Civil Trial

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*CIVIL TRIAL*

Trial of civil suit and follow the procedure stage by stage as under;

1. Plaintiff has to file the plaint complying the provisions in all respect as contemplated under
Order 4 r/w Order 6 and 7 of the code.
2. Plaintiff has to issue summons within 30 days from the institution of suit.
3. After the service of summons defendant has to file his written statement within 30 days from
the receipt of summons as per Order 8 R 1 of the code
4. No further time exceeding 90 days after date of service of summons be extended for filing
written
statement as per proviso to Order 8 R 1 of the code.
5. Within 10 days from the filing of written statement court has to examine the parties so as to
explore the possibilities of compromise in between the parties and to refer the matter of
settlement under section 89 of the code.
6. If parties fail to compromise the matter then court has to keep the matter for discovery and
inspection within the time span of 7 – 10 – 10 – 3 days, as per Order 11 of the code.
7. Then to adjourn thematter for admissionwithin the time span of15 days as per Order 12 of the
code.
8. Then parties have tofile the originaldocuments prior to framing of issues within the time span
of 7 days, as per Order 13 of the code.
9. Court has to frame the issues within 15 days as per Order 14 of the code.
10. Parties have to file the list of witnesses within 15 days from the date of framing of issues as
per
Order 16 of the code.
11. Plaintiff has to issue summons to the witnesses either for adducing evidence or for
production of documents within 5 days of filing of list as per Order 16 R 1 (4) of the code.
12. Parties have to settle the date of evidence as per Order 16 of the code.
13. Plaintiff has to file the affidavits of all his witnesses within 3 adjournments as per Order 18 R
4 r/w Order 17 of the code.
14. Court has to exhibit the documents considering their proof and admissibility with a reasoned
order as per proviso to Order 18 R 4 (1) of the code.
15. Cross examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses on day to day until all the witnesses in
attendance have been examined as per Order 18 R 4 (2) r/w Order 17 R 2 (a) of the code.
16. Defendant has to issue summons to the witnesses either for adducing evidence or for
production of documents as per Order 16 R 1 (4) of the code.
17. Defendant has to file the affidavits of all his witnesses within 3 adjournments as per Order 18
R 4 r/w Order 7 of the code.
18. Court has to exhibit the documents considering their proof and admissibility with a reasoned
order as per proviso to Order 18 R 4 (1) of the code.
19. Cross examination of the defendant and his witnesses on day to day until all the witnesses in
attendance have been examined as per Order 18 R 4 (2) r/w Order 17 R 2 (a) of the code.
20. Parties have to conclude their arguments within 15 days from the completion of their
respective evidence as per Order 18 R 2 (3A) of the code.
21. Court has to delivered judgment forthwith or on or before 30 days and not exceeding 60 days
from the date of conclusion of the arguments as per Order 20 R 1 of the code.
#################

Question-

The time of death can be calculated by various means... Explain it in your words.

Answer: The best answer was given by Abi Vinoy

Many types of changes to a body occur after death. Some of those that can be used to determine
the post-mortem Interval are –

Change In The Eye

Algor Mortis

Hypostatis

Rigor Mortis

Putrefaction

Adipocere... etc .

STAGES OF DECOMPOSITION OF BODY


These Stages Of Post-Mortem Changes Are::

Stage 1 – Fresh Stage


Stage 2 – Bloated Stage
Stage 3 – Active Decay Stage
Stage 4 – Post Decay Stage
Stage 5 – Skeletonization
#######$#$
Ss. 154 & 200---Complainant lodging FIR and a private complaint containing the same
allegations against the same set of accused persons---Trial Court in such circumstances
should hold a trial in the complaint case first and the challan case was to be kept
dormant awaiting the fate of the trial in the complaint case.
PLD 2016 SC 70
#######
2016 SCMR 676

S. 497(5)---Cancellation of bail---Grounds---Abscondence of accused---Bail could not be


cancelled merely on ground of Abscondence---Abscon dence by itself could not be a substitute
of evidence; it was a circumstance which was always taken in a criminal case as corroboration
towards the guilt and not as proof of the guilt.

2016 SCMR 1520

S. 497(2)---Bail---Case of further inquiry into guilt of accused---Abscondment of accused---


Effect--- Person Abscon ding after an occurrence and declared as a proclaimed offender may lose
his claim to exercise of discretion in his favour by a court of law on the basis of propriety but at
the same time it was equally true that an accused person involved in a case calling for further
inquiry into his guilt was to be admitted to bail as a matter of right---Whenever a question of
propriety was confronted with a question of right the latter must prevail.

Citation Name : 2016 SCMR 1593 SUPREME-COURT


Side Appellant : MUHAMMAD SHAFI
Side Opponent : State

S. 497(2)---Bail---Case of further inquiry into guilt of accused---Abscon dment of accused---


Effect---In a case calling for further inquiry into the guilt of an accused person bail was granted
to him as of right and not by way of grace or concession---At times bail was refused to an
accused person upon his having remained a proclaimed offender but at the same time it was
equally true that such refusal of bail proceeded primarily upon a consideration of propriety---
Whenever a question of propriety was confronted with a question of right the latter must prevail.

PLD 2012 SUPREME-COURT 222

S. 497(2)---Bail---Scope---Further inquiry---Right of bail could not be refused to accused merely


on account of his alleged Abscon dance which is a factor relevant only to propriety.

2012 SCMR 1273


S. 497(2)---Bail---Case of further inquiry---Abscon dment of the accused---Effect---Where a
case called for further inquiry into the guilt of an accused, bail was to be allowed to him as a
matter of right and not by way of grace or concession---Bail was sometimes refused to an
accused person on account of his Abscon dment but such refusal of bail proceeded primarily
upon the question of propriety, and whenever a question of propriety was confronted with a
question of a right, the latter must prevail.

2012 SCMR 1137

S. 497(2)---Bail---Abscon dence---Further inquiry---In a case calling for further inquiry into the
guilt of accused, bail is to be allowed to him as of right and not by way of grace or concession---
Mere Abscon dence of accused person may not be sufficient to refuse bail to him.

------------------------------------------------------------------=

Bail Refused

2018 SCMR 28

S. 497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---
Application for cancellation of bail---FIR was lodged on the same day within twenty-five (25)
minutes of the incident which, minimized the chances of false implication---Both the accused
persons had been specifically named in the FIR and assigned specific roles---Complainant, who
was the mother of the deceased, claimed to be the eye-witness of the incident, and there hardly
appeared any reason to disbelieve her---Medical report fully supported the version of the
complainant---Accused persons remained Abscon ders for almost 15 months after the incident,
and no plausible reason was advanced to justify their Abscon dence---Sufficient material was
available on record which prima facie, connected the accused persons with the commission of
offence---Bail granted to accused persons was recalled in circumstances
###########
Confession recorded by Magistrate on oath---Admissibility---

----Extra-judicial confession---Weak type of evidence on basis of which conviction on capital


charge could not recorded.

----Documentary evidence---Oral evidence---Contradiction between--

----'Interested witness' and 'independent witness', evidence of---Scope--

---DN report-----
2016 SCMR 274
##########
[9/30, 5:47 PM] +92 300 2604949: While deciding pre-arrest bail, the Court can have a
look upon the merits of casethough on the yardstick of tentative assessment.
Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019
Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDIJUDICIAL


DEPARTMENT

Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019


Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

Sardar Safir Akram, Advocate with petitioner.

Mr. Muhammad Ahmad Saeed, DPG with M.Arshad S.I.

Qazi Khalil ur Rehman,Advocate for complainant.


Date of hearing. 04.07.2019

This is an application for bail before arrest on behalf of Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner)in case
FIR No.403 dated 23.06.2018,under Sections302, 324, 148, 149PPC registered with Police
StationSaddar Beroni, Rawalpindi.

2.The facts of prosecution case as can be culled from the crime report are to the effect that on
23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m. Azhar ud Din (complainant) was present in his house and
attracted to the street after noticing hue and cry coming therefrom; that he noticed the presence
of Ghzanfar Bhatti, Raja Nazar, Raja Khuram, Ziafat and six unknown persons armed with
different weapons and saw them coming towards his house while using abusive
language; that the complainant raised alarm and asked his cousin, Sehar-ud-Din and Luqman for
returning to their house as a consequence thereof both of them ran for their lives; that Raja
Khurram (co-accused) fired shots from his .12 bore gun hitting Luqman on his back and
right leg; that Ghazanfar Bhatti (co-accused) firedastraight AK-47 shot, which hit Sehar-ud-
Din on his neck; that the perpetrators resorted to indiscriminate firing, which besidescreating
terror and panic in the vicinity also caused injury to Mst. Nadia Israr.

3.Arguments heard. Record perused.

4.It unfolds from the tentative perusal of record that the case in hand stands registered
for an occurrence having taken place on 23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m., within the
jurisdiction of P.S.Saddar Berooni, Rawalpindi. During this occurrence, in pursuance of an
aggression launched by Raja Khurram and his co-accused, one Sehar-ud-Din lost his life
whereas two others, namely, Luqman and Nadia received injuries. It is equally important
to mention here that burden of committing this crime was rested upon the shoulders of
four nominated and six unknown accused persons.
5.In the wake of above facts, it is noticed that Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner) was not
nominated in the crime report. His name surfaced on record through the supplementary
statement of complainant dated 23.06.2018, which was recorded shortly after the registration
ofFIR. After having perused the aforementioned supplementary statement, it is noticed that
the petitioner along with five others, namely, Usman, Sohrab Khan, Touseef, Iqbal and Yaseen
was implicated in the case with the allegation of raising Lalkara and resorting to firing,
which remainedineffective.Though the statements of three other witnesses, namely,
Mastan, Luqman (injured) and Kamal were recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. on the
following day i.e. 24.6.2018, however, the name of petitioner finds no mention therein.
Though, learned counsel for the complainant as well as the learned Law Officer was
confronted with this anomaly but they failed to respond it in any manner. This is not the
only shortcoming noticed by this Court rather it is further observed that though such statement
was made almost immediately after the registration of FIR, however, even then Azhar-ud-Din
(complainant) stated that “till today” he has been looking for the unknown perpetrators and
now have acquired knowledge about their identity. The use of expression “till today” adversely
reflects upon the supplementary statement and reasonably demonstrates that indeed it
was recorded some days after the registration of FIR.

6.The dismissal of this application was vociferously urged by the prosecution on the
ground of limited scope of pre-arrest bail. In this regard, it is observed that no doubt the
criteria laid down for the grant of pre-arrest bail is stringent in nature but not to an extent
whereby a court is precluded to exercise jurisdiction under section 498 Cr.P.C. even in
cases where the innocence or false implication of an accused is patently reflected from the
record. This Court is not oblivious of the fact that though the provision of section 498 was
enacted in Criminal ProcedureCode, 1898 from its very inception, however, the concept of
pre-arrest bail developed through necessary interpretation made by Hon’ble Full Bench of
Lahore Court in case reported as Hidayat ullah Khan v. The Crown(PLD 1949 Lahore 21). From
apeep throughthe judicial archives,it unveils that even prior to the aforementioned Full Bench
decision, the Courts hadbeen granting bail before arrest but such relief was much
dependent upon the discretion of the court,without there being any specific guidelines.If
any reference in this regard is needed that can be made to the cases reported asEmperor
v. Muhammad Fandh AIR (21) 1934 Sind (36 Cr.P.C L J 711)‫۔‬and Johur Mat and others, 10
C W N 1093 (4 Cr.P.C L J 221).
The Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in the case of Hadayat ullah Khan(mentioned supra) while
pondering upon the concept of pre-arrest bail made the law more explicit by laying down
guidelines, which for reference sake are being reproduced hereunder:-

“For the reasons given above, the reply which I would give to the question referred to us is that,
in a proper case, the High Court has power under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code,
to make an order that a person who is suspected of an offence for which he may be arrested by a
police officer or a Court, shall be admitted to bail. The exercise of this power should, however,
be confined to cases in which, not only is good prima facie ground made out for the grant of bail
in respect of the offence alleged, but also, it should be shown that if the petitioner were to be
arrested and refused bail, such an order would, in all probability, be made not from
motives of furthering the ends of justice in relationto the case, but from some ulterior
motive, and with the object of injuring the petitioner, or that the petitioner would in such an
eventuality suffer irreparable harm.”

It reasonably evinces from the observation of Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court, mentioned
above that discretion to grant pre-arrest bail is to be exercised in favour of an accused,if
hisimplication in the case is apparently stirred with malafideand he has a good prima
faciecase for the grant of bail. The proposition of pre-arrest bail was authoritatively adjudged by
this Court in another case reported as Sh. Zahoor Ahmad v. The State(PLD 1974 Lahore
256) with following observation:-

“The main conditions to be satisfied before exercise of jurisdiction to allow pre-arrest bail under
section 498, Cr.P.C. are--

(a)that there should be a genuine proved apprehension of imminent arrest with the effect of
virtual restraint on the petitioner (b)that the petitioner should physically surrender to the Court;
(c)that on account of ulterior motive, particularly on the part of the police, there should
be apprehension of harassment and undue irreparable humiliation by means of unjustified
arrest;
(d)that it should be otherwise a fit case on merits for exercise of discretion in favour of
the petitioner for the purpose of bail.

In this behalf the provisions contained in section 497 Cr.P.C. would have to be kept
inmind;(e)that unless there is reasonable explanation, the petitioner should have earlier
moved the Sessions Court for the same relief under section 498, Cr.P.C.

”In the case reported as Murad Khan v. Fazla-e-Subhan(PLD 1983 SC 82)the Hon’ble
Apex Court cancelled the pre-arrest bail granted to an accused by the High Court on the
ground that his implication apparently was not based on malafide. However, the scope of
pre-arrest bail was widened by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in a subsequent
case reported as Meeran Bux v. The State and another(PLD 1989 SC 347)and
besidesmalafide, the merits of the case were also considered favourably for extending such
relief. For advantage sake,it is being mentioned that in the wake of an accusation of
having participated in homicide occurrence, the accused Meeran Bux was ascribed the
role of inflicting a gunshotinjuryon the left thigh of deceased Badshah Dinoand the pre-arrest
bail granted to accused was cancelled by the High Court, however, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Pakistan restored the bail granting order of learned Sessions Judgewhile observing that the
injury besidesnot being on the vital part of the body was also declared by the doctor to be simple
in nature.

7.From the above discussion, it reasonably insinuates that while deciding pre-arrest
bail, the Court can have a look upon the merits of casethough on the yardstick of tentative
assessment. The application of such rule in the instant case reveals that implication of
petitioner, in the circumstances mentioned above, is not free from doubt. Even otherwise,
the petitioner is ascribed the role of resorting to ineffective firing. Admittedly, as
per accusations, neither petitioner caused any injury tothe victims nor made any attempt
to do so. This aspect, itself is sufficient to lean in favour of petitioner for granting pre-
arrest bail. In arriving at such conclusion, this Court sought guidance from cases reported as
Nazra and 5 others v.The State(1977 PCr. LJ 480), Ashraf and 3 others v. The State(1978 P Cr. L
J 903),Arshad v. The State(1999 P Cr. L J 611)andMuhammad Tariq and another v. The
State(2008 YLR22).The grant of pre-arrest bail to petitioner is further felt inevitable
keeping in view the fact that main accused Khurram was exoneratedby Mastan Khan (father of
Luqman-injured)from all charges at the time of his pre-arrest bail, though he was saddled
with the responsibility of causing multiple firearm injury to Luqman.

8.This Court has also taken note of the fact that Ziafat Mehmood (co-accused) was nominated in
the crime report with the role of making in effective firing, however, was granted post-arrest
bail by this Court vide order dated 04.12.2018 in Crl. Misc. No. 1657-B/2018. Similarly,
Usman Mehboob, who was also arrayed as accused through the supplementary statement
of the complainant with role similar to petitioner, was also held entitled to post-arrest bail by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi vide order dated 16.4.2019. In the given
circumstances, even if the request of petitioner for grant of pre-arrest bail is refused on the
ground of its limited scope, he will become entitled to bail under section 497 Cr.P.C.
immediately after his arrest. In the given circumstances, except causing humiliation and
harassment to petitionerno useful purpose is likely to be served. In somewhat similar
circumstances, the concession of pre-arrest bail was granted in cases reported asMiss
Zubaida Parveen v. State(PLJ 2004 Cr.C.673)and Zahoor Ahmad alias Bhawal Sher and
another v. State(PLJ 2007 Cr.C.83). So far as, implication of the
petitioner in the case on account of malafideand ulterior motive is concerned, it is well evident
from the manner in which supplementary statement of complainant, apparently, was
inserted in the record. In accordance with the peculiar facts of the case, this Court prima
faciehas reasons to believe that petitioner fell preyto the wider net.This Court has also
given a considered thought to the expected recovery of incriminating articles from
petitioner. Suffice it to say in this regard that if the Court arrives at conclusion that person
seeking pre-arrest bail is apparently falsely implicated in the case, his liberty cannot be
curtailed solely on the ground that some recoveries are to be effected from him. It will not be out
of context to refer the observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, expressed in case
reported asAamir Bashir and another v. State and another(PLJ 2018 SC 445), in
somewhat similar circumstances, which is as under:-

“The plea of the Advocate General that the investigating agency has been deprived to
interrogate both the petitioners for the recovery of the crime pistol and to collect further
evidence after getting their custody, is not acceptable in the circumstances of the case.
Moreover, this Court time and again has held that this could not be a ground for refusal of pre-
arrest bail because the police has to use proper skills of investigation while
interrogating the accused person, staying on pre-arrest bail. The interrogation inside the
lockup of the police station or inside the police station would make a very little
difference.”

