12255 because, inter alia: (a)
Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is a
conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar and, thus, only their legitimate issues may validly
inherit the same.17
The RTC ordered, among others, the partition of the subject land between Santiago on the one hand,
and Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. (i.e., Felcon, et al.) on the other hand and,
consequently, the cancellation of TCT No. T-12255 and the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate
certificate in favor of Santiago and the group of Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo,
Sr.19 The RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the subject
land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same. However, the RTC held that
Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share over the subject land, considering that Felcon
admitted the lack of authority to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo, Sr.’s share thereon.
The CA, on the otherhand set aside the RTC Rulings and, consequently, dismissed Santiago’s
complaint for judicial partition.25 It held that Felcon’s siblings, as well as Maude’s children, are
indispensable parties to the judicial partition of the subject land and, thus, their non-inclusion as
defendants in Santiago’s complaint would necessarily result in its dismissal. 26
Aggrieved, the heirs of Santiago27 moved for reconsideration28 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution29 dated April 6, 2011, hence, this petition instituted by herein petitioner, Ma. Elena R.
Divinagracia, as administratrix of Santiago’s estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Felcon’s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s
children are indispensable parties to Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition
RULING:The petition is partly meritorious. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected
by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute
necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court
which is effective, complete, or equitable.30 Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.31
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons
interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.:
SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. – A person having the right to compel the
partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and
joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such,
an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.32
In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate,
who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr.,
Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo.
However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules
on representation under the Civil Code,33 their respective interests shall be represented by their
children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord;
and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.34
The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant
– have vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties
in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards
Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-
representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint
impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 35 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives
to his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of
the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs of Conrado,
Sr. as evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-
heirs. Since his interest over the subject land is merely derived from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter
should first be determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who have
vested interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in Santiago’s complaint.
In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for judicial
partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties, but even as to those present.38 Therefore, the CA correctly set aside the
November 29, 2002 Decision and the April 4, 2003 Order of the RTC.
THEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 26, 2009 and
the Resolution dated April 6, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 80167, setting aside the
Decision dated November 29, 2002 and the Order dated April 4, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 19003, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
REMANDING the instant case to the court a quo, which is hereby DIRECTED to implead all
indispensable parties and, thereafter, PROCEED with the resolution of the case on the merits WITH
DISPATCH.
MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, and THE HEIRS OF EDWARD T.
MARCELO, NAMELY, KATHERINE J. MARCELO, ANNA MELINDA J. MARCELO REVILLA, and
JOHN STEVEN J. MARCELO vs JOSE T. MARCELO, JR.,
G.R. No. 209651 November 26, 2014
On 987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his four compulsory heirs: (1) Edward,
(2) George, (3) Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr.
Initially, petitioner Marcelo Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed a Petition for the
issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr. before the RTC, Branch 76, Quezon City
docketed as S.P. Proc. No. Q-88-1448. At first, Helen, along with her brother, Jose, Jr. separately
opposed MIMCO’s petition; the two prayed for their respective appointment as administrator. Edward
opposed Helen’s and Jose, Jr.’s respective petitions for issuance of Letters of Administration in their
favor and Edward himself prayed for his appointment as regular administrator. Ultimately, MIMCO,
George and Edward banded together: (1) opposed Helen’s and Jose, Jr.’s petitions, and (2) prayed for
Edward’s appointment as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
On 21 September 1989, pending issuance of letters of administration, the RTC appointed Helen and
Jose, Jr. as special administrators.
In an Order dated 13 December 1991, the RTC appointed Edward as regular administrator of Jose.
Questioning Edward’s appointment, Jose, Jr. filed successive oppugnant motions.
The question of who between Edwardand Jose, Jr. should administer their father’s estate reached us in
G.R. No. 123883 (Jose Marcelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals and Edward Marcelo): where in the court did
not find reversible error in the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 43674. We disposed of the
case via a Minute Resolution dated 22 May 1996,7ultimately affirming the RTC’s and the appellate
court’s separate rulings of Edward’s competence and better suited ability to actas regular administrator
of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Thereafter, Jose, Jr. persistently opposed Edward’s actions as administrator and his inventory of Jose,
Sr.’s estate. He filed anew serial motions which culminated in the following 23 June 2000 Order of the
RTC:
After a careful study of the arguments raised by the parties in support of their respective claims, the
Court finds that the motion filed by oppositor [Jose, Jr.] is not well-taken.
On 15 January 2001, Edward filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the Regular Administrator
[Edward]respectfully prays that the Liquidation, duly signed by all four (4) compulsory heirs, be
approved as the project of partition of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo Sr. 9 and moved for the approval of
the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose, Sr. as the project of partition of the Estate of Jose,
Sr.
On 16 February 2001, the RTC issued an Order approving the partition of Jose, Sr.’s estate as
proposed by Edward:
Finding said liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. to bear the conformity of all
the heirs of the decedent and considering further that the period for filing of money claims against the
subject estate had already lapsed, the Court resolves to approve said liquidation of Inventory as the
project ofpartition of the estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. Nonetheless, let the distribution of the estate of
Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. among his compulsory heirs in accordance with the approved Liquidation of the
Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. be deferred until herein regular administrator Edward T.
Marcelo has submitted to the Court proof of payment of estate taxes of the subject estate. 11
On 14 September 2001, the RTC archived the intestate proceedings, S.P. Proc. No. Q-88-1448,
pending Edward’s submission of proof of payment of estate taxes as directed in the 16 February 2001
Order.12
On 3 July 2009, Edward died,13 ushering in the antecedents to the present controversy. Wasting no
time, Jose, Jr. moved to revive the intestate proceedings involving his father’s estate, S.P. Proc. No. Q-
88-1448, and moved for his appointment as new regular administrator thereof.
Petitioners MIMCO and heirs of Edward, joined by George, opposed Jose, Jr.’s motion and nominated
Atty. Henry Reyes as regular administrator in Edward’s stead.
On 6 January 2010, the RTC issued the assailed Order, now appointing Jose, Jr. as regular
administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate:
Contrary to the assertion of petitioners, there is no showing that the [c]ourt has previously declared
oppositor-movant [Jose, Jr.] unfit to be appointed as an administrator.
The estate is left with no one who will administer the estate.
In the sound judgment of the [c]ourt, oppositor-movant [Jose, Jr.], a legitimate child of the decedent,
appears to occupy higher interest than Atty. Henry A. Reyes in administering the subject estate.
Oppositor Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. is appointed as the new regular administrator of the estate of Jose T.
Marcelo, Sr.
ISSUE: WON there is still a necessity to appoint a regular administrator at this liquidation, partition and
distribution stage of the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate.
RULING: Yes. COurt agree with the lower courts that the appointment of a regular administrator is still
necessary, we disagree with the appointment of Jose, Jr. as new regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s
estate.
Specifically, petitioners point out that there is no existing or unliquidated debt against the estate of Jose,
Sr, the settlement thereof being already at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage. Further on
that, the liquidation and proposed partition had long been approved by the probate court.
We are not convinced. The settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and complete albeit it is at
the liquidation, partition and distribution stage.
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides for the Distribution and Partition of the Estate. The rule provides
in pertinent part:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. –
No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum tobe fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
SEC. 3. By whom expenses of partition paid. – If at the time of the distribution the executor or
administrator has retained sufficient effects in his hands which may lawfully be applied for the expenses
of partition of the properties distributed, such expenses of partition may be paid by such executor or
administrator when it appears equitable to the court and not inconsistent with the intention of the
testator; otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to their respective shares or interest in
the premises, and the apportionment shall be settled and allowed by the court, and, if any person
interested in the partition does not pay his proportion or share, the court may issue an execution in the
name of the executor or administrator against the party not paying for the sum assessed.
In this case, we observe that the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate, approved by the RTC in its
Order dated 16 February 2001, is not yet in effect and complete. We further note that there has been no
manifestation forthcoming from any of the heirs, or the parties in this case, regarding the completion of
the proposed liquidation and partition of the estate. In fact, as all parties are definitely aware, the RTC
archived the intestate proceedings pending the payment of estate taxes.
There has been no showing from either of the parties that the receivables of, and claims against, Jose,
Sr.’s estate has been actually liquidated, much less, if an offsetting occurred with the companies listed
in the inventory on one hand, and Jose, Sr.’s estate, on the other. Although the Marcelo family, in
particular the compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr., hold equity in the corporations mentioned in the inventory,
considering that the corporations are family owned by the Marcelos’, these corporations are different
juridical persons with separate and distinct personalities from the Marcelo patriarch, the decedent, Jose,
Sr.18
More importantly, the liquidation scheme appears yet to be effected, the actual partition of the estate,
where each heir separately holds his share in the estate as that which already belongs to him, remains
intangible and the ultimate distribution to the heirs still held in abeyance pending payment of estate
taxes.19
Significantly, even the Liquidation of the Inventory of Jose, Sr.’s estate states that the valuation amount
of the shares of stock as listed therein is based on par value, which may have varied given the passage
of time. The same document delivers a very important notation that the equal distribution of the listed
assets of the estate will depend on the actual selling price of these assets less taxes and other
deductions:
Above assets will be distributed equally by the four (4) [compulsory heirs] depending if these will be sold
or not. It is very important to note that equal distribution will be based on actual selling price minus taxes
and other deduction if any, on the above inventories of estate properties. 20 To date, more than a decade
has passed since the intestate proceedings were archived, thus, affecting the value of the estate’s
assets.
From all of the foregoing, it is apparent that the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate still
requires a regular administrator to finally settle the estate and distribute remaining assets to the heirs of
the decedent.
Moreover, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that in all of Jose, Jr.’s pleadings opposing Edward’s
appointment as regular administrator, he simultaneously prayed for his appointment as regular
administrator of their father’s estate. In short, he proffered his competence and qualification to be
appointed as regular administrator as a legal issue for resolution of the courts. Essentially, Jose, Jr. was
weighed and found wanting by the RTC, the appellate court, and this Court.
The [c]ourt’s choice as to who among the [compulsory heirs] will be appointed regular administrator of
the estate of Jose, Sr. is now limited to Edward and Jose, Jr. in view of the withdrawal of Helen T.
Marcelo.
It is this [c]ourt’s observation that the continuous internal wranglings between the heirs would achieve
nothing. In the meantime, the estate of the late Jose, Marcelo, Sr. isdragged further into the quagmire of
dissipation and loss. It would not be amiss to state that the animosity among the interested [petitioners
therein], Edward and Jose, Jr. have considerably increased since the filing of their respective petitions,
but the [c]ourt on the basis of their qualifications will have to decide whom to appoint as regular
administrator. Willingness to act and/or serve as regular administrator is no longer in issue here as both
applicants are undoubtedly willing to serve as such. However, after subjecting the evidence, both
testimonial and documentary to careful judicial study, this [c]ourt now resolves as it hereby resolves to
appoint Edward T. Marcelo as regular administrator of the estate of the late Jose, Sr.
The documents presented by Jose, Jr. purporting to show that the deceased had other assets other
than those enumerated in the original petition filed by MIMCO and which should have been included in
the estate cannot be accorded any weight or credence by this [c]ourt, as the individual who supposedly
prepared the document was never identified and the sources of information notdisclosed. Upon the
other hand, the petition filed by MIMCO was based on the Financial Statements prepared by an
independent auditor, A. F. Pablo and Associates. On the basis of the information provided by MIMCO in
the original petition, this [c]ourt can determine the probable value and nature of the estate of the
deceased Jose P. Marcelo, Sr.
There is no argument that both Edward and Jose, Jr. are willing to serve as regular administrator but
undoubtedly, Edward appears to be more responsible and competent that his younger brother, Jose, Jr.
This is bolstered by the fact that the family corporations and his own personal corporation are presently
of sound financial condition. This success, the [c]ourt believes can be attributed to the management
skills and the sound management policies Edward has adopted throughout the years. Likewise, it can
be deduced that among the four(4) children of Jose, Sr., it was Edward whom he trusted the most. The
deceased valued the opinion of Edward on decisions that had to bemade and he would have Edward
around in his meetings to discuss matter relating to the corporations which he managed. Further, as can
be gleaned from the evidence presented by Jose, Jr., it was Edward Marcelo who was appointed as
trustee to vote the deceased’s share in a Marcelo Corporation, Polaris Marketing Corporation. It was
also Edward who was made co-signatory when the deceased deposited money in the bank to be given
to the children of Jose, Jr. It is thus quite evident that Edward was really the most trusted child of the
deceased.
Upon the other hand, this court looks with deep concern the manner by which Jose, Jr. treats the
corporate properties of the Marcelo Group of Companies. Evidence shows that sometime October 21,
1998, Jose, Jr. took evidencing liabilities of the deceased and other pertinent records and up to the
present has not returned them. Jose, Jr. cannot justify the taking of the records/or borrowing of the
same by asserting that he is now keeping them in his capacity asSpecial Administrator as he was
appointed Special Administrator only on September 21, 1989 whereas the records were "borrowed" as
early as October 21, 1988. Be that as it may, what belies Jose, Jr.’s assertion is the fact that the records
of the corporation which were allegedly "borrowed/taken" do not form part of the estate of Jose, Sr. but
to the corporation from where they were taken.
Likewise, it should be noted that the appointment of Jose, Jr. as one of the Special Administrators does
not necessarily make him more qualified to be appointed as regular administrator. The records of the
case will bear out, that the appointmentof a Special Administrator was premised on the need to have
someone, oversee, manage and preserve the estate of Jose, Sr., as there was the danger of the estate
being dissipated. Moreover, the [c]ourt never touched on the issue of the qualifications of the applicants,
as there was in fact, no evidence presented on the matter, other than the bare allegations of the
applicants that they were all qualified to act as such.21 (Citations omitted)
Notably, the decision of the trial court appointing Edward as the Administrator of the Estate of Jose, Sr.,
which decision had the imprimatur of a final resolution by this Court, was not merely a comparison of
the qualifications of Edward and Jose, Jr., but a finding of the competence of Edward compared to the
unfitness of Jose, Jr.
As against this Order of the RTC, its subsequent opposite Order dated 6 January 2010 appointing Jose,
Jr. as new regular administrator only had two (2) sentences to essentially reverse the previous findings.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioners, there is no showing that the [c]ourt has previously declared
[Jose,Jr.] unfit to be appointed as an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general disqualification of those who wish to
serve as administrator:
SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators.— No person is competent
to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of
an offense involving moral turpitude.
Section 6 of the same rule, on the other hand, lists an order of preference in instances when there is a
contest of who should be appointed administrator:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.— If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving spouse, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving spouse, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
 (b) If such surviving spouse, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or ifthe surviving spouse, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for the administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one ormore of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
Because Edward and Jose, Jr. are both compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr., they were, at the time the issue
of administration first cropped, equally preferred to administer Jose, Sr.’s estate. Necessarily, the courts
also delved into the question of their suitableness and fitness to serve as administrator, preferring one
over the other, framing it as Edward being more fit and suited to be administrator:
1. Edward has kept the Marcelo family corporations and his own in good financial condition;
2. The trust reposed by the decedent on Edward who voted on Jose, Sr.’s behalf in a Marcelo
corporation; and
3. Edward being made a co-signatory for money deposited for Jose, Jr.’s own children.
It is Jose T. Marcelo’s position that he is more competent, qualified and suitable for the position of
regular administrator.1âwphi1 This, above all else is the main thrust of this second motion for
reconsideration. However, the court in the exercise of its sound discretion after a consideration of the
evidence adduced by both parties, ruled otherwise and instead appointed Edward T. Marcelo as regular
administrator.
True, Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. was initially appointed as Special Administrator of the estate of their
deceased father but the same was without the benefit of a hearing on the qualifications of the parties
concerned. This did not however confer on Jose Marcelo, Jr. as Special Administrator a better right to
the office of regular administrator.
G.R. No. 185745 October 15, 2014
SPOUSES DOMINADOR MARCOS and GLORIA MARCOS, vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO BANGI and
GENOVEVA DICCION, represented by NOLITO SABIANO
On June 26, 1998, the heirs of Isidro Bangi (Isidro) and Genoveva Diccion (Genoveva) (respondents),
filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of documents, cancellation of transfer certificates of titles,
restoration of original certificate of title and recovery of ownership plus damages against spouses
Dominador Marcos (Dominador) and Gloria Marcos (Gloria) (petitioners). Likewise impleaded in the
said complaint are spouses Jose Dilla (Jose) and Pacita Dilla (Pacita), Ceasaria Alap (Ceasaria), and
spouses Emilio Sumajit (Emilio) and Zenaida Sumajit (Zenaida).
In their complaint, the respondents averred that on November 5, 1943, their parents, Isidro and
Genoveva, bought the one-third portion of a 2,138-square meter parcel of land situated in San Manuel,
Pangasinan and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22361 (subject property) from
Eusebio Bangi (Eusebio), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the latter. OCT No.
22361 was registered in the name of Alipio Bangi (Alipio), Eusebio’s father. After the sale, the
respondents claimed that Isidro and Genoveva took possession of the subject property until they
passed away. The respondents then took possession of the same.
Further, the respondents alleged that sometime in 1998, they learned that the title to the subject
property, including the portion sold to Isidro and Genoveva, was transferred to herein petitioner
Dominador, Primo Alap (Primo), Ceasaria’s husband, Jose, and Emilio through a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 10, 1995, supposedly executed by Alipio with the consent of his wife Ramona Diccion
(Ramona). The respondents claimed that the said deed of absolute sale is a forgery since Alipio died in
1918 while Ramona passed away on June 13, 1957.
Consequently, by virtue of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995, OCT No. 22361
was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 47829 was issued to Dominador, Primo, Jose
and Emilio. On November 21, 1995, Primo, Jose and Emilio executed another deed of absolute sale
over the same property in favor of herein petitioners. TCT No. T-47829 was then cancelled and TCT
No. T-48446 was issued in the names of herein petitioners. The respondents claimed that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 21, 1995 was likewise a forgery since Primo could not have signed the
same on the said date since he died on January 29, 1972.
Thus, the respondents sought the nullification of the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 and
November 21, 1995 and, accordingly, the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-47829 and T-48446. The
respondents likewise sought the restoration of OCT No. 22361.
In their answer, herein petitioners, together with the spouses Jose and Pacita, Ceasaria and the
spouses Emilio and Zenaida, denied the allegations of the respondents, claiming that they are the
owners of the subject property, including the one-third portion thereof allegedly sold by Eusebio to the
respondents’ parents Isidro and Genoveva. They averred that the subject property was originally owned
by Alipio; that after his death, his children – Eusebio, Espedita and Jose Bangi – inherited the same.
That on May 8, 1995, Espedita and Jose Bangi executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with quitclaim
wherein they waived their rights over the subject property in favor of Eusebio’s children – Ceasaria,
Zenaida, Pacita and herein petitioner Gloria.
They further claimed that their father Eusebio could not have validly sold the one-third portion of the
subject property to Isidro and Genoveva. They explained that Eusebio supposedly acquired the parcel
of land covered by OCT No. 22361 by virtue of a donation propter nuptias from his father Alipio when he
married Ildefonsa Compay (Ildefonsa) in 1928. They claimed that the donation propter nuptias in favor
of Eusebio was fictitious since Alipio died in 1918 and that, in any case, the said donation, even if not
fictitious, is void since the same was not registered.
They also averred that they had no participation in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
August 10, 1995, claiming that it was a certain Dominador Quero, the one hired by herein petitioner
Gloria to facilitate the transfer of OCT No. 22361 in their names, who caused the execution of the same.
Subsequently, the respondents and Ceasaria and the spouses Emilio and Zenaida entered into a
compromise agreement wherein Ceasaria and spouses Emilio and Zenaida acknowledged the right of
the respondents over the subject property and admitted the existence of the sale of the one-third portion
thereof by Eusebio in favor of the spouses Isidro and Genoveva. Thus, the case as to Ceasaria and the
spouses Emilio and Zenaida was dismissed.
The RTC opined that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 is a nullity; that the same was
falsified considering that Alipio could not have executed the same in the said date since he died in
1918. Consequently, all the documents and certificates of title issued as a consequence of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 are void. Thus:
On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, 10 which affirmed the Decision
dated March 26, 2007 of the RTC. The CA upheld the petitioners’ claim that the supposed donation
propter nuptias of the subject property in favor of Eusebio from his parents was not sufficiently
established. The CA pointed out that the purported Deed of Donation was not recorded in the Register
of Deeds; that there is no showing that the said donation was made in a public instrument as required
by the Spanish Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the supposed donation in favor of Eusebio.
Nevertheless, the CA found that Eusebio, at the time he executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
the spouses Isidro and Genoveva, already owned the subject property, having inherited the same from
his father Alipio who died in 1918. Further, the CA did not give credence to the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Quitclaim purportedly executed by Espedita and Jose Bangi since it appears to have been
caused to be executed by the petitioners as a mere afterthought and only for the purpose of thwarting
the respondents’ valid claim.11
The petitioners sought a reconsideration12 of the Decision.
ISSUE:1. whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC Decision dated March 26,
2007, which upheld the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 5, 1943 over the one-third portion of
the subject property executed by Eusebio in favor of the spouses Isidro and Genoveva.
2. CA erred in ruling that there was already a partition of the estate of Alipio prior to the sale of the one-
third portion of the subject property by Eusebio to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva
RULING 1. NO. The appellate court upheld the validity of the sale of the one-third portion of the subject
property to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva mainly on the finding that, after the death of Alipio in
1918, an oral partition was had between Eusebio and his siblings Espedita and Jose Bangi; that at the
time of the said sale on November 5, 1943 to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva, Eusebio was already
the owner of the subject property.
On the other hand, the petitioners maintain that the said sale of the one-third portion of the subject
property was not valid. They insinuate that the subject property, at the time of the sale, was still owned
in common by the heirs of Alipio; that Eusebio could not validly sell the one-third portion of the subject
property as there was no partition yet among the heirs of Alipio.
Ultimately, the resolution of the instant controversy is hinged upon the question of whether the heirs of
Alipio had already effected a partition of his estate prior to the sale of the one-third portion of the subject
property to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva on November 5, 1943. However, the foregoing question is
a factual question, which this Court may not pass upon in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.14
The determination of whether the heirs of Alipio had already partitioned his estate prior to the sale of the
one-third portion of the subject property on November 5, 1943 necessarily requires an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties; the doubt arises on the truth or falsity of
the allegations of the parties.
2. No. The Court does not agree. Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong.16 Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition.17 Partition may be inferred from
circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty,
a deed of partition may be presumed.18 Thus, in Hernandez v. Andal,19 the Court emphasized that:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced
oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity
will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of
possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to
each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has
been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into
possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that
equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in
severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and
ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto,
or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. 20
Even so, We are of the considered view that in 1943, when Eusebio Bangi executed the deed of sale in
favor of Isidro Bangi, Eusebio already had acquired interest in the property covered by OCT No. 22361
through succession from his father, Alipio Bangi, who died in 1918.
Further, it appears that such interest extends to the entire property embraced by OCT No. 22361. This
much can be gleaned from the testimony of appellant Gloria Marcos herself, who said that her father
Eusebio owned the entire lot because his siblings Espedita and Jose already had their share from other
properties.
That there was no written memorandum of the partition among Alipio Bangi’s heirs cannot detract from
appellee’s cause.1âwphi1 It has been ruled that oral partition is effective when the parties have
consummated it by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership of the respective
portions set off to each. Here, it is obvious that Eusebio took possession of his share and exercised
ownership over it. Thus, the preponderant evidence points to the validity of the sale executed between
Eusebio Bangi and Isidro Bangi on November 5, 1943 over the one-third portion of the property covered
by OCT No. 22361.
Petitioner Federico is the opposite to the respondent Isabel for Petition for letters of Administration over
the estate of Cristina Suntay who died without leaving a will.
The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grand mother of Isabel. Isabel’s father, Enrico,
predeceased his mother, Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’sparents had previously been declared null and void.Federico anchors his
opposition in this fact alleging Art 922 of the Civil Code. Stating that Isabel cannot acquire by virtue of a
right of representation for Isabel is an Illegitimate Child.
The trial court denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Federico contends
that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the decision declaring marriage of Isabel’s parents null and
void should be upheld
ISSUE: WON Isabel may claim by virtue of the right of representation.
RULING: YES. A voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set
aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a
marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born
in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent Isabels
parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the
rights of the children are therefore governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A
contrary interpretation would be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said provision
the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born
prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered
legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren,
including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of representation in the estate of their
grandmother Cirstina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased
their grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether
Letters of Administration may be granted to her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the successional
rights of the personalities involved over the decedents estate.
ALFONSO VS ANDRES GR No. 139611
Spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres filed a complaint for accion publiciana with damages against Noli
Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlinda Fundialan on the ground that Jose sold the lot in question
without publication of the extrajudicial settlement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of deed of extrajudicial settlement is needed to pass title to the
heirs.
RULING: No. Art 777 provides that the properties of a person who dies intestate passes at once to his
heirs. Such transmission is subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from
the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate
passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. The deed of extrajudicial
settlement executed by Filomena Santos Vda. de Alfonso and Jose evidences their intention to partition
the inherited property. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the effectivity of a deed of
extrajudicial settlement that was neither notarized nor published. It delineated what portion of the
inherited property would belong to whom. The sale to respondents was made after the execution of the
deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. The extrajudicial settlement of estate, even though not
published, being deemed a partition of the inherited property, Jose could validly transfer ownership over
the specific portion of the property that was assigned to him.
YPON VS. RICAFORTE
The heirs filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveryance with Damages against respondent
Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. “Gaudioso E. Ypon”. They alleged that Magdaleno Ypon died
intestate and childless, leaving behind a property covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title. Claiming to
be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title. This led to their subsequent transfer in his name of
the TCT, to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-
interest.
Gaudioso answered that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno, as evidenced by his certificate of Life Birth,
two (2) letters from Polytechnic School, and a certified true copy of his passport. By way of affirmative
defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to
state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no
showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.
The RTC ruled for Gaudioso. It held that while the petitioners had established their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of a letter of administration, this did not
mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs.
Issue: Whether heirship may be determined in an ordinary suit.
Held/Ratio: No. As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein,
alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title
issued in the latter's favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a
decedent's lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in
an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs
of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who
are the decedent's lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not
in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession. In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,
this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship
may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily
submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship,
and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been
instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there
lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties
involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED,
without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon
and the rights concomitant therewith.
Sps. Salgado v. Luis Anson GR 204494
Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de Asis-Anson. They had 1 daughter, Maria Luisa and
she was wed to Gaston Maya. Severina had an older daughter to a previous relationship, Jo ann Diaz
and she was also wed to Gerard Salgado. Luis and Severina acquired several real properties and
according to him, since there was no marriage settlement, the properties pertain to their conjugal
partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed 3 Unilateral Deeds of Sale
transferring then properties in favor of Jo ann. When Severina died, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of
Extra-Judcial Settlement of Estate Deceased Severina adjudicating herself as the sole heir. Due to
these acts, Luis filed a complaint for the annulment of these Deeds against Sps Salgado and Sps Maya.
The latter countered that they were not aware of any marriage between Luis and their mother Severina
but they knew they cohabited as common-law couple and that after their cohabitation, Luis went to the
US and married one Teresita. And due to Partition Agreement that divided their properties without court
intervention, both Sps claim that the properties herewith are separate and exclusive properties of
Severina.
Issue: W/N marriage between Severina and Luis is valid and the subject lands as conjugal partnership
Held: Court finds that their marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license. Luis asserted that their
marriage was an exceptional one but he failed to justify the lack of marriage license. He admitted that
they did not seek to apply for it. The Partition agreement is valid. Valdez v RTC Quezon City held that in
a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art 147 or Art 148 as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Also, attesting that his marriage with Severina was subsisting and valid, he knowingly contracted
to a subsequent marriage abroad, and the Court finds such suspicious and fraudulent thereby tainting
his credibility.
Partition Agreement is Valid Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their
cohabitation, Luis and Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement in November 1980, which
divided their properties between them without court intervention. Luis sought to annul such agreement
on the ground that "the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or
agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes
effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is void." The Court does not subscribe to Luis'
posture.
In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, the Court held that "[i]n a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 14 7 is a
remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code x x x. " It provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
