*Hi! Sorry ito muna, naiwan ko kasi flash drive ko sa dorm nandon yung iba huhu.

* If lengthy yung iba for you, ikaw na lang bahala magcut. Carried away kasi minsan 😊
* Sorry hindi sunod-sunod sa may gawing baba, pero numbered naman sila.

1. Tanada vs Tuvera
G.R No. 63915, December 29, 1986

Facts:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they
claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees. The petitioners are, this time, to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision.

Issue:

Whether or not publication is necessary before a law can take effect

Held:

Yes. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided."

2. People vs. Patalin

G.R. No. 125539, July 27, 1999

Facts:

Alfonso Patalin and Alex Mijaque were convicted of Robbery with Multiple Rape. They were meted death penalty. At the
time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death, however, by virtue of the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, death penalty was abolished and all death penalties already imposed were reduced
to reclusion perpetua. The decision for the present case was promulgated on June 14, 1995, after the effectivity of RA
7659 which restored the death penalty. Appellants now contend that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty
as the same was suspended upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the abolition of the death penalty benefits the accused-appellant
Held:

Yes. A person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insists that it shall remain unchanged for his
benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any
omission to legislate on a particular matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to
impair a right that accrued under the old law. Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their
retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or existing rights.

3. Accenture vs. CIR

G.R No. 190102, July 11, 2012

Facts:

Accenture filed an administrative claim of refund for VAT before DOF. The latter did not act on such claim. This
prompted Accenture to file a claim for refund and the latter ruled against Accenture. On appeal to the CTA En bank,
Accenture argued that prior to the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9337, there was no requirement
that the services must be rendered to a person engaged in business conducted outside the Philippines to qualify for
zero-rating. The CTA En Banc agreed that because the case pertained to the third and the fourth quarters of taxable year
2002, the applicable law was the 1997 Tax Code, and not R.A. 9337. Still, it ruled that even though the provision used in
Burmeister was Section 102(b)(2) of the earlier 1977 Tax Code, the pronouncement requiring recipients of services to be
engaged in business outside the Philippines to qualify for zero-rating was applicable to the case at bar, because Section
108(B)(2) of the 1997 Tax Code was a mere reenactment of Section 102(b)(2) of the 1977 Tax Code.

Issue:

Whether or not Burmeister is applicable in this case

Held:

Yes. Even though Accenture’s Petition was filed before Burmeister was promulgated, the pronouncements made in that
case may be applied to the present one without violating the rule against retroactive application. When this Court
decides a case, it does not pass a new law, but merely interprets a preexisting one. When this Court interpreted Section
102(b) of the 1977 Tax Code in Burmeister, this interpretation became part of the law from the moment it became
effective. It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
interpreted law carried into effect.

4. CIR vs. San Roque

G.R No. 187485, Feb. 12, 2013

Facts:

San Roque Power Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation, and Philix Mining Corporation, are all domestic
corporations having their respective line of business. The petition stemmed from the separate claims of the parties
before the CIR for tax refund and/or credit. The respective petitions were decided on the basis of their filing of such
within the periods prescribed by the law. Thus, after review, the CTA En Banc rendered the following judgments: With
respect to San Roque Corporation, the CTA En Banc denied CIRs petition holding that San Roque's judicial claim was not
prematurely filed. As regards to Taganito Mining Corporation, the CTA En Banc granted the CIRs petition on the ground
that Taganitos judicial claim was prematurely filed. As to Philex Mining Corporation, the CTA En Banc denied Philex’s
petition on the ground that its judicial claim long after the expiration of the 120-day period.

Issue:

Whether or not failure to comply with the 120-day mandatory period renders its petition for review with the CTA void

Held:

No. Article 5 of the Civil Code provides, "Acts executed against provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity." San Roque’s void petition for review cannot be legitimized by the
CTA or this Court because Article 5 of the Civil Code states that such void petition cannot be legitimized "except when
the law itself authorizes [its] validity." There is no law authorizing the petition’s validity.

5. University of the Philippines vs. Dizon

G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012

Facts:

UP entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation for the construction of
the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of
the Philippines in Los Baños. In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three
progress billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The third billing was
not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit. Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to pay
the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid
billing and to recover various damages. RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs and thereafter issued a writ of
execution against UP. U.P. System’s deposit with DBP was garnished pursuant to a lawful writ of execution.

