Statutory Construction

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984

INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES' UNION (IBAAEU), petitioner,

vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor and INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND
AMERICA, respondents.

Sisenando R. Villaluz, Jr. for petitioner.

Abdulmaid Kiram Muin colloborating counsel for petitioner.

The Solicitor General Caparas, Tabios, Ilagan Alcantara & Gatmaytan Law Office and Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano &
Hernandez Law Office for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order dated November 10, 1979, of respondent Deputy Minister of Labor,
Amado G. Inciong, in NLRC case No. RB-IV-1561-76 entitled "Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union
(complainant-appellee), vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America" (respondent-appellant), the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated 20 June 1978 be, as it is hereby, set aside and a new judgment.
promulgated dismissing the instant case for lack of merit (p. 109 rec.).

The antecedent facts culled from the records are as follows:

On June 20, 1975, petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then
Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office No. IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed,
and upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on July 7, 1975 (p. 18, NLRC rec.

On August 25, 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner's
complaint for payment of holiday pay. Pertinent portions of the decision read: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

The records disclosed that employees of respondent bank were not paid their wages on unworked regular
holidays as mandated by the Code, particularly Article 208, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 208. Right to holiday pay.

(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in
retail and service establishments regularly employing less than 10 workers.

(b) The term "holiday" as used in this chapter, shall include: New Year's Day, Maundy
Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of
 July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December and the day
designated by law for holding a general election.

xxx xxx xxx

This conclusion is deduced from the fact that the daily rate of pay of the bank employees was computed
in the past with the unworked regular holidays as excluded for purposes of determining the deductible
amount for absences incurred Thus, if the employer uses the factor 303 days as a divisor in determining
the daily rate of monthly paid employee, this gives rise to a presumption that the monthly rate does not
include payments for unworked regular holidays. The use of the factor 303 indicates the number of
ordinary working days in a year (which normally has 365 calendar days), excluding the 52 Sundays and
the 10 regular holidays. The use of 251 as a factor (365 calendar days less 52 Saturdays, 52 Sundays,
and 10 regular holidays) gives rise likewise to the same presumption that the unworked Saturdays,
Sundays and regular holidays are unpaid. This being the case, it is not amiss to state with certainty that
the instant claim for wages on regular unworked holidays is found to be tenable and meritorious.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) xxx xxxx xxx

(b) Ordering respondent to pay wages to all its employees for all regular h(olidays since November 1,
1974 (pp. 97-99, rec., underscoring supplied).

Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano by
paying their holiday pay up to and including January, 1976.

On December 16, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the provisions of the
Labor Code on the right to holiday pay to read as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. — (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wages during regular
holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;

(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a
compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate and

(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes New Year's Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth
of April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth
and the thirtieth of December, and the day designated by law for holding a general election.

Accordingly, on February 16, 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of
Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section
thereof reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. — Employees who are uniformly paid by the month,
irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or
established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.

For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum wage
multiplied by 365 days divided by twelve" (italics supplied).

On April 23, 1976, Policy Instruction No. 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the
above-quoted rule, pertinent portions of which read: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the
case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal
holidays are entitled to the benefit.
 Under the rules implementing P.D. 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on
the entitlement of monthly paid employees, The new determining rule is this: If the monthly paid employee
is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform
from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However,
if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then
he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. ..." (emphasis supplied).

Respondent bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the aforecited rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and
by Policy Instruction No. 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.

On August 30, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter's decision of August 25, 1975,
whereby the respondent bank was ordered to pay its employees their daily wage for the unworked regular holidays.

On September 10, 1975, respondent bank filed an opposition to the motion for a writ of execution alleging, among others,
that: (a) its refusal to pay the corresponding unworked holiday pay in accordance with the award of Labor Arbiter Ricarte
T. Soriano dated August 25, 1975, is based on and justified by Policy Instruction No. 9 which interpreted the rules
implementing P. D. 850; and (b) that the said award is already repealed by P.D. 850 which took effect on December 16,
1975, and by said Policy Instruction No. 9 of the Department of Labor, considering that its monthly paid employees are not
receiving less than P240.00 and their monthly pay is uniform from January to December, and that no deductions are
made from the monthly salaries of its employees on account of holidays in months where they occur (pp. 64-65, NLRC
rec.).

On October 18, 1976, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order enjoining
the respondent bank to continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay on the following grounds: (a) that the
judgment is already final and the findings which is found in the body of the decision as well as the dispositive portion
thereof is res judicata or is the law of the case between the parties; and (b) that since the decision had been partially
implemented by the respondent bank, appeal from the said decision is no longer available (pp. 100-103, rec.).

On November 17, 1976, respondent bank appealed from the above-cited order of Labor Arbiter Soriano to the National
Labor Relations Commission, reiterating therein its contentions averred in its opposition to the motion for writ of execution.
Respondent bank further alleged for the first time that the questioned order is not supported by evidence insofar as it finds
that respondent bank discontinued payment of holiday pay beginning January, 1976 (p. 84, NLRC rec.).

On June 20, 1978, the National Labor Relations Commission promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing respondent
bank's appeal, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

In view of the foregoing, we hereby resolve to dismiss, as we hereby dismiss, respondent's appeal; to set
aside Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano's order of 18 October 1976 and, as prayed for by complainant, to
order the issuance of the proper writ of execution (p. 244, NLRC rec.).

Copies of the above resolution were served on the petitioner only on February 9, 1979 or almost eight. (8) months after it
was promulgated, while copies were served on the respondent bank on February 13, 1979.

On February 21, 1979, respondent bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal
with urgent prayer to stay execution, alleging therein the following: (a) that there is prima facie evidence of grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission, in dismissing the
respondent's appeal on pure technicalities without passing upon the merits of the appeal and (b) that the resolution
appealed from is contrary to the law and jurisprudence (pp. 260-274, NLRC rec.).

On March 19, 1979, petitioner filed its opposition to the respondent bank's appeal and alleged the following grounds: (a)
that the office of the Minister of Labor has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant appeal pursuant to the provisions of P. D.
1391; (b) that the labor arbiter's decision being final, executory and unappealable, execution is a matter of right for the
petitioner; and (c) that the decision of the labor arbiter dated August 25, 1975 is supported by the law and the evidence in
the case (p. 364, NLRC rec.).

On July 30, 1979, petitioner filed a second motion for execution pending appeal, praying that a writ of execution be issued
by the National Labor Relations Commission pending appeal of the case with the Office of the Minister of Labor.
Respondent bank filed its opposition thereto on August 8, 1979.

On August 13, 1979, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order which states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
 The Chief, Research and Information Division of this Commission is hereby directed to designate a Socio-
Economic Analyst to compute the holiday pay of the employees of the Insular Bank of Asia and America
from April 1976 to the present, in accordance with the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated August 25,
1975" (p. 80, rec.).

On November 10, 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order,
the dispositive portion of which states: têñ.£îhqwâ£

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated 20 June 1978 be, as it is hereby, set aside and a new judgment
promulgated dismissing the instant case for lack of merit (p. 436, NLRC rec.).

Hence, this petition for certiorari charging public respondent Amado G. Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

The issue in this case is: whether or not the decision of a Labor Arbiter awarding payment of regular holiday pay can still
be set aside on appeal by the Deputy Minister of Labor even though it has already become final and had been partially
executed, the finality of which was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission sitting en banc, on the basis of
an Implementing Rule and Policy Instruction promulgated by the Ministry of Labor long after the said decision had become
final and executory.

WE find for the petitioner.

WE agree with the petitioner's contention that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction
No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provisions
on holiday pay, they in effect amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion (p. 1 1, rec.).

Article 94 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 850, provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. — (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular
holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers. ...

The coverage and scope of exclusion of the Labor Code's holiday pay provisions is spelled out under Article 82 thereof
which reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 82. Coverage. — The provision of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and
undertakings, whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field
personnel members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support domestic
helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined
by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.

... (emphasis supplied).

From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid
employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides
that: "employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of
not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether
worked or not. "

Public respondent maintains that "(T)he rules implementing P. D. 850 and Policy Instruction No. 9 were issued to clarify
the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. As interpreted, 'unworked' legal holidays are deemed
paid insofar as monthly paid employees are concerned if (a) they are receiving not less than the statutory minimum wage,
(b) their monthly pay is uniform from January to December, and (c) no deduction is made from their monthly salary on
account of holidays in months where they occur. As explained in Policy Instruction No, 9, 'The ten (10) paid legal holidays
law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily paid employees. In case of monthly, only those whose monthly
salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit' " (pp. 340-341, rec.). This
contention is untenable.

It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law
must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the
benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit - it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In
Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally
intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay.
This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states that "All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and
permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112.)

Obviously, the Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code
authorizing him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.

Public respondent vehemently argues that the intent and spirit of the holiday pay law, as expressed by the Secretary of
Labor in the case of Chartered Bank Employees Association v. The Chartered Bank (NLRC Case No. RB-1789-75, March
24, 1976), is to correct the disadvantages inherent in the daily compensation system of employment — holiday pay is
primarily intended to benefit the daily paid workers whose employment and income are circumscribed by the principle of
"no work, no pay." This argument may sound meritorious; but, until the provisions of the Labor Code on holiday pay is
amended by another law, monthly paid employees are definitely included in the benefits of regular holiday pay. As earlier
stated, the presumption is always in favor of law, negatively put, the Labor Code is always strictly construed against
management.

While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to
enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, as in the instant case, the
same must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional
(and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always
in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of
governmental power (The Supreme Court in Modern Role, C. B. Swisher 1958, p. 36).

Thus. in the case of Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission (106 SCRA 444, July 31,
1981) where the Secretary of Labor enlarged the scope of exemption from the coverage of a Presidential Decree granting
increase in emergency allowance, this Court ruled that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

... the Secretary of Labor has exceeded his authority when he included paragraph (k) in Section 1 of the
Rules implementing P. D. 1 1 23.

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory authority granted to the Secretary of
Labor, and the same is therefore void, as ruled by this Court in a long line of cases . . . .. têñ.£îhqwâ£

The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the

administration of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment, may be found in the early case of United States vs. Barrios decided in 1908.
Then came in a 1914 decision, United States vs. Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119) delineation
of the scope of such competence. Thus: "Of course the regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of
the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the
regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." In
1936, in People vs. Santos, this Court expressed its disapproval of an administrative
order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory power vested in an administrative
official We reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that
where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of
the Act, 'the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. Justice Barrera,
speaking for the Court in Victorias Milling inc. vs. Social Security Commission, citing
Parker as well as Davis did tersely sum up the matter thus: "A rule is binding on the
 Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is
within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. ... On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that
finally determine chat the law means."

"It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom
all executive power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser
administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express language of
the Constitution assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to
observe the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the legislative
enactment. Its terms must be followed the statute requires adherence to, not departure
from its provisions. No deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief
Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an act of Congress." Respondents can
be sustained, therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and regulations
promulgated by them were in accordance with what the Veterans Bill of Rights provides"
(Phil. Apparel Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission, supra, 463, 464,
citing Teozon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, PVA 33 SCRA 585; see also
Santos vs. Hon. Estenzo, et al, 109 Phil. 419; Hilado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue,
100 Phil. 295; Sy Man vs. Jacinto & Fabros, 93 Phil. 1093; Olsen & Co., Inc. vs.
Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil. 259).

This ruling of the Court was recently reiterated in the case of American Wire & Cable Workers Union (TUPAS) vs. The
National Labor Relations Commission and American Wire & Cable Co., Inc., G.R. No. 53337, promulgated on June 29,
1984.

In view of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor Code and Policy instruction No.
9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor must be declared null and void. Accordingly, public respondent Deputy Minister of
Labor Amado G. Inciong had no basis at all to deny the members of petitioner union their regular holiday pay as directed
by the Labor Code.

II

It is not disputed that the decision of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated August 25, 1975, had already become final,
and was, in fact, partially executed by the respondent bank.

However, public respondent maintains that on the authority of De Luna vs. Kayanan, 61 SCRA 49, November 13, 1974,
he can annul the final decision of Labor Arbiter Soriano since the ensuing promulgation of the integrated implementing
rules of the Labor Code pursuant to P.D. 850 on February 16, 1976, and the issuance of Policy Instruction No. 9 on April
23, 1976 by the then Secretary of Labor are facts and circumstances that transpired subsequent to the promulgation of
the decision of the labor arbiter, which renders the execution of the said decision impossible and unjust on the part of
herein respondent bank (pp. 342-343, rec.).

This contention is untenable.

To start with, unlike the instant case, the case of De Luna relied upon by the public respondent is not a labor case wherein
the express mandate of the Constitution on the protection to labor is applied. Thus Article 4 of the Labor Code provides
that, "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor and Article 1702 of the Civil Code provides that, " In case of doubt, all
labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

Consequently, contrary to public respondent's allegations, it is patently unjust to deprive the members of petitioner union
of their vested right acquired by virtue of a final judgment on the basis of a labor statute promulgated following the
acquisition of the "right".

On the question of whether or not a law or statute can annul or modify a judicial order issued prior to its promulgation, this
Court, through Associate Justice Claro M. Recto, said: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

 We are decidedly of the opinion that they did not. Said order, being unappealable, became final on the
date of its issuance and the parties who acquired rights thereunder cannot be deprived thereof by a
constitutional provision enacted or promulgated subsequent thereto. Neither the Constitution nor the
statutes, except penal laws favorable to the accused, have retroactive effect in the sense of annulling or
modifying vested rights, or altering contractual obligations" (China Ins. & Surety Co. vs. Judge of First
Instance of Manila, 63 Phil. 324, emphasis supplied).

In the case of In re: Cunanan, et al., 19 Phil. 585, March 18, 1954, this Court said: "... when a court renders a decision or
promulgates a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the
subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect." Thus, the amendatory rule (Rule IV, Book III of
the Rules to Implement the Labor Code) cannot be given retroactive effect as to modify final judgments. Not even a law
can validly annul final decisions (In re: Cunanan, et al., Ibid).

Furthermore, the facts of the case relied upon by the public respondent are not analogous to that of the case at bar. The
case of De Luna speaks of final and executory judgment, while iii the instant case, the final judgment is partially executed.
just as the court is ousted of its jurisdiction to annul or modify a judgment the moment it becomes final, the court also
loses its jurisdiction to annul or modify a writ of execution upon its service or execution; for, otherwise, we will have a
situation wherein a final and executed judgment can still be annulled or modified by the court upon mere motion of a panty
This would certainly result in endless litigations thereby rendering inutile the rule of law.

Respondent bank counters with the argument that its partial compliance was involuntary because it did so under pain of
levy and execution of its assets (p. 138, rec.). WE find no merit in this argument. Respondent bank clearly manifested its
voluntariness in complying with the decision of the labor arbiter by not appealing to the National Labor Relations
Commission as provided for under the Labor Code under Article 223. A party who waives his right to appeal is deemed to
have accepted the judgment, adverse or not, as correct, especially if such party readily acquiesced in the judgment by
starting to execute said judgment even before a writ of execution was issued, as in this case. Under these circumstances,
to permit a party to appeal from the said partially executed final judgment would make a mockery of the doctrine of finality
of judgments long enshrined in this jurisdiction.

Section I of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "... execution shall issue as a matter of right upon the
expiration of the period to appeal ... or if no appeal has been duly perfected." This rule applies to decisions or orders of
labor arbiters who are exercising quasi-judicial functions since "... the rule of execution of judgments under the rules
should govern all kinds of execution of judgment, unless it is otherwise provided in other laws" Sagucio vs. Bulos 5 SCRA
803) and Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that "... decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter or compulsory
arbitrators are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) days
from receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions. ..."

Thus, under the aforecited rule, the lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment
and the judgment becomes final ipso jure (Vega vs. WCC, 89 SCRA 143, citing Cruz vs. WCC, 2 PHILAJUR 436, 440,
January 31, 1978; see also Soliven vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 621; Carrero vs. WCC and Regala vs. WCC, decided jointly, 77
SCRA 297; Vitug vs. Republic, 75 SCRA 436; Ramos vs. Republic, 69 SCRA 576).

In Galvez vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 3 SCRA 422, 423, October 31, 1961, where the lower court
modified a final order, this Court ruled thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

The lower court was thus aware of the fact that it was thereby altering or modifying its order of January 8,
1959. Regardless of the excellence of the motive for acting as it did, we are constrained to hold however,
that the lower court had no authorities to make said alteration or modification. ...

xxx xxx xxx

The equitable considerations that led the lower court to take the action complained of cannot offset the
dem ands of public policy and public interest — which are also responsive to the tenets of equity —
requiring that an issues passed upon in decisions or final orders that have become executory, be deemed
conclusively disposed of and definitely closed for, otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus
setting at naught the main role of courts of justice, which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law
and the maintenance of peace and order, by settling justiciable controversies with finality.
 xxx xxx xxx

In the recent case of Gabaya vs. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 405, 406, March 30, 1982, this Court said: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

In Marasigan vs. Ronquillo (94 Phil. 237), it was categorically stated that the rule is absolute that after a
judgment becomes final by the expiration of the period provided by the rules within which it so becomes,
no further amendment or correction can be made by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. And
such final judgment is conclusive not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim or demand but as to any other admissible matter which must have been offered for that
purpose (L-7044, 96 Phil. 526). In the earlier case of Contreras and Ginco vs. Felix and China Banking
Corp., Inc. (44 O.G. 4306), it was stated that the rule must be adhered to regardless of any possible
injustice in a particular case for (W)e have to subordinate the equity of a particular situation to the over-
mastering need of certainty and immutability of judicial pronouncements

xxx xxx xxx

III

The despotic manner by which public respondent Amado G. Inciong divested the members of the petitioner union of their
rights acquired by virtue of a final judgment is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law Public
respondent completely ignored the rights of the petitioner union's members in dismissing their complaint since he knew for
a fact that the judgment of the labor arbiter had long become final and was even partially executed by the respondent
bank.

A final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected by law under the due process clause of the
Constitution (China Ins. & Surety Co. vs. Judge of First Instance of Manila, 63 Phil. 324). A final judgment is "a vested
interest which it is right and equitable that the government should recognize and protect, and of which the individual could
no. be deprived arbitrarily without injustice" (Rookledge v. Garwood, 65 N.W. 2d 785, 791).

lt is by this guiding principle that the due process clause is interpreted. Thus, in the pithy language of then Justice, later
Chief Justice, Concepcion "... acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain
of nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision
to the contrary notwithstanding (Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbengco 110 Phil. 118, emphasis supplied), And "(I)t
has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divested the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights" (Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Phil.
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 211, June 5, 1973).

Tested by and pitted against this broad concept of the constitutional guarantee of due process, the action of public
respondent Amado G. Inciong is a clear example of deprivation of property without due process of law and constituted
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated November 10, 1979.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS SET ASIDE, AND
THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER RICARTE T. SORIANO DATED AUGUST 25, 1975, IS HEREBY REINSTATED.

COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Guerrero, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Aquino and Abad Santos, JJ., concur in the result.

Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.

DIGEST

IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong

GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)
TOPIC: Statutory Construction Rules (Verba Legis)

FACTS:

On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then
Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and
upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on July 7, 1975. On August 25, 1975, Labor Arbiter
Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner’s complaint for payment of holiday
pay. Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by
paying their holiday pay up to and including January 1976.

On December 16, 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the provisions of the
Labor Code on the right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on February 16, 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the
Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with
pay. The controversial section thereof reads as “Status of employees paid by the month. — Employees who are uniformly
paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or
established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.” On April 23,
1976, Policy Instruction 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule.
The bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy
Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.

On August 30, 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s decision of August 25,
1975, which the bank opposed. On October 18, 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an
order enjoining the bank to continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay. On November 17, 1976, the bank
appealed from the order of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On June 20, 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en
banc dismissing the bank’s appeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of execution. On February 21, 1979, the
bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution.
On August 13, 1979, the NLRC issued an order directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to
compute the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated
August 25, 1975. On November 10, 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong,
issued an order setting aside the resolution en banc of the NLRC dated June 20, 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of
merit. Hence, the petition for certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid employees are excluded from the
benefits of holiday pay.

HELD:

From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and Article 82 of the same Code, it is
clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on
holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by
inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: “employees who are uniformly
paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or
established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.” Even if
contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great
weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. So long, as
the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order
betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be
followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is
within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated
therein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts
that finally determine what the law means.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25
August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.
IBAAEU v. Inciong

G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984, Makasiar, J.

(Labor Standards: Proper Construction and Interpretation of Labor Laws)

FACTS:

The Secretary of Labor, issued Policy no. 9 interpreting article 94 of Labor Code as regards Right to Holiday pay, stated
among others, that PD 850 principally intended to benefit daily-paid workers. Those who are paid by the month, i.e., he is
paid uniformly from January to December is presumed to have been paid with legal holidays, unless his salary is
deducted for the month the holiday occurs. Invoking this Policy, the Bank stopped paying its employees for the legal
holidays.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, PD 850 was intended only for daily wage workers.

RULING

“It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law
must be taken to mean exactly what it says.

In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit
- it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of
Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law
clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory
directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." Moreover, it
shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most
beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112.)

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25
August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 119645 August 22, 1996

SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,

vs.
HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government & Chairman,
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM); HON. ALEXIS CANONIZADO, Commissioner, NAPOLCOM, Manila;
Chairman LEODEGARIO ALFARO, Regional Appellate Board VIII; Regional Director EDMUNDO LAVILLA
LARROZA, Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Command VIII; and MARIO VALDEZ, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 1 to set aside the decision (in the form of a
letter) of 24 March 1995 2 of public respondent National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), which denied due course for
lack of jurisdiction the appeal and the petition for review filed by petitioners SP03 Noel Cabada and SP03 Rodolfo G. de
Guzman, respectively. Challenged in the said appeal and petition for review were the decision of 15 August 1994 3 and
resolution of 25 October 1994 4 of the Regional Appellate Board of the Eighth Regional Command (RAB 8), which
affirmed their dismissal from the service.

The pleadings and annexes filed by the parties disclose the following factual and procedural backdrop of this case:

On 29 October 1993, a complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, and Dishonesty was
filed with the Office of the Commission on Human Rights in Tacloban City by private respondent Mario Valdez.5 The
complaint was referred to the Philippine National Police Eight Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which, after
conducting its own investigation, filed an administrative charge of Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and instituted
summary dismissal proceedings.

On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed down a decision 6 finding the petitioners guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the police service. Pursuant to this decision, Special Order No. 174, dated
23 April 1994, 7 was issued ordering, among other things, the dismissal of the petitioners from the service.

The petitioners claimed that they were not formally furnished with a copy of the decision and that they were able to secure
a copy thereof "thru their own effort and initiative" only on 13 June 1994. 8 However, they received a copy of Special Order
No. 174 on 26 April 1994.

Although they insist that the basis of the appeal before RAB 8 was Special Order No. 174, 9 petitioner Cabada stated
under oath in his
Appeal10 filed with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) that he in fact seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed or refused to act on the
said motion, and that he asked that the said motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB.

In its decision of 15 August 1994, 11 the RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the Regional Director. In its resolution of 25
October 1994, 12 it denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its decision. The petitioners received a copy of this
resolution on 26 January 1995.

Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman then filed with the Honorable Secretary of the DILG and Chairman of the
NAPOLCOM their "Appeal" 13 dated 5 February 1995 and "Petition for Review" 14 dated 4 February 1995, respectively.

In its decision of 24 March 1995, the NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, denied due course to the
petitioners' appeal and petition for review for lack of jurisdiction "it appearing . . . that both the Decision and the Resolution
of the Regional Appellate Board had long become final and executory and there being no showing that the RAB failed to
decide respondents' appeal within the reglementary period of sixty (60) days." 15 In support thereof, the NAPOLCOM cited
Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 91-006, which provide as follows:

Sec. 23. Effect of Failure to Decide Appeal. — Failure of the Regional Appellate Board to decide the
appeal within the reglementary period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice,
however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Finality of Decision/Resolution. — The decision of the Regional Appellate Board on an appealed
case shall become final and executory after ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the appellant,
if no Motion for Reconsideration is filed within said period.

A motion for Reconsideration may be filed by either party from a Decision rendered by the Regional
Appellate Board on an appealed case, provided that the same is filed within ten (10) days from receipt of
a copy of the decision in question. However, only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be allowed.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Office of the Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of prematurity because the petitioners
failed to exhaust administrative remedies; they should have instead appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), which
vests upon the CSC appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of government personnel where the penalty imposed
is, inter alia, dismissal from office. The said provision reads:

Sec. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in
an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, or removal or dismissal
from office. . . .

(2) The Secretaries . . . shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. . . . In case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
Department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when
the penalty is removal, in which case, the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
Secretary concerned.

The Office of the Solicitor General opines that this provision covers PNP personnel, like the petitioners; consequently,
they should have appealed to the CSC. It also advances the view that the instant petition should have been filed with the
proper forum, the Regional Trial Court.

The core issues that present themselves for our determination are whether.

(1) the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course, for lack of jurisdiction,
the petitioners' appeal from and petition for review of the decision and resolution of the RAB 8; and

(2) this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies.

Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 16 provides for the finality of disciplinary actions against members of the PNP as
follows:

Sec. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. — The disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP
shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the regional director or by
 the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the regional appellate
board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the
disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to
the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, That, the
regional or National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days
from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the regional appellate board to act on
the appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to
the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary. (emphasis supplied)

The last proviso of this section is restated in Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. And
Section 3, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 provides:

Sec. 3. Period Within Which to Decide Appealed Cases; Finality of RAB/NAB Decisions. — The
NAPOLCOM appellate board concerned shall decide the appealed cases within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the entire records of the case from the PNP summary dismissal authority. However, failure of
the NAPOLCOM Regional Appellate Board (RAB) to act on the appeal within said period renders the
decision final and executory without prejudice to the filing of an appeal by the respondent-appellant with
the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government. The decision rendered by the
NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board (NAB) disposing an appealed case shall be final and executory
unless a timely Motion for Reconsideration is filed within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, in which case,
it shall become final and executory upon receipt by the respondent-appellant of the resolution of the
aforesaid board denying, modifying or affirming the decision.

Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 specifically provides that if a RAB fails to decide an appeal within the reglementary
period of sixty days, the appealed decision becomes final and executory without, however, prejudice to the right of the
aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. The said provision is, however, silent as regards the availability of
an appeal from a decision rendered by a RAB within the reglementary period.

This gap in Section 45 cannot be construed to prohibit appeals from decisions of the RAB rendered within the
reglementary period, for while the epigraph of the section is worded Finality of Disciplinary Action, there is nothing therein
that explicitly bars any further appeal. Complementary laws on discipline of government officials and employees must then
be inquired into considering that in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution that the PNP must be national in scope
and civilian in character, 17 it is now a part, as a bureau, of the reorganized DILG. 18 As such, it falls within the definition of
the civil service in Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the Constitution. 19 For this reason, Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990
provides:

Sec. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. — The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and
regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department.

The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where the decision
rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the department
and finally to the Commission.

The rules and regulations implementing the Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 known as the Administrative Code of 1987 promulgated
by the CSC. Sections 31 and 32, Rule XIV of the said Rules provide as follows:

Sec. 31. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Commission shall have the final
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil
service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and
employees.

Sec. 32. The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities
shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary.
In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may
be initially appealed to the department, then to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and finally to the
 Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in
which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

Under Section 7 of E.O. No. 262, 20 the Secretary of the DILG has the power of supervision and control of his Department.
His powers and functions thereunder are recognized and affirmed in Section 10 of the DILG Act of
1990. 21

In view then of the aforementioned gap in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990, the provisions of the Civil Service Law and
the rules and regulations implementing it must be taken into account in light of the maxim interpretare concordare legibus
est optimus interpretandi or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. 22

As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an appealed case within sixty days from receipt
of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith
appeal therefrom to the Secretary of the DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-day period, its
decision may still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG.

In the instant case, Cabada's appeal was addressed to "the Honorable Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government . . . as Chairman and Presiding Officer of the National Police Commission," 23 while De Guzman's
petition for review was addressed to "the Honorable Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government and
Chairman, National Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila." 24

We consider the appeal and the petition for review as appeals to the Secretary of the DILG under Section 45 of the DILG
Act of 1990.

Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the
appeal and the petition for review, and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or Presiding
Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter does not have such
jurisdiction because Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently provides as follows:

Sec. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(i) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary action involving
demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the
Chief of the Philippine National Police;

(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over administrative cases against
policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits. . . .

This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercise appellate jurisdiction only on the following cases and
THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service
imposed by the Chief of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative cases against policemen and over decisions
on claims for police benefits. It has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB.

Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to issue, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado,
the 24 March 1995 decision denying due course to the appeal and petition for review filed by petitioners Cabada and De
Guzman, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction because of Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-
006 and Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. The reference to these rules suggest that
the NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the RAB if the latter has not decided the
appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days. Such a suggestion is flawed because it would allow a ridiculous
situation where the NAPOLCOM vests upon itself an appellate jurisdiction from a decision rendered by it in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of the DILG Act of 1990. Moreover, Commissioner
Canonizado cannot, singly, act for the NAPOLCOM because it is a collegial body composed of a Chairman and four
Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of the DILG Act of 1990.

In light of the foregoing, the petitioners could properly invoke our original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the NAPOLCOM's decision of 24 March 1995. It
being a patent nullity, the filing of a motion for its reconsideration before the institution of this special civil action may be
dispensed with. 25

II

The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies is thus untenable. We would have sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due course
to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By then, pursuant to
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987;
and Sections 31 and 32 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would have
to be filed with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim in their Reply to the Comment of the OSG that their case
falls within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

In view of all the foregoing, a discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners relating to the merits of the case and
on the issue of due process is unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision (in the form of a fetter) of the
National Police Commission of 24 March 1995 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government is DIRECTED to RESOLVE with reasonable dispatch the appeal and petition for review of
petitioners SP03 NOEL CABADA and SP03 RODOLFO G. DE Guzman, respectively, from the decision of 15 August
1994 and resolution of 25 October 1994 of the Regional Appellate Boar, Eight Regional Command, if the same were filed
on time.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Mistakenly designated by the petitioners as a "Petition for Review by Certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court."

2 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 33-34. Per NAPOLCOM Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado.

3 Annex "C," Id.; Id., 65-70. Per RAB Chairman Atty. Leodegario J. Alfaro; P/Sr. Supt. Antonio G. Dadula, Deputy
Regional Director for Administration; and Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr..

4 Annex "F," Petition; Rollo, 74-76. Per P/Sr. Supt. Antonio G. Dadula and Regional State Prosecutor Francisco
Q. Aurillo, Jr., with RAB Chairman Atty. Leodegario J. Alfaro, dissenting.

5 The private respondent also instituted three criminal cases against the petitioners, viz., (1) for arbitrary
detention; (2) for violation of R.A. No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or
Under Custodial Investigation As Well As the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating Officers and
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof); and (3) for robbery. The first was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-
05-15 in Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tacloban City, but was dismissed on 10 August
1994 upon motion of the petitioners who invoked their right to speedy trial, considering the private respondent's
non-appearance during the previous setting and the difficulty met by the sheriff in serving the subpoena upon the
latter (Annex "M" of Petition; Rollo, 89; per Judge Marino S. Buban). The second was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 94-05-278 in Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, but was dismissed on 5 October
1994 upon a finding by the trial court that the constitutional rights of the private respondent during custodial
investigation were not violated by the petitioners (Annex "N," Id., Id., 90-91; per Judge Pedro S. Espina). The third
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-08-309 in Branch 8 of the RTC of Tacloban City which was provisionally
dismissed on 7 December 1995 upon motion of the petitioners who invoked their right to speedy trial (Annex "A"
of the petitioners' Memorandum; Id., 158; per Judge Mateo M. Leanda).

6 Annex "D" of Petition; Id., 71 -72.

7 Annex "E," Id.; Id., 73.

8 Petitioners' Memorandum, 8; Rollo, 154.

9 Paragraph 12 of Petition; Id., 17.

10 Annex "B-1," Id.; Id., 51. It may also be pointed out that in its decision of 15 August 1994 (supra note 3), RAB 8
stated that the appeal interposed by the petitioners is based on the following grounds: (a) errors of law and
irregularities have been committed during the investigation prejudicial to their rights; (b) the findings of facts are
not supported by substantial evidence; and (c) the denial of their motion for reconsideration is contrary to law and
jurisprudence. This shows that the petitioners appealed from the decision of the Regional Director of PNP-
RECOM 8 and not from Special Order No. 174, and that the motion for its reconsideration was denied.

11 Supra note 3.

12 Supra note 4.

13 Annex "B-l" of Petition; Rollo, 51.

14 Annex "B," Id.; Id., 35.

15 Annex "A," Petition; Rollo, 33-34.

16 R.A. No. 6975.

17 Section 6, Article XVI, 1987 Constitution.

18 Section 6, DILG Act of 1990, provides:

Sec. 6. Organization. — The Department shall consist of the Department Proper, the existing bureaus and the
offices of the Department of Local Government, the National Police Commission, the Philippine Public Safety
College, and the following bureaus; the Philippine National Police, the Bureau of Fire Protection, and the Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology.

19 It provides as follows:

Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

20 Entitled "Reorganizing the Department of Local Government and for Other Purposes," issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987.