9.For what has been discussed above, the instant petition is allowed and ad-interim pre-
arrest bail already granted to the petitioner in terms of order of this Court dated 25.06.2019
stands confirmed subject to his furnishing fresh bail bonds in the sum of Rs.2,00,000/-(rupees
two hundred thousand) with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of trial court
.(Ch. Abdul Aziz )Judge
Approved for reporting.
[9/30, 5:47 PM] +92 300 2604949: While deciding pre-arrest bail, the Court can have a
look upon the merits of casethough on the yardstick of tentative assessment.
Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019
Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDIJUDICIAL


DEPARTMENT

Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019


Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

Sardar Safir Akram, Advocate with petitioner.

Mr. Muhammad Ahmad Saeed, DPG with M.Arshad S.I.

Qazi Khalil ur Rehman,Advocate for complainant.


Date of hearing. 04.07.2019

This is an application for bail before arrest on behalf of Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner)in case
FIR No.403 dated 23.06.2018,under Sections302, 324, 148, 149PPC registered with Police
StationSaddar Beroni, Rawalpindi.

2.The facts of prosecution case as can be culled from the crime report are to the effect that on
23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m. Azhar ud Din (complainant) was present in his house and
attracted to the street after noticing hue and cry coming therefrom; that he noticed the presence
of Ghzanfar Bhatti, Raja Nazar, Raja Khuram, Ziafat and six unknown persons armed with
different weapons and saw them coming towards his house while using abusive
language; that the complainant raised alarm and asked his cousin, Sehar-ud-Din and Luqman for
returning to their house as a consequence thereof both of them ran for their lives; that Raja
Khurram (co-accused) fired shots from his .12 bore gun hitting Luqman on his back and
right leg; that Ghazanfar Bhatti (co-accused) firedastraight AK-47 shot, which hit Sehar-ud-
Din on his neck; that the perpetrators resorted to indiscriminate firing, which besidescreating
terror and panic in the vicinity also caused injury to Mst. Nadia Israr.

3.Arguments heard. Record perused.

4.It unfolds from the tentative perusal of record that the case in hand stands registered
for an occurrence having taken place on 23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m., within the
jurisdiction of P.S.Saddar Berooni, Rawalpindi. During this occurrence, in pursuance of an
aggression launched by Raja Khurram and his co-accused, one Sehar-ud-Din lost his life
whereas two others, namely, Luqman and Nadia received injuries. It is equally important
to mention here that burden of committing this crime was rested upon the shoulders of
four nominated and six unknown accused persons.
5.In the wake of above facts, it is noticed that Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner) was not
nominated in the crime report. His name surfaced on record through the supplementary
statement of complainant dated 23.06.2018, which was recorded shortly after the registration
ofFIR. After having perused the aforementioned supplementary statement, it is noticed that
the petitioner along with five others, namely, Usman, Sohrab Khan, Touseef, Iqbal and Yaseen
was implicated in the case with the allegation of raising Lalkara and resorting to firing,
which remainedineffective.Though the statements of three other witnesses, namely,
Mastan, Luqman (injured) and Kamal were recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. on the
following day i.e. 24.6.2018, however, the name of petitioner finds no mention therein.
Though, learned counsel for the complainant as well as the learned Law Officer was
confronted with this anomaly but they failed to respond it in any manner. This is not the
only shortcoming noticed by this Court rather it is further observed that though such statement
was made almost immediately after the registration of FIR, however, even then Azhar-ud-Din
(complainant) stated that “till today” he has been looking for the unknown perpetrators and
now have acquired knowledge about their identity. The use of expression “till today” adversely
reflects upon the supplementary statement and reasonably demonstrates that indeed it
was recorded some days after the registration of FIR.

6.The dismissal of this application was vociferously urged by the prosecution on the
ground of limited scope of pre-arrest bail. In this regard, it is observed that no doubt the
criteria laid down for the grant of pre-arrest bail is stringent in nature but not to an extent
whereby a court is precluded to exercise jurisdiction under section 498 Cr.P.C. even in
cases where the innocence or false implication of an accused is patently reflected from the
record. This Court is not oblivious of the fact that though the provision of section 498 was
enacted in Criminal ProcedureCode, 1898 from its very inception, however, the concept of
pre-arrest bail developed through necessary interpretation made by Hon’ble Full Bench of
Lahore Court in case reported as Hidayat ullah Khan v. The Crown(PLD 1949 Lahore 21). From
apeep throughthe judicial archives,it unveils that even prior to the aforementioned Full Bench
decision, the Courts hadbeen granting bail before arrest but such relief was much
dependent upon the discretion of the court,without there being any specific guidelines.If
any reference in this regard is needed that can be made to the cases reported asEmperor
v. Muhammad Fandh AIR (21) 1934 Sind (36 Cr.P.C L J 711)‫۔‬and Johur Mat and others, 10
C W N 1093 (4 Cr.P.C L J 221).
The Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in the case of Hadayat ullah Khan(mentioned supra) while
pondering upon the concept of pre-arrest bail made the law more explicit by laying down
guidelines, which for reference sake are being reproduced hereunder:-

“For the reasons given above, the reply which I would give to the question referred to us is that,
in a proper case, the High Court has power under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code,
to make an order that a person who is suspected of an offence for which he may be arrested by a
police officer or a Court, shall be admitted to bail. The exercise of this power should, however,
be confined to cases in which, not only is good prima facie ground made out for the grant of bail
in respect of the offence alleged, but also, it should be shown that if the petitioner were to be
arrested and refused bail, such an order would, in all probability, be made not from
motives of furthering the ends of justice in relationto the case, but from some ulterior
motive, and with the object of injuring the petitioner, or that the petitioner would in such an
eventuality suffer irreparable harm.”

It reasonably evinces from the observation of Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court, mentioned
above that discretion to grant pre-arrest bail is to be exercised in favour of an accused,if
hisimplication in the case is apparently stirred with malafideand he has a good prima
faciecase for the grant of bail. The proposition of pre-arrest bail was authoritatively adjudged by
this Court in another case reported as Sh. Zahoor Ahmad v. The State(PLD 1974 Lahore
256) with following observation:-

“The main conditions to be satisfied before exercise of jurisdiction to allow pre-arrest bail under
section 498, Cr.P.C. are--

(a)that there should be a genuine proved apprehension of imminent arrest with the effect of
virtual restraint on the petitioner (b)that the petitioner should physically surrender to the Court;
(c)that on account of ulterior motive, particularly on the part of the police, there should
be apprehension of harassment and undue irreparable humiliation by means of unjustified
arrest;
(d)that it should be otherwise a fit case on merits for exercise of discretion in favour of
the petitioner for the purpose of bail.

In this behalf the provisions contained in section 497 Cr.P.C. would have to be kept
inmind;(e)that unless there is reasonable explanation, the petitioner should have earlier
moved the Sessions Court for the same relief under section 498, Cr.P.C.

”In the case reported as Murad Khan v. Fazla-e-Subhan(PLD 1983 SC 82)the Hon’ble
Apex Court cancelled the pre-arrest bail granted to an accused by the High Court on the
ground that his implication apparently was not based on malafide. However, the scope of
pre-arrest bail was widened by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in a subsequent
case reported as Meeran Bux v. The State and another(PLD 1989 SC 347)and
besidesmalafide, the merits of the case were also considered favourably for extending such
relief. For advantage sake,it is being mentioned that in the wake of an accusation of
having participated in homicide occurrence, the accused Meeran Bux was ascribed the
role of inflicting a gunshotinjuryon the left thigh of deceased Badshah Dinoand the pre-arrest
bail granted to accused was cancelled by the High Court, however, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Pakistan restored the bail granting order of learned Sessions Judgewhile observing that the
injury besidesnot being on the vital part of the body was also declared by the doctor to be simple
in nature.

7.From the above discussion, it reasonably insinuates that while deciding pre-arrest
bail, the Court can have a look upon the merits of casethough on the yardstick of tentative
assessment. The application of such rule in the instant case reveals that implication of
petitioner, in the circumstances mentioned above, is not free from doubt. Even otherwise,
the petitioner is ascribed the role of resorting to ineffective firing. Admittedly, as
per accusations, neither petitioner caused any injury tothe victims nor made any attempt
to do so. This aspect, itself is sufficient to lean in favour of petitioner for granting pre-
arrest bail. In arriving at such conclusion, this Court sought guidance from cases reported as
Nazra and 5 others v.The State(1977 PCr. LJ 480), Ashraf and 3 others v. The State(1978 P Cr. L
J 903),Arshad v. The State(1999 P Cr. L J 611)andMuhammad Tariq and another v. The
State(2008 YLR22).The grant of pre-arrest bail to petitioner is further felt inevitable
keeping in view the fact that main accused Khurram was exoneratedby Mastan Khan (father of
Luqman-injured)from all charges at the time of his pre-arrest bail, though he was saddled
with the responsibility of causing multiple firearm injury to Luqman.

8.This Court has also taken note of the fact that Ziafat Mehmood (co-accused) was nominated in
the crime report with the role of making in effective firing, however, was granted post-arrest
bail by this Court vide order dated 04.12.2018 in Crl. Misc. No. 1657-B/2018. Similarly,
Usman Mehboob, who was also arrayed as accused through the supplementary statement
of the complainant with role similar to petitioner, was also held entitled to post-arrest bail by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi vide order dated 16.4.2019. In the given
circumstances, even if the request of petitioner for grant of pre-arrest bail is refused on the
ground of its limited scope, he will become entitled to bail under section 497 Cr.P.C.
immediately after his arrest. In the given circumstances, except causing humiliation and
harassment to petitionerno useful purpose is likely to be served. In somewhat similar
circumstances, the concession of pre-arrest bail was granted in cases reported asMiss
Zubaida Parveen v. State(PLJ 2004 Cr.C.673)and Zahoor Ahmad alias Bhawal Sher and
another v. State(PLJ 2007 Cr.C.83). So far as, implication of the
petitioner in the case on account of malafideand ulterior motive is concerned, it is well evident
from the manner in which supplementary statement of complainant, apparently, was
inserted in the record. In accordance with the peculiar facts of the case, this Court prima
faciehas reasons to believe that petitioner fell preyto the wider net.This Court has also
given a considered thought to the expected recovery of incriminating articles from
petitioner. Suffice it to say in this regard that if the Court arrives at conclusion that person
seeking pre-arrest bail is apparently falsely implicated in the case, his liberty cannot be
curtailed solely on the ground that some recoveries are to be effected from him. It will not be out
of context to refer the observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, expressed in case
reported asAamir Bashir and another v. State and another(PLJ 2018 SC 445), in
somewhat similar circumstances, which is as under:-

“The plea of the Advocate General that the investigating agency has been deprived to
interrogate both the petitioners for the recovery of the crime pistol and to collect further
evidence after getting their custody, is not acceptable in the circumstances of the case.
Moreover, this Court time and again has held that this could not be a ground for refusal of pre-
arrest bail because the police has to use proper skills of investigation while
interrogating the accused person, staying on pre-arrest bail. The interrogation inside the
lockup of the police station or inside the police station would make a very little
difference.”

9.For what has been discussed above, the instant petition is allowed and ad-interim pre-
arrest bail already granted to the petitioner in terms of order of this Court dated 25.06.2019
stands confirmed subject to his furnishing fresh bail bonds in the sum of Rs.2,00,000/-(rupees
two hundred thousand) with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of trial court
.(Ch. Abdul Aziz )Judge
Approved for reporting.
[9/30, 6:03 PM] +92 300 2604949: _*Limitation period for Appeal in Criminal Cases*:_

_*1*. In capital punishment, 7 days._

_*2*. From Magistrate to Sessions Court, 30 days._

_*3*. From Sessions Court to High Court, 60 days._

_*4*. From High Court to Supreme Court, 30 days._

_*5*. From High Court to Supreme Court in special Leave to Appeal, 30 days._

_*6*. From Magistrate to High Court in acquittal in Challan Case is 30 days and in Complaint
Case 60 days._

_*7*. From Sessions Court to High Court in acquittal in Challan Case is 30 days and in
Complaint Case 60 days._

_*8*. From High Court when case decide by it in its original jurisdiction and to Division Bench
than 20 days in acquittal or conviction as the case may._
[9/30, 6:17 PM] +92 300 2604949: 2019 MLD 1168

S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.376---Rape---Bail, grant of---Negative dna report---


Further inquiry---Allegation against accused was that he along with co-accused persons abducted
the daughter of complainant on gun point with intent to commit zina-bil-jabr and subsequently
subjected her to rape---Complainant leveled allegation of rape against four unknown persons
while lodging the crime report and the alleged victim, during medical examination, leveled
allegation of rape against three unknown persons---Doctor, who conducted medical examination
of victim observed that hymen was old ruptured with healed margins and no tear, laceration,
bruise, abrasion and swelling was found at her private parts---dna report qua accused was
negative and the medico legal report issued by the doctor did not connect accused in any manner
with the alleged crime---Report under S.173, Cr.P.C. had already been sent before the Trial
Court and there was no progress in trial---Further incarceration of accused would not serve any
beneficial purpose for the prosecution---Case of accused called for further probe into his guilt---
Bail petition was allowed and the accused was admitted to post-arrest bail, in circumstances.
[9/30, 6:26 PM] +92 300 2604949: 193 ‫ سیکشن‬crpc ‫کے تحت سیشن کورٹ ایک ایسی کورٹ ہے جو صرف‬
‫ سنگین جرائم کا ٹرائل کرتی ہے اور وہ بھی اُن کیسز کا جو اسے مجسٹیریل کورٹ‬Cr.PC ‫ کے‬190-2 ‫کے سیکشن‬
‫ تحت‬Cognizance ‫لینے کے بعد بھیجتی ہے۔ لیکن بعض صورتیں ایسی ہوتی ہیں جن میں سیشن کورٹ میجسٹیریل‬
‫ کورٹ کی مداخلت کے بغیر خود ڈائریکٹ‬Cognizance ‫لے سکتی ہے۔ وہ صورتیں مندرجہ ذیل ہیں‬:-_

_*1*198 ‫۔ *سی آر پی سی کے سیکشن‬A ‫*کے تحت‬:_


_‫ جب‬PPC ‫ گورنر وغیرہ کے بارے میں ُجرم سرزد ہوا ہو۔‬،‫ وزیراعظم‬،‫ کے تحت صدر‬21 ‫_کے چیپٹر‬
_*2*‫ کے تحت‬476 ‫۔ *سی آر پی سی کے سیکشن‬:*_
_‫ جب عدالتی کاروائی کے دوران‬Forgery (‫_کی گئی ہو۔ )یعنی اگر سیشن کورٹ میں جعل سازی کی گئی ہو‬

_*3*‫ کے تحت‬480 ‫۔ *سی آر پی سی کے سیکشن‬:*_


_ ‫جب عدالتی کاروائی کے حوالے سے حکم عدولی کی گئی ہو۔ )یعنی اگر سیشن کورٹ کے حکم کی تعمیل نہ کی گئی‬
‫_)ہو‬

_*4*‫۔ *جب سیشن کورٹ سپیشل کورٹ کی پاورز استعمال کررہی ہو‬:*_
_‫ جیساکہ‬Illegal Dispossession Act ‫ وغیرہ‬،‫ کے تحت‬3 ‫_کے سیکشن‬

_*5*203 ‫۔ *سی آر پی سی کے سیکشن‬A 203 ‫اور‬B ‫کے تحت‬:*_


_‫ کے تحت سیشن کورٹ میں کمپلیمنٹ کی گئی ہو۔‬17 ‫ یا زنا آرڈیننس کے سیکشن‬20 ‫_جب قذف آرڈیننس کے سیکشن‬

_‫ اوپر لفظ‬Cognizance ‫لینے سے مراد کسی کیس کو اپنے دائرہ اختیار میں لینا ہے یعنی اس کیس کو سننا ہے اور‬
‫_اسکا فیصلہ کرنا ہے۔‬
[9/30, 6:27 PM] +92 300 2604949: The concept of Set off in the code of civil procedure,1908.

1. Introduction

A plea of payment refers to the extinguishments of the debt prior to the raising of such debt after
such plea is raised. Set-off can only be claimed where the plaintiff and defendant are reciprocally
debtors of each other. Where a set-off is claimed the whole of it must be claimed or the balance
will be hit.

(I) Effect of Set-off

The effect to a set-off pleaded in a written statement is that such written statement shall have the
same effect as a plaint in a cross suit.

(II) Conditions, as to set-off

A defendant may claim a set-off, if the following conditions are present

i. The suit must be one for the recovery of money.

ii. The amount claimed to be set-off an ascertained sum of recovery.

iii. It must be legally recoverable.

iv. It must be recoverable by the defendant or by all the defendants, from the plaintiff or all the
plaintiffs.

v. The claim must not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the court in which the
suit is brought.
vi. Both parties must filed, in the defendants claim to set-off the same character as in the
plaintiff's suit.

vii. The claim must be made at the first hearing.

(III) Defendant's status in set-off case

The amount claimed as set-off the defendant has the status of a plaintiff and a decree can also be
passed in his favor. Where the plaintiff fails to appear his suit can be dismissed in default and ex-
parte decree, on the basis of the set-off can be passed against him.

(IV) Withdrawal of Plaintiff

Even where the plaintiff withdraw his suit, a decree can be passed against him in favor of a
defendant claiming a set-off.

(V) Time regarding set-off

The set-off should be specifically pleaded in the written statement, otherwise it may be
disallowed. It must be raised at the first hearing. As such it cannot be raised for the first time in
appeal, or in execution but the court may allow the written statement, to be amended to enable a
set-off.

