CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II – REVIEWER FINALS (CASES)

ARTICLE 5 – FREEDOM OF RELIGION

 The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.
 Any restraint of such right can only be justified on the ground that there is clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
 The state must not intrude to purely religious matters.
 No less fundamental than the right to take part is the right to stand apart, the freedom
of religion enshrined in the constitution should be seen as the rule, not the exception.
 The essence of the free exercise clause is freedom from conformity to religious dogma
not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.
 A regulation, neutral on its face, may in its application, offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.
 Expression of diverse beliefs, no matter how upsetting they may seem to the majority,
are the price we pay for the freedoms we enjoy.
 In the case of a regulation which appears to abridge a right to which the fundamental
law accords high significance, it is the regulation, not the act or refusal to act, which is
the exception and which requires the court’s strictest conformity.
 Expulsion or excommunication of members of a religious institution or organization is a
matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization.
 It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance
of their discretionary and official functions.
 It is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church
regulations.
 Disputes involving religious institutions or organization, there is one area in which the
court should not touch
 Doctrinal and
 Disciplinary difference.
 Power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.
 An attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration
for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences
that might follow from, the exercise of the power.
 Benefit or advantage for religious institution must be incidental and secondary in
nature.
 What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not merely religious
toleration.
 There is nothing unconstitutional in holding fiesta and having a patron saint for the
barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint cannot be
branded as illegal.
 Barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural
communities.
 1. Government action must have circular purpose.
2. Benefit to certain religion must only be secondary effect not primary.
3. No entanglement between the Government and religion in the government action
done.
 Non-secularistic separation of the church and state.
SECTION 6- RIGHT TO TRAVEL
 Restrictions on one’s right to travel
1. In the interest of national security
2. Public safety
3. Public health, as may be provided by law.
 No other restriction as those provided above, but mere regulation is allowed.
 Hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court’s inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the
person of the accused.
 Under the obligation assumed by a person in a bail bond, he holds himself amendable
at all times to the orders and processes of the courts, he may legally be prohibited from
leaving the country during pendency of the case.
 The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
 An accused person desiring to leave the Philippine must show to the court’s
satisfaction that the same is justified including the conformity of his sureties.
 While liberty of travel may be impaired even without court order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations.
 They can only limit on the basis if national security, public safety, or public health and
as may be provided by law.
SECTION 7- RIGHT TO INFORMATION
 These constitutional provisions are self-executing.
 They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by
guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of
information.
 What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations
upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the
declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
 The right may be properly invoked in a Mandamus proceeding.
 The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it
the power to prohibit.
 Government agencies in custody of public record may regulate the manner of
examination but the disclosure of information of public concern and the access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of the said agencies.
 The availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the
nature of the information sought:
a. Being of public concern or one that involves public interest
 b. Not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
 The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and
expression.
 The right to information goes hand in hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service.
 Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes exact definitions.
 Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know either:
 These directly affects their lives or
 Simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizens.
 It is for the court to determine in a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
 GSIS funds are matters of public concern.
 National Board examination are matters of public concern (interested in the fair and
competent administration)
 The postulate of public office is public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution to
protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty
words if access to such information of public concern is denied.
 The right to information goes hand in hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in public service.
 Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to the right of information:
1. National security matters and intelligence information;
2. Trade secrets and banking transactions;
3. Criminal matters;
4. Other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially
known to public officers or employees by reason of their office and not made
available on the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door cabinet
meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal
deliberation of the supreme court.
 While public officers in the custody or control of public records have the discretion to
regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by
interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibited
access, inspection, examination or copying the records.
SECTION 8 – RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION
 Mere membership in Communist Party not punished.
 Anti-subversion Act not violative of constitutional freedom of speech and association.
 Freedom of association and freedom of expression are so fundamental that they are
thought by some to occupy a “preferred position” in the hierarchy of constitutional
values.
 Any limitation on their exercise must be justified by the existence of a substantive evil.
 The right to form association or societies for purposes not contrary to law is neither
absolute nor illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive and dominant police power
 of the state and may constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to serve appropriate and
important public interests.
 Whether the restriction imposed is constitutionally permissible or not depends upon the
circumstances of the case.
 Except when the constitution provides otherwise, the lawmaking body may enact law
banning or restricting political partisanship in an election.
 Automatic membership clause in a contract is not a violation of its freedom to
association.
SECTION 9 – EMINENT DOMAIN
 Authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private property for public use
upon observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation.
 The taking of land for use in the agrarian reform program of the government is
conditioned on the payment of just compensation.
 Requisites:
1. The property taken must be private property;
2. There must be genuine necessity to take private property;
3. The taking must be for public use;
4. There must be payment of just compensation; and
5. The taking must comply with due process law.
 Just compensation
 Full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
 The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss.
 Price or value of the property taken at the time it was taken from the owner and
appropriated by the Government shall be the basis.
 If the government takes possession of the land before the institution of the
expropriation proceedings the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of
said possession, not of the filing of the complaint.
 Factors to be considered in arriving at the FMV of the property:
 Cost of acquisition
 The current value of like properties
 Its actual or potential uses
 Size
 Shape
 Location
 Tax declaration
 With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing
which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent
upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires
to reacquire the same.
 There was still full taking of property even if the owners are not completely and actually
dispossessed. Taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not
be an actual physical taking or appropriation.
 The expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or
occupancy but may still amount to a taking.
 Compensable taking includes:
 Destruction
 Restriction
 Diminution, or
 Interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and
enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.
 Where the expropriation entered the property without the intention of formally
expropriating the land, and w/o the prior knowledge and consent of the owners,
reckoning just compensation, as a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to
them, on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation
proceedings is entirely warranted.
 Power of eminent domain prevails over the non-impairment clause and is clearly
superior to the final and executory judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment case.
 Exercised by legislature. However it may be delegated by Congress to the President,
Administrative bodies, local government units, and even to private enterprises
performing public services.
 As a rule, genuine necessity for the exercise of eminent domain is a justiciable question
but when the power is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is
essentially a political question.
 Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a
particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the
improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of
constructing it, the suitableness of location selected and the consequent necessity of
taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to
determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views
for those of the representative of the people.
 Elements of taking
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
3. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
 The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
 State’s power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism
purposes although this specific objective is not expressed in the Constitution.
 State’s power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism
purposes although this specific objective is not expressed in the Constitution.
 Government may take immediate possession of land subject to expropriation
proceedings upon deposit of 10% of its value.
 The immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without notice
and hearing is violative of due process.
 The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men; The
genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be
shown to exist.

