UNDERSTANDING EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY:

Is Countering Violent Extremism Programs the solution to end extremist ideology in the
Philippines?

An Essay

By
KAMIAN, AL-QATAR, ABDULLA
2015-90928, Masters in Asian Studies, Asian Center

Submitted to
PROFESSOR JULKIPLI WADI
Professor
Institute of Islamic Studies
University of the Philippines-Diliman

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements in

IS 292 (Seminar on Islamic Revivalism & Contemporary Muslim Movements)

May 2018

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THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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 UNDERSTANDING EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY:

Is Countering Violent Extremism Programs the solution to end extremist ideology in the

Philippines?

By: Al-Qatar Kamlian

Abstract

The current armed conflict in Southern Philippines offers hindsight to the evolution of

extremist ideology perpetuated by violent groups in the region. After five months of intense

fighting, the Battle of Marawi has concluded as the most massive combat operation in urban

warfare in contemporary Philippine history. The defeat of the extremist group in the battle

ground does not always signify the collapse of their ideologies. A long-term and sustainable

strategy of countering violent extremism must be crafted and subsequently implemented. As

the nature of extremist and terrorist threats continue to evolve and remain dynamic –country

and conflict specific– constant development and research to enhance counter-extremism and

counter-terrorism policies must be prioritized. It cannot be discounted that the specter of

extremist ideologies continues to haunt the vulnerable sector of society. It is, therefore,

paramount that preventive and corrective approaches should be undertaken as part of the

overall government strategy to counter violent extremism.

Introduction

Countering the threats of violent extremism and terrorism has become a priority in the

contemporary security landscape. Traditional military approaches only address the visible

manifestations of extremist and terrorist ideologies while leaving the invisible aspect – which

pertains to the war of ideas, counter-narratives, and counter-ideology – unaddressed. The

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optimal strategy is to combine soft and hard approaches to counter and prevent violent

extremism and terrorism. Even though military and law enforcement methods were effective,

the emergence of new and innovative approaches would create a sustainable and longstanding

outcome.

In 2017, the Battle of Marawi between the extremist group and ISIS affiliate in Southeast Asia

–the so-called Dawlah Islamiya Waliyatul Mashriq (DIWM, under the leadership of Isnilon

Hapilon and the Maute brothers (Omar and Abdullah) – and the Philippine military, was a

watershed moment in many ways. It redefined the societal perceptions on the looming threat

of extremist ideology that plagued the region for decades. The five-month-long battle caused

tremendous dislocation of thousands of innocent civilians, destruction of properties, and loss

of countless lives on both sides –Military personnel and the extremist group. For the supporters

of the extremist group, it serves a clarion call. It provided them the motivation to continuously

advance the Islamic State ideology in the region, as both foreign and local supporters of the

extremist group saw the conflict as an important event for the future of their extremist

undertakings.

The conflict in Marawi also exposed the Philippine government's weaknesses and limitations

–military response and policy-centered interventions. The lack of military experience in urban

warfare has resulted in a high number of casualties and indiscriminate destruction of civilian

properties during the siege. The complacency of intelligence collections and deficiencies on its

appreciation has led to miscalculations on the part of the state forces. At one point, the

overseers, senior officials of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine

National Police (PNP), were part of the delegation of President Rodrigo Duterte during his

state visit in Russia. The Philippine military claimed to have advance information on some

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aspects of the attack, but they failed to have a clear appreciation of intelligence information

(Ranada, 2017).

The government’s policy response to counter-extremism needs a clear trajectory. It must not

be an instantaneous and hasty response, like in the case of Marawi siege. For instance, the

declaration of Martial Law by the President received criticisms from all sectors, only to be

justified by his administration officials and political allies, as a necessity at this critical

juncture. The Filipino people have a long history of opposing this kind of declaration, and their

aversion towards this type of intervention reminds them of the unfortunate past under the

dictatorship of then President Marcos. Speculations of a looming nationwide declaration of

Martial Law that threatens Filipino democratic way of life and violation of basic human rights

have always been critical and often receive with suspicions.

