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(Thijl Sunier, Nico Landman (Auth.) ) Transnational PDF
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0001
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DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0001
Transnational Turkish
Islam: Shifting
Geographies of
Religious Activism and
Community Building
in Turkey and Europe
Thijl Sunier
Professor of Anthropology, VU University Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
and
Nico Landman
Associate Professor of Islamic Studies, Utrecht University,
The Netherlands
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0001
© Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2015
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
www.palgrave.com/pivot
Contents
Acknowledgements vii
Introduction 1
1 Islam and Politics in Turkey 9
Introduction 10
Stage 1 (1923–1945) 12
Stage 2 (1946–1979) 15
Stage 3 (1980–2002) 22
Stage 4 (2003–present) 25
2 Turkish Organized Islam in Europe 29
Introduction 30
Turkish migration to Europe 31
Political culture, legal arrangements, and the
Islamization of migrants 33
Organizational development: Turkish Islam 37
3 Diyanet 46
Introduction 47
Origins 48
To Europe 49
Organizational dimensions 51
Worldviews, goals, and agendas 54
4 Süleymanlıs 57
Introduction 58
Origins 58
To Europe 60
Organizational dimensions 61
Worldviews, goals, and agendas 64
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vi Contents
5 Milli Görüş 68
Introduction 69
Origins 69
To Europe 73
Organizational dimensions 75
Worldviews, goals, and agendas 77
6 Gülen-movement (Hizmet) 81
Introduction 82
Origins 83
To Europe 87
Organizational dimensions 89
Worldviews, goals, and agendas 91
7 Alevis 95
Introduction 96
Origins 97
To Europe 101
Organizational dimensions 102
Worldviews, goals, and agendas 104
8 Other Movements and Organizations 107
Nationalism and Islam 108
Islamic radicalism: the Kaplan movement 112
Conclusions, Dynamics, and Tendencies 114
Bibliography 121
Index 134
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Acknowledgements
This book is the result of an analysis of primary and
secondary sources on Islam in Turkey and in several
countries in Europe and beyond. In addition to these
sources we have collected first-hand information about
the current situation in a number of selected countries in
Europe that are discussed in the book. In such a situation
and with limited time at our disposal, it was absolutely
vital, but first and foremost a great privilege, to have an
extended network of colleagues and friends across Europe
who were willing to provide us with the data we were after.
Especially the network around the Journal of Muslims in
Europe (JOME) and the rich source of data provided by
the ongoing Yearbook of Muslims in Europe project were
essential for our search.
Special thanks are due to Dr. Kerstin Rosenow-Williams
of the Ruhr University in Bochum, Germany; to Prof. Dr.
Brigitte Marechal of the University of Louvain-la-Neuve; to
Prof. Dr. Samim Akgönül of the University of Strasbourg;
to Dr. Nadia Fadil of the University of Leuven; to Dr.
Egdunas Racius of the University of Vilnius; to Prof. Dr.
Göran Larsson of the University of Gothenburg; and last
but not least to Prof. Dr. Jörgen Nielsen of the University
of Copenhagen, the grand old man of studies on Islam in
Europe and initiator of numerous joint scholarly projects,
plans, and networks on this fascinating research field. They
were all willing to help us out despite their busy schedule.
It goes without saying that the final text of this book is
completely our responsibility.
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Transnational Turkish Islam
From the time of the first waves of labour migration from Turkey to
Europe in the early 1960s there have been initiatives to enable Muslims
to fulfil their religious duties. However, the institutionalization of
Turkish Islam in Europe really took off in the second half of the 1970s
when Turkish Islamic movements became active in Europe. Although
the start of organizational activities and the pace of institutionaliza-
tion differed from country to country, most Islamic movements were
firmly settled in countries with a sizable Turkish Muslim population by
the early 1980s. Today the Turkish Islamic landscape is almost entirely
covered by the major Islamic movements with roots in Turkey. Of all the
Muslim communities the Turks have the most tightly knit organizational
networks and structures, and in many countries in Europe they are in
the forefront of advisory boards, of Muslim networks, and of political
action.
The aim of this book is twofold. We present a state-of-the-art portrait
of the Turkish Islamic infrastructure in Europe and analyse how the
organizational landscape has developed in the course of the last three
decades. There are good and thorough monographs on specific Turkish
Islamic movements, and we in no way pretend to redo the work of the
authors and to reach their depth and completeness. We bring together the
prominent players in the Turkish Islamic field and present a comparative
picture. By doing so we set out some relevant lines and discuss some
future trends with respect to Turkish organized Islam. Currently Turkish
organized Islam is a topic of heated debates in all countries in Europe.
Opinion leaders, politicians, and journalists seem to be rather puzzled
about how Turkish organized Islam will develop, what its influence will
be on the integration of people with a Turkish background into the host
countries, and how the principal actors position themselves now and will
do so in the future. In all European countries policy reports have been
published in order to map out the organizational landscape and to get a
grip on the field and to get answers to pressing policy questions.1
There are plenty of indications to reconsider and explore the current
Turkish Islamic organizational landscape to see where it stands and in
what possible directions the principal actors move. There are three main
reasons to do so: (1) the fundamental transformation of Turkish Muslims
from migrants to permanent residents in European societies, (2) the
rooting of Islam in Europe, and (3) the societal and political changes in
Turkey in the past decades. These changes impact on the ways Turkish
Muslims organize and how they relate to Turkey on the one hand and
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Introduction
to their European environment on the other. This does not mean that
the Turkish Islamic landscape has already been changed fundamentally
in the past years. It is a sociological truism that established and embed-
ded organizational structures develop only very slowly. Vested positions
and interests, long-term settlements, elaborate agendas, and, last but
not least, sheer numbers make change slow and complex. And it makes
change more difficult to trace.
Yet, the changing circumstances have to be addressed and taken into
consideration when analysing the current Turkish Islamic landscape.
However, with a few exceptions Turkish Islamic organizations have
hardly been assessed in scholarly work on Turkish Islam in Europe. There
is an impressive body of literature that addresses the developments with
respect to Islam in Turkey in recent decades,2 but this has hardly led to
an exploration of Turkish organized Islam in Europe. In comparison to
the early 1990s, there is even a decrease in scholarly attention for Turkish
organized Islam. There are a number of good studies on particular cases
of Turkish organized Islam in particular countries, but the vast major-
ity of publications on Muslims in Europe do not address organizational
aspects.3 Most studies focus on issues of piety, everyday practices and
convictions, or issues related to the legal position of Islam.
This is remarkable since religious life of Muslims in Europe takes place
in institutional and organizational settings. In political negotiations
about the development of religious accommodation, organizations play
a crucial role. In all countries in Europe with a sizable Turkish Muslim
community there are debates and controversies that concern activities
of organized Islam. Especially the cross-border activities of Turkish
organized Islam worries policymakers because they run counter to
what is envisioned for the place of Islam in society. A key feature of the
dominant integration paradigm is the assumption that Islam should be
‘domesticated’, cut off from its roots, and adopt a ‘European’ format. In
the course of the 1980s ‘Islam’ became the principal denominator with
which the background of migrants could be understood and explained
at the cost of other factors such as economic structure and social context
in the host countries. ‘Muslim culture’ rendered an almost timeless
character.
In the early 1990s most governments in Western Europe were increas-
ingly concerned about how to ‘integrate’ Muslims into their societies,
each according to their own political frameworks (Bader, 2007, p. 879).
It was already clear that most migrants would stay permanently and
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Transnational Turkish Islam
that Islam would be a lasting element in the political and social fabric of
society. An element that became more prominent in the 1990s was the
strong emphasis on the juxtaposition of the perceived liberal and secular
foundations of West-European nation-states and the religious tradi-
tionalism that Muslim immigrants were said to carry with them. The
public debates and policy measures that emerged in the 1990s included
state neutrality, the governance of alterity, but also the perceived roots
of European civilization. They all revolved around the same question:
how to deal with a new Muslim presence and how to defend ‘liberal’
accomplishments against Muslim traditionalism. The terrorist attacks
in the past decade and the ‘war on terror’ have strengthened anxieties
about global events and have led to a further inward turn of European
nation-states, a process of ‘social closure’ (Geschiere and Meyer, 1998).
The worries about young Muslims who joined radical Islamic organiza-
tions in Syria and Iraq have made monitoring and security of Islamic
activity top priority of European governments. The governance of Islam
has become the fastest growing focus of research on Islam in Europe.
The strong emphasis on the nation-state as the prime analytical format
reinforced methodological nationalism and the equation of ‘society’ with
the nation-state but narrowed down the analytical scope and rigour.4
The exclusive focus on the nation-state over the past two centuries has
defined the very concept of migration. Studies on migration processes
have been narrowed down to the question of how nation-states integrate
migrants. Consequently transnational flow as an inherent aspect of
migratory cycles is also caught in a national paradigm (Wimmer and
Glick Schiller, 2002, p. 324). Similarly, the study of Islam in Europe has
implicitly become synonymous with studying how individual states,
with their respective modes of incorporation and integration, national-
ize Islam and integrate Muslims.
Transnational networks of Muslims are considered temporal, at least
undesirable characteristics of religious life in Europe. Muslims must
eventually develop an individualized, ‘private’ Islam that is cut loose
from its former roots. Private transnational networks and contacts
abroad continue to pose a challenge for integration, but they are manage-
able. The transnational activities of foreign states and organizations are,
however, considered to be of a different nature and are generally met
with suspicion and even outrage. The involvement of foreign states in
the lives of their European subjects is a source of contention. This lays
bare the inherent tensions that exist in all migratory cycles across the
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Introduction
globe between sending states and migrants that seek to sustain transna-
tional linkages as long as possible and receiving states that embark on
a domestication and integration program to turn migrants into citizens
(see Sunier, 2014a).
In this book we critically take issue with this paradigm. There is a
growing tension between ‘Muslim’ as a policy category, as it is applied
in integration programs in different countries of Europe, and the experi-
ences, contacts, and practices of Muslims. Migrants and their offspring
can participate fully in the host society while being oriented towards
the country of origin. We cannot fully understand what goes on in the
lives of individuals when we take national boundaries as the only point
of reference. ‘Migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-
sited transnational social fields’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002,
p. 326). There is an extensive body of literature addressing the dialectical
relationship between the fixing and flow inherent in migration cycles.5
This literature convincingly demonstrates that there is no contradic-
tion between transnational activities and practices on the one hand
and processes of local rooting on the other. Contemporary transnational
networks are not the undesirable remnants of an era of migration that will
disappear eventually. They have rather become more important due to
increased communication means (Bowen, 2004; Grillo, 2004; Grillo and
Soares, 2005). The transnational Islamic organizational landscape must be
approached as an inherent part of religious life of Muslims in Europe.
We consider Islam as a dynamic field, a multi-dimensional and multi-
perspective binding mechanism. Religion is a broad register that links
emotion, affect, and ever-changing senses of belonging and binding of
individuals to political and cultural projects of collective actors and
states (Levitt, 1998; Vasquez and Marquardt, 2003; Werbner, 2002). As
a consequence of processes of globalization and international migra-
tion, nation-states have redressed their role as active cultural and social
agents in continuously evolving discursive fields (see also Ferguson and
Gupta, 2002). As Rose and Miller (1992, p. 177) have argued, ‘It is in this
discursive field that “the state” itself emerges as a historically variable
linguistic device for conceptualizing and articulating ways of ruling’. In
that regard, a sharp distinction between the state as the domain of laws,
rules, and institutionalized power and private initiatives as the domain
of contingent, volatile, and personal exchange overlooks the entangle-
ment and the societal embeddedness of both state and private transna-
tional activity. The increasingly diversified transnational field includes
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Introduction
activities also differ markedly from the regular religious services that
the others offer. Their focus on relatively young, well-educated Muslims
makes them an essential factor in today’s Turkish Islam.
Most studies on Turkish organized Islam tend to focus exclusively on
Sunni Muslims because they constitute the vast majority of Muslims in
Europe. In the case of Turkish Islam the heterodox Alevi community
should be included in any overview. Their numbers are estimated at
15–20 per cent of the Turks in Turkey and Europe, so a proper assessment
of the Turkish Islamic landscape should pay attention to this important
community.