(VI) Time regarding set-off

A set-off can be claimed in any suit in which the relief sought is the recovery of money, as for
instance a suit on a negotiable instrument.

But a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts or a suit for redemption, or for the
enforcement of a mortgage where the right to personal decree is barred, are not money suits.

(VII) Fixed Amount Claim

The set-off should be claimed for a known and fixed amount, regardless of whether it is admitted
or denied by the plaintiff i.e. for liquidated amount.

(VII) Illustration

A sues B on a bill of exchange. B alleges that A has wrongfully neglected to insure B's goods
and is liable to him in compensation which he claims to set-off. The amount not being
ascertained cannot be set-off.

But where the amount has to be ascertained after taking accounts or determining the defendant's
share, set-off cannot be claimed. But the mere fact that calculation is necessary does not rendered
the claim uncertain where the defendant's claim is not f an ascertained sum he can bring a cross
suit against the plaintiff.
(IX) Equitable Set-off

Where the amount claimed is unascertained, equitable set-off may be allowed, apart from the
legal set-off permissible under this rule and a claim for this can be made in the written statement.
The 'distinction between the two is that a legal set-off is claimable as a matter of right, but not so
an equitable set-off where in Court has the discretion either to adjudicate upon it or order it to be
determined by a separate suit. But the claim to equitable set-off must have arisen out, of the same
transaction. Where it arises out of a different transaction equitable set-off cannot be claimed. In
England, legal setoff was allowed by Courts of Common Law and equitable set-off by Courts of
Equity.

(X) Amount as to set-off

A sum cannot said to be legally recoverable where the plaintiff is not bound by law to pay it, or
where he is not liable to the defendant in respect of that debt.

(XI) Examples

Following are examples of claims which are not le all recoverable

(i) A claim which is barred by res, judicata.

(ii) or a claim barred by limitation on the date of the suit.

(iii) Or a claim based on a decree incapable of execution. In cases of equitable set-off a barred
debt can be pleaded.

(XII) Mutual Dealing

The claim and the set-off should be for debts due from and to the same parties in the same legal
character i.e., the dealing should be mutual.

(i) Illustration

A dies intestate and in debt to B. C takes o administration of A's effects and B buys parts of the
effects from C. In a suit for the purchase-money to C against B, the latter cannot set off the debt
against the price, for C fills two different Characters one as the vendor to B, in which he sues B
and the other as representative to A.

A joint debt and a separate debt cannot be set-off against one another unless the liability is joint
and several.

(XIII) Extent of Claim


Claim should not exceed pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. The value of the claim and the set-
off separately, should be within the Combined they exceed such limits. The same rule applies to
an equitable set-off.

(XIV) No Bar to Subsequent suit

A defendant is not bound to claim as set-off and where he omits to do so, a subsequent suit for
the same will not be barred but if a set-off is claimed, it should be for the entire amount due.

(XV) Court Fee

Court fee is payable on the full amount claimed by way of set-off legal or equitable and a
counter-claim as if such written statement were a plate. Where proper court fee has not been
affixed the defendant must be directed to do so is the case with plaint.

(XVI) Appeal

A preliminary order disposing of a claim to set-off is not appealable but it may be attacked.
[9/30, 6:29 PM] +92 300 2604949: Hiba in old age is doubtful!
------------------------------
‫ سال کی عمر کا شخص اپنے ذہنی فیصلہ کرنے کی صالحیت‬70 ‫ان میں اکثر ہبہ جات کو کالعدم کردیاگیا تھا کیونکہ‬
‫درست استعمال نہیں کرسکتا۔۔۔شکریہ‬
(1) At the time of making Gift donee was 92/93 years old, meaning thereby that he was fairly old
at the relevant time.
2014 SCMR 1181
(2) Statement of donor (ninety years old)
2003 SCMR 41
(3) First donor was about 75 years old.
2004 SCMR 1370
(4) Donor was 90 years old.
2010 SCMR 1370
(5) Ninety years old
2004 YLR 1956
(6) Gift-deed was executed by an ailing 80/85 years old woman.
2005 SCMR 1885
[9/30, 6:30 PM] +92 300 2604949: Some important things for new lawyers

● Every civil suit is filed in the lowest court of a district which is the court of Senior Civil Judge.

● A summary suit under order 37 of CPC is filed in the court of district judge.

● Family suits are governed by Family Courts Act, 1964 in Pakistan.

● Another statute that governs family suits is West Pakistan Family Court Rules, 1965.
● In case of family suits, it is filed at the place where the female resides even if she resides
temporarily.

● Visitation is a right for both the parents. It cannot be denied by courts unless any one of them
is defaulted.

● Stay order can be permanent or temporary.

● Perpetual or permanent stay is granted under Specific Relief Act 1877.

● Temporary Injunction or stay is granted under order 39 rule 1 & 2 of CPC.

● Any application can be given anytime in a civil suit and Judge is bound to admit or dismiss it.

● Decree can be preliminary or final. It is always appeal-able.

● An order is generally revision-able unless it falls under the ambit of section 104 or order 43 of
CPC.

● The time for filing first appeal in civil cases is 30 days.

● The time for filing second appeal in civil cases is 60 days.

● The time for filing civil revision is 90 days.

● Civil revision is filed under section 115 of CPC.

● The petitioner is bound to provide all the record of trial court in a civil revision.

● The first appeal can have question of law as well as question of fact.

● Second appeal is only filed on Question of Law.

● In normal civil cases first appeal is filed in the court of district judge.

● In normal civil cases second appeal is filed in High Court.

● Civil court has unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction under West Pakistan Civil Courts Act 1962.

● In normal practice different local governments have set different limits for pecuniary
jurisdiction of civil courts.

● When a case is filed in high court for the first time it is heard by single bench.

●........
[9/30, 6:30 PM] +92 300 2604949: Succession certificate, how to get it
====

-----
Succession certificate is issued by a civil court in Pakistan in favour of legal heirs of a deceased
person. This certificate is issued in respect of movable property of a deceased person, for
example a car, money in bank account, jewelry etc. The procedure often becomes more
complicated if there are competing claimants of the same property or asset, and the matter is
finally decided by the court. Contact us to discuss your particular circumstances as our expert
lawyers have vast experience of the whole process of obtaining succession certificates.

LAW OF SUCCESSION 1925 OR SUCCESSION ACT 1925 GOVERNS THE ALL


PROCEDURE RELATED WITH SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE IN PAKISTAN.
Succession Certificate is required when a person dies in order to transfer property of deceased
person to his/her legal heirs such as insurance claims, money in bank account(s), any stocks,
prize bonds, Stock exchange Shares etc.

THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT WAYS TO FILE AN APPLICATION FOR SUCCESSION


CERTIFICATE…
All legal heir can file a joint application in the court with the consent of other legal heirs. During
proceedings all legal heirs record their statements in favor of that one legal heir that they do not
have any objection to the issuance of succession certificate to that one legal heir. Court in this
scenario decided the application in favor of one legal heir who after wards distributes the
property among other heirs.
Second method to obtain succession certificate is that all legal heirs apply for succession
certificate individually and court issue certificate to all of them according to their share in the
property.
[9/30, 6:31 PM] +92 300 2604949: Even a stranger can file application for exhumation . 2014 _
Pcrlj _ 219

Registration of FIR is not necessary for exhumation . 2008 _ crlj _ 246

No time limit is fixed for exhumation or re postmortem . 2014 _ Pcrlj _ 219 & 2008 _ Scmr _
1086

Application for exhumation can be given on mere ground of suspicion . 2010 _ Pcrlj _ 4

In case of death of a witness , his statement recorded u/s 161 crpc is not admissible piece of
evidence . 2007 _ Pcrlj _ 1192

Accused persons can not be convicted merely on account of last seen evidence without any
corroboration . 2013 _ crlj _ 291

Accused was implicated in the cases on the basis of sniffing dogs . Bail granted to accused . 2011
_ crlj _ 641 & PLJ _ 2009 _ crc _ 382
457/380 . Accused was involved in the case on the basis of foot prints and foot trackers evidence
. Foot trackers evidence is weak type of evidence . Bail granted . 2012 _ Pcrlj _ 1794

Accused entered in a house and committed murder , afterwards accused took away rifle of
deceased , offence 404 ppc would be applicable instead of s. 380 ppc . PLJ _ 2010 _ crc _ 219
[9/30, 6:32 PM] +92 300 2604949: LCOMPROMISE IN CRIMINAL CASES AND ITS
EFFECT
Compromise in Compoundable offences:

NLR 1992 CrLJ 320 Shabbir Ahmed V/S The State (Lahore).

S.302/307. Compromise between convict and complainant during pendency of appeal against
conviction. Compromise accepted by High Court. ACQUITTAL

1995 MLD 1503. Muhammad Anar V/S The State (Lahore).

S.302/307 PPC. S.345 CrPC. Legal heirs of the deceased as well as the injured witness had
compromised with the accused of their own free will without any threat or promise and had
forgiven him in the name of Almighty Allah without accepting Diyat. On the direction of High
Court Diyat money in respect of minors had been deposited in the Bank in accordance with their
shares. COMPROMISE ALLOWED

1995 SCMR 1296. Ibrahim & 2 Others V/S The State.

S.302/307/34 PPC. S.345 CrPC. Major legal heirs of the deceased and the injured had waived
their right to claim any compensation and had forgiven the accused. Shares of Diyat money of
minor legal heirs of the deceased had been deposited in the Bank. Compromise had been effected
in accordance with law and since the parties were closely related and as the object of the
compromise was to create cordial relations between them Supreme Court did not press into
service S.311 PPC for imposing punishment of Taxir,. Compromise was accepted and the
accused were ordered to be released forthwith accordingly.

1997 PCrLJ 99. Sharafat Ali V/S The State (Lahore).

S.302/309 PPC. Father and mother of the deceased being his legal heirs had effected compromise
with the accused voluntarily and had genuinely forgiven him in the name of Almighty Allah to
lead their lives cordially in future. ACQUITTAL

1988 PCrLJ 1449. Nisar Ahmed V/S The State (Lahore).

S.307 PPC. Compromise. Parties compromising matter out of court and complainant side
pardoning accused. Parties present in court praying for permission to compromise. Permission
granted in interest of peace and good relations between parties. ACQUITTAL

NLR 2007 CrLJ 392. Ali Raza @ Kalo etc. V/S The State (Lahore DB)
S.324/353 PPC. It is settled law that in compoundable offences, compromise can be effected
with victims/heirs of deceased at any stage with permission of Court. Anti-Terrorism Court
would fail to exercise its jurisdiction by rejecting compromise application of convicts U/S 324
PPC on consideration that case involved police encounter case involving charge of assaulting
upon police force to deter them from discharge of their duties. HIGH COURT ACCEPTED
COMPROMISE.

4: Compromise in Non-Compoundable Offences:

2008 MLD 991.. Hazrat Khan V/S The State (Peshawar)

S.381-A, 411, 148 & 149 PPC. S.13 Arms Ordinance. Offences under which accused had been
charged being not compoundable, compromise between the parties could not be made a ground
for bail in non-compoundable offences. Section 381-A PPC carried a maximum sentence of
seven years while punished provided under S.13 of Arms Ordinance also did not come within the
prohibitory clause of S.497 CrPC. Grant of bail, in such like cases, was a rule and refusal of
same was an exception to that rule. BAIL GRANTED.

2008 MLD 1079.. Muhammad Arshad & Others V/S The State (Lahore)

S.412/34 & 395 PPC. Offences of dacoity |U/S 395 PPC as well as dishonestly receiving stolen
property in the commission of a dacoity in S.412 PPC, though did not find mention in the present
table given in S.345(1) CrPC and were not compoundable, but in the present case parties had
themselves voluntarily forgotten and forgiven the alleged crime and had entered into an outside
court settlement. Said settlement could be considered as a ground for the grant of bail in the
interest of justice and equity. Judicial notice of a compromise having taken place could be taken
even in offences which were not compoundable. As no allegation was of committing dacoity by
accused persons and the charge against them was about recovery recovering stolen property in a
dacoity, the guilt of accused persons was a matter of further inquiry within the meaning of
S.497(2). Challan had already been sent in the court for trial. No useful purpose would be served
by keeping accused in jail as they were no more required to the police for the purpose of
investigation. BAIL GRANTED

PLD 2003Karachi 127.Hussain Bux V/S The State (DB)

S.149/309/310302 PPC. Constructive liability, compounding of. Offence U/S 149 PPC is by way
of constructive liability and when the main offence is allowed to be compounded and the persons
who have taken specific part in the commission of offence are allowed to compound then the
persons who are convicted on account of being merely members of the unlawful assembly are
also entitled to the concession of compromise/compounding/waiver, otherwise it would not be in
consonance with the principles of justice, in accordance with Injunctions of Islam as laid down in
Holy Quran and Sunnah. ACQUITTAL

PLD 2003 SC 389.Saeed Ahmad V/S The State (FB)


S.302/365-A PPC. Legal representatives of the deceased child viz. his father and mother had
compounded and compromised with the accused waiving their right of Qisas and Diyat and
pardoning him in the name of Almighty Allah. Compromise being genuine and voluntary,
permission to compound the offence U/S 302 PPC was accorded and the accused was acquitted
of the charge U/S 302 PPC. Offence U/S 365-A PPC being not compoundable could not be
allowed to be compounded and the case against accused thereunder had to be decided on merits.
Evidence with regard to the kidnapping of the deceased child for the purpose of extorting ransom
money by the accused was of unimpeachable character. Threatening letters sent by the accused
to the father of the kidnapped child had been proved to be in his handwriting. Accused had
arrived at the suggested place and picked up the ransom money where he was caught and
received fire-arm injury at the hands of police party. Dead body of the kidnapped child was
recovered at the information of the accused from the place which nobody else could have known.
Minor boy aged 10/11 years had been murdered by the accused for ransom. Kidnapping for
ransom was rampant in society. No mitigating circumstance for reduction in sentence was
available on record. Conviction and sentence of death of accused U/S 365-A were upheld in
circumstances. CONVICTION UPHELD.

PLD 2005 Lahore 328. Malik Jahangir Ahmad V/S Judge Special Court No.1

S.302(b)/324/398 PPC. S.345 CrPC. Compounding offences. Scheme and scope - Test for
determining the class of offences concerning individuals only as distinguished from those which
have reference to the interests of the State, has been laid down by the legislature in S.345 CrPC.
Courts of law cannot go beyond the said test and substitute their own test for the same.
Compounding a non-compoundable offence is against public police keeping in view the state of
facts existing on the date of application to compound. Unless the provisions of S.345 CrPC are
satisfied as to all matters mentioned therein, no offences shall be compounded. (2) Ac been
found guilty U/S 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 by the trial court for creating terror, sense of
fear and insecurity in the public at large by causing death of the deceased and injuries to the
prosecution witnesses. Said judgment had been concurrently upheld up to Supreme Court.
Contention that since main offence U/S 302 PPC was compoundable, offence U/S 7 of the 1997
Act, would also be considered to have become compoundable, had no force because the latter
offence was more grave and severe being against society as compared to the offence against the
person of deceased. Section 345 CrPC contemplated the compoundable offences and offence U/S
7 of the 1997 Act, was not included therein. Subsection (7) of section 345 CrPC had created a
specific bar for compounding of offences not mentioned therein. Impugned order passed by the
Anti-Terrorism Court dismissing the application of accused for permission to compound the
offences being neither illegal nor arbitrary, could not be interfered with in constitutional
jurisdiction of High Court. PETITION DISMISSED.

2007 SCMR 610. Hikmatullah & 2 Others V/S The State (SC. Shariat Appellate Bench)

S.302(b)/309/311/338-E/392/394 PPC. S.345 CrPC. Complete citation under heading No.8


below)

NLR 1998 SD 682. Ghulam Rasool & Muhammad Riaz V/S The State (FSC).
S.354 PPC. Convict for offence U/S 354 PPC cannot claim acquittal on basis of compromise
outside court with victim as offence U/S 354 is not compoundable. Sentence of two years’ R.I.,
awarded by trial court, however, reduced by FSC to sentence already undergone in view of
compromise.

2004 SCMR 1170, Muhammad Rawab V/S The State (SC.FB)

S.365-A/109 PPC. Compounding offences. Legislature has laid down in S.345 CrPC the test for
determining the classes of offences which concern individuals only as distinguished from those
which have reference to the interests of the State and Courts of law cannot go beyond that test
and substitute one of their own instead. Against public policy to compound a non-compoundable
offence, keeping in view the facts existing on the date of application. No offence shall be
compounded except where the provisions of S.345 CrPC are satisfied concerning all matters
mentioned therein. (2) Section 365-A PPC R/W S.7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was not
compoundable. Provisions of S.345 CrPC could not be stretched too far by including the non-
compoundable offence therein under the garb of humanitarian grounds or any other extraneous
consideration. Offences committed by the accused were not of grave and alarming nature, but the
same were against the society as a whole and could not be permitted to compound by any
individual or any score whatsoever. Tabulation of the offences made U/S 345 being
unambiguous, would be a complete and comprehensive guide for compounding the offences.
APPEAL DISMISSED.

