SON VS.

UST

FACTS:

Raymond A. Son, Raymond S. Antiola (, and Wilfredo E. Pollarco are full time professors of the UST Colleges of Fine Arts and Design
and Philosophy, and are members of the UST Faculty Union, with which UST at the time had a CBA.

Son and Antiola were hired in June, 2005, while Pollarco was employed earlier, or in June, 2004. Under their respective appointment
papers, petitioners were designated as "faculty member[s] on PROBATIONARY status," whose "accession to tenure status is conditioned
by [sic] your meeting all the requirements provided under existing University rules and regulations and other applicable laws including,
among others, possession of the [prerequisite] graduate degree before the expiration of the probationary period and by your satisfactory
performance of the duties and responsibilities set forth in the job description hereto attached."9

The UST-UST Faculty Union CBA provided that –

ARTICLE XV
TENURE

Section 1 .Tenured Faculty Member. - He is:

Teaching Faculty member, given a tenure track appointment upon hiring who has rendered six (6) consecutive semesters of satisfactory
service on a full-time basis, carrying fifteen-unit load (15) or more. Although a master's degree is an entry requirement, a faculty member
admitted to serve the University without a master's degree shall finish his master's degree in five (5) semesters. If he does not finish his
degree in five (5) semesters, he shall be separated from service at the end of the fifth semester; however, if he is made to serve the
University further, in spite of the lack of a master's degree, he shall be deemed to have attained tenure.10
The CBA provision relative to the requirement of a Master's degree in the faculty member's field of instruction is in line with the requirement
laid down in the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools issued by then Department of Education, Culture, and Sports
(DECS), and the CHED's Memorandum Order No. 40-08 - or Manual of Regulations for Private Higher Education of 2008 - stating that:

Section 35.Minimum Faculty Qualifications. - The minimum qualifications of a faculty in a higher education institution shall be as follows:

1. For undergraduate program

Holder of a master's degree; to teach mainly in his major field and where applicable, a holder of appropriate professional license requiring
at least a bachelor's degree for the professional courses. However, in specific fields where there is dearth of holders of Master's degree,
or a holder of a professional license requiring at least a bachelor's degree may be qualified to teach. Any deviation from this requirement
will be subject to regulation by the Commission.
Petitioners did not possess the required Master's degree, but were nonetheless hired by UST on the condition that they fulfill the
requirement within the prescribed period. Petitioners enrolled in the Master's program, but were unable to finish the same. In spite of their
failure to obtain the required Master's degree, they continued to teach even beyond the period given for completion thereof.

On March 3, 2010, then CHED Chairman Emmanuel Angeles issued a Memorandum11 addressed to the Presidents of public and private
higher education institutions, directing the strict implementation of the minimum qualification for faculty members of undergraduate
programs, particularly the Master's degree and licensure requirements, as mandated by Memorandum Order No. 40-08, "to ensure the
highest qualification of their faculty."

Acting on the March 3, 2010 Memorandum, UST wrote the petitioners and other affected faculty members, informing them of the
university's decision to cease re-appointment of those who failed to complete their Master's degrees, but allow a written appeal from the
concerned faculty members who are due for thesis defense/completion of their Master's degrees.12

Petitioners did not make a written appeal, operating under the belief that they have been vested tenure under the CBA for their continued
employment despite failure to obtain the required Master's degree.13

On June 11, 2010, petitioners received termination/thank you letters14 signed by respondent Dr. Cynthia Loza, Dean of the College of
Fine Arts and Design. The reason given for non-renewal of their appointments is their failure to obtain the required Master's degree.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Petitioners filed a labor case against the respondents for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and recovery of money claims. In their
joint Position Paper and other pleadings,15 petitioners claimed that since they have already acquired tenure by default pursuant to the
tenure provision in the CBA, they could not be dismissed for failure to complete their respective Master's degrees; that the UST-UST
Faculty Union CBA is the law between the parties, and its provisions should be observed; that in spite of the CBA provision on tenure,
respondents illegally terminated their employment; that they were illegally terminated for their refusal to send the prescribed appeal letter,
which is tantamount to an undue waiver and unlawful surrender of their tenurial rights, and is against the law and public policy; that in
terminating their employment, respondents did not comply with the required "twin-notice rule"; that respondents are guilty of bad faith and
unfair labor practice on account of their violation of the CBA; that respondents are guilty of bad faith when they re-hired the other
professors even when they did not possess the required Master's degree, while they (petitioners) were discriminated against and
terminated from work just because they did not file the prescribed appeal letter; and that they should be paid backwages and other money
claims. Thus, petitioners prayed for reinstatement with full backwages, allowances and other benefits; moral and exemplary damages;
and attorney's fees and costs of suit.

In their joint Position Paper and other pleadings16 respondents countered that there is no unfair labor practice committed, because the
CBA provision adverted to is not an economic provision; that the implementation of Memorandum Order No. 40-08 takes legal precedence
over the parties' CBA; that the CBA provision granting tenure by default may no longer be enforced on account of the requirement under
Memorandum Order No. 40-08, an administrative regulation that is equivalent to law and has the effect of abrogating the tenure provision
of the CBA; that Memorandum Order No. 40-08 is a police power measure for the protection and promotion of quality education, and as
such, the CBA should yield to the same and to the broader interests of the State; that petitioners could not have acquired tenure since
they did not possess the minimum qualification - a Master's degree - prescribed under Memorandum Order No. 40-08; that the CBA
provision on tenure by default has become illegal as it is contrary to law, and for this reason, it may not be enforced; that said CBA
provision, being contrary to law, cannot be the object of estopppel, and produces no effect whatsoever and need not be set aside nor
declared ineffective by judicial action; that in not renewing petitioners' probationary appointments, respondents observed due process
and the provisions of the Labor Code, particularly Article 281, which provides that a probationary employee may be terminated from work
"when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee
at the time of his engagement"; that petitioners are not entitled to monetary awards as they were dismissed for cause, paid their correct
salaries, and are not entitled to damages and attorney's fees; and that the case against the individual respondents should be dismissed
as well, as they were acting within their official capacities. Thus, they prayed for the dismissal of petitioners' complaint.