Apart from the major players in the field there are a number of smaller
associations. These include two ultranationalist political parties that
extended their network to Turkish migrants in Europe, communities of
Turkish Shia Muslims, and a number of Sufi orders active among Turkish
Muslims. We will briefly refer to them in Chapter 8.
In Chapter 1 we present a historical account of the developments in
Turkey with special focus on recent changes in the state-religion rela-
tions and the position of Islam in Turkey. In Chapter 2 we address the
establishment and institutionalization of Turkish Islam in Europe and
the changes in the socio-economic make-up of the Muslim popula-
tion in Western Europe in recent years. These two chapters constitute
the backdrop of the second part of the book that deals with organized
Turkish Islam in more detail (Chapters 3–8). It provides an analysis of
transnational Turkish Islam along organizational lines in a number of
European countries with a sizable Turkish Muslim population. Each of
the relevant Islamic movements will be treated separately in order to
understand their (changing) position in Turkey and in Europe. We have
very deliberately chosen an account of each of the main collective actors,
rather than an account of Turkish Islamic presence in various European
countries. We see the advantages of an analysis of specific national
contexts, but as we have argued we consider a focus on specific Turkish
Islamic movements across national borders, a format that does justice to
their dynamics.
Notes
1 In Germany authorities regularly publish on certain Turkish organizations,
especially Milli Görüş. Throughout Europe the Gülen-movement is subject
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Transnational Turkish Islam
of public debates, and in the Netherlands already several reports have been
published, commissioned by the government about Turkish organized Islam.
2 See, for example, Azak (2010); Çağlar (2013b); Gözaydın (2009); Turam
(2007); White (2013).
3 Studies on the organizational dimensions include Akgönül (2005); Jonker
(2002); Rosenow-Williams (2012); Schiffauer (2010); Seufert (2014); Yükleyen
(2012).
4 Methodological nationalism ‘is the all-pervasive assumption that the nation-
state is the natural and necessary form of society in modernity; the nation-
state is taken as the organizing principle of modernity’ (Chernillo, 2006, p. 6;
see also Beck, 2000, 2002).
5 See Basch, Glick Schiller, and Blanc (1994); Vertovec (2009).
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1
Islam and Politics in Turkey
Abstract: This chapter addresses the changing relation
between Islam and the Turkish state since the foundation
of the republic in 1923. This is necessary information to
understand the origins of Turkish Islamic organizations in
Europe and the way they have developed since. Rather than
reproducing the simplistic secular-religious dichotomies
that characterize many historical accounts on Turkey, the
authors approach the complex relation between state and
Islam as a political struggle around the question, ‘What
place Islam has and should have in society?’. It shows that
the relationship among religion, politics, and economy
changed fundamentally in each of the four historical
stages to be distinguished. It reveals what issues were at
stake; who the principal actors were; and how Islam was
organized politically and socially.
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Introduction
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Islam and Politics in Turkey
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Transnational Turkish Islam
Stage 1 (1923–1945)
Although the Kemalist state was modelled after the Western concept
of people’s sovereignty, it was forced upon the population (Kieser,
2013; Lewis, 1968, p. 352). A national ideology was meant to provide
the regime with political legitimacy to rule the entire population,
irrespective of race or ethnic or religious background. Populism, one of
the central creeds of the Kemalist doctrine, not only implied a certain
equality of all people, it was also understood as ‘the people ruling the
people’ (Shaw and Shaw, 1977, p. 378). Consequently, only one party
was allowed according to the Kemalist regime: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
(CHP; Republican People’s Party). This party would promote the new
Turkish national identity. Organization on the basis of class, ethnic-
ity, or religion was forbidden (Toprak, 1981, pp. 38–39). From then on
state sovereignty was no longer based on divine legitimacy, but on the
Kemalist conception of people’s power. There is a considerable similarity
between the position of the Communist Party in the early Soviet Union
and the CHP in that the party, rather than being the organization of
a certain political loyalty, constituted the political vanguard that was
supposed to lead the people.
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Islam and Politics in Turkey
Stage 2 (1946–1979)
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Transnational Turkish Islam
to receive the necessary loans for investments. The poorer farmers were
driven out.
Part of the landless peasants could get work as an agricultural labourer,
but for a large part of the peasantry there was no source of income anymore.
In the first half of the 1950s nearly one million people migrated to the cities
in the hope of finding work there, but the developing industry could absorb
only a small proportion of these migrants. Many ended up in the rapidly
expanding informal sector and earned their living in retail or unskilled serv-
ices. Mass unemployment would also give rise to the migration of workers
to Europe at the beginning of the 1960s (Abadan-Unat, 1976; Paine, 1974).
The massive migration to the cities had an impact on the place of Islam
in society. At the outskirts of the big cities whole new neighbourhoods with
migrants from the countryside emerged. The urban population, which
until then formed only a small part of the total population, for the first
time encountered those parts of the population for which Islam had always
played a central and self-evident role in their life. In this context some have
referred to this development as the ‘traditionalization’ of the cities. The
rural population on the other hand was for the first time confronted with
the major changes that had taken place since 1923. The massive urbanization
changed both the self-image of the original and that of the new urbanites
dramatically. Everyday routines and self-evident situations came under
pressure and were problematized.
The DP era, between 1950 and 1960, is one of the most dramatic
periods in the social history of the Turkish republic. The changes that
were initially socio-economic in nature led to a total transformation of
the make-up of society. In the ten years that the DP was in power, the
political, economic, and social landscape of Turkey was radically and
permanently changed. The sharp dividing line between town and coun-
try was blurred. Old differences between urban and rural areas in Turkey
before the Second World War were characterized by socio-economic
centre-periphery relations and not by ethnic, religious, and cultural
differences. The new situation, however, rendered Islam a new meaning.
The image of Islam had hitherto been associated with rural backward-
ness and underdevelopment. The massive urbanization in the 1950s and
1960s generated new dividing lines but it also marked the beginning of
the political and social emancipation of Islam in Turkey (Sunier, 1996).
The changing nature of the socio-economic relations affected the nature
of the political struggle and the modes of organization and participation.
While before the war resistance against the regime was mainly initiated
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Islam and Politics in Turkey
by local şeyhs who could deploy their personal networks and loyalties
to provide grassroots for action, towards the end of the 1950s there was a
shift towards more instrumental political motives (Yücekök, 1971, p. 222).
The importance of the patron-client system typical of many rural politics
diminished and new forms of political loyalty took shape. Hence new types
of Islamic organizations emerged. These organizations, rather than being
local, focussed on society as a whole and drafted political programs inspired
by Islam that were oriented towards the country as a whole (Sunar and
Toprak, 1983, p. 432).
From 1965 onwards the conservative-liberal policies of the DP were
continued by the Adalet Partisi (AP; Justice Party), led by Süleyman
Demirel. He too applied a form of liberalization with respect to Islam
without questioning the secular foundations of the republic. In the heydays
of the Cold War the liberal conservatism of the AP together with Kemalist
nationalism was regarded by the Western powers as a moral counterweight
to communism and socialism. This contributed to the further integration of
parties with an Islamist agenda into mainstream politics (Yavuz, 2003, p. 62;
WRR, 2004, pp. 106–107). The liberal Constitution of 1961 made it possible
to explicitly refer to Islamic principles as the basis of party politics as long
as the secular foundations were not questioned. It goes without saying that
this formulation left significant room for interpretation.
In the course of the 1960s the use of Islamic rhetoric as a political tool
became increasingly common and widespread. This made it increas-
ingly difficult to distinguish between Islamic and non-Islamic parties
or between secular and Islamic politics. The specific meaning of laiklik,
the Turkish version of secularism, became a major political controversy.
Parties would challenge each other’s take on the issue and the very
principle of laiklik that the Kemalists always presented as an apolitical
and neutral principle of statecraft, became a political pivot. The idea that
Turkish politics evolved against the background of a neutral secular state
has been increasingly questioned (Yavuz, 2006, p. 8; see also Mardin,
1989; Çakır, 1990; Turam, 2007).
Between 1945 and 1980, a gradual change in the meaning of the Turkish
version of secularism occurred. This shift is due to the changing role of Islam
in society. While the Kemalists always regarded themselves as the bearers of
modern civilization, towards the end of the 1970s, an increasing number
of political parties considered Islam as a major social force for renewal that
cannot be ignored. The Kemalists were accused of having brought Turkey
into a state of moral void and ethical disarray.
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Islam and Politics in Turkey
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Stage 3 (1980–2002)
The third stage began with the military coup of 12 September 1980. Under
the leadership of junta general Kenan Evren the entire political landscape
was radically reformed. In addition a moral campaign was launched in
which ‘Islamic values’ were given a central place. Turkish society was to
sail on a moral compass in which Islam and Turkish nationalism were
interrelated, the so-called Turkish-Islam synthesis (Yavuz, 2013, p. 38;
WRR, 2004, p. 109). Islam was presented as an ‘enlightened’ religion
open to science and technology (Evren, 1986, p. 221; WRR, 2004, p. 109).
An important motive behind this moral rearmament was to occupy an
ideological position to counterbalance ‘socialist propaganda’ on the one
hand and ‘Islamic propaganda’ on the other. The central role of the state
that decreased considerably in the 1970s had to be repaired and redressed
according to the junta leaders (Yavuz, 2003, pp. 70–71). This new ideol-
ogy should determine the new political landscape that the generals had
in mind.
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In 1996 the party formed a coalition with the Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP;
Party of the Right Path), a neo-liberal centre party. Especially Erbakan’s
decision to replace strong ties with the West with a diplomatic focus on
the Arab world was seen by many as an attempt to turn Turkey into a
‘second Iran’. In February 1997 the army committed a ‘silent coup’ in the
form of an ultimatum to Erbakan. Eventually he had to resign (Çağlar,
2013b). Shortly after the military intervention the RP was banned by the
Constitutional Court. The successor of the RP, the Fazilet Partisi (FP;
Virtue Party), was also banned in 2001. In the same year, the Saadet
Partisi (SP; Felicity Party) was founded. This party was led by Erbakan
until his death in 2011.
The controversies within the Milli Görüş movement between the old
guard around Erbakan and the new generation, led by Erdoğan, rose to a
climax after the ban of the FP in 2001. Milli Görüş split into two groups,
the ‘traditionalists’ around Erbakan and the reformists led by Erdoğan
who founded the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP; Justice and Progress
Party) in the same year. Tayyip Erdoğan who had built up his reputa-
tion as a political leader when he was mayor of Istanbul became the new
party leader. The AKP sharply criticized the Islamist and anti-Western
policies of Erbakan, which according to the AKP had not only caused a
lot of damage to the image of Turkey, but also put Islam in a bad light.
It had strongly contributed to the image that Islam, modernization, and
democracy do not match. In the general elections of 2002, the AKP had
a landslide victory and won the absolute majority in parliament. In 2003,
the party presented the new government.
The AKP presented a program which emphasized that Islam and the
secular order were not opposing principles, but rather mutually rein-
forced each other. The party in fact introduced a new meaning of laiklik
(secularism) by stressing that the secular state implies freedom of reli-
gion. In a speech in 2006, Erdoğan used the term ‘negotiated democratic
secularism’, thereby reintroducing secularism into the political arena.
In response to the allegations of the Constitutional Court in 2008 that
the party undermined secular foundations of the Turkish republic, the
party reiterated that full democracy is not guaranteed by a strong state
and a strong army, but by a well-developed civil society (Yavuz, 2009,
p. 159). Civil democracy according to the party is a better guarantee for
the continuation of the modernization project of Atatürk than continu-
ous state control over religion. The party intended to transform the
Turkish political system after the model of Western democracies. Recent
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Islam and Politics in Turkey
Stage 4 (2003–present)
In the first period of the AKP rule from 2003 to 2007 a general euphoria
prevailed in Turkey about the new political wind that was blowing. The
government concentrated on urgent economic problems. In addition,
the new leaders were trying to reconcile with the opposition to advert
the huge political polarization that had developed towards the end of
the 1990s. That was partly the reason why Erdoğan even enjoyed support
in secular circles. Furthermore, the government embarked on renewed
negotiations with the EU in 2005, but the broad support for the AKP
was mainly due to the economic growth that the country went through
in those years. The elections of 2007 brought another huge victory for
the AKP. Now the party felt secure enough to pursue their other main
goal: to reduce the power of the army and to put an end to the measures
against Islam that were effectuated after 1997.