21 The said section reads in part as follows:

Sec. 10. Specific Powers and Functions of the Secretary. — In addition to his powers and functions as provided in
Executive Order No. 262, the Secretary as Department head shall have the following powers and functions. . . .

22 Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211, 232 [1994], citing RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction 192
[2nd ed., 1990].

23 Rollo, 51.

24 Id., 35.

25 See FLORENZ D. REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. 1 [1988] 460, citing cases
Cabada et al., v Alunan III et al.,G.R. No. 119645. August 22, 1996

FACTS:

On 29 October 1993, a complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, and Dishonesty was
filed with the Office of the Commission on Human Rights in Tacloban City by private respondent Mario Valdez.

On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 (Philippine National Police Eighth Regional Command ) handed
down a decision finding the petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the police service.
Pursuant to this decision, Special Order No. 174, dated 23 April 1994, was issued ordering, among other things, the
dismissal of the petitioners from the service.

The petitioners claimed that they were not formally furnished with a copy of the decision and that they were able to secure
a copy thereof thru their own effort and initiative only on 13 June 1994. However, they received a copy of Special Order
No. 174 on 26 April 1994.

Although they insist that the basis of the appeal before RAB 8 (Regional Appellate Board of the Eighth Regional
Command) was Special Order No. 174,petitioner Cabada stated under oath in his Appeal filed with the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) that he in fact seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed or refused to act on the said motion, and that he asked that the
said motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB.

In its decision of 15 August 1994, the RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the Regional Director. In its resolution of 25 October
1994, it denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of its decision. The petitioners received a copy of this resolution
on 26 January 1995.

Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman then filed with the Honorable Secretary of the DILG and Chairman of the
NAPOLCOM their Appeal dated 5 February 1995 and Petition for Review dated 4 February 1995, respectively.

In its decision of 24 March 1995, the NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, denied due course to the
petitioners appeal and petition for review for lack of jurisdiction it appearing x x x that both the Decision and the Resolution
of the Regional Appellate Board had long become final and executory and there being no showing that the RAB failed to
decide respondents appeal within the reglementary period of sixty (60) days. In support thereof, the NAPOLCOM cited
Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 91-006, which provide as follows:

Section 23. Effect of Failure to Decide Appeal. Failure of the Regional Appellate Board to decide the appeal within the
reglementary period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by
either party with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government.

Section 5. Finality of Decision/Resolution. The decision of the Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case shall
become final and executory after ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the appellant, if no Motion for
Reconsideration is filed within said period.

A motion for Reconsideration may be filed by either party from a Decision rendered by the Regional Appellate Board on
an appealed case, provided that the same is filed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the decision in question.
However, only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be allowed.

*The Office of the Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of prematurity because the petitioners
failed to exhaust administrative remedies; they should have instead appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), which
vests upon the CSC appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of government personnel where the penalty imposed is,
inter alia, dismissal from office.
ISSUE/S:

(1) WON the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course, for lack of jurisdiction, the
petitioners appeal from and petition for review of the decision and resolution of the RAB 8; and

(2) WON this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.

HELD:

1. In light of the foregoing, the petitioners could properly invoke our original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annual and set aside the NAPOLCOMs decision of 24 March 1995. It
being a patent nullity, the filing of a motion for its reconsideration before the institution of this special civil action may be
dispensed with.

If a RAB fails to decide an appealed case within sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is
deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of the DILG.
Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-day period, its decision may still be appealed to the Secretary
of the DILG.

In the instant case, Cabadas appeal was addressed to the Honorable Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government x x x as Chairman and Presiding Officer of the National Police Commission, while De Guzmans
petition for review was addressed to the Honorable Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government and
Chairman, National Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila.

We consider the appeal and the petition for review as appeals to the Secretary of the DILG under Section 45 of the DILG
Act of 1990.

Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the
appeal and the petition for review, and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or Presiding
Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter does not have such
jurisdiction because Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently provides as follows:

Functions of the Commission. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary action involving demotion or
dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National
Police;

(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen and
over decisions on claims for police benefits. x x x

This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction only on the following cases and
THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed by the
Chief of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police
benefits. It has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB.

2. The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies is thus untenable. We would have sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due course
to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By then, pursuant to
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987;
and Sections 31 and 32 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would have
to be filed with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim in their Reply to the Comment of the OSG that their case
falls within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES

○ Statute construed in harmony with the Constitution

○ Constitution- the fundamental law to which all laws are subservient

○ General Rule: Do not interpret a statute independent from the constitution

○ Construe the statute in harmony with the fundamental law: Why? Because it is always presumed that the legislature
adhered to the constitutional limitations when they enacted the statute

○ It is also important to understand a statute in light of the constitution and to avoid interpreting the former in conflict with
the latter

○ What if the statute is susceptible to two constructions, one is constitutional and the other is unconstitutional? A: The
construction that should be adopted should be the one that is constitutional and the one that will render it invalid should be
rejected.

○ The Court should favor the construction that gives a statute of surviving the test of constitutionality

○ The Court cannot in order to bring a statute within the fundamental law, amend it by construction

Statutes in Pare Materia

○ Pari materia - refers to any the following: same person or thing/same purpose of object/same specific subject matter

○ Later statutes may refer to prior laws.

○ What if the later law have no reference to the prior law, does that mean they are not in pari materia? - No. It is sufficient
that they have the same subject matter.

○ When is a statute not in pari materia? - The conditions above are the determinants of ascertaining if a statute is in pari
materia, thus even if two statutes are under the same broad subject as along as their specific subjects are not the same,
they are NOT in pari materia

○ How statutes in Pari Materia construed? Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus –
every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence

○ Construe statutes in pari materia together to attain the purpose of an express national policy

○ Why should they be construed together? - Because of the assumption that when the legislature enacted the statutes
they were thinking of the prior statute. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be compared with the new
provisions.

○ Again it is important to harmonize the statutes. Courts should not render them invalid without taking the necessary steps
in reconciling them

Cabada v. Alunan III

Issue: whether or not an appeal lies from the decision of regional appellate board (RAB) imposing disciplinary action
against a member of the PNP under Sec. 45 of RA 6975 regarding finality of disciplinary action

The court held that the “gap” in the law which is silent on filing appeals from decisions of the RAB rendered within the
reglementary period should be construed and harmonized with other statutes, i.e. Sec 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution because the PNP is part, as a bureau, of the reorganized DILG, as to form a unified system of jurisprudence

Statcon: if RAB fails to decide an appealed case within 60 days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision
is deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of DILG.
Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within 60-day reglementary period, its decision may still be appealed to the
Secretary of DILG.
James M. Imbong v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014
♦ Decision, Mendoza [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Sereno [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Del Castillo [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Reyes [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Carpio [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Leonardo-De Castro [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Abad [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Brion [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen [J]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A.
Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista
& Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C.
Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose
C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco,
Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon
Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and
on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael
C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho &
Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael
Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves
and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah
Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R.
Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE
OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his
personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of
the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP.
NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty.
Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio
Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana,
Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H.
LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G.
MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY
LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their
Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her
personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO
III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA
ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE
VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of
Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people
beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards
the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not
only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its
very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The
legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to
remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete
and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded
as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to
adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to
interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of
the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates 2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-
political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware
of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented
in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in
their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the
Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
 (2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president,
Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the
generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc., 11 Rosevale Foundation,
Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens
(Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several
others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F.
Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also
proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-
Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of
the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities
as citizens (Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others, 31 in
their capacities as citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer
(Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared
policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.35
 • The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners
posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it
causes cancer and other health problems.36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their
beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. 38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that
skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural
health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails
to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH
Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth
program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under
threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively
be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of
the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services. 44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against
the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The
petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the
penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct
to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the
people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their
affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning
methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners
note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still
forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that
the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise
their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law
forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters
pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has
suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives. 50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners
question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient
and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the
local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the
Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in
behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza
I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health
(C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave
to intervene.61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions
for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120)
days, or until July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the
pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral
arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July
16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court. 63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same
time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive
drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the
Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices
were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner." 65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or
anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or
device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be
delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures
included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made
part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family
size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No.
79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under
that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in
conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which,
among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including
family planning and sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace.
From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the
year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not
adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for
the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for
schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to
carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception,
women's health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to
health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the
status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No.
5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a
prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role
that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the
remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent
possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods
and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of
family planning methods, devices and supplies.74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to
the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and
political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a
majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that
the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests
the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with
Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the
legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet
to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices
that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is
often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal
branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere.81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b)
the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the
courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in
striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of
courtesy and caution.86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with
grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the
RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must
demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes
no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or
otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make
sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the
Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of
proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly
provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative
and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling
was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In
Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis
supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between
them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the
judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and
every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the
RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe
for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of
the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH
Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the constitutionality of
an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued
that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could
possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act
in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the
controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger
of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard
on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it has expanded
its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to
sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has,
on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on
the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions
on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these
and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad
spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting
immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is
primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are
being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court
would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case
has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65.121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent - to act as a population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124 and that
the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable. 125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH
Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the
full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the
law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.
It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. 126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it
and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth
attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule
"so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the
first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right
to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act." 129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment
of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers
of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has
life.131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that
the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients
are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of
these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be
used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that
only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made
accessible to the public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the
World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and
respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an
abortive.135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering
that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he
argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the
implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation
of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage.
From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in
order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other
family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of
the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A.
No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the
Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion"
and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life
and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it
was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who
have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view
that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by
the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of
the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily
a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined
by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote;
the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,
that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect
for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal
life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child. 149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception"
used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."
The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human
life. x x x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the
fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it
takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these
nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All
these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of
the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the
sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells.
Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and
human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not
because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase
"fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the
moment of conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying
"from the moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he
would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was
going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now
states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we
know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the
ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the
uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to
reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain
contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already
considered abortifacient.154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall
provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the
right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact
which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus
prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those
that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to
protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I
would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from
the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of
Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually
saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the
sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet
unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine
device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from
the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article
II, Your Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an
ovum and forms a viable zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops." 160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that
ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male
and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of
events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion
of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell.
This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being." 162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous
process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human
organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46
chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now
exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from
the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome
would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that,
there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited.
Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the
factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human
embryos.164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that
the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm
that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that
pregnancy can be medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human
being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those
who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent
the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based
divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court
cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from
conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion
decision passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has
opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with
provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to
the uterus for implantation.170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes
the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that
contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes
sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health
care include the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or
not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction,
free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest
standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include
abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance,
executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified
or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the
RH Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the
word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion
and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that
either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion
becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as
discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and,
second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation,
as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the
petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already
has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and
implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized
ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not
sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized
ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning
of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or
destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an
abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to
be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully
attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance
when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. 171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the
Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under
the second paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills,
postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or
health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or
prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of
the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the
RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is
abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive.
With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against
abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those
contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not
have the secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent
with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be
declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that
have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must
be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the
inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176 Citing
various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk
is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral
contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive
health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives. 180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement
of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute
the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and
self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express
the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to
implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass
the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729.
There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices
will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to
ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent
Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without
prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions
of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by
RA No. 4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether
for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of
preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive
system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not
more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever
nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the
consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the
petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is
completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and
monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local
government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments
shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
 (a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall
provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729,
which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a
heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may
be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH
Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the
agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently,
the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the
case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine
devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested,
evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular
hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning
the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this
construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription,
there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether
abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not
only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive
use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of
God in the transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes
on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for
a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the
conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner
who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious
objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited,
because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive
health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against
a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object,
such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the
RH Law, are also not recognize.191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to
another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They
add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and
1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with
abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon
the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required.192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive
health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may
be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to
the public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom
because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the
people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice
and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible
parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and
responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals
to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the assailed law
dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners
claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out
that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health
services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of
their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is
an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively
going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the
RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that
the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire
citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand,
who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has
the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise
one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
location and impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation
providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention
of the State.204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable
to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing
stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of
contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic,
cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has
allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed
fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance
and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means
that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the
church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one
religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they
are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any
other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit
of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section
29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister,
other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against
other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the
outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of
any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within
limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and
to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation
whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which
has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-
to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two
religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual
religious beliefs and practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of
belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre
and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal
standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper
regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor) 214 where it was stated "that
benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the
Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may
be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the
legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218 Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free
Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it.
Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced
that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The
Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability
may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case
also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona
rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent
case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society.
Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test
involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the
other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions
of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state
interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear
and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or
immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the
benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves
purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-
term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive
evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail
over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights -
"the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of
the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is
premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in
order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right
with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail
over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to
do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to
the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on
Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to
protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm
where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions
against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section
2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the
foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including
effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the
FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family
planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions.
[Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire
with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in
accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their
religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights
instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-
based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and
development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized.
[Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family
and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious
convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple
terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of
any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things
that are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in
line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24
thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person
seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from
the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As
in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet
under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs
are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written,
"at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot,
in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets
the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs
to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter
what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of
choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any
degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. 224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the
State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods
to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong
view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to
act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v.
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the
provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor
ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether
the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty." 227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to
assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should
they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be
struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance
of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good."10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless,
when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses
to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to
another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is
a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head
nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally
protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be
considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally
apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off
even if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind
must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral
discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent
aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
petition, and freedom of association.229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it
is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between
the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with
provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with
qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH
Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the
provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled
health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of
the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled
health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the
constitutional right to the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were
able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to
render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve
the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not
to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same
silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to
refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health
legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by
the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients. 231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious
objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. 232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according
to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from
acting according to one's belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of
the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a
future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or
supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious
freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could
limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral
by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating
the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who
may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who
is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to
the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's
life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses
to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right
of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

 (3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to
the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases,
HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be
provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal
interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and
medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition,
healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in
the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate,
timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in
government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of
moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for
the enrichment and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen
maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x." 235 He, however, failed
to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the
proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they
could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind
conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare
service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a
medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave
danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we
are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to
save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of
the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring
about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally
obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is
medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are
observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor
would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable.238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to
even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a
medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds
the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision
bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of
family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the
OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the
information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather
than promote its solidarity and total development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one
article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;

The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck
the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making
process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor
daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of
lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one
undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately
related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of
the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the
same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is
equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse
who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the
sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of
them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of
their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and
shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private
right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart
their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the
joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law
states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide
whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention
would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy
was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right
to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That
minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even
if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population
growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents.
The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that
their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right
of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of
the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment
of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of
the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State
affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and
society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor
child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a
state substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with
respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation
between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health
procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned,
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in
the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child.
After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the
unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection
and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to
exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and
that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person
should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above,
and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of
academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach
reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. 250 Citing
various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the
prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity
among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of
the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that
is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth.
Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also
for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law
itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes
among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather
than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed
in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be
said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent
that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit. 254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive
health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious
beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further
results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups
from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these
institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering
reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the
same time fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the
statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it
must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be
made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited
and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or
other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3)
public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services
in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the
guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service
provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health
service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier
discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of
information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For
ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range
of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules;
inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the
truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used
together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public
as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health
care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical
practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the
programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and
safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates
against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use .
They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the
poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program
imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection.
Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process,
as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept
of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the
distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the
health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental
to the advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples
with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows
that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to
promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program
under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public
educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other
hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly
because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health
care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced
labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of
giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the
accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal
profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very
lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice
of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to
regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals
that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service.
Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they
wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a
prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but
rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are
exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of
terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary
and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the
same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to
recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of
appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers,
importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health
products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate
authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and
non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said
product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any
person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not
registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty
(30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
 "(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused
death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe,
dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a
requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry
out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to
the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by
permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH
Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to
local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs
the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units
shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have
already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and
facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of
cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other
facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations
Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are
not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national
government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the
LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM.
The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the
organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the
autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no
manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general
welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as
they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be
restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest.275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law
enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive
issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover,
natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The
jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound
to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is
to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable.279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any
shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and
making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and
supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in
pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that
man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside
each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is
the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is
not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain
as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries,
which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their
young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human
capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because
we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an
ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when
our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the
penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by
the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted
by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the
application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of
interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's
function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted
by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the
reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the
assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning
method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual,
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the
full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section
4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is
hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Tingnan ang aking opinyong

Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Concurring Opinion

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

With Separate concurring opinion See: Separate Concurring Opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Concurring and dissenting See Concurring Opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See concurring and dissenting See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Separate dissent

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9,
2003; 405 SCRA 497, 504.

2See <http://wn.com/pro-rh_ bill_vs_anti-rh_ bi ll>, last visited on November 5, 20 13; See also <http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/nation/04/ 19/ I O/h ontiveros-tatad-debate-rh-bill>, last vi sited on November 5, 201 3.

3See <http ://news info .inqu irer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/ 20110321-326743/Stickers-spread-anti-RH-

bill-message>, last visited on November 5, 2 01 3; See also <http ://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/
218169/news/nation/carlos-celdran-distributes-pro-rh-stickers-in-quiapo>, last visited on November 5, 201 3.

4 See <http ://newsinfo. inquirer.net/241 737/massive-church-rally-set-against-rh-bill>, last visited November 5,

201 3; See also <http://www.splendorofthechurch.eom.ph/201 3/04/29/fi lipino-catholics-flex-muscles-in-poll-
clout/>, last visited November 5, 2013.

5With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R.
No. 2048 19; rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 3-32.

6With Prayer for the Urgent Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
docketed as G.R. No. 204934; rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 3-76.

7 Also proceeding in her personal capacity a citizen and as a member of the Bar.

8Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez &
Marietta C . Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista,
Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, Femand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves
and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel
Fernando C . Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V.
Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta &
Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphae l C. Castor,
Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves a nd on behalf of their minor chi ldren Margarita
Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Franc ine Y.
Racho for themse lves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi
Racho, C hessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on
behalf of the ir minor child Gabrie l Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah General
Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R. Laws & Katrina R. Laws

9 With Prayer for Injunction; docketed a s G.R. No. 204957.

10
With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R.
No. 204988; rollo (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 5-3 5.

11 Through and together with its president Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.

12 Through and together with its representative/ member of the school board Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D.

13
Rosemarie R. Alenton, Imelda G. Ibarra, Cpa, Lovenia P. Naces, Phd. , Anthony G. Nagac, Earl Anthony C.
Gambe And, Marlon I. Yap.
14Docketed as G.R. No. 205003; Petition is entitled "Petition (To Declare As Unconstitutional Republic Act No.
10354)." The petition fails to provide any description as to nature of the suit under the Rules of Court; rollo (G.R.
No. 205003), pp. 3-40.

15With prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order; docketed as G.R. No. 205043 ; rollo (G.R. No.
205043), pp. 3-16.

16 Through its vice president and co-founder, Eduardo B.Olaguer.

17With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Prel iminary Injunction; docketed as
G.R. No. 205 138; rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 3-50.

18 Through and together with its president Atty. Ricardo M. Ribo.

19Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F.
Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio 0. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M.
Diokno And Baldomero Falcone.

20 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Pre lim inary Injunction; The petition
fails to provide any description as to nature of the suit under the Rules of Court; docketed as G.R. No. 205478;
rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 3-26.

21Jacqueline H. King, M.D., Cynthia T. Domingo, M.D., Josephine Millado-Lumitao, M.D., Anthony Perez, Michael
Anthony G. Mapa, Carlos Antonio Palad, Wilfredo Jose, Claire Navarro, Anna Cosio, Gabrie l Dy Liacco

22With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Prelim inary Injunction; docketed as
G.R. No. 20549 1; rollo (G.R. No. 20549 1), pp. 3-13.

23
With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R.
No. 205720; rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 3-90.

24 Through and together with its executive director, Loma Melegrito.

25Joselyn B. Basilio, Robert z. Cortes, Ariel A. Crisostomo, Jeremy I. Gatdula, Cri stina A. Montes, Raul Antonio
A. N idoy, Winston Conrad B. Padojinog, Rufino L. Policarpio III.

26 Docketed as G.R. No. 206355, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 3-32.

27Through and together with its co-petitioners, Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and
Berteni Cataluna Causing .

28With prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 207 111 ; rollo (G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 3-
51.

29Mary M. lmbong, Anthony Victorio B. Lumicao, Joseph Martin Q. Verdejo, Antonio Emma R. Roxas and Lota
Lat-Guerrero.

30With prayer for a Writ of Pre liminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 207 172; rollo (G.R. No. 207 172), pp. 3-
56.

31Spouses Juan Carlos Artadi Sarmiento and Francesca Isabelle Besinga-Sarmiento, and Spouses Luis Francis
A. Rodrigo, Jr. and Deborah Marie Veronica N. Rodrigo.

32 Docketed as G.R. No. 2 07563; rollo (G.R. No. 2 07563), pp. 3-1 5.

33 Rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 138-1 55.

34 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 124 8-1 260.

35 Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 20481 9), pp. 8-1 O; Petit ion, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc.
(ALFI) v. Ochoa, rol!o (G.R. No. 20493 4), pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa,
rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 13-1 5; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11 ; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rol!o (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. N o. 205478), pp. 10-1 3; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President,
rollo (G.R. No . 20635 5), pp . 11-15 ; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 17- 18; Petition, Buhay
Party-list (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 1255- 1256.

36 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 26-28; Petition,
Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G. R. No. 204988), pp. 15-1 6; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. N o. 205478), pp. 13- 14; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205720), pp. 30-35.

37 Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 26-27; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 39-44; Petition, Tatad v. Office
of the President, rol/o (G. R. No. 205491), pp. 8-9; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 205720), pp . 59-67; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R.
No. 2 06355), pp. 25-26.

38Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 I 9), pp. 20-22; Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, inc.
(ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 34-38; Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 26-27; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 6-7; Petition,
Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 56-75; Petition, Millennium Saint
Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 16-22; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R.
No. 207 111), pp.28-33 ; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, ro/lo (G.R. No. 207 172), pp. 12-
16.

39Section 5.23 Skilled Health Professional as a Conscientious Objector. ln order to be considered a conscientious
objector, a skilled health professional shall comply with the following requirements:

a) Submission to the DOH of an affidavit stating the modem family planning methods that he or she
refuses to provide and his or her reasons for objection;

b) Posting of a notice at the entrance of the clinic or place of practice, in a prominent location and using a
clear/legible font, enumerating the reproductive health services he or she refuses to provide; and c) Other
requirements as determined by the DOH. xxx.

Provided, That skilled health professionals who are pub lic officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial,
City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital
staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to
implement these Rules cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. xx x (Emphases Ours)

40 Joint Memorandum, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 26 17-26 19.

41Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, ro/lo (G.R. No. 204934), p. 40; Petition,
Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp.6-7; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, In c. v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 205720), p. 81.

42Petition, Pro-l ife Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205720), pp. 63-64; Petition, Couples
for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 20-23.

43Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, In c. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No . 204988), pp. 16-48 ; Petition ,
Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2 05478), pp. 7-9.

44 Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 16-48; Petition, Echavez
v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 7-9.

45
Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 30-3 1;
Memorandum, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 1247- 1250; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation,
Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 2063 55), pp. 25; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 172 ), pp. 43-45.

46 Joint Memorandum, Im bong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 2626-2637; Petition, Alcantara, pp. 9-1 3;
rollo, (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 146- 150; Petition, Pro-l ife Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205720), pp. 78-81.

47 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, ro//o (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 32-34.

48 Petition, l mbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 2623-2626; Petition, Alcantara, pp.5-9; rollo, (G.R. No.
204934), pp. 142- 148; Petition, Serve life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 20-
21; Petition, Bugarin v. Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No. 205003), pp. 14- 16; Petit ion, Millennium Saint
Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No. 206355), p. 16; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation,
In c. v. Ochoa, ro//o (G. R. No. 207 172), pp. 16-20.

49 Petition, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 2 0481 9), pp. 14- 19; Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation,
Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 42-44; Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc.
v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 21-25; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the
President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 23-25; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R.
No. 207172), pp. 23 -28.

50Jo int Memorandum, Jmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No . 204819), pp. 257 1-2574; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo
(G.R. No. 205043), pp. 11-1 2; Petition, Tatad v. Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No. 205491), pp. 7-8;
Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 207172), pp. 28-32.

51Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 28-33; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205138), pp. 37-38.

52Section 26. ( I) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof; Task Force for the Family and l ife Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 6-1 O;
Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205478), pp. 9-10.

53 Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 14-30.

54Memorandum, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 894-900; Petition, Couples for Christ
Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 45-48; Petition, Tillah v. Executive Secretary, rollo (G.R.
No. 207563) pp. 6-12.

55 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 362-480.

56 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 195-353.

57 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 487-528.

58 Rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 871-1007.

59 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp.1 306-1334; rollo, (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 98-132.

60 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 736-780.

61In her Motion for Leave to Intervene, Senator Pilar Ju liana S. Cayetano manifested that she was adopting as
her own the arguments raised by respondents Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G.
Romualdez in their Petition for Intervention; See rollo (G..R. No. 20481 9), pp. 173 1-1 783. After being directed
by the Court to file their respective memoranda, intervenors Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr.
Alberto G. Romualdez manjfested on November 18, 201 3, that they were adopting the arguments raised by
Congressman Lagman in his Joint Memorandum; See rollo (G..R. No. 20481 9), pp. 3061-3070. On November
26, 201 3, Senator Pilar Juliana S. Cayetano file d her separate Memorandum ; see, rollo (G. .R. No. 204819), pp.
3032-3059.
62 Resolution dated March 15, 201 3.

63 Resolution, dated July 16, 201 3.

64In its Resolution, dated August 27, 201 3, the Court required the parties to also include the following in their
respective memoranda:

1. What is the relation of the first portion of Section 7 on Access to Family Planning to the theory that R.A.
No. I 0354 is an anti-poor program that seeks to reduce the population of the poor?

2. How is the second paragraph of the same section related to the proposition that R.A. No. 10354
encourages sex among minors?

3. In relation to Section 23 on Prohibited Acts, where in the law can you find the definition of the term '
health care service provider' ? Is the definition of a ' public health care service provider ' found in Section
4, paragraph (n) of the law sufficient for the Court to understand the meaning of a 'private health care
service provider' or should the Court refer to the Implementing Rules and Regulations which refer to
'health care providers'?

4. With respect to ' health care providers' under the Implementing Rules and Regulations, does it make a
difference that they are called ' health care providers' and not ' health care service providers'? Does the
fact that there is a missing word indicate that there is a difference or that the tautology being proposed
actually refers to different objects? If in the affirmative, is there enough basis to say that the law is a
criminal statute that has sufficient definitions for purposes of punitive action?

5. In relation to Section 23(a)(l), how will the State be able to locate the programs and services on which
the health care service provider has the duty to give information? If the terminology of ' health care
service provider ' includes ' private health care service provider', which includes private hospitals and
private doctors, is the State duty-bound to consequently provide these providers with information on the
programs and services that these providers should give information on?

6. As regards programs, is there a duty on the part of the State to provide a way by which private health
care service providers can have access to information on reproductive health care programs as defined in
Section 4, paragraph (r)? What is the implication of the fact that the law requires even private parties with
the duty to provide information on government programs on the criminal liability of private health care
service providers?

7. As regards services, what is the distinction between 'information' and 'services' considering that
'services' in different portions of the statute include providing of information?

8. What are the specific elements of every sub-group of crime in Section 23 and what are the legal bases
for the determination of each element?

9. Are there existing provisions in other statutes relevant to the legal definitions found in R.A. No. 10354?

10. Why is there an exemption for the religious or conscientious objector in paragraph (3) of Section 23
and not in paragraphs ( 1) and (2)? What is the distinction between paragraph (3) and paragraphs ( 1)
and (2)?

11 . Section 23(a)(3) penalizes refusal to extend quality health care services and information 'on account
of the person's marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature of
work.' What if the refusal is not on account of one's marital status, gender, age, religious convictions,
personal circumstances, or nature of work, or what if the refuser simply does not state the reason for the
refusal? Will there still be a criminal liability under Section 23(a)(3)?

12. Still on Section (23 )(a)(3) on referring a person to another facility or provider, is this the same or
analogous to referral of a person to seek second opinion? What is the medical standard for the provision
of a second opinion? In referring to another professional or service provider for a second opinion, is it the
patient who is not comfortable with the opinion given by the first doctor that triggers the duty or option to
 refer? How is it different with the situation in Section 23(a)(3) when it is the doctor who is not comfortable
about giving an opinion? Is the difference legally material?

13. How does Section 23, paragraph (c) relate to Article 134 the Labor Code which requires employers to
provide family planning services?

14. Section 24 provides that in case the offender is a juridical person, the penalties in the statute shall be
imposed on the president or any responsible officer. For each offense in Section 23, how will the
corporate officer be made responsible if there is no actual participation by the hospital board directors or
officers of such action? Does Section 24 in relation to Section 23 require corporate action? What is the
situation being contemplated in the second paragraph of Section 24 before there can be accountability for
criminal violations?

15. Section 7 provides that access of minors to information and family planning services must be with the
written consent of parents or guardians. Is the re a penalty in the law for those who will make these
information and services (e.g. , contraceptives) available to minors without the parent's consent? How
does this relate to Section 14 which requires the Department of Education to formulate a curriculum which
'shall be used by public schools' and ' may be adopted by private schools'? Is there a penalty for teaching
sex education without the parents' or guardians' written consent? Correlatively, is there a penalty for
private schools which do not teach sex education as formulated by the DepEd considering the use of the
word ' may'?

65 Section I , R.A. No. 4729

66Entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines."

67 See http://www.pop.org/content/coercive-population-ploys-in-ph ilippines-1428, last visited October 17, 2013.

68 Entitled "Revising the Population Act of Nineteen Hundred And Seventy-One."

69<http://www.senate.gov.ph/publications/PB%202009-03%20-%20Promoting%20Reproductive%20Health.pdf->,
last visited October 17, 2013.

70 Held in Cairo, Egypt from September 5- 13, 1994.

71 Section 17, R.A. 97 10.

72 See <www. nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d)pop.asp>; last accessed February 2 0, 2014.

73 Alliance /or the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), p. 1408.

74 Id.

75 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 376.

76 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 377.

77 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 378.

78 G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 20 10, 632 SCRA 146, 166.

79 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 385, 387-388.

80 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp .3 81-384.

81 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 ( 1936).

82 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. I.

83 Constitution, Art. Vll , Sec. I.

84 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.

85 Supra note 81.

86See Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc., et al. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777,
799 (1989).

87Francisco, Jr. v. Th e House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 , November I 0, 2003, citing Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

88 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 77-78 (2009).

89 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G. R. No. 19627 I, October 18, 20 I I, 659 SCRA 270, 326-327.

90
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G. R. No. I 92935 & G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010, 637
SCRA 7 8, I 77.

91 Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 575 (I997).

92 453 Phil. 586 (2003).

93 G.R. No. 188078, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA137.

94 G.R No. 187 167, July 16, 2011 , 655 SCRA 476.

95Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 83 0, 882-883 (2003), citing Florentino P. Feliciano, The
Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects Of The Process Of Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37 A
MJJUR 17, 24 (1 992).

96Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G. R. No . 192935, December 7, 20 10, 637 SCRA 78, 148 ; Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 20 10, 632 SCRA
146, 166-1 67; Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 522 Phil. I, 27 (2006); Francisco v. House of Representatives,
460 Phil. 83 0, 892 (2003).

97 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 2 04819), pp. 375-376.

98Comment-In-Intervention, Hontiveros, et al., rollo, (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 106- 109; Comment-In-Intervention,
Cabral et al., rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 500-501.

99 Republic Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v. Santiago, 556 Phil. 83, 9 1-92 (2007).

100Jriformation Technology Foundation of the Philipp ines v. Commission on Elections , 499 Phil. 281, 304-305
(2005).

101
Lawyers Against Monopoly And Poverty (LAMP) v. Th e Secretary of Budget and Management, G. R. No.
164987, April 24, 201 2, 670 SCRA 373 , 383.

102The Province Of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 589 Phil. 387, 481
(2008).

103 Id. at 483 .

104 Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 574 ( 1997).

105 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 381.

106 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 ( 1987).

107 The First Amendment of the US Constitution reads: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

108
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phi l. 357 (2008); Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil.
265 (2004 ); Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phi I. 290 (200 I).

109 Resolution, Romualdez v. Commission on Elect ions, 594 Phil. 305, 3 16 (2008).

110 Constitution, Article VIII , Section 1.

111 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 375-376.

112 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), p. 384.

113 Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. Th e Executive Secretary, 558 Phil. 338, 350 (2007).

114
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 633 (2000), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (
1962).

115 Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio; Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phil. 357, 406 (2008).

116Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 591 Phil.
393, 404 (2008); Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321 (1997); De Guia v. COMELEC, G
.R . No. 104 71 2, May 6, I 992, 208 SCRA 420, 422.

117 503 Phil. 42, 53 (2005).

118 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).

119 464 Phil. 375, 385 (2004).

120 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 388-389.

121The Province Of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, supra note 102; Ortega
v. Quezon City Government, 506 Phil. 373, 380 (2005); and Gonzales v. Comelec, 137 Phil. 471 (1969).