On March 17, 2011, Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria rendered his Decision17 in NLRC Case Nos. NCR-07-09179-10, 07-09180-10, and 07-
09181-10, finding for petitioners and declaring respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, as well as malice and bad
faith in illegally dismissing the former. The Labor Arbiter upheld the CBA provision granting tenure by default to petitioners, and declared
that petitioners were not accorded due process prior to dismissal. Thus, petitioners were awarded money claims, damages, and attorney's
fees.

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Respondents appealed before the NLRC. On August 10, 2011, the NLRC issued its Decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and
affirming the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It held that the UST-UST Faculty Union CBA took precedence over CHED Memorandum Order
No. 40-08; that by said CBA provision, petitioners acquired tenure by default; that UST continued to hire faculty members without the
required Master's degree in their field of instruction even after petitioners were dismissed from work; and that the only cause for petitioners'
dismissal was their refusal to submit a written appeal, which is not a valid ground for dismissal or non-renewal of their appointment.

Respondents moved for reconsideration. The case was re-opened as the handling Commissioners inhibited themselves from the case.

On March 26, 2012, the Special Division of the NLRC issued a new Decision which set aside the earlier August 10, 2011 Decision and
dismissed petitioners' labor case. It held that CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 took precedence over the parties' CBA; that the CBA
should conform to the said Memorandum, which had the force and effect of law; and that since the CBA provision on tenure by default
did not conform to the CHED Memorandum, it is null and void.

Petitioners moved to reconsider.18 Meanwhile, the case was re-assigned to the Second Division of the NLRC which, on October 30,
2012, promulgated a Decision granting petitioners' motion for reconsideration. It set aside the March 26, 2012 Decision of the Special
Division and reinstated the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It held that the CBA superseded the CHED Memorandum; that CHED Memorandum
Order No. 40-08 requiring a Master's degree of professors in the undergraduate programs is merely directory, and did not provide that
the lack of a Master's degree was a ground to terminate the professor's services; that CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 was issued
only in 2008, while the CBA was concluded in 2006 - thus, it may not be retroactively applied in the absence of a specific provision
authorizing retroactivity; and consequently, petitioners acquired tenure.

Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration,19 but in a January 22, 2013 Resolution,20 the NLRC denied the motion for lack of
merit.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Certiorari21 before the CA, respondents questioned the adverse NLRC dispositions and prayed for dismissal of the labor
case or NLRC Case Nos. NCR-07-09179-10, 07-09180-10 and 07-09181-10.

On September 27, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed Decision granting the Petition, decreeing thus:

Private respondents22 contend that they already attained tenureship by reason of their continuous employment service on a probationary
status to petitioner University, invoking the provision of the 2006-2011 Faculty Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), particularly Article
XV, Section 1 thereof, which was signed on July 18, 2008. According to them, when the petitioner University and the UST Faculty Union
of which private respondents are members agreed to the terms and conditions set forth in the UST Faculty CBA, the former explicitly and
unequivocally intended to vest tenure to those professors without master's degrees who served for at least six (6) semesters.

Private respondents' reliance on the collective bargaining agreement is not tenable. 'While every individual has autonomy to enter into
any contract, the contractual stipulations, however, must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. In a
case involving the observance of a collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court, in Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (LMM)
vs. Abiera, had the occasion to pronounce:
'It is a fundamental postulate that however broad the freedom of contracting parties may be, it does not go so far as to coun tenance
disrespect for or failure to observe a legal prescription. The statute takes precedence; a stipulation in a collective bargaining agreement
must yield to it. That is to adhere to the rule of law.'

The above principle was likewise reiterated in Escorpizo, et al. vs. University of Baguio, et al., from which We quote:

"...Indeed, provisions of a CBA must be respected since its terms and conditions constitute the law between the contracting parties. Those
who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. And in the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved
party has the right to go to court for redress. xxx xxx xxx

...Nevertheless, the aforecited CBA provision must be read in conjunction with statutory and administrative regulations governing faculty
qualifications. It is settled that an existing law enters into and forms part of a valid contract without the need for the parties expressly
making reference to it. Further, while contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may see
fit, such right to contract is subject to limitation that the agreement must not be contrary to law or public policy."

It should be borne in mind that the operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that
only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions.
Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill-
prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to
possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that private respondents failed to meet the standards for regular employment provided under
Memorandum Order No. 040-08 issued by CUED. The termination of their contract was based on their failure to obtain [a] master's degree
and cannot, therefore, be regarded as illegal. In fact, the services of an employee hired on probationary basis may be terminated when
he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the
time of his engagement. There is nothing that would hinder the employer from extending a regular or permanent appointment to an
employee once the employer finds that the employee is qualified for a regular employment even before the expiration of the probationary
period. Conversely, if the purpose sought by the employer is neither attained nor attainable within the said period, the law does not
preclude the employer from terminating the probationary employment on justifiable ground. Mere, no vested right to tenureship had yet
accrued in private respondents' favor since they had not complied, during their probation, with the prerequisites necessary for the
acquisition of permanent status. It must be stressed that herein private respondents were given more than ample opportunities to obtain
their respective master's degree since their first appointment in 2004 or 2005 as a prerequisite to tenure status. But they did not take
advantage of such opportunities. Justice, fairness, and due process demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations
where it had little or no participation or control.