The victory gave a huge boost to the confidence of the party, but it
also meant that the political polarization between the CHP and the AKP
increased, especially after the announcement by the government to lift the
ban on headscarves in public buildings. In 2008 a majority in Parliament
voted in favour of the lifting of this ban, but the Constitutional Court
decided to turn this back. Only in October 2013, after the 2011 elections in
which the AKP had a massive victory for the third time, could the ban be
lifted. In the same month, the first female MP with a headscarf appeared in
Parliament.
According to some observers, the era of the AKP should be divided
in the period before and after August 2007 when AKP’s former foreign
minister Abdullah Gül became president of the republic. His predeces-
sor Ahmet Sezer, a lawyer and former president of the Constitutional
Court, was a very dedicated defender of the Kemalist secular model and
a strong opponent of the government of Erdoğan. With his thorough
knowledge of the Turkish political system, he managed to block various
proposals of the AKP. With the presidency of Gül the AKP was released
from its toughest adversary. In the years after 2007 the government
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Islam and Politics in Turkey
political struggle as it evolved from the early 1980s onwards. The AKP
made the elimination of the state control over Islam and the establishment
of a genuine separation of state and religion into their prime political
goals. The abolition of the separation of church and state as the basis of
the polity has never been questioned, but it is precisely the specific meaning
attached to this separation that is at stake. The AKP argues that separation
was never put into practice by Kemalists. On the contrary, the state strongly
controlled religious life. Separation according to the AKP should imply
non-interference just as in Europe. This principle should be further applied
according to the AKP (Çarkoğlu, 2010, p. 209). One of the intriguing
recent developments is the debate about the status of Diyanet. There is
a growing support for a much more autonomous status for the institute
that organizes religious life in Turkey and among a proportion of Turkish
Muslims in Europe (Seufert, 2014, p. 139).
After 1980 the societal basis was established for the gradual reduction
of the dominant role of the state and the army and the emergence of what
Hendrick (2013) has coined ‘post-political market Islam’ (p. 236). Civil
society grew and diversified and acquired more influence over the political
process. A conservative worldview and an Islamic lifestyle were publicly
disseminated as a feature of the emergent affluent, self-conscious middle
class. Many Muslims in the cities exchanged the poor neighbourhoods
for the new suburban residential areas that fully meet the consumption
needs of the new affluent conservative middle class (see also Saktanber and
Kandiyoti, 2002, p. 257; Fischer, 2011). This is an irreversible development
that goes far beyond current political controversies.
Two recent developments should be discussed here briefly because
they bear relevance to the place of Islam in Turkish society. One is the
clash between the AKP and the Gülen movement (see Chapter 6), the
other is the war with IS at the southern border of Turkey.
The followers of Gülen have largely contributed to the resounding
victories of the AKP in the past decade. Recently, however, they have
increasingly become highly critical of the policies of Erdoğan. The bomb
exploded in December 2013 after police raids among close associates
and political friends of Erdoğan who were suspected of corruption. The
prime minister responded by accusations of the Gülen supporters. They
were accused of infiltrating in government’s institutions and developing
a ‘parallel state’ backed by foreign intelligence. The Gülen movement
was also accused of instigating the so-called Ergenekon-affair in which
senior military leaders were suspected of planning a coup against the
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Transnational Turkish Islam
Erdoğan government (about that affair, see Cizre and Walker, 2010). In
April 2014 Erdoğan asked the American government to arrest Fethullah
Gülen, who resides in the United States, and to hand him over to Turkey.
Gülen and his followers in turn argue that Erdoğan deploys all possible
means to increase his political and legal power.
When finalizing the manuscript for this book Turkey had decided to
fight IS, partly under pressure of international public opinion. In the
weeks before the Turkish government was accused of supporting the
Sunni jihadist forces at the expense of the Kurdish population in the
south-eastern part of the country. Turkey finds itself in a very complex
position. On the one hand there is no reason whatsoever to assume that
the AKP would support IS for ideological or even religious reasons.
On the other hand there is the protracting Kurdish issue. The Turkish
government started to negotiate with Kurdish movements, even with the
incarcerated leader of the Kurdish PKK Abdullah Öcalan. This resulted
in some sort of peace treaty in 2013. Under the present circumstances
this fragile treaty is certainly in jeopardy.
Notes
1 In his biography of Atatürk, Kinross (1964, p. 503) pathetically exclaimed that
Atatürk ‘had transported his country from the Middle Ages to the threshold of
the modern era and a stage beyond’.
2 The current political unrest in the country and the growing critique on the
autocratic measures of Erdoğan have to be taken seriously, but they do not
refute the argument presented here.
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2
Turkish Organized
Islam in Europe
Abstract: This chapter provides a picture of the historical,
social, and political circumstances under which Turkish
Muslims arrived in Europe and how Islamic organizations
came into being. This description builds on two
characteristics. The first concerns the fundamental breach
in organizational development before and after migration.
Turkish Islamic movements are rooted in the political
struggle in Turkey, but they have diverse origins ranging
from state bureaucracy to mystical Islam. In Europe these
organizations converged into typical migrant associations
offering basic religious services. The second characteristic
concerns the major demographic and socio-economic shifts
that took place among the Turkish population in Europe.
This shift also changed the orientation towards Turkey.
In the course of time Turkish Islamic movements have
developed their own niche in the Islamic landscape.
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Introduction
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe
Est. Turkish
population 2010 Population 2010 Est. Turkish
Country (x1000) (x1000) population (%)
Germany , , .
France , .
Netherlands , .
Belgium , .
Austria , .
Sweden , .
Denmark , .
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Transnational Turkish Islam
Note: These figures are based on the 2012 statistical survey of Pew Research Centre in Washington,
DC. They use demographic data and not religious affiliation. It provides us at least with some
consistency, but the figures are certainly too high. In addition we made use of the recent version
of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe published by Brill (Nielsen et al., 2013). The Yearbook gives
a much more accurate picture as far as religious affiliation and practice are concerned.
Source: Pew Research Centre (http://www.pewresearch.org/); Nielsen et al., 2013.
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe
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Transnational Turkish Islam
At the same time, however, there was also a concern about the attitude
of Muslims and their organizations towards the host countries. Dramatic
events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of the
Egyptian president Sadat had their backlash in Europe as well. In 1986
Muslims in several European cities protested against the American raid
against Libya following the attack on a discotheque in Berlin in that year.
For many people in Europe it was the first time that they experienced
Muslims in a way different from the general image of a conservative
backward community, isolated from mainstream society.
A new cultural category emerged in public discourse: ‘Muslim
migrants’. For convenience’s sake, people with completely different back-
grounds were lumped together under the heading of ‘Muslim culture’. The
origin of this image can be related to the rural background of migrants.
The image of Islam that made its way into public discourse was based on
the idea that Muslims are the least integrated migrants. Muslims were
perceived as passive, fatalist people who are turned inwardly and face
difficulties catching up with the pace of modern society, and easily fall
back on their faith (Rath and Sunier, 1994).
Towards the end of the 1980s, mainly as a result of the developments
in the Middle East and the Rushdie Affair in 1989, the image of Muslims
as a powerless, conservative community started to shift and a new type
of image emerged. This image links Muslims in Europe to the violence
in the Middle East. Muslims are conceived as a fifth column that may be
a threat to society. This has resulted in an ongoing debate about growing
radicalization among migrants. Already in the 1980s there were worries
about connections between Muslims in Europe and Islamist groups in
the Middle East. In the beginning of the 1990s European nation-states
were increasingly concerned with the question how to integrate Islam
into their national projects (Fadil, 2011).
It will come as no surprise, then, that the events of 11 September 2001
reinforced this image and made it a dominant one in almost all countries
in Western Europe. These events caused not only a relative strengthening
of this image, but also a shift in argumentation against Islamic institu-
tions such as schools and mosques. Even parties who initially supported
Muslims in attempts to build up a religious infrastructure now expressed
deep worries about the presence of Islam (Fekete, 2004).7
The position of Muslims in European societies and the place of Islam
depend on a complex of factors, notably legal recognition of religion
in the various countries, immigration policies, and the increasingly
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe
negative public image of Islam. However, in this field, Muslims are not
just the passive objects of these conditions and developments, but are
actively involved in the political process. Negotiations about rights and
provisions require organizational and political skills. Turkish Islamic
organizations have been actively engaged in these negotiations. We
suggest that this is because they have a long experience in dealing with
the legal complexities of secular societies.
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe
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Transnational Turkish Islam
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe
life in European societies. Old family networks of the early stages of the
migration have lost their naturalness and emotional underpinnings.
Economically and socially the majority of inhabitants of Europe with
a Turkish background see their future in Europe rather than in Turkey
(Abadan-Unat, 2011). Rooting in the local community has become a rule
rather than an exception.
The other trend is a seemingly opposing development. As a result of
globalization, the rise of modern media and socio-economic upward
mobility of the former migrants and their descendants and the relations
between Turkey and Turks in Europe have not diminished but have
rendered a more egalitarian form. Turkey is no longer the pivot point in
the organizational development, but part of a multipolar transnational
field. For the first generation of migrants religious orientations were
inextricably linked up with family ties, regional affiliations, and dreams
of return. This naturalness has increasingly come under pressure.
Orientation on Turkey now has a different content and significance.
Religiosity and migratory affiliations with the country or region of
origin cannot be conflated anymore. The religious movements that will
be addressed in the following chapters are a part of this increasingly
complex landscape.
Because of these socio-economic and social developments the Turkish
Muslim communities in Europe can no longer be seen as simply an
extension of those in Turkey. Over the years, the Islamic landscape in
Europe has developed its own dynamics that has increasingly been
disentangled from the traditional migration patterns. Not only the
Turkish Islamic movements, but also the Turkish state face this new
reality and act upon it. Attempts to maintain redefine and revive these
ties, both by Turkish Islamic movements and by the Turkish state, must
be understood against the background of this new reality. Thus of the
approximately four million citizens in Europe with a Turkish background
a large part has a Turkish passport. For a long time it was not possible for
Turkish political parties to operate outside the country. Moreover, it was
not possible to vote outside Turkish territory. Those restrictions have
recently been lifted. As a result, the political struggle in Turkey clearly
resonates among Turks in Europe, not just among Muslims, but across
the whole political spectrum.
In recent years the Turkish state has developed an active policy to
bind and sometimes control Turks in the ‘diaspora’ and to give the ties
with Turkey a new meaning. In 2010 the ‘Ministry of the Turks living
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Transnational Turkish Islam
Notes
1 Brill publishers in Leiden started a project, called Annotated Legal Documents
on Islam in Europe, with the aim to collect primary legal sources for the
respective countries, in their original language, with English summaries. The
project will cover the 28 member states of the European Union (including
Croatia), Norway and Switzerland plus the European Union and the European
Court of Justice.
2 Rath et al. (2001) have provided an analysis of the complexities of this process
in a number of countries in Europe.
3 The figures we present here are collected from several sources and should
be observed with maximum precaution. The total number of citizens with
a Turkish background, the potential rank-and-file for Turkish Islamic
movements, is hard to grasp. Statistics in different countries apply different
criteria. The figures we presented in Table 2.1 concern citizens with a Turkish
background, including those with a Turkish passport and those with a
national passport, or both.
4 In a recent Dutch survey on religiosity it turned out that 4 per cent of
the Turks in the Netherlands do not identify as Muslim. A much higher
percentage of them, 25 per cent, did not follow any religious prescription.
Almost half of the population frequents a mosque ranging from occasionally
to daily (SCP, 2012). We have no reason to assume that figures elsewhere in
Europe are considerably different.
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3
Diyanet
Abstract: This chapter deals with Turkish official Islam.
In most European countries the Turkish Directorate of
Religious Affairs (Diyanet) runs the majority of local
Turkish mosques. Diyanet has long been the instrument
of the Turkish secular state to control Islam at home and
abroad. Most national umbrella organizations of Diyanet
in Europe were founded in the early 1980s partly as a
reaction to the growing influence of rival movements
among Muslims in Europe. Even though Diyanet in
Turkey is still a state organization with a broad network of
organizations in Europe, its position has been affected by
developments in both Turkey and Europe. Today Diyanet
branches in Europe present themselves as service centres of
all Turkish Muslims rather than as representatives of the
Turkish secular state.