Issue:

Whether or not UP’s deposit can be held under garnishment

Held:

No. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the
use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the
funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The
adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately
enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.

6. Rieta vs. People

G.R. No. 147817 August 12, 2004 FELICISIMO

Facts:

After a car chase, Col. Lacson and his men searched a vehicle and found several firearms. The persons in the car
belonged to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be equipped with mission orders. During that same
incident, when the cargo truck which was accompanied by the car during the car chase was searched, 305 cases of blue
seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside. Rieta, one of the passengers of the seized cargo truck, denied any
knowledge of the alleged smuggling of the blue-seal cigarettes. He alleged that the cargo truck was not opened in their
presence, nor were the contents thereof shown to them upon their apprehension. These allegations were corroborated
by one of his companions during the incident.

Issue:

Whether or not the arrest by virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754 was invalid, as the law upon
which it was predicated -- General Order No. 60 -- was subsequently declared by the Court, in Tañada v. Tuvera, to have
no force and effect.

Held:

No. The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an imperative
necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive act was in operation should be
duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects. The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 -
- long before our Decision in Tañada and the arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or
simply ignored.

7. Morales vs. International Skills Company

G.R. No. 149285, August 30, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Skills International before the NLRC claiming that he was illegally
dismissed from service by his foreign employer. Respondent Skills International argued that petitioner did not have any
cause of action against it because as a recruitment agency, it could only be held solidarily liable with the employer if the
latter is an accredited principal of the agency.

Issue:

Whether or not the issue of whether respondent Skills International could be held solidarily liable for the alleged illegal
dismissal of petitioner is a question of law, making the remedy of certiorari available to petitioner

Held:

No. There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative
value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.

In this case, the issues brought for our consideration calls for the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
parties and the determination of whether the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals erred in their respective
evaluation of the same. This we cannot do without blurring the difference between a question of fact and a question of
law – a significant distinction as far as the remedy of appeal by certiorari is concerned.
8. In Re: Petition to Sign the Roll of Attorneys: Michael Medado
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

Facts:

Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC.
He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he found
said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC
was probably just an attendance record. He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as important. In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll
number for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide
his roll number. About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the roll of attorneys

Held:

No. While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as it
negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed
to know the law and its consequences. Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Applying these
principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that
what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest
mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member
of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would
have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary
steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

9. Gatchalian vs. Delim

G.R. No. L-56487, October 21, 1991

Facts:

Petitioner boarded as paying passenger a minibus owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway,
a “snapping sound” was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell into
a ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by respondent’s spouse. Before the
spouse left, she had the injured passengers sign an already prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents.
Petitioner was among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a claim to recover actual
and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar
on her forehead. Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the waiver signed by petitioner is valid

Held:

No. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no
doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not
casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a
right vested in such person.

The terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and unequivocal" terms.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered.
Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for
only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while
reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign
the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety.

10. Thomson vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116631, October 28, 1998

Facts:

Petitioner was the Management Consultant of the private respondent, American Chamber of Commerce in the
Philippines (AmCham). While petitioner was still working with private respondent, his superior, Burridge, retired as
AmCham's President. Burridge wanted to transfer his proprietary share in the Manila Polo Club (MPC) to petitioner.
However, through the intercession of Burridge, private respondent paid for the share but had it listed in petitioner's
name. Upon his admission as a new member of the MPC, petitioner paid the transfer fee from his own funds; but private
respondent subsequently reimbursed this amount. Thereafter, MPC issued Proprietary Membership Certificate but
petitioner failed to execute a document recognizing private respondent's beneficial ownership over said share. When
petitioner's contract of employment was up for renewal, he notified private respondent that he would no longer be
available as EVP, but the latter insisted that he stay for 6 months. Pending the negotiation for consultancy arrangement,
private respondent executed a release and quitclaim against petitioner. Private respondent sent a letter to the
petitioner demanding the return and delivery of the MPC share but failed to get a response.

Issue:

Whether or not the private respondent waived the beneficial ownership of MPC share by issuing the Release and
Quitclaim in his favor

Held:

No. The quitclaim executed by private respondent does not clearly show the intent to include therein the ownership
over the MPC share. Private respondent even asserts that at the time the Release and Quitclaim was executed on
September 29, 1989, the ownership of the MPC share was not controversial nor contested. Settled is the rule that a
waiver to be valid and effective must, in the first place, be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt
as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed
to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such
person. If we apply the standard rule that waiver must be cast in clear and unequivocal terms, then clearly the general
terms of the cited release and quitclaim indicates merely a clearance from general accountability, not specifically a
waiver of AmCham's beneficial ownership of the disputed shares.