In addition, the petitioner University as an educational institution enjoys academic freedom - a guarantee that enjoys protection from the
Constitution. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Indeed,
the Constitution allows merely the State's regulation and supervision of educational institutions, and not the deprivation of their rights.

The essential freedoms subsumed in the term 'academic freedom' encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:
(1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study. Undeniably, the school's
prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and to determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with
academic freedom that gives the educational institution the right to choose who should teach. In Peña v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the Supreme Court emphasized:

'It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since quality education is a mandate of the Constitution.
As long as the standards fixed are reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them aside.'

The authority to choose whom to hire is likewise covered and protected by its management prerogative - the right of an employer to
regulate all aspects of employment, such as hiring, the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods, process to be followed,
regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers. This
Court was more emphatic in holding mat in protecting the rights of the laborer, it cannot authorize the oppression or self-destruction of
the employer.

All told, We are satisfied that private respondents' termination from employment was valid and legal.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not they were not illegally dismissed.

RULING:

NO! As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate program professor's field of instruction has been in
place, through DECS Order 92 (series of 1992, August 10, 1992) or the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Article IX,
Section 44, paragraph 1 (a) thereof provides that college faculty members must have a master's degree in their field of instruction as a
minimum qualification for teaching in a private educational institution and acquiring regular status therein.
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of its mle-making power as provided for under Section 70
of Batas PambansaBlg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982.29 As such, it has the force and effect of law.30 In University
of the East v. Pepanio,31 the requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers was held to be not unreasonable but rather
in accord with the public interest.

Thus, when the CBA was executed between the parties in 2006, they had no right to include therein the provision relative to the acquisition
of tenure by default, because it is contrary to, and thus violative of, the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that was
in effect at the time. As such, said CBA provision is null and void, and can have no effect as between the parties. "A void contract is
equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation."32 Under the Civil Code,

Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;

x xxx

When CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 came out, it merely carried over the requirement of a masteral degree for faculty members
of undergraduate programs contained in the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. It cannot therefore be said that the
requirement of a master's degree was retroactively applied in petitioners' case, because it was already the prevailing rule with the issuance
of the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.

Thus, going by the requirements of law, it is plain to see that petitioners are not qualified to teach in the undergraduate programs of UST.
And while they were given ample time and opportunity to satisfy the requirements by obtaining their respective master's degrees, they
failed in the endeavor. Petitioners knew this - that they cannot continue to teach for failure to secure their master's degrees - and needed
no reminding of this fact; "those who are seeking to be educators are presumed to know these mandated qualifications."33

From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents, for maintaining professors without the mandated
masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to be employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary qualifications. Petitioners
cannot therefore insist to be employed by UST since they still do not possess the required master's degrees; the fact that UST continues
to hire and maintain professors without the necessary master's degrees is not a ground for claiming illegal dismissal, or even
reinstatement. As far as the law is concerned, respondents are in violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the practice of hiring
unqualified teaching personnel; but the law cannot come to the aid of petitioners on this sole ground. As between the parties herein, they
are in pari delicto.

Latin for 'in equal fault,' in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law nor
equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto. Under
the pari delicto doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no action against each other, and it
shall leave the parties where it finds them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims "ex dolo malo nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto
potior est conditio defendentis."

x xxx

As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally governed by Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code, which state that:

Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense,
both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.

xxxx

Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall
be observed:

xxxx

1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand
the performance of the other's undertaking;

x x x x.34 (Citations omitted)

The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the undergraduate teacher's field of instruction has been cemented in DECS Order
92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and respondents have been violating it. The fact that government has not cracked down on violators,
or that it chose not to strictly implement the provision, does not erase the violations committed by erring educational institutions, including
the parties herein; it simply means that government will not punish these violations for the meantime. The parties cannot escape its
concomitant effects, nonetheless. And if respondents knew the overwhelming importance of the said provision and the public interest
involved -as they now fiercely advocate to their favor - they should have complied with the same as soon as it was promulgated.

It cannot be said either that by agreeing to the tenure by default provision in the CBA, respondents are deemed to be in estoppel or have
waived the application of the requirement under CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08. Such a waiver is precisely contrary to law.
Moreover, a waiver would prejudice the rights of the students and the public, who have a right to expect that UST is acting within the
bounds of the law, and provides quality education by hiring only qualified teaching personnel. Under Article 6 of the Civil Code, "[r]ights
may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law." On the other hand, there could be no acquiescence - amounting to estoppel - with respect to acts which
constitute a violation of law. "The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra
vires."35 "[N]o estoppel can be predicated on an illegal act."36

It cannot be said either that in requiring petitioners to file a written appeal, respondents are guilty of bad faith and malice for practically
forcing the former to renounce their tenure. There is no tenure to speak of in the first place.

Just the same, as correctly argued by the respondents, the crucial issues in this case have been settled. In the case of University of the
East v. Pepanio,37 the Court held that –

Three. Respondents argue that UE hired them in 1997 and 2000, when what was in force was the 1994 CBA between UE and the faculty
union. Since that CBA did not yet require a master's degree for acquiring a regular status and since respondents had already complied
with the three requirements of the CBA, namely, (a) that they served lull-time; (b) that they rendered three consecutive years of service;
and (c) that their services were satisfactory, they should be regarded as having attained permanent or regular status.