122Section 26. (I) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.

123
Petition, Task Force for the Family and life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 6-10; Petition,
Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 9-10.

124 Joint Memorandum, Lagman, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819) pp. 212-214.

125 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819, pp.389-393.

126 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. N o. 204934), p. 1396.

127 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. No. 204934), p. 1396.

128 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. No. 204934), p. 1396.

129 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 Edition, pp. 15 7-1 58; citing 82 CJS 365.

130 Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rol/o (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 8-10; Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc.
(ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa,
rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 13-1 5; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, ro/lo (G. R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11 ; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, ro/lo (G.R. No . 2051 38), pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2 05478), pp. 10-13; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President,
rollo (G. R. No. 206355), pp. 11-15; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay
Partylist (BU HAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 1255 -1256.

131 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 15-25; Petition,
Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 13-1 5; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona,
rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205138), pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No . 205478), pp. 10-13; Petition, Millennium Saint
Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 11-1 5; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R.
No. 207111), pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay Partylist (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 1255-1256.

132 Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 14-30.

133
Memorandum, Alcantara, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2133; Reply, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp.
339-340.

134Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 393-396; Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rollo,
(G.R. No. 204819), pp. 230-233; Comment-In-Intervention, C4RH, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 1091-11 92;
Hontiveros, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 111-1 16; Memorandum, Cayetano,, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 3038-
3041.

135 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 396-410.

136 Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 225-342.

137 Article 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

138 See Republic Act No. 4729, dated June 18, 1966.

139 See http://www.pop.org/content/coerci ve-population-ploys- in-philippines- 1428 , last visited October 17, 2013.

140
<http://www.senate.gov.ph/publications/PB%202009-03%20-%20Promoting%20Reproductive%20
Health.pdt>, last visited October 17, 2013.

141 <http://www.pop.org/content/ coercive-population-p loys-in-ph ii ippines-1428>

During the deliberation, it was agreed that the individual members of the Court ca n express their own views on
this matter.

142 Petition, Alliance/or the Family Foundation, Inc. (AL FI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp . 15-25; Petition,
Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 2 04988), pp. 13- 15; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona,
rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11 ; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205 138), pp. 8-36 ; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 10-13 ; Petition, Millennium Saint
Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 11-15; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R.
No. 207 111), pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay Party/isl (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 1255-1256.

143 Comment-ln-lntervention, Lag man, rollo, (G. R. No. 204819), pp. 225-342.

144 G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 201 2, 676 SCRA 579.

145 Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 469.

146 Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 262.

147 G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 618 Phil. 634 (2009).

148 Gonzales v. Carhart (Nos. 05-380 and 05-1382), No. 05- 380, 413 F. 3d 791 ; 05- 1382, 435 F. 3d 1163,

149 http: //www.law.comell.edu/supct/html/05-380.ZO.html, last visited February 15, 2014.

150 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 16, 1986, p. 668.

151 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 12, 1986, p. 596.

152 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 12, 1986, p. 669.

153 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 19, 1986, p. 800.

154 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 17, 1986, p. 711 .

155 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 17, 1986, p. 711.

156 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4 , September 17, 1986, p. 745 .

157 TSN, July 9, 2013 , pp. 23-24.

158 Id.

159 4th Edition, p. 375

160 Id, p. 609

161 Sumpaico, Gutierrez, Luna, Pareja, Ramos and Baja-Panlilio, 2"d Edition, (2002), pp. 76-77.

162Moore, Persaud, Torchia, The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryo logy, International Edition, 9th
Edition (2013), pp. 1-5, 13.

163
O'Rahilly, Ronan and Muller, Fabiola, Huma n Embryo logy & Teratology. 2nd edition. New York: Wiley-Liss,
1996, pp. 8, 29, cited at: http://www.princeton.edu/-prolife/articles/embryoguotes2.html, last visited February 15,
2014.

164
From https://www.philippinemedicalassociation .org/downloads/circular-forms/ Position-Paper-on-the-Republic-
Health-Bill-%28Responsible-Parenthood-Bill%29.pdf. last visited March 26, 2014.

165 Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rol/o, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 225-342.

166 Id.

167 Id.

168 See <http://americanpregnancy.org/duringpregnancy/ fetaldevelopment I .htm>, last visited April 7, 2014.

169
Joint Memorandum of the House of Representatives and Respondent- Intervenor Rep. Edee I C. Lagman),
Section 40, Rollo, G.R. No. 2048 19, p. 2343.

170 Concurring Opinion (Justice Carpio), p. 3.

171 See TSN, July 9, 2013, p. 100.

172 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), pp. 17-19; Separate Opinion (Justice Brion), p. 25.

173 Section 3.01 For purposes ofthese Rules, the terms shall be defin ed as fo llows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertil ized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Admini stration (F DA) .

xxxx

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern fam ily planning
method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb
in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) .

174 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), pp. 17-19; Separate Opinion (Justice Brion), p. 25 .

175 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), p. 19 .

176 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI} v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 26-28; Petition,
Serve l ife Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rolfo, (G. R. No . 204988), pp. 15-16; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 13- 14; Petition, Pro-life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rolfo (G.R. No. 205
720), pp. 30-35.

177 Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, rollo, (G.R. No . 204934), pp. 1419-1445.

178 Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxxx

(p) Reproductive Health (RH) refers to the state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its
functions and processes. This implies that people are able to have a responsible, safe, consensual and
satisfying sex life, that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when , and how
often to do so. This further implies that women and men attain equal relationships in matters related to
sexual relations and reproduction.

179 Section 4. Definition of Terms . - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxxx

(w) Sexual health refers to a state of physical, mental and social well-being in relation to sexuality. It
requires a positive and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual relationships, as well as the possibility
of having pleasurable and safe sexual experiences, free from coercion, discrimination and violence.

180
Me morandum, Alcantara, rollo, (G.R. No. 204934)p. 2136; Memorandum , PAX, rollo (G.R. No. 205 138), pp.
2154-2155.

181 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 415-416.

182 Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011 , 6 52 SCRA 690, 738-739.

183 335 Phil. 82 ( 1997).

184 Memorandum , Alliance for the Family Foundation, In c. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rol/o (G.R. No. 204934), p. 1408.

185 Id.
186 Memorandum, Lagman, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 2359-2361.

187 Separate Opinion (Justice Leonardo-De Castro) p. 54.

188 Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205138), pp. 40-41.

189 Petition, Task Force/or the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 26-27; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSem inarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 39-44; Petition, Tatadv. Office
of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 205491), pp. 8-9; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 205720), pp . 59-67; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R.
No. 2063 55), pp. 25-26.

190 Joint Memorandum, lmbong/Luat, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2615.

191 Joint Memorandum, Imbong/Luat, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp . 2616-2621.

192 Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (GR. No. 205478), pp. 6-7.

193 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 20-23.

194 Petition, Coup les for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 I 72), pp. 20-23.

195Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 35-37.; Petition,
Millennium Saint Foundation, In c. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 17- 18.

196
Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 3050; Comment-in-Lntervention, Cabral, rollo (G.R. No. 2
04819), p. 5 11.

197 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 2677.

198 Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), p. 3050.

199 Joint Memorandum Lagman, rol!o (G.R. No. 2048 19), p. 2361.

200
Memorandum . C4RH, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2189; Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p.
3050-305 1.

201 Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204 819), p. 3050 .

202 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2677.

203 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p . 2679.

204 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2679.

205 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2000 ed ., p. 179, citing Justice Laurel in Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421.

206 Gorospe, Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. I 007

207 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed. , p. 330

208 Gorospe, Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. I 066

209 59 SC RA 54 (1974).

210 Escritor v. Estrada, A.M. No. P-02-1651 , June 22, 2006, 525 Phil. 110, 140- 141 (2006).
211 106 Phil. 2 (1959).

212 Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 9- 10 ( 1959).

213 Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools, 219 SCRA 25 6 ( 1993 ), March 1, 1993.

214 525 Phil. 110 (2006).

215 Id. at 137.

216 Id. at 148.

217 Id . at 149.

218 Id. at 175.

219 Id. at 168- 169.

220 Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 4 11 , 560 (2003).

221 Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, pp. 178-1 79.

222 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed. , p. 330.

223
Separate Opinion, Cruz, Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools, 219 SCRA 25 6 ( 1993 ), March 1,
1993.

224 Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 220, at 537.

225 20 130 CSIH 36.

226
http://www. skepticink.com/tippling/201 3/05/0 5/conscientious-objection-to-abortion -cathoIic-midwives-win-
appeal/; last visited February 22, 2014

227http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/20 13/05/03/conscientious-objection-to-abortion-catholic-midwives-win-appeal;
last visited February 22 , 2014

228 453 Phil. 440 (2003).

229
Fernando on the Philippine Constitution, 1974 ed. , p. 565; See Dissenting Opinion Makasiar, Garcia v. The
Faculty Admission Committee G. R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975.

230 TSN , August 13, 201 3, pp. 52-54.

231 TSN, August27, 201 3, pp. 71-72

232Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines v. Office of the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President of
the Philippines, supra note 228 at 450.

233 http://fatherbemasblogs. blogspot.com/2011 _02_0 !_archive.html ; last vi sited February 15, 2014.

234 Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 210.

235 TSN , Aug ust 27 , 201 3, p. 130.

236
http ://www. lifenews.com/2011 /09/01 /philippines-sees-matemal-mortalitv-decline-without-abortion; last visited
March 9, 2014 [Researchers from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation of the University of Washington
in Seattle examined maternal mortality rates in 181 countries and found the rate (the number of women's deaths
per 100,000) dropped by 81 percent in the Philippines between .1980 and 2008. The decrease comes as the
largely Catholic nation has resister efforts to legalize abortions, even though the United Nations and pro-abortion
groups claim women will supposedly die in illegal abortions and increase the maternal mortality rate if abortion is
prohibited.

The 2010 study, published in Lancet, shows the Philippines outpaced first-world nations like Germany,
Russia and Israel - where abortions are legal - in cutting maternal mortality rates.

Meanwhile, the National Statistical Coordination Board in the Philippines, according to Spero Forum, has
shown the same results. From 1990-2010, the daily maternal mortality rate dropped 21 percent, its figures
indicated. The World Health Organization also found that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped 48
percent from 1990 to 2008.

237 TSN, July 23, 2013 , p. 23.

238 Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. {ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), p. 1407.

239SEC. 15. Certificate of Compliance. - No marriage license shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar unless
the applicants present a Certificate of Compliance issued for free by the local Family Planning Office certifying
that they had duly received adequate instructions and information on responsible parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition.

240 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, In c. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 172), p. 29.

241 80 CONST. Art XV, §2 .

242 Separate Opinion (Justice Leonardo-De Castro), p. 42-43.

243 130 Phil. 415 (1968).

244 Id . at 436.

245 81 Griswold v. Connecticut,3 81U.S. 479, June7, 1965.

246 Id.

247 Section 12, Article II , 1987 Constitution.

248 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., p . 85.

249(ii) Parental consent or that of the person exercising parental authority in the case of abused minors, where the
parent or the person exercising parental authority is the respondent, accused or convicted perpetrator as certified
by the proper prosecutorial office of the court. In the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal
guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective
surgical procedures and in no case shall consent be required in emergency or serious cases as defined in
Republic Act No. 8344.

250 Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 15- 16.

251
Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 1453-
1496.

252 Records, 1986 Constitutional Convention, Volume IV, pp. 401-402 .

253 Article II , Section 13, 1987 Constitution.

254 Petition, Task Force for the Family and life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204957), pp. 24-25.
255
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5,
2010; People v. Nazario, No. L-44 143, August 3 1, 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195.

256 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, G.R. No. 1835 17, June 22, 2010, 621 SC RA 461, 469.

257 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 1145 .

258 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 1252.

259 SEC. 3. Guiding Principles for Implementation. - Th is Act declares the following as guiding principles:

xxxx

(d) The provision of ethical and medically safe, legal, accessible, affordable, non-abortifacient, effective
and quality reproductive health care services and supplies is essential in the promotion of people's right to
health, especially those of women, the poor, and the marginalized, and shall be incorporated as a
component of basic health care;

(e) The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family
planning, including effective natural and modem methods which have been proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide fun ding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning,
especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and the irreligious
convictions;

(f) The State shall promote programs that: (I) enable individuals and couples to have the number of
children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions: Provided, That no one shall be deprived, for economic reasons, of the rights to have children;
(2) achieve equitable allocation and utilization of resources; (3) ensure effective partnership among
national government, local government units (LGUs) and the private sector in the design, implementation,
coordination, integration, monitoring and evaluation of people-centered programs to enhance the quality
of life and environmental protection; (4) conduct studies to analyze demographic trends including
demographic dividends from sound population policies towards sustainable human development in
keeping with the principles of gender equality, protection of mothers and children, born and unborn and
the promotion and protection of women's reproductive rights and health ; and (5) conduct scientific
studies to determine the safety and efficacy of alternative medicines and methods for reproductive health
care development;

xxxx

(g) The provision of reproductive health care, information and supplies giving priority to poor beneficiaries
as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization must
be the primary responsibility of the national government consistent with its obligation to respect, protect
and promote the right to health and the right to life;

xxxx

(i) Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs), women's and people's organizations,
civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that
reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the
priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized;

xxxx

(l) There shall be no demographic or population targets and the mitigation, promotion and/or stabilization
of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health ;
 xxxx

(n) The resources of the country must be made to serve the entire population, espec ially the poor, and
allocations thereof must be adequate and effective: Provided, That the life of the unborn is protected;

(o) Development is a multi-faceted process that calls for the harmonization and integration of policies,
plans, programs and projects that seek to uplift the quality of life of the people, more particularly the poor,
the needy and the marginalized;

260 SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxxx

(r) Reproductive health care program refers to the systematic and integrated provision of reproductive
health care to all citizens prioritizing women, the poor, marginalized and those invulnerable or crisis
situations.

xxxx

(aa) Sustainable human development refers to bringing people, particularly the poor and vulnerable, to
the center of development process, the central purpose of which is the creation of an enabling
environment in which all can enjoy long, healthy and productive lives, done in the manner that promotes
their rights and protects the life opportunities of future generation s and the natural ecosystem on which
all life depends.

261 Biraogo v. Th e Philippine Truth Commission, supra note 90.

262
Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G. R. No. 204988), pp. 16-48; Petition,
Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205478), pp. 7-9.

263 Except the practice of law which is under the supervision of the Supreme Court.

264 United States v. Jesus, 3 1 Phil. 218, 230 (1915).

265 Petition , Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. N o. 205478), p. 8.

266With reference to Section 2 , 3(E), 4(L), 9 and I 9(C) of the RH La w; Petition, ALFI, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),
pp. 28-33; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 37-38.

267 358 Phil. 410 (1998) .

268 Pimentel, Jr. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 201 2, 676 SCRA 551, 559.

269 Id . at 559-560.

270 Id. at 561.

271 See Section 6, R.A. No. 10354.

272 See Section 5, R.A . No. 10354.

273 See Section 16, R.A . No. 1354.

274 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270, 306.

275 Id. at 305.

276 Petition, Pro-life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (GR. N o. 205 720), pp. 14-30.

277 Gettel , Political Science, Revised Edition, p. 180.

278 454 Phil. 504 (2003).

279 Separate Opinion, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phi l. 504 (2003).
1. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to life:

NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue
that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual
Members could express their own views on this matter.

Ponente’s view (Justice Mendoza): Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that
conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent
the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from
passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and
actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only
drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the
term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
D. IMBONG VS OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

D. Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection
Clause

Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
 4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of
the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must
concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something
has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must
show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s
thoughts are externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence,
can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a
law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or
put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the
act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or
repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of
the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to
retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can
stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:

SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue
that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that
individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that
conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent
the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from
passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and
actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only
drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the
term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

1. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its
mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives
it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution
of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and
materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are
“safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

1. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To
allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

1. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV
of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH
Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii)
which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the
right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not
deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to
accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

1. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum
on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children
with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant)
the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the
mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.

1. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and
“knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.

1. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State
shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does
not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid.
There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education

1. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the
practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages
private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render
RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present
a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger
of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard
on the matter now.

1. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

1. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court
has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to
sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality
which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such
as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been
directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well
being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

1. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
2. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions
of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right
to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment
of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one
which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

Imbong v. Ochoa case digest no. 2

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners
are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an
actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
 immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title
rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading,
either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to
recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal
effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence
of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

1. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to life:

Ruling/s:

SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue
that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that
individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception.”
 In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception”
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in
line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)),
the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by
using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses
the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its
mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives
it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution
of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices
and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion.
To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even
if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV
of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH
Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of
Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their
absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
 procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical
procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents
are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the
State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing
the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of
the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should
be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and
modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to
the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State
shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In
addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is
valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health
education
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the
practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages
private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to
render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present
a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are
in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights
to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court
has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to
sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality
which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such
as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been
directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible
tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions
of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including
their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right
to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual,
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the
full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section
4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55130 January 17, 1983

PEDRO SANTOS TO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ-PAÑO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII, and
JUAN Y. OCAMPO, respondents.

Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioner.

Abundio J. Macarañas for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) of the crime of
estafa for having issued a bouncing check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from seven years
and eight months of prision mayor as minimum, to nine years and four months of prision mayor, as maximum. 1 He
appealed to the Court of Appeals which reduced the penalty to one year and one day of prision correccional as minimum,
to one year and eight months as maximum. 2

Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final, petitioner not having appealed therefrom, he filed a petition for
probation 3 with respondent judge, who, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, denied the petition
on July 24, 1980, on the following grounds:

(a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed, and

(b) petitioner is not a penitent offender.

A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner having been denied by the respondent judge, the present proceeding was
resorted to, petitioner averring that the respondent judge erred in denying his petition for probation despite the
recommendation for its approval by the Probation Office.

We find for the petitioner.

At the outset, it might be stated that the Solicitor General whose comment was required by this Court, recommends the
granting of probation. As he points out, petitioner is not among the offenders enumerated in the probation law
(Presidential Decree No. 968) from availing of the benefits of probation. Under Section 9 of said law, the disqualified
offenders are the following:

(a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;

(b) those convicted of any offense against the security of the State;

(c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment
of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos;
 (d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of the decree; and

(e) those who were already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the decree became
applicable, pursuant to Section 33.

Under the abovequoted provision, petitioner may not be disqualified from being entitled to the benefits of probation. Some
other provisions have to be sought, if any, upon which to deny petitioner the benefits of probation which, from a reading of
the law in its entirety, should with liberality, rather than undue strictness, be extended to anyone not listed as disqualified.
In expressly enumerating offenders not qualified to enjoy the benefits of probation, the clear intent is to allow said benefits
to those not included in the enumeration.

If only for the above observation as to how the law should be applied in order that its objective could be realized and
achieved, We cannot but find respondent judge's reasons for his denial of the petition for probation insufficient to justify a
deviation from a policy of liberality with which the law should be applied.

The first reason given by the judge is that "probation win depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed." According
to him, the State has shown serious concern with the above of checks as a commercial paper, as shown by various
measures taken to curb the pernicious practice of issuing bouncing checks.

For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the crime. The inquiry is more on
whether probation will help the offender along the lines for which the probation system has been established, such as
giving the first-time offender a second chance to maintain his place in society through a process of reformation, which is
better achieved, at least as to one who has not committed a very serious offense, when he is not mixed with hardened
criminals in an atmosphere not conducive to soul-searching as within prison walls. The consciousness of the State's
benignity in giving him that second chance to continue in peaceful and cordial association with his fellowmen will advance,
rather than retard, the process of reformation in him.

If, therefore, reformation is what the law is more, if not solely, concerned with, not the prevention by means of punitive
measures, of the commission of the offense, it is readily seen that the respondent judge has fallen into a wrong
obsession. He would, in effect, disqualify all those who commit estafa through bouncing cheeks from enjoying the benefits
of probation. He would thereby add to the crimes expressly mentioned in the law which are not subject to probation. Thus,
the only crimes mentioned in the law based on the nature thereof are those against national security (Section 9,
paragraph b), the other crimes being those punished by more than six years imprisonment. Respondent judge would thus
be writing into the law a new ground for disqualifying a first-offender from the benefits of probation, based on the nature of
the crime, not on the penalty imposed as is the main criterion laid down by the law in determining who may be granted
probation. That crime would be estafa only by issuing bouncing check, but not all forms of estafa, which, incidentally, is
one offense the criminal liability for which is generally separated by a thin line from mere civil liability.

For those who would commit the offense a second time or oftener, or commit an offense of manifest gravity, it is the long
prison term which must be served that will act as deterrent to protect society. In protecting society, the family of the
offender which might be dependent or the latter to a greater or lesser extent for support or other necessities of life should
not be lost sight of, it being the basic unit of that society. By the relative lightness of the offense, as measured by the
penalty imposed, more than by its nature, as the law so ordains, the offender is not such a serious menace to society as
to be wrested away therefrom, as the more dangerous type of criminals should be.

The second reason of respondent judge for denying petition petitioner's bid for probation, is that petitioner is allegedly not
a penitent offender, as shown by his protestation of innocence even after his conviction by the trial court and the
affirmance of his conviction by the Court of Appeals.

We find the respondent judge, likewise, in error in assuming that petitioner has not shown repentance in committing the
crime of which he has been found guilty by both the trial and appellate courts. If petitioner appealed the decision of the
respondent judge to the Court of Appeals, he cannot be blamed for insisting on his version by which he could hope either
to be acquitted or at least given a lighter penalty that would entitle him to the benefits of probation.1äwphï1.ñët The
recourse he took has, indeed, proved to be well worth the effort. His penalty was reduced on appeal which placed him
within the benign purpose of the Probation Law. By the move he took by which to achieve this objective, acquittal not quite
being within reach, petitioner cannot be said to be a non-penitent offender, under serving of probation benefits. Once the
opportunity was laid open to him, he grasped it; for instead of appealing further to the Supreme Court, he promptly applied
for probation, made possible only by the reduced penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. The penalty imposed by
respondent court placed petitioner beyond the pale of the Probation Law. How can he be said to be a non-penitent
offender, as the law would judge one to be so, just because he appealed, as he could not have them applied for probation
even if he wanted to? Who knows but that if the penalty imposed by the trial court is that imposed by the Court of Appeals
petitioner would have applied for probation forthwith?

Under the circumstances as just pointed out, We find no sufficient justification for respondent judge's holding petitioner to
be a non-penitent offender. We find, instead, that the liberality with which the Probation Law should be applied in favor of
the applicant for its benefits affords the better means of achieving the purpose of the law, as indicated in Our decision in
the case of Balleta Jr. vs. Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. L-49907, August 21, 1979, 92 SCRA 719, cited by the Solicitor-General
who, as earlier stated, recommends granting of the instant petition for probation.

WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probation is set aside, and petitioner is hereby declared
admitted to probation, subject to the terms and conditions as are prescribed by the law, and recommended by the
probation officer.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino and Escolin, JJ., concur in the result.

PEDRO SANTOS TO vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ-PAÑO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch XVIII, and JUAN Y. OCAMPO

G.R. No. L-55130

January 17, 1983

FACTS:

Express enumeration of disqualified offenders means that, intent of law is to allow benefits of probation to apply
to those not included in the enumeration.

Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) of the
crime of estafa for having issued a bouncing check for P5,000.00. He then appealed to the Court of Appeals to reduce his
penalty.

Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final, petitioner not having appealed therefrom, he filed a petition
for probation with respondent judge, who, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, denied the
petition on the following grounds:

(a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the offense
committed, and
(b) petitioner is not a penitent offender.

A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner having been denied by the respondent judge, the present
proceeding was resorted to, petitioner averring that the respondent judge erred in denying his petition for probation
despite the recommendation for its approval by the Probation Office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can avail the benefits of probation?

RULING:

The Solicitor General whose comment was required by this Court, recommends the granting of probation. As he
points out, petitioner is not among the offenders enumerated in the probation law (Presidential Decree No. 968) from
availing of the benefits of probation. Under Section 9 of said law, the disqualified offenders are the following:

(a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;

(b) those convicted of any offense against the security of the State;

(c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos;

(d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of the decree; and

(e) those who were already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the decree became
applicable, pursuant to Section 33.

Under the above quoted provision, petitioner may not be disqualified from being entitled to the benefits of
probation. Some other provisions have to be sought, if any, upon which to deny petitioner the benefits of probation which,
from a reading of the law in its entirety, should with liberality, rather than undue strictness, be extended to anyone not
listed as disqualified. In expressly enumerating offenders not qualified to enjoy the benefits of probation, the clear intent is
to allow said benefits to those not included in the enumeration.

If only for the above observation as to how the law should be applied in order that its objective could be realized
and achieved, We cannot but find respondent judge's reasons for his denial of the petition for probation insufficient to
justify a deviation from a policy of liberality with which the law should be applied.

WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probation is set aside, and petitioner is hereby
declared admitted to probation, subject to the terms and conditions as are prescribed by the law, and recommended by
the probation officer.
Constitutional Law

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T.
ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO
D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON,
BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T.
PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON,
ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY
SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN,
OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO
H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES,
FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO
DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA,
FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR.,
JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father
CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-
PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In compliance, respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they
defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated
Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants
ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr.
Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as
Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For
this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the
Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the
petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in
which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground
that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies
of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands"
which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that
these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. 4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and
which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
 "(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain
and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied
first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes,
and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the
indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998,
which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon
the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A.
8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and
desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular
No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist
from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to
comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should
be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 114.

2 Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.

3 Id. at 23-25.

4 Section1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

5 Rollo, pp. 25-27.

6 Id. at 27-28.

7 Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:

PRECIS

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses and
Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner 1 wrote:2

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-dependent,' of the
professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic
terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history.
It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained
attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same
token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the Philippine
legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other
natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct sociology
and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our
history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the
indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice
to our indigenous people.

This Opinion discusses the following:

I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.

A. The Laws of the Indies

B. Valenton v. Murciano

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

D. The Philippine Constitutions

II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

A. Indigenous Peoples

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

2. Their Concept of Land

III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.

A. Legislative History

IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.

A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute
part of the land of the public domain.

1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired

2. The concept of native title

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government

(b) Indian Title to land

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands

 2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral domains does not
deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control and supervision in their development
and exploitation.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section
7(a) of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.

(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is allowed under
Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.

(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be harmonized
with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.

DISCUSSION

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.

A. The Laws of the Indies

The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This was the foundation for the
early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western
legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the
Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de
Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:

"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded
away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will
that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that
after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public
squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for
tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands
may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.

We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at such time as shall to
them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall
exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in
possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest
shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will."4

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing
royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian. 5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the
government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown. 6

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage
Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register
and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an
amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and
decrees.8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of
all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.

Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all
rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial
government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.

B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.9

Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation or paper title.
Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the
other hand, purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs
on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the
judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and
the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the
land, could not validly transmit it.

The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws which from earliest time
have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies." 10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did these
special laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it
recognized?"

Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in the Philippines.
However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies
would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be
prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of
the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11

Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the court interpreted it as
follows:

"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the Crown which have
not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that
there might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still
the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the
mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and
within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription were to be
protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time
should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action on the part of the
authorities."12

The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who
preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of
assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise,
the land would be restored to the Crown.14

The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's principal subdelegate to
issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's instructions:

"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation and publication
of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to
said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the
same time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated,
without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to
others."15

On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied" by private individuals
in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with contemporaneous legislative and executive
interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which
followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:

"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient
length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers,
and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."16

In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these Islands by which the
plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any action by the State."17 Valenton had no
rights other than those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of
the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state
ownership of public land.

As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government from earliest times,
requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the
American Government in Act No. 926."18

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the Philippine Bill of 1902. The
law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading,
selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain
native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the
Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government;19 and that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties
between Spain and the United States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, 21 and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands.22

Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law was passed under the
Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and
Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. 23 After the passage of the 1935
Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the
present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the
transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with
Filipino citizens and corporations.24

Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496, or the Land
Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the
Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land
Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration
formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens
system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the
owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or
reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon
issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation. 27

D. The Philippine Constitutions

The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935
Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. 28 There was
an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources
and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine.29 State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting
point to secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. 30 The
delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural
resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
doctrine.31

Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," reads as
follows:

"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant."

The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National Economy and the
Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:

"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development,
exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant."

The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National Economy and Patrimony,"
to wit:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases
of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

x x x."

Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein, whether on public
or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by
the IPRA.

II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing
Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a
distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains
and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous
concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:

- the right to develop lands and natural resources;

- the right to stay in the territories;

- the right in case of displacement;

- the right to safe and clean air and water;

 - the right to claim parts of reservations;

- the right to resolve conflict;32

- the right to ancestral lands which include

a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws
and traditions of the community concerned;

b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer is to a
non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an
unconscionable consideration.33

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and
empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions
and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies. 36

To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is
an independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to
ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups
including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and
Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural
Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which were
merged under a revitalized structure.38

Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still unresolved, the
matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to
the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion
upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to
12 years and/or fined from ₱100,000.00 to ₱500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages. 40

A. Indigenous Peoples

The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the
Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary
international language in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 41 and the United Nations (UN) Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42

ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:

"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies
identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed
and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or
who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures,
became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded
as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state
boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been
displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies
who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These
groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time
immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by
their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the
country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains.

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros,
Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:

1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao,
Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino
and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan,
Quirino and Isabela.

2. In Region III- Aetas.

3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan,
Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental
Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.

4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of Camarines
Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and
Camarines Sur.

5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros Occidental; the
Corolano and Sulod.

6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.

7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of
Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.

8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog,
Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur,
Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis
Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.

9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao
del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur;
Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the Mangguangon of
Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South
Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South Cotabato.

10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and Iranon. 43

How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.

Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and
Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became the dominant
influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or
fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of
Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial
society.45

The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became supplementary activities as
reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine
communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where nature
was a primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common
ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not
differences.47 Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh.48

The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had languages that traced their
origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media of daily communication but also as vehicles for
the expression of their literary moods.49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but
which they sensed to be part of their lives.50 They had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the
immortality of the soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called
Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored
the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to be
respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship
between man and the object of nature.51

The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a
boat, which transported them to these shores.52 The barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of
thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's
duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised
all the functions of government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of
war.53

Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from generation to generation
and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of
the elder persons in the community.54 The written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time
to time as the necessity arose.55 The oldest known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at
about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu.56 Whether customary
or written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and
punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully
through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between
subjects of different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral barangays
acted as arbiters.57

Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The chiefs merely
administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the family with chiefs
embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the community ownership of the
soil and the instruments of production as a member of the barangay. 58 This ancient communalism was practiced in
accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was without
sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the
development of lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended
for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in land communities. 60 Recognized
leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges
and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities
from danger and to provide them with the leadership and means of survival. 61

Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was
established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and
Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon. 62 The Sultanate of
Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.63

The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common but was private
in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated
lands. It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land. 64

The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where most production was
geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to
exchange and profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership and governance
worked to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small and separate communities.66

When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos living in barangay
settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the
encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish government
assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience
and humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and
material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."69

The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would be constructed. All the
new Christian converts were required to construct their houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do
the same.70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination
using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to
make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic
culture and civilization.71

All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not assigned to
them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was
from the realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72

The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of public domain were
the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law.73 The concept that the Spanish king
was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the natives were
stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74

Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the Filipinos according to
their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos,
who generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were
the infieles or the indigenous communities.75

The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards and was allowed
certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.76

The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila and the Visayas to
Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland
societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands
were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral
to colonial administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process,
separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian community. 78 Their own political, economic and social systems
were kept constantly alive and vibrant.

The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of suspicion, fear, and
hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and
rule an otherwise culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and
vices of the Filipinos.79

President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed the existence of
the infieles:

"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by
Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to
which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm
regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous
practices and introduce civilized customs."80

Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization, the American
government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience." 81

The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian Filipinos. The term
"non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." 82

Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act No. 253 creating the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct
ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to
determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT
was modeled after the bureau dealing with American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in
Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth of valuable materials about them. 83

The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging issue then was the
conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.

In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid and complete manner the
economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to
render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all said national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating
the Commission on National Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of integration of
indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on National
Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The
post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of assimilation understood in the context of
a guardian-ward relationship.85

The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and Americans,
government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers
from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in Mindanao. 86 Knowledge
by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in
the settlers' names. With government initiative and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous
peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national government
in the name of national development.87

It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:

"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation
and implementation of State policies."88

For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities" were addressed by
the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly this time,
their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be
considered by the State in the formulation and implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and
transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to
integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same time "protect the rights
of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community." 89 In short, while still adopting the
integration policy, the decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. 90

In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree
provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural communities who were given
up to 1984 to register their claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created under
E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers,
landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92

Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks of the
Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos
of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the
National Development Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later
became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives. 93 Timber
concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of the national government led not
only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction of their natural
environment.94

The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of preservation. Invoking her
powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern
Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President. 95

The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their
way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of
tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands
and domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.