PLD 2006 SC 53.Ghulam Farid @ Farida V/S The State (FB)

S.396/412/309/310/338-E/338-F PPC. S.345(2) CrPC. Compromise as a mitigating circumstance


- Scope - Courts at all levels, without any legal impediment, while deciding the criminal cases on
merits in the regular proceedings, can consider the compromise of an offender with the victim or
his legal heirs as a mitigating circumstance for the purpose of awarding sentence in a non-
compoundable offence, but after final disposal of a criminal matter courts cannot assume
jurisdiction to re-open the case on merits in collateral proceedings arising out of miscellaneous
application. (2) Question was as to whether the court on the basis of the compromise of the
accused with the legal heirs of the deceased could compound the offence U/S 396 PPC which
was non-compoundable in statutory law in the light of concept of forgiveness in Islam............
Offence of murder punishable with death U/S 302(a) PPC as Qisas and law, but the murder
committed during the course of committing dacoity punishable with death U/S 396 PPC was not
compoundable. Ayat Nos.178 and 179 of Surah Baqra of the Holy Quran also revealed that there
was no conflict of the statutory law with the law of Islam regarding forgiveness, as the offence
U/S 302 and offence U/S 396 PPC were entirely different and distinct offences. Offence of
dacoity was not compoundable either under Islamic law or under the statutory law of the
country...............Court, thus could not competently give effect to a compromise in a non-
compoundable offence against the policy of law. Notwithstanding the pardon given by the legal
heirs of the deceased to the accused who had been awarded death sentence U/S 396 PPC, he
could not avail the benefit of S.309 and 310 PPC read with S.338-E PPC as the same could not
be made applicable to give effect to a compromise in a non-compoundable offence under the
law. Court in the matter of interpretation and application of the provisions of Chap. XVI PPC in
respect of the offences mentioned therein or the matters ancillary or akin thereto could seek
guidance from the Holy Quran and Sunnah as provided in S.338-F PPC but it could not bring a
non-compoundable offence within the purview of S.345 CrPC by virtue of S.338-F PPC.........
Compromise between the parties could not be treated a mitigating circumstance for the purpose
of lesser punishment. LEAVE TO APPEAL REFUSED.

2007 PCrLJ 185.Nazir Ahmad V/S The State (Lahore)

S.396 & 460 PPC. Legal heirs of deceased though had compromised with accused but offences
under S.396 & 460 PPC against accused were non-compoundable offences as provided in
Schedule II of CrPC. Accused had already served out 2.1/2 years of his sentences. Legal heirs of
deceased having forgiven the accused in the name of Almighty Allah, case was fit for reduction
of sentences of accused. SENTENCE REDUCED TO ALREADY UNDERGONE.

2007 MLD 1269. The State V/S Irfanullah Qazi (Karachi)

S.452 PPC. S.345 & 439 CrPC.Offence under the FIR had since been compounded and the
matter had been disposed of by the trial court. Considering that offence under S.452 PPC was not
compoundable, show cause notice was issued to complainant and to accused as to why order to
the extent of allowing compounding of the offence U/S 452 PPC should not be recalled. Parties
being neighbours, were living harmoniously and behaving properly, good sense prevailed and
they had patched up their differences and decided to live in peace and harmony. When heinous
crime like murder were allowed to be compounded, present crime U/S 452 PPC i.e. trespass to
cause hurt and assault, was rendered secondary. If court would remand the matter for decision on
merits, there was no likelihood to record conviction or otherwise. Acceptance of compromise
was in the larger interest of two neighbours for the benefit of congenial neighbour-hood
environment. NOTICE DISCHARGED.

NLR 1995 SD 518. Mst. Kaneez Fatima etc. V/S SHO etc. (Lahore).

S.10/11 Zina Ord. FIR registered on statement of brother of female accused. Nikahnama
produced to prove marriage between female and male accused. Male accused offering to seek
forgiveness from complainant. FIR QUASHED

2007 PCrLJ 1433. Muhammad Akram V/S Presiding Official Spl. Court (Lahore DB)

S.10(4) Zina Ord. 1979. Execution of death sentence. Stay of execution. Petitioner was sentenced
to death, appeal filed by petitioner against his conviction and sentence was dismissed by the
High Court and then Supreme Court and murder reference was replied in affirmative whereby
death sentence awarded to petitioner was confirmed. Petitioner had exhausted all remedies
available to him the under law. Offence U/S 10(4) of Offence of Zina Ordinance, 1979, being not
compoundable, question of granting leave to compound offence, especially in those collateral
proceedings, would not arise. Affidavit of the legal heirs of victim who had died natural death
had shown that two days prior to her death she had stated before deponents that she had falsely
implicated the petitioner. Said improvement which at later stage was being urged for stay of
execution of death warrant, was never brought to the notice of Supreme Court either by
petitioner or by legal heirs of the victim and they kept mum. No reason had been given for such a
long delay spreading over one year. During all that one year, petitioner never approached
Supreme Court and filed constitutional petition, a day prior to that of execution of death warrant.
Petitioner and legal heirs of deceased, could not establish their bona fides in seeking relief in
constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. PETITION DISMISSED.

2005 SCMR 1162.Shahzad @ Shado & 3 Others V/S Judge Anti-Terrorism Court (SC.FB)

S.380/411/506 PPC. S.10(4) Zina Ord. Compounding of offence. Contention of the convicts was
that the victim as well as complainant had forgiven them in the name of Allah and had entered
compromise with them and had compounded the offence as such they may be acquitted. Validity.
All the offences under which the petitioners were convicted were non-compoundable offences.
Only offences affecting human body mentioned in Chapter XVI PPC were made compoundable
by substituting S.299 to 338-H PPC vide Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1990
and legal heirs of deceased and victim had been allowed to compound the offence with the
permission of the concerned court. Supreme Court dismissed petition finding no justification to
interfere in the order of High Court. PETITION DISMISSED

1998 MLD 1704. Muhammad Zaman @ Yaqoob & Others (Lahore DB).

S.302/307/148/149 PPC. Compromise reached between the parties was voluntary and nothing
existed on record to warrant punishment of the accused by way of Tazeer. Accused were,
consequently, acquitted of the charges U/S 302/149, 307/149 PPC. Offence U/S 148 PPC not
compoundable, conviction and sentence of accused thereunder were maintained with benefit of
S.382-B CrPC.

2002 SCMR 1885.

S.326, 452, 148 & 338-E PPC. Reduction in sentence. Compounding of offence. Accused was
convicted U/S 326/452/148 PPC. Complainant/injured person compounded the offence U/S 326
PPC. Offences U/S 452/148 PPC were non-compoundable offences. Effect. Findings sof the
courts below regarding conviction U/S 452/148 PPC were based upon correct, elaborated and
careful examination of the record and the same did not suffer from any illegality on account of
misreading and non-reading of any material piece of evidence. Where the complainant had
compounded the offence U/S 326 PPC the case was fit for reduction of sentence of the accused
U/S 452/148 PPC. Supreme Court converted the petition for leave to appeal into appeal, sentence
and conviction awarded U/S 326 PPC were set aside while that u/s 452/148 PPC were reduced to
periods already undergone. APPEAL ALLOWED

2003 PCrLJ 531, Khan Said and three others (DB) V/S The State (Federal Shariat Court).

Ss. 10(3) & 11 Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.149 Crimnal procedure Code (V of 1898), S.345
Compromise victim girl as well as her father (complainant) had forgiven the accused and
compromise the matter and prayed for reduction in the sentences awarded to accused by Trial
Court Federal Shariat Court keeping in view the submissions made by the counsel for the parties,
facts of the case and better future relation of both sides maintained the convictions of accused,
but substantially reduced their sentences from 15 years R.I.to 4 years’ R.I. and from
imprisonment for life to that of already undergone with reduction in fine sentences of stripes
inflicted on the accused were, however, set aside in view of the abolition of punishment of
whipping Act, 1996 Appeals were disposed of accordingly.

NLR 2004 SD 1195. Mustafa V/S The State (FSC)

S.10(3) & 18 Zina Ord. Offences U/S 10(3) & 18 are not compoundable and compromise
between parties would not warrant acquittal of accused. Such compromise taken into
consideration by FSC and sentence of five years’ RI awarded to convict reduced to two years’ RI
in view of compromise between the parties. SENTENCE REDUCED.

2006 MLD 1288. Hafiz Muhammad Aslam V/S The State (Lahore)

S.377 PPC S.345 CrPC. Compromise effected between parties could be considered for the
purpose of sentence, when offence was not compoundable. While maintaining conviction of
accused for offence U/S 377 PPC , his sentence was reduced to two years' R.I. and sentence of
fine was also reduced to Rs:1000/- SENTENCE REDUCED.

2006 PCrLJ 1169. The Registrar V/S Imran Haider (Karachi)

S.367, 368, 336 & 337-A(I) PPC. Compounding of offence. Consideration of goodwill. Scope.
Accused who were charged for offences U/S 336/337-A(I)/367/368 PPC were acquitted by
Additional Sessions Judge, however, while noticing that offence U/S 367 & 368 PPC were not
compoundable, proceeded to hold that for promoting goodwill between the parties, he had
allowed them to compromise. Validity. Consideration of goodwill and amity would always be
there whenever a matter was not per se compoundable between the parties and Court’s
intervention was necessary. Where even the court was not authorized to allow composition of
offences, no consideration of goodwill could outweigh the plain requirements of law. Reference
was accepted by High Court and case was referred to the trial court which would issue
appropriate warrants to respondents for their appearance and proceed to decide case U/S 367 &
368 PPC in accordance with law.

PLD 2006 SC 53. Ghulam Farid @ Farida V/S The State (FB)

S.338-F. Court in the matter of interpretation and application of provisions of Chapter XVI PPC
in respect of the offences mentioned therein or the matters ancillary or akin thereto, can seek
guidance from the Holy Quran and Sunnah as provided in S.338-F PPC but it cannot bring a non-
compoundable offence within the purview of S.345 CrPC by virtue of S.338-F PPC for the
purpose of compounding it on the basis of compromise.

PLD 2007 SC 447. Muhammad Akhtar @ Hussain V/S The State

S.345 CrPC. Compounding of offences--- Scheme and scope—Tabulation of offences as made


U/S 345 CrPC being unambiguous removes all doubts, uncertainty and must be taken as a
complete and comprehensive guide for compounding of offences. Legislature has laid down in
S.345 the test for determining the classes of offences which concern individuals only as
distinguished from those which have reference to the interest of the State and Courts of law
cannot go beyond that test and substitute for it one of their own. Against public policy to
compound a non-compoundable offence, keeping in view the state of facts existing on the date of
application to compound. No offences shall be compounded except where the provisions of
S.345 CrPC are satisfied as to all matters mentioned in the section. (2) S.302/34 PPC.
Compromise as a mitigating circumstance. Guidelines stated--- Courts, no doubt, at all levels
without any legal impediment, while deciding criminal cases on merits in the regular
proceedings, can consider the compromise of an offender with the victim or his legal heirs as a
mitigating circumstance for the purpose of question of sentence in a non-compoundable offence,
but after final disposal of a criminal matter courts cannot assume jurisdiction to re-open the case
on merits in collateral proceedings arising out of miscellaneous application.

PLD 2007 SC 447. Muhammad Akhtar @ Hussain V/S The State

S.302/34 PPC. S.7 Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. Compounding a non-compoundable offence on the
basis of compromise--- Trial court while allowing the compromise to the extent of charge U/S
302(b) PPC acquitted the accused from the said charge, whereas his application to the extent of
conviction and sentence on the charge U/S 7 of the 1997 Act was dismissed. Plea of accused that
his conviction and sentence U/S 7 was the outcome of the main charge U/S 302(b) PPC from
which he had already been acquitted, he was also entitled to be acquitted from the charge U/S 7
of the 1997 Act, was not accepted by High Court and his constitutional petition was dismissed
vide impugned order--- Validity--- Whatever be the nature and status of an offence but for the
purpose of the compromise it would be seen as to whether the offence of the section of law for
which the compromise was requested was compoundable under the law or not. Compoundable
offences had been mentioned in S.345(1) CrPC. Offence U/S 7 of the 1997 Act, which was
punishable with death, was not mentioned in S.345(1) CrPC in the category of compoundable
offences. Both the courts below, therefore, had rightly disallowed the compromise. Question of
reduction of sentence of accused in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties was
also considered. Present matter before Supreme Court was not in the regular proceedings.
Convictions and sentences of accused U/S 302/34 PPC and S.7 of the 1997 Act, had already been
kept intact up to the level of Supreme Court. When once the findings had been given on merits
by Supreme Court, then it would not be appropriate to enter the merits of the case again to
consider the reduction of sentence in an offence which was not compoundable. Findings of the
Courts below by not granting permission to compound the offence U/S 7 of the 1997 Act, were
in accordance with law particularly in view of the bar as contained in subsection (7) OF section
345 CrPC. Impugned order having no illegality did not deserve any interference. LEAVE TO
APPEAL REFUSED.

NLR 2007 CrLJ 417. Rashid Ahmed V/S The State (SC. Shariat Appellate Bench)

S.302/309 PPC. Compromise application in a case of simpliciter murder coupled with


kidnapping of abductee, which being an offence against society is not compoundable, dismissed
by Supreme Court. COMPROMISE APPLICATION DISMISSED.

NLR 2007 SD 461.Hikmatullah etc V/S The State (SC. Shariat Appellate Bench)
S.302(b)/392/394 PPC. Murder during robbery would be compoundable under S.302(b) as such
murder is independent offence independently punishable under S.302(b). Principle of fasad-fil-
arz would be attracted when convicts are most likely to be potential danger in the community. In
such case, Supreme Court accepting compromise, setting aside death sentence of convict and
convicting him with life imprisonment under S.311 PPC. (2) S.392/394 PPC. Offences of
robbery and dacoity which are not compoundable cannot be compounded for reason that murder
which was committed during robbery and dacoity is compoundable under S.302(b). Compromise
for murder under S.302(b) would be no ground for setting aside conviction/sentence recorded by
trial court and affirmed by Federal Shariat Court under S.392/394 which are non-compoundable
offences. In such case, Supreme Court accepting compromise under S.302(b) but rejecting it with
regard to conviction/sentence under S.392/394. COMPROMISE ACCEPTED/REJECTED.

2008 MLD 886. Mukhtar Ali & 2 Others V/S The State (Karachi)

S.302(a)/364-A/109 PPC. During pendency of appeal filed by accued against their conviction
and sentence, a compromise was arrived at between the parties. Accused was convicted and
sentenced under S.302/364-A & 109 PPC out of which S.364-A PPC was not compoundable.
State Counsel had stated that accused persons had served more than 10 years in jail and if the
sentence in a non-compoundable offence under S.364-A was reduced to one already undergone,
he would have no objection. Compromise arrived at between the parties in the case under
S.302(a) was accepted and sentence and conviction awarded thereunder was set aside, while their
conviction under S.364-A was upheld, but their sentence was reduced to the one already
undergone on each count. Fine of Rs:50,000 was also reduced to Rs:5000. SENTENCE
REDUCED.

PLD 2008 Karachi 420. Ashique Solangi & another V/S The State

S.345 CrPC. S.452/337-H(2)/506(2)/148 PPC. Compromise in case where some offences are
compoundable and some are not compoundable---Principle---Where parties have compromised
and the main offence is compoundable, then the small offences should be treated as
compromised, though under the statute those are not compoundable. REVISION ALLOWED.

PLD 2008 Lahore 450. Imdad Hussain V/S The State

S.345(2) CrPC. S.302/449 PPC. Offence of Qatl-e-Amd and house trespass. Compounding of
offence of Qatl-e-Amd---Effect---Held, in given circumstances, the principle of merger would be
applicable which was to the effect that in case of a compromise between the parties in a criminal
case, the minor offence even if not compoundable merges into the compoundable major offence.
Result would be that after acquittal of accused of the major offence of Qatl-e-Amd in terms of
compromise the minor offence of house trespass would be deemed to have been compounded
under the principle of merger. PETITION ACCEPTED.

5: Effect of Partial Compromise:

1994 PCrLJ 1413. Murtab Ali V/S The State (Lahore DB).
S.302/309/310/311 PPC. Some heirs had waived their right of Qisas or had compromised with
accused while remaining heirs had not joined compromise which situation is covered U/S 311
PPC. Conviction/Sentence U/S 302 and direction of payment of compensation consequently set
aside and accused was punished U/S 311 PPC for 10 years.

1997 SCMR 1307. Sh. Muhammad Aslam & another V/S Shoukat Ali @ Shauka etc. (FB).

S.302/309 PPC. If the mother of the deceased has not joined the compromise and High Court has
altered the death sentence into imprisonment for life which could be awarded as Tazir and not as
Qisas, S.309(2) PPC cannot be pressed into service. Application for compromise, in such
circumstances, will be rejected.

2003 PCrLJ 760 , Imran Shah (jj) V/S The State (Lahore).

S.302 (b) Criminal procedure Code (V of 1898), S.345 Partial compounding of offence effect
father and mother of the deceased had not compromised with the accused widow son and
daughter of the deceased ,however, had forgiven the accused, in the name of Almighty Allah
after having waived their right of Qisas, which was a mitigating circumstances in favour of
accused sentence of death of accused was reduced to imprisonment for life in circumstances.

PLD 2003 SC 512. Muhammad Saleem V/S The State (FB)

S.309(2) & S.302(2) PPC. S.345(2) CrPC. Death sentence awarded for murder as Tazir can be
compounded by all the legal heirs of the deceased with the permission of the court concerned.
Where in a case only one of the legal heirs of the deceased had compromised with the accused
and the rest of the heirs had been opposing the compromise, punishment awarded U/S 302(b)
could neither be compounded in absence of other legal heirs nor provisions of S.309(2) PPC
could be pressed into service in such case. PETITION .DISMISSED.