11. United States vs. Soliman

G.R. No. L-11555, January 6, 1917

Facts:

Soliman was found guilty for false testimony. However, in his defense, he argued that since judgment was entered in this
case on November 23, 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 has been expressly repealed by the enactment of the
Administrative Code, which became effective on July 1, 1916, and that the judgment convicting and sentencing the
accused under the provisions of that statute should not be sustained, and that the repeal of the statute should be held
to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal responsibility of the accused incurred under the provisions
of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code.

Issue:

Whether or not his criminal liability is extinguished

Held:

No. Where an Act of the Commission or of the Philippine Legislature which penalizes an offense, such repeal does not
have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with
violations of the old law prior to its repeal. As to the penalty, it is held that in any case in which a statute prescribing a
penalty for the commission of a specific offense is repealed, and in which the new statute provides new and distinct
penalties for the commission of such offense, the penalty which must be imposed on one who committed the offense
prior to the enactment of the repealing statute is that one which is more favorable to the convict.

12. Kida vs. Senate

G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012

Facts:

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. One of
which is RA 9054 which mandates a supermajority vote of each House of Congress and the approval by ARMM voters in
a plebiscite for purposes of amending RA 9054.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional for being an irrepealable law

Held:

Yes. The supermajority vote requirement for its amendment makes RA 9054 unconstitutional. The state legislature has a
plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction,
either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution
or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so
restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of
repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress
and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot
declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.

13. Ting vs. Velez-Ting

G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009

Facts:

Carmen Velez-Ting filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin Ting suffered from psychological incapacity
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. RTC ruled in
favor of respondent declaring the marriage void ab initio. Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Santos and Molina guidelines should not be applied
retroactively to this case. CA granted such motion and sustained the ruling of the RTC

Issue:

1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the
Santos and Molina cases
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration
of nullity of marriage has been liberalized

Held:

1. No. The interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute
is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith.
2. Yes. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

14. Castro vs. Deloria

G.R. No. 163586, January 27, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with
Malversation of Public Funds. Petitioner pleaded not guilty. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information for lack of
juriscidiction and lack of authority of the ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,
petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against her was
cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the
Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. RTC denied the motion,
stating that the Court set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy and issued a March 20, 2001 Resolution expressly
recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the ombudsman has the authority to file the information

Held:

Yes. Where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed
incorporated at the moment of its legislation. In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no
declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by the
public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9,
1999 Decision in the same case.

15. Virtucio vs. Alegarbes

G.R. No. 187451, August 29, 2012

Facts:

Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed a homestead application for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land. His
application was approved. The land, however, was subdivided into 3 lots. Alegarbes opposed the homestead
applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the whole area, including two
lots thereof. The Director of Lands rendered a decision denying Alegarbes' protest and amending the latter's application
to exclude 2 lots. Only one lot was given due course. RTC ruled in favor of Virtucio’s application. CA declared Alegarbes
are the owner.

Issue:

Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the for Recovery of Possession and Ownership in Custodio vs.
Alegarbes (CA case) which contains same factual circumstances as in this case and ruled against JOSE ALEGARBES.

Held:

No. It is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent. The principle of stare decisis enjoins
adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle
that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's insistence that it was erroneous for the CA
to disregard its earlier decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls upon this Court to adhere to that decision by
invoking the stare decisis principle, which is not legally possible because only final decisions of this Court are considered
precedents.

16. Montaje vs. People

G.R. No. 183449, March 12, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner filed with the CA a motion for extension of time to file petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
praying for an extended period of 15 days from May 21, 2007, or until June 5, 2007, within which to file his petition.
Petitioner subsequently filed his petition for review on June 5, 2007. On September 21, 2007, the CA issued its assailed
Resolution dismissing the petition outright for being filed out of time.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in denying due course to his petition for review for being filed out of time

Held:

Yes. Based on the Rules of Court, where the last day of the period for doing any act required by law falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. In this case,
the original period for filing the petition for review with the CA was a Saturday. Petitioner's filing of his motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review on May 21, 2007, the next working day which followed the last day for
filing which fell on a Saturday, was therefore on time. The CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out of
time based in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day extension period prayed for should be tacked to the original period
and commences immediately after the expiration of such period. Thus, counting 15 days from the expiration of the
period which was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on June 5, 2007 was already two days late. However, we find the
circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.