But the policy requiring postgraduate degrees of college teachers was provided in the Manual of Regulations as early as 1992. Indeed,
recognizing this, the 1994 CBA provided even then that UE was to extend only semester-to-semester appointments to college faculty
staffs, like respondents, who did not possess the minimum qualifications for their positions.

Besides, as the Court held in Escorpizo v. University of Baguio, a school CBA must be read in conjunction with statutory and administrative
regulations governing faculty qualifications. Such regulations form part of a valid CBA without need for the parties to make express
reference to it. While the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions, as they may see fit, tine right
to contract is still subject to the limitation that the agreement must not be contrary to law or public policy.

The State through Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 (The Education Act of 1982) delegated the administration of the education system and
the supervision and regulation of educational institutions to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (now Department of Education).
Accordingly, in promulgating the Manual of Regulations, DECS was exercising its power of regulation over educational institutions, which
includes prescribing the minimum academic qualifications for teaching personnel.

In 1994 the legislature transferred the power to prescribe such qualifications to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). CHED's
charter authorized it to set minimum standards for programs and institutions of higher learning. The Manual of Regulations continued to
apply to colleges and universities and suppletorily the Joint Order until 2010 when CHED issued a Revised Manual of Regulations which
specifically applies only to institutions involved in tertiary education.

The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of educational institutions
involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge
and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting,
not only the students, but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge.
They may be required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.

Respondents were each given only semester-to-semester appointments from the beginning of their employment with UE precisely
because they lacked the required master's degree. It was only when UE and the faculty union signed their 2001 CBA that the school
extended petitioners a conditional probationary status subject to their obtaining a master's degree within their probationary period. It is
clear, therefore, that the parties intended to subject respondents' permanent status appointments to the standards set by the law and the
university.

Here, UE gave respondents Bueno and Pepanio more than ample opportunities to acquire the postgraduate degree required of them.
But they did not take advantage of such opportunities. Justice, fairness, and due process demand that an employer should not be
penalized for situations where it had little or no participation or control. (Citations omitted)38

In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholastica 's College39 that –

Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois still cannot legally acquire a permanent status of employment. Private
educational institutions must still supplementarily refer to the prevailing standards, qualifications, and conditions set by the appropriate
government agencies (presently the Department of Education, the Commission on Higher Education, and the Technical Education and
Skills Development Authority). This limitation on the right of private schools, colleges, and universities to select and determine the
employment status of their academic personnel has been imposed by the state in view of the public interest nature of educational
institutions, so as to ensure the quality and competency of our schools and educators.

The applicable guidebook at the time petitioner was engaged as a probationary full-time instructor for the school year 2000 to 2003 is the
1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 Manual). It provides the following conditions of a probationary employment:

Section 89. Conditions of Employment. Every private school shall promote the improvement of the economic, social and professional
status of all its personnel.
In recognition of their special employment status and their special role in the advancement of knowledge, the employment of teaching
and non-teaching academic personnel shall be governed by such rules as may from time to time be promulgated, in coordination with
one another, by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the Department of Labor and Employment.

Conditions of employment of non-academic non-teaching school personnel, including compensation, hours of work, security of tenure
and labor relations, shall be governed by the appropriate labor laws and regulations.

Section 92. Probationary Period. Subject in all instances to compliance with Department and school requirements, the probationary period
for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and
secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) consecutive
trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on the trimester basis.

Section 93. Regular or Permanent Status. Those who have served the probationary period shall be made regular or permanent. Fulltime
teachers who have satisfactorily completed their probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent.

Considering mat petitioner ultimately sought for the position of a permanent full-time instructor, we must further look into the following
provisions under the 1992 Manual, which set out the minimum requirements for such status:

Section 44. Minimum Faculty Qualifications. The minimum qualifications for faculty for the different grades and levels of instruction duly
supported by appropriate credentials on file in the school shall be as follows:

xxxx

c. Tertiary

(1) For undergraduate courses, other than vocational:

(a) Holder of a master's degree, to teach largely in his major field; or, for professional courses, holder of the appropriate professional
license required for at least a bachelor's degree. Any deviation from this requirement will be subject to regulation by the Department.

Section 45. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. As a general rule, all private schools shall employ full-time academic personnel consistent
with the levels of instruction.

Full-time academic personnel are those meeting all the following requirements:

a. Who possess at least the minimum academic qualifications prescribed by the Department under this Manual for all academic personnel;

xxxx

All teaching personnel who do not meet the foregoing qualifications are considered part-time.

xxxx

Thus, pursuant to the 1992 Manual, private educational institutions in the tertiary level may extend 'full-time faculty' status only to those
who possess, inter alia, a master's degree in the field of study that will be taught. This minimum requirement is neither subject to the
prerogative of the school nor to the agreement between the parties. For all intents and purposes, this qualification must be deemed
impliedly written in the employment contracts between private educational institutions and prospective faculty members. The issue of
whether probationers were informed of this academic requirement before they were engaged as probationary employees is thus no longer
material, as those who are seeking to be educators are presumed to know these mandated qualifications. Thus, all those who fail to meet
the criteria under the 1992 Manual cannot legally attain the status of permanent full-time faculty members, even if they have completed
three years of satisfactory service.

In the light of the failure of Manaois to satisfy the academic requirements for the position, she may only be considered as a part-time
instructor pursuant to Section 45 of the 1992 Manual. It is a settled rule that a part-time member of the academic personnel cannot acquire
permanence of employment and security of tenure under the Manual of Regulations in relation to the Labor Code.