Meanwhile, the anti-terror law also received wide criticism due to its apparent loopholes. For

instance, there is an absence of a definition of terrorism, which makes the law vague,

ambiguous, and highly susceptible to abuse (Cabalza, 2017). The Human Security Act (HAS)

of 2007, otherwise known as Republic Act 9372, was enacted to provide a legal framework for

the Philippine government’s anti-terrorism strategy and security policies.

The post-Marawi conflict offers an important opportunity to formulate and evaluate proposed,

as well as proven approaches, to prevent and counter violent extremism. This paper aims to

examine the concept, principles, and methodologies of countering violent extremism. This new

comprehensive approach could be the turning point in the formulation of counter-extremism,

and counter-terrorism strategy as a component of the overall national security plan.

Additionally, as one of the tools of countering violent extremism, this paper also aims to

explore the prospects of de-radicalization and counter-radicalization programs in the Philippine

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context. It also discusses the concept of de-radicalization and counter-radicalization programs

and its methodologies as one of the emerging trends in response to the threat of violent

extremism as a part of the overall counter-terrorism strategy. It is important to note that this

program should be specifically conducted to appropriate beneficiaries. In line with this, it is

relevant to study the existing de-radicalization and counter-radicalization programs of other

countries, especially in South East Asia. Neighboring countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and

Singapore provided an effective framework for these undertakings. It is important to note that

programs should be country-specific and must be indigenized.

Although the Philippine government still resort to the traditional, approaches that were proven

unsustainable and short-term, these programs could provide strategic pivot as part of counter-

terrorism strategies. The value these programs cannot be downplayed, it was proven effective

in other countries; therefore, it must be explored and implemented within the Philippine

context, with appropriate research and studies from qualified professionals with appropriate

backgrounds.

Historical Context of the Conflict

The armed conflict in Mindanao dates back as far as the 14th century before the Philippines

was established. The Spanish colonial power attempted to subdue the Moro nation-

states (Sultanates), ruled by Sultans but failed to occupy the entire island under its control. The

Moro fought against the Spanish rule that brought disruption on maritime activities, systemic

destruction of Muslim lands, depopulation caused by military expeditions, and isolation from

neighboring Muslim Malays in the region (Majul, 1988). While the colonial powers managed

to subjugate Luzon and Visayas, the colonizers found Mindanao much more difficult to

conquer.

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Subsequently, during the American occupation, a more elaborate campaign to control the

Moros was undertaken. Unlike their predecessor, the American colonial power introduced a

different approach to their assimilation policy. Administrative reforms, public schools, and

local constabulary were introduced by the new colonialist regime. In the latter part of the

American occupation, they also provided consent to the migration of Filipinos from the other

parts of the country (Majul, 1988).

The annexation of Mindanao and Sulu Islands to the commonwealth government headed by

Filipino nationalists led to the subsequent collapse of the Moro domination of their ancestral

land. Despite the lobby of support for the Muslim state, the Moros found themselves becoming

a part of national patrimony in 1946 when the first Philippine republic was conceived.

The Moros eventually found themselves losing control over their own affairs, becoming more

marginalized in their own land. The newly founded Philippine government did not bring about

committed undertakings to address the needs of the Moros. They were still neglected and

continue to suffer from the lowest life expectancy, literacy, and per capita income in the entire

country. The Muslim areas in Mindanao have some of the worse infrastructures, as well as the

highest unemployment rates in the country.

The government enticed large movement of people from the islands of Luzon and Visayas to

cultivate the fertile land of Mindanao. As a result, in the 1950s, the Moros were slowly

becoming a minority in their own homeland. The government policy of mass migration created

a sudden influx of non-Moros into the region, once predominantly ruled and occupied by the

Moros. During this time, the disparities were apparent. Non-Moros proceeded to take higher-

paying jobs and took the best lands at the expense of the indigenous Moros, who were displaced

from their traditional social structure.

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These dynamics contributed to the feeling of resentment, subsequently creating friction

between the two groups in Mindanao. Moro nationalist leaders during this time magnify the

discrimination of the government toward the indigenous Muslim population, who found

themselves vulnerable to the exploitation of what they considered oppressive Philippine

colonial government.