17. Felipe vs. Eleuterio

G.R. No. L-4606, May 30, 1952

Facts:

In an oratorical contest, first honor was given by the board of five judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor to Emma
Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the court of the first instance of that province to reverse that award, alleging that
one of the judges had fallen to error in grading her performance. After a hearing, and over the objection of the other
four judges of the contest, the court declared Emma Imperial winner of the first place. Hence this special civil action
challenging the court's power to modify the board's verdict.

Issue:

Whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical competition

Held:

No. For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges. Members of the Court
have taken part in them either as contestants in their school days, or as members of the board of judges afterwards.
They know some (few) verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed
to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such
contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable. The participants are supposed to join the competition to
contribute to its success by striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary. No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the
contestants, because theirs was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a
demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or
referees or judges.
18. University of the East vs. Jader
G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000

Facts:

Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law. During his last year, 1st semester, he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practical Court where he was given an incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of
the incomplete grade which was approved by the dean after the payment of required fees. He took the exam and the
professor gave him a grade of 5. The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the
invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of absence from work from April 20-
Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes
and was not able to take the bar exam. Jader sued UE for damages due to UE’s negligence.

Issue:

Whether or not Jader is entitled to damages

Held:

Yes. Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. Schools and professors
cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to
inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may
be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages.

19. Radio Comm of the Philippines vs. CA

G.R. No. L-44748, August 29, 1986

Facts:

The basis of the complaint against the defendant corporation is a telegram allegedly containing defamatory words sent
through its Manila Office to the offended party, Loreto Dionela. Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the
defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue
embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know of said defamatory
words. Defendant corporation as a defense, alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the
sending and receiving operators and that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form
part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. RTC ruled in favor of Dionela. CA affirmed the
ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not CA erred in holding that the liability of petitioner-company-employer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20
of the Civil Code, Articles on Human Relations.
Held:

No. Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages. Everytime a
person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or
fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately. There is no question that in the case at bar,
libelous matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a
clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the
private respondent.

20. Wassmer vs. Velez

G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on September 4,
1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone their wedding
because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again. Beatriz sued Velez for
damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default. Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to
pay plaintiff actual, moral, and exemplary damages.

Issue:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case

Held:

Yes. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only
to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid.

105. MALLION v. ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 141528, 31 October 2006

FACTS:

Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, seeking for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Editha Alcantara, citing the latter’s alleged psychological incapacity. RTC denied the petition
and so was the appeal filed before the CA dismissed. The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed.
After such attained finality, Oscar filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC, this time
alleging that his marriage with Editha was void for being celebrated without a valid marriage license.

ISSUE: W/N an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on lack of valid marriage license be raised in the same
proceeding on the ground of psychological incapacity

HELD
No. instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same
took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, Oscar impliedly conceded
that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. He is now bound by this admission and is
now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the first civil case.

106. SANTOS v. CA
GR No. 112019, 04 January 1995

FACTS:
Leouel Santos married Julia Bedia. They lived with Julia’s parents and eventually, Julia gave birth to a son.
However, their relationship turned sour and it was in 1988 when Julia left for the United States despite Leouel’s pleas to
dissuade her.

Seven months after her departure, Julia called Leouel for the first time and promised to return home. She never
did. When Leouel had the chance to visit the United States, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with
Julia, but all efforts were to no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to come home, Leouel filed with the RTC a complaint for “Voiding of Marriage Under
Article 36 of the Family Code”. He argued that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate
with him, are circumstances which clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter married life.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage should be declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
No. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.

107. YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 184063, 24 January 2011

FACTS:

After 35 years of marriage, Cynthia filed a petition praying that her marriage with Patricio be declared void by
reason of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

She averred that throughout their marriage, she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the
children. Patricio did nothing but eat and sleep all day and spend time with friends. Also, he allegedly cannot find a
stable job and was engaged in gambling. Further, Cynthia alleged that when Patricio started threatening to kill her, she
decided to live separately from him. She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that Patricio was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Both the RTC and CA denied the petition.

ISSUE: W/N marriage is void due to psychological incapacity.