UE VS. MASANGKAY

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the February 19,
2016 Decision1 and August 26, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132774, entitled "Veronica M.
Masangkay and Gertrudo R. Regondola v. University of the East, Dr. Ester Garcia and The National Labor Relations Commission. "

Respondents Veronica M. Masangkay (Masangkay) and Gertrudo R. Regondola (Regondola) were regular faculty members, Associate
Professors, and Associate Deans of petitioner University of the East (UE) – Caloocan Campus, prior to their dismissal on November 26,
2007.
While holding said positions at UE, respondents submitted three (3) manuals, namely: Mechanics, Statics, and Dynamics, reques ting
said manuals' temporary adoption as instructional materials. Respondents represented themselves to be the rightful authors thereof,
together with their co-author, a certain Adelia F. Rocamora (Rocamora). Accompanying said requests are certifications under oath, signed
by respondents, declaring under pain of perjury, and openly certifying that the manuals are entirely original and free from plagiarism. Said
certification reads:

We hereby certify that the contents of the manual MECHANICS FOR ECE AND COE by Gertrudo R. Regondola, et al. to be used in the
subjects ECE 311N are entirely original and free from plagiarism.

(SGD.)
Gertrudo R. Regondola

(SGD.)
Veronica Masangkay2

After review, UE approved the requests for use of said manuals by students of the College of Engineering.

Thereafter, petitioners received two (2) complaint-letters via electronic mail (e-mail) from a certain Harry H. Chenoweth and Lucy Singer
Block. Chenoweth and Block's father are authors, respectively, of three books, namely: Applied Engineering Mechanics, Engineering
Mechanics, 2nd Edition, 1954, and Engineering Mechanics: Statics & Dynamics, 3rd Edition, 1975. They categorically denied giving
respondents permission to copy, reproduce, imitate, or alter said books, and asked for assistance from UE to stop the alleged unlawful
acts and deal with this academic dishonesty.

Prompted by the seriousness of the allegations, UE investigated the matter. After a thorough evaluation of the alleged plagiarized portions,
petitioner conducted an investigation in which respondents actively participated and filed their Answer. Eventually, UE's Board of Trustees
issued Resolution No. 2007-11-84 dismissing respondents. Notices of Dismissal effective November 26, 2007 were sent to respondents
and Rocamora via registered mail.

Unlike herein respondents, Rocamora sought reconsideration of the decision to the Board of Trustees. Respondents, however, did not
appeal the decision terminating them and instead opted to claim their benefits due them, which consisted of leave credits, sick leave,
holiday pay, bonuses, shares in tuition fee increase, COLA, and RATA. For her part, respondent Masangkay requested that a portion of
her benefits be applied to her existing car loan. For the amounts that they received, they signed vouchers and pay slips. These were duly
acted upon by UE.

Rocamora's case

It appears that after the Board of Trustees denied reconsideration of Rocamora's dismissal, the latter filed a case against UE for illegal
dismissal. Eventually reaching this Court, the illegality of her dismissal was upheld by the Court through a resolution in University of the
East and Dr. Ester Garcia v. Adelia Rocamora, G.R. No. 199959, February 6, 2012.

Meanwhile, almost three years after having been dismissed from service and after collecting their accrued benefits, respondents then
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on July 20, 2010, docketed as NLRC NCR No. 07-09924-10, entitled "Veronica M. Masangkay and
Gertrudo R. Regondola v. University of the East (UE), President Ester Garcia."

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

In its February 28, 2011 ruling,3 the labor arbiter held that respondents were illegally dismissed and ordered their reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other benefits and full backwages inclusive of allowances until actual reinstatement. UE was directed to pay a
total of P4,623,873.34 representing both respondents' backwages, allowances, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding complainants to have been ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.
Respondents are ordered to immediately reinstate complainants to their position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and full
backwages inclusive of allowances until actual reinstatement. Respondent University of the East is directed to pay complainants the
following:

VERONICA M. MASANGKAY
1. BACKWAGES:
11/1/07 - 2/28/11
50,000 x 39.93 =
P1,996,500.00

13th MO. PAY:

P1,996,500/12 =
P 166,375.00

ALLOWANCE: 41741
 P3,000.00 x 39.93 =
P 119,790.00
P2,282,665.00
2. 13th MO. PAY
7/20/2007 - 10/31/2007
P50,000 x 3.40 / 12 =
P 14,166.67
3. MORAL DAMAGES
P 50,000.00
4. EXEMPLARY DAMAGE
P 25,000.00

TOTAL:
P2,371,831.67

GERTRUDO R. REGONDOLA
5. BACKWAGES: November 1, 2007 -February 28, 2011
50,000.00 x 39.93 =
P1,996,500.00

13th MO. PAY:

P1,996,500/12
P 166,375.00

ALLOWANCE:
P3,000.00 x 39.93
P2,162,875.00
6. 13th MO. PAY
July 20, 2007 - October 31, 2007
P50,000 x 3.40 / 12 =
P 14,166.67
7. MORAL DAMAGES
P 50,000.00
8. EXEMPLARY DAMAGE
P 25,000.00

TOTAL:
P 2,252,041.67

10% Attorney's Fees

462,287.33

GRAND TOTAL:
P4,623,873.34
SO ORDERED.4

NLRC Decision

The case reached the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), where the Commission reversed the labor arbiter's ruling and
disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of respondents is GRANTED and the labor arbiter's Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant
complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.5

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,6 respondents elevated the case to the CA.