As a reaction to these compounding events, Moro nationalist movements were founded. The

Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are

two of the most dominant and influential armed groups in the region. These groups espoused

an armed campaign and declared its intention to establish an independent Muslim state in the

predominantly indigenous areas of Mindanao and Sulu. (Gowing, 1979). Young members of

the MNLF and MILF were generally educated and originated from different social classes and

ethnic backgrounds in Mindanao. A series of negotiations were administered abroad between

these Moro armed groups and the Philippine government. Each Philippine administration

committed to accelerating government programs to improve the economic status of the Moros

in Mindanao. Although seminal peace agreements between the state and the Moro nationalist

movements were initiated, the on-going conflict in Mindanao reflects an opposite path for

reconciliation to achieve lasting stability.

The frustrations of the new generation of Moros created divisions within the rank and file of

these liberation fronts. Factions within these groups held more radical views and interpretations

of Islam, and believe that only violent recourse as the solution to the Moro problem in the

region. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Rajah Soliman

Group (RSG), Ansar Khilafah Philippines (AKP), and the Maute Group (MG); held similar

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radical and violent ideologies. The Dawlah Islamiya Waliyatul Mashriq (DIWM) is the result

of a collaboration between the ASG-Basilan based, MG, and AKP.

Contemporary extremist groups in the Philippines did not just appear out of the blue. They

were the result of the discontent and resentment among the new generations of fighters within

the two dominant groups. These groups believed that armed confrontations against the

government and the establishment of an Islamic state would bring about change in the region.

The evolution of these factions, from Al-Qaeda doctrine to their allegiance to the Islamic State

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), is an important indicator that peace agreements between the two

dominant armed groups and the government did not bear a tangible result to change the

narrative of social and historical injustices.

As a result, these disgruntled groups embraced a more extremist ideology, which is more

appealing and modern, as it seemingly addressed the challenges faced by the Muslim

communities in the region. These groups have embraced the violent politico-religious ideology

of ISIS after failing to achieve their aims by adhering to historically based ethnopolitical

ideologies (Gunaratna, 2017).

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

During his speech at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism on February 2015 at the

White House, former United States President Barrack Obama who chaired the summit and was

attended by ministers of from nearly 70 countries, highlighted the importance of collective

effort of the international community to come up with concrete steps to eradicate the threat of

violent extremism. He amplified the need for sustainable and long-term governmental policies

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while accentuating the significant role of civil society and religious institutions as the first line

of defense in combating extremist ideologies.

The field of countering violent extremism emerged from recognition that traditional approaches

–military and law enforcement operations– are essential to taking terrorists off of the battlefield

and disrupting plots, but there are insufficiency in extinguishing the underlying ideologies and

grievances that motivate scores of recruits to join violent extremist groups (Blair, Panetta,

Zarate, Pandith, Green, & Proctor, 2016).

The idea underpinning CVE is that violent extremists should not be fought exclusively with

military, intelligence, and police mean. It also entails a discussion on the structural causes of

violent extremism, including intolerance, government failure, and political, economic, and

social marginalization (Frazer & Nünlist, 2015). There is nothing new about the concept, which

signifies suppression of terrorism should encompass both hard and soft approaches.

The international community, with the significant endorsement from the United Nations

Security Council (UNSC), supports these undertakings. The UNSC resolution 2178 (2014)

underscores the importance of countering violent extremism –which can be conducive to

terrorism including prevention of radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization– as an

“essential element” in addressing the threat to international peace and security posed by these

new generations of extremists., and calls upon member states to enhance efforts to counter

these emerging threats (United Nations Security Council, 2014).

The concept of CVE was introduced in Europe, after different attacks in Spain, and the United

Kingdom (Frazer & Nünlist, 2015). This was part of the response to the concern of homegrown

Islamist terrorism. The United Kingdom government’s program ‘Prevent’ was regarded as the

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pioneer example of CVE, wherein the government focuses on local projects that involve the

community for the prevention of recruitment and radicalization.

The idea, at a micro-level, is to involve the community and family members to identify at-risk

and vulnerable individuals, subsequently enlisting the help of religious authorities to redirect

the core beliefs, and social workers to assist in necessary welfare concerns that individual may

have. Meanwhile, in the macro level, it involves policy development that centered on

sustainable social and economic programs, which may include de-radicalization and counter-

radicalization programs, training of social workers, and law enforcement, countering violent

propaganda campaigns in different media platforms, monitoring intelligence gathering, and

encouraging dialogues in the communities and among different stakeholders.