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Introduction
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Transnational Turkish Islam
Origins
The foundation of the Turkish republic in 1923 led to a program of secu-
larization, but the founders of the republic also intended to monitor and
control religious life. For this purpose, they established the Directorate
of Religious Affairs as a successor of the Ottoman Ministry for Religious
Affairs and Pious Foundations (Şeriye ve Evkâf Vekâleti). But unlike its
predecessor Diyanet was merely a bureaucratic institution designed to
carry out a limited number of tasks.
The official task given to Diyanet when it was established in 1924
was threefold: (1) to administer the affairs of the Islamic faith and the
principles of its worship and morality; (2) to illuminate the public about
religion; and (3) to administer places of worship. This last task was
transferred to another institution, the Directorate General for Religious
Foundations, in 1931, but it was restored to Diyanet in 1950. Diyanet is
mentioned briefly in the constitutions of 1924, 1961, and 1982. The 1982
Constitution states that Diyanet is part of the General Administration,
the Ministry led by the prime minister. It should function in accordance
with the principle of secularism, staying out of all political ideas and
opinions and identifying national solidarity and unity as its primary aim
(Sunier et al., 2011, p. 32). Diyanet can be considered the office of ‘official
Turkish Islam’ (Dumont, 1984, pp. 364–375) and has been used by the
state to prevent Islam from becoming an oppositional force in Turkish
society. As such, it is an important component of the secular system in
Turkey (Gözaydın, 2009, p. 286). In its role as employer of all the imams
and Friday preachers in the mosques of Turkey, Diyanet is entitled even
to prescribe what is to be preached. For a long time, Diyanet has issued
centrally drafted Friday sermons and only recently started to decentral-
ize the responsibility for the content of sermons to regional offices and to
local imams (Sunier et al., 2011, p. 52).
The task to illuminate the public about Islam and simultaneously
advocate the secular and national principles of the Turkish republic
led to a sometimes curious mix of religious and nationalist practices
and formal policy measures. It also shaped the relations with various
non-official Muslim institutions and organizations in Turkey which are
sometimes lumped together as ‘parallel Islam’ (Dumont, 1984). Islamic
scholars have sometimes challenged the legitimacy of Diyanet because of
its strong alliance with the secular regime (Dilipak, 1990, p. 183). Diyanet
officials have justified its position by claiming that leaving religious life
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Diyanet
To Europe
The Turkish authorities started to engage with the religious life of
Turkish migrants in Europe, in the late 1970s by sending some imams
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Diyanet
Organizational dimensions
More than any other Turkish Islamic organization, the Diyanet network
is structured hierarchically. The Diyanet centre in Ankara has a depart-
ment that is responsible for the activities outside Turkey, which covers
not just Western Europe, but also the post-Soviet Central Asian republics,
Australia, and the United States. This ‘Directorate for External Relations’
selects, trains, and sends imams to Western European countries. This
office is also involved in international inter-religious dialogue activities
(Sunier et al., 2011, p. 40). According to the Diyanet website, its offices
abroad are either associated with embassies, in which case the highest
local Diyanet official has the status of a counsellor of the embassy, or with
consulates, where the Diyanet official is an attaché. However, to operate
effectively in foreign countries, associations and foundations have been
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Diyanet
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extent. After the AKP came to power in Turkey, relations with the other
Islamic movements have improved. The causes for this development are
manifold, but a possible one might be the desire to transform Diyanet
into a representative body of Sunni Muslims. An indication for this is
the creation in 2012 of the Coordination Committee of Franco-Turkish
Associations, in which DITIB joined forces with Milli Görüş and the
nationalist Turkish Federation of France.7 Moreover, in countries where
Turks constitute the largest Muslim population, they have claimed a
leading position in representative bodies.
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Transnational Turkish Islam
concern activities in which the Turkish state plays a central role. The
interference of Turkey with Turkish people abroad is certainly not
unique. All national states have transnational agendas (Lafleur, 2011).
Brand (2008) shows how Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon
try to maintain links with their subjects abroad and thus extend their
sovereignty across national borders. The current extent of the Diyanet
network makes it unlikely that the role of Ankara will dwindle in the
near future.
Notes
1 Rohe (2013) and Yükleyen (2012, p. 50) estimate the number of DITIB
mosques in Germany at 740 against 323 for Milli Görüş and 274 for the
Süleymanlı-movement.
2 See http://www.atib.at/. The site mentions 63 member organizations.
3 http://www.diyanet.be/Kurumsal/CamilerveDernekler.aspx. Manço and
Kanmaz (2009, p. 39) and Fadil (2013, pp. 105, 109) state that the Diyanet
network includes two-thirds of the 140 Turkish mosques in the country. This
is substantially more than those listed on the Diyanet website.
4 http://www.danimarkatdv.org.
5 Email communication with Göran Larsson, author of the chapter on Sweden
in Yearbook Muslims in Europe (2013). The website of the Scandinavian Diyanet
organization, http://www.isvecdiyanetvakfi.org, mentions 10 associated
organizations in Sweden.
6 See, for example, http://diyanet.nl/wp-content/uploads/standart/pdf/2013/
HDV_SUBELER_YONETMELIGI_2012.pdf.
7 http://www.zamanfrance.fr/article/le-rC3A9veil-citoyen-de-tous-les-turcs-
de-france.
8 http://www.diyanet.be/Kurumsal/CamilerveDernekler.aspx.
9 http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/906590-gormez-avrupaya-imam-
destegi-verebiliriz.
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4
Süleymanlıs
Abstract: Süleymanlıs belonged to the first Turk migrants
in Western Europe who established religious organizations,
provided Islamic education for children, and created
facilities for ritual prayer. They paved the way for other
movements to follow. As followers of the Turkish teacher
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, they understood the importance
of providing religious service to migrants, even if they
would be in Europe temporarily. In the first decades of
migration the movement was rather closed to the outside
world. Today they have successfully created their own
spiritual, quietist niche in the Turkish Islamic landscape.
They continue to focus primarily on educational activities.
The younger generation who is now in charge in most of
the local organizations is generally well-educated and more
ready to engage with the surrounding society.
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Introduction
Origins
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, the founder of the movement, was a master
in the Nakşibendi Sufi Order, an order that emerged in the 12th century
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Süleymanlıs
and spread over a large part of the Muslim world, in particular India and
the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Tunahan followed the doctrines of
the Indian şeyh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), whom the Turks call Imam
Rabbani and who is considered by his followers to be the ‘Reformer of
the 11th Islamic century’.
In the Turkish republic, the order was abolished in 1925 together with
all Sufi orders, but it survived underground and its leaders continued to
play a significant role in Turkey, sometimes as imams hired by the Turkish
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and sometimes through their
own informal networks. One of them was Tunahan. As an imam and
preacher in Istanbul, Tunahan was arrested several times by the secular
authorities. In 1943, he was deprived of his permission to preach and his
activities were curbed (Akgündüz, 1997, p. 56f; Kısakürek, 1988, p. 135).
Later he was able to travel through the country and to build a network
of informal and private Quran schools led by his pupils. About 1,000 of
such institutions existed when he died.3
Tunahan did not publish books or articles. He was a teacher in the
literal sense of the word, who functioned best teaching situations. The
only documents he left were a seven-page instruction for teaching the
Quran and a number of letters, some of which were later collected in
a booklet in Ottoman characters called Letters and Some Important
Questions, discussing some matters of law and mysticism (Akgündüz,
1997, p. 97). As a result, the only information available about his life and
ideas is produced by his followers. After his death in 1959 his son-in-law
Kemal Kaçar became the leader and organizer of the movement. In 2002
he was succeeded by Tunahan’s grandson Ahmet Arif Denizolgun, the
current leader.
As the Süleymanlı network was mainly organized around Quran
courses, a new law in 1971 that brought all informal Quran schools in
Turkey under the authority of Diyanet was a major blow to the auton-
omy of the movement. In reaction to this law, the movement created
alternative legal forms to conduct their activities. They provide courses
and educational support and, first and foremost, organize student
dormitories. At the national level the movement had operated under
several names such as Federation of Quran Course Associations. Since
1980 they call themselves Kurs ve Okul Talebelerine Yardım Dernekleri
Federasyonu (Federation of Student Support Associations) (Landman
1992, p. 90). The dormitories house high-school and university students
and offered religious lessons in the evenings and weekends. Later on,
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To Europe
Followers of Tunahan belonged to the first Turk migrants in Western
Europe who established religious organizations, provided Islamic
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education for children, and created facilities for the ritual prayer.
From the early 1970s onwards Islamic centres were opened in various
European countries. The Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V.
(VIKZ; Federation of Islamic Cultural Centres) in Cologne became the
European centre. By 1980 the VIKZ coordinated 210 Islamic centres
in Germany. A VIKZ list of associated organizations outside Germany
that circulated in the early 1980s contains the addresses of 16 centres in
the Netherlands, 1 each in Belgium, France, Switzerland, and Sweden,
9 in Austria, and 2 in Denmark (Landman, 1992, p. 95). In the 1970s
the gradual extension of this network did not attract much attention,
but when the centre in Cologne applied for the status of corporation
of public law secular Turkish opponents accused the VIKZ publicly of
being extreme right and hostile towards Europe. The official status was
refused, and from then on the movement tended to avoid public atten-
tion. The emergence of rival Turkish Islamic organizations in the 1980s
made it more difficult to extend the network. Nevertheless, the VIKZ
grew out to currently about 300 congregations in Germany, with about
20,000 registered members (Sezgin and Rosenow-Williams, 2013).5 The
Swedish branch, the Islamiska Kulturcentreunionen i Sverige (IKUS; Union
of Islamic Cultural Centres), became the largest Muslim organization in
the country in the 1980s. Until today it remains one of the larger federa-
tions, with 14 congregations and more than 10,000 members. Especially
in Stockholm, the IKUS is well represented.6 The Austrian branch of
the movement has 23 mosques and organizations that are coordinated
from Vienna (Sezgin and Rosenow-Williams, 2013). In the Netherlands,
the Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland (SICN; Islamic Centre in the
Netherlands) is based in the city of Utrecht and coordinates 48 local
organizations. The Belgium Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (Belçika
İslam Kültür Merkezleri Birliği) represents 13 local centres (Kanmaz, 2003).
In France 12–14 mosques are associated with the Süleymanlı-movement
(Akgönül, 2005), and there are also branches of the movement in other
European countries and across the Atlantic (Jonker, 2002, p. 127).7
Organizational dimensions
After the death of the founder in 1959, his son-in-law Kemal Kaçar led the
movement for four decades. Kaçar was not a theologian, but a business-
man, whose leadership was based on his organizational capacities rather
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Süleymanlıs
level where Islamic law and theology is studied on the basis of Arabic
sources (Jonker, 2002, p. 273).
In Germany this advanced theological training is offered in the Islamic
Centre of Cologne. The Dutch branch SICN developed its own theologi-
cal seminar called Euro Ilim Instituut. Between 2010 and 2014 the insti-
tute cooperated with one of the Dutch universities of applied sciences
in a program for Islamic theology. For the more confessional parts of
the training, SICN relies on their own hocas, but their students also take
general courses about the role of religion in Western societies. The high-
est level of theological training within the movement continues to be
organized in Istanbul only. Within the Turkish Islamic field in Europe,
the Süleymanlı-movement is by far the most advanced in organizing the
training of religious personnel locally.
The educational program is partly organized in dormitories for chil-
dren in the secondary school age, a model that was developed in Turkey.
In Germany, there are 18 dormitories; in other countries numbers are
subject to speculation. Dormitories provide not only religious training,
but also a more comprehensive educational program that is designed
to support the children in off-school hours, helping them with their
homework and giving them a structured life. The European Süleymanlı
dormitories were confronted with strong opposition. Boarding houses
continues to be an issue of great controversy. In the early 2000s several
German states suspended their permission for new dormitories. More
recently, the dormitories in the Netherlands also came under pressure
when similar objections were raised in the Parliament in 2012.