2003 SCMR 416.Hamid V/S The State (SC.FB)

S.302(b) PPC. Contention for reduction of sentence on the ground that the husband of the
deceased had compounded the offence with the accused though other legal heirs had not joined
the compromise, was least impressive as the conviction of the accused was recorded under Tazir
in terms of S.302(b) PPC and not for Qatl-i-Amd liable to Qisas within the contemplation of
S.302(a) PPC. and the witnesses examined at the trial were not subjected to Tazakiya-al-
Shahood, secondly, the benefit of acquittal of co-accused could not be extended to the accused as
leave to appeal was not granted to reapprise the merits of the evidence. Acquittal of co-accused
for valid reasons did not furnish a ground for mitigation of sentence of accused being entirely a
different issue. Accused having been found solely responsible for the callous murder of the
deceased, he was not entitled to any leniency in the matter of sentence. APPEAL DISMISSED.

2003 SCMR 561.Amir & another V/S The State (SC.FB)

S.302/309/311 PPC. Father and one daughter of the deceased had entered into a compromise
with the accused whereas his second daughter had opposed the same. Compromise, therefore,
was accepted only to the extent of father and one daughter of the deceased. Since other daughter
of the deceased had not accepted the compromise the accused were convicted U/S 311 PPC and
sentenced to undergo 12 years" R.I. with the direction to pay Diyat of Rs:1,12,156/- to the said
second daughter of the deceased. Benefit of S.382-B was extended to the accused. PETITION
DISPOSED OFF.

2003 SCMR 1067.Riaz Ahmad V/S The State (SC.FB)

S.302/309/310 PPC. Partial compromise. Effect. Accused had been awarded sentence of death as
Tazir U/S 302(b) PPC and not as Qasis U/S 302(a) PPC and as such legal heirs of the deceased
could not waive or accept "Badle Sulh" but could compound the offence with permission of the
Court. Accused had been convicted under Tazir and his conviction had been upheld by the
Appellate Court which was under challenge. Some of the legal heirs of the deceased only had
compromised with the accused. No composition for the offence could be allowed unless all the
legal heirs of the deceased would enter into compromise with the accused. Mother and daughter
of the deceased having not compounded the matter with the accused, permission to compound
the offence was declined. COMPROMISE NOT ALLOWED.

PLD 2003 SC 635. Niaz Ahmad V/S The State (FB)

s.302 ppc.Reduction in sentence. Contention of the accused was that husband of the deceased
lady being one of the legal heirs had entered into compromise with the accused and that such
factum bee considered as a mitigating circumstance. Validity. Held, such concession was
applicable onbly in a case where the sentence was awarded as Qisas and not in case where the
death sentence was awarded as Tazir. Contention of the accused was overruled by the Supreme
Court. PETITION DISMISSED.

NLR 2004 CrLJ 34. Amir & another V/S The State (SC.FB).

S.309/311 PPC. Compromise would be accepted only to the extent of father and one daughter
who entered into compromise. It would not be accepted to extent of second daughter who has not
entered into compromise. In such case, Supreme court exercising power U/S 311 and substituting
conviction/death sentence recorded U/S 302 with coniviction of 12 years’ R.I. plus payment of
amount of diyat.

2004 SCMR 236. Bashir Ahmed V/S The State & another (SC.FB)

S.302(b)/309/310 PPC. Partial compromise. Accused had been awarded death sentence U/S
302(b) PPC as Tazir, therefore, he could not be extended the benefit of the provisions of S.309 &
310 PPC even for the purpose of lesser sentence on the ground that one of the Walis of the
deceased had forgiven him. Favour extended to the accused of forgiveness by his daughter, one
of the Walis of the deceased, could not save him from death penalty. LEAVE TO APPEAL TO
ACCUSED REFUSED

2005 MLD 1224. Mst. Bashiran Bibi V/S Province of Punjab & Others (Lahore DB)
S.302(b) PPC. Partial compromise. Accused had been sentenced to death as Tazir. Only one
legal heir of the deceased had entered into compromise with the accused whose affidavit had
been placed on record. Ten other legal heirs of the deceased had not compounded the offence.
Partial compromise could not advance the case of accused and help him in any manner.
CONSTITUTION PETITION DISMISSED.

PLD 2005 Peshawar 62. Mst. Khanum Jee V/S The State (DB)

S.302/309/311/324/34 PPC. All legal heirs of four deceased, except mother of one of deceased,
entered into compromise with accused during the trial. Co-accused were acquitted in view of
said compromise and accused was convicted U/S 311 PPC and was sentenced as Tazir with a
direction to pay share of Diyat amount to legal heir of deceased who did not agree to the
compromise. All major legal heirs of four deceased except one had waived their rights of Qisas
and had forgiven the accused in the name of Allah. Shares of minors of deceased in their Diyat
hd been deposited in the Court. Out of five legal heirs, only mother of one of deceased was
contesting the case and had challenged the propriety of punishment of accused. Validity. Held,
punishment awarded by trial court to accused, was quite in accordance with law and in the best
interest of parties, needed no further enhancement. (2) Partial compromise - Effect - Where
punishments were awarded as Tazir, partial compromises between some of legal heirs of
deceased did not enter into compromise) were not allowed to absolve accused of their liabilities.
Partial compromise in appropriate cases, however, was allowed to be a mitigating circumstance
for awarding lesser punishment, but quantum/propriety of punishment would not come up for
consideration. APPEAL REJECTED.

PLD 2005 Lahore 174.Rukhsana Bibi V/S The State

S.302(b) & 309(2) PPC. Compromise between accused and legal heirs of deceased. Accused,
who was convicted and sentenced, had filed appeal against conviction and sentence. Accused,
during pendency of appeal, moved an application U/S 345(5-A) CrPC seeking her acquittal on
the basis of compromise arrived at between her and legal heirs of deceased. Authenticity of legal
heirs of deceased had been duly verified and the legal heirs had stated in unequivocal term that
compromise was without any coercion or under influence and that they had extended forgiveness
to accused...... One of the legal heirs of deceased was stated to be missing for the last 10/11 years
and his whereabouts were not known, it would be presumed that said missing legal heir of
deceased was not alive. COMPROMISE ACCEPTED.

2006 PCrLJ 1483. Muhammad Ameer & another V/S The State (Lahore DB)

S.302(b) PPC. Moreover, partial compromise had been effected by parents of deceased, who
were major legal heirs of deceased. Such could be a mitigiating circumstance for awarding lesser
sentence. Death sentence awarded to co-accused, by the trial court, was not warranted and same
was converted to imprisonment for life in peculiar facts and circumstances of case. DEATH
SENTENCE ALTERED.

2006 PCrLJ 1541. Shahbaz V/S The State (Lahore)


S.302/308/311 PPC. Accused had admitted to have caused injuries to deceased while making
statement U/S 342 CrPC but in a different manner. Trial court through impugned judgment
concluded that prosecution had succeeded in proving case against accused beyond any shadow of
doubt and also rejected defence plea but had convicted and sentenced accused U/S 308/311 PPC
only on ground that one of the heirs of deceased had forgiven accused in the name of Allah and
waived right of Qisas. Case was not that of Qisas falling U/S 302(a) PPC as the eye-witnesses
had not undergone the test of Tazakiya-ul-Shahood before recording of their evidence but it was
a case falling under tazir. In cases of Tazir partial compromise effected with only some of the
legal heirs, could not be used and was not sufficient to hold that offence had been compromised
but compromise could be effected by all legal heirs of deceased . Impugned conviction and
sentence recorded by trial court against accused U/S 305 & 311 PPC was set aside to the extent
of accused and case was remanded to trial court for re-writing of judgment on merits without
being influenced by any finding of High Court after afording opportunity of hearing to counsel
for parties. CASE REMANDED BACK.

2007 PCrLJ 1278. Babar Zaman & another V/S The State (Lahore)

S.311 PPC. Tazir after waiver or compounding of right of Qisas in Qatl-i-Amid-- Partial
compromise-- Effect-- No conviction under section 311, PPC can be awarded in a case of Tazir
on the ground of partial compromise. CONVICTION MAINTAINED.

2007 PCrLJ 852. Musa Khan V/S The State & 2 Others (Peshawar DB)

S.302(b)/304/308/311 PPC. Accused had killed his real mother in a very cruel manner and for a
land dispute. Deceased had sustained six fire-arm entry wounds, but all legal heirs of deceased
had compounded the offence and had compromised with accused, except another son of
deceased. Conviction having been recorded U/S 302(b) PPC as Tazir and all legal heirs having
not compounded the offence, and there being no evidence of Qisas as required U/S 304 PPC
accused could not be extended benefit U/S 308 & 311 PPC. APPEAL PARTLY ALLOWED.

2007 PCrLJ 852. Musa Khan V/S The State & 2 Others (Peshawar DB)

S.302(b)/304/308/311 PPC. Accused had killed his real mother in a very cruel manner and for a
land dispute. Deceased had sustained six fire-arm entry wounds, but all legal heirs of deceased
had compounded the offence and had compromised with accused, except another son of
deceased. Conviction having been recorded U/S 302(b) PPC as Tazir and all legal heirs having
not compounded the offence, and there being no evidence of Qisas as required U/S 304 PPC
accused could not be extended benefit U/S 308 & 311 PPC. APPEAL PARTLY ALLOWED.

2007 SCMR 1496.Abdul Jabbar V/S The State

S.302(b) (c ), 309 & 338(E) PPC. Partial compromise-- Effect-- Complainant and his wife
contracted marriage against the wishes of the family of his wife. Both accused armed with guns
in a broad daylight; chased the victims who tried to take refuge in a nearby hotel but accused
broke open the door and made repeated fires, as a result complainant was injured and his wife
was murdered. During trial, only the parents of deceased forgave the accused and compounded
the offence, thus trial court convicted the accused and sentenced them to 25 years of
imprisonment. High Court found it to be a case of grave and sudden provocation, therefore,
reduced the sentence to what they had already undergone. Validity... Case was that of partial
compromise. Offence of Tazir U/S 302 PPC could be compounded only by the heirs of victim.
All heirs did not compound the offence but only parents of deceased had done so and not her
husband. Accused having been tried and convicted as Tazir, they could be extended benefit of
compromise only if all legal heirs had compounded the offence. High Court failed to appreciate
that neither S.302(c ) nor S.309 PPC which stipulated Afw by Wali were applicable as those
would have been relevant only if evidence led trial and sentence awarded was for Qatl-i-Amd as
Qisas. Offence of Qatl-i-Amd having been proved against accused as Tazir and all heirs of
victim having not compounded the offence, the accused ought to have been sentenced U/S
302(b) PPC to life imprisonment and not U/S 302(c ) PPC. Deceased and complainant claimed to
be husband and wife pursuant to a registered Nikah Nama, veracity of which was affirmed by
Federal Shariat Court judgment delivered subsequent to the occurrence. Motive alleged, weapons
used, the manner of attack and place of occurrence reflected pre-mediation and planning both.
Provocation was neither sudden nor grave. Ground of grave and sudden provcation taken by
High Court to reduce sentence was not available to warrant award of lesser punishment.
Judgment thus, was not sustainable. Supreme Court set aside the sentence awarded by High
Court and restored that of Trial Court. Appeal allowed.

PLJ 2008 SC 109. Abdul Jabbar V/S The State etc.

S.302(b) PPC. Deceased was legally wedded wife of complainant/appellant. All the heirs of the
deceased were not compounded of the offence--- Validity--- Parents of deceased had forgiven
the respondents/convicts but not her husband. Punishment of qisas could not be awarded and
proceeded to sentence the respondents U/S 302(c) PPC. Respondents were liable to be punished
U/S 302(b) as tazir. Conviction/sentence under tazir can be compounded only if all the heirs
firgive the offender. Conviction converted from S.302(c) to S.302(b) and sentenced the
respondents to life imprisonment. APPEAL ALLOWED.

NLR 2008 CrLJ 543. Muhammad Farooq V/S The State (SC)

S.302/309/310/311 PPC. Mother not waiving her right when father of deceased has entered into
compromise would be entitled to badle-sulh/compensation under S.338E PPC. With this finding,
Supreme Court directing convict to deposit the amount of badl-e-sulh/compensation in the Court.

PLD 2008 Lahore (DB) 418. Muhammad Anwar V/S The State

S.302(b) & 309(2) PPC. Art.124 Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984. S.345 CrPC. All the legal heirs
of deceased, except his missing daughter, had affirmed that they had effected compromise with
the accused with their free consent waiving their right of Qisas and Diyat and had pardoned him
in the name of Allah Almighty without getting any compensation and that they had no objection
if the accused was acquitted of the charge. Regarding non-availability of the aforesaid one
daughter of the deceased who was missing for the last 7/8 years, there was no witness or sign
that she was alive and under Art.124 of Qanoon-e-Shahadat, the burden of proving that she was
alive would be shifted to the person who would affirm that fact, therefore, if the said daughter of
the deceased appeared subsequently and she did not waive her right of Qisas, she would be
entitled to her share of Diyat as provided in proviso to subsection (2) of S.309 PPC. Compromise
was accepted and the accused was acquitted. COMPROMISE ACCEPTED.

6: Who may enter into Compromise:

KLR 1995 CrC 141 Bashir Ahmed V/S The State (Karachi).

S.302 PPC. Application U/S 345(2). The mother of deceased expired and none survived the
deceased except his father. No doubt the sister and two brothers of the deceased could inherit the
property of deceased if none of the parents had been alive. Held: According to Futawas from
different religious institutions in the present case father of the deceased would inherit all the
rights over the properties of the unmarried deceased and the remaining heirs such as sisters or
brothers stood excluded from the possession of anything of the deceased’s property as legal
heirs. REVISION ALLOWED

KLR 1995 CrC 562. Ghulam Abbas etc. V/S The State (Lahore).

S.302/34 PPC. S.410 CrPC. The deceased having left father, brothers and sistes only, the former
would succeed to the whole of the estate. Held: He was the only Muslim legal heir to grant
forgiveness.

PLD 1995 Karachi 5. Bashir Ahmed V/S The State.

S.302 PPC. S.345(2) CrPC. Legal heir entitled to compromise. Father of the deceased only could
inherit all the right over the properties of his unmarried deceased son and the remaining heirs
such as sisters or brothers stood excluded from possessing anything of the deceased’s property as
legal heirs. Father of the deceased, therefore, was the only legal heir to compromise with the
accused on any of the terms permitted by law.

1997 MLD 1329 Ghulam Shabbir V/S The State & 6 Others (Lahore).

S..302/34, 309/310/338-E PPC. Trial court had allowed the application of compromise moved by
the widow of the deceased and her minor son. Said order of trial court had been challenged on
the ground that other legal heirs of the deceased had not been associated in the compromise.
Right to compound having been given to the legal heirs of the deceased under the law,
complainant, though a brother of the deceased was not his legal heir as the deceased had left
behind his children and he was excluded from inheritance. Trial court, however, had not
discussed in the impugned order as to how the case of the minor heir was to be dealth with and
the same was consequently set aside with the direction to trial court to first ascertain about all the
legal heirs of the deceased and then redecide the matter keeping in view the safeguard of the
interest of the minor heirs and the provisions of S.309 & 310 PPC and 339-E and S.345 CrPC.

1997 PCrLJ 247. The State V/S Manzoor Ali (Quetta DB).
S.309 PPC. S.345(2) CrPC. Legal heirs of the deceased/victim are entitled to compromise the
offence or to waive the right of qaisas, but such right can be exercised only when the Wali is
adult as well as sane. (2) Affidavit attested by Oath Commissioner and not by District Magistrate
or MPA of the area as is the prevalent procedure in cases of compromise or waiver has been
accepted. Statement of the lady Wali was not recorded by the trial court. On this basis alone the
judgement is not sustainable in law because sanity of Mst. Murad Bibi the sole legal heir
competent to compound or waive the right of qaisas has been challanged. (3) Person committing
homicide is excluded from inherting the property of the victim.

2006 SCMR 1916. Saraj & Others V/S Mushtaq Ahmad & Others (SC.DB)

S.302/310 PPC. Compounding of offence. Legal heirs. Deceased was unmarried, who left behind
father, brothers, sisters and a step-mother. Father of deceased entered into compromise and
compounded the offence, resultantly trial court acquitted the accused. Brothers, sisters and step-
mother of the deceased objected to the compounding of offence on the ground that they were
also included in the list of legal heirs, therefore, offence could not have been compounded
without their consent. High Court remanded the matter to trial court for determination of the
legal heirs of the deceased. Validity. Undisputedly step-mother was not an heir of the deceased.
Brothers and sisters of the deceased were also not the legal heirs of the deceased, there was no
difference of opinion in the Sunni and Shia school of thought as far as exclusion of brothers and
sisters of the deceased by the father was concerned. Judgment of High Court was, therefore,
based on mistaken assumption as to the correct legal position and was not sustainable. Supreme
Court converted petition for leave to appeal into appeal and set aside the judgment passed by the
High Court. APPEAL ALLOWED.

Abdul Khaliq & another V/S Muhammad Shafique & Others

S.197, 345, 402-B & 402-C CrPC. (as added by Pakistan Criminal Law (Fourth Amendment)
Ordinance of 1991). Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act (XL of 1958), S.6(5). S.299 to 338-
H (as substituted by Pakitan Criminal Law (Second Amendment Ordinance - VII of 1990), PPC-
-- Constitution of Pakistan Art.203-D. --- Provisions of S.197 CrPC and S.6(5) of Pakistan
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958 being repugnant to injunctions of Islam shall cease to have
effect after 31st March 2005. Such provisions did not have any nexus with provision of S.402-C
CrPC. Composition, suspension, remittance and commutation of sentences passed under S.299 to
338-H PPC could not be done without consent of victim or his heirs ------ Principles----------.
REVIEW DISMISSED.

