MAGALLONA VS ERMITA G.R. No.
187167 Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition
Facts:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the
terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they
contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of
the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary
treaties.
RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and
national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.
RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.
assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting
the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories.
Issues:
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is
unconstitutional.
Discussions:
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic
doctrine, which we connect the outermost points of our archipelago with
straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal
waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime
Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an
explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.
Rulings:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to
Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under
UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s
maritime zones and continental shelf.
 Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into
archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49
of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends
to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their
depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of
archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic
waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and
subsoil and the resources therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for
the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice
to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting or
producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR NO. 183591
FACTS:
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP)
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli
Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement
mentions “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE) to which it grants the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of
the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources
within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes:
the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they
negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD
brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional
HELD:
GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and
initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to
law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.
REASONING:
The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both
national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process
and the mobilization and facilitation of people’s participation in the peace
process.
Article III (Bill of Rights)
Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized,
access to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
LGC (1991), “require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic
consultations. No project or program be implemented unless such
consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.”
Article VII (Executive Department)
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Article X. (Local Government)
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as
hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and
geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions
shall provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of
the general welfare of the people of the region.

The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.

ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be

proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under

Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with
the present constitution and laws “shall come into force upon signing of a
comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the
legal framework.” The president’s authority is limited to proposing
constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that
the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend
therein.

FACTS:
DELA CRUZ VS GARCIA GR NO. 177728
FACTS:
Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit of marriage. Jenie
got pregnant but unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie gave birth.
Jenie then applied for registration of the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname,
Aquino.
When Jenie applied for registration of child’s birth, Jenie attached the ff.:
Certificate of Live Birth
AUSF, together with Dominique’s handwritten autobiography
Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by Dominique’s father and brother
Respondent denied the registration because the child was born out of wedlock.
Trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition because the document (autobiography)
was unsigned and as per IRR of RA 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to
Use the Surname of their Father) which states that:
“Private handwritten instrument must be duly signed by him where he expressly
recognizes paternity”
Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not contain any
express recognition of paternity.
ISSUE:
WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor
Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity
RULING:
YES.
RATIONALE:
Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private handwritten
instrument must be signed by putative father. It must be read in conjunction with
Art. 175 and 172. It is therefore implied.
Special circumstances to the case:
Died 2 months prior to child’s birth
Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented
Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment by father and brother who stand to
be affected by their hereditary rights
The Court then adopted the ff. rules:
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted
to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging parent
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
UP VS DIZON GR NO. 171182

FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General

Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern
Builders) for the construction and renovation of the buildings in the
campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing.
However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its
disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued
the UP to collect the unpaid balance.

On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay
Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for
reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion
was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal
Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of
record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.

Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the

RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of
time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued
the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial
became final and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its
motion for execution despite their previous motion having already been
granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June
11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9,
2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on
October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment
to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the
RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
I. Was UP's funds validly garnished?
II. Has the UP's appeal dated June 3, 2002 been filed out of time?
HELD: UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to
garnishment. (Garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the
State)
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a
"chartered institution" performing a legitimate government function.
Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States
constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a
government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced
from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve
the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic
Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including
any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking
institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which
should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should
always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are
government funds that are public in character. They include the income
accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent
only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability.
As the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v.
Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability and liability.
"Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is
suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can
never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued.
When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The
execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary
jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory
decision already validated the claim against the UP.
judgment has not been absolute, and has admitted several exceptions,
among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and
(d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that
render its execution unjust and inequitable. We rule that the UPs plea for
equity warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional power to disregard
the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear
violation of the UPs right to due process.

HELD: The period of appeal did not start without effective service of
decision upon counsel of record. (The doctrine of immutability of a final
judgment; service of judgments; fresh-period rule; computation of time)

At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of
P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea
is the finality of the judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UPs
appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002. It is true that a
decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as the
highest court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, GR
No. 212426, 2016-07-26
Facts:
petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER,
REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a
new Decision GRANTING the instant consolidated petitions by declaring the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the
respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of
America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its
implementation.
petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a
treaty.[5] In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the
form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction under
Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases,
troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the
issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]
Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the
word "allowed in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and
facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of the provision in
question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and
facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the
Court has simply applied the plain meaning of the words in the particular
provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has been established by a subsisting
treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty.
After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops,
and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines.
Issues:
constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
(U.S.)
Ruling:
we find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US
troops has long been authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which
is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along with the
longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the
conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within
the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.
Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully
conforms to the Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also
fully conforms to the government's continued policy to enhance our
military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues
that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any
additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision.

Principles:

On verba legis interpretation... verba legis

Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will
in fact result in an absurdity, which legal construction strictly abhors.

The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the
Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a
construction that changes its meaning

With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's
theory of "initial entry" mentioned above ventured into a construction of
the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is
patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said
constitutional provision.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS GR NO. 122156

Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance

System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide
management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system,
and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior
to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as
bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and
that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not
self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by
the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
 for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If
the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per sejudicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce
such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term
natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark,
a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively
an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for
the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant
events which have shaped Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot
be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
 question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid
of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a
foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the
Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this
policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and
laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public
scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider
when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of
its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when
there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign
group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of
judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people.
The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the
Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not
only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the
Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the
bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian
firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG
BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.