In discussing the violent extremism, it is pertinent to look into the push and pull factors, which

includes economic, political, social marginalization, discrimination, failure of the government,

corruption, injustice, experience of violence, influence of public or social media, attraction of

extremist narratives, charismatic ideologues, personal identity crisis, feeling of victimhood,

and lack of access to secular and religious education (Kofi Anan Foundation Initiative, 2015).

Violent extremism comes as a result of direct and indirect socio-economic, political, and

historical factors that inhibit access to security and social services. One of the drivers of violent

extremism revolves around the perceptions and realities of marginalization and exclusion of

certain groups of people within a nation-state.

The success of the CVE will require undermining the appeal and legitimacy of extremist

narratives and offering meaningful alternatives to the youth sector, in order for them to turn

away from violent extremist movements to find meaning, belonging, and dignity they seek.

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The strategy must leverage on soft and hard approaches proportionally and enable sectors of

the society and international community to address extremist ideologies (Blair, Panetta, Zarate,

Pandith, Green, & Proctor, 2016).

De-radicalization and Counter Radicalization Programs

One of the effective tools of CVE is the concept of de-radicalization and counter-radicalization

programs. The conception of these programs has gained much attention as one of the soft

approaches through rehabilitation of apprehended terrorists in a post-conflict setting, and as

part of holistic community intervention to manage the prevalence of violent extremism.

The general objective of these programs was to change the attitudes and behaviors of former

terrorists and subsequently reject violence as an ideological, religious, or political goal. It also

aims to prevent extremist tendencies growing within the communities by engaging

stakeholders and potential recruits to embrace peaceful co-existence and improve social

cohesion.

The programs provide pathways for individuals to rehabilitate and reintegrate into the

mainstream multicultural society. It corrects the interpretation of Islamic doctrines, mobilize

community awareness, and strengthen the social fabric. It fosters peacebuilding initiatives with

values of moderation, tolerance, and co-existence replacing the menace of violent narratives

propagated by extremist and terrorist groups. Different countries in the world have pioneered

de-radicalization programs, and it is also known as terrorist rehabilitation and reintegration

programs (Basit, 2018).

As the extremist and terrorist doctrines progress, these programs also need further

development. It is imperative to train and promote specialized staff –ulamas, psychologists,

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educators, social workers– who have an understanding of the different components of counter-

radicalization and de-radicalization programs. On the other hand, continuous doctrinal research

to enhance the programs must also be considered. Aftercare or post-rehabilitation and

reintegration monitoring of individuals must be tracked and supervise to avoid re-radicalization

or recidivism.

In the Philippines, such undertakings have not been presented as a methodology in countering

violent extremism. De-Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization should be part of the

country’s counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies. The country needs to transform

its short-term tactical and operational accomplishments against extremist and terrorist groups

into a long-term strategic advantage. Comprehensive strategy and policy on countering violent

extremism must be drafted by the government to address the imbalances in combating

radicalization, extremism, and terrorism. Strong political will and leadership will help propel

the trajectory of such undertakings.

Most of the programs implemented were framed in a specific country’s historical, cultural,

political, social, economic, and religious contexts. In addition to these considerations, varying

government structures, regional environment, and the magnitude of the security problem has

also been acknowledged. These significant variables have reshaped the responses and

effectiveness of these programs.

During the course of the program, community engagement was also emphasized. In essence,

the community is part of the solution, as it is the communities in a collective manner that defeats

extremism, not the government or the military. It is the community that rejects the extremist

and terrorist ideologies, thus delegitimizing doctrines propagated by these groups.

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In formulating counter-radicalization and de-radicalization policies, it is practical to review the

experiences of other countries. In southeast Asia, for instance, one of the sought out model is

Singapore’s counter-radicalization and extremism model. It is very comprehensive and

contains effective conceptual frameworks and institutional structures that continue to upgrade

as new security threats emerged.

Singapore’s terrorist rehabilitation and reintegration focus on six (6) aspects, namely religion,

education, education, and vocational training, and psychological input, socio-cultural, and

family rehabilitation. The participation of religious sectors, government agencies, and non-

government organizations have contributed to the success of the programs. This comprehensive

process, coupled with good governance and effective community engagement, resulted in

declining of terrorism in the country.