PLD 2007 SC 607.Ayaz Baig V/S The State

S.302(b) & 338-E PPC. Deceased at the time of offence was survived by father, mother and
widow but subsequently both the parents had died and widow contracted second marriage.
Accused filed compromise effected by the widow but trial court and High Court declined to
accept the same----Validity-----At the time of death, deceased being issueless and father being
alive, his seven brothers and a sister could not be the legal heirs. At a belated stage, brother and
sister could not be ignored when question had come to genuineness of compromise and when
they all were most likely to nurse grudge against accused. Brothers and sister had not agreed to
compromise which agreement was necessary for future harmony between the families.
Genuineness had to be sine qua non of a compromise which might or might not be accepted by
court in cases of punishment as Tazir. Trial Court as well as High Court had rightly

[9/30, 6:32 PM] +92 300 2604949: Very important case laws

Contradiction by medical evidence of ocular account of murder occurrence would create serious
dents on Prosecution case going to it's roots . NLR _ 2016 _ crc _ Lah _ 567

Ocular evidence of murder occurrence which is corroborated by medical evidence would be


reliable evidence in support of Prosecution case u/s . 302 (b ) PPC . NLR _ 2016 _ crc _ 489

When a definite motive is alleged and the same is not proved , the Prosecution has to suffer .
NLR _ 2016 _ crc _ Lah _ 74

S. 302 . Toka recovered after nineteen days of occurrence , shetters the possibility of Prosecution
version being true . NLR _ 2016 _ crc _ Lah _ 74

Case of free fight during murder occurrence would entail individual liability of each accused .
NLR _ 2016 _ crc _ Bwp _ 278

Ss. 309 & 310 . Waiver and compounding provided in Ss. 309 & 310 are only relevant at trial
stage before trial court and not at any stage before the case reaches the trial court . NLR _ 2016 _
crc _ Sc _ 404

S. 377 . Accused would be illegally convicted of offence of sodomy u/s 377 when according to
medical opinion , victim of sodomy was habitual catamite . NLR _ 2016 _ crc _ Quetta _ 122

Joint disclosure and joint recovery made by two accused persons would not be admissible in
evidence . NLR _ 2016 _ crc _ Quetta _ 122

Recovery effected on pointation of accused which was wedded with empties recovered from
place of occurrence in terms of positive report of FSL would be reliable evidence . NLR _ 2016
_ crc _ Sc _ 530

Recovery of crime weapon from accused would be of no consequence when report of FSL is
only to the effect that crime weapon was in working order . NLR _ 2016 _ crc _ Lah _ 567
[9/30, 6:45 PM] +92 300 2604949: Addition of word "offence" after word "bail" in S.497,
Cr.P.C.---Effect---Deliberate use of word 'offence' in S.497, Cr.P.C. makes it clear that if
after lodging of F.I.R. at any subsequent stage, any offence is added or court takes
cognizance of another offence then release of accused or his admission to bail does not
exempt such accused from seeking bail in such offence added subsequently.
PLD 2015 SIND 295
[9/30, 9:12 PM] +92 300 2604949: Guardian
Guardian ship---Persons entitled to be the Guardian s of the property of minor---De facto
Guardian has no power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable property of the minor---
Principles.

2003 PLD 849 SC-1501


Guardian

Guardian ship---Sale transaction by father as natural Guardian of minor could be questioned by


the minor on attainment of age of majority on the ground that the transaction had not been made
for her.

2011 SCMR 921 2011 SCMR 1444 2009 SCMR 1062


2008 SCMR 527 2007 PLD 609 SC 2006 SCMR 1667
2005 PLD 443 SC 2004 SCMR 821 2004 SCMR 1502
2003 SCMR 480 2002 SCMR 371 2001 SCMR 1441
2000 SCMR 838 1999 SCMR 1834 1998 SCMR 816
1997 SCMR 425 1996 SCMR 1083 1995 SCMR 1225
1994 SCMR 351 1993 SCMR 2303 1992 SCMR 1199

2012 SCMR 519-1502


Intra Court Appeal

Counsel for the appellant, however under instructions, made request to the Court to delete the
said questions from the pleadings and the Supreme Court acceded to the same---Questions were
deleted from pleadings of Intra Court Appeal accordingly.

2012 SCMR 377-1503


Intra Court Appeal

Petitioner filed constitutional petition which was dismissed on 24-6-2011 and filed Intra Court
Appeal before Division Bench of High Court , which was dismissed on 22-9-2011, being not
maintainable---Petitioner sought exclusion of time spent by him before Division Bench of High
Court ---Validity---Legislature specifically excluded Appeal or application from the purview of
"suit"---Benefit of S.14 of Limitation Act, 1908, could not be extended to exclude time
consumed in prosecuting an Appeal before wrong forum having no jurisdiction, for the purposes
of filing of Appeal before a forum having jurisdiction---Petitioner instead of filing petition for
leave to Appeal before Supreme Court , within time, filed the same on 27-10-2011 and did not
give any plausible explanation for not filing the same within reasonable time after the dismissal
of Intra Court Appeal ---

2012 SCMR 114-1504


[9/30, 10:05 PM] +92 300 2604949: Administration of justice is the prime and paramount
function and legal obligation of the Court. The Court is required to ensure that not only
justice is done between the parties but appears to have been done. It is possible, where
the judge remains cautious and conscious by strictly adhering to legal procedure
prescribed by the High Court rules and Orders, particularly that relates to murder trials.
The High Court rules and orders require that once a murder case starts that continues
‘DE DIE IN DIEM’, until it finishes. Legally no adjournment is granted, except
inevitable and that too for valid, viable and justifiable reasons in the greater interest of
justice. But the record shows that request for adjournment on any pretext or even
without any reasons, were frequently entertained in a casual and mechanical manner.

Jail Criminal Appeal No.19/K of 2018

1. Muhammad 2. Muhammad Ashraf VERSUS The State


[10/1, 9:29 AM] +92 300 2604949: Ss. 203 & 204 CrPC---Orders passed by court under
s.203 & 204, Cr.P.C. nature of---Judicial orders---Orders passed either under S.203,
Cr.P.C. whereby a direct complaint was dismissed or under S.204,Cr.P.C. whereby the
Court had taken cognizance of an offence complained of an issued warrants or summons
for causing the accused to be brought or produced before the Court were judicial orders.
PLD 2016 SC 55
[10/1, 9:30 AM] +92 300 2604949: Ss. 154 & 200---Complainant lodging FIR and a
private complaint containing the same allegations against the same set of accused persons-
--Trial Court in such circumstances should hold a trial in the complaint case first and
the challan case was to be kept dormant awaiting the fate of the trial in the complaint
case---
PLD 2016 SC 70
[10/1, 9:35 AM] +92 300 2604949: 2019 SCMR 1704
Professional privilege for confidential information--No professional doctors Advocate etc would
be forced to share confidential information of the client to anyone.
[10/1, 9:36 AM] +92 300 2604949: 2019 SCMR 1657
Prime Minister can not reopen any case which was already decided by the Supreme Court.
[10/1, 9:37 AM] +92 300 2604949: Administration of justice is the prime and paramount
function and legal obligation of the Court. The Court is required to ensure that not only
justice is done between the parties but appears to have been done. It is possible, where
the judge remains cautious and conscious by strictly adhering to legal procedure
prescribed by the High Court rules and Orders, particularly that relates to murder trials.
The High Court rules and orders require that once a murder case starts that continues
‘DE DIE IN DIEM’, until it finishes. Legally no adjournment is granted, except
inevitable and that too for valid, viable and justifiable reasons in the greater interest of
justice. But the record shows that request for adjournment on any pretext or even
without any reasons, were frequently entertained in a casual and mechanical manner.

Jail Criminal Appeal No.19/K of 2018

1. Muhammad 2. Muhammad Ashraf VERSUS The State


[10/1, 9:37 AM] +92 300 2604949: Addition of word "offence" after word "bail" in S.497,
Cr.P.C.---Effect---Deliberate use of word 'offence' in S.497, Cr.P.C. makes it clear that if
after lodging of F.I.R. at any subsequent stage, any offence is added or court takes
cognizance of another offence then release of accused or his admission to bail does not
exempt such accused from seeking bail in such offence added subsequently.
PLD 2015 SIND 295
[10/1, 9:37 AM] +92 300 2604949: Judgment of Supreme Court of Pakistan about "Law
Colleges and LLB programe"
2019 SCMR 389
[10/1, 10:47 AM] +92 300 2604949: Ss. 203 & 204 CrPC---Orders passed by court under
s.203 & 204, Cr.P.C. nature of---Judicial orders---Orders passed either under S.203,
Cr.P.C. whereby a direct complaint was dismissed or under S.204,Cr.P.C. whereby the
Court had taken cognizance of an offence complained of an issued warrants or summons
for causing the accused to be brought or produced before the Court were judicial orders.
PLD 2016 SC 55
[10/1, 10:53 AM] +92 300 2604949: Even the testimony of an injured witness is to be
subjected to scrutiny, for making it basis of conviction.

Identify the culprits of crime in the light of torch in night time occurrence is always
regarded as weak in nature.

Crl. Appeal-No. 165-16


HABBIR AHMAD VS THE STATE ETC.
Mr. Justice Ch. Abdul Aziz
23-09-2019
2019 LHC 3203
#############
While deciding pre-arrest bail, the Court can have a look upon the merits of casethough
on the yardstick of tentative assessment.
Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019
Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDIJUDICIAL


DEPARTMENT

Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019


Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

Sardar Safir Akram, Advocate with petitioner.

Mr. Muhammad Ahmad Saeed, DPG with M.Arshad S.I.

Qazi Khalil ur Rehman,Advocate for complainant.


Date of hearing. 04.07.2019

This is an application for bail before arrest on behalf of Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner)in case
FIR No.403 dated 23.06.2018,under Sections302, 324, 148, 149PPC registered with Police
StationSaddar Beroni, Rawalpindi.
2.The facts of prosecution case as can be culled from the crime report are to the effect that on
23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m. Azhar ud Din (complainant) was present in his house and
attracted to the street after noticing hue and cry coming therefrom; that he noticed the presence
of Ghzanfar Bhatti, Raja Nazar, Raja Khuram, Ziafat and six unknown persons armed with
different weapons and saw them coming towards his house while using abusive
language; that the complainant raised alarm and asked his cousin, Sehar-ud-Din and Luqman for
returning to their house as a consequence thereof both of them ran for their lives; that Raja
Khurram (co-accused) fired shots from his .12 bore gun hitting Luqman on his back and
right leg; that Ghazanfar Bhatti (co-accused) firedastraight AK-47 shot, which hit Sehar-ud-
Din on his neck; that the perpetrators resorted to indiscriminate firing, which besidescreating
terror and panic in the vicinity also caused injury to Mst. Nadia Israr.

3.Arguments heard. Record perused.

4.It unfolds from the tentative perusal of record that the case in hand stands registered
for an occurrence having taken place on 23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m., within the
jurisdiction of P.S.Saddar Berooni, Rawalpindi. During this occurrence, in pursuance of an
aggression launched by Raja Khurram and his co-accused, one Sehar-ud-Din lost his life
whereas two others, namely, Luqman and Nadia received injuries. It is equally important
to mention here that burden of committing this crime was rested upon the shoulders of
four nominated and six unknown accused persons.

5.In the wake of above facts, it is noticed that Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner) was not
nominated in the crime report. His name surfaced on record through the supplementary
statement of complainant dated 23.06.2018, which was recorded shortly after the registration
ofFIR. After having perused the aforementioned supplementary statement, it is noticed that
the petitioner along with five others, namely, Usman, Sohrab Khan, Touseef, Iqbal and Yaseen
was implicated in the case with the allegation of raising Lalkara and resorting to firing,
which remainedineffective.Though the statements of three other witnesses, namely,
Mastan, Luqman (injured) and Kamal were recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. on the
following day i.e. 24.6.2018, however, the name of petitioner finds no mention therein.
Though, learned counsel for the complainant as well as the learned Law Officer was
confronted with this anomaly but they failed to respond it in any manner. This is not the
only shortcoming noticed by this Court rather it is further observed that though such statement
was made almost immediately after the registration of FIR, however, even then Azhar-ud-Din
(complainant) stated that “till today” he has been looking for the unknown perpetrators and
now have acquired knowledge about their identity. The use of expression “till today” adversely
reflects upon the supplementary statement and reasonably demonstrates that indeed it
was recorded some days after the registration of FIR.

6.The dismissal of this application was vociferously urged by the prosecution on the
ground of limited scope of pre-arrest bail. In this regard, it is observed that no doubt the
criteria laid down for the grant of pre-arrest bail is stringent in nature but not to an extent
whereby a court is precluded to exercise jurisdiction under section 498 Cr.P.C. even in
cases where the innocence or false implication of an accused is patently reflected from the
record. This Court is not oblivious of the fact that though the provision of section 498 was
enacted in Criminal ProcedureCode, 1898 from its very inception, however, the concept of
pre-arrest bail developed through necessary interpretation made by Hon’ble Full Bench of
Lahore Court in case reported as Hidayat ullah Khan v. The Crown(PLD 1949 Lahore 21). From
apeep throughthe judicial archives,it unveils that even prior to the aforementioned Full Bench
decision, the Courts hadbeen granting bail before arrest but such relief was much
dependent upon the discretion of the court,without there being any specific guidelines.If
any reference in this regard is needed that can be made to the cases reported asEmperor
v. Muhammad Fandh AIR (21) 1934 Sind (36 Cr.P.C L J 711)‫۔‬and Johur Mat and others, 10
C W N 1093 (4 Cr.P.C L J 221).
The Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in the case of Hadayat ullah Khan(mentioned supra) while
pondering upon the concept of pre-arrest bail made the law more explicit by laying down
guidelines, which for reference sake are being reproduced hereunder:-

“For the reasons given above, the reply which I would give to the question referred to us is that,
in a proper case, the High Court has power under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code,
to make an order that a person who is suspected of an offence for which he may be arrested by a
police officer or a Court, shall be admitted to bail. The exercise of this power should, however,
be confined to cases in which, not only is good prima facie ground made out for the grant of bail
in respect of the offence alleged, but also, it should be shown that if the petitioner were to be
arrested and refused bail, such an order would, in all probability, be made not from
motives of furthering the ends of justice in relationto the case, but from some ulterior
motive, and with the object of injuring the petitioner, or that the petitioner would in such an
eventuality suffer irreparable harm.”

It reasonably evinces from the observation of Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court, mentioned
above that discretion to grant pre-arrest bail is to be exercised in favour of an accused,if
hisimplication in the case is apparently stirred with malafideand he has a good prima
faciecase for the grant of bail. The proposition of pre-arrest bail was authoritatively adjudged by
this Court in another case reported as Sh. Zahoor Ahmad v. The State(PLD 1974 Lahore
256) with following observation:-

“The main conditions to be satisfied before exercise of jurisdiction to allow pre-arrest bail under
section 498, Cr.P.C. are--

(a)that there should be a genuine proved apprehension of imminent arrest with the effect of
virtual restraint on the petitioner (b)that the petitioner should physically surrender to the Court;
(c)that on account of ulterior motive, particularly on the part of the police, there should
be apprehension of harassment and undue irreparable humiliation by means of unjustified
arrest;
(d)that it should be otherwise a fit case on merits for exercise of discretion in favour of
the petitioner for the purpose of bail.

In this behalf the provisions contained in section 497 Cr.P.C. would have to be kept
inmind;(e)that unless there is reasonable explanation, the petitioner should have earlier
moved the Sessions Court for the same relief under section 498, Cr.P.C.
”In the case reported as Murad Khan v. Fazla-e-Subhan(PLD 1983 SC 82)the Hon’ble
Apex Court cancelled the pre-arrest bail granted to an accused by the High Court on the
ground that his implication apparently was not based on malafide. However, the scope of
pre-arrest bail was widened by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in a subsequent
case reported as Meeran Bux v. The State and another(PLD 1989 SC 347)and
besidesmalafide, the merits of the case were also considered favourably for extending such
relief. For advantage sake,it is being mentioned that in the wake of an accusation of
having participated in homicide occurrence, the accused Meeran Bux was ascribed the
role of inflicting a gunshotinjuryon the left thigh of deceased Badshah Dinoand the pre-arrest
bail granted to accused was cancelled by the High Court, however, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Pakistan restored the bail granting order of learned Sessions Judgewhile observing that the
injury besidesnot being on the vital part of the body was also declared by the doctor to be simple
in nature.

7.From the above discussion, it reasonably insinuates that while deciding pre-arrest
bail, the Court can have a look upon the merits of casethough on the yardstick of tentative
assessment. The application of such rule in the instant case reveals that implication of
petitioner, in the circumstances mentioned above, is not free from doubt. Even otherwise,
the petitioner is ascribed the role of resorting to ineffective firing. Admittedly, as
per accusations, neither petitioner caused any injury tothe victims nor made any attempt
to do so. This aspect, itself is sufficient to lean in favour of petitioner for granting pre-
arrest bail. In arriving at such conclusion, this Court sought guidance from cases reported as
Nazra and 5 others v.The State(1977 PCr. LJ 480), Ashraf and 3 others v. The State(1978 P Cr. L
J 903),Arshad v. The State(1999 P Cr. L J 611)andMuhammad Tariq and another v. The
State(2008 YLR22).The grant of pre-arrest bail to petitioner is further felt inevitable
keeping in view the fact that main accused Khurram was exoneratedby Mastan Khan (father of
Luqman-injured)from all charges at the time of his pre-arrest bail, though he was saddled
with the responsibility of causing multiple firearm injury to Luqman.