2. Their Concept of Land

Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are non-Christians.
They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon
the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are
perceived as different from those of the rest of the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to
deal with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode
their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented,
from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems were still structured on the
patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the
concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of labor and
distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social
courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant. 98

Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional concept of permanent,
individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land
or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe
ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and
primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present
generation but the future ones as well. 99

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and spirits, and that
those who work the land are its mere stewards.100 Customary law has a strong preference for communal
ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by
marriage,101 or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of
communal ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of
economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest
products, and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds
should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common economic base. Thus, as
a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual ownership. The
residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because
while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of an
exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-
owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to
sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member
before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.105

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of individual land
ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and
governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as
inferior, if not inexistent.106

III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.

A. The Legislative History of the IPRA

It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of
1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.

Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four proposed
measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means,
as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a
result of six regional consultations and one national consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide. 108 At the
Second Regular Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the
situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:

"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the dominance and neglect of
government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory
and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral
land and with the massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became
marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was
massive during the Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first
introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government
passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to migrant
homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109

Senator Flavier further declared:

"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land long before any central
government was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other
tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the
animals. This is their environment in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives
through political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.

Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs
shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on two
postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.

According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the
doctrine." This exception was first laid down in the case of Cariño v. Insular Government where:

"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural communities as one of
private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was
affirmed in subsequent cases."111

Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734
(the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or
restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite the
passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:

"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented the policy. In fact, it
was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the
Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic when government organized and supported massive
resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."

Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral land. The bill was
prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in
Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which
places them in a position of actual inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the
State.

Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in favor and none against,
with no abstention.112

House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural Communities. It was
originally authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North
Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:

"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would promote, recognize the
rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.

Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and ascertain that these rights shall
be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was
established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early
approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million
Filipinos that they be considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114

Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in the Constitution. He
also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cariño v. Insular Government which recognized
the fact that they had vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes. 115

After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was approved on
Second Reading with no objections.

IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.

A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples and Do Not Constitute
Part of the Land of the Public Domain.

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Ancestral
lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right
Act, viz:

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied
or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as
a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had
access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals,
families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government
projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not
limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until
the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence
of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or
corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and
includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are
still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are
limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under
claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces
or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.117

The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in Department
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by special task
forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain
Claims (CADC's) to IPs.

The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by the IPRA on the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-
delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all
the activities pertinent thereto.121

The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA.
The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.

Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding by the NCIP that the
application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the
community concerned.122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate
(family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions. 123 With
respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title
(CALT).124

CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of Deeds in the place
where the property is situated.125

(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native
title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.

(2) The Concept of Native Title

Native title is defined as:

"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have
been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably
presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."126

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far
back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which
also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition, when
solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall
recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated. 128

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a right of
private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares
ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held under native
title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular Government.130 Cariño firmly
established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares of land in Baguio
Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time
immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated
some parts of the land. Cariño inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted
under the Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown. 131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a possessory
title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The North American colonial government, however, ignored his
possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land
registration court. While his petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly
thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cariño,
off the land.134

In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership to the land. Both the Government
of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration
court and dismissed Cariño's application. The Philippine Supreme Court 135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying
the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked
the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cariño failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25,
1880, which required registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was
the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the public domain.

In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held:

"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown,
and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment
accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is
absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it
does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.
When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign
shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts,
are matters for it to decide."137

The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the new colonizer.
Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.

The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due process" as well as the
pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the
Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:

"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States. Whatever
consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was
to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we
suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of
the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902,
chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to
be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by
the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its
own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution,
extends those safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the
light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to
declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only
that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that
it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association,- of the profoundest factors in
human thought,- regarded as their own."139

The Court went further:

"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper
and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the
Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in
the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."140

The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or memory went, and (2)
under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to "never have been public land."

Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904 decision of Valenton
v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the
contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any
royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was
observed that titles were admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:

"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it was bad by
that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the
counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some
lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the
Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de
Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys
and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good
grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the
origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were
admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books." (Emphasis
supplied).141

The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over unconquered territories. The
wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey to the natives that failure to register what to them
has always been their own would mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply
to establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions
were in danger, if he had read every word of it."

By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank enough, however, to
admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the inherent
ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because
of the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of
title.142 This title was sufficient, even without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens
certificate. Justice Holmes explained:

"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not without difficulties for
courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of
sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of
the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and
should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143

Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in Baguio Municipality in
his name.144

Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as "native title." It simply
said:

"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument, characterized as a
savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems
probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the
registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his title
beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the
United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The
argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part of the Island of Luzon, at
least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce." 145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of the Cariño decision. It is
observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting
Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch
published an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This
article was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin
and development of Philippine land laws.147 He discussed Cariño extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to
Cariño's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.

(b) Indian Title

In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined by Justice Holmes
in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians. 148 This is not surprising, according to Prof.
Lynch, considering that during the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in
reference to native Americans.149 This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150

In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to remove the
Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan
who refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to
escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court
denied the petition on the ground of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent
settlement was the only successful method for educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their
health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they roamed. 151 Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court
said:

"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for the
Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-
Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its
dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian
policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The
recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian
and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always
subject to the plenary authority of the United States.152

x x x.

As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even admitting
similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken
from different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own
wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the
general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided
upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful
reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes
in the United States."153

Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian reservation is a part of the
public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians. 154 It may be set apart
by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and prescription. 155

Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the "aboriginal right of
possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in
question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute definable territory occupied
exclusively by the particular tribe or nation.157 It is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental
action, although in numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal
possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries. 158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they have held and occupied
before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme
Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.159

In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes.
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance
that was recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court,
Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation
to the inhabitants of the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court,
they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle
that discovery gives title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was made,
against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession. 160 The exclusion of all
other Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and
establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that:

"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by themselves. The
rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but
were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with
a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the
soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive
title to those who made it.

While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted the ultimate
dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power
to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a
title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy."161

Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire Indian land and
extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England, France, Spain or Holland- did this right belong and not
to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to
land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as
the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the
discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then
that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.

The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title paramount to the title of
the United States itself to other parties, saying:

"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has never been
questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with this right of
possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right." 162

It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the universal recognition of this
principle.163

The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without having to invalidate
conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens.164

Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of Georgia enacted a law
requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia;
and any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain
said license and were thus charged with a violation of the Act.

The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties established between the
United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized
the relationship between the United States government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for the supply of their
essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally
termed their protector. They had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British
power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the
declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power.
They assumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.

This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not that of individuals
abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master." 166

It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial boundaries and recognize
their right of occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus:

"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the
Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which
treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian
nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive,
and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by
the United States.

x x x.

"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with the single exception of
that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first
discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates
imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people
distinct from others." x x x.167

The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent
of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between
the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."168

The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as against all other European
governments. Designated as the naked fee,169 this title was to be consummated by possession and was subject to the
Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land,
the Indians being the original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire
the Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only
the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different
nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be
in themselves.170

As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands occupied by the
Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign- first the discovering European nation and
later the original 13 States and the United States- a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless
recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called
Indian title, which it accorded the protection of complete ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes
"permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by
Congress.172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property right. 173 It is
vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish
the right of occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual,
exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time.175 It entails that land owned by Indian title must be used
within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor to any
citizen.176 Such title as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of
individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon tribal membership, the property of the tribe
generally being held in communal ownership.177

As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to designate such lands as are
subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. 178 Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the
public domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and
occupation of a tribe of Indians.180 Once set apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until
the Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the nation's power to
dispose of, them.181

The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of indigenous
Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are
also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native
Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title, however, there are at present some
misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S.
recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the
U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by action
authorized by Congress.184 The protection of aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by persons other than
the Federal Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native Americans' ownership
of these lands,186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched. 187

Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral domains and ancestral
lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between its application in the Philippines vis-à-vis
American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in
limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cariño is the
only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing Cariño did not
touch on native title and the private character of ancestral domains and lands. Cariño was cited by the
succeeding cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a
different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public agricultural land.
When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land. 189 The land ceases to be part of the public
domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory
period.

It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the rule that all lands that were not
acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time
immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. 193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under
the provisions of the Public Land Act and Cariño was cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription
under the said Act.

All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and adverse possession in
the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of
owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens 194 and members of the national cultural minorities195 that converts the land
from public into private and entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.

(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is Private.

The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by the option
given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public
agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that ancestral land is
private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for registration purposes. To wit:

"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act
496- Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in
the concept of owner since time immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the
approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their
ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually used for
agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or
more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval of this Act." 196

ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned ancestral lands. This
option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.

Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are uncontested by the members of the same
ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration
Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands regardless of
whether they have a slope of 18% or more.

The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements of the Public Land
Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain. 198 Its
provisions apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for
public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor
those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private
lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the
benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a
slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural land for proper disposition.

The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a limited period. This
option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.

Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private and
belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies
lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national
parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them
under any of the said four categories. To classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render
the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms
of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs.201

The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain."202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership
over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership under the civil
law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land
Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act
on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:

"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who
since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real
estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this
chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall
be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his
free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under the provision of the
Public Land Law.203

x x x.

"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204

Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural land but because of
adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become
private. Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application
therefor. The possession has to be confirmed judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.

A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights of ownership under
the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on
Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman
Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing
owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces, 205 the
right to consume the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned,207 and
the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted
such thing.208

1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.

Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their
ancestral domain. Thus:

"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains
and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of
ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all
generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource
rights."

The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous
concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character ends
there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA
itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally
held.209 These communal rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil
Code.210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code
expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned. 211 To allow such a right over ancestral
domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the very community itself. 212

Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less corporate
condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another
fifty years in any single instance.213 Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the
corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily.215

Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extends to all
generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain
must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It
belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.

Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are communal. These lands,
however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in
accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15
years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.

Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations in determining the ownership
and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a
concept that has long existed under customary law.217

Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of
law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision
is applicable.219 In other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven,
can define rights and liabilities.220

Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its
recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of
ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and
the laws on land titling and land registration.221

To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT is merely a "formal
recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:

"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of Native
Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories
identified and delineated."

The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land, being people of the land-
by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of
one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land- the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate
tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for
man.222

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands

The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Section 7 provides for the
rights over ancestral domains:

"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include:
 a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made
by them at any time within the domains;

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right to develop, control
and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural
resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and
share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of
any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and
fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"

c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs
will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain.
x x x;

d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural catastrophes, the State shall
endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary life support
systems: x x x;

e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and organizations into
their domains;

f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated systems
for the management of their inland waters and air space;

g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have been
reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common and public welfare and service;

h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the area where
the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the
Courts of Justice whenever necessary."

Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:

"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall
be recognized and protected.

a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights to/among
members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.

b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of any
agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the
ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right
to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer."

Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b)
bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the domains. The right of ownership includes the
following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to
resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and
water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in
accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the
ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof.
This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to domains.

2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the
State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.

The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared in Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone,
and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution."223

All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources- are owned by
the State. The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources, the
State exercises full control and supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:

1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or

2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or
qualified corporations;

3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens;

4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the
President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.

As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in the exploration,
development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and
development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through co-production,224 joint venture,225 or
production-sharing agreements.226 These agreements may be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
The State, through Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-
scale exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the
President, may enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the
three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale227 and
small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple
implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment."229

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this
"ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:

"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied
by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;"

The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within
the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing
grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources found within the ancestral
domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover
"waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources" enumerated in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.

The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian
doctrine.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And
is Unconstitutional.

The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:

"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural resources and all
improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to,
the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover
ownership, and the rights or interests over land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to
lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."

Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, waters and natural resources."
The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and
jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over land does not necessarily include the right to claim
ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land. 231 The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land
and natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the ancestral
domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be
discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.

The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and categorically
challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in
general.232 Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the
inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of
Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraph 3,
Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.

Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the
right to manage them, viz:

"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and
use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the
territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation
and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to
receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to
effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"

The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA enumerates the following rights:

a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;

b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for
future generations;

c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein;

d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws;

e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;

f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights.233

Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are
merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits
from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the
purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures." It must be noted that
the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for
the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain.
It does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources.

Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or stewardship. For
the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their
exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral
domains are conserved for future generations and that the "utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and
environment pursuant to national and customary laws.234

The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale utilization
of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly
allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest
dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily
sustenance and survival."235 Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these
resources and ensure environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very nature,
necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.

(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and
4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 57 of the IPRA provides:

"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the
ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of
not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and
written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making
process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take
appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."

Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural resources within ancestral
domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction, development or
exploitation" of any natural resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is
utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that require technology other than manual
labor.236 The law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development
and utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation for a period of not more than 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition that a formal written agreement be entered into by the
non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.

Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the
law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference.
Having priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights
implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights
over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.

Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural
resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine,
hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these
natural resources, may directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or
in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural
resources are found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them.
The State may likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or
juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, or allow such non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an
agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the
rights of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable
for another 25 years.

To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the State, as owner of these
resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the development and exploitation of the
natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for
such development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether
natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.

The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has
several options and it is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the
law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their
domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State supervision or control. This indicates that the
State does not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law
simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have
traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.

Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following provision:

"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly
enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing
agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain.
Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the
area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written
consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or -
controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a
pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance
with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."

Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural resources shall not be
issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the
area subject of the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only
after a field-based investigation shall have been conducted and the free and prior informed written consent of the
ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any
project granted by any department or government agency.

As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession, license or agreement
over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within
any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to
determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to
ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note
that the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains.
For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.

V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL

MOVEMENT.

The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to prehistoric times. The
movement received a massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa
brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination
was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to
the attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for
fundamental rights and freedoms.

In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, 239 and during the 1980's, indigenous affairs were
on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international
indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the building
of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the
world.240

Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a result of the
increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and the destruction of the
indigenous peoples' environment, together with the national governments' inability to deal with the situation. 241 Indigenous
rights came as a result of both human rights and environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for
the international agenda.242

International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and specific rules
concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal
experience of projects in Latin America.243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of its
projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the projects of the Asian Development Bank. 244

The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a State policy the
promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and development. 245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine
category of ICCs with the international category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 247

ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and many other international instruments on the prevention of discrimination. 249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the
"Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in
Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law made it appropriate to
adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the assimilationist orientation of the
earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of
life and economic development."250
CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious differences. These
differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal order
that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation.251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation
of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to
the evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. 252 It is through the IPRA
that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through
common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the
decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed
democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization, 253 it is this
Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence
with the land laws in our national legal system.

With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.

Footnotes

1 Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School.

2 The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 67, Summer 2000, No. 3, p. 573.

3 Dominium is distinguished from imperium which is the government authority possessed by the state expressed
in the concept of sovereignty- Lee Hong Hok v. David, 48 SCRA 372, 377 [1972].

4Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 543 [1904]; See also Florencio D.R. Ponce, The Philippine Torrens System,
p. 13 [1964].

5 Antonio H. Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 5 [1986]; these grants were better known as repartimientos and
encomiendas. Repartimientos were handouts to the military as fitting reward for their services to the Spanish
crown. The encomiendas were given to Spaniards to administer and develop with the right to receive and enjoy
for themselves the tributes of the natives assigned to them.- Ponce, supra, p. 12, citing Benitez, History of the
Philippines, pp. 125-126.

6 Narciso Pena, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 2 [1994].

7The Mortgage Law is a misnomer because it is primarily a law on registration of property and secondarily a
mortgage law- Ponce, supra, at 16.

8 Ponce, supra, at 15.

9 3 Phil. 537 [1904].

10 Id. at 540.

11 Id. at 548.

12 Id. at 543-544.

13 Id. at 543.

14Id. at 542-543. These comments by the court are clear expressions of the concept that Crown holdings
embraced both imperium and dominium—Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface Between
National Land Law and Kalinga Land Law, 58 P.L.J. 420, 423 [1983].
15 Id. at 545-546.

16 Id. at 543.

17 Id. at 557.

18Id. at 553-554; Valenton was applied in Cansino v. Valdez, 6 Phil. 320 [1906]; Tiglao v. Insular Government, 7
Phil. 80 [1906]; and Cariño v. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 132 [1906]; all decided by the Philippine Supreme
Court.

19 Please see Section 70, Act 926.

20 Ponce, supra, at 33.

21 Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572 [1909]; also cited in Ponce, supra, at 32.

22 Archbishop of Manila v. Director of Lands, 27 Phil. 245 [1914]; also cited in Ponce, supra, at 32.

23 Antonio H. Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 250 [1961].

24 Ponce, supra, at 32.

25 Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 26 [1982]; Noblejas, supra, at 32.

26 Noblejas, supra, at 32.

27 Ponce, supra, at 123-124; Noblejas, supra, at 33.

28 2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592 [1937].

29 Id. at 600.

30 Id. at 600-601.

31 Ibid.

32 Section 7.

33 Section 8.

34 Sections 13 to 20.

35 Sections 21 to 28.

36 Sections 29 to 37.

37 Sections 38 and 40.

38 Sections 74 to 77.

39 Section 69.

40 Section 73.

41 Convention Conerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989.
42Guide to R.A. 8371, published by the Coalition for Ips Rights and ancestral Domains in cooperation with the ILO
and Bilance-Asia Department, p. 4 [1999]—hereinafter referred to as Guide to R.A. 8371.

43Taken from the list of IPs sbmitted by Rep. Andolana to the house of Representatives during the deliberations
on H.B. No. 9125—Interpellations of Aug. 20, 1997, pp. 00086-00095. "lost tribes" such as the Lutangan and
Tatang have not been included.

44 How these people came to the Philippines may be explained by two theories. One view, generally linked to
Professor Otley H. Beyer, suggests the "wave theory"—a series of arrivals in the archipelago bringing in different
types and levels of culture. The Negritos, dark-skinned pygmies, came between 25,000 to 30,000 B.C. Their
cultural remains are preserved by the Negrito-type Filipinos found in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Their
relatively inferior culture did not enable them to overcome the pressures from the second wave of people, the
Indonesians A and B who came in 5,000 and 3,500 B.C. They are represented today by the Kalinga, Gaddang,
Isneg, Mangyan, Tagbanua, Manobo, Mandaya, Subanon, and Sama. The first group was pushed inland as the
second occupied the coastal and downriver settlements. The last wave involved Malay migrations between 500
B.C. and 1,500 A.D. they had a more advanced culture based on metal age technology. They are represented by
the Christianized and Islamized Filipinos who pushed the Indonesian groups inland and occupied much of the
coastal, lowland and downstream areas.

A second view is postulated by Robert Fox, F. Landa Jocana, Alfredo Evangelista, and Jesus Peralta.
Jocano maintains that the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays stand co-equal as ethnic groups without any
one being dominant, racially or culturally. The geographic distribution of the ethno-linguistic groups, which
shows overlapping of otherwise similar racial strains in both upland and lowland cultures or coastal and
inland communities, suggests a random and unstructured advent of different kinds of groups in the
archipelago—Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, published by the Manila Studies Association,
Inc. and the Philippine National Historical society, Inc., pp. 33-34 [1997]; Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of
the Filipino People, p. 21 [1990].

45 Tan, supra, at 35-36.

46 Onofre D. Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Edition, vol. 1, p. 13,
Aklahi foundation, Inc. [1989]. It was in 800-1,000 A.D. that the Ifugaos of Northern Luzon built the rice terraces—
Id. at 37.

47 Id. at 5-6.

48 Id. at 13.

49 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, p. 54 [1990].

50 Corpuz, supra, at 5.

51 Id. at 44-45.

52 Agoncillo, supra, at 40.

53 Id. at 40-41.

54Rafael Iriarte, History of the Judicial System, the Philippine Indigenous Era Prior to 1565, unpublished work
submitted as entry to the Centennial Essay-Writing Contest sponsored by the National Centennial Commission
and the Supreme Court in 1997, p. 103, citing Perfecto V. Fernandez, Customs Laws in Pre-Conquest
Philippines, UP Law Center, p. 10 [1976].

55 Agoncillo, supra, at 41.

56Amelia Alonzo, The History of the Judicial System in the Philippines, Indigenous Era Prior to 1565, unpublished
work submitted as entry to the Centennial Essay-Writing Contest sponsored by the National Centennial
Commission and the Supreme Court in 1997.
57 Agoncillo, supra, at 42.

58 Renato Constantino, A Past Revisited , p. 38 [1975].

59Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, published by the Manila Studies Ass’n., Inc. and the Phil. National
Historical Society, Inc., p. 43 [1997].

60 Id.

61 Id. at 43-44.

62 Tan, supra, at 47-48.

63 Id. at 48-49.

64Cacho v. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil. 616, 625-627 [1914]; see also Ponce, The Philippine Torrens System,
pp. 11-12 [1964]. In Philippine pre-colonial history, there was only one recorded transaction on the purchase of
land. The Maragtas Code tells us of the purchase of Panay Island by ten Bornean datus led by Datu Puti from the
Atis under Marikudo in the 13th century. The purchase price for the island was a gold salakot and a long gold
necklace – Agoncillo, supra, at 25.

65 Constantino, supra, at 38.

66 Corpuz, supra, at 39.

67Resettlement- "bajo el son de la campana" (under the sound of the bell) or "bajo el toque de la
campana" (Under the peal of the bell).

68 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].

69 Id. at 17, citing the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.

70 Agoncillo, supra, at 80.

71 Id. at 80.

72 Corpuz, supra, at 277-278.

73 Id. at 277.

74Id., N.B. But see discussion in Cariño v. Insular Government, infra, where the United States Supreme Court
found that the Spanish decrees in the Philippines appeared to recognize that the natives owned some
land. Whether in the implementation of these decrees the natives’ ancestral rights to land
were actually respected was not discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court; see also Note 131, infra.

75 Tan, supra, at 49-50.

76 Id. at 67.

77 Id. at 52-53.

78 Id. at 53.

79 Id. at 55.

80 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].

81Memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 714
[1919]; also cited in People v. Cayat, supra, at 17-18.

82 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra, at 693.

83Charles Macdonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between Segregation and Integration, Indigenous
Peoples of Asia, p. 348, ed. by R.H. Barnes, A. Gray and B. Kingsburry, pub. by Association for Asian Studies
[1995]. The BNCT made a Bontok and subanon ethnography, a history of Sulu genealogy, and a compilation on
unhispanized peoples in northern Luzon.—Owen J. Lynch, Jr., The Philippine Colonial Dichotomy: Attraction and
Disenfranchisement, 63 P. L. J. 139-140 [1988].

84 R.A. No. 1888 of 1957.

85 See People v. Cayat, supra, at 21; See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 694 [1919]

86 MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 351.

87The construction of the Ambuklao and Binga dams in the 1950’s resulted in the eviction of hundreds of Ibaloi
families – Cerilo Rico S. Abelardo, Ancestral Domain Rights: Issues, Responses, and Recommendations, Ateneo
Law Journal, vol. 38, No. 1, p. 92 [1993].

88 Section 11, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution.

89 Presidential Decrees Nos. 1017 and 1414.

90 The PANAMIN, however, concentrated funds and resources on image-building, publicity, and impact projects.
In Mindanao, the agency resorted to a policy of forced resettlement on reservations, militarization and
intimidation- MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 349-350.

91No occupancy certificates were issued, however, because the government failed to release the decree’s
implementing rules and regulations- Abelardo, supra, at 120-121.

92 Id., Note 177.

93 Id., at 93-94.

94 MacDonald, Indigenous People of the Philippines, supra, at 351.

95 E.O. Nos. 122-A, 122-B and 122-C. The preamble of E.O. No. 122-B states:

"Believing that the new government is committed to formulate more vigorous policies, plans, programs,
and projects for tribal Filipinos, otherwise known as Indigenous Cultural Communities, taking into
consideration their communal aspirations, customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests, in order to promote
and preserve their rich cultural heritage and insure their participation in the country’s development for
national unity; xxx"

96
Article II, sec. 22; Article VI, sec. 5, par. 2; Article XII, sec. 5; Article XIII, sec. 6; Article XIV, sec. 17; and Article
XVI, sec. 12.

97 MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 345.

98 Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, p. 54 [1997].

99 Cordillera Studies Program, Land Use and Ownership and Public Policy in the Cordillera, 29-30 [n.d.]; also
cited in Dante B. Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain Recognition in the Philippines: Trends in Jurisprudence and
Legislation, 5 Phil. Nat. Res. L.J. No. 1, pp. 47-48 [1992].
100
Abelardo, Ancestral Domain Rights, supra, at 98-99, citing Ponciano L. Bennagen, Indigenous Attitudes
Toward Land and Natural Resources of Tribal Filipinos, 31 National Council of Churches in the Philippines
Newsletter, Oct.-Dec. 1991, at 4-9.

101 Id. at 99, citing June Prill-Brett, Bontok Land Tenure (UP Law library, mimeographed).

102
Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface of National Land Law and Kalinga Law, 58 P.L.J.
420, 440-441 [1983].

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

106 Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface, supra, at 420.

107
Senate Bill No. 1728 was co-sponsored by Senator Macapagal-Arroyo and co-authored by Senators Alvarez,
Magsaysay, Revilla, Mercado, Enrile, Honasan, Tatad, Maceda, Shahani, Osmena and Romulo.

The Eighth Congress, through Senators Rasul, Estrada and Romulo filed a bill to operationalize the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution on indigenous peoples. The bill was reported out, sponsored an
interpellated but never enacted into law. In the Ninth Congress, the bill filed by Senators Rasul and
Macapagal-Arroyo was never sponsored and deliberated upon in the floor.

108
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Flavier, Legislative History of SBN 1728, Tenth Congress, Second Regular
Session, Senate, Oct. 16, 1996, pp. 15-16.

109 Id. at 12.

110 Id. at 17-18.

111 Id. at 13.

112 Journal of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, Senate, Session No. 5, Aug. 5-6, 1997, pp. 86-87.

113
Co-authors of the bill were Reps. Ermita, Teves, Plaza, Calalay, Recto, Fua, Luciano, Abad, Cosalan,
Aumentado, de la Cruz, Bautista, Singson, Damasing, Romualdo, Montilla, Germino, Verceles—Proceedings of
Sept. 4, 1997, pp. 00107-00108.

114 Sponsorship speech of Rep. Andolana of House Bill No. 9125, March 20, 1997.

115 Interpellation of Aug. 20, 1997, 6:16 p.m., p. 00061.

116 Section 3 [a], IPRA.

117 Section 3 [b], IPRA.

118 Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 14.

119 Section 44 [e], IPRA.

120 Section 51, IPRA.

121 Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 15.

122A CADT refers to a title formally recognizing the right of possession and ownership of ICCs/IPs over their
ancestral domains identified and delineated in acordance with the IPRA—Rule II [c], Rules & Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, NCIP Admin. Order No. 1.

123 Section 53 [a], IPRA.

124
A CALT refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands- Rule II [d],
Implementing Rules, NCIP A.O. No. 1.

125 Section 52 [k], IPRA.

126 Section 3 [1], IPRA.

127 Section 11, IPRA.

128 Ibid.

129 41 Phil. 935 (1909), 212 U.S. 449, 53 L.Ed. 594.

130
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Juan Flavier, Leg. History of SBN 1728, Tenth Congress, Second Regular
Session, Oct. 16, 1996, p. 13.

131It was the practice of the Spanish colonial government not to issue titles to Igorots—Owen J. Lynch, Jr.,
Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913), 63
P.L.J. 249, 288 [1988], citing the testimony of Benguet Provincial Governnor William F. Pack, Records at 47,
Cariño.

132 Maura Law or the Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1894.

133 Later named Camp John Hay.

134 Lynch, Invisible Peoples, supra, at 288-289.

135 7 Phil. 132 [1906].

136In 1901, Cariño had entered into a promissory agreement with a U.S. merchant in Manila. The note obliged
Cariño to sell the land at issue "as soon as he obtains from the Government of the United States, or its
representatives in the Philippines, real and definitive title." See Lynch, Invisible Peoples, supra, at 290, citing
Government’s Exhibit G, Records, at 137-138, Cariño.

137 Cariño v. Insular Government, supra, at 939.

138Ibid.

139Id. at 940.

140Id. at 941.

141Id. at 941-942.

142Aranal-Sereno and Libarios, The Interface Between Kalinga Land Law, supra at 428-This artcile was one of
those circulated among the Constitutional Commissioners in the formulation of Sec. 5, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution (4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 33).

143Id. at 944.
144Certificate
of Title No. 2 covering the 148 hectares of Baguio Municipality was issued not in the name of Cariño
who died on June 6, 1908, but to his lawyers John Hausserman and Charles Cohn and his attorney-in-fact
Metcalf Clarke. Hausserman, Cohn and Clarke sold the land to the U.S. Government in a Deed of Quitclaim-
Richel B. Langit, Igorot Descendants Claim Rights to Camp John Hay, Manila Times, p. 1, Jan. 12, 1998.

145Id. at 939.

14657 P.L.J. 268, 293-296 [1982].

147From 1987 to 1988, Prof. Lynch allowed the P.L.J. to publish parts of his doctoral dissertation at the Yale Law
School entitled "Invisible Peoples: A History of Philippine Land Law." Please see the Legal Bases of Philippine
Colonial Sovereignty: An Inquiry, 62 P.L.J. 279 [1987]; Land Rights, Land Laws and Land Usurpation: The
Spanish Era (1568-1898), 63 P.L.J. 82 [1988]; The Colonial Dichotomy: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63
P.L.J. 112; Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws (1900-
1913), 63 P.L.J. 249.

148"Native
title" is a common law recognition of pre-existing aboriginal land interests in Autsralia- Maureen Tehan,
Customary Title, Heritage Protection, and Property Rights in Australia: Emerging Patterns of Land Use in the
Post-Mabo Era, 7 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, No. 3, p. 765 [June 1998].

149Lynch, Native Titles, supra, Note 164, p. 293.

15039 Phil. 660 [1919].

151Id. at 712-713.

152Id. at 694.

153Id. at 700.

15442 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 29 [1944 ed.].

155There are 3 kinds of Indian reservations: (a) those created by treaties prior to 1871; (b) those created by acts of
Congress since 1871; and (c) those made by Executive Orders where the President has set apart public lands for
the use of the Indians in order to keep them within a certain territory- 42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 29 citing Sioux Tribe
of Indians v. U.S. 94 Ct. Cl. 150, 170, certiorari granted 62 S. Ct. 631, 315 U.S. 790, 86 L. Ed. 1194, affirmed 62
S. Ct. 1095, 316 U.S. 317, 86 L. Ed. 1501. It is observed that the first two kinds may include lands
possessed by aboriginal title. The last kind covers Indian reservations proper.

Until 1871, Indian tribes were recognized by the United States as possessing the attributes of nations to
the extent that treaties were made with them. In that year, however, Congress, by statute, declared its
intention thereafter to make the Indian tribes amenable directly to the power and authority of the United
States by the immediate exercise of its legislative power over them, instead of by treaty. Since then,
Indian affairs have been regulated by acts if Congress and by contracts with the Indian tribes practically
amounting to treaties- 41 Am Jur 2d, Indians, Sec. 55 [1995 ed].

15642 C.J.S. Indians, Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].

157Ibid.; see also U.S. v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., Ariz., 62 S. Ct. 248, 314 U.S. 339, 86 L. Ed. 260 [1941].

158Ibid.

1598 Wheat 543, 5 L. Ed. 681 [1823].

160Id. at 680.

161Id. at 689.
162Id.
at 696; see also 41 ALR Fed 425, Annotation: Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands,
Sec. 2[a] [1979].

163Buttz v. Northern Pac.R. Co., Dak., 7 S. Ct. 100, 119 U.S. 55, 30 L. Ed. 330, 335 [1886].

164Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293-294; Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn. L.R. 48-49 [1947].

1656 Pet 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 [1832].

166Id. at 499.

167Id. at 500.

168Id. at 501.

169The title of the government to Indian lands, the naked fee, is a sovereign title, the government having no
landlord from whom it holds the fee- Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming v. U.S., 85
Ct. Cl. 331, certiorari granted U.S. v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 58 S. Ct. 609, 303 U.S. 629, 82 L. Ed. 1090,
affirmed 58 S. Ct. 794, 304 U.S. 111, 82 L. Ed. 1213, 1218-1219 [1938].

170Buttzv. Northern Pac. R. Co., Dak., at 30 L. Ed. 330, 335; Beecher v. Wetherby, Wis., 95 U.S. 517, 24 L. Ed.
440, 441 [1877]; see also 42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].

171Annotation, Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal title to Indian Lands, 41 ALR Fed 425, Sec. 2 [b] [1979]-
hereinafter cited as Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands.

172Ibid.;
see also Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., 348 U.S. 272, 99 L. Ed. 314, 320, 75 S. Ct. 313 [1955], reh den 348
U.S. 965, 99 L. Ed. 753, 75 S. Ct. 521.

173Ibid.; Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., at 99 L. Ed. 320.

174Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 39 L. Ed. 2d 73, 94 S Ct. 772 [1974]; U.S. v. Alcea
Bank of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 91 L. Ed. 29. 67 S. Ct. 167 [1946].

175For compensation under the Indian Claims Commission Act, the proof of aboriginal title rests on actual,
exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time prior to the loss of the property. (The Indian Claims
Commission Act awards compensation to Indians whose aboriginal titles were extinguished by the government
through military conquest, creation of a reservation, forced confinement of Indians and removal of Indians from
certain portions of the land an the designation of Indian land into forest preserve, grazing district, etc.) - Aboriginal
Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Secs. 2[a], 3[a], pp. 431, 433, 437.

176Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[b], p. 435.

17741 Am Jr 2d, Indians, Sec. 59 [1995 ed.].

178An allotment of Indian land contains restrictions on alienation of the land. These restrictions extend to a devise
of the land by will- Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. U.S., 235 U.S. 37, 59 L. Ed. 116,. 35 S. Ct. 6 [1914]; A railroad land
grant that falls within Indian land is null and void- Northern P. R. Co. v. U.S., 227 U.S. 355, 57 L.Ed. 544,33 S. Ct.
368 [1913]; Portions of Indian land necessary for a railroad right of way were, by the terms of the treaty, declared
"public land," implying that land beyond the right of way was private- Kindred v. Union P.R. Co., 225 U.S. 582, 56
L. Ed. 1216, 32 S. Ct. 780 [1912]; see also 41 Am Jur 2d, Indians, Sec. 58 [1995 ed].

179Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[a], p. 433.

18042 C.J.S. Indians, Sec. 29 [1944 ed.]

181Ibid.
182North American Indians have made much progress in establishing a relationship with the national government
and developing their own laws. Some have their own government-recognized constitutions. Usually the
recognition of Indian tribes depends on whether the tribe has a reservation. North American tribes have reached
such an advanced stage that the main issues today evolve around complex jurisdictional and litigation matters.
Tribes have acquired the status of sovereign nations within another nation, possessing the right to change and
grow- Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the Environmental and Human
Rights Perspective, Texas International Law Journal, vol. 32: 97, 104 [1997].

183Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293.

184Dante Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain Recognition in the Philippines: Trends in Jurisprudence and Legislation, 5
Phil. Nat. Res. L.J. No. 1, pp. 43, 40 [Aug. 1992]; see also Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., supra, at 320.

185Ibid.

186D.Gatmaytan, supra, citing Churchill, The Earth is Our Mother: Struggles for American Indian Land and
Liberation in the Contemporary United States, The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization and
Resistance 139 (M. Jaimes 1992); and Indian Law Resource Center, United States Denial of Indian Property
Rights: A Study in Lawless Power and Racial Discrimination, Rethinking Indian Law 15 (National Lawyers Guild,
Committee on Native American Struggles 1982).

187Id.,Note 28, stating that some earlier decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have held that Congress is subject
to the strictures of the Constitution in dealing with Indians. When an Indian property is taken for non-Indian use,
the U.S. government is liable for payment of compensation, and an uncompensated taking may be enjoined. F.
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 217 [1982], citing Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. 299 U.S. 476 [1937];
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 [1912]; and Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 [1919].

188See Discussion, infra, Part IV (c) (2).

189Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 [1925]; Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437 [1980].

190Ibid.

191Director
of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 509 [1986]; Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216
SCRA 78 [1992]; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapina, 235 SCRA 567 [1994].

19275 Phil. 890 [1946].

193Id. at 892.

194Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141.

195Sec. 48 [c], C.A. 141, as amended. This provision was added in 1964 by R.A. 3872.

196Section 12, IPRA.

197"Time immemorial" refers "to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain ICCs/Ips are known
to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by
operation of customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions."
(Sec. 3 [p], IPRA).

198Section 2, C.A. 141.

199Section 8, C.A. 141.

200The classification of ancestral lands 18% in slope or over as alienable in the IPRA is an exception to Section
15, P.D. 705, the Revised Forestry Code.
201
Charles MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between Segregation and Integration, Indigenous
Peoples of Asia, supra, at pp. 345, 350.

202 Section 5, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.

203 Words in bold were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 in 1964.

204
Words in bold were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 on June 18, 1964. On January 25, 1977, however,
Sec. 48 [b] and 48 [c] were further amended by P.D. 1073 stating that these provisions on cultural minorities
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain- Please see Republic v. CA and Paran,
201 SCRA 1, 10-11 [1991].

205 Jus utendi, jus fruendi.

206 Jus abutendi.

207 Jus disponendi.

208 Jus vindicandi. Please see Tolentino, Civil Code, vol. II, pp. 45-46 [1992]; see also Tolentino, vol. I, pp. 12-14.

209 Sec. 55, IPRA provides:

"Sec. 55. Communal rights.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas within the ancestral domains, whether
delineated or not, shall be presumed to be communally held: provided, That communal rights under this
Act shall not be construed as co-ownership as provided in Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the
New Civil Code."

210 Ibid.

211 Article 494, Civil Code.

212 Antonio M. La Vina, Arguments for Communal Title, Part II, 2 Phil. Nat. Res. L. J. 23 [Dec. 1989].

213 Section 11, Corporation Code.

214 Sections 60-72, Corporation Code.

215 Section 117, Corporation Code. Please see also La Vina, Arguments for Communal Title, Part II, supra, at 23.

216 Section 5, par. 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.

217Customary law is recognized by the Local Government Code of 1991 in solving disputes among members of
the indigenous communities, viz:

"Sec. 412 (c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities.- The customs and
traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the
cultural communities."

218 Law writes custom into contract-Hongkong & Shanghai Bank v. Peters, 16 Phil. 284 [1910].

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced."

"Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence."
219Article 78 on marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces- this is now
Art. 33 of the Family Code; Art. 118, now Art. 74 of the Family Code on property relations between spouses; Art.
577 on the usufructuary of woodland; Art. 657 on easement of right of way for passage of livestock; Arts. 678,
1315, 1376, 1522, 1564 and 1577. Please see Aquino, Civil Code, vol. 1, p. 25.

220Castle Bros. v. Gutierrez Hermanos, 11 Phil. 629 [1908]; In Re: Firm Name of Ozaeta Romulo, 92 SCRA 1
[1979]; Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 [1988]; Please see Aquino, Civil Code, vol. 1, p. 26 for a list of
other cases.

221This situation is analogous to the Muslim code or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (P.D. 1083) which took
effect on February 4, 1977 despite the effectivity of the Civil Code and the Family Code. P.D. 1083 governs
persons, family relations and succession among Muslims, the adjudication and settlement of disputes, the
organization of the Shari’a courts, etc.

222
Mariflor P. Pagusara, The Kalinga Ili: Cultural-Ecological Reflections on Indigenous Theora and Praxis of Man-
Nature Relationship, Dakami Ya Nan Dagami, p. 36, Papers and Proceedings of the 1st Cordillera Muti-Sectoral
Land Congress, 11-14 March 1983, Cordillera Consultative Committee [1984].

223 Section 2, Article XII.

224A "co-production agreement" is defined as one wherein the government provides input to the mining operation
other than the mineral resource- Section 26 (b), R.A. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

225A "joint venture agreement" is one where a joint-venture company is organized by the government and the
contractor with both parties having equity shares, and the government entitled to a share in the gross output-
Section 26 (c), R.A. 7942.

226A mineral "production-sharing agreement" is one where the government grants to the contractor the exclusive
right to conduct mining operations within a contract area and shares in the gross output. The contractor provides
the financing, technology, management and personnel necessary for the implementation of the agreement-
Section 26 (a), R.A. 7942.

227 Section 26, R.A. 7942.

228 Section 3 [d], People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) provides:

"Sec. 3 [d] 'Small-scale mining contract' refers to co-production, joint venture or mineral production
sharing agreement between the State and a small-scale mining contractor for the small-scale utilization of
a plot of mineral land."

229 Section 3 [b], R.A. 7076.

230 NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998.

231 In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228, 239 [1988], Cruz, J., ponente, it was declared that if a person
is the owner of a piece of agricultural land on which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not
give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals
belong- also cited in H. de Leon, Phil. Constitutional Law, Principles and Cases, vol. 2, pp. 800-801 [1999].

232 See Ground I, Grounds to Issue Writ of Prohibition, Petition, p. 14.

233 Section 7 (b) is subject to Section 56 of the same law which provides:

"Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes.- Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing
and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected."

The law took effect 15 days upon publication in the O.G. or in any 2 newspapers of general circulation
(Sec. 84, IPRA). The IPRA was published in the Chronicle and Malaya on Nov. 7, 1997.
234 Section 9 of the IPRA also gives the ICCs/IPs the ff. responsibilities over their ancestral domains:

(a) Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced ecology in the ancestral
domain by protecting the flora and fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;

(b) Restore Denuded Areas.- To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the reforestation of denuded
areas and other development programs and projects subject to just and reasonable renumeration;

(c) Observe Laws.- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations
for its effective implementation."

Section 58 of the same law also mandates that ancestral domains or portions thereof, which are found to
be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover, or reforestation as determined by appropriate agencies with the full participation of the ICCs/IPs
concerned shall be maintained, managed and developed for such purposes. The ICCs/IPs concerned
shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas with the full and
effective assistance of government agencies.

235
Hector S. de Leon, Textbook on the New Philippine Constitution pp. 473-474 [1987] citing the 1986 UP Law
Constitution Project, The National Economy and Patrimony, p. 11.

236Under the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, "small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily
on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment"-
Section 3 [b], R.A. 7076.

237 See infra., pp. 77-79?.

238Andrew Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, ed. By Barnes, Gray and
Kingsbury, pub. By Ass'n. for Asian Studies, at 35, 42 [1995].

239 E.g. International Indian Treaty Council, World Council of IPs.

240Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, supra, at 44, citing the International Work Group for Indigenous
Affairs, 1988.

241
Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the Environmental and Human Rights
Perspective, 32 Texas International Law Journal 97, 102 [1997].

242
Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian
Controversy, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 92: 414, 429 [1998].

243The World Bank supported the Chico Dam project. Due to the Kalingas' opposition, the WB pulled out of the
project but the conflict between the Philippine government and the natives endured long after- Marcus Colchester,
Indigenous Peoples' Rights and Sustainable Resource Use in South and Southeast Asia, Indigenous Peoples of
Asia, supra, pp. 59, 71-72.

244 Kingsbury, supra, at 417.

245 Section 22, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

246Interpellation of Senator Flavier on S.B. No. 1728, Deliberation on Second Reading, November 20, 1996, p.
20.

247Guide to R.A. 8371, Coalition for IPs Rights and Ancestral Domains, the International Labor Organization, and
the ILO-Bilance- Asia Dep't, p. 3 [1999].

248 Also referred to as the "Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989."
 249 See Introduction to ILO Convention No. 169, par. 4.

250 Id., pars. 5 and 6.

251Perfecto V. Fernandez, Towards a Definition of National Policy on Recognition of Ethnic Law within the
Philippine Legal Order, 55 P.L.J. 383, 385 [1980].

252
Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, Manila Studies Association, Inc. and the Phil. National Historical
Society, Inc., p. 6 [1997].

253 Fernandez, supra, at 385, 391.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a proper place in any forum and, when it shows itself in a
given judicial controversy, the rules of procedure, like locus standi, the propriety of the specific remedy invoked,
or the principle of hierarchy of courts, that may ordinarily be raised by party-litigants, should not be so perceived
as good and inevitable justifications for advocating timidity, let alone isolationism, by the Court.

A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that one who invokes the Court’s adjudication must have a personal and
substantial interest in the dispute;1 indeed, the developing trend would require a logical nexus between the status
asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated in order to ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke
judicial power.2 The rule requires a party to aptly show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself
that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant his invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction and to render
legally feasible the exercise of the Court’s remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of that power
can easily become too unwieldy by its sheer magnitude and scope to a point that may, in no small measure, adversely
affect its intended essentiality, stability and consequentiality.

Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exits, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance and
paramount interest to the nation,3 the Court must take the liberal approach that recognizes the legal standing of
nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues that affect them. 4 This Court thus did
so in a case5 that involves the conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until and exact balance is struck, the
Court must accept an eclectic notion that can free itself from the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant
technicalities subordinate to what may be considered to be of overriding concern.

The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, a law
that obviously is yet incapable of exact equation in its significance to the nation and its people now and in the generations
yet to come. Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 ("IPRA"),
enacted into law in 1997 and made effective on 22 November 1997, is apparently intended to be a legislative response to
the 1987 Constitution which recognizes the rights of indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of national
unity and development"6 and commands the State, "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs," to protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands in
order to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.7

Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its Section 3(a) which defines "ancestral domains" to embrace "all areas
generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources" including
"ancestral lands, forest, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable
and disposable or otherwise," over which indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples ("ICCs/IPs") could
exercise virtual ownership and control.
IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains covering literally millions of
hectares. The notion of community property would comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also
some forms of self-governance over the curved-out territory. This concept is elaborated in Section 7 of the law which
states that the "rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and
protected," subsumed under which would encompass the right of ownership (paragraph a); the right to develop,
control and use lands and natural resources, including "the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;" (par. b); the right to stay in the territories (par. c);
the right to return to their abandoned lands in case of displacement (par. d); the right to regulate entry of
migrants (par. e); the right to claim parts of ancestral domains previously reserved (par. g); and the right to
resolve land conflicts in accordance primarily with customary law (par. h). Concurrently, Section 57 states that
ICCs/IPs shall be given "priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources
within the ancestral domains." These provisions of IPRA, in their totality, are, in my view, beyond the context of the
fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State
authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony.

Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all "lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forest or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State," and, with the exception of agricultural lands, "shall not be alienated." It
ordains that the "exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State."8

These provisions had roots in the 1935 Constitution which, along with some other specific mandates in the 1935
Constitution, forming Article XII under the title "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources", were derived largely
from the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources. 9 According
to the Committee report, among the principles upon which these provisions were based, was "that the land, minerals,
forest and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation," and should thereby "be
preserved for those under the sovereign authority of the Nation and for their posterity." 10 The delegates to the 1934
Constitutional Convention were of the unanimous view that the "policy on natural resources, being fundamental to the
nation’s survival should not be left to the changing mood of the lawmaking body." 11

The 1987 Constitution, like the precursor provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, thus expresses this regalian
doctrine of the old, and the domainial doctrine of the new, that all lands and natural resources belong to the state other
than those which it recognizes to be of private ownership. Except for agricultural lands of the public domain which
alone may be alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources, of the country
must remain with the state, the exploration, development and utilization of which shall be subject to its full
control and supervision albeit allowing it to enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements, or
into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development and utilization.12

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cariño vs. Insular Government,13 holding that a parcel of land held
since time immemorial by individuals under a claim of private ownership is presumed never to have been public land and
cited to downgrade the application of the regalian doctrine, cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in
the Constitution. It is in them that sovereignty resides and from them that all government authority emanates.14 It is not
then for a court ruling or any piece of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former to
adapt to the latter, and it is the sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate.

The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." I do
not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that "customary laws shall
govern" and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution could have itself easily provided without having to still
commission Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations
of the 1986 Constitutional Convention, thus:

"Mr. Davide. x x x Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain is concerned, it is respectfully submitted that the particular matter must
be submitted to Congress. I understand that the idea of Comm. Bennagen is for the possibility of the codification of these
customary laws. So before these are codified, we cannot now mandate that the same must immediately be applicable. We
leave it to Congress to determine the extent of the ancestral domain and the ownership thereof in relation to whatever
may have been codified earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart ahead of the horse." 15
The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and, with
specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of, the stream of laws. The "due process
clause," as I so understand it in Tanada vs. Tuvera16 would require an apt publication of a legislative enactment before it
is permitted to take force and effect. So, also, customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of statutory law,
must first undergo that publication to render them correspondingly binding and effective as such.

Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress to re-examine the law.
Indeed, the State is exhorted to protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands, a
task that would entail a balancing of interest between their specific needs and the imperatives of national
interest.

WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.

Footnotes

1 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89; Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 244.

2 Am Jur § 189, p. 591, S. vD., 410 US 641, 35 L Ed 2d 536, 93 S Ct 1146.

3 Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 540; Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, 36, 37.

4Defensor Santiago, Miriam, Constitutional Law, First Edition, 1994, p. 11; see also Rev. Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
S.J., on the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 Ed., pp. 336-337.

5 Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792.

6 Art. 11, Sec. 22.

7 Art. XII, Sec. 5.

8 Sec. 2.

9 II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 594.

10 Ibid., p. 595.

11 Ibid., p. 600.

12 CONST., Art. XII, Sec. 2; Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., vs. Factoran, Jr., 240 SCRA 100.

13 41 Phil. 935.

14 CONST., Art. II, Sec. 1.

15 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 32.

16 146 SCRA 446.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 SEPARATE OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

You ask if we own the land. . . How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the race own the land because only the
race lives forever. To claim a piece of land is a birthright of every man. The lowly animals claim their place; how much
more man? Man is born to live. Apu Kabunian, lord of us all, gave us life and placed us in the world to live human lives.
And where shall we obtain life? From the land. To work (the land) is an obligation, not merely a right. In tilling the land,
you possess it. And so land is a grace that must be nurtured. To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of
Apu Kabunian to all his children. Land is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs …life.

- Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L. Bennagen, "Tribal Filipinos" in Indigenous View of
Land and the Environment, ed. Shelton H. Davis, the World Bank Discussion Papers, No. 188, pp. 71-72.)

It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of,
the Constitution.1 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which
operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. 2

The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) must be construed in view of such presumption of
constitutionality. Further, the interpretation of these provisions should take into account the purpose of the law, which is to
give life to the constitutional mandate that the rights of the indigenous peoples be recognized and protected.

The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands and domains and therefore, their heritage, is not
unique. It is one that they share with the red-skinned "Indians" of the United States, with the aborigines of Australia, the
Maori of New Zealand and the Sazmi of Sweden, to name a few. Happily, the nations in which these indigenous peoples
live all have enacted measures in an attempt to heal an oppressive past by the promise of a progressive future. Thus has
the international community realized the injustices that have been perpetrated upon the indigenous peoples. This
sentiment among the family of nations is expressed in a number of documents, the most recent and most comprehensive
of which is the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by its resolution on August 26, 1994. Among the
rights recognized by the UN Draft is the restitution of lands, territories and even the resources which the indigenous
peoples have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or
damaged without the free and informed consent of the indigenous peoples.

A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples

The term "indigenous" traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu, meaning "within." In the sense the term has come to be
used, it is nearer in meaning to the Latin word indigenus, which means "native."3 "Indigenous" refers to that which
originated or has been produced naturally in a particular land, and has not been introduced from the outside. 4 In
international law, the definition of what constitutes "indigenous peoples" attains some degree of controversy. No definition
of the term "indigenous peoples" has been adopted by the United Nations (UN), although UN practice has been guided by
a working definition in the 1986 Report of UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo: 5

Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-
colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sections of the societies now
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sections of society and are determined
to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of
their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.

This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the present, of one or more
of the following factors:

(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;

(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;

(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal system, membership of
an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style, etc.);
 (d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means of communication at
home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal language);

(e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the world;

(f) Other relevant facts.6

In Philippine constitutional law, the term "indigenous peoples" pertains to those groups of Filipinos who have retained a
high degree of continuity from pre-Conquest culture.7 Philippine legal history, however, has not been kind to the
indigenous peoples, characterized them as "uncivilized,"8 "backward people,"9 with "barbarous practices"10 and "a low
order of intelligence."11

Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now employs the politically-correct
conjunctive term "indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural communities" as follows:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.- For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx

(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. - refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified
by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded
and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized
such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have,
through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall likewise include peoples who are
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country at the time of
conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of
present State boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who
may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains x x x.

Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous peoples were already plowing our soil and hunting in
our forests. The Filipinos of Aeta and Malay stock, who were the original inhabitants of our archipelago, were, at that time,
practicing a native culture. From the time the Spaniards arrived up to the early part of the American regime,12 these native
inhabitants resisted foreign invasion, relentlessly fighting for their lands. Today, from the remote uplands of Northern
Luzon, to Palawan, Mindoro and Mindanao, the indigenous peoples continue to live on and cultivate their ancestral lands,
the lands of their forefathers.

Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the indigenous peoples, our national culture exhibits only the
last vestiges of this native culture. Centuries of colonial rule and neocolonial domination have created a discernible
distinction between the cultural majority and the group of cultural minorities. 13 The extant Philippine national culture is the
culture of the majority; its indigenous roots were replaced by foreign cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if
not dominant.14 While the culture of the majority reoriented itself to Western influence, the culture of the minorities has
retained its essentially native character.

One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous cultural community. Around twelve million Filipinos are members
of the one hundred and ten or so indigenous cultural communities,15 accounting for more than seventeen per centum of
the estimated seventy million Filipinos16 in our country. Sadly, the indigenous peoples are one of the poorest sectors of
Philippine society. The incidence of poverty and malnutrition among them is significantly higher than the national average.
The indigenous peoples are also among the most powerless. Perhaps because of their inability to speak the language of
law and power, they have been relegated to the fringes of society. They have little, if any, voice in national politics and
enjoy the least protection from economic exploitation.

The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples

The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less fortunate brothers, fittingly saw the
historic opportunity to actualize the ideals of people empowerment and social justice, and to reach out particularly to the
marginalized sectors of society, including the indigenous peoples. They incorporated in the fundamental law several
provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples, to wit:
Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and
development.17

Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall
protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining
the ownership and extent of ancestral domains.18

Sec. 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments.19

Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with
law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or
concession, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their
ancestral lands.20

Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and
develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and
policies.21

Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural
communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such communities. 22

IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional provisions. It provides, among others, that the State
shall recognize and promote the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and development,
protect their rights over the ancestral lands and ancestral domains and recognize the applicability of customary laws
governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains. 23 Moreover, IPRA
enumerates the civil and political rights of the indigenous peoples; 24 spells out their social and cultural
rights;25 acknowledges a general concept of indigenous property right and recognizes title thereto; 26 and creates the NCIP
as an independent agency under the Office of the President.27

Preliminary Issues

A. The petition presents an actual controversy.

The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest
personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. 28

Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. 29 The threshold issue, therefore, is
whether an "appropriate case" exists for the exercise of judicial review in the present case.

An "actual case or controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe for resolution and susceptible of
judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, 30 or that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or
feigned constitutional problems.31 A petition raising a constitutional question does not present an "actual controversy,"
unless it alleges a legal right or power. Moreover, it must show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term
"controversy" is the presence of opposing views or contentions.32 Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues
which remain unfocused because they lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed from
a clash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding
interests.33 The controversy must also be justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination. 34

In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been enacted, and the
Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the government agencies concerned
have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that we should await the adverse
consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is precisely the
contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over
lands of the public domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to
implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent
injury and violation of the constitutional process.

B. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the constitutional questions herein.

In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.35 Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the
citizens, the violation of which may result only in a "generalized grievance". 36 Yet, in a sense, all citizen’s and taxpayer’s
suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the allocation of power. 37

In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with regard to standing. 38 The proper party requirement is
considered as merely procedural,39 and the Court has ample discretion with regard thereto.40 As early as 1910, the Court
in the case of Severino vs. Governor General 41 held:

x x x When the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the relator must show some personal or special
interest in the subject matter, since he is regarded as the real party in interest and his right must clearly appear. Upon the
other hand, when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of
a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient
to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. 42

This Court has recognized that a "public right," or that which belongs to the people at large, may also be the subject of an
actual case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled that a private citizen may enforce a "public right" in behalf of other
citizens. We opined therein that:

… The right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from that of any other qualified elector in the
municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which he would suffer in case he fails to obtain the relief sought would
not be greater or different from that of the other electors; but he is seeking to enforce a public right as distinguished
from a private right. The real party in interest is the public, or the qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each elector
has the same right and would suffer the same injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with reference to
maintaining a petition whether or not the relief sought by the relator should be granted.43

In Tañada v. Tuvera,44 the Court enforced the "public right" to due process and to be informed of matters of public
concern.

In Garcia vs. Board of Investments,45 the Court upheld the "public right" to be heard or consulted on matters of national
concern.

In Oposa v. Factoran,46 the Court recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." 47 Mr. Justice (now
Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that:

Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation-aptly and fittingly stressed by petitioners-the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. 48

Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in
violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian of the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all
Filipinos without distinction as to ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that
any grant of concessions covering the national economy and patrimony strictly complies with constitutional requirements.
Thus, the preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizen’s suit.

In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that a taxpayer has the right to enjoin public officials from
wasting public funds through the implementation of an unconstitutional statute, 49 and by necessity, he may assail the
validity of a statute appropriating public funds.50 The taxpayer has paid his taxes and contributed to the public coffers and,
thus, may inquire into the manner by which the proceeds of his taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State
for the purpose of administering an invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 51

The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing
Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." In the same manner, Section 79
authorizes for the expenditure of public funds by providing that "the amount necessary to finance [its] initial
implementation shall be charged against the current year's appropriation for the Office for Northern Cultural Communities
(the "ONCC") and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (the "OSCC")," 52 which were merged as organic offices of
the NCIP.53 Thus, the IPRA is a valid subject of a taxpayer’s suit.

C. The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.54 Mandamus, on the other hand, is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when said entity or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or
when said entity or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other
is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 55

In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from implementing the challenged provisions of the IPRA
and its Implementing Rules and the assailed DENR Circular No. 2, series of 1998, and that the same officials be enjoined
from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the said law and rules. They further ask that the Secretary of the
DENR be compelled to perform his duty to control and supervise the activities pertaining to natural resources.

Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from implementing the questioned provisions of the IPRA and
from disbursing funds in connection therewith if the law is found to be unconstitutional. Likewise, mandamus will lie to
compel the Secretary of the DENR to perform his duty to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization
and conservation of the country’s natural resources. Consequently, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an
improper remedy for the relief sought.

D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the
petition in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.

Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially pass upon the issues of a
case. That way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the important legal issues or
those of first impression, which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate court. This is a procedural rule borne of
experience and adopted to improve the administration of justice.

This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although this Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,56 such concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. The resort to this Court’s primary jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such
invocation.57 We held in People v. Cuaresma58 that:

A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Court’s docket x x x.59 (Emphasis supplied.)

IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous peoples. Its impact upon the lives not only of the
indigenous peoples but also upon the lives of all Filipinos cannot be denied. The resolution of this case by the Court at the
earliest opportunity is necessary if the aims of the law are to be achieved. This reason is compelling enough to allow
petitioners’ invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction in the first instance.

Substantive Issues

Primary Issue

The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor General revolves around the constitutionality of certain
provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and 59. These provisions allegedly violate Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone,
and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution.

Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of ownership60 over ancestral lands and
ancestral domains by virtue of native title.61 The term "ancestral lands" under the statute refers to lands occupied by
individuals, families and clans who are members of indigenous cultural communities, including residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots. These lands are required to have been "occupied,
possessed and utilized" by them or through their ancestors "since time immemorial, continuously to the present". 62 On the
other hand, "ancestral domains" is defined as areas generally belonging to indigenous cultural communities, including
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds, worship areas, and lands no longer
occupied exclusively by indigenous cultural communities but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home
ranges of indigenous cultural communities who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators. Ancestral domains also include
inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein.63 Again, the same are required to have been "held under a
claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present". 64 Under Section 56, property rights within the ancestral
domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of said law "shall be recognized and respected."

Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to ancestral lands, ancestral domains,
and natural resources are unconstitutional. The fundamental question is, who, between the State and the indigenous
peoples, are the rightful owners of these properties?

It bears stressing that a statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation, of the fundamental law.65 The
reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have acted within its authority and adhered to the
constitutional limitations. Accordingly, courts should presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid,
sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the
law.66
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are not unconstitutional.

In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the public domain and, thus, owned by the
State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners and the Solicitor General advance the following
arguments:

First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired exclusive dominion over the Philippines
by virtue of discovery and conquest. They contend that the Spanish King under the theory of jura regalia, which was
introduced into Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in 1521, acquired title to all the lands in the archipelago.

Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State.
They invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to the State the ownership of all lands and makes the State the
original source of all private titles. They argue that the Philippine State, as successor to Spain and the United States, is
the source of any asserted right of ownership in land.

Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cariño doctrine exists. However, petitioners maintain that the
doctrine merely states that title to lands of the public domain may be acquired by prescription. The Solicitor General, for
his part, argues that the doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the public domain and, thus, cannot be extended to
other lands of the public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.

Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over ancestral lands and ancestral domains
existed by virtue of the Cariño doctrine, such native title was extinguished upon the ratification of the 1935 Constitution.

Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to protect that rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. However, they contend that the mandate is subject to
Section 2, Article XII and the theory of jura regalia embodied therein. According to petitioners, the recognition and
protection under R.A. 8371 of the right of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains is far in excess of the
legislative power and constitutional mandate of Congress.

Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State, petitioners posit that R.A.
8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits the alienation of non-agricultural lands of the public
domain and other natural resources.

I am not persuaded by these contentions.

Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia is understandable. Not only is the
theory well recognized in our legal system; it has been regarded, almost with reverence, as the immutable postulate of
Philippine land law. It has been incorporated into our fundamental law and has been recognized by the Court. 67

Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from
the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The
belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to land must
emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere. 68

In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights,69 or those rights which the King has by virtue of his
prerogatives.70 In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of
property or propriedad.71 These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the sovereign.

The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while the use of lands was
granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the
title.72 By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title,
and from him all lands were held.73 The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of
conquest.74

The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. In
the landmark case of Cariño vs. Insular Government75 the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision76of the
pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement:
x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be
proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by
individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. x x x.77 (Emphasis supplied.)

The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos
by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish
Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

In Cariño, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cariño applied for registration in his name of an ancestral land located in
Benguet. The applicant established that he and his ancestors had lived on the land, had cultivated it, and had used it as
far they could remember. He also proved that they had all been recognized as owners, the land having been passed on
by inheritance according to native custom. However, neither he nor his ancestors had any document of title from the
Spanish Crown. The government opposed the application for registration, invoking the theory of jura regalia. On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court held that the applicant was entitled to the registration of his native title to their ancestral
land.

Cariño was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court were binding as
precedent in our jurisdiction.78 We applied the Cariño doctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands,79 where
we stated that "[a]ll lands that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of
his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest."80

Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Cariño was premised on the fact that the applicant had
complied with the requisites of acquisitive prescription, having established that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the property since time immemorial. In effect, petitioners suggest that title to the ancestral land
applied for by Cariño was transferred from the State, as original owner, to Cariño by virtue of prescription. They conclude
that the doctrine cannot be the basis for decreeing "by mere legislative fiat…that ownership of vast tracts of land belongs
to [indigenous peoples] without judicial confirmation."81

The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cariño doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the public domain and,
as such, cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks.

There is no merit in these contentions.

A proper reading of Cariño would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to lands which have always
been considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether alienable or otherwise. A distinction must be
made between ownership of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State. Ownership
by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-in-
interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of title from the State as the land
has been regarded as private in character as far back as memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive
prescription against the State involves a conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private
land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person. Since native title assumes that the property
covered by it is private land and is deemed never to have been part of the public domain, the Solicitor General’s thesis
that native title under Cariño applies only to lands of the public domain is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks under the Constitution 82 is
irrelevant to the application of the Cariño doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of
lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.

Legal history supports the Cariño doctrine.

When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its discovery and occupation thereof in the 16th century
and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 which it entered into with Portugal, 83 the continents of Asia, the Americas and Africa
were considered as terra nullius although already populated by other peoples.84 The discovery and occupation by the
European States, who were then considered as the only members of the international community of civilized nations, of
lands in the said continents were deemed sufficient to create title under international law. 85
Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did not mean that it acquired title
to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws of Spain, the Spanish Crown was considered to have
acquired dominion only over the unoccupied and unclaimed portions of our islands.86

In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the natives of their property. Miguel Lopez
de Legazpi was under instruction of the Spanish King to do no harm to the natives and to their property. In this regard, an
authority on the early Spanish colonial period in the Philippines wrote:

The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a challenging opportunity to avoid a repetition
of the sanguinary conquests of Mexico and Peru. In his written instructions for the Adelantado Legazpi, who commanded
the expedition, Philip II envisaged a bloodless pacification of the archipelago. This extraordinary document could have
been lifted almost verbatim from the lectures of the Dominican theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, delivered in the University
of Salamanca. The King instructed Legazpi to inform the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to their
persons or to their property. The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and in friendship and "to explain to
them the law of Jesus Christ by which they will be saved." Although the Spanish expedition could defend themselves if
attacked, the royal instructions admonished the commander to commit no aggressive act which might arouse native
hostility.87

Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings including native land occupancy. 88 Thus,
the Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred ownership of lands already held by the natives.89 The royal
decrees of 1880 and 1894 did not extinguish native title to land in the Philippines. The earlier royal decree, dated June 25,
1880, provided that all those in "unlawful possession of royal lands" must legalize their possession by means of
adjustment proceedings,90 and within the period specified. The later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894, otherwise
known as the Maura Law, declared that titles that were capable of adjustment under the royal decree of 1880, but for
which adjustment was not sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh wording of the Maura Law, it was held in the case
of Cariño that the royal decree of 1894 should not be construed as confiscation of title, but merely as the withdrawal of the
privilege of registering such title.91

Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the United States, contrary to petitioners’
assertion that the US merely succeeded to the rights of Spain, including the latter’s rights over lands of the public
domain.92 Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the cession of the Philippines did not impair any right to
property existing at the time.93 During the American colonial regime, native title to land was respected, even protected.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided that property and rights acquired by the US through cession from Spain were to be
administered for the benefit of the Filipinos.94 In obvious adherence to libertarian principles, McKinley’s Instructions, as
well as the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the US Constitution. One of these
rights, which served as an inviolable rule upon every division and branch of the American colonial government in the
Philippines,95 was that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."96 These vested
rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902 were in turn expressly protected by the due process clause of the 1935
Constitution. Resultantly, property rights of the indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and ancestral domains were
firmly established in law.

Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
domains were "abated by the direct act by the sovereign Filipino people of ratifying the 1935 Constitution." 97 He advances
the following arguments:

The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the power to restructure the consolidation of
rights inherent in ownership in the State. Through the mandate of the Constitutions that have been adopted, the State has
wrested control of those portions of the natural resources it deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence.
It has been held that the State may impair vested rights through a legitimate exercise of police power.

Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only essential to but determinative of social welfare
and existence. To allow otherwise is to invite havoc in the established social system. x x x

Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of natural resources that have been found from
generation to generation to be critical to the survival of the Sovereign and its agent, the State. 98

Stated simply, the Solicitor General’s argument is that the State, as the source of all titles to land, had the power to re-vest
in itself, through the 1935 Constitution, title to all lands, including ancestral lands and ancestral domains. While the
Solicitor General admits that such a theory would necessarily impair vested rights, he reasons out that even vested rights
of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not absolute and may be impaired by the legitimate exercise
of police power.

I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor General, while embodying the
theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any misunderstanding. It simply declares that "all agricultural, timber, and mineral
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State."99 Nowhere does it state that certain lands which are
"absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence," including those which are not part of the public domain, shall
thereafter be owned by the State. If there is any room for constitutional construction, the provision should be interpreted in
favor of the preservation, rather than impairment or extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated otherwise, Section 1, Article
XII of the 1935 Constitution cannot be construed to mean that vested right which had existed then were extinguished and
that the landowners were divested of their lands, all in the guise of "wrest[ing] control of those portions of the natural
resources [which the State] deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence." On the contrary, said Section
restated the fundamental rule against the diminution of existing rights by expressly providing that the ownership of lands
of the public domain and other natural resources by the State is "subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concessions." The "existing rights" that were intended to be protected must, perforce, include the right of ownership by
indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains. The words of the law should be given their ordinary or usual
meaning,100 and the term "existing rights" cannot be assigned an unduly restrictive definition.

Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution 101to protect the rights
of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Nonetheless, they contend that the recognition and
protection under IPRA of the right of ownership of indigenous peoples over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are far
in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of the Congress, 102 since such recognition and protection
amount to the alienation of lands of the public domain, which is proscribed under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to "protect the rights of indigenous peoples to
their ancestral lands." In its general and ordinary sense, the term "right" refers to any legally enforceable claim. 103 It is a
power, privilege, faculty or demand inherent in one person and incident upon another. 104 When used in relation to
property, "right" includes any interest in or title to an object, or any just and legal claim to hold, use and enjoy it. 105 Said
provision in the Constitution cannot, by any reasonable construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the right
of ownership over such ancestral lands. For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have exceeded its constitutional
mandate and power in enacting the provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 7(a) and 8, which recognize the right of
ownership of the indigenous peoples over ancestral lands.

The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the power to "provide for the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." In
light of this provision, does Congress have the power to decide whether ancestral domains shall be private property or
part of the public domain? Also, does Congress have the power to determine whether the "extent" of ancestral domains
shall include the natural resources found therein?

It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of the Constitution did not intend Congress to decide
whether ancestral domains shall be public or private property. Rather, they acknowledged that ancestral domains shall be
treated as private property, and that customary laws shall merely determine whether such private ownership is by the
entire indigenous cultural community, or by individuals, families, or clans within the community. The discussion below
between Messrs. Regalado and Bennagen and Mr. Chief Justice Davide, then members of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, is instructive:

MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications from either Commissioner Bennagen or
Commissioner Davide regarding this phrase "CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF
CUSTOMARY LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS in determining the ownership and extent of
the ancestral domain," because ordinarily it is the law on ownership and the extent thereof which determine the property
rights or relations arising therefrom. On the other hand, in this proposed amendment the phraseology is that it is the
property rights or relations which shall be used as the basis in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
domain. I assume there must be a certain difference in the customary laws and our regular civil laws on property.

MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it to Congress to make the necessary
exception to the general law on property relations.

MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an example of such a customary law wherein it
is the property rights and relations that determine the ownership and the extent of that ownership, unlike the basic
fundamental rule that it is the ownership and the extent of ownership which determine the property rights and relations
arising therefrom and consequent thereto. Perhaps, these customary laws may have a different provision or thrust so that
we could make the corresponding suggestions also by way of an amendment.

MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.

MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.

There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership. There would be ownership based on
individuals, on clan or lineage, or on community. And the thinking expressed in the consultation is that this should be
codified and should be recognized in relation to existing national laws. That is essentially the concept. 106 (Emphasis
supplied.)

The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also apparent from the following exchange between
Messrs. Suarez and Bennagen:

MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of the ancestral domain, are we thinking in terms of the tribal ownership or community ownership or of private
ownership within the ancestral lands or ancestral domain?

MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered as ownership by private individuals,
clans and even communities.

MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that the State will set aside the ancestral domain
and there is a separate law for that. Within the ancestral domain it could accept more specific ownership in terms of
individuals within the ancestral lands.

MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain. 107 (Emphasis supplied.)

It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the Constitution never expressly mentioned Cariño in their
deliberations, they did not intend to adopt the concept of native title to land, or that they were unaware of native title as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia.108 The framers of the Constitution, as well as the people adopting it, were
presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial doctrines concerning the subject of constitutional provisions, and courts
should take these doctrines into consideration in construing the Constitution. 109

Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution are considered as private property of indigenous
peoples, the IPRA, by affirming or acknowledging such ownership through its various provisions, merely abides by the
constitutional mandate and does not suffer any vice of unconstitutionality.

Petitioners interpret the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs" in Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to mean "as subject to the provision of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution," which vests in the State ownership of all lands of the public domain, mineral lands and other natural
resources. Following this interpretation, petitioners maintain that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are the property
of the State.

This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the declarations made in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions on the state policy of conservation and nationalization of lands of the public domain and natural resources,
and is of paramount importance to our national economy and patrimony. A close perusal of the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission reveals that the framers of the Constitution inserted the phrase "subject to the provisions of
this Constitution" mainly to prevent the impairment of Torrens titles and other prior rights in the determination of what
constitutes ancestral lands and ancestral domains, to wit:

MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting ancestral lands. How does this affect the
Torrens title and other prior rights?

MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and we did say that in cases where due
process is clearly established in terms of prior rights, these two have to be respected.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true that parts of Baguio City are considered as
ancestral lands?

MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still recalls, in one of the publications that I
provided the Commissioners, the parts could be considered as ancestral domain in relation to the whole population of
Cordillera but not in relation to certain individuals or certain groups.

MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is considered as ancestral land?

MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same manner that Filipinos can speak of the
Philippine archipelago as ancestral land, but not in terms of the right of a particular person or particular group to exploit,
utilize, or sell it.

MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear that the prior rights will be respected.

MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely. 110

Thus, the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" was intended by the framers of the Constitution as a
reiteration of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.

There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the protection of rights of the indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands cannot be construed as subject to Section 2 of the same Article ascribing ownership of all public lands to
the State. The Constitution must be construed as a whole. It is a rule that when construction is proper, the whole
Constitution is examined in order to determine the meaning of any provision. That construction should be used which
would give effect to the entire instrument.111

Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands and other natural resources
should be read together with the other provisions thereof which firmly recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples.
These, as set forth hereinbefore,112 include: Section 22, Article II, providing that the State recognizes and promotes the
rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the
protection of the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being, and for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domains; Section 1, Article XIII, directing the removal or reduction of social, economic,
political and cultural inequities and inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good; Section 6, Article XIII, directing the application of the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship in the disposition
and utilization of other natural resources, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands; Section 17, Article XIV, decreeing that the State shall recognize,
respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and
institutions; and Section 12, Article XVI, authorizing the Congress to create a consultative body to advise the President
on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities.

Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first goal of the national economy is the more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth.113 Equity is given prominence as the first objective of national economic
development.114 The framers of the Constitution did not, by the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national development policies and programs," intend to establish a hierarchy of constitutional norms. As explained by then
Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., it was not their objective to make certain interests primary or
paramount, or to create absolute limitations or outright prohibitions; rather, the idea is towards the balancing of interests:

BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davide’s formulation of the first sentence, he says: "The State, SUBJECT TO THE
provisions of this Constitution AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS shall guarantee the rights
of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands to insure their economic, social and cultural well-being." There are
at least two concepts here which receive different weights very often. They are the concepts of national development
policies and programs, and the rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I would like to
ask: When the Commissioner proposed this amendment, which was the controlling concept? I ask this because
sometimes the rights of cultural minorities are precisely transgressed in the interest of national development policies and
programs. Hence, I would like to know which is the controlling concept here. Is it the rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands or is it national development policies and programs.

MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question of which is primary or which is more paramount. The concept introduced
here is really the balancing of interests. That is what we seek to attain. We have to balance the interests taking into
account the specific needs and the specific interests also of these cultural communities in like manner that we did so in
the autonomous regions.115 (Emphasis supplied.)

B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the State’s ownership over the natural resources within the ancestral
domains.

Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the public domain and other natural
resources,116 as well as the State’s full control and supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources.117 Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General assail Sections 3 (a), 118 5,119 and 7120 of IPRA as violative
of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which states, in part, that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State."121 They would have the Court declare as unconstitutional Section
3(a) of IPRA because the inclusion of natural resources in the definition of ancestral domains purportedly results in the
abdication of State ownership over these resources.

I am not convinced.

Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and composition of
ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a particular area is to be
considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a) serves only as a yardstick which
points out what properties are within the ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over
the natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.

The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind, important to ensure that no unnecessary
encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral domains will result during the delineation process. The mere
fact that Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include the natural resources found therein does not ipso facto convert
the character of such natural resources as private property of the indigenous peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to
Section 3(a) cannot be construed as a source of ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources simply
because it recognizes ancestral domains as their "private but community property."

The phrase "private but community property" is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples’ concept of ownership as
distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In Civil Law, "ownership" is the "independent and general power of a
person over a thing for purposes recognized by law and within the limits established thereby."122 The civil law concept of
ownership has the following attributes: jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing that which it produces, jus
abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use, jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform and
even destroy that which is owned and jus vidicandi or the right to exclude other persons from the possession the thing
owned.123 In contrast, the indigenous peoples’ concept of ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or group
ownership. By virtue of the communal character of ownership, the property held in common "cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed"124 because it was meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not merely the individual member.125

That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous peoples is also clear from the
deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on Section 7 which recites the rights of indigenous peoples over their
ancestral domains, to wit:

CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8126 rights to ancestral domain, this is where we transferred the other provision
but here itself -

HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I maybe allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we have
decided to remove the provisions on natural resources because we all agree that that belongs to the State. Now,
the plight or the rights of those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could be exploited by mining, by
dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any
mining areas should be done in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this has
been disturbing our people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers or the secretariat could just
propose a provision for incorporation here so that maybe the right to consultation and the right to be compensated when
there are damages within their ancestral lands.

CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection both are already considered in subsequent
sections which we are now looking for.

HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the indigenous people where they are. Number
two, in terms of the mines there is a need for prior consultation of source which is here already. So, anyway it is on the
record that you want to make sure that the secretariat takes note of those two issues and my assurance is that it is
already there and I will make sure that they cross check.

HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a Senate version you do not have and if
you agree we will adopt that.127 (Emphasis supplied.)

Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources. In
fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains." Neither does Section 7(b), which enumerates certain rights of the indigenous
peoples over the natural resources found within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-
vis the natural resources.

What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples’ rights and welfare in relation to the natural resources
found within their ancestral domains,128 including the preservation of the ecological balance therein and the need to
ensure that the indigenous peoples will not be unduly displaced when State-approved activities involving the natural
resources located therein are undertaken.

Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not been recognized in the
Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of Reavies v. Fianza129 in support of their thesis that native title to
natural resources has been upheld in this jurisdiction.130 They insist that "it is possible for rights over natural resources to
vest on a private (as opposed to a public) holder if these were held prior to the 1935 Constitution." 131 However, a judicious
examination of Reavies reveals that, contrary to the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did not recognize native
title to natural resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership of
minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.

While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of land by virtue of time immemorial
possession in the concept of an owner was acknowledged and recognized as far back during the Spanish colonization of
the Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as regards natural resources. The unique value of natural
resources has been acknowledged by the State and is the underlying reason for its consistent assertion of ownership and
control over said natural resources from the Spanish regime up to the present.132 Natural resources, especially minerals,
were considered by Spain as an abundant source of revenue to finance its battles in wars against other nations. Hence,
Spain, by asserting its ownership over minerals wherever these may be found, whether in public or private lands,
recognized the separability of title over lands and that over minerals which may be found therein. 133

On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals. As the owner of
natural resources over the Philippines after the latter’s cession from Spain, the United States saw it fit to allow both
Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral
lands. A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to the laws then prevailing could
exclude other persons, even the State, from exploiting minerals within his property. 134 Although the United States made a
distinction between minerals found in public lands and those found in private lands, title in these minerals was in all cases
sourced from the State. The framers of the 1935 Constitution found it necessary to maintain the State’s ownership over
natural resources to insure their conservation for future generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the country
through economic domination; and to avoid situations whereby the Philippines would become a source of international
conflicts, thereby posing danger to its internal security and independence.135

The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and other natural resources in the 1935 Constitution was
reiterated in both the 1973136 and 1987 Constitutions.137

Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral domains belong to the State, the Court
deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the NCIP with respect to ancestral domains under Section 52 [i] of
IPRA extends only to the lands and not to the natural resources therein.

Section 52[i] provides:

Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies. - The Chairperson of the NCIP
shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. The secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Interior and Local Government, and Department of
Justice, the Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, and any other government agency claiming
jurisdiction over the area shall be notified thereof. Such notification shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction
previously claimed.

Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under the administration of other agencies
of the Government, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform, with respect to agricultural lands, and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources with respect to timber, forest and mineral lands. Upon the certification of these areas
as ancestral domain following the procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the government
agency or agencies concerned over lands forming part thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of government
agencies over the natural resources within the ancestral domains does not terminate by such certification because said
agencies are mandated under existing laws to administer the natural resources for the State, which is the owner thereof.
To construe Section 52[i] as divesting the State, through the government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over the
natural resources within the ancestral domains would be inconsistent with the established doctrine that all natural
resources are owned by the State.

C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not unconstitutional.

The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve the natural resources found on
the ancestral domains, to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of these resources, and to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of such natural resources. 138 The statute also grants them priority
rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains.139 Before the NCIP can issue a certification for the renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or for
the perfection of any production-sharing agreement the prior informed written consent of the indigenous peoples
concerned must be obtained.140 In return, the indigenous peoples are given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains or portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation. 141

The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an active and dominant role in the utilization of our
country’s natural resources. Petitioners, on the other hand, allege that under the Constitution the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources may only be undertaken by the State, either directly or indirectly through
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements.142 To petitioners, no other method is allowed by the
Constitution. They likewise submit that by vesting ownership of ancestral lands and ancestral domains in the indigenous
peoples, IPRA necessarily gives them control over the use and enjoyment of such natural resources, to the prejudice of
the State.143

Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the exploration, development and utilization
of natural resources must be under the full control and supervision of the State, which may directly undertake such
activities or enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements. This provision, however, should not
be read in isolation to avoid a mistaken interpretation that any and all forms of utilization of natural resources other than
the foregoing are prohibited. The Constitution must be regarded as consistent with itself throughout. 144 No constitutional
provision is to be separated from all the others, or to be considered alone, all provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the fundamental law. 145

In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources stated in paragraph
1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself states in the third paragraph of the same section that Congress may, by
law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens.146 Further, Section 6, Article XIII, directs the State,
in the disposition and utilization of natural resources, to apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship.147 Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII mandates the State to protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to
the preferential use of marine and fishing resources.148 Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of the pro-
Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our fundamental law, and in harmony with the other provisions of the Constitution rather
as a sequestered pronouncement,149 cannot be construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of
natural resources without the State’s direct participation.

Through the imposition of certain requirements and conditions for the exploration, development and utilization of the
natural resources under existing laws,150 the State retains full control over such activities, whether done on small-scale
basis151 or otherwise.
The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources under Sections 7(b) and 57 of
IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076)
and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942). R.A. 7076 expressly provides that should an ancestral land be
declared as a people’s small-scale mining area, the members of the indigenous peoples living within said area shall be
given priority in the awarding of small-scale mining contracts.152 R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall be
opened for mining operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community concerned153 and in
the event that the members of such indigenous cultural community give their consent to mining operations within their
ancestral land, royalties shall be paid to them by the parties to the mining to the contract.154

In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the indigenous peoples are duly
circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the following: "to manage and conserve natural resources within
territories and uphold it for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the
natural resources found therein; to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the
areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws; to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project, and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment of these rights."

It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section 7(b) pertains only to
the exploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers only to the search or prospecting of mineral resources,
or any other means for the purpose of determining the existence and the feasibility of mining them for profit.155 The
exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot be equated with the entire process of "exploration, development
and utilization" of natural resources which under the Constitution belong to the State.

Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the utilization of natural resources and not
absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights does not mean exclusive rights. What is granted is merely the right of
preference or first consideration in the award of privileges provided by existing laws and regulations, with due regard to
the needs and welfare of indigenous peoples living in the area.

There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character in the grant of concessions. Nor
does the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by government entities. Several factors still have to be considered.
For example, the extent and nature of utilization and the consequent impact on the environment and on the indigenous
peoples’ way of life are important considerations. Moreover, the indigenous peoples must show that they live in the area
and that they are in the best position to undertake the required utilization.

It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a blanket authority to disregard
pertinent laws and regulations. The utilization of said natural resources is always subject to compliance by the indigenous
peoples with existing laws, such as R.A. 7076 and R.A. 7942 since it is not they but the State, which owns these
resources.

It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude the State from undertaking activities, or entering
into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with private entities, to utilize the natural resources
which may be located within the ancestral domains. There is no intention, as between the State and the indigenous
peoples, to create a hierarchy of values; rather, the object is to balance the interests of the State for national development
and those of the indigenous peoples.

Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples exclude non-indigenous peoples from undertaking the
same activities within the ancestral domains upon authority granted by the proper governmental agency. To do so would
unduly limit the ownership rights of the State over the natural resources.

To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular sector in the utilization of natural resources is
nothing new. As previously mentioned, Section 7, Article XIII of the Constitution mandates the protection by the State of
"the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of communal marine and
fishing resources, both inland and offshore."

Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources within the ancestral
domains may disrupt the natural environment as well as the traditional activities of the indigenous peoples therein. Hence,
the need for the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples before any search for or utilization of the natural
resources within their ancestral domains is undertaken.
In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake such activities, IPRA requires that the prior
informed consent of the indigenous peoples be obtained. The State must, as a matter of policy and law, consult the
indigenous peoples in accordance with the intent of the framers of the Constitution that national development policies and
programs should involve a systematic consultation to balance local needs as well as national plans. As may be gathered
from the discussion of the framers of the Constitution on this point, the national plan presumably takes into account the
requirements of the region after thorough consultation. 156 To this end, IPRA grants to the indigenous peoples the right to
an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, and
the right not to be removed therefrom without their free and prior informed consent.157 As to non-members, the prior
informed consent takes the form of a formal and written agreement between the indigenous peoples and non-members
under the proviso in Section 57 in case the State enters into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreement with Filipino citizens, or corporations. This requirement is not peculiar to IPRA. Existing laws and regulations
such as the Philippine Environmental Policy,158 the Environmental Impact System,159 the Local Government Code160 and
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995161already require increased consultation and participation of stakeholders, such as
indigenous peoples, in the planning of activities with significant environment impact.

The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the indigenous peoples must be procured before the
NCIP can issue a certification for the "issuance, renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or to the perfection
of any production-sharing agreement," must be interpreted, not as a grant of the power to control the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources, but merely the imposition of an additional requirement for such
concession or agreement. The clear intent of the law is to protect the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples which
may be adversely affected by the operation of such entities or licensees.

Corollary Issues

A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.

The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which
provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
deprived the equal protection of the laws."

Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of
IPRA includes private lands. They argue that the inclusion of private lands in the ancestral lands and ancestral domains
violates the due process clause.162 Petitioners’ contention is erroneous.

Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains are "subject to
Section 56," which reads:

Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. – Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested
upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and protected.

Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of indigenous peoples, but not those
who are not members of such communities. Following their interpretation, IPRA, under Section 56, recognizes the rights
of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject to the vested rights of the same
communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Such interpretation is obviously incorrect.

The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or non-
indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins of the ownership of these "property
rights." The IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-
indigenous peoples. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. 163 What IPRA only requires is
that these "property rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.

Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens titles within areas claimed as
ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes strict procedural requirements for the proper delineation of
ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land,
whether or not he is member of an indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and
ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines. 164 With
regard to ancestral domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural community,
or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and census by the Ancestral domains Office ("ADO") of the
NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO; fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon
submission of the final report of the ADO.165 With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral
domain, the statute imposes the following procedural requirements: first, application; second, posting and
publication; third, investigation and inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon
submission of a report by the ADO.166 Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the petitioners that the law affords no
protection to those who are not indigenous peoples.

Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP 167 and the
application of customary law,168 violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of indigenous
peoples,169 and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving indigenous
peoples,170 including even disputes between a member of such communities and one who is not a member, as well as
over disputes in the delineation of ancestral domains.171 Petitioners clarify that they do not claim that the members of the
NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial judges. They merely contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial,
because a party who is not a member of an indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one who
is] before judges who are all members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a suspicion that they do not have the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge."172

In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied first in disputes involving property,
succession and land,173 and that such laws shall likewise be used in disputes involving indigenous peoples. 174 They assert
that "[w]hen the dispute involves a member of an [indigenous cultural community and another who is not], a resolution of
such a dispute based on customary laws. . . would clearly be a denial of due process. . . [because those who are not
indigenous peoples] do not know what these customary laws are." 175

Petitioners’ concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous peoples does not
mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples.
A person’s possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this
wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter
have no monopoly of the concept of justice.

In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its quasi-judicial powers. Section 67
states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The regular
remedies under our rules of procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by the decision of the NCIP.

Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to say that such
is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may
provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and
extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks
merely of primacy of use.176 The IPRA prescribes the application of such customary laws where these present a
workable solution acceptable to the parties, who are members of the same indigenous group. This interpretation is
supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules which states:

RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS

Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as
but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the
application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.

All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or where the
dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the
Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. (Emphasis supplied.)

The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domains,177 where all the parties involved are members of indigenous
peoples,178 specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a
non-member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to different groups, the application
of customary law is not required.

Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in disputes concerning ancestral
lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of customary laws is in line
with the constitutional policy of recognizing the application thereof through legislation passed by Congress.
Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this jurisdiction. Under the Civil Code, use of
customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence, 179 and it is not contrary to
law, public order or public policy.180 Moreover, the Local Government Code of 1991 calls for the recognition and
application of customary laws to the resolution of issues involving members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the
operation of customary laws in the settling of disputes if such are ordinarily used in barangays where majority of the
inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples.181

B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the President’s power of control
over the Executive Department.

The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA violate Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides that:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

The assailed provision of the Implementing Rules provides:

Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)

xxx

Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President

Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to recognize, promote and protect the rights and well-being of indigenous peoples. It shall be an independent
agency under the Office of the President. As such, the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination. This relationship shall be carried out through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day
administration or all those pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the discretion of the Chairperson of the
Commission, as the Chief Executive Officer.

Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control of the President over the NCIP by
characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President as "lateral but autonomous...for purposes of
policy and program coordination."

Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules characterize the NCIP as
an independent agency under the Office of the President, such characterization does not remove said body from the
President’s control and supervision.

The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well being of the indigenous peoples
and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto. 182 It has been granted administrative,183 quasi-
legislative184 and quasi-judicial powers185 to carry out its mandate. The diverse nature of the NCIP’s functions renders it
impossible to place said agency entirely under the control of only one branch of government and this, apparently, is the
reason for its characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An "independent agency" is defined as an
administrative body independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a superior head of department, as
distinguished from a "subordinate agency" or an administrative body whose action is subject to administrative review or
revision.186

That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all instances is evident in the IPRA
itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be appealable to the
Court of Appeals,187 like those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress "under
the office of the President" and, as such, is still subject to the President’s power of control and supervision granted under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution188 with respect to its performance of administrative functions, such as the
following: (1) the NCIP must secure the President’s approval in obtaining loans to finance its projects; 189 (2) it must obtain
the President’s approval for any negotiation for funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in whatever from
and from whatever source;190 (3) the NCIP shall submit annual reports of its operations and achievements to the
President, and advise the latter on all matters relating to the indigenous peoples; 191 and (4) it shall exercise such other
powers as may be directed by the President.192 The President is also given the power to appoint the Commissioners of
the NCIP193 as well as to remove them from office for cause motu proprio or upon the recommendation of any indigenous
community.194

To recapitulate:

(1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, and 8) affirming the
ownership by the indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title do not diminish
the State’s ownership of lands of the public domain, because said ancestral lands and domains are considered as
private land, and never to have been part of the public domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cariño vs.
Insular Government;195

(2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands and other natural resources in the
State is not violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the IPRA which grant certain rights to the indigenous
peoples over the natural resources found within the ancestral domains, e.g., to benefit from and share in the
profits from the allocation and utilization of the same, as well as priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation thereof. The State retains full control over the exploration, development and utilization
of natural resources even with the grant of said rights to the indigenous peoples, through the imposition of
requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural resources under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991196and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.197 Moreover, the rights granted to indigenous peoples
for the utilization of natural resources within their ancestral domains merely amplify what has been earlier granted
to them under the aforesaid laws;

(3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to their ancestral lands and domains,
it also protects the vested rights of persons, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples, who may have
acquired rights of ownership lands or rights to explore and exploit natural resources within the ancestral lands and
domains;198

(4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions (Sections 40, 51-54, 62, 63, 65
and 66) of the IPRA which, among others, establish the composition of the NCIP, and prescribe the application of
customary law in certain disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of
indigenous peoples does not mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is
sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution; and

(5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office
of the President does not infringe upon the President’s power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP under the Office of
the President, and therefore under the President’s control and supervision with respect to its administrative
functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers are
concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the SEC.

In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Footnotes

1Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 89 SCRA 69 (1979); Phil. Long
Distance Telephone Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil 674 (1952).

2 In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).

3In Philippine Colonial history, the term indio applied to indigenous throughout the vast Spanish empire. India was
a synonym for all of Asia east of the Indus River. Even after it became apparent that the explorer Christopher
Columbus was not able to reach territories lying off the east coast of Asia, the Spanish persisted in referring to all
natives within their empire as los Indios. (Owen J. Lynch, Jr., THE PHILIPPINE COLONIAL DICHOTOMY:
Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 PL J 112 [1988] citing R. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE MAN’S INDIAN:
IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESIDENT 5 [1979].
4 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976), p. 1151.

5 Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian
Controversy, 92 The American Journal of International Law 414, 419 (1998) citing Jose Martinez Cobo, Study of
the Problem of Discrimination against indigenous population, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1986/ 7/ Add. 4, paras. 379-
80.

6 Ibid. This definition is criticized for taking the potentially limited, and controversial view of indigenous peoples by
requiring "historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories."

7 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 34.

8 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 680 (1919).

9Hearing before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-Third Congress, Third Session on
HR 18459, pp. 346, 351. Quoted in Rubi at 686.

10United States President McKinleys’ Instruction to the Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900, quoted in Rubi at
680.

11 US v. Tubban, 29 Phil. 434, 436 (1915).

12See Owen J. Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples And A Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land
Laws (1900-1913), 63 PLJ 249 (1988).

13For an introduction to the chasm that exists between Philippine Law and Indigenous Custom Law, see Owen J.
Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey 52 PLJ 268 (1982); and the
Philippine Indigenous Law Collection: An Introduction and Preliminary Bibliography, 58 PLJ 457 (1983), by the
same author.

14See Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited (1975), pp. 26-41; Teodoro Agoncillo, A History of
the Filipino People, 8th ed., pp. 5, 74-75.

15Response of Rep. Gregorio A. Andolana to the interpellation of Rep. John Henry R. Osmeña on ouse Bill No.
9125, Journal of August 20 and 21, 1997 of the House of Representatives, p.20.

16 Philippines Yearbook (1998 ed.), p. 366.

17 Article II of the Constitution, entitled State Principles and Policies.

18 Article XII of the Constitution, entitled National Economy and Patrimony.

19 Article XIII of the Constitution, entitled Social Justice and Human Rights.

20 Ibid.

21 Article XIV of the Constitution, entitled Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports.

22 Article XVI of the Constitution, entitled General Provisions.

23SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policies . - The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the framework of the
Constitution:

a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and
development;
 b) The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their economic,
social and cultural well being and shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain;

c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their
cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and
policies;

d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally enjoy the full
measure of human rights and freedoms without distinction or discrimination;

e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights
and guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on
an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other
members of the population; and

f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural
integrity by assuring maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education, health, as well as other
services of ICCs/IPs, in order to render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of these
communities.

Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and
guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values,
beliefs, interests and institutions, and to adopt and implement measures to protect their rights to their
ancestral domains.

24 See Sections 13-20, R.A. 8371.

25 See Sections 21-37, R.A. 8371.

26 See Sections 4-12, R.A. 8371.

27 See Sections 38-50, R.A. 8371.

28 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392, 400 (1980), citing People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

29 Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492, 513 (1996).

30 Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 104 (1996).

31 Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346, 362 (1913).

32 WEBSTERS’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1976, p. 497.

33 United States v. Freuhauf, 365 US 146 (1961).

34Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 364 (1989); Joya v. PCGG,
225 SCRA 568 (1993).

35 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937).

36 Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337, 342 (1983).

37 US v. Richardson, 418 US 166, 194 S Ct 2940, 41 L Ed 2d 678 (1974).

38Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, 135 (1994), citing, among others, Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA
479 (1965); CLU V. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991);
Osmena v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Carpio v. Executive
Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992).

In Kilosbayan v. Morato (250 SCRA 130 [1995]) the Court discoursed on the rule on standing as follows:
taxpayers may sue on the claim of illegal disbursement of funds, or to assail the constitutionality of a tax
measure; voters may question the validity of election laws; citizens may raise constitutional questions of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and, legislators may question the validity of
official acts which infringe their prerogatives.

39 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).

40 Assn. of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 364-365 (1989).

41 16 Phil. 366 (1910), citing HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES.

42 Id., at 371.

43 Id., at 374-375.

44 136 SCRA 27, 37 (1985).

45 177 SCRA 374, 383 (1989).

46 224 SCRA 792 (1993).

47 Id., at 805.

48 Ibid.

49 Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300, 306 (1966).

50 Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479, 487 (1965), citing 11 Am Jur 761.

51Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333, 358-359 (1976); Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331
(1960); Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 (1972).

52Section 79. Appropriations.- The amount necessary to finance the initial implementation of this Act shall be
charged against the current year's appropriation of the ONCC and the OSCC. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

53 Section 74. Merger of ONCC/OSCC.—The Office for Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC) and the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), created under Executive Order Nos. 122-B and 122-C respectively, are
hereby merged as organic offices of the NCIP and shall continue to function under a revitalized and strengthened
structure to achieve the objectives of the NCIP x x x.

54 Section 2, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

55 Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

56 Article VIII of the Constitution states:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

xxx
 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as amended, provides:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction.-The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

x x x.

Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases.- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:

(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and

(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.

57 Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154, 173-174 (1997).

58 172 SCRA 415 (1989).

59 Id., at 424.

60Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:

(a) Right of Ownership. – The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional

(b) hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;

xxx

61Section 3(l) Native Title – refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory
reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are
thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest; x x x

Section 3(p) Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain
ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owners, and utilized a defined
territory devolved to them, by operation of customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance
with their customs and traditions.

62Section 3(b) Ancestral Lands – Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously to
the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by the government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots;

63Section 3(a) Ancestral Domains – Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by Indigenous peoples, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally
or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure
or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings entered into by the government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure
their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds,
burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other resources, and lands which may no longer be
exclusively be occupied by Indigenous peoples but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or
shifting cultivators.

64 Ibid.

65 Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958); San Miguel Corporation v. Avelino, 89 SCRA 69 (1979).

66 In re Guarina, 24 Phil 37 (1913).

67 See Lee Hong Hok vs. David, 48 SCRA 372 (1972).

68 Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1994 rev. ed., p. 15.

69 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd revision, p. 1759.

70 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 1282.

71 76 Corpus Juris Secundum, citing Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 566.

72 Washburn, p. 44; see also Williams, Principles Of The Law On Real Property, 6th ed. (1886), p.2; Bigelow, p. 2.

73 Warvelle, Abstracts and Examination of Title to Real Property (1907), p.18.

74 1 Dictionary of English Law (Jowitt, ed.), p. 797.

75 41 Phil. 935, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L Ed. 594 (1909).

76Cariño vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 132 (1906). The Philippine Supreme Court in this case held that in the
Philippines, there is no conclusive presumption of a grant of title to land from the Government founded merely
upon long possession of the same by the applicant.

