Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Republic of The Philippines, Petitioner, V. Marelyn TANEDO MANALO, Respondent. Decision Peralta, J.
Republic of The Philippines, Petitioner, V. Marelyn TANEDO MANALO, Respondent. Decision Peralta, J.
SO ORDERED.3
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition
and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;
The facts are undisputed.
2. Affidavit of Publication;
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo
(Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision. In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
arising after marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following
rules exist: The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife
our courts cannot grant it.10 became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code,
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
can thus remarry.
even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
xxxx
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do
more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due."
avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses
subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra- when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will
marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if justice.86
We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may,
according to indigenous customs.82 therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning
of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the
present time. With the advancement of communication and The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to
information technology, as well as the improvement of the this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize
transportation system that almost instantly connect people and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry
uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages of San Juan, Metro Manila.
are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often
than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts
the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before
and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
are of rotten quality. party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
productive of any good to the society where one is considered evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
released from the marital bond while the other remains admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by
bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted: written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of
a foreign country.
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court
stated: Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted: Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that
2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor,
the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on
relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a later, on January 8, 2006.5
fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese
Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93 Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case,
City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
the divorce decree is rendered admissible as a written act of
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate.
the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
so.95 court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
of proving the material allegations of the complaint when She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact,
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She,
when they introduce new matters. x x x thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s
must be alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the
must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96 the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving
Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry
the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former
under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
reason of their judicial function. accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076,
are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
to the relevant Japanese law on divorce. obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
SO ORDERED.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010 legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was
vs. enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
GENERAL, Respondents. obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
DECISION
THE PETITION
BRION, J.:
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
1
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is
elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
45 of the Rules of Court (present petition). Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his
rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the
who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in
to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
Gerbert’s position. remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the
policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
THE COURT’S RULING judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion
of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
spouse
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds
of Article 26 of the Family Code. that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or alien spouse (other than that already established by the
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the governed by his national law.26
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and
divorce between Filipino citizens.18 the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows: The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a
right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in its recognition in this jurisdiction
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
to remarry under Philippine law. foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family law have been duly proven according to our rules of
Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights judgments. This Section states:
after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and
the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that: country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]
has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The specific thing, the judgment or final order is
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the
alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
should not be discriminated against in her own country if evidence of a right as between the parties and their
the ends of justice are to be served.22 successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper;
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for to what had been done.
the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry
her national law.27 in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status
our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration
himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another
action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for
integral aspect of his claim or defense. recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity (a) births;
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official (b) deaths;
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having
legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official (c) marriages;
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper (d) annulments of marriages;
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record (e) divorces;
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
(f) legitimations;
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a (g) adoptions;
copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation,
we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for (h) acknowledgment of natural children;
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to (i) naturalization; and
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.
(j) changes of name.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments change of name and naturalization register.
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 registration. The law should be read in relation with the
of the Family Code provides. requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of
the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
divorce decree Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority
of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength
alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered DECISI ON
in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the CARPIO, J.:
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.1avvphi1 The Case
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a
of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion
of entries in the civil registry. for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the petition.
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be The Facts
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or with each other.
claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
of Court. Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
one for recognition of the foreign decree and another declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay
right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4)
the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on (NSO).6
certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of
the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs. issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the
case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
SO ORDERED.
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC):
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no It has not been proved in these proceedings what the
longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of
partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to
Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision. discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no
SO ORDERED. abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927 national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in
the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
administrator, petitioner-appellee, executed. lawphil.net
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant. Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this
respect was not erroneous.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee. In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with
the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in
will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion
is based on the last part of the second clause of the will,
which says:
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G.
am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
Brimo is in question in this case.
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free
choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of having resided for a considerable length of time in
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
opposed it. The court, however, approved it. acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is
my wish that the distribution of my property and
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: everything in connection with this, my will, be made
and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul
motion for reconsideration of the order approving the and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found
partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the in this will favorable to the person or persons who
Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of fail to comply with this request.
transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the
Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance
until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
the Turkish laws. laws of the Philippines.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor
G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected
his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from
being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, receiving his legacy.
among other things, provides the following:
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the
in respect to the order of succession as well as to following:
the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or 4. I further declare that I now have no living
good morals shall be considered as not imposed ascendants, and no descendants except my above
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
manner whatsoever, even should the testator DANEY.
otherwise provide.
xxx xxx xxx
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly
ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has
above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
and effective even as to the herein oppositor. Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
It results from all this that the second clause of the will Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the
regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at
to law. the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their well as any interest which may have accrued
dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it thereon, is exhausted..
not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the
testator's national law. xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is 12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
by the judicial administrator is approved in all other Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income
respects, without any pronouncement as to costs. from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property
and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
So ordered. whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the
executor in his final account and project of partition ratified
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN,
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed
by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen)
of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal
appellant.
grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said
LABRADOR, J.: order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children,
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the
of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern
Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
approving among things the final accounts of the executor, internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply,
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes
Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on legitimate from the time of her birth.
March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the
California, U.S.A. right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited
in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal. approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their
The most important assignments of error are as follows: case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
I
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was
interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
April 1945, he left for the United States but returned
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM",
"MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
II 1953.)
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once
AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF more to California shortly after the making of his last
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES will and testament (now in question herein) which
CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW. he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on
March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in
III the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased
THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY born in New York, migrated to California and resided there
OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never
THE PHILIPPINES. to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state,
which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
IV Philippines and make home in the State of California.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE of meaning from mere temporary presence to the
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS. most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is
used to denote something more than mere physical
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
V
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento,
UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
FULL OWNERSHIP.