.ioint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a
void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of
their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid
marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,8in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the
pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license." "Under this
property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed
by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family household."'
Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the
properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that
"partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those
to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may be validly
done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement
to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through
the execution of the Partition Agreement.
Mactan vs Unchuan
On March 2004, respondent Richard Unchuan (Unchuan) filed a complaint for Partial Declaration of
Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale with Plea for Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees before the
RTC against MCIAA. Unchuan later filed an Amended Complaint for of Nullity of Deed of Absolute
Sale, Quieting of Title and/or Payment of Just Compensation, Rental and Damages and Attorney's
Fees.
his complaint, Unchuan alleged, among others, that he was the legal and rightful owner of Lot No. 4810-
A, with an area of 177,176 square meters, and Lot No. 4810-B, with an area of 2,740 square meters,
both located in Barrio Buaya, Lapu-Lapu City, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. R0-
1173; that the title was registered under the Qames of the heirs of Eugenio Godinez, specifically,
Teodora Tampus, Fernanda Godinez (the wife of Iscolastico Epe), Tomasa Godinez (the wife of Mateo
Ibanez), Sotera Godinez (the wife of Guillermo Pino), Atanasio Godinez (married to Florencia Pino),
Juana Godinez (the wife of Catalino Cuison), and Ambrosio Godinez (married to Mamerta Inot); and
that he bought the two lots from the surviving heirs of the registered owners through deeds of absolute
sale, all dated December 7, 1998.
Unchuan further alleged that he came to know that Atanacio Godinez {Atanacio), the supposed
attorney-in-fact of all the registered owners their heirs, already sold both lots to Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), the predecessor of MCIAA; that the sale covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale,
dated April 3, 1958, was null and void because the registered owners and their heirs did not authorize
Atanacio to sell their undivided shares in the subject lots in favor of CAA; that no actual consideration
was paid to the said registered owners or their heirs, despite promises that they would be paid; that the
deed of absolute sale did not bear the signature of the CAA representative; that there was no proof that
the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways approved the sale; and that his
predecessors-in-interest merely tolerated the possession by CAA and, later, by MCIAA.
MCIAA averred that on April 3, 1958, Atanacio, acting as the representative of the heirs of Eugenio
Godinez, who were the registered owners, sold Lot No. 4810-A and Lot No. 4810-B to the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by CAA. Thereafter, CAA took possession of the said property upon
payment of the purchase price. To corroborate the said transaction, on September 17, 1969, Atanacio,
along with other former registered co-owners, signed a deed of partition attesting to the fact of sale of
the two lots in favor of the government and admitted its absolute right over the same. Since then, the
said lots had been in the possession of the Republic in the concept of an owner. The said real
properties were declared by the Republic for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 00078 and
Tax Declaration No. 00092. In by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6958, otherwise known as "The
Charter of Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority," the Republic officially turned over the
management of the said lots to MCIAA. On March 3, 2006, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Unchuan. On November 29, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in declaring the sale by atanacio void.
Held: The transaction entered into by Atanacio and CAA, however, was not entirely void because the
lack of consent by the other co-owners in the sale was with respect to their shares only.
Article 493 of the New Civil Code expressly provides: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
The quoted provision recognizes the absolute right of a co-owner to freely dispose of his pro indiviso
share as well as the fruits and other benefits arising from that share, independently of the other co-
owners. The sale of the subject lots affects only the seller's share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets
only what corresponds to his grantor's share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a
co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void; only the rights of the co-owner/seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
In the case at bench, although the sale transaction insofar as the other heirs of the registered owners
was void, the sale insofar as the extent of Atanacio' s interest is concerned, remains valid. Atanacio was
one of the registered co-owners of the subject lots, but he was not clothed with authority to transact for
the other co-owners. By signing the deed of sale with the CAA, Atanacio effectively sold his undivided
share in the lots in question. Thus, CAA became a co-owner of the undivided subject lots. Accordingly,
Atanacio' s heirs could no longer alienate anything in favor of Unchuan because he already conveyed
his pro indiviso share to CAA.
G.R. No. 200274 MELECIO DOMINGO vs. SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA,
substituted by ESTER MOLINA, Respondents.
In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac,
consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18, 164 square meter parcel of land. The sale was
annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354 covering the subject property.
During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina
(spouses Molina). On September 10, 1978 or 10 years after Flora’s death4, Anastacio sold his interest
over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. The sale to the spouses Molina was
annotated at the OCT of the subject property. In 1986, Anastacio died.
Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the spouses Molina on May 17,
1999. Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as
collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over
the subject property without Flora’s consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.
The spouses Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of the disputed sale since he accompanied
Anastacio several times to borrow money. The last loan was even used to pay for Melecio’s wedding.
Finally, the spouses Molina asserted that Melecio built his nipa hut on the subject property only in 1999,
without their knowledge and consent. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case because
Melecio failed to establish his claim that Anastacio did not sell the property to the spouses Molina.
The RTC also held that Anastacio could dispose of conjugal property without Flora’s consent since the
sale was necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.
The core issues of the petition are as follows: (1) whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses
Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and legal; and (2) whether fraud attended the transfer of the
subject property to the spouses Molina.
Ruling:
There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code’s effectivity on
August 3, 1988 and their property relation is a conjugal partnership.
An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with
respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the
other hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an
undivided interest.
Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership provides:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399) (emphases supplied)
Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties
without an actual partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless,
Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property.
The OCT annotation of the sale to the spouses Molina reads that "[o]nly the rights, interests and
participation of Anastacio Domingo, married to Flora Dela Cruz, is hereby sold, transferred, and
conveyed unto the said vendees for the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) which pertains
to an undivided one-half (1/2) portion and subject to all other conditions specified in the document At the
time of the sale, Anastacio’s undivided interest in the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) one-half of
the entire conjugal properties; and (2) his share as Flora’s heir on the conjugal properties.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
interest of his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactio’s sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of
the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacio’s rights or a portion thereof were thereby
effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of
Anastacio’s interest. This result conforms with the well-established principle that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat
quantum valere potest).
The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any
portion that might belong to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition.
Victoria v Pidlaoan GR 196470
Victoria (Rosario) and Elma lived together since 1978 until Rosario left for Saudi Arabia. In 1984, Elma
bought a parcel of land with an area of 201 square meters in Lucena City and was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-50282. When Rosario came home, she caused the construction of a
house on the lot but she left again after the house was built. ma allegedly mortgaged the house and lot
to a certain Thi Hong Villanueva in 1989. When the properties were about to be foreclosed, Elma
allegedly asked for help from her sister-in-law, EufemiaPidlaoan (Eufemia), to redeem the property.5 On
her part, Eufemia called her daughter abroad, Normita, to lend money to Elma. Normita agreed to
provide the funds.6 Elma allegedly sought to sell the land. When she failed to find a buyer, she
offered to sell it to Eufemia or her daughter. On March 21, 1993, Elma executed a deed of sale
entitled “Panananto ng Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad” transferring the ownership of the lot to
Normita. The last provision in the deed of sale provides that Elma shall eject the person who erected
the house and deliver the lot to Normita. The document was signed by Elma, Normita, and two
witnesses but it was not notarized. When Elma and Normita were about to have the document
notarized, the notary public advised them to donate the lot instead to avoid capital gains tax. On the
next day, Elma executed a deed of donation in Normita’s favor and had it notarized. TCT No. T-
50282 was cancelled and TCT No. T-70990 was issued in Normita’s name. Since then, Normita had
been paying the real property taxes over the lot but Elma continued to occupy the house. Rosario found
out about the donation when she returned to the country a year or two after the transaction.13In
1997, the petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of contract, cancellation of TCT No. T-70990, and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against Eufemia, Normita, and Herminigilda Pidlaoan
(respondents). The petitioners argued that: first, they co-owned the lot because both of them
contributed the money used to purchase it; second, Elma and Normita entered into an equitable
mortgage because they intended to constitute a mortgage over the lot to secure Elma’s loan but they
executed a deed of sale instead; and third, the deed of donation was simulated because Elma executed
it upon the notary public’s advice to avoid capital gains tax. In their answer, the respondents admitted
that the deed of donation was simulated and that the original transaction was a sale. They argued,
however, that there was no agreement to constitute a real estate mortgage on the lot. The RTC ruled
that Rosario and Elma co-owned the lot and the house. Thus, Elma could only donate her one-half
share in the lot. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and dismissed the petitioners’ complaint.
Issue (1) Rosario is a co-owner because she caused the construction of the house, which has a higher
market value than the lot; (2) the deed of donation is simulated; (3) the transaction was a mere
equitable mortgage; and (4) the CA unduly disturbed the RTC’s factual findings.
Held: First, we rule that Elma transferred ownership of the entire lot to Normita. One who deals with
property registered under the Torrens system has a right to rely on what appears on the face of the
certificate of title and need not inquire further as to the property’s ownership. A buyer is charged with
notice only of the claims annotated on the title. The Torrens system was adopted to best guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. In the present case, the records of the case show that Elma alonepurchased the lot in
1984 from its previous owners. Accordingly, TCT No. T-50282 was issued solely in her name. Thus,
Normita bought the lot relying on the face of the TCT that Elma and no other person owned it. We
acknowledge that registration under the Torrens system does not create or vest title. A certificate of title
merely serves as an evidence of ownership in the property. Therefore, the issuance of a certificate of
title does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the
real property, or that the registered owner is only holding the property in trust for another person.28In
the present case, however, the petitioners failed to present proof of Rosario’s contributions in
purchasing the lot from its previous owners. The execution of the transfer documents solely in Elma’s
name alone militate against their claim of co-ownership. Thus, we find no merit in the petitioners’
claim of co-ownership over the lot. At this point, we address the petitioners’ claim that Rosario co-
owned the lot with Elma because the value of the house constructed by Rosario on it is higher than the
lot’s value. We find this argument to be erroneous. We hold that mere construction of a house on
another’s land does not create a co-ownership. Article 484 of the Civil Code provides that co-
ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Verily,
a house and a lot are separately identifiable properties and can pertain to different owners, as in this
case: the house belongs to Rosario and the lot to Elma. Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if a
person builds on another’s land in good faith, the land owner may either: (a) appropriate the works as
his own after paying indemnity; or (b) oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. The law does not
force the parties into a co-ownership. A builder is in good faith if he builds on a land believing himself to
be its owner and is unaware of the defect in his title or mode of acquisition0As applied in the present
case, Rosario’s construction of a house on the lot did not create a co-ownership, regardless of the value
of the house. Rosario, however, is not without recourse in retrieving the house or its value. The
remedies available to her are set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code. Second, on the nature of the
transaction between Elma and Normita,we find that the deed of donation was simulated and the parties’
real intent was to enter into a sale. The petitioners argue that the deed of donation was simulated and
that the parties entered into an equitable mortgage. On the other hand, the respondents deny the claim
of equitable mortgage and argue that they validly acquired the property via sale The RTC ruled that
there was donation but only as to half of the property. The CA agreed with the respondents that
the deed of donation was not simulated, relying on the presumption of regularity of public documents.
We first dwell on the genuineness of the deed of donation. There are two types of simulated documents
– absolute and relative. A document is absolutely simulated when the parties have no intent to bind
themselves at all, while it is relatively simulated when the parties concealed their true agreement. The
true nature of a contract is determined by the parties’ intention, which can be ascertained from their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.35 In the present case, Elma and Normita’s
contemporaneous and subsequent acts show that they were about to have the contract of sale
notarized but the notary public ill-advised them to execute a deed of donation instead. Following
this advice, they returned the next day to have a deed of donation notarized. Clearly, Elma and Normita
intended to enter into a sale that would transfer the ownership of the subject matter of their contract but
disguised it as a donation. Thus, the deed of donation subsequently executed by them was only
relatively simulated. The CA upheld the deed of donation’s validity based on the principle that a
notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity. This presumption, however, is overthrown
in this case by the respondents’ own admission in their answer that the deed of donation was simulated.
Judicial admissions made by a party in the course of the proceedings are conclusive and do not require
proof.36 Notably, the respondents explicitly recognized in their answer that the deed of donation was
simulated upon the notary public’s advice and that both parties intended a sale.
Inalvez vs Nool GR No 188145
This petition stemmed from a complaint for recovery of possession over a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3058625 with an area of 10.2135 hectares situated at Villa
Aglipay, San Jose, Tarlac, filed by Spouses Primo and Juliana Inalvez (Juliana) (petitioners) against
Bayang Nool (Bayang), Allan Nool and Celestino Nool (respondents), with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The records showed that the subject property was originally
covered by TCT No. 583986 originally registered in the names of Spouses Nicolas and Francisca Nool
and Spouses Cornelio and Bayang, with an area of 15.1441 ha. On May 3, 1965, Spouses Cornelio and
Bayang sold a large portion of their one-half share of the landholding to the petitioners and Maria
Zamora (Zamora), which sale was inscribed on the title as Entry No. 5-4972.7 Consequently, TCT No.
58398 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 584398 was issued in the names of the following co-
owners: Spouses Nicolas and Francisca (one-half share); Zamora (one-fourth share); Spouses Cornelio
and Bayang (one-eighth share); and the petitioners (one-eighth share).9 On June 4, 1979, Spouses
Nicolas and Francisca sold their entire one-half share over the property in favor of Spouses Abraham
and Olivia Macayanan (Spouses Macayanan), which sale was inscribed on the title as Entry No. E-19-
7847.10 Then, on April 16, 1980, the new set of owners, namely, Spouses Macayanan, Zamora,
Spouses Cornelio and Bayang, and the petitioners executed a Real Estate Mortgage11 (REM) over the
whole property in favor of Tarlac Development Bank (TDB) to secure a loan of Pl0,000.00.12
Unfortunately, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the title to the subject property was consolidated with
TDB, together with the corresponding issuance of TCT No. 188251.13 On April 17, 1985, TDB sold the
parcel of land to the petitioners and Spouses Jim and Liberty Baluyot (Spouses Baluyot).14 Hence, TCT
No. 188251 was cancelled andTCT No. 18825215 was issued in the names of the petitioners and
Spouses Baluyot. 16 Meanwhile, the respondents continued possession of the subject lot. On October
3, 1991, pursuant to an Agreement of Subdivision, 17 the property was subdivided as follows: Lot 1 with
138,734 square meters to the petitioners, and Lots 2 and 3 with 10,000 sq m and 2,707 sq m,
respectively, to Spouses Baluyot. The portion pertaining to the petitioners was separately titled under
TCT No. 260916, and was later replaced by TCT No. 262142,18 showing that the original area of
138,734 sq m had been reduced to 133,809 sq m.19 On March 24, 1998, the petitioners caused their
property to be subdivided into nine sub-lots, by virtue of which subdivision, TCT No. 262142 was
cancelled and new titles were issued, namely, TCT Nos. 305854 to 305862. The petitioners also
declared the property for tax purposes.20 On June 16, 2000, the petitioners instituted a complaint for
ejectment, collection of shares and damages, against the respondents before the DARAB-Region III
docketed as DARAB Case No. III-T-1952-00. The petitioners alleged that since Bayang is Juliana's
sister, they allowed the respondents to cultivate 2-ha portion of the subject property covered by TCT
No. 305862,21 with an area of 102,135 sq m, with the obligation to share the landowners 25% of the
harvest proceeds thereof. The respondents' cultivation thereof was purportedly conditioned upon the
payment to the petitioners of a rightful share in the produce. Thus, when the respondents failed to fulfil
their undertaking, the petitioners instituted an ejectment complaint against them. For her part, Ba yang
averred that she and her late husband were the actual and registered co-owners of the subject property,
which they inherited from her father, together with the petitioners. Bayang denied having sold portions
of their property to the petitioners and Zamora. She also disclaimed knowledge as to how their original
title was replaced by TCT No. 58439 showing the acquisition by the petitioners of one-eight portion of
the property and the corresponding reduction of their share. urther denied having signed any document
consenting to the mortgage of the subject property and refuted the genuineness of her husband's
signature as appearing on the REM executed with TDB. Lastly, the respondents argued that they are
deemed to have already acquired the subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription since
they have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property for more than 30
years.23 On January 14, 2002, the DARAB dismissed the case upon finding that no tenancy
relationship exists between the parties.24 Dissatisfied, the petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of
possession, damages with an application for preliminary injunction25 against the respondents before
the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac docketed as Civil Case No. 02-09. The case was raffled to Branch 68. After
trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of the petitioners. CA reversed the decision.
Issue: The main issue before this Court is whether a co-ownership exists between the petitioners and
the respondents.
Held: The petition has no merit.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that no tenancy or
agricultural leasehold relationship existed between the parties whether express or implied since the
petitioners have failed to overcome the burden of proving their affirmative allegation of tenancy. The
petitioners however argue that they are the sole owners of the subject property since they have bought
it from TDB after it had been foreclosed. On the other hand, the respondents insist that they are co-
owners of the subject property which they inherited from their parents.
Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether or not the subject property pertains
to the exclusive ownership of the petitioners. Hence, the pertinent point of inquiry is whether co-
ownership by the petitioners and the respondents over the subject property continued even after the
subject property was purchased by TDB and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was
eventually bought back by the petitioners from TDB.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court normally abstain from, yet,
considering the divergent positions of the courts below, this Court shall go by the exception to the
general rule and proceed to review the facts of this case and make its own assessment of the evidence
and documents on record. But even if the Court were to re-evaluate the evidence presented, there is
still no reason to depart from the CA's ruling that the property in dispute is owned in common by the
petitioners and the respondents.
In this case, the petitioners' cause of action for recovery of possession is grounded on their alleged
exclusive ownership of the subject property which they merely purchased from TDB. They contend that
TDB's consolidation of ownership over the subject property effectively ended and terminated the co-
ownership. The respondents, however, counter that they are co-owners of the subject property and their
co-ownership was by virtue of their inheritance, which was registered in the names of the petitioners by
way of an agreement. Bayang also asserted that she never sold her share to the petitioners and
Zamora nor was she aware of any mortgage over the subject property.
Here, records show that the subject property was originally owned by Juliana and Bayang's father, Cleto
Macayanan under Original Certificate of Title No. 1665. "Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code,
when land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of
another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner." Bayang, being an
heir and a co-owner, is thus entitled to the possession of the subject property. This was confirmed by
the issuance of TCT No. 58439 in the names of Spouses Nicolas and Francisca for one-half share,
Spouses Cornelio and Bayang for one-eighth share, Zamora for one-fourth share, and the petitioners
for one-eighth share. Evidently, a co-ownership existed between the parties prior to the foreclosure and
consolidation of title in favor of TDB and the subsequent re-acquisition thereof by the petitioners.
"Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others." "Before the partition of
a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof.
All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota proportionate share in the entire land or thing."
"Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall
remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership." "In case of foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission only of
whatever rights the seller had over of the thing sold."
Indeed, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is
mortgaged by another co-owner without the former's knowledge and consent as in the case at bar. The
mortgage of the inherited property is not binding against co-heirs who never benefited.38 As correctly
emphasized by the CA, the petitioners' right in the subject property is limited only to their share in the
co-owned property. When the subject property was sold to and consolidated in the name of TDB, the
latter merely held the subject property in trust for the respondents. When the petitioners and Spouses
Baluyot bought back the subject property, they merely stepped into the shoes of TDB and acquired
whatever rights and obligations appertain thereto.
Be that as it may, the rights of the respondents as co-owners of the subject property were never
alienated despite TDB's consolidation of ownership over the subject property. Neither does the fact that
the petitioners succeeded in acquiring back the property from TDB and having a new title issued in their
name terminate the existing co-ownership. Besides, it seems that petitioners knew of the fact that they
did not have a title to the entire lot and could not, therefore, have validly mortgaged the same, because
of the respondents' possession of the subject portion.
The trial court's reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat the right of a holder of a
registered Torrens title over property is misplaced, considering that the respondents were almost
deprived of their dominical rights over the said lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on the part of
the petitioners. Failure and intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by
another person during registration proceedings constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to
knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.
Contrary to the petitioners' argument that the respondents' claim is a collateral attack upon their title
which is impermissible, the Court had categorically ruled that a resolution on the issue of ownership
does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be
borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.
"Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that
the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the
registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title." The alleged incontrovertibility of title cannot be
successfully invoked by the petitioners because certificates of title merely confirm or record title already
existing and cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud.
The CA was also on point when it upheld the respondents' claim of forgery with respect to the
signatures of Spouses Cornelio and Bayang as appearing in the REM. The CA explained that:
The evidence on record tends to corroborate [the respondents'] claim that [the petitioners] succeeded in
mortgaging the co-owned property to [TDB] without their consent. The signature on the [REM] Contract,
which purports to be that of Cornelio Nool, is undoubtedly a forgery considering that Cornelio Nool died
on December 21, 1979 prior to the execution of said mortgage on April 16, 1980. Bayang's claim that
her signature in the mortgage was forged was never rebutted by [the petitioners]. Also, the manifest
disparities between [Bayang's] purported signature on the [REM] Contract and her signature as
appearing on the Marriage Contract, which public document was admitted as genuine writing, supports
[sic] a finding that her signature on the mortgage contract was also forged. The trial court failed to
consider the evidence and to make its own comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings that are
proved to be genuine as explicitly authorized by Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The Court disbelieves the petitioners' argument that the respondents started occupying the subject
property only after the petitioners have bought back the subject property from TDB. Obviously, the
respondents have been the owners and in possession of the subject property even before May 3, 1965
when they sold portions of their original share to the petitioners. The subject property presently in the
respondents' possession covers an area of not more than 2 ha, which corresponds, more or less, to the
one-eighth aliquot share (1.8930 ha) in the co-owned property which the Spouses Cornelio and Bayang
had retained for themselves in the co-ownership. It must be noted that since the mortgage and sale of
the subject property to the petitioners, the latter had allowed the respondents to occupy that portion
allotted to them. Clearly, the petitioners were in possession of the subject property for more than 35
years. However, at no instance during this time did the petitioners, for that matter, question the
respondents' right over the subject property.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that the CA did not err in declaring that the petitioners have
no legal basis to recover possession of the subject property. Except for their claim that they merely
purchased the subject property from TDB, the petitioners presented no other j ustification to disprove
co-ownership. Since the mortgage of the co-owned property was done without the respondents'
consent, they cannot be deemed to have lost their share as a consequence of the subsequent
foreclosure and sale of the co-owned property. In the same way, the petitioners, as mere co-owners,
had no right to mortgage the entire property for their right to do so is limited only to that portion that may
be allotted to them upon termination of the co-ownership
G.R. No. 194260
HEIRS OF FELICIANO YAMBAO, namely: CHONA YAMBAO, JOEL YAMBAO, WILLY YAMBAO,
LENNIE YAMBAO and RICHARD YAMBAO, and all other persons acting under their authority,
Petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF HERMOGENES YAMBAO, namely: ELEANOR YAMBAO, ALBERTO YAMBAO,
DOMINIC YAMBAO, ASESCLO YAMBAO, GERALD DANTIC and MARIA PILAR YAMBAO, who are
all represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA PILAR YAMBAO, Respondents.
The subject of this case is a parcel of land located in Barangay Bangan, Botolan, Zambales, which was
originally possessed by Macaria De Ocampo (Macaria). Macaria's nephew, Hermogenes Yambao
(Hermogenes ), acted as the administrator of the property and paid realty taxes therefor. Hermogenes
has eight children, namely: Ulpiano, Dominic, Teofilo, Feliciano, Asesclo, Delia, Amelia, and Melinda, all
surnamed Yambao.
After Hermogenes died, it was claimed that all of his heirs were free to pick and harvest from the fruit-
bearing trees planted on the subject property. Eleanor Yambao (Eleanor), Ulpiano's daughter, even
constructed a house on the subject property. However, sometime in 2005, the communal and mutual
use of the subject property by the heirs of Hermogenes ceased when the heirs of Feliciano, herein
petitioners, prohibited them from entering the property. The heirs of Feliciano even ejected Eleanor from
the subject property.
This prompted the heirs of Hermogenes, herein respondents, to file with the RTC a complaint for
partition, declaration of nullity of title/documents, and damages against the heirs of Feliciano. The heirs
of Hermogenes alleged that they and the heirs of Feliciano are co-owners of the subject property,
having inherited the right thereto from Hermogenes.
The heirs of Feliciano denied the allegations of the heirs of Hermogenes and claimed that their father,
Feliciano, was in possession of the subject property in the concept of owner since time immemorial.
Accordingly, Feliciano was awarded a free patent thereon for which Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. P-10737 was issued. They also averred that the cause of action in the complaint filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes, which questioned the validity of OCT No. P-10737, prescribed after the lapse of one year
from its issuance on November 29, 1989.
Ruling of the RTC
On December 23, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes. The RTC opined that the heirs of Hermogenes failed to show that the subject property is
owned by Macaria, stating that tax declarations and receipts in Macaria's name are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. The RTC further held that even if Macaria owned the subject property, the heirs
of Hermogenes failed to show that Hermogenes had the right to succeed over the estate of Macaria.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal,. the CA, in its Decision 7 dated October 22, 2010, reversed and set aside the RTC's
Decision dated December 23, 2008. The CA found that the RTC, in hastily dismissing the complaint for
partition, failed to determine first whether the subject property is indeed co-owned by the heirs of
Hermogenes and the heirs of Feliciano. The CA pointed out that:
[A] review of the records of the case shows that in Feliciano's application for free patent, he
acknowledged that the source of his claim of possession over the subject property was Hermogenes's
possession of the real property in peaceful, open, continuous, and adverse manner and more
importantly, in the concept of an owner, since 1944. Feliciano's claim of sole possession in his
application for free patent did not therefore extinguish the fact of co-ownership as claimed by the
children of Hermogenes.
Accordingly, the CA, considering that the parties are co-owners of the subject property, ruled that the
RTC should have conducted the appropriate proceedings for partition.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property is coowned by the heirs of Hermogenes
Held: A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual
possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-
owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in
favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property.
Prescription may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the other co-owner/s.1âwphi1 In order that a co-
owners possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following
requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear
and convincing.
Although OCT No. P-10737 was registered in the name of Feliciano on November 29, 1989, the
prescriptive period within which to demand partition of the subject property, contrary to the claim of the
heirs of Feliciano, did not begin to run. At that time, the heirs of Hermogenes were still in possession of
the property. It was only in 2005 that the heirs of Feliciano expressly prohibited the heirs of
Hermogenes from entering the property. Thus, as aptly ruled by the CA, the right of the heirs of
Hermogenes to demand the partition of the property had not yet prescribed. Accordingly, the RTC
committed a reversible error when it dismissed the complaint for partition that was filed by the heirs of
Hermogenes.
There is likewise no merit to the claim that the action for partition filed by the heirs of Hermogenes
amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of OCT No. P-10737. The complaint for partition filed by
the heirs of Hermogenes seeks first, a declaration that they are a co-owners of the subject property, and
second, the conveyance of their lawful shares. The heirs of Hermogenes do not attack the title of
Feliciano; they alleged no fraud, mistake, or any other irregularity that would justify a review of the
registration decree in their favor. Their theory is that although the subject property was registered solely
in Feliciano's name, they are co-owners of the property and as such is entitled to the conveyance of
their shares. On the premise that they are co-owners, they can validly seek the partition of the property
in co-ownership and the conveyance to them of their respective shares.
G.R. No. 205705, August 05, 2015 DOMINADOR M. APIQUE, Petitioner, v. EVANGELINE APIQUE
FAHNENSTICH, Respondent.
Dominador and Evangeline are siblings who used to live with their parents at Babak, Island Garden City
of Samal, Davao, until Evangeline left for Germany to work sometime in 1979. On August 2, 1995,
Evangeline executed General and Special Powers of Attorney7 constituting Dominador as her attorney-
in-fact to purchase real property for her, and to manage or supervise her business affairs in the
Philippines.
As Evangeline was always in Germany, she opened a joint savings account on January 18, 1999 with
Dominador at the Claveria Branch of the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) in Davao
City, which later became Equitable PCI Bank (EPCIB), and now Banco de Oro, under Savings Account
No. 1189-02819-5 (subject account).
On February 11, 2002, Dominador withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject account and,
thereafter, deposited the money to his own savings account with the same bank, under Savings
Account No. 1189-00781-3. It was only on February 23, 2003 that Evangeline learned of such
withdrawal from the manager of EPCIB. Evangeline then had the passbook updated, which reflected the
said withdrawal. She likewise discovered that Dominador had deposited the amount withdrawn to his
own account with the same bank and that he had withdrawn various amounts from the said account.
Evangeline demanded the return of the amount withdrawn from the joint account, but to no avail.
Hence, she filed a complaint for sum of money, damages, and attorney's fees, with prayer for
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against
Dominador before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 29,122-02, impleading EPCIB as a party
defendant.
In her complaint, Evangeline claimed to be the sole owner of the money deposited in the subject
account, and that Dominador has no authority to withdraw the same. On the other hand, she alleged
that EPCIB violated its banking rules when it allowed the withdrawal without the presentation of the
passbook. She also prayed for a TRO to enjoin EPCIB from allowing any withdrawal from the subject
account, which was granted by the Executive Judge on May 7, 2002.
Issue: The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Evangeline is entitled to the return
of the amount of P980,000.00 Dominador withdrew from their joint savings account with EPCIB, plus
legal interest thereon
Held: A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or more
juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the said
account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved,
pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil Code, which provides:c
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to
their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proved.
The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account, each of the
named account holder has an undivided right to the entire balance, and any of them may deposit and/or
withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without the need or consent of the other, during their lifetime
Nevertheless, as between the account holders, their right against each other may depend on what they
have agreed upon, and the purpose for which the account was opened and how it will be operated.
In this case, there is no dispute that the account opened by Evangeline and Dominador under Savings
Account No. 1189-02819-5 with EPCIB was a joint "OR" account. It is also admitted that: (a) the
account was opened for a specific purpose, i.e., to facilitate the transfer of needed funds for
Evangeline's business projects; and (b) Dominador may withdraw funds therefrom "if" there is a need to
