SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120547. January 29, 2001.]

PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee, vs . EDISON PLAZO,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1
accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Appellant was convicted of murder. The mother of the victim testi ed that she saw
appellant mauling her son and later, chased him with a small bolo and stabbed him several
times on the chest. This was duly supported by the autopsy report that the body sustained
four stab wounds. Defense, on the other hand, claimed self-defense. Allegedly, it was the
victim who drew the bladed weapon and chased appellant. They grappled with the small
bolo and suddenly, the bolo was already imbedded in the chest of the victim. Appellant
then fled to Manila because of threats from the relatives of the victim.
The Court nds no reason to reverse the ndings of the trial court. There is no
evidence to support the claim of self-defense considering the nature, location and number
of wounds sustained in the body of the victim. At any rate, as the qualifying circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation were not duly proven, appellant can only be liable
for the crime of homicide.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF

TRIAL COURT, RESPECTED. — Well-entrenched is the rule that ndings of the trial court as
to the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight, even nality, on appeal, unless
the trial court has failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into
account would materially affect the result of the case. Having had the opportunity to
personally observe the witnesses' demeanor and manner of testifying, the trial judge is in a
better position to pass judgment on their credibility. As observed by the trial court, "Leonor
Fabula testi ed in a straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner." A review of the
records and transcript of stenographic notes leads us to agree with that conclusion.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY ALLEGED INDIFFERENT REACTION IN
WITNESSING A CRIME. — The testimony of witnesses to a crime could not be expected to
be error-free throughout. Different persons have different impressions and recollections of
the same incident. Likewise, we nd nothing extraordinary or unusual about a mother
seeking help from the authorities rst before rushing to help her son. As repeatedly
stressed, there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted
with a strange, startling, or frightful experience. Witnessing a crime is an unusual
experience that elicits different reactions from the witnesses, and for which no clear-cut
standard form of behavior can be drawn.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY RELATION OF WITNESS TO THE VICTIM —
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 [W]hile it was only the mother of the victim who testi ed on the events leading to the
stabbing incident, we have held that the testimony of a single eyewitness is su cient to
support conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward, and found worthy of credence by
the trial court. The mere fact that she is the mother of the victim does not impair her
credibility. Blood relationship between a witness and victim does not, by itself, impair the
credibility of the witness. On the contrary, relationship strengthens credibility, for it is
unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit.
The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon
his conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the crime. More
importantly, Leonor Fabula's version of the stabbing incident, that appellant repeatedly
stabbed her son in the "upper and lower chest area," is duly supported by the ndings of
the medico-legal o cer that the victim sustained four stab wounds in the chest and
abdomen area.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; NEGATED
BY THE ABSENCE OF ELEMENTS THEREOF. — [S]elf-defense as a justifying circumstance
must satisfy the following requirements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (3) lack of
su cient provocation on the part of the accused. The burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the killing was justi ed is on the accused. In doing so, he must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution. Appellant herein failed to prove any of the elements of self-defense. As
correctly pointed out by the trial court, the number of wounds on the body of the victim
negates self-defense. If indeed, the victim was stabbed while the two protagonists were
grappling with the small bolo, then why did the victim sustain four stab wounds? The
nature, location and number of wounds in icted on the victim negate the claim of self-
defense and, instead, indicate a determined effort to kill the victim.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; FLIGHT AS INDICATION OF
GUILT. — [T]he ight of the appellant after the incident betrays the existence of his guilty
conscience. According to his testimony, he went to Manila because his relatives and
residents of their barangay advised him to take care of himself because the relatives of the
victim were running after him. Appellant himself admitted that he hid "for several years."
This conduct is inconsistent with his protestations of self-defense.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; MUST BE
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED. — While the information alleged the attendance of the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, these were not proven by the
prosecution's evidence. Circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility must in no
case rest upon mere presumptions, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be
based on facts of unquestioned existence. It is settled that circumstances which qualify
killing to murder must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. Hence, in the absence
of any circumstance which would qualify the crime of murder, we find that appellant should
be found liable only for the crime of homicide.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; NOT ESTABLISHED. — There was no treachery
because there was no proof in this case as to how the attack started. For treachery to be
present, two conditions must be shown: (1) the employment of means of execution that
give the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate and (2) the deliberate or
conscious adoption of the means of execution. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be
proven as fully and as convincingly as the crime itself. The sole eyewitness testi ed that
when she arrived at the scene, appellant was already boxing her son. Hence, she could not
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 have possibly witnessed the inception of the attack. Any doubt as to the existence of
treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused. Where no particulars are known
regarding the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in
the death of the victim began and developed, it cannot be established from mere
supposition that an accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; NOT ESTABLISHED. — [T]he
prosecution failed to prove the following requisites of evident premeditation: (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the culprit clung to his determination; and (3) su cient lapse of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
9. ID.; HOMICIDE; PROPER PENALTY. — Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal. There being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty of reclusion temporal should be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum of
the indeterminate sentence should be taken from penalty next lower in degree, which is
prision mayor.
10. ID.; ID.; PROPER CIVIL DAMAGES. — The trial court correctly awarded the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity. However, the award of actual damages in the amount
of P15,712.00 was based solely on the bare assertions of the mother of the victim. The
Court can only grant such amount for expenses if they are supported by receipts. In the
absence thereof, no actual damages can be awarded. However, in lieu of actual damages,
temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered where it has been
shown that the victim's family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof
cannot be proved with certainty. We nd the award of P15,000.00 as temperate damages
reasonable. Moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of any evidence to support
its award.