HELD:
 No. There is no showing that Patricio was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that he was
unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, his efforts, though few and far between, showed an
understanding of his duty to provide for his family. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or
irresponsibility is not relevant. What is clear is that Patricio, in showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with
his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity.

108. Halili v. Halili G.R. No. 165424 June 6, 2009

FACTS:

Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to Chona Santos-Halili null and void based on his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed Chona in civil rites
thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife. They started fighting
constantly, at which point Lester decided to stop seeing Chona and started dating other women. It was only upon
making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lester’s marriage to Chona declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity.

HELD:

It was sufficiently established that Lester had a psychological condition that was grave, incurable and had a
deeply rooted cause. It was also shown that he is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders
him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the Court declared the marriage null and void.

109. VELASCO v. VELASCO

CA-G.R. No. 36075, 16 February 1995

FACTS:

While being married to Ramon Velasco, Norma Velasco had an adulterous relationship with a certain Donald
Tan. This prompted Ramon to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Norma’s
psychological incapacity. Ramon alleged that Norma even boasted to him that Donald had a bigger physique, was
macho, and was better in bed. He also showed letters written by Norma, stating how much she misses Donald – these
facts not being denied by Norma. However, it was also shown that Ramon was likewise psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations.

ISSUE: W/N the defense of in pari delicto is applicable in psychological incapacity cases.

HELD:
No. The Court held that both spouses were suffering from “psychological incapacity,” but it said it was worse for
the wife. In ordinary contracts, if there is pari delicto, the court would leave the parties where they are. But in actions
for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of “psychological incapacity,’’ such defense is unavailing.

Since there is no pari delicto in “psychological incapacity’’ cases, any of the parties or both can commence the
action to declare the marriage void. Even the one suffering from “psychological incapacity’’ can commence the action.
The reason is that, the law does not make any distinction. When the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.

110. MARCOS v. MARCOS

GR No. 136490, 19 October 2000

FACTS:
Brenda filed before the RTC a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
She alleged that due to Wilson’s failure to engage in any employment, they would often quarrel and he would hit and
beat her. He would even force her to have sexual intercourse with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict
physical harm on their children for a slight mistake. Brenda also submitted herself to a psychologist for psychological
evaluation while Wilson did not.

The RTC held Wilson was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. However, the CA ruled
that it is essential to allege the root cause of the spouse’s psychological incapacity which should also be medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. Wilson was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about Wilson by the psychiatrist were based only on
the interviews conducted with Brenda.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA could set aside the findings of the RTC simply because Wilson did not subject himself to
psychological evaluation.

HELD:

No. The guidelines set in Santos vs. CA do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.

111. MATIAS v. MATIAS

G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001

FACTS:

Erlinda Matias filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of her husband Avelino Dagdag’s
psychological incapacity. Matias alleged that Dagdag usually left without an explanation, engaged in drinking sprees,
forced to have sexual intercourse with her despite her refusal, and was even imprisoned for some crime.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage is void due to psychological incapacity.

HELD:

No. Erlinda failed to comply with the guideline set in Molina, speicifically one that requires that the root cause
of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive
from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The
investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court’s
decision was prematurely rendered.
113. CHI MING TSOI v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 119190, 16 January 1997,

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi were married on 22 May 1988. On the night of their wedding day, they slept
together on the same bed in the same room. According to Gina, they were supposed to have sexual intercourse, but Chi
Ming Tsoi turned his back on her and went to sleep. It continually happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
When they had their honeymoon in Baguio City for four days, Chi Ming Tsoi distanced himself and there was still no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them.

Because of this, they both submitted themselves for medical examinations. The result of Gina’s physical
examination was she was healthy, normal, and still a virgin. As for Chi Ming Tsoi, his penis was examined to find out
whether he was impotent. The result showed that there was no evidence of impotency and he was capable of erection
and of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged refusal to have sexual intercourse constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD:
Yes. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

117. DEDEL v. DEDEL

GR No. 151867,29 January 2004

FACTS:

David alleged that during their marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and
mother. She had extra-marital affairs. Despite undergoing psychiatric treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with a Jordanian national whom she married and had two children. Thereafter, Sharon abandoned David
and joined her Jordanian lover with their two children.

A psychological evaluation on Sharon showed that such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage
like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aberrant sexual behavior of Sharon falls within psychological incapacity under the Family
Code.

HELD:

No. Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.