meet Evangeline's financial obligations arising from said projects. Hence, while Dominador is a co-
owner of the subject account as far as the bank is concerned — and may, thus, validly deposit and/or
withdraw funds without the consent of his co-depositor, Evangeline — as between him and Evangeline,
his authority to withdraw, as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is circumscribed by the purpose for
which the subject account was opened.
Under the foregoing circumstances, Dominador's right to obtain funds from the subject account was,
thus, conditioned on the necessity of funds for Evangeline's projects. Admittedly, at the time he
withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject account, there was no project being undertaken
for Evangeline. Moreover, his claim that the said amount belonged to him, as part of the compensation
promised by Holgar for his services as administrator of the business affairs of Evangeline, was correctly
rejected by the CA, considering the dearth of competent evidence showing that Holgar: (a) undertook to
pay Dominador the amount of P1,000,000.00 for his services as administrator of Evangeline's various
projects; and (b) remitted such amount to the subject account for the benefit of Dominador. Having
failed to justify his right over the amount withdrawn, Dominador is liable for its return, as correctly
adjudged by the CA.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, or evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. Thus, the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to
prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment. For the plaintiff, the burden to prove its
positive assertions never parts. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of
an essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of action, but one which, if established, will be a Rood
defense, i.e. an avoidance of the claim. Dominador miserably failed in this respect.
GR NO 196750 Divinagracia v Parilla
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a 313-square meter parcel of land located at Cor. Fuentes-
Delgado Streets, Iloilo City denominated as Lot 133-B-1-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-12255 (subject land). During his lifetime, he contracted two marriages: (a) the first was
with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2) children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and (b) the
second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven (7) children, namely, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion,
Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three (3) illegitimate
children, namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and was
survived by his children Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord. Cebeleo, Sr.
also pre-deceased his father and was survived by his wife, Maude, and children Cebeleo, Jr. and
Neobel.
According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in representation of
his father, Mateo, Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo
sold their respective interests over the subject land to Santiago for a consideration of P447,695.66, as
embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale dated November 22,
1989 (subject document), which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their
respective shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his husband, Cebeleo,
Sr., and their children). On December 22, 1989, the same parties executed a Supplemental Contract
whereby the vendors-heirs and Santiago agreed that out of the aforesaid consideration, only
P109,807.93 will be paid up front, and that Santiago will only pay the remaining balance of P337,887.73
upon the partition of the subject land. However, Santiago was not able to have TCT No. T-12255
cancelled and the subject document registered because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal to
surrender the said title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition the
subject land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint dated January 3, 1990 for judicial partition and for
receivership.
For their part, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude maintained that Santiago had no legal right to file an
action for judicial partition nor compel them to surrender TCT No. T-12255 because, inter alia: (a)
Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is a
conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar and, thus, only their legitimate issues may validly
inherit the same.
Issue: The issues for the Court’s resolution are whether or not the CA correctly: (a) ruled that Felcon’s
siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are indispensable parties to Santiago’s complaint for
judicial partition; and (b) dismissed Santiago’s complaint for his failure to implead said omitted heirs.
Held: An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject
matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his
legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a
resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus,
the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons
interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.:
SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. – A person having the right to compel the
partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and
joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such,
an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate,
who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr.,
Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo.
However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules
on representation under the Civil Code, their respective interests shall be represented by their children,
namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for
Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant
– have vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties
in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards
Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-
representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint
impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 97235 of the Civil Code, the proper
representatives to his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily,
Santiago’s omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
Santiago’s contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of the heirs and, thus,
they should no longer be regarded as indispensable parties deserves no merit. As correctly noted by
the CA, in actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it
first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue
of ownership, which is the first stage in an action for partition. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless
this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of
the disputed properties.
In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs of Conrado,
Sr. as evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-
heirs. Since his interest over the subject land is merely derived from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter
should first be determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who have
vested interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in Santiago’s complaint.
JUAN P. CABRERA vs. HENRY YSAACG.R. No. 166790 NOVEMBER 19, 2014
FACTS: Henry Ysaac is one of the co-owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 506 with an area
of 5,517 square meters. He leased out a portion of the property to several lessees including Juan
Cabrera who leased a 95-squaremeter portion of the land. In need of money, Henry offered to sell the
95 sq.meter lot but Juan demurred because the lot was too small for his needs since there was no
parking space for his vehicle. To deal with Juan’s need, Henry expanded his offer to include two
adjoining lands which was then leased by two families but warned that the sale could only proceed if the
two families would agree. The deal was almost closed with the agreed price of P 250/sq.m but Juan
stated that he could only pay the full price after his retirement. Henry agreed but demanded for an initial
payment of P1, 500.00 which Juan paid.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid contract of sale between petitioner and respondent.
Held: We find that there was no contract of sale. It was null and ab initio.
As defined by the Civil Code, “[a] contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one
binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.” For there to be a
valid contract, there must be consent of the contracting parties, an object certain which is the subject
matter of the contract, and cause of the obligation which is established.
Sale is a special contract. The seller obligates himself to deliver a determinate thing and to transfer its
ownership to the buyer. In turn, the buyer pays for a price certain in money or its equivalent. A “contract
of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price.” The seller and buyer must agree as to the certain thing that will be subject
of the sale as well as the price in which the thing will be sold. The thing to be sold is the object of the
contract, while the price is the cause or consideration. The object of the sales contract between
petitioner and respondent was a definite portion of a co-owned parcel of land. At the time of the alleged
sale between petitioner and respondent, the entire property was still held in common. This is evidenced
by the original certificate of title, which was undert he names of Matilde Ysaac, Priscilla Ysaac, Walter
Ysaac, respondent Henry Ysaac, Elizabeth Ysaac, Norma Ysaac, Luis Ysaac, Jr., George Ysaac,
Franklin Ysaac, Marison Ysaac, Helen Ysaac, Erlinda Ysaac, and Maridel Ysaac.85 The rules allow
respondent to sell his undivided interest in the coownership.However, this was not the object of the sale
between him and petitioner. Theobject of the sale was a definite portion. Even if it was respondent who
was benefiting from the fruits of the lease contract to petitioner, respondent has “no right to sell or
alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because his right over
the thing is represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
VILMA QUINTOS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACTS FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR., ET AL.
VS. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 210252. June 16, 2014
FACTS: Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia
Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto
Ibarra are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject
property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered
by TCT No. 318717.
The deceased parents left their 10 children ownership over the subject property. In 2002, respondent
siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-
52 and was raffled to the RTC at Camiling, Tarlac but was later on dismissed as neither of the parties
appeared and appealed.
Respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in
favor of the 10 siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and TCT No. 390484 was issued in
the names of the 10 heirs of the Ibarra spouses. The siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the
property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale and Agreement of Subdivision, and the title was partially cancelled as a result.
Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents wherein they
alleged that during their parents’ lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal properties in
favor of their 10 children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they received the subject property
and the house constructed thereon as their share. They had been in adverse, open, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession of the property for over 4 decades and are allegedly entitled to equitable title.
Participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deeds was denied.
Respondents, on the other hand, countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred by
estoppel when in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share, which is an
admission petitioners’ part that the property is not entirely theirs. The Ibarras allegedly mortgaged the
property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the
property. Not having been repaid, the Candelarios accepted their share in the subject property as
payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.
RTC: dismissed petitioners’ complaint, as it did not find merit in petitioners’ asseverations that they have
acquired title over the property through acquisitive prescription and noted there was no document
evidencing that their parents bequeathed the property. Subsequent transfer of the siblings’ interest in
favor of respondent spouses Candelario was upheld.
CA: upheld lower court decision and held that since the property is co-owned by the plaintiffs-
appellants, ( 3/10 undivided interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses Candelarios (7/10 undivided
interest) and considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already constructed a 3-storey building at the
back portion of the property, partition is in order, in accord with the subdivision plan.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches
or res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for the partition
of the property.
HELD: PETITION IS PARTLY MERITORIOUS.
Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property. Quieting of title is a
common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action must necessarily fail
mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of whether or not petitioners sufficiently
proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is substantially a factual issue that is generally
improper for Us to delve into.In any event, a perusal of the records would readily show that petitioners,
as aptly observed by the courts below, indeed, failed to substantiate their claim. Their alleged open,
continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that
respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over
the subject lot without any objection from the petitioners. Petitioners’ inability to offer evidence tending
to prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over the property in favor of
petitioners is likewise fatal to the latter’s claim.
The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence. Regrettably, petitioners failed to discharge the
said burden. There is no reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that all 10 siblings inherited the subject
property from Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, and after the respondent siblings sold their aliquot
share to the spouses Candelario, petitioners and respondent spouses became co-owners of the same.
The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment.
As to the issue of partition as raised by respondents in their counterclaim, the petitioners countered that
the action for partition has already been barred by res judicata.
The Court had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice satisfies one of the elements of res
judicata. It is understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their claim. However,
dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-
owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of
shares yet. This is pertinent to Article 494 of the Civil Code which discusses how the law generally does
not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining
the co-owners’specific shares so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo.
Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art.
494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right
of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned by
the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a
procedural rule. Art. 494 is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even
if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be
deemed to be without prejudice.
This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata. There can
still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter once the
respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent court with
jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co- ownership does not or no longer
exists.
The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches. We now proceed to petitioners’second line of
attack. According to petitioners, the claim for partition is already barred by laches since by 1999, both
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already died and yet the respondent siblings only belatedly filed
the action for partition, Civil Case No. 02-52, in 2002. And since laches has allegedly already set in
against respondent siblings, so too should respondent spouses Candelario be barred from claiming the
same for they could not have acquired a better right than their predecessors-in-interest.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which––
by the exercise of due diligence––could or should have been done earlier. It is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. The principle is a creation of equity which, as
such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s right, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable
defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the petitioners’ title, but only with whether
or not by reason of the respondents’ long inaction or inexcusable neglect, they should be barred from
asserting this claim at all, because to allow them to do so would be inequitable and unjust to
petitioners.
As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to have neglected to assert
their right over the subject property. They cannot be considered to have abandoned their right given that
they filed an action for partition. The fact that respondent siblings entered into a Contract of Lease with
Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject property is evidence that they are exercising rights of
ownership over the same.
The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision. There is merit, however, in
petitioners’ contention that the CA erred in approving the proposal for partition submitted by respondent
spouses. Art. 496, as earlier cited, provides that partition shall either be by agreement of the parties or
in accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by
respondent spouses Candelario and petitioners cannot serve as basis for partition for respondents
admitted that the agreement was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same.
The "agreement" was crafted without any consultation whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at mutually
acceptable terms with petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to
approve the agreement in spite of this fact would be tantamount to allowing respondent spouses to
divide unilaterally the property among the co-owners based on their own whims and caprices.
Cruz v. Villasor G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973
The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However,
the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed without
the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance with
law.
One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged.
Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial
compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one
of them.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC
HELD: NO.
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he
cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot
serve as witness at the same time.
To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in
front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one
will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such
situation would be absurd.
Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a
function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested
in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. he would
be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize
fraud.
Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil 476, GR 134431
On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan’s will executed July, 1916.
From this decision the opponents appealed.
The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the
bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three
witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the
three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and
the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters. These omissions, according to appellants’ contention, are
defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.
Issue: Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate.
Held: YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the testator
and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the
avoidance of substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of the testatrix. But
when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet (as in the instant case) signed at the
bottom by the testator and three witnesses, their signatures on the left margin of said sheet are not
anymore necessary as such will be purposeless.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet
of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only,
the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered,
cannot be hidden.
In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is
signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation
clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be
further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator’s last will, must be disregarded.
Garcia v. Vasquez G.R. No. L-26808 March 28, 1969
Gliceria del Rosario executed 2 wills, one in June 1956, written in Spanish, a language she knew an
spoke. The other will was executed in December 1960 consisting of only one page, and written in
Tagalog. The witnesses to the 1960 will declared that the will was first read 'silently' by the testatrix
before signing it. The probate court admitted the will.
The oppositors alleged that the as of December 1960, the eyesight of the deceased was so poor and
defective that she could not have read the provisions contrary to the testimony of the witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
RULING: The will is not valid. If the testator is blind, Art. 808 of the New Civil Code (NCC) should
apply.If the testator is blind or incapable of reading, he must be apprised of the contents of the will for
him to be able to have the opportunity to object if the provisions therein are not in accordance with his
wishes.
The testimony of her opthalmologist established that notwithstanding an operation to remove her
cataract and being fitted with the lenses, this did not improve her vision. Her vision remained mainly for
viewing distant objects and not for reading. There was no evidence that her vision improved at the time
of the execution of the 2nd will. Hence, she was incapable of reading her own will. The admission of the
will to probate is therefor erroneous.
Maloto vs CA GR No. 76464
Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto- Casiano
and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that
the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of their aunt’s estate. While the case was still in progress, they executed
an extrajudicial settlement of Adriana’s estate dividing it into four equal parts among themselves. They
presented the same and successfully gained court approval. Three years later, a document was
discovered entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),” purporting to be the last will
and testament of Adriana. Malotos oppposed the probate of the Will stating among others that the said
will was revoked. Two witnesses were presented to prove that the will was burned by Adriana herself.
Issue: Whether or not the will was validly revoked.
Held: No, the will was not validly revoked. A valid revocation must be done with animus revocandi or
the intention to revoke coupled with an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling
the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
The document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established–that
such was the will of Adriana Maloto. And that the burning was not proven to have been done under the
express direction of Adriana. Also the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses stated that they
were the only ones present at the place where papers were burned. The act done by the witnesses
could not have constituted a valid revocation of Adriana’s Will.
Gago v. Mamuyac L-26317
Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. It appears from the record that Miguel executed a last will
and testament on July 27, 1918. Gago presented such will for probate which was opposed by Cornelio
Mamuyac et. al. Said petition for probate was denied on the ground that the deceased executed another
will on April 16, 1919. Gago presented the April 16 will for probate which was again opposed by
Cornelio et. al. alleging that the will presented by Gago is a carbon copy of the original April 16 will;
such will was cancelled during the lifetime of the deceased; and that said will was not the last will and
testament of the deceased. The RTC found that the deceased executed another will on December 30,
1920.
ISSUE: W/N the April 16 will was cancelled.
HELD: YES. With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not
denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The
law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore
becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation
or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing that
after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have
been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other
competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it
is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not
be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority
of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying
greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be
overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel
Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the
conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In
a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its
execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the
contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed
for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all
evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts
with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate
and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may
be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled
or destroyed by the testator.
Molo vs. Molo G.R. No. L-2538
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a
revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was
survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and
nieces.
Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939
will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove
its due execution.
As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the
oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that
despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the
1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent
disallowed 1939 will
RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not
executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as
the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately
destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will
executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative
revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the
old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
Diaz v. De Leon G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922
Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the requirements
under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to him. As it was
returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse.
After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will has
already been destroyed.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will
RULING: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or
change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the
witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will
which was presented for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and
testament of testator.
Sulpicia Ventura vs Hon. Francis Militante
GR NO. 63145 October 5, 1999
TOPIC: After death: Legal Standing of estate in a court action
Private respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages against petitioner. The
complaint alleged, among others, that during the lifetime of Carlos Ngo, he was indebted with the plaintiff
which account was obtained by him for the benefit of his family and that the defendant thru Mrs. Ventura,
refused, failed and neglected to pay despite repeated demands.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the foregoing complaint on the ground that the estate of Carlos Ngo has
no legal personality, the same being neither a natural nor legal person in contemplation of law.
Petitioner insisted that since the money claim subject of this case actually represents the costs of
automotive spare parts/replacements contracted by deceased Carlos Ngo during his lifetime for the
benefit/business of the family x x x the conjugal partnership shall be accountable for the payment thereof.
Petitioner also argued that the action instituted by the private respondent is a money claim which,
under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, does not survive, the same having been filed
after Carlos Ngo had already died. She likewise claimed that the public respondent never acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case which, being an action to recover a sum of money from a
deceased person, may only be heard by a probate court.
For his part, private respondent insisted that petitioner, being the wife of the deceased Carlos Ngo,
is liable to pay the obligation which benefited their family.
Public respondent denied the motion of the defendant to dismiss the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate has a legal personality in a court action?
HELD: NO. Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A
deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion
to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent's estate cannot
be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a
nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court
to amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent,
a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court
action.
Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, private respondent may apply in court for
letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased Carlos Ngo if after thirty
(30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for administration or request that administration be
granted to some other person.
ALVAREZ VS IAC AND JESUS YANES, ET AL.
GR NO. L-68053 May 7,1990
TOPIC: Transmission of Rights
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents,
Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private
respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe.
It was established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the
outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not
visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share
of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and
Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.
Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of
P7,000.00. After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, his wife, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.
Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed a
complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds
of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823.
During the pendency in court of said case, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason. CFI, on the other hand, ordered the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the
plaintiffs said lots.
ISSUE. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or transmitted by
operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process?
HELD: YES. Petitioners contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B
made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez
or of his estate, after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus,
the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. URETA v. URETA
In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso,Prudencia, Vicente,
Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The children
of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the rest of Alfonso’s children and their descendants.
Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several fish pens, a fishpond, a sari-sari
store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. Policronio, the eldest, was
the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish schooling and instead worked on his father’s lands.
Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children, namely, Policronio, Liberato,Prudencia, and
Francisco, met at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in
order to reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he had sold some of his
lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels
of land in favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The
Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, infavor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are
the properties in dispute in this case. Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no
monetary consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their
produce.
When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted as the administrator of his father’s estate. He
was later succeeded by his sister Prudencia, and then by her daughter, Carmencita Perlas. Except for a
portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels transferred to Policronio were tenanted by the Fernandez
Family. These tenants never turned over the produce of the lands to Policronio or any of his heirs, but to
Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate. Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for
the said portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands.
On April 19, 1989, Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands
that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation
purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of
Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.
After their father’s death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering the six
parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25,
1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio. Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly
learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the
July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter.
ISSUE : Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid.
RULING: Yes.
It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real
property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one person to
the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing
in favour of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely a designation and
segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore,
be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is not necessary. In fact,
as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The
requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by
the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property
resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to
each heir. A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified,
expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the
other contracting party.
Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable,
but rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against Conrado’s co-heirs for having been
entered into without their authority.
RABADILLA vs. CA
A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee to a 511, 855
hectare land. A condition was however imposed to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime of said Maria
Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall continue
delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey the said land to the
estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply with the terms of the will; that
since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the land was mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near
descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near
descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits
of the devised land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of the Will left by Aleja
Belleza.
HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The “near descendants” being referred
to in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised property was already transferred
to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same
property was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of the
Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished
by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on
the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is
clear therefore, that Johnny should have continued complying with the terms of the Will. His failure to do
so shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey the property to the estate of Aleja.
RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ
Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French. In
the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1 st part to the widow, and 2nd part to the
grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3 was given to the
widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that
usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands
by aliens.
ISSUE: WON the ground for the opposition is correct.
HELD: No, it is not correct.
The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands
does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and
meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does
not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
DAVID A. NOVERAS vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS,
David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. They
have 2 children, Jerome and Jena. Leticia states that sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family to
live with his mistress. Further, she states that David executed an affidavit where he renounced all his
rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties in the Philippines.
After learning of the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce before the Superior Court of
California. Upon issuance of the judicial decree of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were awarded
to Leticia. Leticia then filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before the RTC of Baler,
Aurora.
The RTC regarded the petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as a petition for liquidation of
property since the spouses’ marriage has already been dissolved.
It classified their property relation as absolute community because they did not execute a marriage settlement
before their marriage ceremony. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of
processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the
US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The court awarded the properties
in the Philippines to David, subject to the payment of the children’s legitimes.
Upon Leticia’s appeal to the CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties be divided equally between
the spouses and that both should pay their children P520k. David argues that the Court should have
recognized the California judgment that awarded him the Philippine properties and that allowing Leticia
to share in the PH properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment considering she already owns all the US
properties.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved2.
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper
HELD: No. The trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage
between the parties. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign
authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof. Such publication must be authenticated by a seal of a consular
official. Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state that the copy is a correct copy of the original. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer. Based on the records, only the divorce
decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the
pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree,
it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding
directly to liquidation.
Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient
cause for judicial separation of property: xxxx(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Separation in fact for one
year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was no ttackled in the trial court’s because, the
trial =Court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties. The records of
this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and
that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the
Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been
cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who
worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed
as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for
divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.Having established that Leticia and David
had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of
property should be granted.
SPOUSES ILUMINADA CAPITLE and CIRILO CAPITLE, vs. FORTUNATAELBAMBUENA and
ROSALINDA C. OLAR,