DECISION

QUISUMBING , J : p

On appeal is the decision 2 dated January 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30, convicting appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the victim
P50,000.00 as indemnity, P15,712.00 as actual damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages,
and to pay the costs.
The facts, based on the records, are as follows:
On August 8, 1989, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, Leonor Fabula went out of her
house in May-anao, Tigaon, Camarines Sur to buy sugar at a nearby store. When she
reached the store, she saw appellant boxing her son Romeo Fabula and banging his head
on the post of the store, while asking him why he told the police about his brother and the
location of appellant's house. When Leonor sought to intervene, appellant got angry at her.
She became afraid and asked for help but nobody went near them. Romeo freed himself
from the hold of appellant and ran away. Appellant chased Romeo with a small bolo known
locally as "gatab." Leonor shouted at appellant to stop but the latter did not heed her pleas.
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 Appellant caught up with Romeo and stabbed him at the back causing Romeo to fall on the
ground. Appellant continued to stab Romeo in the upper and lower chest area. Leonor
continued shouting for help and eventually someone came to help. However, when she saw
her son no longer moving, she told the people not to touch or move him because she was
going to the Poblacion of Tigaon to get a policeman.
When Patrolmen Virgilio Azucena and Jose Madera arrived at the scene of the crime,
they saw the fallen body of Romeo with a small bolo imbedded on his chest and the
detached handle of the bolo on the ground near his body. The policemen brought the body
to the Municipal Building where the Municipal Health O cer, Dr. Constancio Tam,
conducted an autopsy. 3
On June 10, 1991, appellant was charged with the crime of murder under the
following Information: 4
"That on or about the 8th day of August, 1989 at Barangay May-Anao,
Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
knife, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloneously (sic) attack, assault and stab one
Romeo Fabula directing the blow on the vital parts of his body which was the
direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs
in such amount as maybe awarded by the Court.

Acts Contrary To Law."

On arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. 5

During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Leonor Fabula,
the mother of the victim; (2) SPO1 Jose Madera and SPO4 Virgilio Azucena, both members
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, and (4) Dr. Constancio A.
Tam, Municipal Health Officer of Tigaon, Camarines Sur.
Leonor Fabula testi ed that she witnessed the stabbing incident and identi ed
appellant as the assailant of her son. She said that the police were looking for appellant's
brother who had a pending case for robbery in Manila. The police asked her son where the
house of appellant's brother was. Her son, who knew nothing of the case, pointed out the
house to the police leading to the arrest of appellant's brother. This angered appellant who
sought out and killed her son. She also testi ed on damages sustained as a result of her
son's death. 6
SPO1 Jose Madera testi ed that he was present during the autopsy and that Dr.
Tam turned over to him the bolo which was imbedded in the body of the victim. He
identified the same bolo in court. 7
SPO4 Virgilio Azucena testi ed that upon the report of Leonor Fabula of the
stabbing incident, he and four others immediately went to the place of the incident in May-
anao, Tigaon. They found the body of the victim in the rice eld some 50 meters away from
the road. The bolo was embedded in the victim's chest and the handle lying beside him. 8
Dr. Constancio A. Tam testified that the victim sustained four stab wounds in the left
upper abdomen, right iliac part of the abdomen, upper part of the left chest, and upper part
of the left back. The weapon was still embedded in the upper left abdomen when he
examined the body. 9 Dr. Tam testi ed that this wound was fatal since it pierced the heart.
He said that the stab wounds could have been caused by a sharp-bladed, sharp-pointed
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 instrument, locally known as "gatab". 1 0
The defense presented as its witnesses the appellant himself and his cousin,
Alfredo Siso. Appellant's version is as follows: HcTSDa

In the afternoon of August 8, 1989, appellant was at a billiard hall in May-anao,

Tigaon, serving as a spotter in a game between Celso Plazo and Alfredo Siso. The victim
suddenly arrived drunk, placed a ball on top of the table, and said that he wanted to put a
bet against Alfredo Siso. Insulted, Alfredo told appellant to pacify the victim. However, the
victim became angry and struck appellant with a billiard stick. Alfredo and Celso helped
pacify the victim who became even angrier, and then drew a bladed weapon saying he
would use it on appellant. Appellant ran away followed by the victim. Appellant slipped and
injured his foot and the victim caught up with him. The two grappled with the small bolo
and suddenly, the bolo was already imbedded in the chest of the victim. Appellant ed and
eventually went to Manila because of the threats of relatives of the victim. Appellant's
cousin, Alfredo, merely testi ed that after the two protagonists ran away, he already went
home. 1 1
After trial, the trial court rendered its decision 1 2 nding appellant guilty of the crime
of murder, disposing thus —
"WHEREFORE, the accused Edison Plazo is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the inherent accessories provided by law, to
indemnify the heirs of the late Romeo Fabula for the latter's death the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); the sum of Fifteen Thousand Seven Hundred
Twelve Pesos (P15,712.00) as actual damages; and the sum of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages, all of Philippine Currency and for the said
accused to pay the costs.

The accused Edison Plazo shall be entitled to full credit of his preventive
imprisonment if he agreed to abide with the rules imposed upon convicted
persons, otherwise, he shall only be entitled to four-fifth (4/5) credit thereof.

SO ORDERED."

Appellant assigns the sole error that — 1 3

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.