8.This Court has also taken note of the fact that Ziafat Mehmood (co-accused) was nominated in
the crime report with the role of making in effective firing, however, was granted post-arrest
bail by this Court vide order dated 04.12.2018 in Crl. Misc. No. 1657-B/2018. Similarly,
Usman Mehboob, who was also arrayed as accused through the supplementary statement
of the complainant with role similar to petitioner, was also held entitled to post-arrest bail by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi vide order dated 16.4.2019. In the given
circumstances, even if the request of petitioner for grant of pre-arrest bail is refused on the
ground of its limited scope, he will become entitled to bail under section 497 Cr.P.C.
immediately after his arrest. In the given circumstances, except causing humiliation and
harassment to petitionerno useful purpose is likely to be served. In somewhat similar
circumstances, the concession of pre-arrest bail was granted in cases reported asMiss
Zubaida Parveen v. State(PLJ 2004 Cr.C.673)and Zahoor Ahmad alias Bhawal Sher and
another v. State(PLJ 2007 Cr.C.83). So far as, implication of the
petitioner in the case on account of malafideand ulterior motive is concerned, it is well evident
from the manner in which supplementary statement of complainant, apparently, was
inserted in the record. In accordance with the peculiar facts of the case, this Court prima
faciehas reasons to believe that petitioner fell preyto the wider net.This Court has also
given a considered thought to the expected recovery of incriminating articles from
petitioner. Suffice it to say in this regard that if the Court arrives at conclusion that person
seeking pre-arrest bail is apparently falsely implicated in the case, his liberty cannot be
curtailed solely on the ground that some recoveries are to be effected from him. It will not be out
of context to refer the observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, expressed in case
reported asAamir Bashir and another v. State and another(PLJ 2018 SC 445), in
somewhat similar circumstances, which is as under:-

“The plea of the Advocate General that the investigating agency has been deprived to
interrogate both the petitioners for the recovery of the crime pistol and to collect further
evidence after getting their custody, is not acceptable in the circumstances of the case.
Moreover, this Court time and again has held that this could not be a ground for refusal of pre-
arrest bail because the police has to use proper skills of investigation while
interrogating the accused person, staying on pre-arrest bail. The interrogation inside the
lockup of the police station or inside the police station would make a very little
difference.”

9.For what has been discussed above, the instant petition is allowed and ad-interim pre-
arrest bail already granted to the petitioner in terms of order of this Court dated 25.06.2019
stands confirmed subject to his furnishing fresh bail bonds in the sum of Rs.2,00,000/-(rupees
two hundred thousand) with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of trial court

.(Ch. Abdul Aziz )Judge


Approved for reporting.
############
While deciding pre-arrest bail, the Court can have a look upon the merits of casethough
on the yardstick of tentative assessment.
Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019
Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDIJUDICIAL


DEPARTMENT

Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019


Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

Sardar Safir Akram, Advocate with petitioner.

Mr. Muhammad Ahmad Saeed, DPG with M.Arshad S.I.

Qazi Khalil ur Rehman,Advocate for complainant.


Date of hearing. 04.07.2019

This is an application for bail before arrest on behalf of Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner)in case
FIR No.403 dated 23.06.2018,under Sections302, 324, 148, 149PPC registered with Police
StationSaddar Beroni, Rawalpindi.
2.The facts of prosecution case as can be culled from the crime report are to the effect that on
23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m. Azhar ud Din (complainant) was present in his house and
attracted to the street after noticing hue and cry coming therefrom; that he noticed the presence
of Ghzanfar Bhatti, Raja Nazar, Raja Khuram, Ziafat and six unknown persons armed with
different weapons and saw them coming towards his house while using abusive
language; that the complainant raised alarm and asked his cousin, Sehar-ud-Din and Luqman for
returning to their house as a consequence thereof both of them ran for their lives; that Raja
Khurram (co-accused) fired shots from his .12 bore gun hitting Luqman on his back and
right leg; that Ghazanfar Bhatti (co-accused) firedastraight AK-47 shot, which hit Sehar-ud-
Din on his neck; that the perpetrators resorted to indiscriminate firing, which besidescreating
terror and panic in the vicinity also caused injury to Mst. Nadia Israr.

3.Arguments heard. Record perused.

4.It unfolds from the tentative perusal of record that the case in hand stands registered
for an occurrence having taken place on 23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m., within the
jurisdiction of P.S.Saddar Berooni, Rawalpindi. During this occurrence, in pursuance of an
aggression launched by Raja Khurram and his co-accused, one Sehar-ud-Din lost his life
whereas two others, namely, Luqman and Nadia received injuries. It is equally important
to mention here that burden of committing this crime was rested upon the shoulders of
four nominated and six unknown accused persons.

5.In the wake of above facts, it is noticed that Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner) was not
nominated in the crime report. His name surfaced on record through the supplementary
statement of complainant dated 23.06.2018, which was recorded shortly after the registration
ofFIR. After having perused the aforementioned supplementary statement, it is noticed that
the petitioner along with five others, namely, Usman, Sohrab Khan, Touseef, Iqbal and Yaseen
was implicated in the case with the allegation of raising Lalkara and resorting to firing,
which remainedineffective.Though the statements of three other witnesses, namely,
Mastan, Luqman (injured) and Kamal were recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. on the
following day i.e. 24.6.2018, however, the name of petitioner finds no mention therein.
Though, learned counsel for the complainant as well as the learned Law Officer was
confronted with this anomaly but they failed to respond it in any manner. This is not the
only shortcoming noticed by this Court rather it is further observed that though such statement
was made almost immediately after the registration of FIR, however, even then Azhar-ud-Din
(complainant) stated that “till today” he has been looking for the unknown perpetrators and
now have acquired knowledge about their identity. The use of expression “till today” adversely
reflects upon the supplementary statement and reasonably demonstrates that indeed it
was recorded some days after the registration of FIR.

6.The dismissal of this application was vociferously urged by the prosecution on the
ground of limited scope of pre-arrest bail. In this regard, it is observed that no doubt the
criteria laid down for the grant of pre-arrest bail is stringent in nature but not to an extent
whereby a court is precluded to exercise jurisdiction under section 498 Cr.P.C. even in
cases where the innocence or false implication of an accused is patently reflected from the
record. This Court is not oblivious of the fact that though the provision of section 498 was
enacted in Criminal ProcedureCode, 1898 from its very inception, however, the concept of
pre-arrest bail developed through necessary interpretation made by Hon’ble Full Bench of
Lahore Court in case reported as Hidayat ullah Khan v. The Crown(PLD 1949 Lahore 21). From
apeep throughthe judicial archives,it unveils that even prior to the aforementioned Full Bench
decision, the Courts hadbeen granting bail before arrest but such relief was much
dependent upon the discretion of the court,without there being any specific guidelines.If
any reference in this regard is needed that can be made to the cases reported asEmperor
v. Muhammad Fandh AIR (21) 1934 Sind (36 Cr.P.C L J 711)‫۔‬and Johur Mat and others, 10
C W N 1093 (4 Cr.P.C L J 221).
The Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in the case of Hadayat ullah Khan(mentioned supra) while
pondering upon the concept of pre-arrest bail made the law more explicit by laying down
guidelines, which for reference sake are being reproduced hereunder:-

“For the reasons given above, the reply which I would give to the question referred to us is that,
in a proper case, the High Court has power under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code,
to make an order that a person who is suspected of an offence for which he may be arrested by a
police officer or a Court, shall be admitted to bail. The exercise of this power should, however,
be confined to cases in which, not only is good prima facie ground made out for the grant of bail
in respect of the offence alleged, but also, it should be shown that if the petitioner were to be
arrested and refused bail, such an order would, in all probability, be made not from
motives of furthering the ends of justice in relationto the case, but from some ulterior
motive, and with the object of injuring the petitioner, or that the petitioner would in such an
eventuality suffer irreparable harm.”

It reasonably evinces from the observation of Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court, mentioned
above that discretion to grant pre-arrest bail is to be exercised in favour of an accused,if
hisimplication in the case is apparently stirred with malafideand he has a good prima
faciecase for the grant of bail. The proposition of pre-arrest bail was authoritatively adjudged by
this Court in another case reported as Sh. Zahoor Ahmad v. The State(PLD 1974 Lahore
256) with following observation:-

“The main conditions to be satisfied before exercise of jurisdiction to allow pre-arrest bail under
section 498, Cr.P.C. are--

(a)that there should be a genuine proved apprehension of imminent arrest with the effect of
virtual restraint on the petitioner (b)that the petitioner should physically surrender to the Court;
(c)that on account of ulterior motive, particularly on the part of the police, there should
be apprehension of harassment and undue irreparable humiliation by means of unjustified
arrest;
(d)that it should be otherwise a fit case on merits for exercise of discretion in favour of
the petitioner for the purpose of bail.

In this behalf the provisions contained in section 497 Cr.P.C. would have to be kept
inmind;(e)that unless there is reasonable explanation, the petitioner should have earlier
moved the Sessions Court for the same relief under section 498, Cr.P.C.
”In the case reported as Murad Khan v. Fazla-e-Subhan(PLD 1983 SC 82)the Hon’ble
Apex Court cancelled the pre-arrest bail granted to an accused by the High Court on the
ground that his implication apparently was not based on malafide. However, the scope of
pre-arrest bail was widened by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in a subsequent
case reported as Meeran Bux v. The State and another(PLD 1989 SC 347)and
besidesmalafide, the merits of the case were also considered favourably for extending such
relief. For advantage sake,it is being mentioned that in the wake of an accusation of
having participated in homicide occurrence, the accused Meeran Bux was ascribed the
role of inflicting a gunshotinjuryon the left thigh of deceased Badshah Dinoand the pre-arrest
bail granted to accused was cancelled by the High Court, however, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Pakistan restored the bail granting order of learned Sessions Judgewhile observing that the
injury besidesnot being on the vital part of the body was also declared by the doctor to be simple
in nature.

7.From the above discussion, it reasonably insinuates that while deciding pre-arrest
bail, the Court can have a look upon the merits of casethough on the yardstick of tentative
assessment. The application of such rule in the instant case reveals that implication of
petitioner, in the circumstances mentioned above, is not free from doubt. Even otherwise,
the petitioner is ascribed the role of resorting to ineffective firing. Admittedly, as
per accusations, neither petitioner caused any injury tothe victims nor made any attempt
to do so. This aspect, itself is sufficient to lean in favour of petitioner for granting pre-
arrest bail. In arriving at such conclusion, this Court sought guidance from cases reported as
Nazra and 5 others v.The State(1977 PCr. LJ 480), Ashraf and 3 others v. The State(1978 P Cr. L
J 903),Arshad v. The State(1999 P Cr. L J 611)andMuhammad Tariq and another v. The
State(2008 YLR22).The grant of pre-arrest bail to petitioner is further felt inevitable
keeping in view the fact that main accused Khurram was exoneratedby Mastan Khan (father of
Luqman-injured)from all charges at the time of his pre-arrest bail, though he was saddled
with the responsibility of causing multiple firearm injury to Luqman.

8.This Court has also taken note of the fact that Ziafat Mehmood (co-accused) was nominated in
the crime report with the role of making in effective firing, however, was granted post-arrest
bail by this Court vide order dated 04.12.2018 in Crl. Misc. No. 1657-B/2018. Similarly,
Usman Mehboob, who was also arrayed as accused through the supplementary statement
of the complainant with role similar to petitioner, was also held entitled to post-arrest bail by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi vide order dated 16.4.2019. In the given
circumstances, even if the request of petitioner for grant of pre-arrest bail is refused on the
ground of its limited scope, he will become entitled to bail under section 497 Cr.P.C.
immediately after his arrest. In the given circumstances, except causing humiliation and
harassment to petitionerno useful purpose is likely to be served. In somewhat similar
circumstances, the concession of pre-arrest bail was granted in cases reported asMiss
Zubaida Parveen v. State(PLJ 2004 Cr.C.673)and Zahoor Ahmad alias Bhawal Sher and
another v. State(PLJ 2007 Cr.C.83). So far as, implication of the
petitioner in the case on account of malafideand ulterior motive is concerned, it is well evident
from the manner in which supplementary statement of complainant, apparently, was
inserted in the record. In accordance with the peculiar facts of the case, this Court prima
faciehas reasons to believe that petitioner fell preyto the wider net.This Court has also
given a considered thought to the expected recovery of incriminating articles from
petitioner. Suffice it to say in this regard that if the Court arrives at conclusion that person
seeking pre-arrest bail is apparently falsely implicated in the case, his liberty cannot be
curtailed solely on the ground that some recoveries are to be effected from him. It will not be out
of context to refer the observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, expressed in case
reported asAamir Bashir and another v. State and another(PLJ 2018 SC 445), in
somewhat similar circumstances, which is as under:-

“The plea of the Advocate General that the investigating agency has been deprived to
interrogate both the petitioners for the recovery of the crime pistol and to collect further
evidence after getting their custody, is not acceptable in the circumstances of the case.
Moreover, this Court time and again has held that this could not be a ground for refusal of pre-
arrest bail because the police has to use proper skills of investigation while
interrogating the accused person, staying on pre-arrest bail. The interrogation inside the
lockup of the police station or inside the police station would make a very little
difference.”

9.For what has been discussed above, the instant petition is allowed and ad-interim pre-
arrest bail already granted to the petitioner in terms of order of this Court dated 25.06.2019
stands confirmed subject to his furnishing fresh bail bonds in the sum of Rs.2,00,000/-(rupees
two hundred thousand) with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of trial court

.(Ch. Abdul Aziz )Judge


Approved for reporting.

While deciding pre-arrest bail, the Court can have a look upon the merits of casethough
on the yardstick of tentative assessment.
Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019
Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDIJUDICIAL


DEPARTMENT

Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019


Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

Sardar Safir Akram, Advocate with petitioner.

Mr. Muhammad Ahmad Saeed, DPG with M.Arshad S.I.

Qazi Khalil ur Rehman,Advocate for complainant.


Date of hearing. 04.07.2019
This is an application for bail before arrest on behalf of Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner)in case
FIR No.403 dated 23.06.2018,under Sections302, 324, 148, 149PPC registered with Police
StationSaddar Beroni, Rawalpindi.

2.The facts of prosecution case as can be culled from the crime report are to the effect that on
23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m. Azhar ud Din (complainant) was present in his house and
attracted to the street after noticing hue and cry coming therefrom; that he noticed the presence
of Ghzanfar Bhatti, Raja Nazar, Raja Khuram, Ziafat and six unknown persons armed with
different weapons and saw them coming towards his house while using abusive
language; that the complainant raised alarm and asked his cousin, Sehar-ud-Din and Luqman for
returning to their house as a consequence thereof both of them ran for their lives; that Raja
Khurram (co-accused) fired shots from his .12 bore gun hitting Luqman on his back and
right leg; that Ghazanfar Bhatti (co-accused) firedastraight AK-47 shot, which hit Sehar-ud-
Din on his neck; that the perpetrators resorted to indiscriminate firing, which besidescreating
terror and panic in the vicinity also caused injury to Mst. Nadia Israr.

3.Arguments heard. Record perused.

4.It unfolds from the tentative perusal of record that the case in hand stands registered
for an occurrence having taken place on 23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m., within the
jurisdiction of P.S.Saddar Berooni, Rawalpindi. During this occurrence, in pursuance of an
aggression launched by Raja Khurram and his co-accused, one Sehar-ud-Din lost his life
whereas two others, namely, Luqman and Nadia received injuries. It is equally important
to mention here that burden of committing this crime was rested upon the shoulders of
four nominated and six unknown accused persons.

5.In the wake of above facts, it is noticed that Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner) was not
nominated in the crime report. His name surfaced on record through the supplementary
statement of complainant dated 23.06.2018, which was recorded shortly after the registration
ofFIR. After having perused the aforementioned supplementary statement, it is noticed that
the petitioner along with five others, namely, Usman, Sohrab Khan, Touseef, Iqbal and Yaseen
was implicated in the case with the allegation of raising Lalkara and resorting to firing,
which remainedineffective.Though the statements of three other witnesses, namely,
Mastan, Luqman (injured) and Kamal were recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. on the
following day i.e. 24.6.2018, however, the name of petitioner finds no mention therein.
Though, learned counsel for the complainant as well as the learned Law Officer was
confronted with this anomaly but they failed to respond it in any manner. This is not the
only shortcoming noticed by this Court rather it is further observed that though such statement
was made almost immediately after the registration of FIR, however, even then Azhar-ud-Din
(complainant) stated that “till today” he has been looking for the unknown perpetrators and
now have acquired knowledge about their identity. The use of expression “till today” adversely
reflects upon the supplementary statement and reasonably demonstrates that indeed it
was recorded some days after the registration of FIR.

6.The dismissal of this application was vociferously urged by the prosecution on the
ground of limited scope of pre-arrest bail. In this regard, it is observed that no doubt the
criteria laid down for the grant of pre-arrest bail is stringent in nature but not to an extent
whereby a court is precluded to exercise jurisdiction under section 498 Cr.P.C. even in
cases where the innocence or false implication of an accused is patently reflected from the
record. This Court is not oblivious of the fact that though the provision of section 498 was
enacted in Criminal ProcedureCode, 1898 from its very inception, however, the concept of
pre-arrest bail developed through necessary interpretation made by Hon’ble Full Bench of
Lahore Court in case reported as Hidayat ullah Khan v. The Crown(PLD 1949 Lahore 21). From
apeep throughthe judicial archives,it unveils that even prior to the aforementioned Full Bench
decision, the Courts hadbeen granting bail before arrest but such relief was much
dependent upon the discretion of the court,without there being any specific guidelines.If
any reference in this regard is needed that can be made to the cases reported asEmperor
v. Muhammad Fandh AIR (21) 1934 Sind (36 Cr.P.C L J 711)‫۔‬and Johur Mat and others, 10
C W N 1093 (4 Cr.P.C L J 221).
The Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in the case of Hadayat ullah Khan(mentioned supra) while
pondering upon the concept of pre-arrest bail made the law more explicit by laying down
guidelines, which for reference sake are being reproduced hereunder:-

“For the reasons given above, the reply which I would give to the question referred to us is that,
in a proper case, the High Court has power under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code,
to make an order that a person who is suspected of an offence for which he may be arrested by a
police officer or a Court, shall be admitted to bail. The exercise of this power should, however,
be confined to cases in which, not only is good prima facie ground made out for the grant of bail
in respect of the offence alleged, but also, it should be shown that if the petitioner were to be
arrested and refused bail, such an order would, in all probability, be made not from
motives of furthering the ends of justice in relationto the case, but from some ulterior
motive, and with the object of injuring the petitioner, or that the petitioner would in such an
eventuality suffer irreparable harm.”