A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued to Cristobal Olar (Olar) covering theLot
1849. Respondents Fortunata Elbambuena (Fortunata) and Rosalinda Olar (Rosalinda),spouse and
daughter-in-law, respectively, of Olar, now deceased, claim that Olar relinquished one-half lot to
Rosalinda by a "Kasunduan"
the execution of which was witnessed by petitioner Cirilo Capitle; and that the remaining portion of the lot
was surrendered to Fortunata by an undated document.
Respondents, alleged that on petitioners’ request, petitioners were allowed to occupy the lot to pursue a
means of livelihood. however, petitioners did not pay rentals despite demand and neither did they heed
the demand to return the possession of the lot, drawing respondents to file a Petition for Recovery of
Possession and Payment of Back Rentals before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) Regional Office docketed as DARAB Case No.
5987’NNE’96.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that they have been in possession of the lot since 1960.
They further claim that since 1959, respondent Fortunata was already separated from Olar and
she even remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit from Olar.
While respondents’ petition in DARAB Case No. 5987'NNE'96 was pending before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD),petitioners filed before the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of Talavera, Nueva Ecija a petition for cancellation of the CLOA issued toOlar,
docketed as DARAB Case No. 6261'NNE'97, claiming that they are the new farmer-beneficiaries
as shown by, among other things, the "Waiver of Rights" executed by Olar wherein he renounced
in their favor his rights and participation over the lot.
By Decision dated August 20, 1997, which jointly resolved the 2 petitions, the PARAD ruled in favor of
petitioners. DARAB set aside thePARAD’s decision. Appellate court affirmed in toto theDARAB decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not mere estrangement is a legal ground for disqualification as an heir of the
deceased.
HELD: NO. Petitioners’ argument that "[i]t would be absurd for [Olar] to bequeath his property to his
estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed helped him in tilling the property and [took] good care of
his needs," is a virtual admission that their possession was not in the concept of owners, they having
merely "helped" in tilling the lot, thereby acknowledging that Olar was the actual possessor and Even
assuming
Arguendo that petitioners were indeed the actual tillers of the lot, their petition for the cancellation of the
CLOA issued in favor of Olar would not bind respondents as they were not
impleaded. Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir, mere
estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the
deceased spouse. Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of Olar’s son. The two
are thus real parties-in-interest who stand to be injured or benefited by the judgment on the
cancellation of the CLOA issued in Olar’s name.
FRANCISCO vs FRANCISCO-ALFONSO 354 SCRA 112, G.R No. 138774, March 8, 2001
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso is the sole legitimate daughter of Gregorio Francisco while
Petitioners are daughters of the latter with his common law wife Julia Mendoza. Gregorio Francisco
owned two parcels of residential land situated in Bulacan. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in
1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificate of title of his property were in the possession
of the petitioners. When Gregorio died. Aida inquired about the certificate of title from petitioners and they
informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them in 1983as executed by a “Kasulatan”. After
verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioners.
In 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, a complaint against petitioners for annulment
of sale with damages. In their joint answer, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the
Deed of Sale. The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint while upon appeal the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the “Kasulatan” or Deed of Sale is valid.
HELD: The Kasulatan was simulated. There was no cause or consideration for the contract of sale. The
same was a simulation and hence, null and void. We find it incredible that engaging inbuy and sell could
raise the amount of P10,000.00 , or that earnings in selling goto could saveenough to pay P 15,000.00,
in cash for the land. The testimonies of petitioners were incredibleconsidering their inconsistent
statements as to whether there was consideration for the saleand also as to whether the property was
bought below or above its supposed market value.They could not even present a single witness to the
Kasulatan that would prove receipt of thepurchase price. The petition is hereby denied and decision of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of
their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not
inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent
thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary
assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their
inheritance.
Heirs of Feraren Vs. CA G.R. No. 159328
FACTS: On May 25, 1999, herein private respondent Celia Tadiar (Celia) filed with the MTC of San
Fernando, La Union a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against herein petitioners Heirs of Antonio Feraren.
In said Complaint, Celia alleged that she and her three brothers are co-owners of a 1,200 square meter
parcel of land located in the poblacion of San Fernando City in La Union; that on September 21, 1960,
the said lot was sold by their father to the spouses Antonio and Justina Feraren (Spouses Feraren) on
pacto de retro; it was stipulated that the right to repurchase may be exercised within ten years; on August
31, 1970, Celia and her co-heirs re-acquired the subject property; thereafter, the lot was leased on a
month-to-month basis to the Spouses Feraren who have constructed a residential house thereon; that
sometime in March 1992, Celia and her co-heirs informed the Spouses Feraren of their intention to
terminate their lease contract; the Spouses Feraren, in turn, offered to sell them their house or buy the
subject lot, which offers were declined by Celia and her co-heirs and, instead, allowed the Spouses
Feraren to continue renting the property; after the death of Antonio in 1995, herein petitioners requested
Celia and her co-heirs to extend the lease until June 30, 1997 and even volunteered to temporarily vacate
the said property; Celia and her co-heirs agreed and they did not even increase the rentals; nonetheless,
petitioners failed to comply with their commitment to temporarily vacate; they continued to stay within the
premises of the subject property and refused to vacate the same notwithstanding repeated demands from
Celia and her co-heirs
In their Answer, herein petitioners contended that a 128-square-meter portion of the lot being claimed by
private respondent is their property; even before the Spouses Feraren entered into a contract of sale with
pacto de retro with the father of Celia, the former were already in possession of the remaining portion of
the subject property on the strength of a lease contract executed in their favor by the latter in 1949; their
construction of a residential house on the subject property was by virtue of a right granted under the said
contract of lease; petitioners were very much willing to vacate the disputed lot but only upon payment of
the value of all the improvements that they have legally introduced as builders in good faith on the said
lot, which includes the house presently standing thereon as well as the concrete fence surrounding the
said house; in the alternative, they offered to buy the parcel of land subject of the complaint.
Petitioners allege in the instant petition that the house presently standing on the subject parcel of land is
different from the house built on the same lot in 1949. Petitioners insist on their claim that the house built
at the time that their parents were lessees of the subject property in 1949 was demolished to give way to
the construction of the present house which was erected sometime in the late 1960's when the said lot
was then owned by their parents by virtue of the pacto de retro sale executed in the latter's favor on
September 21, 1960.
ISSUE: Whether the house was built at the time petitioners' parents possessed the subject lot as
lessees.
HELD: Yes. the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that petitioners' statement in their Answer, that
their parents built the subject residential house as lessees under the authority given to them by private
respondent's father in their contract of lease executed in 1949, is a judicial admission. Under Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,21 petitioners may not contradict this judicial admission unless they are
able to show that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. In the
instant case, petitioners' subsequent claim in their Position Paper that their house was built during the
time that their parents were the owners of the disputed lot is a direct contradiction of their judicial
admission in their Answer. However, petitioners failed to prove that such admission was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Hence, they may not contradict the same.
Hence, under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of paying one-half of the value of the improvements
that the lessee made in good faith, which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, and
which have not altered the form and substance of the land. On the other hand, the lessee may remove
the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.22
It appears, nonetheless, that in her Complaint, private respondent prayed for the demolition of petitioners'
residential house constructed on the subject lot. It is, thus, clear that private respondent does not want to
appropriate the improvements. As such, petitioners cannot compel her to reimburse to them one-half of
the value of their house. The sole right of petitioners under Article 1678 then is to remove the
improvements without causing any more damage upon the property leased than is necessary.
Heirs of Joaquin Limense Vs. Vda. De Ramos G.R. No. 152319
FACTS: Lozada was the registered owner of a land in Manila, he subdivided his property into five and
gave the divided lots to his daughters through a deed of donation on March 9, 1932.
In 1981, Joaquin Limense wanted to build a hollow block fence on his property but could not
because a substantial portion of the respondent's building encroached upon portion of Limense property.
Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area, respondent ignored both oral and
written demands.
In the RTC, the respondents averred that they are daughters of on of the Lozada daughters. .
After subdividing the said lot, Dalmacio Lozada donated Lot No. 12-C in favor of his daughters Catalina,
married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud, married to Francisco Ramos.
Being the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos, respondents later became co-owners of Lot No. 12-C. Lot
No. 12-C has served as right of way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada since 1932 up
to the present. As a common alley, it could not be closed or fenced by Joaquin Limense without causing
damage and prejudice to respondents.
RTC: dismissed the complaint of Limense ruling that an apparent easement of right of way
existed in favor of respondents. The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which
forms the alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an alley.
Joaquin filed a notice of appeal but during the pendency of the appeal with the CA, Joaquin died.
His heirs then elevated the case to the SC via petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether CA committed a grave abuse amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that
respondent's lot has an easement of right of way.
HELD: In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC against respondents was an action for removal
of obstruction and damages. Respondents raised the defense that Joaquin Limense's title could have
been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation in the trial proceedings before the RTC. Such defense
is in the nature of a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.
As with the present case, the CA's observation that TCT No. 96886 is of dubious origin, as TCT
No. 40043 does not appear to have been disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and Salud Lozada, is improper
and constitutes an indirect attack on TCT No. 96886. As we see it, TCT No. 96886, at present, is the
best proof of Joaquin Limense’s ownership over Lot No. 12-C. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that
respondents and petitioners co-owned Lot No. 12-C, as said lot is now registered exclusively in the name
of Joaquin Limense.
Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered owner of Lot 12-C, and his successors-
in-interest, may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges,
or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware that Lot No. 12-C has been
continuously used and utilized as an alley by respondents and residents in the area for a long period of
time.
The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width and 17 meters
in length; the stairs; and the concrete structures are all within the 1/3 share allotted to them by their donor
Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a showing that respondents acted in bad faith when
they built portions of their house on Lot No. 12-C.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December
20, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C, covered by TCT No. 96886, between petitioners and
respondents.
2. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Manila, for further proceedings without
further delay to determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code.
Tuatis Vs. Sps. Eliseo and Visminda Escol G.R. No. 175399
FACTS: Visminda Escol, the seller and Ophelia Tuatis, the buyer entered into a Deed of Sale by
Installments, the subject matter of which is a parcel of land in Sindangan. It provided that upon the
failure of the buyer to pay the remaining balance within the time stipulated, he shall return the land to
the seller, and the seller shall return all the amounts paid by the buyer. Tuatis took possession of the
land and constructed a residential building. Tuatis asserted that she paid Visminda the remaining
balance of P3000 in the presence of one Erik Selda and thereafter requested Visminda to sign the
absolute deed of sale. Visminda refused contending that the purchase price has not been fully paid. The
RTC dismissed Tuatis’s complaint and also ruled that Tuatis constructed the building in bad faith for she
had knowledge of the fact that Visminda is still the absolute owner of the land and there was also bad
faith on the part of Visminda since she allowed the construction of the building without opposition on her
part. The rights of the parties must, therefore, be determined as if they both had acted in bad faith. Their
rights in such cases are governed by Article 448 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal by Tuatis which resulted to the finality of the appealed decision. Visminda filed a writ of
execution. Tuatis then moved that the RTC issue an order allowing her to buy the subject property and
maintained that she has the right to choose between being indemnified for the value of her building or
buying from Visminda the parcel of land. During the pendency of the motion, the writ of execution was
enforced. Tuatis filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus but the same was
denied hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Tuatis is entitled to exercise the options granted in Art. 448 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No, Tuatis is not entitled to exercise the options granted in Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Article 448 provides that the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted
in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees
after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof.
According to the provision, the landowner can choose between appropriating the building by
paying the proper indemnity for the same, as provided for in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.
Under the first option, Visminda may appropriate for herself the building on the subject property after
indemnifying Tuatis for the necessary and useful expenses the latter incurred for said building, as provided
in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Until Visminda appropriately indemnifies Tuatis for the building
constructed by the latter, Tuatis may retain possession of the building and the subject property.
Under the second option, Visminda may choose not to appropriate the building and, instead,
oblige Tuatis to pay the present or current fair value of the land.The P10,000.00 price of the subject
property, as stated in the Deed of Sale on Installment executed in November 1989, shall no longer apply,
since Visminda will be obliging Tuatis to pay for the price of the land in the exercise of Visminda’s rights
under Article 448 of the Civil Code, and not under the said Deed. Tuatis’ obligation will then be statutory,
and not contractual, arising only when Visminda has chosen her option under Article 448 of the Civil Code
Still under the second option, if the present or current value of the land, the subject property
herein, turns out to be considerably more than that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged
to pay for the subject property, but she must pay Visminda reasonable rent for the same. Visminda and
Tuatis must agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms.
The Court highlights that the options under Article 448 are available to Visminda, as the owner of the
subject property. There is no basis for Tuatis’ demand that, since the value of the building she constructed
is considerably higher than the subject property, she may choose between buying the subject property
from Visminda and selling the building to Visminda for P502,073.00. Again, the choice of options is for
Visminda, not Tuatis, to make. And, depending on Visminda’s choice, Tuatis’ rights as a builder under
Article 448 are limited to the following: (a) under the first option, a right to retain the building and subject
property until Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b) under the second option, a right not to be obliged
to pay for the price of the subject property, if it is considerably higher than the value of the building, in
which case, she can only be obliged to pay reasonable rent for the same.
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is
in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other
way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove
it from the land.
The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower
has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to
protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving
the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to
oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise
either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is
older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
Visminda’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution cannot be deemed as an expression of her
choice to recover possession of the subject property under the first option, since the options under Article
448 of the Civil Code and their respective consequences were also not clearly presented to her by the 19
April 1999 Decision of the RTC. She must then be given the opportunity to make a choice between the
options available to her after being duly informed herein of her rights and obligations under both.
Sps. Narvaez Vs. Sps. Alciso G.R. No. 165907
FACTS: Larry Ogas owned a parcel of land, and a portion was subject to a 30-year lease agreement with
Esso standard eastern, Inc. Ogas sold the property to his daughter Rose Alciso. Rose later sold the
property to Jaime Sansano, repurchased the property then sold it again to Celso Bate. I the deed of sale,
it stated that it recognizes the lease over the property in favor of ESSO, upon sale, the rights over the
land as lessor and seller were likewise transfers in full to Bate. The TCT was then cancelled and new
TCT was issued in the name of Bate.
Bate then sold the property to Narvaez. Alciso demanded a stipulation be made in the deed of sale
allowing her to repurchase the property from the Narvaez. Upon repurchasing the property, Narvaez and
Alciso did not reach an agreement for the price.
Alciso filed a complaint claiming that the intention of the parties was to enter into a contract of real estate
mortgage and not a contract of sale with right of repurchase.
RTC held that (1) the 25 August 1979 Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase became functus officio
when Alciso repurchased the property; (2) the action to annul the 28 March 1980 Deed of Absolute Sale
had prescribed; (3) Alciso had no legal personality to annul the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty;
(4) the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty contained a stipulation pour autrui in favor of Alciso —
Alciso could repurchase the property; (5) Alciso communicated to the Spouses Narvaez her acceptance
of the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui; (6) the repurchase price was P80,000; (7) Alciso could
either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity equivalent to one-half of its
market value when constructed or sell the land to the Spouses Narvaez; and (8) Alciso was entitled to
P100,000 attorney’s fees and P20,000 nominal damages.
Spouses Narvaez appealed to the CA claiming that (1) the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty did
not contain a stipulation pour autrui — not all requisites were present; (2) the RTC erred in setting the
repurchase price at P80,000; (3) they were purchasers for value and in good faith; and (4) they were
builders in good faith.
Court of Appeals held that (1) the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty contained a stipulation pour
autrui; (2) Alciso accepted the favor contained in the stipulation pour autrui; (3) the RTC erred in setting
the repurchase price at P80,000; (4) the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty involved a contract of
sale with right of repurchase and not real estate mortgage; (5) the Spouses Narvaez were builders in
good faith; and (6) Alciso could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity
or oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was considerably more than
that of the building. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the RTC for determination of the
property’s reasonable repurchase price.
ISSUE: Whether the repurchase of property is barred by not communicating the acceptance of the favor
contained in the stipulation pour autrui.
HELD: The petition is unmeritorious.
Article 1311, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code states the rule on stipulations pour autrui:
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment
provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit
or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately
conferred a favor upon a third person.
Listed down are the requisites of a stipulation pour autrui: (1) there is a stipulation in favor of a third
person; (2) the stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) the contracting parties clearly
and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person — the favor is not an incidental benefit; (4) the favor
is unconditional and uncompensated; (5) the third person communicated his or her acceptance of the
favor before its revocation; and (6) the contracting parties do not represent, or are not authorized by, the
third party.
All the requisites are present in the instant case: (1) there is a stipulation in favor of Alciso; (2) the
stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) Bate and the Spouses Narvaez clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor to Alciso; (4) the favor is unconditional and uncompensated; (5) Alciso
communicated her acceptance of the favor before its revocation — she demanded that a stipulation be
included in the 14 August 1981 Deed of Sale of Realty allowing her to repurchase the property from the
Spouses Narvaez, and she informed the Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to repurchase the property;
and (6) Bate and the Spouses Narvaez did not represent, and were not authorized by, Alciso
Cheng Vs. Sps. Donini G.R. No. 167017
FACTS: Cheng agreed to lease his property located in Mandaluyong City to the spouses who intended
to put a restaurant thereon, they agreed to a monthly rental of 17k to commence in December 1990.
Bearing an interim grant of authority executed by Cheng, spouses proceeded to introduce
improvements in the premises.
But before the business could take off and before final lease agreement could be drafted and signed,
the parties began to have serious disagreements regarding the terms and conditions. Cheng then
demanded for the deposits and rentals with the intention of not continuing with the lease. The spouses
ignored the demand and continued to occupy the premises until their caretaker voluntarily surrendered
the property to Cheng.
Spouses then filed an action for specific performance and damages with a prayer for the issues of writ
of preliminary injunction in RTC Pasig. Respondents prayed that petitioner be ordered to execute a
written lease contract for five years, deducting from the deposit and rent the cost of repairs in the
amount of P445,000, or to order petitioner to return their investment in the amount of P964,000 and
compensate for their unearned net income of P200,000 with interest, plus attorney’s fees.
Petitioner denied the claims and sought for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. RTC
favored the Cheng.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which, in its decision[5] dated March 31, 2004,
recalled and set aside the RTC decision, and entered a new one ordering petitioner to pay respondents
the amount of P964,000 representing the latter’s expenses incurred for the repairs and improvements of
the premises.
ISSUE: Whether the spouses are possessors in good faith.
HELD: The relationship between petitioner and respondents was explicitly governed by the Civil Code
provisions on lease, which clearly provide for the rule on reimbursement of useful improvements and
ornamental expenses after termination of a lease agreement. Article 1678 states:
If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease
is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the
termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even
though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may
remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor
does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
Contrary to respondents’ position, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code did not apply. Under these
provisions, to be entitled to reimbursement for useful improvements introduced on the property,
respondents must be considered builders in good faith. Articles 448 and 546, which allow full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made,
apply only to a possessor in good faith or one who builds on land in the belief that he is the owner
thereof. A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he
builds on it.
Respondents are not entitled to reimbursement for the ornamental expenses under the express
provision of Article 1678. Moreover, since they failed to remove these ornaments despite the
opportunity to do so when they vacated the property, then they were deemed to have waived or
abandoned their right of removal.
(1) petitioner Serafin Cheng is ORDERED to pay respondents, spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini,
the amount of P171,650.95 as indemnity for the useful improvements; and
(2) respondents, spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini, are ORDERED to pay petitioner Serafin Cheng
the following sums: (a) P100,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages and (c)
P25,000.00 attorney’s fees
Pecson Vs. CA G.R. No. 115814
FACTS: Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot on which he built a 4-door-2-storey
apartment building. He failed to pay realty taxes amounting to P12k so the lot was sold at public auction
to Mamerto Nepomuceno who later on sold it to the Sps. Nuguid.
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction before the RTC but was dismissed but the RTC held that
the apartment bldg was not subject of the litigation. On appeal, the CA appealed in toto the decision of
the RTC that the apartment bldg was not included in the auction sale.
After an entry of judgment was made, the Sps. Nuguid filed a motion with the RTC for a motion for
delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment bldg citing Art. 546 of the CC. The RTC issued an
order declaring that the owner of the lot and apartment bldg were the Sps. Nuguid and to pay the
construction cost of the apartment before a writ of possession would be issued and to pay rent to the
spouses. Pecson moved for reconsideration but the Trial court did not act on it, instead it issued a writ
of possession. The CA affirmed in part the decision declaring the cost of construction can be offset from
the amount of rents to be collected and that since Sps. Nuguid opted to appropriate the improvement,
Pecson is entitled to be reimbursed the cost of construction at the time it was built in 1965 which is at
P53k and the right the retain the improvement until full indemnity is paid.
ISSUE: Whether Art. 448 and 546 applies in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in analogy. Whoever is
the owner of the land may appropriate whatever has been built, planted or sown after paying indemnity.
However, it does not apply when the owner of the land is also the builder of the works on his own land
who later on loses ownership by sale or donation.
Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which shall be refunded to the possessor in good
faith with right of retention. However, it does not state how to determine the value of the useful
improvement. The respondents [court and private respondents alike] espouses as sufficient
reimbursement the cost of construction in 1965, however, this is contrary to previous rulings which
declares that the value to the reimbursed should be the present market value of said improvements so
as not to unjustly enrich either of the parties. [the trial court erred in ordering Pecson to pay rent since the
Sps. Nuguid has yet to pay the indemnity therefore Pecson has the right to retain the improvements and
the income thereof. The case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the current market value
of the apartment bldg and ordered the Sps to pay Pecson otherwise it shall be restored to Pecson until
payment of indemnity.
Heirs of Narvasa Vs. Imbornal G.R. No. 182908
FACTS: Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Pangasinan which she conveyed to her
three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920. Meanwhile,
Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a homestead patent over a
31,367-sq. m. riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian,
Pangasinan.
He was eventually awarded Homestead Patent No. 24991 therefor, and, on December 5, 1933,
OCT No. 1462 was issued in his name. Later, or on May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cancelled, and
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 101495 was issued in the name of Ciriaco’s heirs, namely:
Margarita Mejia; Rodrigo Abrio, marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio, married to Crisenta Corpuz;
Remedios Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito Abrio; Dominador Abrio; Francisca Abrio; Violeta
Abrio; and Perla Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco). Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of
the Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion.
Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the southern portion
of the Motherland. On August 15, 1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano,
married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First Accretion.
Decades later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less,
abutted the First Accretion on its southern portion.
On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents covering the
Second Accretion. Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of
Alejandra and Balbina, filed on February 27,1984 an Amended Complaint
for reconveyance, partition, and/or damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978.
They anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife Catalina, urged Balbina
and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property. Likewise, Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud,
falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First Accretion, and the
respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the said accretions
in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners (as they did not own
the Motherland to which the accretions merely formed adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et
al. explained that they did not assert their inheritance claims over the Motherland and the two (2)
accretions because they respected respondents’ rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents
have repudiated their (Francisco, et al.’s) shares thereon.
Thus, bewailing that respondents have refused them their rights not only with respect to the Motherland,
but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance of said properties,
or, in the alternative, the payment of their value, as well as the award of moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P150,000.00, including attorney’s fees and other
costs.
On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Francisco, et al. and thereby
directed respondents to: (a) reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland and
in the accretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent; and (b) pay actual damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the sum of
P10,000.00, as well as costs of suit.
On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision and
entering a new one declaring: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco as the exclusive owners of the Motherland;
(b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano asthe exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the
descendants of Pablo (i.e., respondents collectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion. At
odds with the CA’s disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May 7, 2008, hence, this petition taken by the
latter’s heirs as their successors-in-interest.
Issue/s: (a) WON the descendants of Ciriaco are the exclusive owners of the Motherland;
(b) WON the descendants of respondent Victoriano are the exclusive owners of the First Accretion;
(c) WON the descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of the Second
Accretion on the basis of the following grounds:
(1) prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as
an affirmative defense in the Amended Answer, and
(2) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and
Ciriaco.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.
A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.
At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the Motherland and the First Accretion
are barred by prescription. To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-ownership over the
Motherland, alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trust for their predecessors-in interest
Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that respondents
acquired the First and Second Accretions by means of fraud and deceit.
When property is registered in another’s name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor
of the true owner. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10
years. The reference point of the 10-yearprescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the
issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property
as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the
property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession
of the property does not run against him.
Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years from the registration of the
respective titles covering the disputed properties within which to file their action for reconveyance, taking
into account the fact that they were never in possession of the said properties. Hence, with respect tot he
Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action for
reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5, 1943; with respect to the First Accretion
covered by OCT No. P-318 issued on August 15, 1952 in the name of respondent Victoriano, an action
of the same nature should have been filed until August 15, 1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second
Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481 issued on November 10, 1978in the name of the respondents, a
suit for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until November 10, 1988. A judicious perusal of the
records, however, will show that the Amended Complaint covering all three (3) disputed properties was
filed only on February 27, 1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within
which to seek the reconveyance of two (2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and the First
Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the Second Accretion having been
seasonably filed.
B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.
The main thrust of Francisco, et al.’s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen between the
Imbornal sisters, on the one hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland. A homestead
patent award requires proof that the applicant meets the stringent conditions set forth under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and
improvement of the homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that
Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary for the grant of his
homestead patent application. As such, it is highly implausible that the Motherland had been acquired
and registered by mistake or through fraud as would create an implied
trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco. Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was
issued in his name pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 24991 on December 15, 1933, Ciriaco’s title to
the Motherland had become indefeasible. It bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration that
led to the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in Ciriaco’s name are
presumptively regular and proper, which presumption has not been overcome by the evidence presented
by Francisco, et al. Consequently, as Francisco, et al. failed to prove their ownership rights over the
Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the First Accretion and, necessarily, the Second
Accretion, must likewise fail. A further exposition is apropos.
As regards the third issue, being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the
riparian or littoral owner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area. Accordingly, therefore,
alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial
property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only
restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under
the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by
third persons.
In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners are not the riparian owners of
the Motherland to which the First Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over the
First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they
also have no right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these
properties through prescription as it was ·not established that they were in possession of any of them.
Therefore, whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible conclusion
is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over
the First and Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be
reconveyed in their favor. This is especially so since on the other end of the fray lie respondents armed
with a certificate of title in their names covering the First and Second Accretions coupled with their
possession thereof, both of which give rise to the superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners'
action for reconveyance with respect to both accretions must altogether fail. WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED.
Republic Vs. Santos III G.R. No. 160453
FACTS: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan
A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square
meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, and was bounded in the
Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by
the Paraque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also
owned by Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to
include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged
that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public,
continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.
ISSUE: Whether the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of accretion.
HELD: No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit
of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects
of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion.