In his brief, 1 4 appellant assails the credibility of the testimony of Leonor Fabula, the
victim's mother, considering that (1) contrary to her testimony, the medical ndings did
not indicate that the victim was boxed nor his head banged on the store post; (2) her
testimony that her son was stabbed dead on a ditch did not jibe with the testimony of
SPO4 Azucena that the body of the victim was recovered from the ricefield; and (3) her
actions after seeing her son dead and getting a policeman instead of comforting him was
contrary to normal human conduct. Further, appellant claims that his testimony that he
acted in self-defense was corroborated by the testimony of his cousin, Alfredo Siso. Lastly,
appellant claims there was no treachery because there was no proof as to how the attack
began.
For the State, 1 5 the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that appellant
failed to establish the elements of self-defense considering the number and location of the
wounds of the deceased. Further, the testimony of defense witness Alfredo Siso should
not be given credence because he did not actually witness the stabbing incident. The OSG
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 asserts that treachery attended the killing because appellant unleashed two separate
attacks on the victim, the rst consisted only of st blows, and the second consisted of
the stabbing.
The issues for our consideration pertain to (1) the assessment of credibility of
witnesses, (2) the existence of valid self-defense, and (3) the su ciency of the evidence to
convict appellant of the crime of murder.
Well-entrenched is the rule that ndings of the trial court as to the credibility of
witnesses are accorded great weight, even nality, on appeal, unless the trial court has
failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into account, would
materially affect the result of the case. Having had the opportunity to personally observe
the witnesses' demeanor and manner of testifying, the trial judge is in a better position to
pass judgment on their credibility. 1 6 As observed by the trial court, "Leonor Fabula
testi ed in a straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner." 1 7 A review of the records
and transcript of stenographic notes leads us to agree with that conclusion.
As to the alleged inconsistencies in Fabula's testimony, the fact that the medical
ndings did not indicate that the victim was boxed nor his head banged does not negate
the possibility of such acts. The defense failed to question the medico-legal o cer on the
stand and it cannot now raise such factual matter before this court. As to the location of
the body of the victim, while Leonor Fabula testi ed that her son was stabbed "just by the
ditch of the road of May-anao," 1 8 SPO4 Azucena testi ed that they found the body "in the
rice eld." The records show, however, that on cross-examination, SPO4 Azucena clari ed
that they found the body on the "embankment of the rice- eld (bas-og)." 1 9 Hence, there is
no inconsistency between their testimonies on the matter.
The testimony of witnesses to a crime could not be expected to be error-free
throughout. Different persons have different impressions and recollections of the same
incident. 2 0 Likewise, we nd nothing extraordinary or unusual about a mother seeking help
from the authorities first before rushing to help her son. As repeatedly stressed, there is no
standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,
startling, or frightful experience. 2 1 Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits
different reactions from the witnesses, and for which no clear-cut standard form of
behavior can be drawn. 2 2
Further, while it was only the mother of the victim who testified on the events leading
to the stabbing incident, we have held that the testimony of a single eyewitness is
su cient to support conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward, and found worthy of
credence by the trial court. 2 3 The mere fact that she is the mother of the victim does not
impair her credibility. Blood relationship between a witness and victim does not, by itself,
impair the credibility of the witness. 2 4 On the contrary, relationship strengthens credibility,
for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual
culprit. 2 5 The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness
abandon his conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the crime. 2 6
More importantly, Leonor Fabula's version of the stabbing incident, that appellant
repeatedly stabbed her son in the "upper and lower chest area," 2 7 is duly supported by the
ndings of the medico-legal o cer that the victim sustained four stab wounds in the chest
and abdomen area.
As to appellant's claim of self-defense, there is no evidence to support such
assertion. Self-defense as a justifying circumstance must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity
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 of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (3) lack of su cient provocation on
the part of the accused. 2 8 The burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the
killing was justi ed is on the accused. 2 9 In doing so, he must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. 3 0 Appellant herein
failed to prove any of the elements of self-defense. As correctly pointed out by the trial
court, the number of wounds on the body of the victim negates self-defense. If indeed, the
victim was stabbed while the two protagonists were grappling with the small bolo, then
why did the victim sustain four stab wounds? The nature, location and number of wounds
in icted on the victim negate the claim of self-defense 3 1 and, instead, indicate a
determined effort to kill the victim. 3 2
Further, the ight of the appellant after the incident betrays the existence of his
guilty conscience. 3 3 According to his testimony, he went to Manila because his relatives
and residents of their barangay advised him to take care of himself because the relatives
of the victim were running after him. 3 4 Appellant himself admitted that he hid "for several
years." This conduct is inconsistent with his protestations of self-defense.
While the information alleged the attendance of the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation, these were not proven by the prosecution's evidence.
Circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility must in no case rest upon mere
presumptions, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of
unquestioned existence. It is settled that circumstances which qualify killing to murder
must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. 3 5
There was no treachery because there was no proof in this case as to how the
attack started. For treachery to be present, two conditions must be shown: (1) the
employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend
or retaliate and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution.
Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proven as fully and as convincingly as the crime
itself. The sole eyewitness testi ed that when she arrived at the scene, appellant was
already boxing her son. 3 6 Hence, she could not have possibly witnessed the inception of
the attack. Any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Where no particulars are known regarding the manner in which the aggression
was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it
cannot be established from mere supposition that an accused perpetrated the killing with
treachery. 3 7
Likewise, the prosecution failed to prove the following requisites of evident
premeditation: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his determination; and (3) su cient lapse of
time between the determination and execution to allow him to re ect upon the
consequences of his act. 3 8
Hence, in the absence of any circumstance which would qualify the crime to murder,
we find that appellant should be found liable only for the crime of homicide.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of homicide is
reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty of
reclusion temporal should be imposed in its medium period. 3 9 Applying the indeterminate
sentence law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor. ECDaAc