The links with the Nakşibendi Sufi Order is becoming increasingly
manifest in the public profile of the movement in Europe. The ‘About
Us’ page on the website of VIKZ Germany has a rather elaborate section
on the mystical orientation of the organization. Here, the importance of
some Nakşibendi traditions are explained, such as the zikr hafi (silent
meditation), the hatim ihlas (recitation of Sura 112 in groups), and the
sohbet (explaining the mystical dimensions of Islam to the community).
After having presented these mystical orientations, the website states that
the VIKZ is not organized as a Sufi order, but as a religious community,
stating that the mürşit or mystical master is Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan
who died in 1959.10 On the website of the Dutch branch this reference to
the mystical dimensions of the movement are presented only in Turkish.
In 2004 a report commissioned by the German state of Hessen was
published by Spuler-Stegemann (2004), a German turcologist about the
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VIKZ and its dormitories. The report was not published but summaries
circulate on the Internet.11 The report contains heavy accusations about
the ideology and goals of the VIKZ in general, and the educational facili-
ties in particular. The VIKZ was portrayed as an elitist sect with an anti-
Western, anti-democratic, anti-Christian, anti-Judaist, and anti-secular
ideology based on a strict sharia-interpretation that rejects human rights,
gender equality, and tolerance towards other faiths. According to Spuler,
the public statements of the VIKZ should be distrusted and are meant
to deceive the outside world. She particularly refers to the alleged bad
conditions and poor pedagogical climate in the educational institutions
and dorms. Homework support, German language training, and compu-
ter lessons are marginal and function as a façade for the outside world.
According to Spuler the main activity is Arabic and Islamic teaching.
The accuracy of the report by Spuler was, however, questioned by a
counter research, commissioned by the VIKZ. An empirical research
among students and teachers of 18 educational institutions about the
pedagogical climate was conducted in which most of the allegations by
Spuler were refuted. According to researcher Boos-Nünning, there are no
indications that ordinary school work is hampered by religious instruc-
tion. Most of the dormitories hire non-Muslim German personal and
pupils are not deliberately isolated from non-Muslims. Boos-Nünning
argues that the dormitories structure the daily life of the pupils in a way
that is beneficial for the school success; in fact, this structure is a major
motive for the students to come and live there. Also in other European
countries the pedagogical climate of religious institutions continues to
be a source of controversies and debates.
The Süleymanlıs are first and foremost an association of Muslims
who are primarily focussed on ethical self-improvement and spiritual
immersion. As such they have carved out their own religious niche in
the course of years.
Notes
1 See the website of the German branch of the movement, http://www.vikz.de/
index.php/unsere-gemeinden.html.
2 Tarikat is Turkish for the Arabic tariqa, meaning mystical order. However, in
contemporary Kemalist literature it acquired a negative connotation close to
the derogatory term ‘sect’.
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5
Milli Görüş
Abstract: Milli Görüş is the general denominator of an
Islamic political movement founded in the 1970s. Political
leader Erbakan was critical about the strict control
of the Turkish state on religious issues, but first and
foremost he opted for a strong Turkish economy and an
acknowledgement of the deeply religious attitude of the
Turkish people. Erbakan founded several political parties
since 1970 and was successful until the early 2000s. The
ruling AK party originates in the MG movement, but
diverted considerably from the Erbakan political agenda
under the leadership of the current president Erdoğan. In
the late 1970s members of the MG founded organizations
in many countries in Europe. They have always been
successful among young Muslims and counted as the most
important competitors of Diyanet.
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Introduction
Origins
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Milli Görüş
but not very central part. His parents were not very religious. Erbakan
himself spent much of his professional life in mechanics and industry
and lived a couple of years in Germany. He was a follower of the influen-
tial Nakşibendi teacher Mehmed Zahid Kotku. The Nakşibendi order also
stood at the cradle of some other Turkish-Islamic movements, such as the
Süleymanlıs and Nurcu’s. But where these two chose to build an educational
network, Kotku encouraged his disciples to reform society with political
means. Although there are differences of opinion about whether Erbakan
has been initiated into the ‘mystical way’, he himself belonged to Kotku’s
pupils, and he was encouraged to go into politics by the şeyh (Schiffauer,
2010, p. 67). Erbakan actually took the initiative to found a political
party.
It has been claimed that the Nakşibendi background of the founders
of Milli Görüş constitute a key factor in understanding the implications
of Erbakan’s ideas. However, due to the strict secular legislation his real
intentions were hidden behind seemingly neutral key concepts such
as adil düzen (just order), ahlak ve maneviyat (morals and spirituality),
and fikir ve inanç hürriyeti (freedom of speech and belief). The most
well-known example is the apparent double meaning of Milli (national)
denoting the Turkish people and Muslims in general. Hence according
to his adversaries, Milli Görüş actually denotes ‘Islamic vision’, and all
his talk about nationalism, modernization, and economic development
is secondary, even a cover-up.
This is, however, a serious misinterpretation of Erbakan’s political
ideas. In fact it reduces Islamic inspiration in political matters to the
reconstruction of the state foundations, and it ignores the intercon-
nectedness of the different spheres and the role of morality. In the book
Erbakan presented his views about the economic, societal, and spiritual
condition of Turkey and what should be changed. He elaborated what
he considered the core values of Turkish identity. Basically the book
must be understood as a timely document that deals with the roots of
Turkish identity, written by an important political actor, published in
an extremely turbulent period in Turkish history in which Islam had
become a highly sensitive issue. It should be seen as a declaration about
the poor moral condition of the Turkish people and a proposal for the
way back to spiritual prosperity and material welfare. In the preface of
the book Erbakan (1975, p. 10) summarized this moral appeal with the
catchphrase Yeniden Büyük Türkiye (Towards a grand Turkey again).
Although it was not stated explicitly, it was obvious that he referred to
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Transnational Turkish Islam
the heydays of the Ottoman Empire, but it was certainly not a call for
simple restoration.
In order to reach this goal a national vision is needed, a total economic,
political, and moral program that gives back to the Turkish people
what they deserve: independence, not just materially, but also morally
and spiritually. This should be accomplished through a program that
combines a moral uplift with a thorough industrial development and an
overall societal modernization. ‘Giving back’ referred to the Kemalists
who imposed an ‘empty ideology’ on the Turkish people. Erbakan then
explains what went wrong. Already in the 1930s and 1940s but especially
after the Second World War, when Turkey became an ally of the West, a
part of the Turkish people took over a Western mentality (batı zihniyeti),
in other words a liberal vision (liberal görüş) took root. Others were
inclined to follow a socialist or leftist vision (solcu görüş). But, according
to Erbakan, both visions are false, fake, and empty. They do not fit with
the Turkish soul. They have no substance. They are foreign to the Turkish
nation and people. They are a misfit and therefore not useful and in many
cases even harmful. Be it international capital, laiklik (secularism), the
Western ideas introduced in Turkish public education, or the European
common market, all these phenomena are bad for the Turkish nation
and largely account for its woeful condition. Turkey has allied with the
West not out of strength but out of weakness and dependence (Erbakan
(1975, p. 24).
In the book Erbakan does not call for a struggle to fight those practices
itself; he simply wants to keep them out of Turkey. The Turkish people
have been lazy and forgot their national strength and the roots of their
identity, but now there is an old and proven and trusty alternative ahead
of us: the national vision (Milli Görüş). ‘Most of what these foreign
ideas pretend we do better. We do not need them’. This was a phrase that
Erbakan would articulate on many occasions.
A crucial issue that still haunts Milli Görüş today is whether or not
Erbakan intended to overthrow the secular state. Although we should not
overestimate the influence of the book, there are intriguing clauses that
give a hint to what Erbakan had in mind. Throughout the book he refers
to human dispositions as the key conditions for a sound society. These
key conditions must be fulfilled otherwise legal and state structures are
empty boxes. The most important human quality is iman (belief). It is the
source of strength, not just for Turks, but for humankind. It provides the
indispensable resources for knowing ourselves, taking the morally right
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Milli Görüş
decisions, and adopting the proper attitude towards others. It feeds our
soul and makes us spiritually independent. It also comes as an indispen-
sable prerequisite for material progress and welfare (refah). The obvious
basis for iman in the case of Turks is Islam. Once this is accomplished
a combination of technological development throughout the country
(especially in the more backward regions in Anatolia) within a spiritual
framework and a democratic political structure will bring prosperity in
the Turkish people.
The general message of the book revolves around three basic issues:
the recognition of what we today would call identity, the political
arrangements that grants the space and freedom to live according to this
identity, and the development of the proper conditions to accomplish
a glorious and prosperous future. Identity refers to the centrality of the
Turkish consciousness and the Turkish soul. Not surprisingly Erbakan
adopts a rather essentialist notion of Turkish identity with a core that
consists of an intricate relation between Turkishness and Islam. Turks,
according to Erbakan, have a natural inclination towards the dignity and
morality that is to be found in Islamic sources. Erbakan then proposes a
political and legal framework that secures the opportunity to live accord-
ing to this identity of which freedom of opinion and freedom of belief
are the core conditions. Then Erbakan states that the present political
situation in Turkey does not fulfil these requirements, and therefore the
country is in a bad situation. Turkey has been dominated by principles
that are alien to the Turkish soul.
His appeal which he restated again and again in public speeches reso-
nated well among all those who felt victim of the economic policies of the
big parties. The MSP became the voice of the traditional and underde-
veloped regions in central Anatolia where the people blamed the secular
authorities in the urban centres for their misery (Seufert, 1997, p. 271).
To Europe
Among the Turkish workers in Europe, who were predominantly from the
Turkish countryside, were also supporters of Erbakan’s political movement.
In 1976 they founded the Türkische Union in Europa, later to be renamed as
Islamic Union and from 1985 Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatları (Milli Görüş
organizations Europe) (Binswanger and Sipahioğlu, 1988, p. 91). Since 1994
it is called Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş (IGMG), with the European
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Milli Görüş
The years between 1997 and 2002 were marked by the dissolution of
the RP in Turkey and fierce debates about the future prospects of Milli
Görüş. Within the RP a younger generation advocated a reconsidera-
tion of the strong anti-European stance of the party. This resulted in a
split between the old supporters of Erbakan who later founded the SP
and a new generation led by Tayyip Erdoǧan which founded the AKP.
Although it would be too simple to argue that the schism in Turkey
would neatly cut across the Milli Görüş echelons in Europe, a similar
debate took place there. In Milli Görüş in Europe it was not primarily a
matter of Turkish foreign policy, but a matter of how to position oneself
vis-à-vis the non-Muslim environment. In Germany the new leader of
IGMG Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, a nephew of Necmettin Erbakan, who
was appointed in 1995, stated that the West should not be demonized
without solid argumentation. Europe also offered opportunities for
Muslims to live according to their convictions.
The victory of the AKP in Turkey in 2002 heralded a new political era,
with a party that has roots in Milli Görüş but embarked on a different route
away from Erbakan. The party of the old leader Erbakan gradually margin-
alized, but his person was still immensely popular among many Muslims in
Europe and Turkey. This popularity, however, did not turn the tide within
the European ranks of the movement to adopt a more autonomous policy
independent from the Turkish origin. Erbakan himself made an attempt in
the early 2000s to strengthen the links between the IGMG and his party, but
he too failed despite his personal popularity. The attempt only widened the
gap between the SP and Milli Görüş (Schiffauer, 2010, pp. 127–131). After
Erbakan passed away, the anniversary of his death has become a contro-
versial issue, as both the SP leadership and part of the IGMG rank-and-file
have tried to turn it into an important event, whereas the IGMG leadership
has discouraged this. In 2013, IGMG, accepted the celebration to take place,
but turned it into a broader event to commemorate ‘those who preceded us’
(Bundesministerium des Innern, 2014).
Organizational dimensions
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Milli Görüş
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Transnational Turkish Islam
were invited to donate for fellow Muslims in countries where the situation
was difficult such as Bosnia, Chechnya, China, Kashmir, Palestine, Pakistan,
and Algeria. This was articulated in a discourse of struggle against oppressive
regimes and Muslim-hostile environments. Turkish Muslims were regarded
as a community in diaspora physically as well as ideologically.