The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river
banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not
recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right
to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of
the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and
categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and
categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and fundamental
duty of courts is then to apply the law.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of
the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It
follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of
public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong
to some other person.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to
make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance
because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that
the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is
simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent
to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B
that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than
thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other
means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by
the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a
showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners
of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to
acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the
natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of
public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the
Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already
declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property
through prescription.
Sps. Galang Vs. Sps. Reyes G.R. No. 184746
FACTS: On September 4, 1997, spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes filed a case for
the annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-928 against spouses Crispin and Caridad
Galang with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo.
Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties: (1) a subdivision project known as Ponderosa Heights
Subdivision (Ponderosa), and (2) an adjoining property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 185252, with an area of 1,201 sq.m.; that the properties were separated by the Marigman Creek,
which dried up sometime in 1980 when it changed its course and passed through Ponderosa; that the
Galangs, by employing manipulation and fraud, were able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried
up creek bed from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that they discovered the
existence of the certificate of title sometime in March 1997 when their caretaker, Federico Enteroso
(Enteroso), informed them that the subject property had been fraudulently titled in the names of the
Galangs; that in 1984, prior to such discovery, Enteroso applied for the titling of the property, as he had
been occupying it since 1968 and had built his house on it; that, later, Enteroso requested them to
continue the application because of financial constraints on his part.
The Galangs in their Answer denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a creek and
countered that OCT No. P-928 was issued to them after they had complied with the free patent
requirements of the DENR, that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in possession,
occupation, cultivation, and ownership of the land for quite some time; that the property described under
TCT No. 185252 belonged to Apolonio Galang, their predecessor-in-interest, under OCT No. 3991; that
the property was transferred in the names of the Reyeses through falsified document; that assuming ex
gratia argumenti that the creek had indeed changed its course and passed through Ponderosa, the
Reyeses had already claimed for themselves the portion of the... dried creek which adjoined and co-
existed with their property; that Enteroso was able to occupy a portion of their land by means of force,
coercion, machinations, and stealth in 1981; In its Decision, dated July 16, 2004, the RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action and for being an erroneous remedy.
In the case before the trial court, the Reyeses presented no evidence of fraud despite their allegations
that the Galangs were not in possession of the property and that it was part of a dried creek. There
being no evidence, these contentions remained allegations and could not defeat the title of the Galangs.
The fraud must be actual, the evidence thereof must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant, because the proceedings which are being assailed as having been fraudulent are judicial
proceedings, which by law, are presumed to have been fair and regular.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. P-928 and the
reconveyance of the land to the Reyeses.
The free... patent covering the subject land, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto, are null and void. The Galangs moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the private respondents has the sole the sole authority to file a case for annulment of
title involving public land.
HELD: Regarding the first issue, the Galangs state that the property was formerly a public land, titled in
their names by virtue of Free Patent No. 045802-96-2847 issued by the DENR. Thus, they posit that the
Reyeses do not have the personality and authority to institute any action for annulment of title because
such authority is vested in the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General.
In this regard, the Galangs are mistaken. The action filed by the Reyeses seeks the transfer to their
names of the title registered in the names of the Galangs. In their Complaint, they alleged that: first,
they are the owners of the land, being the owners of the properties through which the Marigman creek
passed when it changed its course; and second, the Galangs illegally dispossessed them by having the
same property registered in their names. It was not an action for reversion which requires that the State
be the one to initiate the action in order for it to prosper.
In this case, the complaint instituted by the Reyeses before the RTC was for the annulment of the title
issued to the Galangs, and not for reversion. Thus, the real party in interest here is not the State but the
Reyeses who claim a right of ownership over the property in question even before the issuance of a title
in favor of the Galangs. Although the Reyeses have the right to file an action for reconveyance, they
have failed to prove their case.
Court agrees with the RTC that the Reyeses failed to adduce... substantial evidence to establish their
allegation that the Galangs had fraudulently registered the subject property in their names.
Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be
shown, that is, it must be proven that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made
intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must prove three key elements by clear and
convincing evidence. These are: (1) the old course of the creek, (2) the new course of the creek, and (3)
the change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence.
Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old course, its natural abandonment and the
new course.
The bottom line here is that, fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and
annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
with mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which must be
proved.
Fernando Vs. Acuna G.R. No. 161030
FACTS: A parcel of land was registered in the names of Spouses Jose Fernando and Lucila Tinio and
spouses Antonia Fernando and Felipe Galvez. When they died inestestate, the property remained
undivided. The heirs and successors-in-interest, herein petitioners (Jose and Zoilo Fernando, Norma
Fernando Banares, Rosario Fernando Tangkencgo, heirs of Tomas Fernando, heirs of Guillermo
Fernando, heirs of Iluminada Fernando and heirs of Germogena Fernando) failed to agree on the division
of the subject property. Thus, except for the heirs of Germogena Fernando, filed a Complaint for partition
against the heirs of Germogena Fernando praying that the subject property be partitioned into 8 equal
parts corresponding to the hereditary interest of each group of heirs.
In his Complaint in intervention, 1998, respondent Leon Acuna averred that the portion of the
property identified as Lot 1303 was already adjudicated the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. He
likewise claimed the portion identified as Lot 1302 was also already adjudicated to other people as well.
TC found that Lot 1302 was already titled in the names of third persons. With respect to Lot 1303
TC found out that the November 1929 decision was never executed and has already prescribed. TC
ordered the reversion of Lot 1303 to the ownership of spouses Jose Fernando and Lucila Tinio and
spouses Antonia Fernando and Felipe Galvez and allowed the partition of Lot 1303 among petitioners as
successors-in-interest of said registered owners. Excluded from the partition, however, were the portions
of the property which petitioners admitted had been sold or transferred to Ruperta Sto. Domingo
Villasenor and respondent Acuna.
With respect to Sapang Bayan, TC found that the same had not been alleged in the pleadings
nor raised as an issue during the pre-trial conference. Also, according to the trial court, the parties failed
to clearly show whether Sapang Bayan was previously a dry portion of either Lot 1302 or Lot 1303. Neither
was there any proof that Sapang Bayan was a river that just dried up or that it was an accretion which the
adjoining lots gradually received from the effects of the current of water. It was likewise not established
who were the owners of the lots adjoining Sapang Bayan. The trial court concluded that none of the
parties had clearly and sufficiently established their claims over Sapang Bay.
All the parties, with the except Acuna, elevated this case to the CA which
REVERSED and SET ASIDE the desicsion. Hence, plaintiffs and defendants in the court to SC for review.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners can validly claim the ownership of the Sapang Bayan.
HELD: NO. CA erred in ruling that the principle of accretion is applicable. the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the principle of accretion is applicable ("to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." Art. 457,
CC) The character of the Sapang Bayan property was not shown to be of the nature that is being referred
to in the provision which is an accretion known as alluvion. In fact the parties could not agree how Sapang
Bayan came about. Whether it was a gradual deposit received from the river current or a dried-up creek
bed connected to the main river could not be ascertained.
Even assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek bed, under Article 420, paragraph 1
and Article 502, of the CC, rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion. In the absence
of any provision of law vesting ownership of the dried-up river bed in some other person, it must
continue to belong to the State.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals Court ruled that lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan
river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420. They are not open
to registration under the Land Registration act. Furthermore, in Celestial v. Cachopero, the Court similarly
ruled that a dried-up creek bed is property of public dominion: A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a
recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under
Article 420 the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the
government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.
Therefore, on the basis of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, Sapang Bayan cannot be adjudged
to any of the parties in this case.
Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque Vs. Ebio G.R. No. 178411
FACTS: Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in Parañaque City
covered by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.
Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose
Vitalez, which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously
and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavitdeclaring
possession and occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964
and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the
construction of their house within the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rights over the land
in favor of Ebio.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No.
08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an
access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma
Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents
immediately opposed and the project was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and
the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.
On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property.
Respondents sent a reply asserting their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further
dialogue. The request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005
and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the State may build on the land in question.
HELD: No. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have
gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership
over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in
relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by
accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do
not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate
to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject
to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how
long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding
property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the
State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual
and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by
clear provision of law.
New Regent Sources, Inc. Vs. Tanjuatco G.R. No. 168800
FACTS: The petitioner filed a complaint on rescission/declaration of nullity of contract,
reconveyance and damages against the respondent. Petitioner allegedly authorized
Vicente Cuevas being its Chairman and President to apply on its behalf to acquire
two parcels of land by right of accretion. Cuevas applied the lot in his name and while
pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands he assigned his rights to
the respondent. An order from the Director of Lands was issued transferring rights from
Cuevas to Tanjuatco. During the preliminary hearing, respondent filed a motion for
demurrer of evidence after the petitioner presented their evidence. The RTC dismissed
the case for insufficiencies of evidence and ruled that respondent is an innocent purchaser
hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is an innocent purchaser of the property in dispute?
HELD: The court held that to warrant a reconveyance of land where the mode of acquiring a
property is by accretion, the following requisites should be met: (1) that the deposition
of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action
of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent
to the banks of rivers. It is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the
benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant
evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably
failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the
foregoing requisites. Respondent derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. A
certification was issued confirming that said lands were verified to be Alienable and
Disposable property of the State entitling it to transfer ownership to the respondent.
Moreover, petitioners failed to establish fraudulent registration of ownership of the title
to respondent since they did not provide evidence that Cuevas is empowered by the
petitioner to apply a registration of the property in their behalf. The respondent may
safely rely on what appears on the face of the registered title hence he is a buyer in good
faith. Petitioner was not able to substantiate its claim for ownership of the property
therefore their claim for reconveyance should be denied.
De Nazareno Vs. CA G.R. No. 98045
FACTS: Sometimes in 1979, PR Salasalan and Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses
stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, PR
allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC of CDO.
A decision was rendered against PR, which decision was affirmed by the RTC of Misamis Oriental, before
he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the Survey plan with a view of
perfecting his title over the accretion are being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be
released to the applicant, however it was protested by PR before the Bureau of Land.
 Upon investigating of the RD of Bureau of Land, it was recommended that Survey Plan in the
name of Antonio Nazareno who denied the motion, Respondent Director of Land then ordered him to
vacate the portion adjudicated to private respondent be placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners
Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for
annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and recommendation by
respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of
respondent Hilario and order of execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the administrative decision of
the
Bureau of Lands, On Appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complain.
ISSUE: Whether the subject land is public land.
HELD: Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property,
applying Art. 457 of the Civil Code which provides:
 To the owner of lands adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effect of the current of the water.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art.
457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites.
a. That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
b. That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea).
c. That the land where takes place is adjacent to the bank of river (or the sea cost).
These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owner of lands adjoining the
bank of rivers or stream any accretion gradually received from the effect of the current of waters.
Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands, classified the subject land as an accretion are which was formed by
deposits of sawdust in Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection
conducted by the Bureau of Land
Meneses Vs. CA G.R. No. 82220
FACTS: On March 1, 1977, Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baños, Laguna, issued to
Pablito Meneses 2 Free Patent and 2 OCT covering lots located in Los Baños, Laguna.
Pablito acquired said property from Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights executed
in 1975 in consideration of Bautista’s “love and affection” for and “some monetary obligations” in favor
of Meneses. After the execution of said document, Meneses took possession of the land, introduced
improvements thereon, declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty
taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the land from his aunt. He had been occupying the land since 1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of their land as far back as 1919 when their
matriarch was issued an OCT covering a lot, with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The
same parcel of land was registered on 1973 under a TCT in the names of her heirs, all surnamed
Quisumbing.
The Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an additional area which had
gradually accrued to their property by the natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. The CFI of
Biñan confirmed the Quisumbings’ title thereto.
In 1979, the Quisumbings filed a case before the CFI of Calamba against Lorenzo and Pablito
Meneses, Darum and Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses.
They alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baños, using his brother Pablito as a “tool
and dummy,” illegally occupied their “private accretion land” and confederating with District Land Officer
Darum and Land Inspector Almendral, obtained free patents and OCTs to the land.
In 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by the Meneses brothers
are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid right as owners of the riparian land to which
nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. (The lots occupied by Meneses, as found by the court,
are to be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by the Quisumbings. )
Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the to the CA, which affirmed in toto the lower
court’s decision.The defendants-appellants filed two MRs of the CA decision but it was denied, hence
this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: 1 Whether the lands in question are not accretion lands but lands of the public domain
2. Whether there is conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the issuance of the free
patent and titles to Pablito Meneses
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision CA is AFFIRMED
While the lots occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners are claiming
here, the two cases refer to the same accretion lands northwest of the original land owned by the
Quisumbings.
The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains “falling directly on or
flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources.” Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not
due to “flux and reflux of tides” it cannot be considered a foreshore land. The land sought to be
registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the
Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property
provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.
Additionally, the provision of the law on waters will govern in determining the natural bed or basin of the
lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:
Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers and lakes by accessions
or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is necessary in order to acquire ownership of
the alluvial formation as the law does not require the same.
2. As found by the CA, petitioners conspired in the approval and grant of the free patents heirs
Quisumbing. Such fraud was confirmed by this Court in Meneses v. People, which held the petitioners
therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in the issuance of the same free
patents and titles. In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the defendants guilty
as charged. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.
NOTES:
1. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of these requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).
2. The task of fixing the amount of damages is primarily with the trial court. While it is the appellate
court’s duty to review the same, a reduction of the award of damages must pass the test of
reasonableness. The CA can only modify or change the amount awarded as damages when they are
palpably or scandalously and reasonably excessive.
3. A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for
official actions.
Palaganas Vs. PalaganasG.R. No. 169144
FACTS: Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, died single and childless. Inthe last will
and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio, as theexecutor of her will
for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta, filed with
the RTC, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of
her estate. However, Manueland Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta , opposed the petition on the ground that
Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel
and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid
nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the
consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified toact as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign -based siblings, Gloria and Sergio, were on separateoccasions in the
Philippines for a short visit, Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave totake their deposition, which it
granted. The RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not
Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippiines.The RTC issued an
order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointingErnesto as special administrator at the
request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated inthe will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto. Manuel and Benjaminappealed to the CA arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S.cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. The
appellate court, in its decision,affirmed the order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the
probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the
documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2,
Rule76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its
execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has
not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
HELD: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same
have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given
legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California,
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before
admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign
country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent
court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance,
since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In
reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its
jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Vda. De Perez Vs. Tolete G.R. No. 76714
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens
and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on
presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the
husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that
gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate
proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing
that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed
in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his
brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings,
which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in
accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York,
the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE: Whether the reprobate of the will be allowed
HELD: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this
country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws
is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the
testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted
to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970
ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for
the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country
is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always
considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself
an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings.
Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose
order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876
[1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2)
means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will"
or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are
required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of
the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
"court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed
to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable
time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses
and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all
pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
Accession Cases G.R. No. 206534, October 05, 2016
JULIA LIM ROSARIO, MERCEDES LIM CUSTODIO AS REPRESENTED BY DONNO CUSTODIO,
NORMA LICARDO, AND LEILA ESPIRITU, v. ALFONSO LIM,
Brigida Aquino Lim acquired a leasehold right over a government-owned lot in Hilltop-Kayang,
Baguio City, pursuant to City Council Resolution. Later, Brigida and his son, respondent Alfonso Lim,
allegedly entered into an agreement for the construction of a building on said property, which would be
fully financed by the latter. Brigida executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights, categorically waiving,
renouncing, and transferring all her rights and interests over the leased lot in Alfonso's favor.
However, Brigida executed another affidavit assailing the validity of the previously executed
documents and stating that she and her husband, Luis, were the real owners of the property and that
Alfonso never caused and paid for the construction of the subject building.
Brigida died intestate. Subsequently, Alfonso and his sisters, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
for the estates of their parents without including the disputed property. However, after six (6) years,
petitioners filed a Complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Estate.
The RTC ruled that the parties are co-owners of the disputed property and ordered its partition
among them in equal shares.
Aggrieved, Alfonso elevated the case to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision granting the
petition.
Issue:
whether the property in question should be included in Brigida's estate and be divided in equal shares
among her children.
Brigida acquired the disputed property during the subsistence of her marriage to Luis. It likewise
appears that the title to said property remains in Brigida's name.
It was never Brigida's intention to give the exclusive ownership of the contested lot to Alfonso,
and the title to the same was never transferred in anybody else's name.
The CA concluded that Alfonso was the owner of the building simply based on the assailed
agreement between Alfonso and Brigida, building contract with a certain contractor, Romeo Laigo, tax
declarations, and various acknowledgment receipts and commercial invoices for construction materials.
But while the CA utilized said affidavit to uphold Brigida's ownership of the lot, it ignored the other portions
which categorically declared that the money used for, the development of the building had actually come
from Brigida and Luis and not from Alfonso, who was jobless and had no sufficient source of income at
that time to finance the construction of a building. Said affidavit indubitably exposes the fact that Brigida
never intended to transfer the sole ownership of the contested property to her only son, but wanted it to
benefit all of her children, and that whatever document she may have had executed in the past was
fraudulently acquired and not obtained with her valid consent.
Further, Alfonso failed to present any proof that the money used for the erection of the building
in question actually came from him and that he indeed possessed sufficient financial capacity to cause
the construction of the structure.
The abovementioned findings of fact of the trial court must be accorded respect and great weight.
It is a hornbook doctrine that the trial court's factual findings, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons since
it is in a better position to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.leslaw
Neither can Alfonso lean on the supposed tax declarations in his name as these are not
conclusive evidence of ownership unlike a certificate of title which indicates true and legal ownership by
the registered owners.10 Thus, Articles 44811 and 54612 of the Civil Code find no application in this case,
but the doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that is, the ownership of the property gives the
right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto,
either naturally or artificially.13 Verily, the RTC aptly held that preponderance of evidence must shift in
favor of petitioners and the contested properties should necessarily form part of Brigida's estate.
G.R. No. 183416, October 05, 2016 PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF AGUSAN DEL SUR, v. FILIPINAS
PALM OIL PLANTATION, INC.,
 Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation Inc. (Filipinas) is a private organization engaged in palm oil
plantation5 with a total land area of more than 7,000 hectares of National Development Company (NDC)
lands in Agusan del Sur.
The Provincial-Assessor of Agusan del Sur (Provincial Assessor) assessed Filipinas' properties found
within the plantation area,13 which Filipinas assailed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
(LBAA).
The LBAA found that the P207.00 market value declared in the assessment by the Provincial
Assessor was unreasonable.16 It found that the market value should not have been more than P85.00
per oil palm tree.17 The sudden increase of realty tax assessment level from P42.00 for each oil palm
tree in 1993 to P207.00 was confiscatory.
The LBAA adopted Filipinas' claim that the basis for assessment should only be 98 trees. The
LBAA exempted the low-cost housing units from taxation except those with a market value of more than
P150,000.00 under the Local Government Code.24 Finally, the LBAA considered the road equipment and
mini haulers as movables that are vital to Filipinas' business.
Board decided to set aside the decision rendered by the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of
the Province of Agusan del Sur.
The Provincial Assessor filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals, which, in turn,
sustained the CBAA's Decision.
The Court of Appeals held that the land owned by NGPI-NGEI, which Filipinas has been leasing,
cannot be subjected to real property tax since these are owned by cooperatives that are tax-exempt as
provided by Section 133(n) of the Local Government Code.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the CBAA that the roads constructed by Filipinas had become
permanent improvements on the land owned by NGPI-NGEI.37 Articles 440 and 445 of the Civil Code
provide that these improvements redound to the benefit of the land owner under the right of accession
On the road equipment and mini haulers as real properties subject to tax, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the CBAA's Decision that these are only movables.
The Court of Appeals held that Section 19 (o) of the Local Government Code should be
construed to include machineries covered by the meaning of real properties provided for under Article
415(5) of the Civil Code:
Issues:
First, whether the exemption privilege of NGPI-NGEI from payment of real property tax extends to
respondent Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation Inc. as lessee of the parcel of land owned by cooperatives
Second, whether respondent's road equipment and mini haulers are movable properties and have not
been immobilized by destination for real property taxation.
Held:
Under Section 133(n) of the Local Government Code, the taxing power of local government units
shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees, or charges on duly registered cooperatives under the
Cooperative Code.61 Section 234(d) of the Local Government Code specifically provides for real property
tax exemption to cooperatives:
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. — The following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax:
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under [Republic Act] No. 6938.
NGPI-NGEI, as the owner of the land being leased by respondent, falls within the purview of the law.
Section 234 of the Local Government Code exempts all real property owned by cooperatives without
distinction. Nothing in the law suggests that the real property tax exemption only applies when the property
is used by the cooperative itself. Similarly, the instance that the real property is leased to either an
individual or corporation is not a ground for withdrawal of tax exemption.
Thus, reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of the Local Government C[ode], we
conclude that as a general rule, as laid down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local government units
cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia, "taxes, fees and charges of any kind on the National Government,
its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units"; however, pursuant to Section 232,
provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax
except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to
a taxable person," as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234.
As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the Local Government Code
prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code,
except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock
and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the L[ocal]
Gfovernment] C[ode]. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234 which enumerates the properties
exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the
exemption insofar as real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated
therein; all others not included in the enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the L[ocal]
G[overnment] C[ode]. Moreover, even as to real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any
of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is
withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has been granted to a taxable person for consideration
or otherwise.
The petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133 that the taxing powers of the
local government units cannot extend to the levy of:
(o) taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies or instrumentalities, and
local government units.
It must show that the parcels of land in question, which are real property, are any one of those
enumerated in Section 234, either by virtue of ownership, character, or use of the property.
It cannot be disputed that the ownership of the road that was constructed by appellee belongs
to the government by right accession not only because it is inherently incorporated or attached to the
timber land leased to appellee but also because upon the expiration of the concession, said road would
ultimately pass to the national government. ... In the second place, while the road was constructed by
appellee primarily for its use and benefit, the privilege is not exclusive, for, under the lease contract
entered into by the appellee and the government and by public in by the general. Thus, under said lease
contract, appellee cannot prevent the use of portions, of the concession for homesteading purposes. ... It
is also in duty bound to allow the free use of forest products within the concession for the personal use of
individuals residing in or within the vicinity of the land. ... In other words, the government has practically
reserved the rights to use the road to promote its varied activities. Since, as above shown, the road in
question cannot be considered as an improvement which belongs to appellee, although in part is for its
benefit, it is clear that the same cannot be the subject of assessment within the meaning of section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 470.
The roads that respondent constructed became permanent improvements on the land owned by
the NGPI-NGEI by right of accession under the Civil Code, thus:
Article 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially. . . .
Article 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or repairs
made thereon, belong to the owner of the land.
Despite the land being leased by respondent when the roads were constructed, the ownership
of the improvement still belongs to NGPI-NGEI. As provided under Article 440 and 445 of the Civil Code,
the land is owned by the cooperatives at the time respondent built the roads. Hence, whatever is
incorporated in the land, either naturally or artificially, belongs to the NGPI-NGEI as the landowner.
There is no dispute that the roads are on the land owned by NGPI Multi-Purpose Cooperative
which leased the same to Petitioner-Appellee. These roads belong to the Multi-Purpose Cooperative, not
only by right of accession but also by express provisions of the Contract of Lease. NGPI-NGEI, as owner
of the roads that permanently became part of the land being leased by respondent, shall be liable for real
property taxes, if any. However, by express provision of the Local Government Code, NGPI-NGEI is
exempted from payment of real property tax.
II
The road equipment and mini haulers shall be considered as real property, subject to real
property tax.
Section 199(o) of the Local Government Code defines "machinery" as real property subject to
real property tax,85 thus:
SECTION 199. Definition of Terms. — When used in this Title, the term:
(o) "Machinery" embraces machines, equipment, mechanical contrivances, instruments, appliances or
apparatus which may or may not be attached, permanently or temporarily, to the real property. It includes
the physical facilities for production, the installations and appurtenant service facilities, those which are
mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, and those not permanently attached to the real property which are
actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of the particular industry, business or activity
and which by their very nature and purpose are designed for, or necessary to its manufacturing, mining,
logging, commercial, industrial or agricultural purposes.
Article 415(5) of the New Civil Code defines "machinery" as that which constitutes an immovable property:
Article 415. The following are immovable property:
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works.
While the Local Government Code still does not provide for a specific definition of "real property,"