Meanwhile, countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka also studied the model pioneered by

Singapore. It is important to note that the two countries ' adaptation was framed into their local

context. Both countries adopted the best practices and reviewed the outcomes of the programs.

Published case studies evaluate the effectiveness of terrorist rehabilitation by examining

different countries' experiences in the implementation of the programs.

In the context of the Philippines, we have yet to see an actual undertaking of the government

geared towards counter-radicalization and de-radicalization. The government continues to

pursue traditional approaches –military and law enforcement– discounting the potentials of

these programs. The government should explore the potential of soft approaches to defeat

extremism and terrorism in the country. Leaders must have the political will formulate

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sustainable and long term policy that will address the country’s security challenges posted by

radical ideology.

In the post-conflict setting of Marawi, inefficient efforts of the government in exploring the

potentials of de-radicalization and counter-radicalization programs were inexistent. It is

palpable that some members of the local Muslim community in the region have received

societal backlash for supporting the politico-religious ideology of ISIS. Unfortunately, this has

not been corrected by the government to the mainstream Philippine society. Vulnerable

communities in Mindanao are prone to recruitment and indoctrination of radical ideologies.

This could be attributed to the failing social and political infrastructures in the region infested

with poverty and illiteracy.

There is an enormous potential of this type of program to address the gaps and imbalances in

Philippine’s effort to counter violent extremism. Socio-cultural and historical considerations

must be taken into account in order to avoid clashes in the opinion that further the

misunderstanding between the government and the Moro people. The tangible political change

should be complemented with economic development in the region, to help persuade the

greater populations to counter these violent groups’ narratives by accurate doctrinal

interpretations from the religious sector.

Role of Stakeholders in Countering Violent Extremism

While the protection of the populations and prevention of violence, crimes, and terrorism is

primarily the responsibilities of the states, it is a multi-layered endeavor to which different

societal stakeholders can make an important contribution in the effort to counter violent

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extremism. In this section, an overview of the important role of different stakeholders would

be examined.

Role of Religious Sector

The role of religion as a potential driver of violent extremism is significant, but religion usually

interacts with a wide array of other factors –socio-cultural, economic, societal makeup.

Countering violent extremism entails accurate doctrinal interpretations from the community

religious leaders. On the other hand, religious leaders should promote the prevention of violent

extremism by amplifying truthful interpretations of religious scriptures and teachings. They are

an integral part of the solution because of their unique position of authority, credibility,

institutional resources, and ties with the communities and religious institutions. Recognizing

the role of the religious leaders in CVE, and subsequently promoting the religious dimension

of intercultural dialogue, they must be able to protect the vulnerable followers and potential

recruits of the extremist groups and promote tolerance through understanding and

reconciliation between different communities (Hassan, 2017).

In the case of Singapore, religious rehabilitation as one of the three components of their

rehabilitation programs was undertaken by Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG). Members

of the RRG are religious teachers, and scholars acting in their individual capacities. The group

conducts regular counseling sessions to educate the beneficiaries on the proper teachings and

interpretations of Islam to counter radical ideology they have previously imbibed (Weiying,

2018).

Understanding the importance of religious dynamics surrounding violent extremism as well as

efforts to integrate engagement with religious actors in CVE must not be overlooked. The

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capability of this sector to provide counter-ideology and counter-narrative against the

erroneous doctrinal interpretations used to justify violent extremism must be integrated into the

overall endeavor to realign the communities’ core beliefs away from that extremist narrative.

Role of Civil Society

One of the fundamental parts in building community resilience and contributing to the success

of the CVE strategy is the participation of civil society. The civil society organizations (CSO)

were able to integrate and mobilize different sectors of society. They have constant engagement

with religious leaders, community leaders, local chief/officials, and influential personalities

within the communities. Civil society also emphasized the importance of protecting the most

vulnerable members of the communities –youth and women sectors. Violent extremist groups

have targeted women by restricting their public mobility and imposing harsh codes of behavior

in the locality they control. They also face restrictions on movements and participation in their

public life (Cortright, Millar, Gerber-Stellingwerf, & Lopez, 2012).