From the late 1990s onwards the IGMG and Milli Görüş organizations
elsewhere in Europe embarked on a much more pragmatic route and
focussed on the interests of Turkish Muslims in European societies whose
open, pluralistic, and democratic character was recognized and accepted.
Schiffauer (2010) has referred to the new young generation that grew up in
Europe as Change into: post-Islamist to emphasize their dissociation from
the old ideas of Erbakan. This new course became visible in all countries in
Europe and manifested itself in the aims and activities presented on websites
and annual reports of the national umbrella organizations and affiliated local
organizations.
Milli Görüş increasingly presented itself as an organization that
works in the interests of Muslims, solving their problems, and encour-
aging them to participate in society. This is done by embracing the
multi-religious and multicultural character of European societies and
emphasizing the constitutional freedom of religion. Rather than focuss-
ing on the interests of an ethnically specific Muslim population with a
migratory background, they stressed that Muslims constitute an integral
part and an enriching element of society. Whereas the discourse in the
initial years was anti-European, it became increasingly inclusive by argu-
ing that Muslim presence is a European societal reality. Although the
Turkish language and culture continue to be important for many of the
adherents, the leadership tries to focus on the religious rather than the
ethnic and cultural identity.
In all countries where Milli Görüş has an active branch a wide
variety of activities is organized partly to cater religious needs of their
constituency such as the yearly hajj to Mecca, funeral services, religious
instruction, religious accommodation, but also activities with the aim to
strengthen the position of Muslims in the local community. The central
aim of Milli Görüş to be found in IGMG documents but also in the local
statutory principles is the improvement of the position of Muslims as
citizens of the country of residence. In the Netherlands and Belgium
Milli Görüş has been very active early onwards in the foundation of
schools with an Islamic identity according to legal provisions in each of
the countries (Landman, 1992).
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Transnational Turkish Islam
Notes
1 In his study on Milli Görüş in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, Schiffauer
(2010) argues that the movement embarked on a different trajectory and
should therefore be viewed from a different perspective. Research carried
out in other European countries point in the same direction (Akgönül, 2005;
Canatan, 2001; Lindo, 2008). For the perspective of the security service, see:
Bundesministerium des Innern, 2013, pp.296–307.
2 http://www.cimgfrance.fr/.
3 http://www.igmg.org/gemeinschaft/islamic-community-milli-goerues/
organisational-structure.html.
4 http://www.verfassungsschutz.niedersachsen.de/portal/live.
php?navigation_id=12327&article_id=54208&_psmand=30.
5 For an elaborate analysis of the conflict, see Lindo (2008) and Sunier (2006).
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6
Gülen-movement (Hizmet)
Abstract: The Gülen-movement was founded in Turkey in
the 1960s. It is one of the fastest growing Islamic movements
in the world. They have established schools, institutions, and
business companies in more than one hundred countries.
The movement was founded by its present spiritual leader
Fethullah Gülen and emerged in the early 1980s in the
changing political and economic environment of Turkey. In
the 1990s the movement expanded internationally. Today they
count as the most influential Islamic movement in the Turkish
political landscape and beyond. The modus operandi of the
Gülen-movement as well as its internal structure is markedly
different from the established organizations. It has made the
organization effective on the one hand, but also suspicious in
the eyes of many policy makers on the other.
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Introduction
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet)
Origins
Hizmet is a branch of the Nurcu-movement, founded by the charismatic
Islamic theologian Said Nursi (1873–1960). Nursi was of Kurdish origin
and born in the eastern Turkish city of Bitlis. After being trained in a
local medrese for a number of years, Nursi moved to the city of Mardin in
southern Turkey. He soon became well known for his profound knowl-
edge of Islamic sources. He gathered a group of followers who would call
him Bediüzzaman (glory of his time) (Dumont, 1986; Yavuz, 2009). Nursi
produced a series of comments on Islamic sources and a collection of
tractates in which he put special emphasis on the mystical dimensions of
the sources. Nursi contended that these divine sources contained ‘hidden
layers’ of knowledge, only to be accessed after long and disciplined study.
Nursi’s main and most well-known work was the Risale-i-Nur (message
of Light). Light refers to one of the Quranic verses in which God is
depicted as light. Nursi’s disciples therefore referred to themselves as
‘followers of the Light’ (Nurcu) (Bruinessen, 2010, p. 9; Mardin, 1989).
Nursi’s students have sometimes referred to him as the ‘Spinoza of the
Islamic world’ because there are some striking parallels in the theologies
of both thinkers (Çelik, 2010, pp. 125–133). Just as Spinoza, Nursi encour-
aged his followers to understand God’s creation by studying it. ‘The
Machinery of Nature’, according to Nursi, is one of the great mysteries
of God’s creation (Mardin, 1989, p. 214). Only through continuous study
human beings are able to remain connected with God’s creation (Turner
and Horkuç, 2009, p. 60).
Although Nursi considered himself an ordinary Islamic scholar, the
roots of the Nurcu-movement are to be found in the mystical traditions
of Islam, notably the Nakşibendi-order, founded in central Asia. One
of the relevant features of the order is the central role of religious text,
but Nursi also distanced himself from those scholars who only focussed
on legal issues and fiqh, Islamic law. Nursi proposed a proper balance
between textual and rational dimensions of religious reasoning and
knowledge production on the one hand and the emotional relation with
God on the other (Turner and Horkuç, 2009, p. 90).
Gülen was born in 1941 in a village in the eastern province of Erzurum.
He received training as a local priest in the Sufi environment so typical
for this part of the country. Here he became acquainted with Nursi’s
work. Fethullah Gülen had mastered Nursi’s work thoroughly, but he
did not belong to Nursi’s intimate community. He developed Nursi’s
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet)
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Transnational Turkish Islam
should not be removed, but liberalized and opened up. This transition
has also been described as the ‘conservative democratic turn’ (Hendrick,
2013, p. 52). The term ‘dialogue’ that appears in many of Gülen’s writings
occupies a central place in his doctrine. It is based on the idea that Muslims
must accept that society is composed of a multitude of beliefs, religions, and
worldviews. Instead of fighting diversity people should encounter each
other in a continuous dialogue.
The 1990s were very crucial for the movement in many respects. Gülen
emerged as a prominent preacher who was addressed with the title
hocaefendi, a title that denotes religious authority. It gave him a prominent
public role (Yavuz, 2013, p. 40). Hizmet opened an increasing number of
educational institutions in Turkey in those years. Sympathizers of Gülen
also set up a network of schools in the new independent states in central
Asia. Because education at these institutions was of good quality, many
parents, including those who were not followers of Gülen, brought their
children to those schools. Economic development and the emergence
of a prosperous middle class made it possible to build up a commercial
imperium with banks and media, including the newspaper Zaman, and
the TV station Samanyolu. The movement was funded by fellow entre-
preneurs who were willing to invest in projects of Hizmet. Eventually
the movement was able to become independent from gifts and charity
(Bruinessen, 2010, p. 13; Ebaugh, 2010, p. 83).
A major factor that has contributed to the success of the movement in
the 1990s was its attention for to the emerging middle class in the urban
regions. Erbakan continued to focus on the traditional, relatively poor
Muslim population in the countryside, in the provincial towns, and in
the poor areas of the big cities. His popularity among these segments
of society remained very strong. Gülen started to build a generation of
young followers who were employed in key sectors of society and industry
(Bruinessen, 2010).
Although Gülen was not involved in any way in the political activities of
Erbakan, he also got in trouble in 1997 when Erbakan was forced by the mili-
tary to resign as prime minister (see Chapter 1). The new government that
took office after the 1997 coup took a series of measures in which the rela-
tively liberal policy towards Islamic private activities was reversed. Gülen’s
departure to the United States (officially for medical reasons) in 1999 and
the opening of his headquarters in Pennsylvania was a major turning point
for the movement. The nationalism that was part and parcel of Gülen’s ideas
well into the 1990s, receded further and further into the background, not
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet)
To Europe
Although Hizmet propagates a global Islamic doctrine with explicitly
cosmopolitan underpinnings, it goes without saying that the activities
that Hizmet developed outside Turkey were largely related to local
conditions and circumstances. In the United States they received sympa-
thetic responses for the NGO-like activities (Yavuz, 2013, p. 24; see also
Vasquez and Marquardt, 2003). In Central Asia and the Balkans the
Turkish origin was emphasized in a stronger manner than elsewhere. The
establishments of Hizmet in Western Europe, especially their activities
from the late 1990s onwards, differ from those developed by the other
Turkish organizations in several respects.
In most countries in Europe organizations such as Süleymanlıs, Milli
Görüş, and Diyanet were already active in the 1970s, even in the late
1960s in some countries. Followers of Gülen started much later in the
1980s, but especially in the 1990s (Seufert, 2014). Due to their relative
late start they arrived in an organizational environment that was already
well-established. The other movements concentrated on religious accom-
modation and focussed on the first generation migrant population, the
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet)
Hizmet, is becoming less and less important in many of the public meet-
ings organized by organizations related to Hizmet. Most international
conferences are in English and national activities are predominantly in
the local language. In that respect Hizmet has a big advantage over other
organizations. The other reason for their success is their loose organi-
zational structure. As we saw, the other Turkish-Islamic movements
developed into migrant organizations providing religious services which
typically imply a local structure and rooting. Hizmet is almost by defini-
tion ‘uprooted’.
Organizational dimensions
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Transnational Turkish Islam
critical of Hizmet are suspicious about the actual power relations within
the movement (Sunier and Landman, 2014).
The prominent role of individual actors and the lack of a formal
organizational cadre resemble the structure of Sufi movements, but
otherwise Hizmet differs significantly from traditional Sufi networks.
Some observers see a resemblance with the Jesuit order especially its
emphasis on an ascetic way of life and the absence of a formal organi-
zation (see, e.g., Bruinessen, 2010). It should be emphasized that even
Fethullah Gülen himself has no formal statutory power of decision in
matters concerning the movement at the local level. Gülen’s influence
manifests itself mainly through his charisma and stature as an important
Islamic scholar. Ebaugh (2010, p. 48) refers to local networks with their
own agenda. In a certain sense these local networks consist of concentric
circles in which those members belonging to the inner circle dispose
of the most authority and informal status. This status has to do with
knowledge about important Islamic sources including of course the
Risale-i-Nur and the works of Fethullah Gülen. In addition to knowledge,
it is also crucial to what extent individual members have acquired a habit
of self-discipline and austerity. This is another parallel with the way
access to esoteric knowledge; dedication and discipline are intertwined
in many Sufi orders. Gülen (2007, p. 50) himself refers to the earliest
Muslim community where an ascetic attitude was central. Next to the
abis, who are mainly responsible for theological and spiritual activities,
there is a larger group of sympathizers (mütevelli) essential for building
up the institutional landscape of the movement, both organizationally
and financially. The dersanes (educational institutions) are the focal heart
of the activities of the movement, but they too are not part of a formal
structure.
There is little information about the size of the movement in Europe.
This is partly because of the personal network structure, but equally
important is the need for secrecy that developed at the time the Nurcu-
movement and Hizmet were heavily attacked in Turkey (Bruinessen,
2010, p. 24). Due to the recent developments and the accusations
towards Fethullah Gülen by current president and former prime minis-
ter Erdoğan, members prefer to keep silence about size, support, and
activities. The inner core of active members, supporters, and volunteers
is relatively small, but the number of people involved in activities is much
bigger. The vast majority of the followers is relatively young and well
educated (Yükleyen, 2012, p. 72). Contrary to what is often assumed, the
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet)
movement is not at all directed to rapid growth and expansion per se. It
is a very long and difficult road to arrive at the inner circle of the move-
ment. The movement focusses on young people who have already shown
that they are successful and dedicated and who have demonstrated that
they have career ambitions. In addition there are activities designed for
under-educated youth, but these activities are less designed to raise a
new generation of activists.
In each European country the basic organizational format with educa-
tional centres is similar, but in addition to that there are organizations
that are associated with Hizmet through personal networks and contacts.
In each of the European countries there is a local branch of the move-
ment’s newspaper Zaman with the headquarters in the city of Frankfurt.