119. REPUBLIC v. HAMANO

GR No. 149498, 20 May 2004

FACTS:

Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio
Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity, which incapacity became manifest only after
the celebration of their marriage.

Lolita alleged that one month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return in their
conjugal home by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with their family. After sending money to Lolita for two months,
Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times, but he never responded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lolita was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio to perform his marital
obligations.

HELD:

No. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness.

114. ANTONIO v. REYES

GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:

Barely a year after their first meeting, Leonilo Antonio and Marie Reyes got married. During the subsistence of
their marriage, Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events. She did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as
an adopted child of her family. After being separated, Antonio filed a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared
null and void based on the latter’s psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage can be declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity

HELD:
 Yes. Reyes’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories with fictitious characters enabled her to live in a
world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity were medically identified as was
sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of her psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from
contracting marriage without their consent. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to
reconcile with her, but her behavior remains unchanged.

174. MATTHEWS v. TAYLOR

GR No. 164584, 22 June 2009

FACTS:

Benjamin Taylor, a British citizen, was married to Joselyn Taylor, a Filipina. While their marriage was subsisting,
Joselyn bought a lot in Boracay which was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s
funds, constructed improvements therein.

After their relationship turned sour, Joselyn leased the subject lot to Philip Matthews. Claiming that the
Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his consent, Benjamin filed an action to nullify
the sale. Both the RTC and CA held that the lease was null and void.

ISSUE: W/N the lease is null and void for the lack of consent of Benjamin.

HELD:

No. Aliens are disqualified from acquiring private lands as proscribed by the Constitution. Considering that Joselyn
was the "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said lot, she acquired sole ownership. This is true even Benjamin’s claim was
sustained that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no
implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be
made that the subject property was part of the conjugal property of the spouses.

176. WONG v. IAC

GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991

FACTS:

Romario Henson was married to Katrina. During their marriage, Romario bought a parcel of land registered in his
name. Meanwhile, without the knowledge of Romario, Katrina entered into a loan agreement with spouses Wong but
she failed to settle the same. Consequently, a collection for sum of money was filed against Katrina and a court order
was issued against her. However, her properties were insufficient to settle her debts so a writ of execution was issued
upon her properties, including the lots exclusively owned by Romario. The lots were placed at an auction and were sold
to spouses Wong.

ISSUE: W/N the debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through the conjugal property.

HELD:

No. The subject lots were acquired during the marriage hence, presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership
in the absence of proof to the contrary. The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she
exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of Romario nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. In as
much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still
execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.

181. Ayala Investment v. CA

GR. No. 118305, 12 February 1998

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC).
As added security for the credit line, Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, made himself as a surety on behalf
of PBM.

Upon failure of PBM to pay the loan, the court judgment ordering PBM and Ching to settle the obligation to
AIDC was enforced against three conjugal properties of Ching. Despite opposition, said properties were sold to AIDC.
Ching filed an opposition stating that judgment cannot be enforced against the conjugal partnership because the subject
loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property can be held liable to satisfy a loan when one of the spouses acted as a
surety

HELD:

No. Payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. AIDC failed to
prove that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The debt is a corporate debt and AIDC’s
right of recourse against Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. It does not extend to the
conjugal partnership of gains of his family.

182. SPOUSES BUADO v. CA

GR No. 145222, 24 April 2009

FACTS:

To satisfy her civil liability in a slander case, the property of Erlinda Nicol was sold at a public auction due to the
insufficiency of her properties to satisfy her liability against Spouses Buado. After having a certificate of sale issued to
the spouses, Romulo Nicol, the husband of Erlinda filed a complaint for annulment of sale. Spouses Buado opposed,
averring that the conjugal property shall satisfy the obligation of Erlinda, which redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil liability of Erlinda arising from a criminal case can be charged upon the conjugal
property.

HELD:

No. The conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless
some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. Parenthetically, an obligation arising
from a crime cannot be said to have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

183. JOHNSON AND JOHNSON (PHILS), INC. v. CA

GR No. 102692, 23 September 1996

FACTS:

A complaint for collection of sum of money was filed by Johnson and Johnson against spouses Delilah and Alejo
Vinluan. However, the trial court ruled that Delilah was solely liable to pay the obligations she incurred. Two notices of
levy on execution covered not only her exclusive properties, but also the properties of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Vinluan. Alejo opposed the execution on the ground that the conjugal partnership should not be held liable to
pay the debts incurred solely by Delilah and he did not consent thereto.