CA Ruling

The appellate court reinstated the labor arbiter's ruling that petitioners failed to prove that indeed a just cause for respondents' dismissal
exists. Too, it emphasized, among others, that the instant petition is bound by this Court's Decision in the Rocamora case, calling for the
application of the doctrine of stare decisis. The CA thus disposed of the case in this manner:
IN VIEW OF ALL THESE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 29, 2012 and Resolution dated September 17,
2013 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 28, 2011 of the Labor
Arbiter is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

The CA denied reconsideration of the questioned Decision in the assailed Resolution of August 26, 2016, prompting petitioners to file the
instant petition, raising the following issues, to wit:

1) Whether or not respondents' misrepresentation, dishonesty, plagiarism and/or copyright infringement which is considered academic
dishonesty tantamount to serious misconduct is a just and valid cause for their dismissal.

2) Whether or not the CA erroneously applied the principle of stare decisis.

3) Whether or not respondents are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages, and other monetary awards despite the fact that they
were dismissed for valid cause under the Labor Code.

4) Whether or not the award of damages and attorney's fees have factual and legal basis.

Petitioners argue, among others, that the instant case cannot be bound by the Rocamora case via application of the doctrine of stare
decisis because of substantial differences in Rocamora's situation and in that of respondents, as noted by the NLRC. Too, petitioners
maintain that plagiarism, a form of academic dishonesty, is a serious misconduct that justly warrants herein respondents' dismissal.

This Court's Ruling

We resolve to grant the petition.

The principle of stare decisis requires that once a case has been decided one way, the rule is settled that any other case involving exactly
the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner.7 It simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in
one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds
from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.8

Applying said principle, the CA held that Our ruling in University of the East v. Adelia Rocamora9 is a precedent to the case at bar,
involving, as it does, herein respondents' co-author and tackling the same violation—the alleged plagiarism of the very same materials
subject of the instant case.

In this petition, UE, however, asserts that the case of respondents substantially varies from Rocamora so as not to warrant the application
of said rule.

Indeed, the CA erred when it relied on Our ruling in University of the East v. Adelia Rocamora in resolving the present dispute. Our
decision in Rocamora, rendered via a Minute Resolution, is not a precedent to the case at bar even though it tackles the same violation—
the alleged plagiarism of the very same materials subject of the instant case, which was initiated by respondents' co-author. This is so
since respondents are simply not similarly situated with Rocamora so as to warrant the application of the doctrine of stare decisis.

A legal precedent is a principle or rule established in a previous case that is either binding on or persuasive for a court or other tribunal
when deciding subsequent cases with similar issues or facts.

Here, We find that the Rocamora case is not on all fours with the present dispute, thereby removing it from the application of the principle
of stare decisis. First, herein respondents categorically represented to UE under oath that the Manuals were free from plagiarism—an act
in which their co-author Rocamora did not participate. Second, respondents benefited financially from the sale of the Manuals while
Rocamora did not. Third, respondents acquiesced to UE's decision to terminate their services and even requested the release of and
thereafter claimed the benefits due them.

Aside from these, respondents executed a Certification categorically stating under oath and declaring under pain of perjury that the
manuals are entirely original and free from plagiarism. To reiterate:

We hereby certify that the contents of the manual MECHANICS FOR ECE AND COE by Gertrude R. Regondola, et al. to be used in the
subjects ECE 311N are entirely original and free from plagiarism.

(SGD.)
Gertrudo R. Regondola

(SGD.)
Veronica Masangkay10
As correctly noted by the NLRC in its September 17, 2013 Resolution,11 Rocamora made no such undertaking with respect to the subject
materials. This Certification is crucial in determining the guilt of herein respondents and cannot simply be disregarded.

By expressly guaranteeing to UE that their Manuals were entirely original, coupled by their omission to attribute the copied portions to
the original authors thereof, as per the Memorandum submitted by Chancellor Celso D. Benologa, it is apparent that respondents
represented said copied portions as their own.

More importantly, We find that the CA erred in disregarding the evidence presented by petitioner as regards the issue of plagiarism.

In the assailed ruling, the CA held that petitioner UE failed to prove that respondents were indeed guilty of the charge of misconduct or
dishonesty through plagiarism—a form of academic dishonesty. It found that the evidence does not show that respondents were motivated
with wrongful intent in publishing the manuals.12 In ruling thus, the appellate court heavily relied on the approval of the manual by the
Textbook Evaluation and Publishing Office (TEPO) and the Board of Trustees m exculpating respondents from liability.

The CA also found that their act of allegedly plagiarizing the books of Chenoweth and Singer was not duly proven since the two (2) e-
mails from Chenoweth and Block were not verified such that, therefore, such e-mails afford no assurance of their authenticity and
reliability.13 The CA went on to state that "[h]aving issues on their authenticity and reliability, the allegations in the e-mails are mere
speculations that, therefore, such fact renders such e-mails inadmissible in evidence against petitioners."14

The CA, in its Resolution, thereafter ruled that the evidence charging respondents with plagiarism was inadmissible, viz:

Be that as it may, We reiterate that private respondents failed to sufficiently prove that petitioners were guilty of plagiarism that would
warrant the latter's dismissal from service. In order to prove petitioners' act of plagiarizing the books of Chenoweth and Ferdinand Singer,
private respondents only presented the following: unauthenticated and unverified e-mails from Chenoweth and Block and the Lecture
Guides/Manuals. The e-mails from Chenoweth and Block, being unauthenticated, are, therefore, inadmissible in evidence against
petitioners. Private respondents cannot merely rely on the Lecture Guides/Manuals in order to show that petitioners were guilty of
plagiarism. The reason is that such Lecture Guides/Manuals were duly scrutinized and evaluated by the TEPO, through its Board of
Textbooks Review, and were eventually approved by the UE Board of Trustees. It would be absurd for private respondents to declare the
Lecture Guides/Manuals as plagiarized documents when in the first place, private respondents, through TEPO and the UE Board of
Trustees, had initially scrutinized and approved the same.15

In labor cases, the deciding authority should use every reasonable means to ascertain speedily and objectively the facts, without regard
to technicalities of law and procedure. Technical rules of evidence are not strictly binding in labor cases such as the instant one.16 Thus,
it was error on the part of the CA to disregard the evidence presented by petitioners to establish the act of plagiarism committed by
respondents.