In Germany with an estimated 2.9 million inhabitants of Turkish back-
ground, Hizmet has founded a number of educational institutes.2 The
Munich-based International Dialogue Centre, established in 2001, is the
biggest of its sort in Europe. It organizes all kinds of seminars, public
debates, and study activities about a wide variety of topics. In Belgium
the Intercultural Dialogue Platform, the Dialogue Forum in Denmark,
and the Platform INS in the Netherlands have a similar function.3 There
are also networks of businessmen that sympathize with the movement
and which provide material support. In a number of countries the move-
ment runs public schools (Bruinessen, 2010; Seufert, 2014).4
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet)
respect is zuhd, the Arabic word for asceticism (Gülay, 2007, p. 51). At
the same time adopting an austere and moderate lifestyle is considered
essential for a life of service in this world. Here the Weberian concept of
Innerweltliche Askese to denote the Protestant attitude is applicable (see
Weber, 1930).
Several studies about Hizmet point at the strict discipline in the dersanes,
boarding houses and institutes. The potential group of active members is
enrolled in regular education, but also receives instructions about important
works of the movement. They are expected to develop an ascetic and disci-
plined attitude. In the boarding houses strict rules and a tight schedule is
applied. Students who have actually chosen a life as a disciple of Gülen must
submit to this regime voluntarily (Bruinessen, 2010). In recent years the
disciplinary regime has been loosened because the current generation
of students, born and raised in Europe, are not accustomed to an overly
strict and disciplined educational regime.
Often the charge has been made that there is a strong discrepancy
between the internal religious disciplining activities on the one hand,
and public embrace of the secular foundations of society and the open-
ness on the other. Some critics even argue that the outward activities only
serve to cover up the internal activities. However, both types of activities
are more in line with each other than they are opposite (Sunier, 2014b).
The transformation of Hizmet from an esoteric mystic community into
a global religious movement with a strong outwardly oriented message
brings to light an intriguing development about the way the movement
is perceived. Gülen’s ever widening and inclusive message to the world
stands in stark contrast to its esoteric and secretive ways of knowledge
production and the sectarian and closed character of its inner circles.
This contradiction has often been depicted as Gülens’s double face and
the esoteric practices he espouses as some sort of ‘cover up’. The younger
members of Hizmet have become visible in society and the more they
are actively engaged in it, the more this double image is depicted as a
way to detract attention from Gülen’s ‘Islamist agenda’ to turn Turkey
into an Islamic state (see, e.g., Koç, 2008; Sharon-Krespin, 2009).
However, to depict these two aspects of Hizmet as contradictory or
as the outer and inner face of the movement misses the point. First,
it assumes that the transformation of the movement from the 1980s
onwards was a strategy of deception that did not reflect Gülen’s inten-
tions. Rather, this transformation took place in response to the move-
ment’s changing position within the Turkish political landscape and the
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Transnational Turkish Islam
changing demography of the rank and file of Hizmet which also trans-
formed Gülen’s vision of Islam in the contemporary globalized world.
Notes
1 Recent studies include Agai (2003, 2005, 2007); Çarkoğlu and Rubin (2006);
Ebaugh (2010); Esposito and Yılmaz (2010); Hendrick (2013); Özdalga (2003);
Turam (2007); White (2013); Yavuz (2009, 2013). In a number of studies the
position of Hizmet in Turkey is explicitly addressed.
2 Yükleyen (2012) estimates a total number of 200 educational institutes and
dorms in Germany, but this number is probably not very accurate. Others
mention at least 100 educational centres in Bavaria alone.
3 For a more extended overview, see Bektovic (2012).
4 See http://cosmicus.nl/; http://www.lucernacollege.be/.
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0009
7
Alevis
Abstract: The Alevis is a heterodox religious minority in
Turkey whose identity is shaped by Shia Islam, elements of
popular religious culture. From a traditional, village-based
cultural and religious community the Alevis developed in
the 1980s and 1990s into a predominantly urban-based
movement. In the past decades there was a revival of the
Alevi identity. New Alevi associations emerged among
urban groups of Alevi background, both in Turkey and in
Western Europe. Today the Alevi community in Turkey
and in Europe consists of a wide variety of associations.
Among them there is some rivalry and debate about
what Alevi identity implies and how one should position
themselves vis-à-vis the state and the Sunni majority both
in Europe and in Turkey.
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Transnational Turkish Islam
Introduction
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Alevis
Dressler (2013) historicizes the label ‘Alevi’ and the meanings it has
today. He argues that the word ‘Alevi’ has been framed by secular Turkish
nationalists in the first half of the 20th century, attributing a prominent
role to the historian Mehmet Fuad Köprülü (1890–1966). Turkish
nationalists tried to include Alevis in the conception of a unified Turkish
nation. They emphasized the Turkish origins and Islamic orientations
of Alevis, and refuted two alternative views: (1) the Ottoman rhetoric
that had excluded them from mainstream Islam, and (2) the Western
discourse that suggested strong Christian influences on Alevism (Lee,
1994, p. 22f). This nationalist project has been quite successful. Attempts
to link Alevism to Iranian and Kurdish culture, and to Zoroastrianism,
have been marginalized in much of the public imaginary on Alevis
(Dressler, 2013, pp. xvii and 273).
In contemporary Turkey the ‘Alevi issue’ is inextricably linked up with
the general discussion on Turkish Islamic and national identity. The
position of Alevis vis-à-vis the Muslim population of Turkey is subject
of fierce debates, both within the Alevi community and among Sunni
Muslims. We include Alevis in our analysis of the Turkish Islamic land-
scape because we contend that they constitute an important factor that
influences European policies towards the Turkish communities and their
religious affiliations.
Origins
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Transnational Turkish Islam
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Alevis
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Transnational Turkish Islam
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Alevis
To Europe
Alevis were among the migrants from Turkey to Western European
countries in the 1960s and 1970s, but there are no data available about
their numbers. Whereas their Sunni compatriots soon started to organ-
ize themselves around mosques and Islamic centres, the Alevis remained
by and large invisible to the outside world, largely on similar grounds as
in Turkey (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 45f).
Alevis tended to become involved in social and political organizations
such as trade unions, committees of Turkish workers, and left-wing
political parties. The first Alevi organization in the south of Germany
was called Türkiye Amele Birliği (Union of Workers of Turkey). Some
Kurdish cultural and political organizations also had large constituen-
cies of Alevis from the Kurdish regions of Turkey. Only a small minority
among the Alevis held informal cem gatherings organized by travelling
dedes (Landman, 1992, p. 142; Massicard, 2013, p. 186).
In the late 1980s there was an Alevi revival in Europe as well, but it
took different trajectories due to different conditions. The European
context allowed for a greater freedom and Europe became the centre of
Turkish and Kurdish political activism. Alevis in Europe resented the
increasing influence of Sunni Islam in Turkey since the 1980 military
coup. The introduction of the compulsory subject Knowledge of Religion
and Morality in state schools in Turkey was seen by Alevis as an instru-
ment of assimilation and exclusion. Also initiatives of the Turkish state
to found mosques in Alevi villages and not least the attempts to organize
religious life in Europe were seen as an indication to prioritize Sunni
Islam. In Hamburg discontent about this Islamization and ‘Sunnification’
motivated Alevis to form an Alevi Culture group. Similar initiatives were
taken elsewhere. The German government facilitated these initiatives by
offering funding for Alevi cultural manifestations. Thus, in Hamburg,
an ‘Alevi Cultural Week’ was organized in 1989, with lectures about the
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Transnational Turkish Islam
history of Anatolian Alevism, a festival with Alevi poets and singers, and
a cem-ceremony. For the Alevis of Hamburg, this was a decisive moment
to become more assertive and articulate (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 55f).
From the mid-1980s, associations were founded in various European
cities carrying names that contained the words ‘Alevi’, ‘Bektaşi’ or ‘Haci
Bektaş’. This was not just a move to make public what existed informally;
in fact it implied the revival of a culture that was considered to be lost.
Alevi associations had to apply strategies to involve the younger genera-
tion into Alevi culture and belief. An important tool in this respect
was the music of the saz (lute). Ozans (folk singers) playing the saz are
prominent figures in Alevi culture. The songs are the medium through
which religious ideas of Alevism have been transmitted from generation
to generation. For European Alevi associations, offering saz courses
constituted a major tool to attract young people (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 78).
In addition, they offered courses to explain the young generation about
Alevi history, culture, and religious traditions. The Dutch Alevi federa-
tion organized such a course in 1995 in cooperation with the University
of Utrecht, with more than one hundred young Alevis attending. After
a series of 12 lectures, the young men and women were invited to a cem
ceremony in Rotterdam where the local Alevi association had its own
centre. During the course it had become clear that most of the partici-
pants knew hardly anything about Alevi history and culture. For many
the cem ceremony was the first encounter with Alevi culture (Landman,
1995, p. 7).
Organizational dimensions
Alevi organization on a national level started in the late 1980s. Nine
German Alevi organizations established Federation of Alevi Associations
in Germany (Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu, AABF) in 1989, which
from then on played a major role in the struggle for recognition in
Turkey. Anger about the massacre of Sivas in 1993, followed in 1995 by
violence against Alevis in the Gazi quarter in Istanbul fuelled the emerg-
ing Alevi movement demanding punishment for the perpetrators. Those
who were killed in these attacks became the martyrs of the Alevis. By
2014, the number of local member organizations of the AABF had risen
to 130.4 Alevis in the Netherlands founded the Haci Bektaş Foundation
in The Hague in 1987. The celebration of the Kurdish New Year (nevruz)
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Alevis
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Transnational Turkish Islam
As the Austrian controversy about recognition makes clear that the Alevi
movement in Europe is far from united. The German recognition of
the AABF as the one and only representative of the Alevi helps them to
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Alevis
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Transnational Turkish Islam
Notes
1 The claim in some Alevi publications that they constitute 30 per cent of the
Turkish population is challenged by analysts of election results who combine
an assumed leftist preference of the Alevis with low score of left-wing
political parties. On the other hand, an estimation of only 6.1 per cent Alevis
may have been influenced by the reluctance of Alevi respondents to identify
themselves as such (see Schüler, 2000).
2 http://www.alevi-bochum.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=48&Itemid=82.
3 Several editions were published in Turkey between 1958 and 1982. A German
edition was prepared by Bozkurt (1988).
4 http://alevi.com/de/mitgliederaktivitaten/ortsgemeinden/. According to
Massicard (2013, p.189) all 40 existing Alevi associations were included in
1993. Pries and Tuncer-Zengingül (2013, p.153) claim that the AABF was
founded in 1989.
5 http://www.hakder.nl/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=132:lid-
organisaties&catid=44&Itemid=202.
6 http://www.aleviten.or.at/menuleft/aabf/geschichte.html.
7 http://www.alevi-fuaf.com/index.php?p=downloads&area=1.
8 http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/tsv_pdf/2008/02/28/08033120.pdf.
9 http://alevi.dk/.
10 http://www.trf.nu/isvec-alevi-birlikleri-federasyonu-kuruldu.html.
11 Massicard (2013) mentions four German states that introduced Alevi
religious education. Today, there are eight German states that have done so.
http://alevi.com/de/religionsunterricht/allgemeines/.
12 http://alevi.com/de/religionsunterricht/allgemeines/.
13 http://www.aleviten.at/de/?page_id=136, and http://www.bka.gv.at/site/4735/
default.aspx#a18.
14 http://www.aleviten.or.at/de-detail/article/sachverhaltsdarstellung.html.
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8
Other Movements and
Organizations
Abstract: This chapter deals with two smaller but
nevertheless relevant ideological currents among Turkish
Muslims in Europe: Turkish ultra-nationalism and radical
Islam. Originally Turkish ultra-nationalists were anti-
Islamic because Islam was considered alien to the Turkish
identity. For strategic reasons they changed their position.
Turkish nationalists in Europe today are predominantly
organized in religious organizations, but the core of their
activities is strictly nationalist in character.
For many years a small movement with a radical Islamist
agenda was active among Turkish Muslims in Europe. The
movement was founded by a charismatic preacher Cemalettin
Kaplan who wanted to overthrow the Turkish political system
and set up a Caliphate. His radical political program never
gained much foothold among Turkish Muslims. Only a tiny
minority sympathizes with the ideas, and the movement
hardly exists today.