It reasonably evinces from the observation of Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court, mentioned
above that discretion to grant pre-arrest bail is to be exercised in favour of an accused,if
hisimplication in the case is apparently stirred with malafideand he has a good prima
faciecase for the grant of bail. The proposition of pre-arrest bail was authoritatively adjudged by
this Court in another case reported as Sh. Zahoor Ahmad v. The State(PLD 1974 Lahore
256) with following observation:-

“The main conditions to be satisfied before exercise of jurisdiction to allow pre-arrest bail under
section 498, Cr.P.C. are--

(a)that there should be a genuine proved apprehension of imminent arrest with the effect of
virtual restraint on the petitioner (b)that the petitioner should physically surrender to the Court;
(c)that on account of ulterior motive, particularly on the part of the police, there should
be apprehension of harassment and undue irreparable humiliation by means of unjustified
arrest;
(d)that it should be otherwise a fit case on merits for exercise of discretion in favour of
the petitioner for the purpose of bail.
In this behalf the provisions contained in section 497 Cr.P.C. would have to be kept
inmind;(e)that unless there is reasonable explanation, the petitioner should have earlier
moved the Sessions Court for the same relief under section 498, Cr.P.C.

”In the case reported as Murad Khan v. Fazla-e-Subhan(PLD 1983 SC 82)the Hon’ble
Apex Court cancelled the pre-arrest bail granted to an accused by the High Court on the
ground that his implication apparently was not based on malafide. However, the scope of
pre-arrest bail was widened by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in a subsequent
case reported as Meeran Bux v. The State and another(PLD 1989 SC 347)and
besidesmalafide, the merits of the case were also considered favourably for extending such
relief. For advantage sake,it is being mentioned that in the wake of an accusation of
having participated in homicide occurrence, the accused Meeran Bux was ascribed the
role of inflicting a gunshotinjuryon the left thigh of deceased Badshah Dinoand the pre-arrest
bail granted to accused was cancelled by the High Court, however, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Pakistan restored the bail granting order of learned Sessions Judgewhile observing that the
injury besidesnot being on the vital part of the body was also declared by the doctor to be simple
in nature.

7.From the above discussion, it reasonably insinuates that while deciding pre-arrest
bail, the Court can have a look upon the merits of casethough on the yardstick of tentative
assessment. The application of such rule in the instant case reveals that implication of
petitioner, in the circumstances mentioned above, is not free from doubt. Even otherwise,
the petitioner is ascribed the role of resorting to ineffective firing. Admittedly, as
per accusations, neither petitioner caused any injury tothe victims nor made any attempt
to do so. This aspect, itself is sufficient to lean in favour of petitioner for granting pre-
arrest bail. In arriving at such conclusion, this Court sought guidance from cases reported as
Nazra and 5 others v.The State(1977 PCr. LJ 480), Ashraf and 3 others v. The State(1978 P Cr. L
J 903),Arshad v. The State(1999 P Cr. L J 611)andMuhammad Tariq and another v. The
State(2008 YLR22).The grant of pre-arrest bail to petitioner is further felt inevitable
keeping in view the fact that main accused Khurram was exoneratedby Mastan Khan (father of
Luqman-injured)from all charges at the time of his pre-arrest bail, though he was saddled
with the responsibility of causing multiple firearm injury to Luqman.

8.This Court has also taken note of the fact that Ziafat Mehmood (co-accused) was nominated in
the crime report with the role of making in effective firing, however, was granted post-arrest
bail by this Court vide order dated 04.12.2018 in Crl. Misc. No. 1657-B/2018. Similarly,
Usman Mehboob, who was also arrayed as accused through the supplementary statement
of the complainant with role similar to petitioner, was also held entitled to post-arrest bail by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi vide order dated 16.4.2019. In the given
circumstances, even if the request of petitioner for grant of pre-arrest bail is refused on the
ground of its limited scope, he will become entitled to bail under section 497 Cr.P.C.
immediately after his arrest. In the given circumstances, except causing humiliation and
harassment to petitionerno useful purpose is likely to be served. In somewhat similar
circumstances, the concession of pre-arrest bail was granted in cases reported asMiss
Zubaida Parveen v. State(PLJ 2004 Cr.C.673)and Zahoor Ahmad alias Bhawal Sher and
another v. State(PLJ 2007 Cr.C.83). So far as, implication of the
petitioner in the case on account of malafideand ulterior motive is concerned, it is well evident
from the manner in which supplementary statement of complainant, apparently, was
inserted in the record. In accordance with the peculiar facts of the case, this Court prima
faciehas reasons to believe that petitioner fell preyto the wider net.This Court has also
given a considered thought to the expected recovery of incriminating articles from
petitioner. Suffice it to say in this regard that if the Court arrives at conclusion that person
seeking pre-arrest bail is apparently falsely implicated in the case, his liberty cannot be
curtailed solely on the ground that some recoveries are to be effected from him. It will not be out
of context to refer the observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, expressed in case
reported asAamir Bashir and another v. State and another(PLJ 2018 SC 445), in
somewhat similar circumstances, which is as under:-

“The plea of the Advocate General that the investigating agency has been deprived to
interrogate both the petitioners for the recovery of the crime pistol and to collect further
evidence after getting their custody, is not acceptable in the circumstances of the case.
Moreover, this Court time and again has held that this could not be a ground for refusal of pre-
arrest bail because the police has to use proper skills of investigation while
interrogating the accused person, staying on pre-arrest bail. The interrogation inside the
lockup of the police station or inside the police station would make a very little
difference.”

9.For what has been discussed above, the instant petition is allowed and ad-interim pre-
arrest bail already granted to the petitioner in terms of order of this Court dated 25.06.2019
stands confirmed subject to his furnishing fresh bail bonds in the sum of Rs.2,00,000/-(rupees
two hundred thousand) with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of trial court

.(Ch. Abdul Aziz )Judge


Approved for reporting.

While deciding pre-arrest bail, the Court can have a look upon the merits of casethough
on the yardstick of tentative assessment.
Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019
Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDIJUDICIAL


DEPARTMENT

Crl. Misc. No.1138-Bof 2019


Muhammad Fayyaz. Vs. The State etc.

Sardar Safir Akram, Advocate with petitioner.

Mr. Muhammad Ahmad Saeed, DPG with M.Arshad S.I.

Qazi Khalil ur Rehman,Advocate for complainant.


Date of hearing. 04.07.2019
This is an application for bail before arrest on behalf of Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner)in case
FIR No.403 dated 23.06.2018,under Sections302, 324, 148, 149PPC registered with Police
StationSaddar Beroni, Rawalpindi.

2.The facts of prosecution case as can be culled from the crime report are to the effect that on
23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m. Azhar ud Din (complainant) was present in his house and
attracted to the street after noticing hue and cry coming therefrom; that he noticed the presence
of Ghzanfar Bhatti, Raja Nazar, Raja Khuram, Ziafat and six unknown persons armed with
different weapons and saw them coming towards his house while using abusive
language; that the complainant raised alarm and asked his cousin, Sehar-ud-Din and Luqman for
returning to their house as a consequence thereof both of them ran for their lives; that Raja
Khurram (co-accused) fired shots from his .12 bore gun hitting Luqman on his back and
right leg; that Ghazanfar Bhatti (co-accused) firedastraight AK-47 shot, which hit Sehar-ud-
Din on his neck; that the perpetrators resorted to indiscriminate firing, which besidescreating
terror and panic in the vicinity also caused injury to Mst. Nadia Israr.

3.Arguments heard. Record perused.

4.It unfolds from the tentative perusal of record that the case in hand stands registered
for an occurrence having taken place on 23.06.2018 at about 06:30 p.m., within the
jurisdiction of P.S.Saddar Berooni, Rawalpindi. During this occurrence, in pursuance of an
aggression launched by Raja Khurram and his co-accused, one Sehar-ud-Din lost his life
whereas two others, namely, Luqman and Nadia received injuries. It is equally important
to mention here that burden of committing this crime was rested upon the shoulders of
four nominated and six unknown accused persons.

5.In the wake of above facts, it is noticed that Muhammad Fayyaz (petitioner) was not
nominated in the crime report. His name surfaced on record through the supplementary
statement of complainant dated 23.06.2018, which was recorded shortly after the registration
ofFIR. After having perused the aforementioned supplementary statement, it is noticed that
the petitioner along with five others, namely, Usman, Sohrab Khan, Touseef, Iqbal and Yaseen
was implicated in the case with the allegation of raising Lalkara and resorting to firing,
which remainedineffective.Though the statements of three other witnesses, namely,
Mastan, Luqman (injured) and Kamal were recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. on the
following day i.e. 24.6.2018, however, the name of petitioner finds no mention therein.
Though, learned counsel for the complainant as well as the learned Law Officer was
confronted with this anomaly but they failed to respond it in any manner. This is not the
only shortcoming noticed by this Court rather it is further observed that though such statement
was made almost immediately after the registration of FIR, however, even then Azhar-ud-Din
(complainant) stated that “till today” he has been looking for the unknown perpetrators and
now have acquired knowledge about their identity. The use of expression “till today” adversely
reflects upon the supplementary statement and reasonably demonstrates that indeed it
was recorded some days after the registration of FIR.
6.The dismissal of this application was vociferously urged by the prosecution on the
ground of limited scope of pre-arrest bail. In this regard, it is observed that no doubt the
criteria laid down for the grant of pre-arrest bail is stringent in nature but not to an extent
whereby a court is precluded to exercise jurisdiction under section 498 Cr.P.C. even in
cases where the innocence or false implication of an accused is patently reflected from the
record. This Court is not oblivious of the fact that though the provision of section 498 was
enacted in Criminal ProcedureCode, 1898 from its very inception, however, the concept of
pre-arrest bail developed through necessary interpretation made by Hon’ble Full Bench of
Lahore Court in case reported as Hidayat ullah Khan v. The Crown(PLD 1949 Lahore 21). From
apeep throughthe judicial archives,it unveils that even prior to the aforementioned Full Bench
decision, the Courts hadbeen granting bail before arrest but such relief was much
dependent upon the discretion of the court,without there being any specific guidelines.If
any reference in this regard is needed that can be made to the cases reported asEmperor
v. Muhammad Fandh AIR (21) 1934 Sind (36 Cr.P.C L J 711)‫۔‬and Johur Mat and others, 10
C W N 1093 (4 Cr.P.C L J 221).
The Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in the case of Hadayat ullah Khan(mentioned supra) while
pondering upon the concept of pre-arrest bail made the law more explicit by laying down
guidelines, which for reference sake are being reproduced hereunder:-

“For the reasons given above, the reply which I would give to the question referred to us is that,
in a proper case, the High Court has power under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code,
to make an order that a person who is suspected of an offence for which he may be arrested by a
police officer or a Court, shall be admitted to bail. The exercise of this power should, however,
be confined to cases in which, not only is good prima facie ground made out for the grant of bail
in respect of the offence alleged, but also, it should be shown that if the petitioner were to be
arrested and refused bail, such an order would, in all probability, be made not from
motives of furthering the ends of justice in relationto the case, but from some ulterior
motive, and with the object of injuring the petitioner, or that the petitioner would in such an
eventuality suffer irreparable harm.”

It reasonably evinces from the observation of Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court, mentioned
above that discretion to grant pre-arrest bail is to be exercised in favour of an accused,if
hisimplication in the case is apparently stirred with malafideand he has a good prima
faciecase for the grant of bail. The proposition of pre-arrest bail was authoritatively adjudged by
this Court in another case reported as Sh. Zahoor Ahmad v. The State(PLD 1974 Lahore
256) with following observation:-

“The main conditions to be satisfied before exercise of jurisdiction to allow pre-arrest bail under
section 498, Cr.P.C. are--

(a)that there should be a genuine proved apprehension of imminent arrest with the effect of
virtual restraint on the petitioner (b)that the petitioner should physically surrender to the Court;
(c)that on account of ulterior motive, particularly on the part of the police, there should
be apprehension of harassment and undue irreparable humiliation by means of unjustified
arrest;
(d)that it should be otherwise a fit case on merits for exercise of discretion in favour of
the petitioner for the purpose of bail.

In this behalf the provisions contained in section 497 Cr.P.C. would have to be kept
inmind;(e)that unless there is reasonable explanation, the petitioner should have earlier
moved the Sessions Court for the same relief under section 498, Cr.P.C.

”In the case reported as Murad Khan v. Fazla-e-Subhan(PLD 1983 SC 82)the Hon’ble
Apex Court cancelled the pre-arrest bail granted to an accused by the High Court on the
ground that his implication apparently was not based on malafide. However, the scope of
pre-arrest bail was widened by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in a subsequent
case reported as Meeran Bux v. The State and another(PLD 1989 SC 347)and
besidesmalafide, the merits of the case were also considered favourably for extending such
relief. For advantage sake,it is being mentioned that in the wake of an accusation of
having participated in homicide occurrence, the accused Meeran Bux was ascribed the
role of inflicting a gunshotinjuryon the left thigh of deceased Badshah Dinoand the pre-arrest
bail granted to accused was cancelled by the High Court, however, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Pakistan restored the bail granting order of learned Sessions Judgewhile observing that the
injury besidesnot being on the vital part of the body was also declared by the doctor to be simple
in nature.

7.From the above discussion, it reasonably insinuates that while deciding pre-arrest
bail, the Court can have a look upon the merits of casethough on the yardstick of tentative
assessment. The application of such rule in the instant case reveals that implication of
petitioner, in the circumstances mentioned above, is not free from doubt. Even otherwise,
the petitioner is ascribed the role of resorting to ineffective firing. Admittedly, as
per accusations, neither petitioner caused any injury tothe victims nor made any attempt
to do so. This aspect, itself is sufficient to lean in favour of petitioner for granting pre-
arrest bail. In arriving at such conclusion, this Court sought guidance from cases reported as
Nazra and 5 others v.The State(1977 PCr. LJ 480), Ashraf and 3 others v. The State(1978 P Cr. L
J 903),Arshad v. The State(1999 P Cr. L J 611)andMuhammad Tariq and another v. The
State(2008 YLR22).The grant of pre-arrest bail to petitioner is further felt inevitable
keeping in view the fact that main accused Khurram was exoneratedby Mastan Khan (father of
Luqman-injured)from all charges at the time of his pre-arrest bail, though he was saddled
with the responsibility of causing multiple firearm injury to Luqman.

8.This Court has also taken note of the fact that Ziafat Mehmood (co-accused) was nominated in
the crime report with the role of making in effective firing, however, was granted post-arrest
bail by this Court vide order dated 04.12.2018 in Crl. Misc. No. 1657-B/2018. Similarly,
Usman Mehboob, who was also arrayed as accused through the supplementary statement
of the complainant with role similar to petitioner, was also held entitled to post-arrest bail by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi vide order dated 16.4.2019. In the given
circumstances, even if the request of petitioner for grant of pre-arrest bail is refused on the
ground of its limited scope, he will become entitled to bail under section 497 Cr.P.C.
immediately after his arrest. In the given circumstances, except causing humiliation and
harassment to petitionerno useful purpose is likely to be served. In somewhat similar
circumstances, the concession of pre-arrest bail was granted in cases reported asMiss
Zubaida Parveen v. State(PLJ 2004 Cr.C.673)and Zahoor Ahmad alias Bhawal Sher and
another v. State(PLJ 2007 Cr.C.83). So far as, implication of the
petitioner in the case on account of malafideand ulterior motive is concerned, it is well evident
from the manner in which supplementary statement of complainant, apparently, was
inserted in the record. In accordance with the peculiar facts of the case, this Court prima
faciehas reasons to believe that petitioner fell preyto the wider net.This Court has also
given a considered thought to the expected recovery of incriminating articles from
petitioner. Suffice it to say in this regard that if the Court arrives at conclusion that person
seeking pre-arrest bail is apparently falsely implicated in the case, his liberty cannot be
curtailed solely on the ground that some recoveries are to be effected from him. It will not be out
of context to refer the observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, expressed in case
reported asAamir Bashir and another v. State and another(PLJ 2018 SC 445), in
somewhat similar circumstances, which is as under:-

“The plea of the Advocate General that the investigating agency has been deprived to
interrogate both the petitioners for the recovery of the crime pistol and to collect further
evidence after getting their custody, is not acceptable in the circumstances of the case.
Moreover, this Court time and again has held that this could not be a ground for refusal of pre-
arrest bail because the police has to use proper skills of investigation while
interrogating the accused person, staying on pre-arrest bail. The interrogation inside the
lockup of the police station or inside the police station would make a very little
difference.”

9.For what has been discussed above, the instant petition is allowed and ad-interim pre-
arrest bail already granted to the petitioner in terms of order of this Court dated 25.06.2019
stands confirmed subject to his furnishing fresh bail bonds in the sum of Rs.2,00,000/-(rupees
two hundred thousand) with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of trial court

.(Ch. Abdul Aziz )Judge


Approved for reporting.

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