In Indonesia, scholars and preachers exist within the ranks of the two biggest mainstream

Muslim civil society organizations, the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and the

modernist Muhammadiyah. Both organizations played a key role in “cognitive

immunizing” the wider Indonesian society against violent Islamist appeals, by underlining the

authentic doctrinal interpretations and practical examples derived from daily experience which

enables them to connect with the public (Ramakrishna, 2014).

Civil society organizations provide a space for constructive engagement between the state and

its citizens. They ensure that governments have an effective feedback mechanism to understand

the impact of CVE policies. They also have a pool of experts, religious and community leaders,

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youth, and women sectors, which could shape the trend of responses to CVE. With their deep

expertise and long experiences in identifying and addressing relevant drivers of violent

extremism, they can assist the government in crafting relevant policies and strategies related to

CVE. Most civil society organizations are community-based, which allows them to experience

firsthand the effects of violent extremism. By empowering the CSOs and the community, the

struggle against violent extremism could easily be won.

Role of Youth Sector

The youth sector is the game-changer of the society and the agents of peace. They have

unprecedented access to information technology. They are one of the most vulnerable sectors

in the dynamic of violent extremism, as they continue to face many challenges that exacerbate

their susceptibility living in fragile and conflict infested regions.

The youth can be found on both sides of the extremist activities. They remained one of the

easily targeted members of the society and at the same time, once radicalized, they are capable

of targeting individuals and groups to conduct their terrorist activities. This alarming

phenomenon signifies that violent extremist ideologies transcend beyond borders, ethnicity,

religion, and cultural affiliations.

In order to fight violent extremism, the youth sector must learn the value counter-narratives

and understand the accurate doctrinal interpretation whilst maintaining awareness. Moreover,

the youth sector should be engaged in educational, vocational, and livelihood training available

in their communities. Education is often considered a path to peace as it helps young people

acquire critical thinking skills to prevent radicalization and engagement with violent extremist

ideologies. The impact of education on the youth sector will not only shape their response to

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extremist ideologies, but it also provides an overview of the communities’ capability to deter

such ideologies.

Preventing violent extremism initiatives created by or targeting young people who have grown

exponentially in recent years. It ensures that more young people are now involved in youth,

peace, and security initiatives. The impact of awareness of youth initiatives relevant to CVE

by the communities, governments, and other stakeholders has also increased despite few

functioning systems which strategically support such engagements.

Conclusion

Preventing and Countering violent extremism (PCVE) is an indirect strategy that caters

counter-ideological, counter-narrative, and counter-violence undertakings with local, regional,

and international interventions. In the post-conflict setting of Marawi, urgent efforts to rebuild

and rehabilitate the affected sector of the populations must be done, in order to prevent

discontent and uncertainty about the future of those who were greatly affected. The violent

extremist ideology has taken advantage of inefficient governance, inept social services, high

levels of societal divisions along ethnic or religious lines, endemic political and economic

marginalization, low levels of development with high levels of poverty, social injustice and

inequality. The historical context of the rise of violent extremism must be reviewed in order to

craft appropriate policies with long term effects deliberately.

CVE serves as an alternative strategy from traditional military and law enforcement approaches

that the government occasionally implements. One of the ways to change the trajectories of

combating violent extremism is to rethink current approaches in creating a counter-narrative.

The counter-narrative remains a key strategy in the struggle to diminish extremist ideologies.

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In doing so, enlisting the religious sector, community-based civil society organizations, and

other relevant stakeholders will form a genuine partnership that would develop an effective

reach beyond the traditional dimension of the society.

De-radicalization and Counter radicalization programs were proven effective, to some extent,

by pioneering countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. This methodology

remains to be one of the emerging trends with compelling and promising development. The

Philippines, with its long history of insurgency and terrorist attacks, does not have similar

strategies and even complementing government policies. It is about time that the Philippine

government must immerse itself with developing a concept to prevent and counter the re-

awakening of violent extremism.

The tragedy in Marawi was an awakening to every dimension of the Philippine society.

Inefficient governance, complacent politico-military strategy, inaccurate religious doctrinal

interpretations, and the long history of social injustice and inequality were the catalyst of

modern and emerging extremist ideology. In order to respond to this, the government must be

able to accentuate itself in line with other nation-states to counter the evolving threat of violent

extremism.

*****

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