Sections 199(o) and 232 of the said Code, respectively, gives an extensive definition of what constitutes
"machinery" and unequivocally subjects such machinery to real property tax. The Court reiterates that the
machinery subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code "may or may not be attached,
permanently or temporarily to the real property"; and the physical facilities for production, installations,
and appurtenant service facilities, those which are mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, or are not
permanently attached must (a) be actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of the
particular industry, business, or activity; and (b) by their very nature and purpose, be designed for, or
necessary for manufacturing, mining, logging, commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes.
Article 415, paragraph (5) of the Civil Code considers as immovables or real properties
"[m]achinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works." The Civil Code, however, does not define "machinery."
Section 199(o) of the Local Government prevails over Article 415(5) of the Civil Code. As
between the Civil Code, a general law governing property and property relations, and the Local
Government Code, a special law granting local government units the power to impose real property tax,
then the latter shall prevail.
Therefore, for determining whether machinery is real property subject to real property tax, the
definition and requirements under the Local Government Code are controlling.
Under the definition provided in Section 199(o) of the Local Government Code, the road
equipment and the mini haulers are classified as machinery, thus:
SECTION 199. Definition of Terms. — When used in this Title, the terra:
(o) "Machinery" . . . includes the physical facilities for production, the installations and appurtenant service
facilities, those which are mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, and those not permanently attached to
the real property which are actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of the particular
industry, business or activity and which by their very nature and purpose are designed for, or necessary
to its manufacturing, mining, logging, commercial, industrial or agricultural purposes.
Petitioner is correct in claiming that the phrase pertaining to physical facilities for production is
comprehensive enough to include the road equipment and mini haulers as actually, directly, and
exclusively used by respondent to meet the needs of its operations in palm oil production.96 Moreover,
"mini-haulers are farm tractors pulling attached trailers used in the hauling of seedlings during planting
season and in transferring fresh palm fruits from the farm [or] field to the processing plant within the
plantation area."97 The indispensability of the road equipment and mini haulers in transportation makes
it actually, directly, and exclusively used in the operation of respondent's business.
G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016
PABLO M. PADILLA, JR. AND MARIA LUISA P. PADILLA, Petitioners, v. LEOPOLDO MALICSI,
LITO CASINO, AND AGRIFINO GUANES, Respondents.
Spouses Padilla bought a parcel of land in Magsaysay Norte, Cabanatuan City in 1984.
Sometime in 1998, Spouses Padilla discovered that Leopoldo Malicsi, Lito Casino, and Agrifino Guanes
(Malicsi, et al.) constructed houses on their lot.
Spouses Padilla made repeated verbal and written demands for Malicsi, et al. to vacate the
premises and pay a monthly rental of P2,000.00, but Malicsi, et al. refused to heed Spouses Padilla's
demands.
Spouses Padilla filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Malicsi, et al., along with
three (3) others. Malicsi, et al. alleged that they believed in all honesty and good faith that the lot belonged
to Toribia Vda. De Mossessgeld (De Mossessgeld).11 They claimed that they possessed the land and
built their houses on the lot only after receiving De Mossessgeld's permission.
Between 1980 and 1983, Malicsi, et al. constructed their respective houses on the lot in the
belief that they would eventually own the areas they were occupying. Malicsi and Casino even introduced
improvements to the houses they had built.
Spouses Padilla, exercising their option to sell the land to Malicsi, et al. under Article 448 of the
Civil Code in the amount of P5,000.00 per square meter, filed a Motion and Manifestation with Offer to
Sell. In their Comment, Malicsi, et al. stated that by filing the Motion and Manifestation, Spouses Padilla
had, in effect, recognized Malicsi, et al.'s standing as builders in good faith. They did not accept the offer
to sell.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that Malicsi, et al. cannot be considered as builders in good faith.
The Court of Appeals gave credence to Malicsi, et al.'s allegation that they relied on De
Mossessgeld's representation that she owned the lot and gave them permission to build their houses on
it.
Issue: Whether respondents are builders in good faith.
Held: A builder in good faith is a builder who was not aware of a defect or flaw in his or her title when he
or she introduced improvements on a lot that turns out to be owned by another.
The essence of good faith is an honest belief of the strength and validity of one's right It implies
honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry.
The remedies available to a landowner and builder in good faith:
Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith, the person who has
defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying
the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
Article 548. Expense for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good
faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no
injury thereby, and if his successors in the possession do not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Article 448 of the1 Civil Code gives a builder in good faith the right to compel the landowner to choose
between two (2) options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by law; or (2) to
sell the land to the builder. Ignacio v. Hilario47 summarized the respective rights of the landowner and
builder in good faith as follows:
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article [546]. The owner of the land,
upon the other hand, has the option, under article [448], either to pay for the building or to sell his land to
the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and
to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is
entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for
the same.
Rosales v. Castelltort has emphasized that the choice belongs to the landowner, but the landowner must
choose from the two (2) available options:
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that
the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.
Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove
it from the land.
The Regional Trial Court was not swayed by respondents' assertion of being builders in good
faith since it found that the property was titled, as early as 1963, to petitioner Pablo M. Padilla, Jr.'s
mother, while respondents only entered the lot sometime between 1980 and 1983, thus:
Undoubtedly, [Malicsi, et al.] cannot claim that they were builders in good faith because they relied on the
promise of one Mrs. Toribia Vda. De Mossessgeld who will sell the same to them but such allegations are
contrary to the actual circumstances obtaining in this case.
Said Mrs. Mossessgeld had never been an owner thereof to sell the same to them. If
respondents had looked into the ownership of the lot, they would have easily discovered that it was titled
to petitioner Pablo M. Padilla, Jr.'s mother as early as 1963.
The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies on the person asserting that
status. As the party asserting the status of builder in good faith, must substantiate their claim through
preponderance of evidence.
Failing to substantiate their claim, respondents cannot be considered as builders in good faith. Therefore,
the benefits and rights provided under Article 448 of the Civil Code do not apply.
As builders in bad faith, respondents have no right to recover their expenses over the
improvements they have introduced to petitioners' lot under Article 449 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted
or sown without right to indemnity.
Under Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup the necessary
expenses incurred for the preservation of the land. However, respondents neither alleged nor presented
evidence to show that they introduced improvements for the preservation of the land.
Therefore, petitioners as landowners became the owners68 of the improvements on the lot,
including the residential buildings constructed by respondents, if they chose to appropriate the
accessions. However, they could instead choose the demolition of the improvements at respondents'
expense or compel respondents to pay the price of the land under Article 450 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things
in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
The owner of the land has three alternative rights: (1) to appropriate what has been built without any
obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2) to demand that the builder remove what he had built, or (3) to
compel the-builder to pay the value of the land. In any case, the landowner is entitled to damages under
Article 451, above cited.
Considering that petitioners pray for the reinstatement of the Regional Trial Court Decision
ordering respondents to vacate the lot and surrender its possession to them, petitioners are deemed to
have chosen to appropriate the improvements built on their lot without any obligation to pay indemnity to
respondents.
REX DACLISON v. EDUARDO BAYTION GR No. 219811, Apr 06, 2016
Respondent Eduardo Baytion (Baytion) filed a complaint[5] for Forcible Entry and Damages with
Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the Metropolitan Trial Court against
petitioner Rex Daclison (Daclison).
Baytion alleged that he was a co-owner of a parcel of land. The said property was inherited by
him and his siblings from their parents and, as agreed upon, was being administered by him. As
administrator, he leased portions of the property to third persons.
When the lease of Leonida expired, Daclison and other persons acting under her took
possession of the portion leased and occupied by Leonida without the prior knowledge and consent of
Baytion. Since then, Daclison had been occupying the contested portion and using it for his business of
selling marble and other finishing materials without paying anything to Baytion.
Despite oral and written demands to vacate, Daclison refused to do so. This prompted Baytion
to file the complaint for forcible entry and damages.
The MeTC dismissed the case on the ground that Baytion failed to include his siblings or his co-
owners, as plaintiffs in the case. The dismissal, however, was without prejudice.
Baytion appealed the case to the RTC, which ruled that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction to decide
the case because the allegations in the complaint failed to constitute a case of forcible entry. Pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, however, the RTC did not dismiss the case and, instead,
exercised its original jurisdiction over the same.
The RTC then decided that Baytion had a better right of possession over the property.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the instant case is an accion publiciana
2. Whether or not the second property or land was an improvement on the property of the respondent.
3. Who between the parties has a better right over this contested portion between the land co-owned by
Baytion and the constructed riprap.
Held:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belongs the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
In other words, the following requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be considered,
namely:
(1) that the deposit be GRADUAL AND IMPERCEPTIBLE;
(2) that it be made through the EFFECTS OF THE CURRENT of the water; and,
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is ADJACENT to the banks of rivers
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention.
The disputed property cannot also be considered an improvement or accession. Article 445 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following articles.
It must be noted that Article 445 uses the adverb "thereon" which is simply defined as "on the
thing that has been mentioned."[20] In other words, the supposed improvement must be made,
constructed or introduced within or on the property and not outside so as to qualify as an improvement
contemplated by law.
It is the opinion of this Court that Baytion, not being the owner of the contested portion, does not
have a better right to possess the same. In fact, in his initiatory pleading, he never claimed to have been
in prior possession of this piece of property. His claim of ownership is without basis. As earlier pointed
out, the portion is neither an accretion nor an accession. That being said, it is safe to conclude that he
does not have any cause of action to eject Daclison.
G.R. No. 192268, January 27, 2016 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, Petitioner, v. DELFINA C. CASIBANG, ANGELINA C. CANAPI, ERLINDA C.
BAJAN, LORNA G. GUMABAY, DION1SIA C. ALONZO, MARIA C. BANGAYAN AND DIGNA C.
BINAYUG, Respondents.
The property in controversy is a seven thousand five hundred thirty-two (7,532) square meter portion of
Lot registered under the name of Juan Cepeda, the respondents' late father.
In 1965, upon the request of the then Mayor Justo Cesar Caronan, Cepeda allowed the construction and
operation of a school on the western portion of his property. The school is now known as Solana North
Central School, operating under the control and supervision of the petitioner DepEd.
The respondents entered and occupied a portion of the property. Upon discovery of the said occupation,
the teachers of the school brought the matter to the attention of the barangay captain. The school officials
demanded the respondents to vacate the property.6 However, the respondents refused to vacate the
property, and asserted Cepeda's ownership of the lot.
The DepEd filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages against respondents before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). The MCTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and directed respondents to vacate
the premises. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC.
Thereafter, respondents demanded the petitioner to either pay rent, purchase the area occupied, or
vacate the premises. DepEd did not heed the demand and refused to recognize the ownership of the
respondents over the property.
The respondents filed an action for Recovery of Possession and/or Sum of Money against the DepEd.11
Respondents averred that since their late father did not have any immediate need of the land in 1965, he
consented to the building of the temporary structure and allowed the conduct of classes in the premises.
They claimed that they have been deprived of the use and the enjoyment of the portion of the land
occupied by the school, thus, they are entitled to just compensation and reasonable rent for the use of
property. The RTC found that the respondents are the owners of the subject property.
The CA then affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents' right to recover the possession of the subject property is not
barred by prescription and/or laches.
Held: Laches, in a general sense, is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the
pleadings. The following elements, as prescribed in the case of Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., must
be present to constitute laches:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right
on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
Unfortunately, the DepEd failed to present any evidence to support its claim that the disputed
land was indeed purchased by the residents
A fundamental principle in land registration under the Torrens system is that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein.34 Thus, the certificate of title becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of
land.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware
of the petitioner's occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful
owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
Case law teaches that those who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the
occupants will vacate the property upon demand.
It was the then Mayor who convinced Cepeda to allow its use of his property and in the absence
of evidence that the same was indeed sold to it, the occupation and use as school site of the subject lot
by the DepEd upon Cepeda's permission is considered a tolerated act.
There was no solid evidentiary basis to establish that laches existed in the instant case. The
DepEd failed to substantiate its claim of possession in the concept of an owner from the time it occupied
the lot after Cepeda allowed it to use the same for a school site in 1965. The possession by the DepEd
of the subject lot was clearly by mere tolerance, since it was not proven that it laid an adverse claim over
the property by virtue of the purported sale.
Despite being a possessor by mere tolerance, the DepEd is considered a builder in good faith,
since Cepeda permitted the construction of building and improvements to conduct classes on his property.
Hence, Article 448 may be applied in the case at bar.
Article 448, in relation to Article 546 of the Civil Code, provides for the rights of respondents as landowners
as against the DepEd, a builder in good faith. The provisions respectively read:
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing, or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price
of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged
to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor
in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount
of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
The two options available to the respondents as landowners are: (a) they may appropriate the
improvements, after payment of indemnity representing the value of the improvements introduced and
the necessary and useful expenses defrayed on the subject lots; or (b) they may oblige the DepEd to pay
the price of the land. However, it is also provided under Article 448 that the builder cannot be obliged to
buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the improvements and buildings. If that is the
case, the DepEd is not duty-bound to pay the price of the land should the value of the same be
considerably higher than the value of the improvement introduced by the DepEd on the subject property.
In which case, the law provides that the parties shall agree on the terms of the lease and, in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Since the determination of the value of the subject property is factual in nature, this Court finds
a need to remand the case to the trial court to determine its value. In case the trial court determines that
the value of the land is considerably more than that of the buildings and improvements introduced, the
DepEd may not be compelled to pay the value of the land, instead it shall pay reasonable rent upon
agreement by the parties of the terms of the lease. In the event of a disagreement between the parties,
the trial court shall fix the terms of lease.
 GR No. 213233, Aug 05, 2015 BLISS DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. MONTANO DIAZ
Petitioner Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) (subsequently reorganized as Home Guaranty
Corporation) is the registered owner of Lot. On October 19, 1984, it entered into and executed a Deed of
Sale over the said property in favor of Spouses Emiliano and Leonila Melgazo (Sps. Melgazo), both of
whom are now deceased.
Diaz then paid BDC the amortizations due on the property, amounting to P406,915.15, and BDC
issued a permit to occupy the property in favor of Diaz. Diaz then introduced improvements on the
property, amounting to P700,000.00.
BDC executed a Contract to Sell in favor of Diaz. However, BDC informed Diaz that respondent
Edgar Arreza (Arreza) was claiming that the heirs of Sps. Melgazo sold to him the rights over the
property.[4] BDC then placed Diaz’s account in “inactive status.” To resolve the conflicting claims of
Arreza and Diaz, BDC filed a complaint for Interpleader against them, before the RTC, Makati City, the
Makati City RTC ruled that the signatures of Sps. Melgazo transferring their rights to Nacua were mere
forgeries. Thus, it ruled that Arreza had a better right over the property. This decision became final and
executory.
Diaz filed the present complaint for sum of money against BDC include Arreza and Tapay as
defendants. Diaz argued that BDC and Tapay’s representations led him to believe that he had a good
title over the property, but due to the court’s ruling in the interpleader case, he was constrained to transfer
the property to Arreza.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding that Diaz failed to prove that he is an assignee in good
faith, and thus dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and, instead,ruled that Diaz is entitled to be paid
reimbursement and damages.
Issue: Whether the ca erred in declaring bdc in bad faith
Held: The CA committed reversible error in ruling that Diaz was a buyer in good faith and for value.
Nevertheless, BDC is liable to Diaz because it acted in bad faith.
We find that the CA committed no reversible error in finding that BDC acted in bad faith, when it
allowed Diaz to take over the payment of the amortizations over the subject property. As the CA correctly
noted, “It is undisputed that Bliss knew about Arreza’s claim in 1991. It even received amortization
payments from Arreza. Yet, Bliss acknowledged the transfer to Diaz and received the monthly
amortizations paid by Diaz. Also, Bliss is aware that should Arreza pursue his claim in court, Diaz may be
evicted from the property.”
Instead of waiting for the resolution on the matter, BDC immediately accepted the deed of
transfer presented by Diaz, as well as the amortizations he paid over the property. It was only in 1994
that BDC filed the Interpleader case to resolve the conflicting case. This is nothing short of evident bad
faith.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same at
the time of such purchase or before he or she has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in
the property. For one to be considered a purchaser in good faith, the following requisites must concur: (1)
that the purchaser buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and fair price for the property at the time
of such purchase or before he or she has notice of the claim of another. We find that in the case at bar,
the first element is lacking.
While it is true that the subject lot is registered lot, the doctrine of not going beyond the face of
the title does not apply in the case here, because what was subjected to a series of sales was not the lot
itself but the right to purchase the lot from BDC. The subject of those deeds of assignment was never the
real right over the subject property, but merely the personal right to purchase it. Therefore, the mirror
doctrine finds no application in the case at bar.
When Diaz transacted with Tapay, it was also clear that what was being transferred was merely
rights to purchase the property, and not title over the lot itself; if it were, the sale would have been void
because Tapay never had ownership over the subject property. As the buyer in such a transaction, it was
incumbent upon Diaz not only to inquire as to the right of Tapay to transfer his rights, but also to trace the
source of that right to purchase the property. For his failure to inquire diligently and trace the source of
the right to purchase the property, Diaz cannot claim to be a purchaser in good faith and for value.
G.R. No. 182754 June 29, 2015 SPOUSES CRISPIN AQUINO and TERESA V. AQUINO, herein
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, AMADOR D. LEDESMA, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
EUSEBIO AGUILAR and JOSEFINA V. AGUILAR, Respondents.
Teresa Vela Aquino (Teresa) and her husband, Crispin Aquino, are the owners of a house and
lot Since 1981, this property has been occupied by Teresa's sister, Josefina Vela Aguilar; Josefina's
spouse Eusebio; and their family. It appears from the record that respondents stayed on the property with
the consent and approval of petitioners, who were then residing in the United States.
While respondents were in possession of the property, the house previously constructed therein
was demolished, and a three-storey building built in its place. Respondents occupied half of the third floor
of this new building) for the next 20 years without payment of rental.
Petitioners sent a letter to respondents informing them that an immediate family member needed
to use the premises and demanding the surrender of the property within 10 days from notice.
Respondents failed to heed this demand, prompting petitioners to file a Complaint for ejectment against
them before the office of the barangay captain.
Petitioner spouses Aquino filed a Complaint with the MeTC of Makati City praying that
respondents be ordered to (a) vacate the portion of the building they were then occupying; and (b) pay
petitioner a reasonable amount for the use and enjoyment of the premises from the time the formal
demand to vacate was made.
Respondents claimed that they had contributed to the improvement of the property and the
construction of the building, both in terms of money and management/supervision services. Petitioners
purportedly agreed to let them contribute to the costs of construction in exchange for the exclusive use of
a portion of the building.
The MeTC ruled in favor of petitioners, stating that they had the right to enjoy possession of the
property as the registered owners thereof. Since the case was merely one for ejectment, the court held
that it was no longer proper to resolve respondents' claim of co-ownership over the building.
The MeTC also declared that respondents were builders in bad faith who were not entitled to
recover their purported expenses for the construction of the building.
The RTC denied the appeal and affirmed the MeTC's Decision. According to the court,
respondents did not become co-owners of the property although they may have contributed to the
construction of the building thereon. Hence, their stay in the premises remained to be by mere tolerance
of the petitioners.
CA affirmed the conclusion of the lower courts.
Issue: Whether or not the CA seriously erred in remanding the case to the court of origin for the purpose
of ascertaining the right of respondents to be reimbursed for the improvements introduced on the property.
Held: We agree. The resolution of the issues at bar calls for the application of the rules on accession
under the Civil Code. The term "builder in good faith" as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code,
refers to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land believing himself to be its owner
and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of acquisition. In the instant case, the Spouses Aguilar
cannot be considered as builders in good faith on account of their admission that the subject lot belonged
to the Spouses Aquino when they constructed the building. At the onset, petitioners were aware of a flaw
in their title and a limit to their right to possess the property. By law, one is considered in good faith if he
is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Respondents are deemed to have acquiesced to the foregoing findings when they failed to
appeal the CA Decision. A party who does not appeal from a judgment can no longer seek the modification
or reversal thereof.
By its express provision, Article 1678 of the Civil Code applies only to lessees who build useful
improvements on the leased property. It does not apply to those who possess property by mere tolerance
of the owners, without a contractual right.
In this case, there is absolutely no evidence of any lease contract between the parties. In fact,
respondents themselves never alleged that they were lessees of the lot or the building in question. Even
if we were to subscribe to the CA' s theory that the situation of respondents is "analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance," the
absence of good faith on their part prevents them from invoking the provisions of Article 1678.
Defendants are undoubtedly builders in bad faith for despite the prohibition made upon them,
they continued their construction activities upon respondents' property.
We hold that petitioners, as the owners of the land, have the right to appropriate what has been built on
the property, without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor; and that respondents have no right to a
refund of any improvement built therein, pursuant to Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code:
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without right of indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things
in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder,
planter or sower.
Respondents may recover the necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of the property
but without the right of retention.
Pursuant to Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup the necessary
expenses incurred for the preservation of the land. The CA correctly ruled that respondents in this case
are similarly entitled to this reimbursement. However, being builders in bad faith, they do not have the
right of retention over the premises.
G.R. No. 182378 March 6, 2013 MERCY VDA. DE ROXAS, represented by ARLENE C. ROXAS-
CRUZ, in her capacity as substitute appellant-petitioner, Petitioner,
vs. OUR LADY'S FOUNDATION, INC., Respondent
Salve Dealca Latosa filed before the RTC a Complaint for the recovery of ownership of a portion
of her residential land located at Our Lady’s Village, Bibincahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. According to her,
Atty. Henry Amado Roxas (Roxas), represented by petitioner herein, encroached on a quarter of her
property by arbitrarily extending his concrete fence beyond the correct limits.
In his Answer, Roxas imputed the blame to respondent Our Lady’s Village Foundation, Inc., now
Our Lady’s Foundation, Inc. (OLFI). He then filed a Third-Party Complaint against respondent and claimed
that he only occupied the adjoining portion in order to get the equivalent area of what he had lost when
OLFI trimmed his property for the subdivision road.
The trial court held that Latosa had established her claim of encroachment by a preponderance
of evidence.
Roxas appealed to the CA, which later denied the appeal.
Issues: What is the correct amount to be reimbursed by OLFI to Roxas?
Whether or not the issuing of the Notices of Garnishment against the bank accounts of Arcilla-Maullon as
OLFI’s general manager was proper
Held: In the event that the seller elects to sell the lot, "the price must be fixed at the prevailing market
value at the time of payment." More recently, Tuatis v. Spouses Escol illustrates that the present or current
fair value of the land is to be reckoned at the time that the landowner elected the choice, and not at the
time that the property was purchased.
The valuation of the property at the time that the real owner of the land asked the builder to
vacate the property encroached upon is the current fair price as determined in the Amended Sheriff’s Bill.
G.R. No. 195825 February 27, 2013
SPOUSES ALFONSO AND MARIA ANGELES CUSI, Petitioners, vs. LILIA V. DOMINGO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 195871
RAMONA LIZA L. DE VERA, Petitioner, vs LILIA V. DOMINGO AND SPOUSES RADELIA AND
ALFRED SY, Respondents.
The property in dispute was a vacant unfenced lot situated in White Plains, Quezon City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of respondent Lilia V. Domingo by the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City. Domingo learned that construction activities were being undertaken on her property
without her consent. She soon unearthed the series of anomalous transactions affecting her property.
One Radelia Sy (Sy), representing herself as the owner of the property, petitioned the RTC for the
issuance of a new owner’s copy of Domingo’s TCT.
Sy subsequently subdivided the property into two, and sold each half by way of contract to sell to Spouses
Edgardo and Ramona Liza De Vera and to Spouses Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi. All the while, the
transactions between Sy and the De Veras, and between Sy and the Cusis were unknown to Domingo,
whose TCT remained in her undisturbed possession.
Domingo commenced this action against Sy and her spouse, the De Veras and the Cusis in the RTC.
The RTC granted Domingo’s application for the TRO enjoining the defendants from proceeding with the
construction activities on the property. The RTC later granted her application for the writ of preliminary
injunction.
The RTC rendered a decision declaring the sale between Lilia V. Domingo and Radella Sy void and
declaring the Sps. Edgardo and Ramona Liza De Vera and Sps. Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi to be
purchasers in good faith and for value.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith and for value
Held: Under the Torrens system of land registration, the registered owner of realty cannot be deprived of
her property through fraud, unless a transferee acquires the property as an innocent purchaser for value.
A transferee who acquires the property covered by a reissued owner's copy of the certificate of title without
taking the ordinary precautions of honest persons in doing business and examining the records of the
proper Registry of Deeds, or who fails to pay the full market value of the property is not considered an
innocent purchaser for value.
Beyond dispute is the nullity of the transfer of Domingo’s property to Sy because both lower
courts united in so finding.
Under the Torrens system of land registration, the State is required to maintain a register of landholdings
that guarantees indefeasible title to those included in the register. The State issues an official certificate
of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject
to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.
The curtain principle, in that one does not need to go behind the certificate of title because it
contains all the information about the title of its holder. This principle dispenses with the need of proving
ownership by long complicated documents kept by the registered owner, which may be necessary under
a private conveyancing system, and assures that all the necessary information regarding ownership is on
the certificate of title. Consequently, the avowed objective of the Torrens system is to obviate possible
conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and, as a rule,
to dispense with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of the registered owner, the system gives
him complete peace of mind that he would be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily
disposed of any right over the covered land. "a person dealing in registered land has the right to rely on
the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry".
The Court has treated a reissued duplicate owner’s copy of a TCT as merely a reconstituted
certificate of title.
The Cusis and the De Veras did not investigate beyond the face of Sy’s TCT, despite the
certificate derived from the reissued duplicate owner’s copy being akin to a reconstituted TCT. Thereby,
they denied themselves the innocence and good faith they supposedly clothed themselves with when
they dealt with Sy on the property.
Being the buyers of the registered realty, the Cusis and the De Veras were aware of the
aforementioned several almost simultaneous transactions affecting the property. Their awareness, if it
was not actual, was at least presumed, and ought to have put them on their guard, for, these almost
simultaneous transactions, particularly the date of the alleged loss of the TCT and the purported Deed of
Sale, suffice[d] to arouse suspicion on [the part of] any person dealing with the subject property." Simple
prudence would then have impelled them as honest persons to make deeper inquiries to clear the
suspiciousness haunting Sy’s title. But they still went on with their respective purchase of the property
without making the deeper inquiries. In that regard, they were not acting in good faith.
Good faith is the HONEST INTENTION TO ABSTAIN from taking unconscientious advantage of
another. It means the "freedom from knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on
inquiry."
Given this notion of good faith, therefore, a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property
of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full
and fair price for the same. As an examination of the records shows, the petitioners were not innocent
purchasers in good faith and for value. Their failure to investigate Sy's title despite the nearly simultaneous
transactions on the property that ought to have put them on inquiry manifested their awareness of the
flaw in Sy's title. That they did not also appear to have paid the full price for their share of the property
evinced their not having paid true value.
COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN, INC., vs. SPOUSES ARSENIO (Deceased) and ANGELES NANOL AND
ANYBODY CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM
Sometime in 1994, respondent-spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol entered into a Contract to
Sell with petitioner Communities Cagayan, Inc., (CCI) whereby the latter agreed to sell to respondent-
spouses a house and Lots 17 and 19 located at Block 16, Camella Homes Subdivision, Cagayan de Oro
City, for the price of P368,000.00 (P368T). They obtained a loan from Capitol Development Bank (CDB),
using the property as collateral. To facilitate the loan, a simulated sale over the property was executed
by petitioner in favor of respondent-spouses. Accordingly, titles (TCT Nos. 105202 and 105203) were
transferred in the names of respondent-spouses and submitted to CDB for loan processing. The bank
collapsed and closed before it could release the loan.
On November 30, 1997, respondent-spouses entered into another Contract to Sell with
petitioner over the same property for the same price. This time, they availed of petitioner’s in-house
financing thus, undertaking to pay the loan over four years, from 1997 to 2001.
Respondent Arsenio demolished the original house and constructed a three-story house
allegedly valued at P3.5 million, more or less. (Respondent Arsenio died, leaving his wife, herein
respondent Angeles, to pay for the monthly amortizations.)
On September 10, 2003, petitioner sent respondent-spouses a notarized Notice of Delinquency
and Cancellation of Contract to Sell due to the latter’s failure to pay the monthly amortizations. Petitioner
filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, an action for unlawful detainer against respondent-spouses.
In her Answer, respondent Angeles averred that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid.
Issues
1) Whether petitioner is obliged to refund to respondent-spouses all the monthly installments paid; and
2) Whether petitioner is obliged to reimburse respondent-spouses the value of the new house minus the
cost of the original house.
Held: The petition is partly meritorious.
Respondent-spouses are entitled to the cash surrender value of the payments on the property
equivalent to 50% of the total payments made under the Maceda Law.
Respondent-spouses are entitled to reimbursement of the improvements
made on the property.
In view of the special circumstances obtaining in this case, we are constrained to rely on the
presumption of good faith on the part of the respondent-spouses which the petitioner failed to rebut. Thus,
respondent-spouses being presumed builders in good faith, we now rule on the applicability of Article 448
of the Civil Code. Article 448 on builders in good faith does not apply where there is a contractual relation
between the parties, such as in the instant case. We went over the records of this case and we note that
the parties failed to attach a copy of the Contract to Sell. As such, we are constrained to apply Article 448
of the Civil Code, which provides viz:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is
in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other
way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove
it from the land. The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter
or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary
to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving
the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to
oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise
either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is
older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
In conformity with the foregoing pronouncement, we hold that petitioner, as landowner, has two
options. It may appropriate the new house by reimbursing respondent Angeles the current market value
thereof minus the cost of the old house. Under this option, respondent Angeles would have "a right of
retention which negates the obligation to pay rent." In the alternative, petitioner may sell the lots to
respondent Angeles at a price equivalent to the current fair value thereof. However, if the value of the lots
is considerably more than the value of the improvement, respondent Angeles cannot be compelled to
purchase the lots. She can only be obliged to pay petitioner reasonable rent.
G.R. No. 173636 HEIRS OF JOSE MA. GEPUELA, Petitioners,
vs.BERNITA MENEZ-ANDRES, ET AL., Respondents.