77 Cariño vs. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 941.

78 Section 10, Philippine Bill of 1902.

79 75 Phil 890 (1946).

80 Id., at 892.

81 Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, p. 861.

82 Section 3, Article XII, Constitution.

83Under the Treaty of Tordesillas, the world was divided between Spain and Portugal, with the former having
exclusive power to claim all lands and territories west of the Atlantic Ocean demarcation line (Lynch, The Legal
Bases of Philippine Colonial Sovereignty, 62 Phil L J 279, 283 [1987]).

84 See AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th ed., 142-143.

85 See Cruz, International Law, 1996 ed., pp. 106-107.

86 Cariño v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 939.

This point finds significance in light of the distinction between sovereignty and dominion. Sovereignty is
the right to exercise the functions of a State to the exclusion of any other State (Case Concerning the
Island of Las Palmas [1928], UNRIAA II 829, 838). It is often referred to as the power of imperium, which
 is defined as the government authority possessed by the State (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines: A Commentary Vol. 2, p. 419). On the other hand, dominion, or dominium, is the
capacity of the State to own or acquire property such as lands and natural resources.

Dominium was the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the theory of jura regalia. The
declaration in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that all lands of the public domain are owned
by the State is likewise founded on dominium (Ibid.). If dominium, not imperium, is the basis of the theory
of jura regalia, then the lands which Spain acquired in the 16th century were limited to non-private lands,
because it could only acquire lands which were not yet privately-owned or occupied by the Filipinos.
Hence, Spain acquired title only over lands which were unoccupied and unclaimed, i.e., public lands.

87 Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipinos Responses, 1565-1700 (1959), pp. 8-
9.

88 Cariño vs. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 943.

89Book 4, Title 12, Law 9, decreed by Philip II, 1 June 1594. We order that grants of farms and lands to Spaniards
be without injury to the Indians and that those which have been granted to their loss and injury, be returned to the
lawful owners.

Book 4, Title 12, Law 14. We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories,
and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still
pertaining the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true
deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that x x x after distributing to the
natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasteurage, confirming them in what they now have and
giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
dispose of as we wish. [Quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 542-543 (1904).] (Emphasis
supplied.)

Book 6, Title 1, Law 15, decreed by King Philip II, at Madrid, 7 November 1574. We command that in the
Philippine Islands the Indians not be removed from one to another settlement by force and against their
will.

Book 6, Title 1, Law 23, otherwise known as Ordinance 10 of 1609 decreed by Philip III. It is right that
time should be allowed the Indians to work their own individual lands and those of the community.

Book 6, Title 1, Law 32, decreed by Philip II, 16 April 1580. We command the Viceroys, Presidents, and
Audiencias that they see to it that the Indians have complete liberty in their dispositions.

Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754. Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds it
shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription; x x x.
[Quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, supra, at 546.] (Emphasis supplied.)

90 Article 6 of the royal decree of June 25, 1880, quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, supra note 89 at 549.

91 Cariño v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 944.

92 Memorandum of Petitioners, par. 3.4, Rollo, pp. 845-846.

93 The Treaty of Paris reads in part:

Article III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, x x x.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars, within three months after the
exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

xxx
 Article VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles One, Two, and Three of this treaty, Spain
relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands of the West Indies, in the Island of Guam,
and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways,
and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain and as such
belong to the Crown of Spain.

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding
paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful
possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments,
ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess
property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality
such individuals may be.

94 The statute reads in part:

Section 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands under
the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such
land or other property as shall be designated by the President of the United States for military and other
reservations of the Government of the United States, are hereby placed under the control of the
Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as
provided by this Act.

McKinley’s Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, in Mendoza, From McKinley’s Instructions to the
95

New Constitution: Documents on the Philippine Constitutional System (1978) p. 71.

96 Id., at 65-75; Section 5, Philippine Bill of 1902.

97 Solicitor General’s Memorandum, Rollo, p. 668-669.

98 Id, at 668.

99 Section 1, Article XII, 1935 Constitution reads:

All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of
the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for another twenty five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may
be the measure and limit of the grant.

100 Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104 Phil 598 (1954).

101Sec. 5, Article XII. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies
and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations
in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains.

102 See Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 863-864.

103 Sibal, Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, p. 893.

104 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 1189.

105 Ibid.

106 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 32.

107 Id., at 37.

108 Solicitor General’s Memorandum, Rollo, p. 665.

109 Torres v. Tan Chim, 69 Phil 518 (1940); CIR v.Guerrero, 21 SCRA 180 (1967).

110 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 36.

111 See 1 COOLEY, CONST., LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., pp. 127-129.

112 See pp. 8-9 of this Opinion for the full text of the constitutional provisions mentioned.

113 Section 1, Article XII provides:

The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit
of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources,
and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives and similar
collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership. (Emphasis
supplied.)

114 Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, p. 800, citing the sponsorship speech of Dr. Bernardo
Villegas, Chairman of the Committee on National Economy and Patrimony.

115 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 34.

116 Petition, Rollo, pp.18-19.

117 Id., at 20.

118 Section 3. Definition of Terms. -For Purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

a) Ancestral Domains. -Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any
other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are
necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests,
pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands, individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
119Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The
indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community
property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers
sustainable traditional resource rights.

120Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:

(a) Right of Ownership. – The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;

(b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. – Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop,
control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve
natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit
and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of
the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights; x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

121 Section 2, Article XII, Constitution.

122Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 42 (1983); see also
Articles 427 and 428, Civil Code.

123 Id., at 43.

124 Section 5, R.A. 8371.

125 Ibid.

126
Should be Section 7. The Transcript of Session Proceedings of the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on National Cultural Communities regarding House Bill No. 9125 refers to Section 8 but the
Committee was actually discussing Section 7 on Rights to Ancestral Domains.

127
Transcript of Session Proceedings, Bicameral Conference Committee on National Cultural Communities,
October 9, 1997, XIV-2.

128 Sections 7 (b) and Section 57, R.A. 8371.

129 40 Phil. 1017 (1909), 215 US 16, 54 L Ed 72.

130Ibid. The facts of the case were discussed in Fianza vs. Reavies, (7 Phil. 610 [1909]) thus: Jose Fianza, et al.,
members of the Igorot tribe, claimed that he and his predecessors had, for more than fifty years prior to 1901,
possessed a certain parcel of mineral land on which were found two gold mines. The same parcel of land was
also claimed by an American, J.F. Reavies, who entered the land in 1901 and proceeded to locate mining claims
according to the mining laws of the United States. The Philippine Supreme Court held that Fianza, et al. were the
rightful owners of the mineral lands pursuant to Section 45 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which in sum states that
where a person have held or worked on their mining claims for a period equivalent to ten years, evidence of such
possession and working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto. On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court and held that the
indigenous peoples were the rightful owners of the contested parcel of land, stating that the possession and
working by Fianza, et al. of the mining claim in the Philippine Islands for the time required under the Section 45 of
the Philippine Bill of 1902 to establish the right to a patent, need not have been under a claim of title.
131 Memorandum of Intervenors Flavier, et al., Rollo, p. 918.

132Article I of the Decree of Superior Civil Government of January 29, 1864 provided that "The supreme
ownership of mines throughout the kingdom belong to the crown and the king. They shall not be exploited except
by persons who obtained special grant from this superior government and by those who may secure it thereafter,
subject to this regulation." (FRANCISCO, PHILIPPINE LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 2nd ed. [1956], p.
14, citing the unpublished case of Lawrence v. Garduno, G.R. No. 19042.)

Article 2 of the Royal Decree of May 14, 1867 (the Spanish Mining Law), the law in force at the time of the
cession of the Philippines to the United States contained a similar declaration, thus:

The ownership of the substances enumerated in the preceding article (among them those of inflammable
nature) belongs to the state, and they cannot be disposed of without an authorization issued by the
Superior Civil Governor.

The Spanish Civil Code contained the following analogous provisions affirming the State’s ownership over
minerals:

Art. 339. Property of public dominium is-

xxx

2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some
public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for
the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.

Art. 350. The proprietor of land is the owner of the surface and of everything under it and may build, plant
or excavate thereon, as he may see fit, subject to any existing easements and to the provisions of the
Laws on Mines and Waters and to police regulations.

After the Philippines was ceded to Spain, the Americans continued to adhere to the concept of State-
ownership of natural resources. However, the open and free exploration, occupation and purchase of
mineral deposits and the land where they may be found were allowed under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Section 21 thereof stated:

Sec. 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and
unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase, and the
land in which they are found, to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said
Islands: Provided, That when on any lands in said Islands entered and occupied as agricultural lands
under the provisions of this Act, but not patented, mineral deposits have been found, the working of such
mineral deposits is hereby forbidden until the person, association, or corporation who or which has
entered and is occupying such lands shall have paid to the Government of said Islands such additional
sum or sums as will make the total amount paid for the mineral claim or claims in which said deposits are
located equal to the amount charged by the Government for the same as mineral claims.

Other natural resources such as water and forests were similarly regarded as belonging to the State
during both the Spanish and American rule in the Philippines, viz:

Article 33 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 defined waters of public ownership as (1) the waters
springing continuously or intermittently from lands of the public domain; (2) the waters of rivers; and (3)
the continuous or intermittent waters of springs and creeks running through their natural channels.

Article 1 of the same law states:

The following are also part of the national domain open to public use:

1. The coasts or maritime frontiers of the Philippine territory with their coves, inlets, creeks,
roadsteads, bays and ports
 2. The coast of the sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the coasts, to the full width
recognized by international law. The state provides for and regulates the police supervision and
the uses of this zone as well as the right of refuge and immunity therein, in accordance with law
and international treaties.

With respect to forests, there are references made regarding State-ownership of forest lands in Supreme
Court decisions (See Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198-1199 [1968]; Director of Lands
vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5, 11 [1975]; Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175, 184 [1908]; Montano
vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil 572, 584 [1909]).

The State’s ownership over natural resources was embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution declared:

All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of
the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for another twenty -five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.

Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provided:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State.
With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the
public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

133 Noblejas, Philippine Law on Natural Resources 1961 Revised Ed., p. 6

134 See Laurel (ed.), Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. VI, pp. 494-495.

135Explanatory Note of the Committee on Nationalization of Lands and Natural Resources, September 14, 1934,
reproduced in Laurel (ed.), Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. VII, pp. 464-468; see
also De Leon and De Leon, Jr., Philippine Constitutional Law: Principles and Cases, Vol. 2, pp. 801-802.

136 Section 8, Article XIV, see note 139 for the full text of the provision.

137 Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations and
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may
be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
 138Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:

xxx

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control
and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural
resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and
share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of
the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights;

139Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.-The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-
member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural
resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years:
Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community,
pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided, finally, That the NCIP
may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same
contract.

140 Section 59. Certification Precondition - All departments and other governmental agencies shall henceforth be
strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any
production-sharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap
with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted by
the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the
NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of Indigenous peoples
concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or controlled
corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending
application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance
with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.

141 Section 58. Environmental Considerations.- Ancestral domains or portions thereof, which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or
reforestation as determined by appropriate agencies with the full participation of the Indigenous peoples
concerned shall be maintained, managed and developed for such purposes. The Indigenous peoples
concerned shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas with
the full and effective assistance of government agencies. Should the Indigenous peoples decide to transfer
the responsibility over the areas, said decision must be made in writing. The consent of the Indigenous peoples
should be arrived at in accordance with its customary laws without prejudice to the basic requirements of existing
laws on free and prior informed consent: Provided, That the transfer shall be temporary and will ultimately revert
to the Indigenous peoples in accordance with the program for technology transfer; Provided, further, That no
Indigenous peoples shall be displaced or relocated for the purpose enumerated under this section without the
written consent of the specific persons authorized to give consent.

142 Citing Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

143 Memorandum of Petitioners, Id., at 840-841.

144 State v. Lathrop, 93 Ohio St 79, 112 NE 209, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, § 100.

145Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 US 8, 51 L Ed 345, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law,
§ 100.

146 Third paragraph, Section 2, Article XII, Constitution –

 The Congress may, by law, allow small scale-utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.

147 Section 6, Article XIII, Constitution –

The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance
with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain
under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of the indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be
distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

148 Section 7, Article XIII, Constitution –

The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide
support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production,
and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such
resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against
foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and
fishing resources.

149 Bower v. Big Horn Canal Assn. (Wyo) 307 P2d 593, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law, § 100.

150Republic Act No. 7076 (the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991), Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995).

151
Section 3(b) of R.A. 7076 defines "small-scale mining" as referring to mining activities which rely heavily on
manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment.

152 Section 7, R.A. 7076 provides:

Ancestral lands. - No ancestral land may be declared as a people’s small-scale mining area without the
prior consent of the cultural communities concerned: Provided, That, if ancestral lands are declared as
peole’s small-scale mining areas, the members of the cultural communities therein shall be given priority
for the awarding of a people’s small-scale mining contract.

153 Section 16, R.A. 7492.

154 Section 17, R.A. 7942.

155 Sec. 3(q), Chapter 1, Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995).

156 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 37.

157 Sections 7(a) and (b), R.A. 8371.

158 Presidential Decree No. 1151 (1971).

159 Presidential Decree No. 1586 (1978) and DENR Administrative Order No. 37 (1996).

160 Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).

161 Republic Act No. 7942.

162 Petition, Rollo, pp. 23-25.

163 Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590, 596 (1995).

164 Section 53 (f), R.A. 8371.

165 Section 52, R.A. 8371.

166 Section 53, R.A. 8371.

167 Sections 40, 51, 52, 53, 54, 62 and 66, R.A. No. 8371.

168 Sections 63 and 65, R.A. No. 8371.

169Section 40. Composition.- The NCIP shall be an independent agency under the Office of the President and
shall be composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to the ICCs/IPs, one (1) of whom shall be the
Chairperson. The Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines from a list of
recommendees submitted by authentic ICCs/IPs: Provided, That the seven (7) Commissioners shall be appointed
specifically from each of the following ethnographic areas, Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II, the rest of
Luzon; Island Groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and
Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao: Provided, That at least two (2) of
the seven (7) Commissioners shall be women.

170Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.- The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the
NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute
that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition
with the NCIP.

171 Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts.- In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within the
ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which can not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and
decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains:
Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of their
respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That any decision, order, award or
ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation,
enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

172 Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo ,pp. 873-874.

173Section 3 (f). Customary Laws - refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and
practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs;

xxx

Sec. 63. Applicable Laws. - Customary laws, traditions and practices of the ICCs/IPs of the land where
the conflict arises shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims and ownerships, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes. Any doubt or ambiguity in the application and interpretation
of laws shall be resolved in favor of the ICCs/IPs.

174Sec. 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

175 Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp.875-876.

176 R.A. 8371 states:

Sec. 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws
and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.
177 See Secs. 62 and 63, R.A. 8371.

178 Sec. 65, R.A. 8371.

179 The Civil Code provides:

Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.

180 The Civil Code provides:

Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.180

181 R.A. No. 7160 reads:

Sec. 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. –

xxx

(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples, local systems of
settling disputes of indigenous peoples, local systems of settling disputes through their councils of datus
or elders shall be recognized without prejudice to the applicable provisions of this Code.

182 Sec. 38, R.A. 8371.

183 Secs. 44 (a), (b), (c),(d), (f), (g), (h), (I), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (p), (q), R.A. 8371.

184 Sec. 44 (o), R.A. 8371.

185 Secs. 44 (e), 51-54, 62, R.A. 8371.

186 1 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law, § 55.

187 Sec. 62, R.A. 8371.

188Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

189 Sec. 44 (f), R.A. 8371.

190 Sec. 44 (g), R.A, 8371.

191 Sec. 44 (j), R.A. 8371.

192 Sec. 44 (p), R.A. 8371.

193 Sec. 40, R.A. 8371.

194 Sec. 42, R.A. 8371.

195 Supra note 75.

196 R.A. 7076.

197 R.A. 7942.

198 Section 56, R.A. 8371.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

MENDOZA, J.:

This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners do not complain of any injury as a result of the application of the statute to
them. They assert a right to seek an adjudication of constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers, upon the plea that
the questions raised are of "transcendental importance."

The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, §1 extends only to cases and controversies for the determination of
such proceedings as are established by law for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress or
punishment of wrongs.1 In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a property right of petitioners against the
government and other respondents or to demand compensation for injuries suffered by them as a result of the
enforcement of the law, but only to settle what they believe to be the doubtful character of the law in question. Any
judgment that we render in this case will thus not conclude or bind real parties in the future, when actual litigation will bring
to the Court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation. Such judgment cannot be executed as it amounts to
no more than an expression of opinion upon the validity of the provisions of the law in question. 2

I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, §1 of the Constitution to determine in the abstract
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
legislative and executive departments in enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies. No one
reading Art. VIII, §5 can fail to note that, in enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins
with the phrase "all cases. . . ."

The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion
was inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not really to give the judiciary a roving commission to right any wrong it perceives but to
preclude courts from invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the decision of certain cases even where
violations of civil liberties are alleged.

The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia,3 in which this Court, adopting the submission of
the Solicitor General, formulated the following test of its jurisdiction in such cases:

[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the
President’s decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the
writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.

That is why Art. VII, §18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, who chaired the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, was the author of the opinions of the Court in Lopez v.
Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.

Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without
upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to
rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting in this case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide
wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a
statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.

The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression.
In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to
him it is not unconstitutional but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a
"chilling" effect on freedom of expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is
unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far inseparable from the rest of the
statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not possible.

For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is not only to act without jurisdiction but
also to run the risk that, in adjudicating abstract or hypothetical questions, its decision will be based on speculation rather
than experience. Deprived of the opportunity to observe the impact of the law, the Court is likely to equate questions of
constitutionality with questions of wisdom and is thus likely to intrude into the domain of legislation. Constitutional
adjudication, it cannot be too often repeated, cannot take place in a vacuum.

Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional issues raised by petitioners will be a "galling cop out"4 or
an "advocacy of timidity, let alone isolationism."5 To decline the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is no more a "cop out"
or a sign of "timidity" than it was for Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison6 to hold that petitioner had the right to
the issuance of his commission as justice of the peace of the District of Columbia only to declare in the end that after all
mandamus did not lie, because §13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred original jurisdiction on the United States
Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional as the court’s jurisdiction is mainly appellate.

Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the institution of the power of judicial review, and so that there can be no
doubt of this power of our Court, we in this country have enshrined its principle in Art. VIII, §1. Now, the exercise of judicial
review can result either in the invalidation of an act of Congress or in upholding it. Hence, the checking and legitimating
functions of judicial review so well mentioned in the decisions 7 of this Court.

To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is not to show timidity but respect
for the judgment of a coequal department of government whose acts, unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the
fundamental law, are presumed to be valid. The polestar of constitutional adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in
the Angara case when he said that "this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota, presented."8 For the exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.9 Until, therefore, an actual case is brought to test
the constitutionality of the IPRA, the presumption of constitutionality, which inheres in every statute, must be accorded to
it.

Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites the statement in Severino v. Governor General,10 reiterated in Tanada v.
Tuvera,11 that "when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as
such is interested in the execution of the laws." On the basis of this statement, he argues that petitioners have standing to
bring these proceedings.12

In Severino v. Governor General,13 the question was whether mandamus lay to compel the Governor General to call a
special election on the ground that it was his duty to do so. The ruling was that he did not have such a duty. On the other
hand, although mandamus was issued in Tanada v. Tuvera, it was clear that petitioners had standing to bring the suit,
because the public has a right to know and the failure of respondents to publish all decrees and other presidential
issuances in the Official Gazette placed petitioners in danger of violating those decrees and issuances. But, in this case,
what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in
common with other citizens.

For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.

Footnotes

1 Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966).

2 Muskrat v. United States, 279 U.S. 346, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911).

3 42 SCRA 448, 481 (1971) (emphasis on the original).

 4 Panganiban, J., Separate Opinion, p. 2.

5 Vitug, J., Separate Opinion, p. 1.

6 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

7Occeña v. Commission on Elections; Gonzales v. The National Treasurer, 104 SCRA 1 (1981); Mitra v.
Commission on Elections, 104 SCRA 59 (1981).

8 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

9 Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806 (1955).

10 16 Phil. 366 (1913).

11 136 SCRA 27 (1985).

12 Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion, pp. 21-23.

13 Supra note 10.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring and Dissenting)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted handling of the procedural or
preliminary issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners have shown an actual case or controversy involving at least two
constitutional questions of transcendental importance,1 which deserve judicious disposition on the merits directly by the
highest court of the land.2 Further, I am satisfied that the various aspects of this controversy have been fully presented
and impressively argued by the parties. Moreover, prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies 3 to address the
problems raised by petitioners. In any event, this Court has given due course to the Petition, heard oral arguments and
required the submission of memoranda. Indeed, it would then be a galling copout for us to dismiss it on mere technical or
procedural grounds.

Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Must Be Within the Constitutional Framework

With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencia’s resolution of the two main substantive issues, which constitute
the core of this case. Specifically, I submit that Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples’
Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, violates and contravenes the Constitution of the Philippines insofar as -

1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain, waters, x x x and other
natural resources" which, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, "are owned by the State" and "shall not
be alienated." I respectfully reject the contention that "ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not public lands
and have never been owned by the State." Such sweeping statement places substantial portions of Philippine
territory outside the scope of the Philippine Constitution and beyond the collective reach of the Filipino people. As
will be discussed later, these real properties constitute a third of the entire Philippine territory; and the resources,
80 percent of the nation's natural wealth.

2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration, development, and utilization
of natural resources," which the Constitution expressly requires to "be under the full control and supervision of the
State."
True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural communities’ right to their ancestral lands,
but such mandate is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution."4 I concede that indigenous cultural communities and
indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to the beneficial use of public domains, as well as
priority in the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to
the fundamental law.

Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in life, Congress in its wisdom may
grant preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the
Constitution must be respected. I personally believe in according every benefit to the poor, the oppressed and the
disadvantaged, in order to empower them to equally enjoy the blessings of nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to
legitimize perpetual inequality of access to the nation's wealth or to stamp the Court's imprimatur on a law that offends
and degrades the repository of the very authority of this Court - the Constitution of the Philippines.

The Constitution Is a Compact

My basic premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all other laws must conform.5 It is the
people's quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying the principles upon which the State and the government are
founded.6 Having the status of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks for all the people all the time, not just for
the majority or for the minority at intermittent times. Every constitution is a compact made by and among the citizens of a
State to govern themselves in a certain manner.7 Truly, the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the
Filipinos to govern themselves. No group, however blessed, and no sector, however distressed, is exempt from its
compass.

RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples, admittedly professes a
laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and
promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development."8 Though
laudable and well-meaning, this statute, however, has provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which
it claims origin and authority. More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions
contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic foundation of the State's property regime.

Public Domains and Natural Resources Are Owned by the State and Cannot Be Alienated or Ceded

Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the "discovery" and the "conquest" of our country in the
sixteenth century. Under this concept, the entire earthly territory known as the Philippine Islands was acquired and held by
the Crown of Spain. The King, as then head of State, had the supreme power or exclusive dominion over all our lands,
waters, minerals and other natural resources. By royal decrees, though, private ownership of real property was
recognized upon the showing of (1) a title deed; or (2) ancient possession in the concept of owner, according to which a
title could be obtained by prescription.9 Refusal to abide by the system and its implementing laws meant the abandonment
or waiver of ownership claims.

By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the United States. The latter assumed
administration of the Philippines and succeeded to the property rights of the Spanish Crown. But under the Philippine Bill
of 1902, the US Government allowed and granted patents to Filipino and US citizens for the "free and open x x x
exploration, occupation and purchase [of mines] and the land in which they are found."10 To a certain extent, private
individuals were entitled to own, exploit and dispose of mineral resources and other rights arising from mining patents.

This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 when it crafted and ratified our first
Constitution. Instead, the said Constitution embodied the Regalian Doctrine, which more definitively declared as belonging
to the State all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals and other natural resources. 11 Although respecting mining
patentees under the Philippine Bill of 1902, it restricted the further exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources, both as to who might be entitled to undertake such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision reads:

"SECTION 1 [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant."

The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8 and 9, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution, state:

"SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not
be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the
Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens. The National Assembly, in the national interest, may allow such citizens,
corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of
assistance with any foreign person or entity for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of
assistance are hereby recognized as such."

Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

"SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizen, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

"The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone,
and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.

"The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.

"The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution."

The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially impelled by the desire to preserve the
nation's wealth in the hands of the Filipinos themselves. Nationalism was fervent at the time, and our constitutional
framers decided to embody the doctrine in our fundamental law. Charging the State with the conservation of the national
patrimony was deemed necessary for Filipino posterity. The arguments in support of the provision are encapsulated by
Aruego as follows: "[T]he natural resources, particularly the mineral resources which constituted a great source of wealth,
belonged not only to the generation then but also to the succeeding generation and consequently should be conserved for
them."12

Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, all forces of energy and other natural
resources belonged to the Philippine State, the Commonwealth absolutely prohibited the alienation of these natural
resources. Their disposition, exploitation, development and utilization were further restricted only to Filipino citizens and
entities that were 60 percent Filipino-owned. The present Constitution even goes further by declaring that such activities
"shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Additionally, it enumerates land classifications and expressly
states that only agricultural lands of the public domain shall be alienable. We quote below the relevant provision: 13

"SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations
may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. x x x."

Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that all ancestral domains and lands are
outside the coverage of public domain; and that these properties - including forests, bodies of water, minerals and parks
found therein - are private and have never been part of the public domain, because they have belonged to the indigenous
people’s ancestors since time immemorial.

I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt
from its all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was subject to "any existing right, grant, lease or
concession," the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute terms. Because of the State’s implementation of
policies considered to be for the common good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even
vested rights of ownership.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court said that once minerals are found even in private land, the State may
intervene to enable it to extract the minerals in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is converted into mineral
land and may not be used by any private person, including the registered owner, for any other purpose that would impede
the mining operations. Such owner would be entitled to just compensation for the loss sustained.

In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC,15 the Court clarified that while mining claim holders and patentees have the
exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim, their rights are not absolute or strictly one of
ownership. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of pertinent mining laws was deemed an abandonment or a
waiver of the claim.

Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political history cannot be set aside or
ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be. The perceived lack of understanding of the cultural minorities cannot
be remedied by conceding the nation’s resources to their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more privileged simply
because they have chosen to ignore state laws. For having chosen not to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles,
ICCs/IPs cannot now maintain their ownership of lands and domains by insisting on their concept of "native title" thereto. It
would be plain injustice to the majority of Filipinos who have abided by the law and, consequently, deserve equal
opportunity to enjoy the country’s resources.

Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does not grant ownership of public
domains and natural resources to ICCs/IPs. "Rather, it recognizes and mandates respect for the rights of indigenous
peoples over their ancestral lands and domains that had never been lands of the public domain." 16 I say, however, that
such claim finds no legal support. Nowhere in the Constitution is there a provision that exempts such lands and domains
from its coverage. Quite the contrary, it declares that all lands of the public domain and natural resources "are owned by
the State"; and "with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated."

As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,17 the Court declared as belonging to the public domain all lands not acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant under laws, orders or decrees promulgated by the Spanish
government; or by possessory information under Act 496 (Mortgage Law).

On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier et al.18 differentiate the concept of ownership of ICCs/IPs from that which is defined
in Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They maintain that "[t]here are variations among ethnolinguistic groups in the
Cordillera, but a fair synthesis of these refers to ‘x x x the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control x x x, a
collective right to freely use the particular territory x x x [in] the concept of trusteeship.'"

In other words, the "owner" is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that preserves the property for the common
but nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit of its members, without the attributes of alienation or disposition. This
concept, however, still perpetually withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other
citizens of the Republic. The perpetual and exclusive character of private respondents’ claims simply makes them
repugnant to basic fairness and equality.
Private respondents and intervenors trace their "ownership" of ancestral domains and lands to the pre-Spanish conquest.
I should say that, at the time, their claims to such lands and domains was limited to the surfaces thereof since their
ancestors were agriculture-based. This must be the continuing scope of the indigenous groups’ ownership claims: limited
to land, excluding the natural resources found within.

In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use - not ownership - of ancestral domains, then I have no
disagreement. Indeed, consistent with the Constitution is IPRA’s Section 57 19- without the too-broad definitions under
Section 3 (a) and (b) - insofar as it grants them priority rights in harvesting, extracting, developing or exploiting natural
resources within ancestral domains.

The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must fail. Our Constitution vests the
ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the Filipino people. As the protector of the Constitution,
this Court has the sworn duty to uphold the tenets of that Constitution - not to dilute, circumvent or create exceptions to
them.

Cariño v. Insular Government Was Modified by the Constitution

In this connection, I submit that Cariño v. Insular Government20 has been modified or superseded by our 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as referring only to a means by which public agricultural land may be
acquired by citizens. I must also stress that the claim of Petitioner Cariño refers to land ownership only, not to the natural
resources underneath or to the aerial and cosmic space above.

Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals,21 a Decision handed down after our three Constitutions
had taken effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority member's registration of land under CA 141, Section 48 (c). 22 The
reason was that the property fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. This Court quoted with favor the solicitor
general’s following statements:

"3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law involved, as to include even
forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to unconstitutionally apply such provision. For, both the 1973
and present Constitutions do not include timber or forest lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973
Constitution states that ‘with the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of
the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated.’ The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also
expressly states that ‘with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated’."

Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court also stated that "forest land is incapable of registration, and its
inclusion in a title nullifies that title. To be sure, the defense of indefeasiblity of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a
free patent does not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of
a public forest or of a forest reservation, the patent covering forest land being void ab initio."

RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains

The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the natural resources found within
ancestral domains. However, a simple reading of the very wordings of the law belies this statement.

Section 3 (a)24 defines and delineates ancestral domains as "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement x x x. It shall include ancestral lands, forests,
pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise,
hunting grounds x x x bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources x x x." (Emphasis ours.)

Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs encompass the natural resources
found therein. And Section 7 guarantees recognition and protection of their rights of ownership and possession over such
domains.

The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, "holds that ancestral domains are the
ICC’s/IP’s private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed." Simply put, the law declares that ancestral domains, including the natural resources found therein,
are owned by ICCs/IPs and cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. Not only does it vest ownership, as understood under
the Civil Code; it adds perpetual exclusivity. This means that while ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral domains, the
majority of Filipinos who are not indigenous can never own any part thereof.

On the other hand, Section 3 (b)25 of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to "lands occupied, possessed and utilized
by individuals, families and clans of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial x x x, under claims of individual or traditional
group ownership, x x x including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms
and tree lots." Section 8 recognizes and protects "the right of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
lands." Such ownership need not be by virtue of a certificate of title, but simply by possession since time immemorial.

I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, more specifically the
declaration that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals and natural resources – none of which, except
agricultural lands, can be alienated. In several cases, this Court has consistently held that non-agricultural land must first
be reclassified and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes by a positive act of the
government.26 Mere possession or utilization thereof, however long, does not automatically convert them into private
properties.27 The presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Hence, x x x all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in
showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present
competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of
law other than factual evidence of possession and title."28

Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections 3 are merely definitions and should
not be construed independently of the other provisions of the law. But, precisely, a definition is "a statement of the
meaning of a word or word group."29 It determines or settles the nature of the thing or person defined.30 Thus, after
defining a term as encompassing several items, one cannot thereafter say that the same term should be interpreted as
excluding one or more of the enumerated items in its definition. For that would be misleading the people who would be
bound by the law. In other words, since RA 8371 defines ancestral domains as including the natural resources found
therein and further states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means that ICCs/IPs can own natural
resources.

In fact, Intervenors Flavier et al. submit that everything above and below these ancestral domains, with no specific limits,
likewise belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this theory directly contravenes the Constitution. Such outlandish contention
further disregards international law which, by constitutional fiat, has been adopted as part of the law of the land. 31

No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371

Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of alienable public
land, whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than that, but not exceeding 500 hectares, they may hold by lease
only.

RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their mere definitions, they
could cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The properties under the assailed law cover everything held, occupied or
possessed "by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial." It also includes
all "lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by [them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators."

Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as they have used up the
resources of a certain area, they move to another place or go back to one they used to occupy. From year to year, a
growing tribe could occupy and use enormous areas, to which they could claim to have had "traditional access." If
nomadic ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring title to their enlarging ancestral domain or land, several thousands of hectares of
land may yet be additionally delineated as their private property.

Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people's claim to their ancestral land is not based on compounded or consolidated title, but
"on a collective stake to the right to claim what their forefathers secured for them when they first set foot on our
country."32 They trace their right to occupy what they deem to be their ancestral land way back to their ancient sultans and
datus, who had settled in many islands that have become part of Mindanao. This long history of occupation is the basis of
their claim to their ancestral lands.33
Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various ICCs/IPs as ancestral domains; and
over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral lands.34 Based on ethnographic surveys, the solicitor general estimates that
ancestral domains cover 80 percent of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 million hectares of
land in the country.35 This means that four fifths of its natural resources and one third of the country's land will be
concentrated among 12 million Filipinos constituting 110 ICCs,36 while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the
overwhelming majority will have to share the remaining. These figures indicate a violation of the constitutional principle of
a "more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth" among Filipinos.