It is worthy to note that the CA failed to examine the actual text written in the manual and compare the same with the work claimed to
have been plagiarized. However, after a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court finds that respondents, indeed, plagiarized
the works of Chenoweth and Singer. It is glaring from a comparison of the subject text that respondents heavily lifted portions of the said
books, as reported in the Memorandum submitted by Chancellor Celso F. Bebologa,17 thus:

FINDINGS:

1.
In his Memorandum dated March 15, 2007, Dean Constantino T. Yap verified Mr. Chenoweth's claim that he is one of the authors of the
textbook "Applied Engineering Mechanics". (EXHIBIT "1")

2.
At least three (3) books containing the names of Masangkay, Rocamora, Regondola, and Tolentino were copied verbatim or with slight
modifications from the following original engineering books:

-
Engineering Mechanics, Second Edition, by Ferdinand L. Singer

-
Applied Engineering Mechanics, Metric Edition, by Alfred Jensen, Harry H. Chenoweth, adapted by David N. Watkins

Another author, Hibbeler, is also mentioned as a source of the "reproduction" but the specific book is not identified (EXHIBITS "2," "3,"
"4," & "5")
Tolentino's name appeared only in one of the three books copied from the original (EXHIBITS "6" TO "6-B," "7" TO "7-B" & "8" TO "8-
B").

3.
No publisher is indicated in the "copied" volumes which are made of low quality paper.

OTHER INFORMATION

-
"Reproduced" copies are sold to students. Copies bought by students are retrieved by professors at the end of the school term. Records
of students who failed to return the "reproduced" copies bought by them are marked LFR and/or NC.

-
Students interested to buy the "reproduced" book are referred to specific bookstores. A bookstore – Special & Journal – with address at
No. 76 Samson Road, Caloocan City is selling the "reproduced" books.

-
Some professors reportedly own or operate printing press facilities. Others are holding personal review classes or having their own review
centers.

-
There are pending lapsed applications for removal of LFR at the Engineering Department. Professors alleged their class records were
lost when required to present them to support the applications.

In a letter requiring respondents to provide the basis of their appeal of their dismissal, Dr. Ester A Garcia quoted the findings of the Faculty
Disciplinary Board:

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1.
From the books of Singer, 558 sentences/figures were plagiarized and used in the manuals of Respondents, either verbatim or with
modification; while from the book of Jensen-Chenoweth, 52 sentences and figures were likewise taken and used in Respondents'
manuals.

2.
Respondents did not mention, as required in Section 184 of the Intellectual Property Law, the sources and the names of the authors of
the textbooks from where they lifted passages, illustrations, and tables used in their manuals.

3.
In their request to TEPO for temporary adoption of the manuals, Respondents certified under oath that the manuals are all original and
free from plagiarism. Other investigation, however, shows otherwise. (emphasis ours)
To this Court, the bulk of the copied text vis-a-vis the said Certification clearly shows wrongful intent on the part of respondents. We
cannot subscribe to the CA ruling that respondents were in good faith since, being the principal authors thereof, they had full knowledge
as to what they were including in their written work. In other words, they knew which portions were truly original and which were not.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that there is sufficient basis for dismissing respondents from service, considering the highest integrity
and morality which the profession requires from its teachers. Respondents plagiarized the works of Chenoweth and Singer by lifting large
portions of the text of the works of said writers without properly attributing the copied text, and, to make matters worse, they represented
under oath that no portion of the Manuals were plagiarized when, in truth and in fact, huge portions thereof were improperly lifted from
other materials.

Lastly, it is well to emphasize that Rocamora strongly opposed her dismissal from service as contained in her December 3, 2007 Letter,18
where she invoked denial of due process in her termination, denied having committed plagiarism or benefiting from the printing of the
materials in question, and "sincerely hop[ing] that the [Board of Trustees] x x x, will see the injustice [she] got which ought to be reversed
and reconsidered."19
Such, however, is not so for herein respondents. It is well to emphasize that in her June 2, 2008 Letter,20 respondent Masang kay
requested the recomputation of the amounts due in her favor after said termination, as well as the application of said amounts to her car
loan balance. She was even cooperative with the procedure, asking the management to advise her should there be a need for her to
prepare and accomplish her time records for purposes of recomputing her salary.

As to Regondola, aside from the cash and check vouchers21 that he signed after receiving the amounts due him after said termination,
it does not appear that he made any similar letter request or appeal, unlike Masangkay or Rocamora, respectively.