ISSUE: W/N the conjugal partnership of Spouses Vinluan can be held liable for the obligation of Delilah.

HELD:

No. In order to bind the conjugal partnership and its properties, the New Civil Code provides that the debts and
obligations contracted by either the husband or the wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that the
husband must consent to his wife's engaging in business.

184. RAVINA v. VILLA ABRILLE

GR No. 160708, 16 October 2009

FACTS:

Spouses Mary Ann and Pedro Villa Abrille acquired a parcel of land (Lot 7) which was registered in their names.
Said lot was adjacent to a parcel of land exclusively owned by Pedro. The spouses then built a house on Lot 7 and
Pedro’s lot.

By himself, Pedro sold the house and the two lots to Spouses Ravina despite Mary Ann’s objections and without
her consent. Thereafter, Mary Ann filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale. Pedro argued that the sale is valid
because he exclusively owned the parcel of land. The RTC nullified the sale, but the CA reversed it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale made to Spouses Ravina was valid

HELD:

No. Under the Family Code, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property is governed by Article 124 of the same
Code that treats such a disposition to be void if done without the consent of both the husband and the wife. But the
annulment of the sale does not extend to the lot exclusively owned by Pedro.

188. MANACOP v. CA

GR No. 104875, 13 November 1992

FACTS:

Spouses Florante and Euaceli purchased a residential lot on March 1972. Meanwhile, Florante failed to pay the
sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between Manacop corporation and FF Cruz and Co. The
latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the
former. As a consequence of the court order granting the prayer of the complainant, the residential lot of spouses
Manacop was subject to attachment.

Florante Manacop insisted that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his
family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE: W/N the subject residential lot is exempted from attachment.

HELD:
 No. The residential house and lot of Florante became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the
Family Code. Such provision does not mean that it has a retroactive effect such that all family residences are deemed
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Since Florente incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt
form attachment.

197. FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON

GR No. 124853, 24 February 1998

FACTS:

While being married to Lilia Jison, Francisco Jison impregnated Esperanza Amolar who was then employed as a
nanny in their household. As a result, Monina was born. However, when Francisco refused to expressly recognize
Monina, she prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and for Francisco to support and treat her as such.

Monina alleged that since childhood, she enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of
Francisco. She averred that Francisco supported her education up until she obtained a master’s degree and became a
professional. Further, she made occasional and discreet visits at Francisco’s because his wife did not want to see her.
Whenever they meet, Monina would address Francisco as “Daddy”. She also freely entered Francisco’s office as
everyone in there knew her as Francisco’s child.

Francisco denied all the allegations. The RTC dismissed Monina’s prayer but the Court of Appeals reversed such.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monina was able to establish her filiation with Francisco.

HELD:

Yes. To establish illegitimate filiation under Article 175 in relation to 172(2) of the Family Code, a “high standard
of proof” is required. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also
the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but society
and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.

In this case, Monina’s proof of filiation which was anchored on the “open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child” met the “high standard of proof” requirement. As such, Francisco’s bare denial cannot
overcome the pieces of evidence presented by Monina which established her filiation to him.

201. Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong

GR No. 97906, 21 May 1992

FACTS:
 Maximo Wong is the adopted son of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.
Prior to his adoption, he was known as Maximo Alcala, Jr and upon reaching the age of 22, he filed a petition to revert to
his former name, surnamed Alcala. Concepcion Wong did not oppose such desire.

He averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as
Wong suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact, he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community.
Such use likewise hampered his business and social life, him being the subject of ridicule for carrying a Chinese surname.

Both the RTC and CA granted Maximo’s petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reasons given by Maximo warrant a change of surname despite his status as of being an
adopted child.

HELD

Yes. While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted
child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be stressed that the change of the surname of the
adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings.

In this case, the arguments of Maximo warrant a valid, sufficient, and justifiable cause to change his surname to
Alcala. It is not fair to construe such reversion as crass ingratitude to his adoptive parents, taking into consideration that
his adoptive mother consented to such act.

202. SAYSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 89224-25, 23 January 1992

FACTS:

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children – Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios, and Teodoro. Following the
death of Eleno and Rafaela, Teodoro, who was married to Isabel Bautista, died in 1972. Isabel died nine years later. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all claiming to be their children.