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
of the United States and of the State of California at the time of citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have
his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
brief:
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be
In the proceedings for admission of the will to taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
probate, the facts of record show that the deceased abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a
1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in place where he has never been. And he may reside in
the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was a place where he has no domicile. The man with two
on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport homes, between which he divides his time, certainly
"Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He on business which would require his presence for
stayed in the Philippines until 1904. several weeks or months, he might properly be said
to have sufficient connection with the place to be
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
United States and stayed there for the following nine treated his settlement as continuing only for the
years until 1913, during which time he resided in, particular business in hand, not giving up his former
and was teaching school in Sacramento, California. "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker.
Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
departed the Philippines for the United States and inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a
country, and came back to the Philippines the term used with many shades of meaning, from the
following year, 1939. merest temporary presence to the most permanent
abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The
the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29) Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
Philippines, which is as follows: is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the
reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property
"endless chain of references" which has so often
is subject to the law of the country where it is
been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
situated.
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law
of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference
However, intestate and testamentary successions, back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason
both with respect to the order of succession and to why the original reference should be the internal law
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round,
regulated by the national law of the person whose but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
succession is under consideration, whatever may be this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
the nature of the property and regardless of the reference and at that point applying internal law.
country where said property may be found. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the rule of reference.
determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is
used therein. Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the
objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity
There is no single American law governing the validity of will result from adoption of their respective views.
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the And still more strange is the fact that the only way to
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if
only and in force only within the state. The "national law" in the dispute the two states whose laws form the
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will
State of California. vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated
above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
The next question is: What is the law in California governing judgment would have been against the woman; if the
the disposition of personal property? The decision of the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they
court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose woman. The same result would happen, though the
of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, courts would switch with respect to which would
citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946
of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows: The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two
instances: where the title to land is in question, and
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where where the validity of a decree of divorce is
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in
of his domicile. the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any
further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus,
a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's
be recognized by every court; and every divorce,
opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp.
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to
13-14.)
by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It
is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate,
internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
case, should govern the determination of the validity of the Massachusetts, England, and France. The question
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being arises as to how this property is to be distributed
in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a among X's next of kin.
citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and Assume (1) that this question arises in a
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for
referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is an application of the law of the deceased's last
the Philippines. domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was
France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various to do would be to turn to French statute of
authors, thus: distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in
French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the
that if a French court were called upon to determine
Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
how this property should be distributed, it would
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference
refer the distribution to the national law of the
to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its
distributions. So on the surface of things the
Conflict of Laws rules?"
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course
of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to be determined by the law of the domicile, or
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a even by the law of the place where the act in
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of question occurred.
distributions, on the assumption that this is what a
French court would do. If it accepts the so- (b) The decision of two or more foreign
called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, systems of law, provided it be certain that
thus applying its own law. one of them is necessarily competent, which
agree in attributing the determination of a
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented question to the same system of law.
which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to
a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in xxx xxx xxx
turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to
German term for this judicial process is
distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31,
has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the
pp. 523-571.)
law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the
law of Belgium would distribute personal property
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law upon death in accordance with the law of domicile,
is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
further question may arise: Are the rules as to the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality
conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to — that is the English law — he must accept this
be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has reference back to his own law.
been considered by the courts in but a few instances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its
textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved
conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
has been descriptively designated by them as the
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and
"Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung",
the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
answer to the question postulated and the operation
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in
of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in
the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as
many cases result in returning the main controversy
are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The
to be decided according to the law of the forum. ...
rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
(16 C.J.S. 872.)
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights
has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine which follow the person of the owner.
of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in
determining the question before it, must take into
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but
more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the
distribution of the property, the law of the state
law to the actual question which the rules of the
where he was domiciled at the time of his death will
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of
be looked to in deciding legal questions about the
the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally
will, almost as completely as the law of situs is
been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am.
consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is
Jur. 296)
logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and succession, the same rules should determine the
the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917- the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary
1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary
quoted herein below: state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as
controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the property, and the reason for the recognition as in the
rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as case of intestate succession, is the general
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the said on the point: 'The general principle that a
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
law of a country' means the whole of its law. domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of
the universal application. It had its origin in that
xxx xxx xxx international comity which was one of the first fruits
of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900,
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
in the form of the following theses:
apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec.
164, pp. 442-443.)
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country
as regards the application of foreign laws.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law
(2) Provided that no express provision to the of California. But as above explained the laws of California
contrary exists, the court shall respect: have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
disclaims the right to bind its nationals California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
abroad as regards their personal statute, therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens
and desires that said personal statute shall domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as
in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of BENGZON, J.P., J.:
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law,
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad. April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no
law to the contrary in the place where the property is The facts of the case are as follows:
situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of
to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is and Miriam Palma Bellis.
not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
not and should not refer the case back to California; such
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
action would leave the issue incapable of determination obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
forth between the two states, between the country of which following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,
conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder
internal law of California provides no legitime for children shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them. Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156;
Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a
867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila
support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, on September 15, 1958.
for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does
not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the
with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
California Civil Code. Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it
Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the released from time to time according as the lower court
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be by the latter three requesting partial advances on account
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. of their respective legacies.
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California.. On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its
administration, the executor submitted and filed its
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
and the case returned to the lower court with instructions Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the
that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees. to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor
— pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project
of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
appellants. heirs of the deceased.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees
E. A. Bellis, et al.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose
issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
the executor's final account, report and administration and provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes. which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed
by the national law of the decedent.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors- It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law. Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. must prevail over general ones.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other
a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming
rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a
refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
application of the law of the place where the properties are not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it national law should govern.
should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or Bellis.
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby
(e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
the capacity to succeed. They provide that —