The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity. However,
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 the award of actual damages in the amount of P15,712.00 was based solely on the bare
assertions of the mother of the victim. The Court can only grant such amount for expenses
if they are supported by receipts. 4 0 In the absence thereof, no actual damages can be
awarded. However, in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the
Civil Code may be recovered where it has been shown that the victim's family suffered
some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. 4 1 We nd
the award of P15,000.00 as temperate damages reasonable. Moral damages cannot be
awarded in the absence of any evidence to support its award. 4 2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur,
Branch 30, in Criminal Case No. T-1009, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Edison Plazo is
found guilty of the crime of homicide, and sentenced to a minimum of eight (8) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six
(6) months, and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, and to pay
the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P15,000.00 as
temperate damages, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. The records did not indicate his middle name or initial.

2. Rollo, pp. 19-26.

3. Id. at 20-21.
4. Records, p. 12.

5. Id. at 15-16.
6. TSN, August 9, 1993, pp. 4-11; TSN, August 31, 1993, pp. 2-11.

7. TSN, August 9, 1993, pp. 2-4; Exhibits "C," "C-1," and "C-2."

8. TSN, October 13, 1993, pp. 2-4.

9. Autopsy Report, Exhibit "A," Records, p. 2.

10. TSN, December 2, 1991, pp. 2-8.

11. Decision, Rollo, pp. 22-23; TSN, November 22, 1993, pp. 4-13; TSN, May 30, 1994, pp. 2-
5; TSN, August 16, 1994, pp. 2-4.

12. Records, pp. 231-238.

13. Appellant's Brief, Rollo, p. 35.

14. Id. at 35-45.

15. Appellee's Brief, Rollo, pp. 78-96.

16. People v Batidor, 303 SCRA 335, 345 (1999).

17. Decision, Rollo, p. 25.

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 18. TSN, August 31, 1993, p. 4.

19. TSN, October 13, 1993, p. 3.

20. People v. Real, 308 SCRA 244, 255-256 (1999).

21. People v. Laceste, 293 SCRA 397, 406 (1998).
22. Id. at 407.
23. People v. Hillado, 307 SCRA 535, 549 (1999).
24. People v. Realin, 301 SCRA 495, 510 (1999).
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. TSN, August 9, 1993, p. 6.

28. Article 11, No. 1, Revised Penal Code.

29. People v. Tadeje, 310 SCRA 426, 432 (1999).

30. People v. Dorado, 303 SCRA 61, 69 (1999).
31. People v. De la Cruz, 313 SCRA 189, 205 (1999).
32. People v. Magallanes, 275 SCRA 222, 231 (1997).
33. People v. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680, 691 (1999).
34. TSN, August 16, 1994, p. 3.

35. People v. Israel, 272 SCRA 95, 110 (1997).

36. TSN, August 9, 1993, p. 5; TSN, August 13, 1993, p. 2.

37. People v. Bahenting, 303 SCRA 558, 567 (1999).

38. Id. at 566.
39. Art. 64, first par., Revised Penal Code.

40. People v. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68, 91 (1999).

41. People v. Suplito, 314 SCRA 493, 504 (1999).
42. People v. Benito, 303 SCRA 468, 480 (1999).

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