G.R. No. 173770
HERNITA MENEZ-ANDRES and NELIA MEÑEZ CAYETANO, represented by their duly-appointed
Attorney-In-Fact ANGELITO MEÑEZ, Petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF JOSE MA. GEPUELA, Respondents.
The late Jose Ma. Gepuela (Gepuela), transferee of an aliquot portion of the property of the
36/72 pro indiviso share of Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz (Basilia). (Hernita, et al.), petitioners in G.R. No.
173770, assailed the redemption on the ground that Gepuela had no legal personality to make the
redemption.
Basilia executed a Huling Habilin,4 where she named her daughter Benita’s children Hernita,
Nelia, Rosemarie, Angel and Gracita as voluntary heirs to ten percent (10%) of the free portion of her
estate. Her daughter Luz Cruz Salonga (Luz) was appointed Administratrix of Basilia’s
When Basilia died, she left behind considerable properties, including a 36/72 pro indiviso share
in a 5,492 square meter property in San Juan. This property was co-owned with some of Basilia’s children
and grandchildren.
Perfecto and Flavia sold their interests (14/72 pro indiviso share) in the property to Severino
Etorma (Etorma), who later on sold the same to Gepuela and one Antonio Cinco (Cinco). Cinco sold his
share to Gepuela. Luz also disposed, by way of a Sale of Rights with Mortgage.
Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share was sold in a public auction. Benita, as judgment creditor in
the case, emerged as the highest bidder.
Gepuela redeemed Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share from Benita by paying the auction price.
After the expiration of the periods to redeem, Gepuela filed an action to consolidate his
ownership over the 36/72 pro indiviso share he acquired by way of redemption from Basilia’s estate.
Isagani, et al. opposed this action, raising Gepuela’s lack of standing to redeem given that he is not a co-
owner of Basilia’s one-half portion.
The trial court granted Gepuela’s petition, declared him the owner of Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso
share in the parcel of land.
The CA, however, affirmed the trial court’s findings. TCT No. 5033-R was cancelled and several
titles were issued covering the respective shares of Gepuela, Isagani, Perfecto and Pedrito, and Vito Cruz
in the property.
Basilia’s grandchildren Hernita and Nelia filed a Complaint for Redemption and Consignation
with Damages24 and a subsequent Amended Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Redemption,
Cancellation of Notation in Title, and Consignation with Damages25 against Gepuela.
In their complaint, Hernita and Nelia alleged, among others, that: 1) Gepuela’s redemption was
null and void as he (not being an heir, legatee/devisee, co-owner or creditor) did not have the legal
personality to redeem the share; and 2) Hernita and Nelia sent notices to Gepuela informing him of their
intent to recover their interest in Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share and to tender payment of the
redemption price paid by him, plus interest, which Gepuela refused.
The trial court upheld Gepuela’s redemption of Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share. It, however,
ruled that because Gepuela failed to formally notify Hernita, Nelia and Rosemarie of the redemption, the
same was null and void insofar as it affected the latter’s six percent (6%) share in the property.
The CA rejected both appeals and affirmed the trial court’s Decision
Issues: (1) whether Gepuela’s redemption of Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share in the subject property
was valid; and
(2) whether Hernita et al. could still redeem the 36/72 pro indiviso share.
Held: Hernita, et al., though not a party to LRC Case No. R-3855, share an identity of interest with Isagani,
et al., in that they (1) are heirs of Basilia, the owner of the disputed 36/72 portion of the land covered by
TCT No. 95524, and (2) both sought to challenge the redemption made by Gepuela of the said portion of
property. Following the ruling in Cruz, both Hernita, et al. and Isagani, et al. can be considered to share
"an identity of interest from which flowed an identity of relief sought,"61 that is, to be eventually declared
owners of the portion being contested.
As instituted heirs in the "Huling Habilin" of Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz, it is indubitable that the
plaintiffs are co-owners of the 36/72 pro-indiviso share of the estate of said decedent and they are legally
entitled to redeem the same pursuant to Article 1620 of the Civil Code.
Hernita, et al. cannot claim a stake over a specific property of the decedent.
Even assuming that res judicata would not bar Civil Case No. 65327, Hernita, et al.’s claim of a
right to redeem Basilia’s disputed share would still not prosper.
First. As instituted heirs only to a part of the free portion of Basilia’s estate, Hernita, et al. are entitled to
receive their share of the same, if any, only after payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow and inheritance tax.75 Otherwise stated, their share would be
dependent on whether anything is left of the estate after payment of all its obligations.
The disputed 36/72 pro indiviso share was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment claim of a creditor
(Benita) of the estate. When it was redeemed by Gepuela, no further redemption was made. Upon
expiration of the periods to redeem, Gepuela became entitled, as a matter of right, to the consolidation of
the ownership of the share in his name. The share no longer formed part of the estate which can
theoretically be distributed to Hernita, et al. as Basilia's voluntary heirs.
Second, and more importantly, as voluntary heirs to the free portion, Hernita, et al. have no right to claim
any specific property of the estate, such as the contested 36/72 pro indiviso share in the property, until
after the estate had been settled and distributed in accordance with law.
G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, vs. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA
AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 177192
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, vs. EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,
TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.
Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a verified petition for the judicial settlement of
the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin).
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate without any known debts or obligations. During
his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia), and second with Caridad
Garcia (Caridad). Joaquin and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose
(survived by three children. Joaquin married Caridad. They also had three children. At the time of his
death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and
improving the said realties and had been appropriating for himself ₱26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the
appointment of a regular administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots
belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they
became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with
the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant) was built with the exclusive
money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the appointment of Eduardo as administrator
on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is
minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed that the best interests of the estate
dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular administrator.
The RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquin’s estate.
The estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now consequently – ripe – for distribution among the heirs minus
the surviving spouse Caridad Garcia.
 The net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a total value of HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:
₱14,177,500.00, together with whatever interest from bank deposits and all other incomes or increments
thereof accruing after the Accounting Report of December 31, 1996, after deducting therefrom the
compensation of the administrator and other expenses allowed by the Court, are hereby ordered
distributed as follows: 1) JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros Agtarap
TOTAL ESTATE – ₱14,177,500.00
CARIDAD AGTARAP – ½ of the estate as her conjugal share – ₱7,088,750.00, the other half of ₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
₱7,088,750.00 – to be divided among the compulsory heirs as follows:
1) JOSE (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30 ₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