SECTION 11 – FREE ACCESS TO COURTS & RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF

CASES.
 The Constitution affords litigants — moneyed or poor — equal access to the courts;
moreover, it specifically provides that poverty shall not bar any person from having
access to the courts.
 The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III of the
Constitution.
 The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings.
 While the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, such that a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, the right to the speedy
disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.
 The doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated,
the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:
1. the length of delay;
2. the reasons for the delay;
3. the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
4. the prejudice caused by the delay

ARTICLE IV – CITIZENSHIP
 There are two ways of acquiring citizenship:
1. By birth and
2. By naturalization;
 A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.
 Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization generally under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.
 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a
Filipino citizen.
 Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law.
 Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. By naturalization,
2. By repatriation, and
3. By direct act of Congress.
 Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen.
 On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
 The signing into law of the 1935 Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
 An application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express
renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application for an alien certificate
of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, were mere acts of assertion
of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same.
 The phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. 7160 and in R.A. 7854 must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance”—persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.
 For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship
upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship; A declaration in the certificate of candidacy that one is a Filipino citizen
and that he or she will support and defend the Constitution and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship.
 In order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the
following must be present:
1. A person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where
said person is a party;
2. The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof, and
3. The finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
 If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
 C.A. No. 625 prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid
election of Philippine citizenship.
 Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention “in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry.
 The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
 The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made;
 The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election
should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
 The three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule.
 The 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the
person has always regarded himself as a Filipino.
 The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof
of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus
enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country.
 No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and
any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.
 Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient.
 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to
such citizenship.
 Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis—once the citizenship of an
individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon..
 It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and
that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality.
 Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
 It is the State, through its representatives designated by statute that may question the
illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings—it is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private
persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.

ARTICLE V – SUFFRAGE
 The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which
im-ports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
 In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur
1. residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
2. an intention to remain there, and
3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.
 In other words, there must be an animus non revertendi and an animus manendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
 time. The acts of the person must conform with his purpose. The change of residence
must be voluntary; the residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual;
and to the fact of residence there must be added the animus manendi.
 Mere absence from one's residence of origin—domicile—to pursue studies, engage in
business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss
of such residence.
 The determination of a person's legal residence or domicile largely depends upon
intention which may be inferred from his' acts, activities and utterances.
 The party who claims that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin must
show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss.
 A previous registration as voter in a municipality other than that in which he is elected is
not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.
 Sudden departure from the country to go into self-exile until conditions favorable have
been established cannot be described as voluntary or as abandonment of residence in
the context of domicile by choice.
 Right to vote is a precious political right as well as a bounden duty of every citizen.