Indeed, rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to
a third person with a right to be recognized by law.22 Within the context of a termination dispute, waivers are generally looked upon with
disfavor and are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the measure of a worker's legal
rights. If (a) there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (b) the terms of the settlement
are unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such quitclaims must be struck down as invalid or illegal.23

Thus, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where
there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable
on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so
voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction
must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.24

In the case at bar, We find no reason to rule that respondents did not waive their right to contest UE's decision. Based on their actuations
subsequent to their termination, it is clear that they were amenable to UE's decision of terminating their services on the ground of academic
dishonesty. Nowhere can we find any indication of unwillingness or lack of cooperation on respondents' part with regard to the events
that transpired so as to convince Us that they were indeed constrained to forego their right to question the management's decision.
Neither do we find any sign of coercion nor intimidation, subtle or otherwise, which could have forced them to simply accept said decision.
In fact, based on their qualifications, this Court cannot say that respondents and UE do not stand on equal footing so as to force
respondents to simply yield to UE's decision. Furthermore, there is no showing that respondents did not receive or received less than
what is legally due them in said termination.

In sum, We are of the view that their acceptance of UE's decision is voluntary and with full understanding thereof, tantamount to a waiver
of their right to question the management's decision to terminate their services for academic dishonesty. It is as though they have waived
any and all claims against UE when they knowingly and willingly acquiesced to their dismissal and opted to receive the benefits due them
instead.

We also find that they genuinely accepted petitioner University's decision at that time and that their filing of the complaint almost three (3)
years later was a mere afterthought and, in their own words, inspired by their colleague's victory.25

In the light of the foregoing, the Rocamora case cannot be used as a precedent to the case at bar. In view of the substantial evidence
presented by petitioner UE that respondents committed plagiarism, then the complaint for illegal dismissal must, therefore, be dismissed
for utter lack of basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

TADEO-MATIAS VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration
of presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).4 The allegations of the petition read:

[Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a resident of 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
[Wilfredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Arayat, Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]
The [petitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;
After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at 106 Molave street, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
[Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to again serve as a member
of the Philippine Constabulary;
[Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated with the
[p]etitioner nor to his relatives;
That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission, [Wilfredo] was already declared missing
since 1979 x x x;
Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her] beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the
Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he
was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army;
[W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope, and after more than three (3) decades of
waiting, the [petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her
age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;
[T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least a declaration of presumptive death by the
Honorable Court;
That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac City RTC. A copy of the petition was then
furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic).5

On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:7

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for purposes of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari.8

On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the Republic and setting aside the decision of the
RTC. It accordingly disposed:

WFIEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.

The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:

The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC
does not apply to the instant petition as it was clear that petitioner does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking the
presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.

Be that as it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without
authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390
or Article 391 of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence
that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead—which presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but
itself cannot be the subject of an independent action or proceeding.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence, this appeal.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal.

The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have
been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside.

RTC Erred in Declaring the Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's Petition for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Not Based on Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil Code
A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.

It can be recalled that the RTC, in the fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner's petition by declaring Wilfredo
presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, the RTC gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.9 This is wrong.

The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the application of Article
41 of the FC because petitioner was not seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death of Wilfredo as a prerequisit e for
remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any
other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended."10

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying
on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code11as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose, to wit:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.

Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly
improper. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of
the FC.

Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is to Declare
a Person Presumptively Dead Under the Civil Code, Like that Filed by the Petitioner Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our Jurisdiction
The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The decision itself is objectionable.

Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC
should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to take cognizance of the
same.

The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw.12 In the said
case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of death13 is merely one of evidence that—while may be invoked in any action or
proceeding—cannot be the lone subject of an independent action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:

The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such
person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case,
either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently
of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or
special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent
husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the
petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption
is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption
only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question
or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the
parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations
arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgement, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact
established, by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or
upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially
provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from
in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.
(Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

The above ruling in Szatraw has since been used by the subsequent cases of Lukban v. Republic14 and Gue v. Republic15 in disallowing
petitions for the declaration of presumptive death based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, implicitly, also those based on Article 391
of the Civil Code).

Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the considerations why a petition for declaration
of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:16
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a court or a. tribunal to presume that a person is
dead upon the establishment of certain facts.

Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare a person
presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action,
there would be no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established.

A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively
based thereon, would never really become "final" as the same only confirms the existence of a prima facie or disputable presumption.
The function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between litigants is thereby compromised.

Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary.
The presumption in the said articles is already established by law.
Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition that—like the one filed by the petitioner
in the case at bench—only seeks to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized
by law.17 Hence, by acting upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of presumptive death, the RTC violated
prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in setting aside the RTC's
decision.

II

Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is minded to make.

It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the misconception that a court declaration is required in
order to establish a person as presumptively dead for purposes of claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman under pertinent
laws.18 This misconception is what moved petitioner to file her misguided petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo
and what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for death benefits either before the
Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office (PVAO) or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

What the Court finds deeply disconcerting, however, is the possibility that such misconception may have been peddled by no less than
the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such agencies, as a matter of practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the petitioner, to
first secure a court declaration of presumptive death before processing the death benefits of a missing serviceman.

In view of the foregoing circumstance, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following guidelines—culled from relevant law and
jurisprudential pronouncements—to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar
to that of the petitioner:

The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce a court
declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, on the
basis of evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be
applied or not. It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law,
without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the said articles are established.19 Hence, requiring the
claimant to further secure a court declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes
established jurisprudence on the matter.20]

In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as
the case may be, any "evidence" which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and/or under the
circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to here excludes a court
declaration of presumptive death.

The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the claimant and determine their sufficiency to
establish the requisite factual conditions specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise.
If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the
presumption of death and pay the latter's claim. 4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not
sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, the claimant may file
an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the
Court. And finally, should such recourse still fail, the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.

While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate
experience of the petitioner would no longer be replicated in the future.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.