2) MILAGROS (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30 2) TERESA AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros Agtarap

3) MERCEDES (deceased) - ₱1,181,548.30

₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
4) SEBASTIAN - ₱1,181,548.30
₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
5) EDUARDO - ₱1,181,548.30
3) WALTER DE SANTOS - ₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros Agtarap
6) CARIDAD - ₱1,181,548.30
₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount of ₱1,181,548.30 and who died in
1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and half brothers Eduardo and ₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
Sebastian Agtarap in equal proportions.

HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:

TERESA AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66

JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999

WALTER DE SANTOS - ₱236,291.66 ₱7,088,750.00 - as conjugal share

SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66 ₱1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir

EDUARDO AGTARAP - ₱236,291.66

Total of ₱8,270,208.30
Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows: b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory heir
COMPULSORY HEIRS:
1) GLORIA – (deceased) – represented by Walter de Santos – ₱ 236,291.66 – share from Milagros

- ₱295,364.57 c) EDUARDO AGTARAP - ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory heir

2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57 ₱ 236,291.66 – share from Milagros

3) TERESA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57 d) MERCEDES - as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as the

surviving spouse of a compulsory heir
4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP - ₱295,364.57
₱1,181,458.38

Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit ₱295,364.57.

Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the first marriage stand to receive REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:
the total amount of:
 1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap)
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit:
SEBASTIAN – ₱4,135,104.10 – share from Caridad Garcia
₱1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir
₱ 236,291.66 - share from Milagros
₱5,522,854.06
EDUARDO – ₱4,135,104.10 – share from Caridad Garcia
₱1,181,458.30 – as compulsory heir
₱ 236,291.66 – share from Milagros
₱5,522,854.06
Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the necessity of hearing the issue of
legitimacy of respondents as heirs;
Whether the court of appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over the estate of milagros g. agtarap
and erred in distributing her inheritance from the estate of joaquin agtarap notwithstanding the existence
of her last will and testament in violation of the doctrine of precedence of testate proceedings over
intestate proceedings.
Held: As to Sebastian’s and Eduardo’s common issue on the ownership of the subject real properties,
we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. A probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to
belong to outside parties by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory
of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but
if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the
final determination of ownership in a separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are
all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership
issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral
to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the
death of the husband or the wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,
and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.
Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had to
liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and
Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should be consolidated
with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucia’s spouse. Accordingly, the CA correctly
distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255
subject of this case, to her compulsory heirs.
Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the estate of a deceased person. No
distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the debts of
the estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to
say that both the RTC and the CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that
Sebastian did not present clear and convincing evidence to support his averments in his motion to exclude
them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and
Teresa being the children of Jose was never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the latter two
even admitted this in their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts.
Also, Sebastian’s insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to the
estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. The RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on May 4,
1995, and was later substituted in the proceedings below by her husband Walter de Santos.
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling reason to hold that
both courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully
participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence to
refute his and Eduardo’s admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs
of Joaquin, and to timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro.
Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the
right to participate in the estate in representation of the Joaquin’s compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes,
respectively.
G.R. No. 141634 February 5, 2001
Heirs of Spouses REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS and ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS SR. -- ROBERTO R.
SANDEJAS, ANTONIO R. SANDEJAS, CRISTINA SANDEJAS MORELAND, BENJAMIN R.
SANDEJAS, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, and heirs of SIXTO S. SANDEJAS II, RAMON R.
SANDEJAS, TERESITA R. SANDEJAS, and ELIODORO R. SANDEJAS JR., all represented by
ROBERTO R. SANDEJAS, petitioners, vs. ALEX A. LINA, respondent.
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of administration be
issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, Letters of
Administration [were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the
estate of the late Remedios Sandejas.
An Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by [M]ovant
Alex A. Lina alleging among others that, movant and [A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity
as seller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and
absolutely and in their entirety the following parcels of land which formed part of the estate of the late
Remedios R. Sandejas.
The lower court issued an [O]rder granting the intervention of Alex A. Lina the counsel for
[A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas filed a [M]anifestation alleging among others that the administrator,
Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, died sometime in November 1984 in Canada and said counsel is still waiting
for official word on the fact of the death of the administrator. He also alleged, among others that the matter
of the claim of Intervenor Alex A. Lina becomes a money claim to be filed in the estate of the late Mr.
Eliodoro P. Sandejas.
Alex A. Lina as petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila an Omnibus Pleading for
(1) petition for letters of administration [and] (2) to consolidate instant 'IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF
ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR., ALEX A. LINA PETITIONER", [for letters of administration.
Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed [a] Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate
Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas.
The lower court issued an order granting the [M]otion of Alex A. Lina.
Theirs Sixto, Roberto, Antonio and Benjamin, all surnamed Sandejas, and heirs [sic] filed a
[M]otion for [R]econsideration and the appointment of another administrator Mr. Sixto Sandejasl in lieu of
[I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina stating among others that it [was] only lately that Mr. Sixto Sandejas, a son and
heir, expressed his willingness to act as a new administrator of the intestate estate of his mother,
Remedios R. Sandejas.
Intervenor filed [an] Omnibus Motion (a) to approve the deed of conditional sale executed
between Plaintiff-in-lntervention Alex A. Lina and Elidioro [sic] Sandejas, Sr.; (b) to compel the heirs of
Remedios Sandejas and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. thru their administrator, to execute a deed of absolute
sale in favor of [I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina pursuant to said conditional deed of sale to which the
administrator filed a [M]otion to [D]ismiss and/or [O]pposition to said omnibus motion.
The lower court rendered the questioned order granting intervenor's [M]otion for the [A]pproval
of the Receipt of Earnest Money with promise to buy between Plaintiff-in-lntervention Alex A. Lina and
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr.
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and
respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of
the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas until the approval of the sale was
obtained from the settlement court.
Issues: Whether or not the undivided shares of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. in the subject property is three-
fifth (3/5) and the administrator of the latter should execute deeds of conveyance therefor within thirty
days from receipt of the balance of the purchase price from the respondent
Held: Jurisdiction of Settlement Court - Petitioners also fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a)
jurisdiction over ordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale but to compel performance of a
contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an intestate court; and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the
executor or administrator, and no one else, to file an application for approval of a sale of the property
under administration.
We hold that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters
relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased
persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It
also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers
such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on
this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from
such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.
Computation of Eliodoro's Share
The CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on one tenth of the entire disputed property.
It should be based only on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share.24
The proper determination of the seller-heir's shares requires further explanation. Succession
laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife,
the decedent's entire estate - under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally,
with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased.25 After the
settlement of the debts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal
heirs, legatees and devices. We assume, however, that this preliminary determination of the decedent's
estate has already been taken into account by the parties, since the only issue raised in this case is
whether Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the disputed lots.
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999 LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO
and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter
died in 1969 without her estate being settled. The court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to
probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. They filed a "Motion To Declare The Will
Intrinsically Void."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since
she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each
other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the
same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended period granted.2 This dismissal
became final and executory.
An Order was issued by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory Order, as
well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely
"interlocutory", hence not final in character.
Issue: Whether or not a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory may still be given effect
Held: A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court
in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court
cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the
hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated
will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.
If no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains
finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined
by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different
motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of
res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith
being for once and forever closed. Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as
to its extrinsic validity and due execution.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not
acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that
he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from
making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even
after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last
will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides
for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according
to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is
specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void.
Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not
avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is
deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as
she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of
January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are
not parties thereto, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate
proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would
amount to forum-shopping. It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse
should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy
is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing
test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove
the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in
nature and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the
estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the
will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is
extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether the provisions of the
will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro
was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as
correctly held by the trial court.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was
not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979 TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL
RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC,
petitioner-appellant, vs. BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR
and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at
Guimba, Nueva Ecija. That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor in favor of his
nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will
executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of
December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three
sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave
a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative
who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the
Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the real properties.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, the parish priest of Victoria filed
in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator, who
should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered
to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957 praying that
the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said ricelands since,
as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied for
the priesthood".
The lower court, declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the testator's
legal heirs. The parish priest filed two motions for reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration on the ground that the testator
had a grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian
in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to deliver
the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the testator created a public charitable
trust and in not liberally construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and to
prevent intestacy.
Held: Where the intention of the contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the
primary issue is the determination of the testator's intention which is the law of the case - dicat testor et
erit lex.
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention
is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning
of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different from that literally
expressed
From the foregoing re-statement of the provisions of his will, it may be deduced that the testator
intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was
forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood,
or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually
twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only
in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying
for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who would
study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the testator contemplate only his nearest male relative
at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest male relatives at anytime after his
death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of
his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee
or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it
is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
When the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters or second-degree
relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his
nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his third-
degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the exact date of his
death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his death,
he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son of his
nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in
1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate court's order
adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at
the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was
not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before
the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he
would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the
trusteeship would be terminated.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of
the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will was likewise inoperative.
 This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which
provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the
testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed
among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said
ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there
may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's will is no longer valid. Thus,
if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property recovered
by the said legacy.
G.R. No. L-22797 September 22, 1966
TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS. ROSALINA SANTOS (Executrix), petitioner and
appellee, vs. FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee), oppositor and appellant.
Rosalina Santos filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the last will
allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. 1 The nearest
of kin of the deceased were her brothers and a sister, nephews and nieces. Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-
appellee herein, is one of said nieces. Among the legatees — or more accurately, devisees — mentioned
in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the deceased.
Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not
executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix
Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of Maxima was secured through fraud; and
that at the time of the execution of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.
After the probate court had received the evidence for both the petitioner and oppositors, but
before the latter could close their evidence, Flora Blas filed a manifestation that she is withdrawing her
opposition to the probate of the will.
The proceedings continued however as to the opposition of Justo Garcia.
The court below issued an order allowing the probate of the will. After the order had become
final and executory, Flora Blas, filed a petition praying for the delivery to her of a fishpond as a specific
devise in her favor under Item No. 3, Clause No. 6, of the will. To this petition, inspite of apparent
understanding, Rosalina Santos filed an opposition predicated on the ground that said specific devise in
favor of Flora was forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs, pursuant to a provision of the will that
should any of the heirs, devisees or legatees contest or oppose its probate, the latter shall lose his or her
right to receive any inheritance or benefit under it, which shall be forfeited in favor of the other heirs,
devisees and legatees.
The court a quo sustained the theory that the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will was
valid and had the effect of depriving Flora of her devise in view of her previous opposition to its probate,
which it held not justified under the circumstances. Accordingly, it denied the motion for delivery of the
specific devise, declaring the same forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs.
Issue: Whether or not appellant's filing of her opposition was justified under the particular circumstances
of the case
Whether or not a timely withdrawal of said opposition had precluded violation of the "no contest
and forfeiture clause
Held: The most important single factor that should engender reasonable doubt as to the physical and
mental capacity of a person to execute a will, was the condition of Maxima Blas as gleaned from the
records of the case. She was an old woman more than 86 years old who suffered from various ailments.
Several documents executed by her before the alleged date of execution of the will, were no longer signed
but merely thumbmarked by her, whereas the will appealed to have been signed.
It is difficult for Us to imagine that one situated and equally faced with the above enumerated
facts and circumstances as the appellant was, should keep her peace. She had her doubts, and to resolve
them she had to conduct inquiries and investigations. Her findings all the more strengthened her belief
that there was something untoward about the execution of the will. Thus, in her desire to know the truth
and to protect her rights, she opposed the probate of the will.
Above all, the factor that preponderates in favor of appellant is that, after realizing her mistake
in contesting the will — a mistake committed in good faith because grounded on strong doubts — she
withdrew her opposition and joined the appellee in the latter's petition for the probate of the will. She must
not now be penalized for rectifying her error. After all, the intentions of the testatrix had been fulfilled, her
will had been admitted and allowed probate within a reasonably short period, and the disposition of her
property can now be effected.
It should be pointed out that, contrary to the translation accorded to Paragraph Fourteen of the
will, the testatrix enjoins not a mere contest or opposition to its probate, but a contest or opposition to the
probate of the will and the carrying out of its provisions.
This furnishes a significant index into the intention of the testatrix, namely, that she was more
concerned in insuring the carrying out of her testamentary provisions than in precluding any contest or
opposition to it. By the withdrawal of the contest which appellant brought in good faith, no prejudice has
been done into the intention of the testatrix. The dispositions of her will can now be safely carried out.
From the foregoing premises it cannot be said that Flora's actuations impaired the true intention
of the testatrix in regard to the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will. Flora's act of withdrawing her
opposition before she had rested her case contributed to the speedy probation of the will. Since the
withdrawal came before Flora had rested her case, it precluded the defeat of the probate upon the
strength of Flora's evidence. Through said withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her
dispositions of her properties under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a whole, Flora's
actuations subserved rather than violated the testatrix's intention.
G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015
ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, NAMELY: ESPERANZA, REX
EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA LORENCE, ALL SURNAMED SUPAPO, AND
SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-SANDIGAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE
JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, AND THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM,
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus
(Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively,
the respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches,
Quezon City, described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-284416 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names. The
land has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as shown in
the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the Office of the City Assessor of
Caloocan.7
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but they
made sure to visit at least twice a year.8 During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built
on the subject lot. The houses were built without their knowledge and permission. They later learned
that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the other one.9
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot by
bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan
Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of the parties to settle amicably.10
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case11 against the respondents for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law.12 The trial court convicted the respondents for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 772, and each accused is hereby ordered to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject premises.
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.14 While the appeal was pending, Congress
enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No.
772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.15
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final. 16
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents' civil
liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion
and issued the writ of execution. The respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied
the same. The RTC also denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's orders denying
the quashal of the writ and the respondent's motion for reconsideration. 17 The CA granted the petition
and held that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities
were extinguished.18 The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction is GRANTED. The orders dated June 5, 2003 and
July 24, 2003 of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-45610
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby permanently ENJOINED from further executing
or implementing its decision dated March 18, 1996.
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not mean that people
now have unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to
compromise the property rights of legitimate landowners.19 In cases of violation of their property rights,
the CA noted that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.
Issue: WOT Accion Publiciana falls within exclusive jurisdiction of RTC; WOT Action has
Prescribed; WOT action is barred by Res Judicata
RULING: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action has not prescribed;
and (3) the complaint is not barred by res judicata.
JURISDICTION: MeTC
The complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the
nature of the action and the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect
when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims
asserted therein.
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
Section 3 of the same law provides:
Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is
now determined by its assessed value.40 The assessed value of real property is its fair market value
multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. 41
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained: [D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of
recovery of possession regardless of the value of the property involved?
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss,
as affirmed by the CA — that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the
regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property — no longer holds true. As tilings now stand,
a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below
P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in
Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration45 issued by the Office of the City
Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax
declaration.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the
MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
PRESCRIPTION – Action Not Prescribed
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is
baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 49 of the Civil Code in
relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 50].51
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system.
The most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the
title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to
the possession thereof.52 The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical
consequence of ownership.53 Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject
any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible.
No LACHES - laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the Spouses Supapo's petition.61 On the
contrary, the facts as culled from the records show the clear intent of the Spouses Supapo to exercise
their right over and recover possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the dispute to the
appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed the
action publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.
G.R. No. 204626 June 9, 2014
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C. CALWAG, THOMAS L. TINGGA-AN, and the Heirs of JULIET
B. PULKERA, Petitioners, vs. CARMELING CRISOLOGO, Respondent.
Carmeling Crisologo (Crisologo), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Pedro Isican (Isican), filed her
complaint5 for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership with Damages against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul
P. Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an (petitioners) before the MTCC.
Crisologo alleged that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of
approximately 2,000 square meters, described in, and covered by, two (2) certificates of title – Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT)Nos. T-13935 and T-13936;that the properties were covered by an Assessment
of Real Property; that the payments of realty taxes on the said properties were updated; that in 2006,
she discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her properties by stealth, by force and
without her prior consent and knowledge, and constructed their houses thereon; that upon discovery of
their illegal occupation, her daughter, Atty. Carmelita Crisologo, and Isican personally went to the
properties and verbally demanded that petitioners vacate the premises and remove their structures
thereon; that the petitioners begged and promised to buy the said properties for 3,500.00 per square
meter; that she gave petitioners time to produce the said amount, but they reneged on their promise
to buy them; that petitioners refused to vacate the subject properties despite several demands; that the
petitioners knew full well that the subject premises they were occupying were titled properties but they
insisted on unlawfully holding the same; and that she was unlawfully dispossessed and displaced
from the subject properties due to petitioners’ illegal occupation.
On the other hand, petitioners countered that the titles of Crisologo were products of Civil Registration
Case No. 1, Record 211, which were declared void by the Supreme Court in Republic v. Marcos, 6 and
reiterated in Republic v. Marcos;7 that the said case was later enacted into law, Presidential Decree
(P.D.)No. 1271, entitled "An Act Nullifying Decrees of Registration and Certificates of Title within the
Baguio Town site Reservation Case No.1, GLRO Record No. 211, pursuant to Act No. 931, as
amended, but Considering as Valid Certain Titles of Lands that are Alienable and Disposable Under
Certain Conditions and For Other Purposes" which took effect on December 22, 1977; that Crisologo
failed to comply with the conditions provided in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of said
titles, hence, the titles were void; that petitioners had been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious,
uninterrupted, and continuous possession of the subject land, in good faith; and that Crisologo was
never in prior possession and had no valid title over the subject land. 8
ISSUE – Who between petitioners and respondent Crisologo have a better right of possession over the
subject parcels of land. Both contending parties claim that they have a superior possessory right over
the disputed lands.
RULING Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land. As the lawful
possessor. the respondent has the right to eject the petitioners
Accion Publiciana: its nature and purpose Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion
publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual
of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
The records show that TCT No. T-1393517 and TCT No. T-1393618 bear the name of Carmeling P.
Crisologo, as the registered owner. Petitioners do not dispute the fact that she has a Torrens title over
the subject parcels of land.
The respondent’s Torrens certificates of title are immune from a collateral attack.
As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects Crisologo from a collateral attack on the
same. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides that
a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it
indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral
attack. A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an
incident of the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.
This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title,
through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such
judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been
disposed of. To permit a collateral attack on respondents-plaintiffs' title is to water down the integrity
and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
The petitioners-defendants' attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs' title, by claiming that fraud
attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend
their possession of the properties in an "accion publiciana," not in a direct action whose main objective
is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title. This is the attack that possession of a Torrens
Title specifically guards against; hence, we cannot entertain, much less accord credit to, the petitioners-
defendants' claim of fraud to impugn the validity of the respondents-plaintiffs' title to their property.
G.R. No. 193075, June 20, 2016
EMMANUEL REYES, SR. AND MUTYA M. REYES, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF DEOGRACIAS
FORLALES, NAMELY: NAPOLEON FORLALES, LITA HELEN FORLALES-FRADEJAS, JAIME
FORLALES, JR., JULIUS FORLALES FORTUNA, HORACE FORLALES, GALAHAD FORLALES,
JR., INDEPENDENCE FORLALES-FETALVERO, MELITON FORLALES, JR., MILAGROS V.
FORLALES AND MERCEDES FORLALES-BAUTISTA, Respondents.
As early as 1978, the petitioners claimed that they had already been occupying the disputed portion.
For one reason or another, they executed an affidavit dated September 18, 1988, saying that their stay
on the lot owned by Mercedes was with the permission of Independencia Forlales Fetalvero
(Independencia), the administrator of the estate of Deogracias Forlales, and was subject to the terms
and conditions imposed by the rightful owner.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On January 5, 1989, Mercedes invited the petitioners to see her for a formal talk regarding their
temporary stay on her property, but the latter refused and simply sent a note asking Mercedes if they
could stay longer "for the sake of convenience" of their family. 7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On May 28, 1993, upon realizing that the petitioners still had not vacated the disputed portion,
Independencia wrote the petitioners, asking them to vacate the premises within six (6) months from
receipt of the letter.
No action followed until the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer on August 28, 1997,
docketed as Civil Case No. OD-229. This complaint was dismissed on September 29, 1997, because
the respondents filed it one (1) year beyond May 28, 1993, the date Independencia demanded that the
petitioners vacate the premises. This decision became final and executory on October 15, 1997.
On May 16, 2005, the respondents, through Independencia, instituted a complaint for ejectment and
demolition of the house before the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay, Brgy. Dapawan, Odiongan,
Romblon. On May 27, 2005, Independencia sent a fomia! letter to the petitioners demanding that they
vacate the subject property, cease and desist from constructing their house, and remove what had
already been constructed.
The petitioners mainly argued in their answer that the complaint for ejectment had prescribed. They
maintained that if the respondents' suit were to be considered a Forcible Entry case, the right to file it
within one (1) year from deprivation of possession had lapsed because their entry allegedly took place
even before 1998. Alternatively, as an Unlawful Detainer case, the right to file the action had likewise
prescribed because the respondents considered the occupation of the petitioners illegal either when
they filed an ejectment case on August 28, 1997, or when they formally demanded the respondents to
vacate on May 28, 1993.
ISSUE – Whether the case filed is Forcible Enrty or Unlawful detainer? Whether 1 year period to
file the case already prescribed? When 1 year period commence for purposed of FE or UD?
RULING - The respondents availed of the wrong remedy after the MCTC dismissed the first complaint
because the period allowed to file a complaint for unlawful detainer already lapsed one year after May
28, 1993. The ejectment complaint filed by the respondents on October 27, 2005 should have been
dismissed for being filed beyond the one-year period allowed under the law
An accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought
before the proper RTC when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. 26 If at the time of the
filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned the plaintiff out of
possession or the defendants' possession had become illegal, the action will be not one of forcible entry
or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana
While both remedies are summary actions to recover physical possession of property, they are distinct
and different causes of action under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The plaintiff may file a forcible entry
case to recover possession against a defendant whose occupation is illegal from the very beginning if
he acquired the possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. 10 On the other hand, he
may file an unlawful detainer suit when the defendant's possession of the property was inceptively
lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued
his possession despite the termination of the right to do so
The difference between these two actions is greatly significant in reckoning when the one-year period to
file an ejectment suit should begin. If the entry is illegal from its inception, the action which may be filed
against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. 12 If not - or the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter became illegal - the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within
one (1) year from the date of the last demand to vacate.
The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the action, as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case.15 A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to
the defendant of the termination of the right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year
from the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.16 In the absence of these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper
remedy and the municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court do not have jurisdiction over the case.
In this light, the occupation from May 28, 1993 up to May 27, 2005 cannot be characterized as
possession by mere tolerance. The filing of the first complaint for unlawful detainer four (4) years after
May 28, 1993, affirms the fact that the respondents no longer wanted the petitioners to occupy the
disputed portion as early as 1993. It was duly alleged in their first complaint that it was on May 28,
1993, when the respondents finally demanded the petitioners to vacate. Thus, the possession of the
petitioners after said date started becoming illegal because they no longer had a right to occupy the
portion of the lot.
We likewise cannot consider the possession after the dismissal on September 29, 1997, of the first case
for unlawful detainer, until the final demand that triggered the present complaint was sent on May 27,
2005. The evidence for the respondents shows that they allowed the petitioners to remain on the
disputed portion of the lot thereafter. As plaintiffs, it was incumbent upon the respondents to
substantiate their allegation with proof that they continuously tolerated the petitioners occupying the
disputed portion until May 27, 2005.
The Court cannot allow the respondents' present suit to prosper because we would effectively allow
circumvention of the one-year limitation. This period would be rendered useless if every plaintiff could
simply make a new formal demand to vacate every time the Municipal Trial Courts dismisses their
complaint on grounds that it was filed beyond the one-year limitation period.
TOLERANCE: acts merely tolerated are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the
owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those
particular services or benefits which one's property can give to another without material injury or
prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy. They are acts of little
disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do
on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well.
And even though this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription.
There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of
knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of
tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are
realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the
permission.
G.R. No. 201289, May 30, 2016
SPOUSES ROLANDO AND SUSIE GOLEZ, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO BERTULDO,
NAMELY: ERINITA BERTULDO-BERNALES, FLORENCIO BERTULDO, DOMINADOR BERTULDO,
RODEL BERTULDO AND ROGER BERTULDO, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY THEIR CO-HEIR AND
DULY APPOINTED ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ERINITA BERNALES, Respondents.
The dispute involves two neighboring unregistered parcels of land located at Roxas, Capiz,3 designated
as Lot 10244 and Lot 1025.5
In 1976, Benito Bertuldo (Benito) sold Lot 1024 to Asuncion Segovia acting for her daughter, Susie
Golez.6 They executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 10, 1976, clearly indicating the lot's
metes and bounds.7
After the sale, the Sps. Golez started the construction of their house on Lot 10258, instead of on Lot
1024.
Domingo Bertuldo (Domingo), Benito's first cousin9, claimed ownership over Lot 1025 and protested
against the Sps. Golez's house construction.10 In response, the Sps. Golez assured Domingo that the
construction was being done on Lot 1024.11
Sometime in 1993 and after Domingo's death, the respondents conducted a relocation survey on Lot
1025.12 The relocation survey revealed that the Sps. Golez's house stood on Lot 1025. 13 The
respondents confronted the Sps. Golez with this result.
The Sps. Golez claimed that Benito clearly pointed to Susie Golez the natural boundaries of Lot 1025
whose entire area was the subject of the sale between Asuncion Segovia and Benito. 14 To correct the
alleged error in the sale, Asuncion Segovia and Benito executed an Amended Deed of Absolute Sale15
in 1993 to change the stated property sold as "Lot 1024" to "Lot 1025" including the specification of the
metes and bounds of Lot 1025
ISSUE -WOT the respondents have cause of action for Unlawful detainer
RULING – No Cause of Action alleged for UD; FE since the possession was illegal from the beginning.
But one year period to file FE has already prescribed.
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action may
be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue
of any contract, express or implied. A complaint for unlawful detainer must allege that: (a) the
possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on
account of an express or implied contract between them; (b) the defendant's possession became illegal
when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under the contract; (c) the defendant refused to heed such demand;
and (d) the case for unlawful detainer is instituted within one year from the date of last demand. 58
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court.
The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these
factual allegations , an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court
does not have jurisdiction over the case.
In an unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal and his possession was
permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract.61
In the present case, paragraph 6 of the complaint clearly characterized the Sps. Golez's possession of
Lot 1025 as unlawful from the start and bereft of contractual or legal basis. Domingo did not tolerate
the possession of Sps. Golez since he had immediately objected and protested over the construction of
Sps. Golez's house on Lot 1025. Notably, the RTC expressly found that there was no tolerance or
permission on the part of Domingo on the construction of the Sps. Golez house on Lot 1025. 62
Since tolerance has not been effectively alleged in the complaint, the complaint fails to state a cause of
action for unlawful detainer. Therefore, the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the respondents' complaint.
the Sps. Golez's possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning and the proper action
which the respondents should have filed was one for forcible entry. An action for forcible entry,
however, prescribes one year reckoned from the date of the defendant's actual entry into the land.
In the present case, the Sps. Golez entered the property immediately after the sale in 1976. Thus, their
action for forcible entry had already prescribed.
Since the action for forcible entry has already prescribed, one of the remedies for the respondent heirs
to recover the possession of Lot 1025 is accion publiciana. Accion publiciana is the plenary action to
recover the right of possession which should be brought to the proper Regional Trial Court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
better right of possession of realty independently of title.
In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since the
defendant had turned the plaintiff out of possession or the defendant's possession had become illegal,
the action will be not one of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, but an accion publiciana.
G.R No. 163157
SPOUSES BERNABE MERCADER, JR. and LORNA JURADO-MERCADER, OLIVER MERCADER,
GERALDINE MERCADER and ESRAMAY MERCADER, Petitioners,
vs. SPOUSES JESUS BARDILAS and LETECIA GABUYA BARDILAS,
The Spouses Mercaders aired in their motion for reconsideration in the CA.1âwphi1 They contend that
the technical description of their property contained the phrase "with existing Right of Way (3.00 meters
wide)," which signified that they were equally "entitled to the road-right-of-way being conferred upon
them by TITLE pursuant to Article 622 of the New Civil Code." They submit that: Hence,they too should
equally share in its retention for uses other than the easement after its non-user brought about by the
closure of the exit point by Clarita Village Association.
ISSUE – WOT the owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the
easement is established, and may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of
the easement
RULING : YES
Easement or servitude, according to Valdez v. Tabisula,43is "a real right constituted on another's
property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing
or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person." "It
exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of
the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an
acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another. " 44
It is settled that road right of way is a discontinuous apparent easement 45 in the context of Article 622 of
the Civil Code, which provides that continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones,
whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of title. But the phrase with existing Right of
Way in the TCT is not one of the modes of acquisition of the easement by virtue of a title. Acquisition by
virtue of title, as used in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers to "the juridical act which gives birth to the
easement, such as law, donation, contract, and will of the testator."46
A perusal of the technical description of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A indicates that the phrase with existing Right
of Way (3.00 meters wide) referred to or described Lot No. 5808-F-2-B,47 which was one of the
boundaries defining Lot F-2-A. Moreover, under the Torrens system of land registration, the certificate
of title attests "to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein
described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or
reserves. The objective is to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon
the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The
Torrens system gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in
his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land." 48 The
Torrens certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular property described
therein.
It is noteworthy that an encumbrance "subject to 3 meters wide right of way" was annotated on TCT No.
107915, which covers Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of the Spouses Bardilas.53 As the owners of the servient
estate, the Spouses Bardilas retained ownership of the road right of way even assuming that said
encumbrance was for the benefit of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A of the Spouses Mercader. The latter could not
claim to own even a portion of the road right of way because Article 630 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that "[t]he owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the
easement is established, and may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of
the easement."
With the right of way rightfully belonging to them as the owners of the burdened property, the Spouses
Bardilas remained entitled to avail themselves of all the attributes of ownership under the Civil Code,
specifically: jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus abutendi, jus disponendi and jus vindicandi. Article 428 of the
Civil Code recognizes that the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law
April 18, 2016 G.R. No. 202051
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS &
HIGHWAYS; ENGINEER SIMPLICIO D. GONZALES, District Engineer, Second Engineering
District of Camarines Sur; and ENGINEER VICTORINO M. DEL SOCORRO, JR., Project Engineer,
DPWH, Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur, Petitioners,
vs. SPOUSES ILDEFONSO B. REGULTO and FRANCIA R. REGULTO, Respondents.
Respondents spouses Ildefonso B. Regulto and Francia R. Regulto are the registered owners of the
property in controversy located at Mabel, Naga City, Camarines Sur consisting of 300 square meters
covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 086-2010000231.2 The Spouses Regulto acquired the said property by
virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed by Julian R. Cortes, attorney-in-fact of the spouses
Bienvenido and Beatriz
Santos, in February 1994.3 The subject property originated from a Free Patent property consisting of
7,759 square meters registered and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 235 dated April
14, 1956.4
Sometime in April 2011, the DPWH Second Engineering District of Camarines Sur apprised the
Spouses Regulto of the construction of its road project, the Naga City-Milaor Bypass Road, which will
traverse their property and other adjoining properties. 5 The DPWH initially offered the spouses the sum
of P243,000.00 or Pl ,500.00 per square meter for the 162 square-meter affected area as just
compensation.6
However, in a letter dated May 11, 2006, the DPWH, through District Engr. Rolando P. Valdez,
withdrew the offer, and informed the Spouses Regulto that they were not entitled to just compensation
since the title of their land originated from a Free Patent title acquired under Commonwealth Act (CA.)
No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, which contained a reservation in favor of the government of an
easement of right-of-way of twenty (20) meters, which was subsequently increased to sixty (60) meters
by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 635, for public highways and similar works that the government or
any public or quasi-public service enterprise may reasonably require for carrying on their business, with
payment of damages for the improvements only. 7
The Spouses Regulto, in their letter dated May 30, 2011, protested the findings of the DPWH and
ordered them to cease from proceeding with the construction. 8 They alleged that since their property is
already covered by TCT No. 086-2010000231, it ceased to be a public land.9 They communicated that
the market value of the property is P450,000.00 plus the Zonal Value of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR), which is more or less the acceptable just compensation of their property. 10 Furthermore, they
requested that they be furnished, within five (5) days from the receipt of their letter, with a Program of
Works and Sketch Plan showing the cost of the project and the extent or area covered by the road that
will traverse their property.
The petitioners reiterated their defense that no legal right has been violated since C.A. No. 141, as
amended by P.D. No. 1361,24 imposes a 60-meter wide lien on the property originally covered by a Free
Patent.25 Petitioners also avowed that Section 5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) of the
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 897426 provides that if the private property or land is acquired under the
provisions of C.A. No. 141, the government officials charged with the prosecution of the projects or their
representative is authorized to take immediate possession of the property subject to the lien as soon as
the need arises, and the government may obtain a quitclaim from the owners concerned without the
need for payment for the land acquired under the said quit claim mode except for the damages to
improvements only. 27 Hence, petitioners maintained that the Spouses Regulto are not entitled to a just
compensation for the portion of their property affected by the construction of the Naga City-Milaor
Bypass Road
The DPWH furnished the Spouses Regulto with the sketch plan showing the extent of the road right-of-
way that will cut across their property. 12 It also reiterated its earlier position that the title to the land was
acquired under C.A. No. 141. 13
On October 8, 2011, the Spouses Regulto filed a complaint for payment of just compensation, damages
with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the
RTC of Naga City, Branch 62, against herein petitioners Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
DPWH; District Engr. Valdez of the Second Engineering District of Camarines Sur; and Project Engr.
Del Socorro, Jr. of the DPWH, Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur.
ISSUE - Whether the petitioners are liable for just compensation in enforcing the Government's legal
easement of right-of-way on the subject property which originated from the 7,759 square-meter of public
land awarded by free patent to the predecessor-in-interest of the Spouses Regulto.
Petitioners allege that a legal easement of right-of-way exists in favor of the Government since the land
in controversy was originally public land awarded by free patent to the Spouses Regulto's
predecessors-in-interest.
RULING – Yes .
Jurisprudence settles that one of the reservations and conditions under the Original Certificate of Title of
land granted by free patent is that the said land is subject "to all conditions and public easements and
servitudes
recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and
114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. "49
Section 112 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, provides that lands granted by patent shall be subjected to a
right-of-way in favor of the Government, to wit:
Sec. 112. Said land shall further be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding sixty (60) meters on width
for public highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraph and telephone lines, airport
runways, including sites necessary for terminal buildings and other government structures needed for
full operation of the airport, as well as
areas and sites for government buildings for Resident and/or Project Engineers needed in the
prosecution of government-infrastructure projects, and similar works as the Government or any public or
quasi-public service or enterprise, including mining or forest concessionaires, may reasonably require
for carrying on their business, with damages for the improvements only.
Government officials charged with the prosecution of these projects or their representatives are
authorized to take immediate possession of the portion of the property subject to the lien as soon as the
need arises and after due notice to the owners. It is however, understood that ownership over said
properties shall immediately revert to the title holders should the airport be abandoned or when the
infrastructure projects are completed and buildings used by project engineers are abandoned or
dismantled, but subject to the same lien for future improvements.’’ 50
In other words, lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters in
width for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or
any public enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the improvements existing thereon that
may be affected.
It is noted that the 162 square meters of the subject property traversed by the bypass road project is
well within the limit provided by the law While this Court concurs that the petitioners are not obliged to
pay just compensation in the enforcement of its easement of right-of-way to lands which originated from
public lands granted by free patent, we, however, rule that petitioners are not free from any liability as to
the consequence of enforcing the said right-of-way granted over the original 7,759-square-meter
property to the 300-square-meter property belonging to the Spouses Regulto.kl
There is "taking," in the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, when the owner is
actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or material
impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. 54 Using one
of these standards, it is apparent that there is taking of the remaining area of the property of the
Spouses Regulto. It is true that no burden was imposed thereon, and that the spouses still retained title
and possession of the property. The fact that more than half of the property shall be devoted to the
bypass road will undoubtedly result in material impairment of the value of the property. It reduced the
subject property to an area of 138 square meters. Thus, the petitioners are liable to pay just
compensation over the remaining area of the subject property, with interest thereon at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of writ of possession or the actual taking until full payment is
made.
Just compensation is defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator." The word "just" is used to qualify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey
the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample. On the other hand, the word "compensation" means "a full indemnity or remuneration for the
loss or damage sustained by the owner of property taken or injured for public use."
Simply stated, just compensation means that the former owner must be returned to the monetary
equivalent of the position that the owner had when the taking occurred. To achieve this monetary
equivalent, we use the standard value of "fair market value" of the property at the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking of property, whichever is earlier. 56
The case is remanded to the court of origin for the purpose of determining the final just compensation
for the remaining area of the subject property. The RTC is thereby ordered to make the determination of
just compensation payable to the respondents Spouses Regulto with deliberate dispatch.