The four siblings of Teodoro filed for the partition of the intestate estate of the latter and Isabel. This action was
resisted by Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel who filed their own complaint for partition, claiming to be the decedents’
lawful descendants. Delia and Edmundo being adopted while Doribel was a legitimate child.

Petitioners argue that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel was already born when the
decree of adoption was issued, thus disqualifying the decedents from adopting, as provided for by law. Likewise, they
also discredit that Doribel is not the legitimate daughter of the decedents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Delia and Edmundo, being adopted children, are entitled to inherit from the estate of the
deceased.
HELD:

Yes. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. Assuming
the petitioners were proper parties, they should have seasonably appealed the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth
of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo.

Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted
children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple.

203. ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 118671, 29 January 1996

FACTS:

Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, Maria
Montes, and his three granddaughters, Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond.
Upon Hilario’s death, Edmond, the executor, did not probate his father’s will.

Consequently, he leased out a house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which was bequeathed to his three children.
When the will was admitted to probate, the court ordered the deposit of the rental deposits accrued from the lease.
Maria prayed for the release of the rentals to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline.

The probate court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to
cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the probate court erred in granting the release of funds for the support of the testator’s
grandchildren.

HELD:

No. Under section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from
the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it
to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.

204. CERVANTES vs. FAJARDO

GR No. 79955, 27 January 1989

FACTS:

Angelie Anne Cervantes, a minor, was born to Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, common-law husband and
wife. They offered the child for adoption to Spouses Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, who took
custody of the child. The Petition for adoption was granted by the RTC which freed Angelie from parental authority of
her natural parents and adopt the surname Cervantes.
 Conrado and Gina sent a letter to Spouses Cervantes demanding P150 000, otherwise, they would get back
Angelie. Upon refusal of the spouses, Gina took Angelie at Spouses Cervantes’ residence and did not return the child
saying that she had no desire to give up the child unless they get the desired payment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Angelie’s natural parents can have parental authority over her.

HELD

No. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the
contending parents.

Here, Conrado is legally married to a woman other than Gina and his open cohabitation with her will not accord
the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow into an upright and moral-minded person. Upon the other
hand, spouses Cervantes who are legally married appear to be in all aspects capable of supporting Angelie and giving her
a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married
man, can most likely give her.

205. REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING

GR No. 115640, 15 March 1995

FACTS:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding maintained a common law relationship of husband and wife, while
Teresita was lawfully married to another. Subsequently, two children named Rosalind and Reginald, were born out of
wedlock. Reynaldo and Teresita eventually got married.

When their relationship turned sour, the two decided to separate, where Teresita left for Pittsburgh, leaving
Reynaldo and her two children. Upon return in the Philippines, she filed a petition to gain custody over the children. The
two children, who were both over the age of 7, were under the custody of Reynaldo, as granted by the trial court.
Rosalind voluntarily chose to be with her father. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Teresita has rightful custody over her children.

HELD

No. Under the Family Code, if a child is over seven, his choice is paramount, but the court may find the chosen
parent unfit. However, whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount consideration must always be
the best interest of the child.

In this case, the Court refused to grant Teresita the custody over her children because she is deemed unfit. As
per the testimony of Rosalind, the child suffered emotional and psychological trauma since she was a child because she
witnessed the clandestine infidelity of her mother. More so, there are no compelling reasons which tend to show that
Reynaldo is an unfit parent.

207. PEOPLE v. VILLAR

GR No. L-54063, 24 July 1981

FACTS:

Francisco Villar was charged with murder. He then withdrew his original plea of not guilty and substituted it with
a plea of guilty.

After changing his plea, the trial court allowed Villar to present evidence to prove his claim of minority as a
privileged mitigating circumstance. He showed the certified true copy of his Certificate of Live Birth which states that he
was born on October 26, 1961. However,the certificate was prepared and submitted by Francisco's mother only more
than 17 years after the date when Francisco was said to have been born and 4 days before he changed his plea.

The appellant invokes Art. 410 of the Civil Code which reads: "Art. 410. The books making up the civil register
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
herein contained."

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 410 warrants the proof of his minority.

HELD:

No. Article 410 makes the information on the Certificate of Live Birth only prima facie but not conclusive evidence. This
must be so because the Local Civil Registrar merely receives the information submitted to him; he does not inquire into
its veracity. Moreover, to regard as conclusive the content of a certificate of live birth can lead to absurd results.