Diyanet, Süleymanlıs, Mili Görüş, and Hizmet are currently the major
actors in the Turkish-Islamic landscape in Europe. Alevis also became
an important Turkish community in Europe. In addition, there are a
number of religious-ideological currents that co-shape the Turkish-
Islamic landscape. We will briefly discuss them in this final chapter.
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Other Movements and Organizations
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Transnational Turkish Islam
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Other Movements and Organizations
Seyid Ahmet Arvasi, the most well-known and most vocal representa-
tive of this idea, published a four-volume book titled Türk-İslam Ülküsü
(the Turkish-Islamic Ideal), claiming that Turkishness and Islam need
no ‘synthesis’ because they always constituted an organic whole (Bora
and Can, 1991, pp. 243–282). The political leader of this movement was
Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, who founded the Büyük Birlik Partisi (BBP; Great
Unity Party) in 1993, but never rose to prominence. Yazıcıoğlu also
founded the Alperen Ocakları, a foundation that promoted the Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis ideology. The Avrupa Türk Birliği (Turkish Union in
Europe), founded in 1994, was closely associated with this movement. It
has about ten centres, most of them in Germany, but also in Amsterdam
and Mulhouse.6
Prior to the foundation of the BBP in Turkey, the new Islamic direction
resulted in a cleavage in the ADÜTDF in 1987 and the creation of a new
federation, the Avrupa Türk-İslam Birliği (ATİB; Turkish-Islamic Union
in Europe), based in Cologne. Under the leadership of Musa Serdar
Çelebi, who had been a former president of the ADÜTDF, the ATIB
developed a more explicitly Islamic profile than the Turkish Federation
had done so far. Çelebi is said to have been sympathizing with the ideas
of the BBP but also emphasized his independence from Turkish political
parties (Landman, 1992, p. 117). Currently the ATIB claims to have 122
member associations.7 Although its name suggests that they operate on
a European level, not much is known about activities outside Germany.
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Union of Turkish-Islamic Associations
(NUTIO) split off from the Turkish Federation in the year of ATIB’s
foundation and is a federation with 7 member organizations. It is not
very active, though, and its current website refers to activities in 2008
and 2009.8 The German ATİB, however, is a more visible actor in the
Turkish-Islamic field. It is the largest of 19 member organizations of
the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD) and one of the four
participants in the Coordination Council of the Muslims in Germany
(Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland, KRM).
In comparison to the big Islamic organizations nationalist movements
have always been of minor importance. This has several reasons. One is
of course the (moderate) Turkish nationalist rhetoric that can be found
in all organizations, but equally important is the fact that explicit Turkish
nationalism as a political project has increasingly become a marginalized
alternative for a population for which strong ties with Turkey are not
self-evident anymore.
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Transnational Turkish Islam
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Other Movements and Organizations
evolving developments in northern Iraq and Syria there are also activists of
Turkish background who seek connection. However the strong Arab influ-
ence in radical networks along with the strong organizational structures
that characterize the Turkish-Islamic landscape make a growing support for
radical alternatives less likely.
Notes
1 http://www.turkfederasyon.com.
2 Security Service of Baden-Württemberg, http://www.verfassungsschutz-bw.de.
3 The federation was strongly criticized of being extremist, racist, and criminal by
two journalists in 1997 (Braam et al., 2004; Tanja, 2008), but an anthropological
study in 1998 presented a more moderate portrait of the movement (Geerse, 1998).
4 http://www.zamanfrance.fr/article/le-rC3A9veil-citoyen-de-tous-les-turcs-de-
france.
5 http://88.255.31.62/htmldocs/genel_baskan/1545/konusmalari/Devlet_
Bahceli_2012_yili_konusmalari.html.
6 http://www.atb-europa.com/node/119.
7 http://islam.de/1630.php, and http://www.atib.org/.
8 Landman (1992, p. 117).
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Conclusions, Dynamics,
and Tendencies
Abstract: Two seemingly opposing trends can be observed
in the development of Turkish Islam in Europe. On the
one hand the transnational field has been intensified
and transformed, partly as the result of modern means
of communication and the explosive growth of social
media. On the other hand an increasing number of young
Turkish Muslims are rooted in local society of residence,
and organized Islam in Europe increasingly evolves
according to its own dynamics, independent from Turkey.
This is not a contradiction, but part of the contemporary
global conditions. The Turkish-Islamic landscape should
be approached as a transnational field that is structured
not anymore by unequal migrant family networks
stretching between two nation-states, but by multi-polar
transnational networks and new senses of belonging
sustained by modern media.
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Conclusions, Dynamics, and Tendencies
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Transnational Turkish Islam
the Turkish community around loyalty to the flag and the nation. Turkish
federations cultivate Turkish solidarity worldwide and maintain ties with
the National Action Party. Other nationalists have severed ties with the
party but see a synthesis of Turkishness and Islam as the core of their
identity.
The Süleymanlıs concentrate on deepening religious spirituality and
educating their followers. More than the other Turkish-Islamic move-
ments they are a community of Muslims that share specific meditational
practices. Rooted as they are in the Nakşibendi Sufi order, they empha-
size their connection with the Muslim community as a whole, but at the
same time they have a very distinct religious identity. This concentration
on a shared religious life has generated an inward-looking attitude.
However, they also actively engage with their environment.
Milli Görüş is the organization that has actually diverted most from
its initial goal. Since 1997 a reorientation has taken place. Before that the
ideology was oriented towards the pursuit of an Islamic state in Turkey. The
European branch was an extension of the Turkish political movement.
Activities and goals were fully subordinate to the Turkish movement.
The new course from 1997 onwards that was adopted throughout Europe
was much more pragmatic and focussed on the interests of Turkish Muslims
in European societies whose open, pluralistic, and democratic character was
recognized and accepted. From an Islamist they transformed into a post-
Islamist movement that is focussed on the improvement of the position
of Islam in European societies. They have maintained their activist atti-
tude but revised their goals and ambitions.
Hizmet, or the Gülen-movement, only relatively recently developed
into an important force in the Turkish-Islamic landscape and beyond.
Their growth has impacted considerably on the parameters that shape
this landscape. One important reason for that is they have never
competed with the other movements by refraining from the ‘mosque
organization model’. In addition to that nowhere in Europe they take
part in consultation boards and negotiation processes. Their activities cut
across the initial dividing lines between the other movements. Although
they have their own niche and have developed their own specific activi-
ties, their active involvement in public debates, their engagement with
academic topics, and the way in which they take up important and often
sensitive and controversial issues have made them into a kind of model
for a European Islam. The average profile of their constituency enhances
this image. But the combination of disciplined internal training and
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Conclusions, Dynamics, and Tendencies
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Transnational Turkish Islam
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DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0013
Index
AABF (Federation of Alevi AP (Justice Party), 19–20
Associations in Germany), Arayıcı, Ali, 17
102–4, 106n4 Atacan, Fulya, 112
AABK (Confederation of Alevi Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 10, 15,
Associations in Europe), 24, 28n1, 47, 99, 108–9, 112
103 ATB (Turkish Union in
Abadan-Unat, Nermin, 18, 31, Europe), 111
35, 43 ATİB (Turkish Islamic Union
ABF (Alevi Bektaşi in Austria), 50, 76
Federasyonu), 100 ATİB (Turkish-Islamic Union
Adalet Partisi, see AP in Europe), 111
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, see Austria, 31–4, 50, 55, 61, 75–6,
AKP 104–5, 110, 112, 115
Adams, Patrick, 25 AÜTDK (Confederation
ADÜTDF (Federation of of Idealist Turkish
Democratic Idealist Associations), 110
Turkish Associations), Azak, Umut, 22
109–11
Agai, Begim, 87, 94n1 Bader, Veit, 3
AİF (Avusturya İslam Basch, Linda, 8n5
Federasyonu or Islamic BBP (Great Unity Party), 111
Federation Austria), Beck, Ulrich, 8n4
75–6 Bektaşi Order, 97–100
Akgönül, Samim, 8n3, 32, 38, Bektovic, 94n3
49, 51, 61, 80n1 Belgium, 31–3, 51, 54, 61, 76, 78,
Akgündüz, Ahmet, 58, 59 82, 91, 103, 110
AKP (Justice and Progress Belgium Union of Islamic
Party), 10–12, 24–8, 49, 54, Cultural Centres, 61
75, 77, 105 BİF (Belçika İslam Federasyonu
Alevi, 7, 49, 96–7, 99–106, or Islamic Federation
106n1, 106n4, 106n11, 119 Belgium), 76
Alperen Ocakları, 111 Binswanger, Karl, 47, 58, 73, 74,
AMGT (Milli Görüş 77, 109
organizations Europe), 74 Boos-Nünning, Ursula, 66
Andrews, Mathew, 82 Bowen, John, 5, 30
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Index
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Index
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Index
Sezgin, Zeynep, 50, 61 Turam, Berna, 8n2, 11, 17, 19, 85, 92,
Shankland, David, 100 94n1
Sharon-Krespin, Rachel, 93 Turkey, 2–3, 6–7, 10–28, 31, 37–40,
Shaw, Stanford, 12, 16 42–44, 45n8, 47–51, 53–6, 58–9, 62,
Shia, 7, 96–100 65, 69, 71–7, 79–80, 82–3, 85–8, 90,
SICN (Islamic Centre in the 93, 94n1, 96–7, 99, 101–2, 104–6,
Netherlands), 61, 63, 65, 67n9 106n3, 108, 110–12, 115–20
Smit, Wicher, 15, 17 Turkish Foundation for Religious
Sökefeld, Martin, 98, 101–2, 105 Affairs, see TDV
SP (Felicity Party), 24, 69, 75 Turkish Islamic Foundation
Spuler-Stegemann, Ursula, 65–6, 109 (Denmark), 51
Sufi order, 7, 58–60, 65, 90, 96–7, 99, Turkish Islamic Synthesis, 70, 85, 100,
118 109, 111
see also tarikat Turkish nationalism, see nationalism
Sufism, see tarikat Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, see TDV
Süleymancis, see Süleymanlı movement Turner, Colin, 83
Süleymanlı movement, 6, 22, 38–40,
49, 56n1, 58–67, 71, 77, 87, 89, 108, Ülkücü, 108–10
117–18 umbrella organizations, 38, 50, 75–6,
Sunar, Ilkay, 14, 19, 21–2 78, 89, 109
Sunier, Thijl, 5, 14, 18, 21, 23, 30, 35–7,
39–41, 45n8, 48–9, 51–2, 54–5, 64, Vasquez, Manuel, 5, 87
76, 80n5, 90, 92–3, 96 Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren
Sweden, 31–3, 51, 56n5, 61, 67n6, 76, 103 e.V., see VIKZ
Swedish Alevi Federation, 103 Vertovec, Steve, 6, 8n5
Szyliowicz, Joseph, 16 VIKZ (Federation of Islamic
Cultural Centres, Germany), 61,
Tanja, Jaap, 109, 110, 113n3 63, 65–6
Tanzimat (reforms), 13 Virtue Party, see FP
tarikat, 15, 58–60, 62, 64–6, 66n2, 71, Vorhoff, Karin, 96
83–4, 90–1, 93, 96, 99, 117
TDV (Turkish Foundation for Weber, Max, 93
Religious Affairs), 49 Welfare Party, see RP
TICF (Federation of Turkish Islamic Werbner, Pnina, 5
Cultural Organizations, White, Jenny, 8n2, 17, 94n1, 109
Netherlands), 52 Wimmer, 4, 5
Toprak, Binnaz, 12, 14, 19–22, 47
transnational field, 5–6, 10, 43, 115–16, Yavuz, Hakan, 17, 19, 22, 24, 64, 83–7,
120 94n1
transnational Islam, 5, 120 Yilmaz, Ihsan, 87, 91, 94n1
transnational networks, 4–6, 55–6, Yücekök, Ahmet, 19
88–9, 115–16, 120 Yükleyen, Ahmet, 8n3, 38, 50, 52, 53,
transnationalism, 5–8 56n1, 60, 62, 63, 67n3, 77, 82, 90,
Trimingham, John Spencer, 60 94n2
Tunahan, Süleyman Hilmi, 39, 58–60,
62, 64–5, 67n7 Zürcher, Erik Jan, 13, 16, 17
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