RA 8371 Abdicates the State Duty to Take Full Control and Supervision of Natural Resources

Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that "[t]he exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." The State may (1) directly undertake such activities;
or (2) enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities, 60 percent
of whose capital is owned by Filipinos.37 Such agreements, however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same
period and under terms and conditions as may be provided by law.

But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar as natural resources
found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and possession, they may develop and
manage the natural resources, benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and the utilization thereof. 38 And
they may exercise such right without any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25
years, renewable for a like period.39 Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize
natural resources must also be limited to such period.

In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources,40 a right vested by the Constitution only in the State. Congress, through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor
of a minority group the State's power of ownership and full control over a substantial part of the national patrimony, in
contravention of our most fundamental law.

I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale utilization of natural resources and
cooperative fish farming, I absolutely have no objection. These undertakings are certainly allowed under the third
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA 8371 – (1) ownership of ancestral lands
and domains and the natural resources therein; and (2) the ICCs/IPs' control of the exploration, development and
utilization of such resources – I believe I should no longer tackle the following collateral issues petitioners have brought
up:

1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains amounts to undue deprivation
of private property

2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants

3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies and other forms of exaction

4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in the settlements of disputes over
their rights and claims

5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) violate
the due process and equal protection clauses

6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces against their will

I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered academic or, at least, no longer of
"transcendental importance," in view of my contention that the two major IPRA propositions are based on unconstitutional
premises. On the other hand, I think that in the case of the last three, it is best to await specific cases filed by those whose
rights may have been injured by specific provisions of RA 8371.

Epilogue
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides:

"SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall
protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well being.

"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining
the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."

Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of ICCs/IPs: (1) the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution and (2) national development policies and programs.

Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society. This does not, however, give
Congress any license to accord them rights that the Constitution withholds from the rest of the Filipino people. I would
concede giving them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of their ancestral lands and domains. 41 But to
grant perpetual ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens
who have chosen to live and abide by our previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also
subversive of the rule of law.

In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively mandating "reverse discrimination."
In seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so at the expense of the majority of the Filipino people. Such short-
sighted and misplaced generosity will spread the roots of discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of turmoil to a
conflagration of national proportions.

Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to coddle the few, however
disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can a just society be approximated by maiming the healthy to place them at
par with the injured. Nor can the nation survive by enclaving its wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored minorities.

Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of opportunities and privileges that are open
to all and by preventing the powerful from exploiting and oppressing them. This is the essence of social justice –
empowering and enabling the poor to be able to compete with the rich and, thus, equally enjoy the blessings of prosperity,
freedom and dignity.

WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and to DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3(a) and (b),
5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and related provisions of RA 8371.

Footnotes

1Kilosbayan v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130, 140, November 16, 1995; Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 365, July 14, 1989; Antonio v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368 (1949).

2Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 46, May 2, 1997; Santiago v. Comelec, 270 SCRA 106, 123-24, March 19,
1997; Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, 60, May 14, 1991.

3 Tanada v. Angara, ibid.

4 §5, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

5 16 CJS §3.

6 16 Am Jur 2d §2.

7 Ibid.

8 §22, Art. II of the Constitution.

9 Abaoag v. Director of Lands, 45 Phil 518 (1923), cited in petitioners' Memorandum.

10Soledad M. Cagampang-de Castro, "The Economic Policies on Natural Resources Under the 1987 Constitution
Revisited," Journal of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Vol. XXV, Nos. 3 & 4 (1999), p. 51.

11In a republican system of government, the concept of jura regalia is stripped of royal overtones; ownership is
vested in the State, instead. (Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 1009-1010.)

12 II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 603, quoted in Bernas, supra, p. 1010.

13 §3, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

14 160 SCRA 228, 239, April 15, 1988.

15 261 SCRA 528, September 9, 1996.

16 NCIP’s Memorandum, p. 24.

17 75 Phil 890, 892, August 31, 1946.

18 Intervenors’ Memorandum, pp. 33 et seq.

19"SEC. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. – The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. x x x."

20 41 Phil 935, February 23, 1909.

21 172 SCRA 455, 463, April 18, 1989, per Gutierrez Jr., J.

22"(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall
be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (As amended by R.A. No. 3872, section 1, approved
June 18, 1964)."

23 284 SCRA 617, 633, January 22, 1998, per Puno, J.

24 "a) Ancestral Domains - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and
cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands
which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or
shifting cultivators."

25"b) Ancestral Lands - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to lands occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to
the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a
consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots."
26 Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development v. Intermediate Appellate Court, March 2, 1993; Director
of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296, December 17, 1990; Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, January 29, 1990.

27 Ibid., Margolles v. Court of Appeals, February 14, 1994; Gordula v. Court of Appeals, supra.

28 Republic v. Sayo, October 31, 1990, per Narvasa, J. (later CJ). See also Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra.

29 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 41.

30 Ibid.

31 §2, Art. II of the Constitution.

32Cecilio R. Laurente, "The King's Hand: The Regalian Doctrine as a Contributing Factor in the Mindanao
Conflict," Human Rights Agenda, Vol. 5, Issue No. 7, July & August 2000, pp. 6-7.

33 Ibid.

34 Solicitor General's Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 651.

35 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

36Ibid. See also Datu Vic Saway, "Indigenous Peoples and the Uplands: A Situationer," Proceedings of the 6th
Upland NGO Consultative Conference, 23-27 August 1998, p. 30.

37 Or (3) in case of large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, enter – through the President
– into "agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance." (Miners
Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr., 240 SCRA 100, January 16, 1995.)

38 §7(b), RA 7381.

39 §57, ibid.

40 §7(b), ibid.

41 As stated earlier, Sec. 57 of IPRA, insofar as it grants them such priority, is constitutional.
Cruz v. Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

Respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed their comment to the petition, in which they
defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated
comment. Sec. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, Ikalahan Indigenous People, the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
Resources, Inc., and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a motion to intervene. The CHR asserts that IPRA is
an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the
rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be
dismissed. Motions granted.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provisions of the IPRA, to wit, Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57 and 58 and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether or not the IPRA violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

RULING

It has been held that the IPRA did not violate the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Ancestral domain
and lands referred to do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.

As defined in Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

The provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands and other natural resources should be
read together with the other provisions thereof which firmly recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples. These, as set
forth hereinbefore, include: Section 22, Article II, providing that the State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and development.

The petition was dismissed.

G.R. No. 135385 Case Digest

G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa

vs National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

Facts:

Petitioners view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples. They argue that IPRA and its implementing rules will amount to an unlawful deprivation
of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources, in violation of
the regalian doctrine of the Constitution.

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral
lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the
ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998,
which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon
the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56,
Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Notes:
 Puno: "When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the
Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land
and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct
sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the
mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfil the constitutional mandate of protecting
the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice
to our indigenous people."

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a
distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of
ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies
who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of
people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial.
They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the
country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains.

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1)
the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising
lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as
a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare.

b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families
and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential
lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, widen farms and tree lots."

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title
over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with
respect to ancestral lands only.

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far
back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.

Article 12

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone,
and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations
may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by
purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of
agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired,
developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of forest lands and national
parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved
and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide for such period as it may determine,
measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.

Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall
protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good.
Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the
right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice
and to intervene when the common good so demands.

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights
Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA
and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants
to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources
in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are
found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands
and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999.]

LEO ECHEGARAY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are public respondents’ Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January
4,1999 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
It is the submission of public respondents that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"(1) The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of
the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;

(2) The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to
litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.

(3) Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be
raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court
had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .

(4) Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . .
the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.

(5) At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the
law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous
crimes.

b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, Et Al., that they are against the repeal of the law;

c. The fact that Senator Roco’s resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel."cralaw
virtua1aw library

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty,
notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representatives on this
matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The
Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressmen.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order . . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty
and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to
stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from
the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court’s jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that
the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various
resolutions and bills filed before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No.
117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The
instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection
Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of
January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa ‘Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry
of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let
alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the
case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking
the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there
should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a
comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court
that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177)
as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act
No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review
and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential,
hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from
enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.’

and that the same has, on November 6, 1998 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.

Manila, Philippines.

Clerk of Court

By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP

Acting Chief

Judicial Records office"

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed
with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing
R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation
informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the
Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that
R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No.
8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by
this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of
its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well
established jurisprudence on this issue as follows: 2

x x x

"the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment,
what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the
court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to
execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment
has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . .
. For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or
impossible. 5

In truth, the argument of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner,
as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 6
viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in
criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court
cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has
been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in
issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to
the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any
event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the
convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be
accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a
well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the
proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement
can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of
the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that
after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the
need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and
there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the question arises as to
whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation
and as to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation."cralaw virtua1aw library

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the most important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the
process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes
and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by
law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained
temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening
events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity
of a law enacted by Congress.

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain
the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in
our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned
jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out
the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent,
necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs
execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be
stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this
Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts
will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution,
the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to
be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its
Section 13, Article VIII provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10 Congress
in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the
Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July
4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In
his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that." . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not
the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12 The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated
the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however,
may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and
the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be Uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."cralaw virtua1aw library

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the
additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule
making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure
in .all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."cralaw virtua1aw library

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power
to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution
took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In
fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the
judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of
execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.chanrobles law library

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the
implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on November
6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice
recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the
Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him" a certified true copy of the Warrant of
Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow
(him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public
when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice
beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada’s Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the instant
Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the
constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people’s right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable
Court to provide the appropriate relief .

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise
of his power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of
Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and
for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully
observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of execution limits the exercise
by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death sentence
shall be carried out ‘without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times."
(Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day
certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such
clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution
and the applicable statute as when the date of execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by the
court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to herein respondent and the public
violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution which read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

SECTION 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

9. The ‘right to information’ provision is self-executing. It supplies ‘the rules by means of which the right to information may
be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the
duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the
people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What
may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which
must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed
by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the
adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150
SCRA ,530, 534-535 [1987]."cralaw virtua1aw library

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his
counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client’s right to due process and the public’s right to
information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner’s motion on the ground
that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed
for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not
a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its
jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of
litigants.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents’ contention that the "decision in this case having become final and
executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . . By granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their
authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress."cralaw virtua1aw library

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is
simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures
after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of
courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final
judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death
convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by
Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death
sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is
the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that
Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such
an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress
of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences
of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the
United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and
their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant
reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an
accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.

III

Third. The Court’s resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it
has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent
Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his
execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for
his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino
Pimentel’s resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been
concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have
publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Raul Roco has also sought the repeal
of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are
demanding review of the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume session on
January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1999
17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner’s Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner’s
motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner’s
allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the
Court’s majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner’s allegations as mere
speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner’s allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely
publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and
has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The
present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the
Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court’s minority felt that petitioner’s allegations lacked clear factual
bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner’s allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from
Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court’s majority did not rush to
judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension
was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress,
unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution
taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of
the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at stake, the Court refused to
constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court’s majority felt it needed the certainty that the
legislature will not change the circumstance of petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable
considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.

The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether
Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior
events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names
these supervening events as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

x x x

"a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law repealing the death penalty involving heinous
crimes.

b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, Et Al., that they are against the repeal of the law;

c. The fact that Senator Roco’s resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel." 18

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629
introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject
any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary
and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representatives on this matter and urging the President to
exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by
113 congressmen as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up to 3 o’clock in the morning,
the House of Representatives with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote.
House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House" does not desire at this time to review Republic Act
7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in view of the
prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court’s TRO should now be lifted as it
has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that" the question of capital punishment has been the subject
of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime and time
when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has
been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right
and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is
healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger
threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us" it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and
particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities."
20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we
can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by
rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be
fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents’ Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January
4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law
and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ.,
concur.

Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold
similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by Regional
Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a temporary restraining
order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to be indications that Congress would re-examine
the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to
reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for
the purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or
recall the imposition of the death penalty.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is further done
except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations. The rule
notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with
established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of lethal
injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of
final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the
execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events
warrant it. 1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to
life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance of Cavite, 2 should be
instructive. Thus —

"This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in
criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court
can not change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according to the classical
phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the
judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial
authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty
and to pardon.

"Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be
accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a
well-known principle that, notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the
proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement
can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of
the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that
after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the
need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its
ministerial duty of ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises
that ought to delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement .
. ."cralaw virtua1aw library

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the President to grant
pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that could benefit the
convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible and may each be
exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court would not prevent
either the President from exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be
advantageous to the adjudged offender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the
duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law
is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General states that as of
the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of
the law imposing death penalty has become nil" If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely 3 re-
examination by Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court feel
rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.

I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate
re-examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second look at the conditions
sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In People v. Masalihit, 4 in urging, with
all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty law, I have said.

"The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the law-making authority, the
Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be
compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous
crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple ‘reimposition’ of the death penalty to offenses
theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term ‘compelling reasons’
would indicate to me that there must first be a marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the statute prescribing the
death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death
penalty. Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the ‘heinous nature’ of the crime and make it so
exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without
necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances of each case. To
venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become ‘heinous’ within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify,
the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party
is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could
somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too
unlikely beyond what might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of
offenders to the great prejudice of victims and society."cralaw virtua1aw library

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove
expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who continue to hold the presently
structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant and
inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents
pertinent thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else, however, must
respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I agree with the Court’s Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain my vote
in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session
which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or amendment, the TRO
should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of the death penalty transcend
the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the
capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the
Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinions in various death cases decided
by the Court, as well as during the Court’s deliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby
attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.

Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift the TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of a law
(or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent.
I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it merely
prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is to be implemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA
7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that the death penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by means of
lethal injection.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the
accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act No. 7659, the law reimposing the
death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original) Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, 3 this
transcendental issue was not brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial
court’s sentence of death. 4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua." (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the
1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion
perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one
(it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the death
penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion
perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction of
an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may no longer be
carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas exclaimed, 6" (t)he majority voted
for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."cralaw virtua1aw library

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the
death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty. This
became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of
Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an
exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in
favor of the people. 8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes but (2)
authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to re-impose it on condition that it
(Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if
"awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

(1) by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and

(2) to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and
of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For
clarity’s sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes; and courts, by their
decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by
amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by
amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It
merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general
terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more severe sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or individually for
each of them.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until
February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the
commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution?
More legally put: In reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very
limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes,
it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous." Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely
selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a
characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only
too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or
"whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses
and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society."cralaw
virtua1aw library

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a heinous
crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases therefor.
It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness can be
determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither
is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does
not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the authoritative
source to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once
the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16 There’s nothing really new that
Congress did which it could not have otherwise done had such provision not been included in our fundamental
law.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery, 17 no new crimes were
introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already so punishable by the Revised Penal
Code 18 and by special laws. In short, Sec. 19, Article III of the Constitution did not have any impact upon the legislative
action. It was effectively ignored by Congress in enacting the capital punishment law.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen.
Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

"So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws which, before
abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty."cralaw virtua1aw library

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior to the
charter’s effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional
Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not have written
Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death
penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is
evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm.
Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on
"organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim." 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say
"murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather
scanty, I believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional
Commission did not have in mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the
heinousness clause requires that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of
perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or

2) even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show
their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or

3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme
violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the
same manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is
prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to determine
"compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659 22
made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should be
remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done
wholesale but must be shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future,
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the return of the
constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to
questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

"MR. LAGMAN:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker?. . .

MR. GARCIA (P.).

The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.

MR. LAGMAN.

So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of
the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that that
is one of the compelling reasons. But before we dissect this particular "compelling reason," may we know what are the
other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.)

Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.

Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.

Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a
compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling
reason should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an organized society governed by law, justice
demands that crime be punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.

MR. LAGMAN.

The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the
reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987
Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense committed, was
not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses being
committed at this time, justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have committed
heinous crimes.

x x x

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice." With all
due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact,
I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police show that the crime
volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between 1987,
the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted.

Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"MR. LAGMAN.

Very good, Mr. Speaker. Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of
murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN.

So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.

That was in 1987. Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.

Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the
abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.

MR. LAGMAN.

Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we know from the distinguished
Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN.

No. Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.).

It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN.

This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery
cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.

Obviously the Gentleman would agree with me, Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in
1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

This is what the statistics say. I understand we are reading now from the same document.

MR. LAGMAN.

Now, going to homicide, the volume in 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or
a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.)

As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman is
misreading the document that I have here.

MR. LAGMAN.

But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.).

The document speaks for itself ."cralaw virtua1aw library

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons arrested in
regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991:25cralaw:red

"Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were
3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and
it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued
a downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991."cralaw virtua1aw library
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition "would
pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or
otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of the death
penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof.

This is a theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent
to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk, expense
and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be argued indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the
academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act
within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it
should — like any other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any exception thereto
meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to
persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that" (n)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its
fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life and
pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death,
emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of
conception 34 and establishes the people’s rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property, for people more than the state, and for life more than
mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the
final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech, assembly and even religion. But the most basic
and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and
expression.

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the poor,
the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance
Group 36 highlights this sad fact:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there
were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7) convicts per month;
double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From January to June 1996, the number of death
penalty convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly average of capital
sentences imposed in 1995.

(2) Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty-one percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while
approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000
monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between
P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000
comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent
(13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five percent (5%)
earning variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.chanrobles
lawlibrary : chanrobles.com

(3) Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the government-mandated minimum
monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn
between P4,500.00 and P11,000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; only one (1) earns P30,000.00
monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not
know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.

(4) In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal
husbandry; of these, thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and
construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding)
while twenty seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of
them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers
(engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security
guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks, (janitors, MERALCO
employee and clerk). About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to the armed
services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee and executives comprise only three
percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.

(5) None of the DRC’s use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly less than
half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano. The
rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a
foreign national and speaks and understands Niponggo.

(6) Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying levels of
elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58)
convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of them graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts
finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all."cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has
militated against the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital
crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required. The best example to show the
sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the
proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free Legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible language.
Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a death
penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense —
unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of
justice.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a
very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving
capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged.
To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and written in a
strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate
penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by
law, it seems to me that there will always be a certain class or classes of people in our society who, by reason of their
poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and
subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are
therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that
perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more
precise, such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent
to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-
poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection
and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of themselves, they can
be empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply
that everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree
if we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this
direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and
disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent,
erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional
firmament.

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its
imposition.

(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitutional right against the death penalty, which is really a species
of the right to life.

(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused
because such a statute denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the
underprivileged.chanrobles.com:cralaw:nad

(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.

(5) Congressional power to prescribe death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

(a) First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt, apart from the elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how these circumstances define or
characterize the crime as "heinous" .

(b) Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of the
Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They must
both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The
compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.

(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each and every
crime, and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.

"Thou shall not kill" is a fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino
people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong,
acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to
"cases of extreme gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 40a
"punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender
except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . .
(which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."cralaw virtua1aw library

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are
pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the state which man
created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment only for
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only for reasons of "absolute
necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden
of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH, as provided for under
RA 7659," and substitute therefor reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in
its text.cha
 CASE DIGEST

BACKGROUND: The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime was all set.
• On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same
day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only
violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of
Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered... that by granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.

RULING:
The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what
the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC
retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may
be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the
rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have
been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law
and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve
which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by
final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a
death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a
state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death
Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like
that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered
as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there
is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect
the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3
branches of the government.

It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time
to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain
the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in
our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned
jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out
the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent,
necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions.

ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

FACTS:

The DOJ, through the Department of Justice, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on the January 4, 1999 issuance
of the Supreme Court of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray.

The DOJ, represented by the Solicitor General, argued that the Court no longer has the authority to grant the TRO
because:

1. That the Court lost its jurisdiction the moment it rendered its judgment that is already final and executory;

2. That it is encroaching on the powers specifically vested by the Supreme Court to the executive department in
granting the TRO;

3. That the purpose sought to be achieved by the TRO is nil due to certain supervening events that transpired.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of
Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered.

RULING:

No, the Court was within its authority when it granted the TRO despite the final and executory judgment having been
rendered already.

1. The Court did not lose its jurisdiction when it granted the TRO. In its decision, it categorically answered the
contention of the plaintiff in such that it is not changing its judgment. The Court is merely suspending its execution
temporarily.

It was emphasized tht the Court, in rendering the judgment lost its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same,
but it retained its power to execute and enforce it. It was further stated that the power to control the execution of
its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction.
 The 1987 Constitution, according to the Court, strengthened and broadened the power of the Court in matters like
these. It gave the Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, i.e. the right to life.

On a final note regarding the first contention of the respondent, the DOJ acknowledged this Court’s jurisdiction
when it filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Compel the trial judge to disclose the Warrant of Execution
containing the date of Echegaray’s execution to the public. The jurisdiction of the Court, it emphasizes, does not
depend on the convenience of the litigants.

2. The respondent’s contention that the issuance of the TRO encroaches on the power of the executive is also
rejected. Section 19 Article VII of the Constitution cannot be interpreted as denying the powers of the Court to
Control the enforcement of their decision after their finality. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve, although it has he same effect.

It must be noted that the powers of the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict does not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.

3. The Court made it a point to clarify the rationale behind the issuance of the TRO. The Court had to decide on the
petitioner’s Very Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO with a mere (5) hours prior to the execution of
Echegaray. They had been placed in a very difficult position because it was such a short period to ascertain the
validity and substance of the allegation contained in the Very Urgent Motion.

They also had no way of checking and verifying with Congress because it was in recess at that time. The Court
took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of the petitioner because of fear that
any error of the Court in not stopping the execution will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the
graveyard.

At the end of the day, the TRO had achieved its purpose. It crystallized the issue on whether the Congeress is disposed to
review capital punishment or not. Supervening events like the (1) pronouncement of then President Estrada that it will
veto any law repealing death penalty; (2) the resolkution of the Congressmen that they are against the repeal of the law;
and (3) that current actions undertaken by Senators Roco and Pimentel are futile.
Effects of Pardon

ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

301 SCRA 96) (1999)

FACTS:

The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions. In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change
the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN
ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it
constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines'
obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by
respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of
Justice to respondent Director. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground. Furthermore,
public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:

“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of
Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered, that by granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an Executive function.

HELD:

NO. The constitutional provision which is the source of the pardoning power of the President cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality; An accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for
the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each
other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various states in the United
States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their
constitutionality has been upheld over-arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his
final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.—
The text and tone of this provision (Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution) will not yield to the interpretation
suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority
for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision,
however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their
finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights
can be claimed in the appropriate courts.

ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE

October 26, 2012 § Leave a Comment

January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)

PARTIES:
Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL

FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same
day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only
violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution
of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered… that by granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.

HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each
other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his
final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

Per Curiam

Facts:

The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to
lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE
METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it
constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines'
obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by
respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of
Justice to respondent Director.

In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law,
and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by
lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the
most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the
power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of
Corrections.

The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with
the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.

The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.

Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a)
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international
treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

Issue:

1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?

2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?

3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?

4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held:

No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.

Ratio:

1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment considering that
(1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to
be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing
rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which
uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or
mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details
involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For
reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and
expertise of administrative officials.

Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and date of execution,
and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which
designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is
entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below
including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the
time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the
last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than
one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and
executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the
death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual
affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection
that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is
concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.

First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of
phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply
cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing
death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.

Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in
the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public
officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.

Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does
not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict,
it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is
to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method
of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.

What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."

2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:

2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty
can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."

The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".

Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The
Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.

3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the
person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further,
"the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient
to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the
administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any
useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a
criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is
sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.

However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be
overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a
manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.

The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has
practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of
Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative
superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of
departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for
being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the
instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be
inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon
any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of
the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or
within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.

While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the
implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the
implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended,
and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended,
which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-
based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain consistent and in
harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE

October 26, 2012 § Leave a comment

January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)

PARTIES:

Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY

Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL

FACTS:

On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same
day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only
violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution
of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered… that by granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.

HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each
other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.

For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his
final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, 1947

ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.

Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio Barredo, and Jose W.
Diokno for petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Tañada, and First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes for respondents.

TUASON, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both
houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto." The
members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the
Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and the petitioners are eight senators, seventeen representatives, and the
presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. The validity of the above-
mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.

The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of the case it is unnecessary to go into the facts
at length. We will mention only the facts essential for the proper understanding of the issues. For this purpose it suffices to
say that three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of
the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946.
The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the
elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been
allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they
had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives,
but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.

As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the questioned
resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is
required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative
votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress.

At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents deny that this Court has
jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some merit in the
petitioners' contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness of an
enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice. This objection, however, is purely academic.
Whatever distinction there is in the juridical sense between the two concepts, in practice and in their operation they boil
down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in that both are founded on the regard which the
judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent departments of the Government. If a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the
judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.

It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the province of the
judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of
powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining
what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents
and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle
with the actions of the political departments of the government.

But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court reported and annotated in 122 A.L.R., 695. The case, by a majority decision delivered by Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes, is authority for the conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable. The Court further held that the
decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the questions of whether an amendment has been
adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the state legislature, is not subject to review by the court.

If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question.
The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the
amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct
parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character
from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent
of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to
safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a
ratification. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has once said:

There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed, or
that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government; because the measure derives all its vital force
from the action of the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an established
form, to a free people, the proposition whether they will change their fundamental law. The means provided for
the exercise of their sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a construction as not to
trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments in its exercise are in derogation of the right of
free government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security against tumult and revolution is the free
and unobstructed privilege to the people of the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed by the
instrument. (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 150.)

Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas, in
Miller vs. Coleman, supra, finds no basis for discriminating between proposal and ratification. From his forceful opinion we
quote the following paragraphs:

The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments. Final
determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is conclusive upon the
 courts." In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However, whether
submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the commands of
the Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department" of questions of a type which this Court has
frequently designated "political." And decision of a "political question" by the "political department" to which the
Constitution has committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of .
. . government." Proclamation under authority of Congress that an amendment has been ratified will carry with it a
solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken place as the Constitution commands. Upon this
assurance a proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its
traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even impliedly
assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over
submission and ratification of amendments, we are unable to agree.

The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is being followed between
submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed
limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly authorized
State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State may reverse its
action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are all consistent only with an intimate
control over the amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the course of amendment by
subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the political
branch of government.

The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as subject to judicial
construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the conclusion
arrived at in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must
die unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior assumption of power to
make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has constitutional power to determine if
there is any such implication in Article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion declares that
Congress has the exclusive power to decide the "political questions" of whether as State whose legislature has
once acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its position, and whether, in the
circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed. No
such division between the political and judicial branches of the government is made by Article 5 which grants
power over the amending of the Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been given
by the Article exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is "political" in its entirely, from
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control
or interference at any point.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three justices subscribed, arrives at the same
conclusion. Though his thesis was the petitioner's lack of standing in court — a point which not having been raised by the
parties herein we will not decide — his reasoning inevitably extends to a consideration of the nature of the legislative
proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that case assailed. From a different angle he sees the matter as political,
saying:

The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130; 66 Law.
ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a voter's right to protect his franchise. The historic source of this doctrine and the
reasons for it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U.S., 436, 540; 71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S. Ct., 446.
That was an action for $5,000 damages against the Judges of Elections for refusing to permit the plaintiff to vote
at a primary election in Texas. In disposing of the objection that the plaintiff had no cause of action because the
subject matter of the suit was political, Mr. Justice Homes thus spoke for the Court: "Of course the petition
concerns political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be
caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two
hundred years, since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld.
Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710, and has been recognized by this Court." "Private damage" is the clue to the
famous ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its scope as well as that of cases in this Court of which it
is the justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is permeated with the conception that a voter's franchise is a
personal right, assessable in money damages, of which the exact amount "is peculiarly appropriate for the
determination of a jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler, 179 U.S., 58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17, and for which
there is no remedy outside the law courts. "Although this matter relates to the parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it is
an injury precedaneous to the parliament, as my Lord Hale said in the case of Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev.,
114, 116; 83 Eng. Reprint, 175. The parliament cannot judge of this injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff for it:
they cannot make him a recompense." (2 Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)
 The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it leave intra-parliamentary controversies
to parliaments and outside the scrutiny of law courts. The procedures for voting in legislative assemblies — who
are members, how and when they should vote, what is the requisite number of votes for different phases of
legislative activity, what votes were cast and how they were counted — surely are matters that not merely
concern political action but are of the very essence of political action, if "political" has any connotation at all.
Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 649, 670, et seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct., 495;
Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are they matters of
"private damage." They pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political representatives executing the
legislative process. To open the law courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold
disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative assemblies. If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White
vindicating the private rights of a voting citizen has not been doubted for over two hundred years, it is equally
significant that for over two hundred years Ashby vs. White has not been sought to be put to purposes like the
present. In seeking redress here these Kansas senators have wholly misconceived the functions of this Court.
The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme Court should therefore be dismissed.

We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles of political jurisprudence and represent
liberal and advanced thought on the working of constitutional and popular government as conceived in the fundamental
law. Taken as persuasive authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of the United States institutions
after which ours are patterned.

But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be presently shown, they are the opinions which
should operate to adjudicate the questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is necessary, at the risk of
unduly lengthening this decision, to make a statement and an analysis of the Coleman vs. Miller case. Fortunately, the
annotation on that case in the American Law Reports, supra, comes to out aid and lightens our labor in this phase of the
controversy.

Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-one
members of the Senate, including twenty senators who had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child Labor
Amendment, and by three members of the House of Representatives, to compel the Secretary of the Senate to erase in
indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Senate and to indorse thereon the words "as
not passed." They sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of Representatives from signing the resolution,
and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor.

The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor Amendment was proposed by Congress in
June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the legislature of Kansad adopted a resolution rejecting it and a copy of the resolution
was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States; that in January, 1927, a new resolution was introduced in the
Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment; that there were forty senators, twenty of whom voted for and twenty
against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the Lieutenant Governor cast his vote in favor of the resolution.

The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set forth prior rejection of the proposed
amendment and alleged that in the period from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment had been rejected by
both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified only in five states, and that by reason of that
rejection and the failure of ratification within a reasonable time, the proposed amendment had lost its vitality.

The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but dismissed the petition on the merits. When the
case reached the Supreme Court of the United States the questions were framed substantially in the following manner:

First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had standing to seek to have the judgment of the
state court reversed; second, whether the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of a tie, as he did, it being the
contention of the petitioners that "in the light of the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the
Senate under the state Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court of the state, the Lieutenant Governor was not a
part of the 'legislature' so that under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, he could be permitted to have a deciding vote on
the ratification of the proposed amendment, when the Senate was equally divided"; and third, the effect of the previous
rejection of the amendment and of the lapse of time after its submission.

The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding the authority of the Lieutenant Governor
to vote, the court avoided, stating: "Whether this contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a question which is
political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally divided and therefore the
court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the third question, the Court reached the conclusion before referred to,
namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a
political question, within the ultimate power of Congress in the exercise of its control and of the promulgation of the
adoption of amendment, and (2) that the decision by Congress, in its control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the
questions whether an amendment to the Federal Constitution has been adopted within a reasonable time, is not subject to
review by the court.

The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed but in the grounds stated in the United
States Supreme Court's decision. The nine justices were aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and
Douglas opined that the petitioners had no personality to bring the petition and that all the questions raised are political
and non-justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that all the questions were justiciable; that the Court had
jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition should have been granted and the decision of the Supreme Court of
Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal to amend had died of old age. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and
Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as political and non-justiciable, passed by the question of the authority of
the Lieutenant Governor to case a deciding vote, on the ground that the Court was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of
the rest of the questions.

The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the one hand and the Chief Justice,
Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the result to be reached,
these two groups were divided. The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, on the one
hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed, on the other, was on the result and on that part of the decision
which declares certain questions political and non-justiciable.

As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four opinions "show interestingly divergent but
confusing positions of the Justices on the issues discussed. "It cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, amusingly
entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the light of the divergencies in the opinions rendered, aptly queries" whether
the proper procedure for the Supreme Court would not have been to reverse the judgment below and direct dismissal of
the suit for want of jurisdiction." It says that these divergencies and line-ups of the justices "leave power to dictate the
result and the grounds upon which the decision should be rested with the four justices who concurred in Mr. Justice
Black's opinion." Referring to the failure of the Court to decide the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor to vote,
the article points out that from the opinions rendered the "equally divided" court would seem under any circumstances to
bean equal division of an odd number of justices, and asks "What really did happen? Did a justice refuse to vote on this
issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make up his mind, or is it possible to saw a justice vertically in half
during the conference and have him walk away whole?" But speaking in a more serious vein, the commentator says that
decision of the issue could not be avoided on grounds of irrelevance, since if the court had jurisdiction of the case,
decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have required reversal of the judgment below regardless of the
disposal of the other issues.

From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be considered as laying down the rule of the
case.

The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute
verity and is binding on the courts. This is the rule prevailing in England. In the United States, "In point of numbers, the
jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con the general principle (of these, two or three have changed from their
original position), two or three adopted a special variety of view (as in Illinois), three or four are not clear, and one or two
have not yet made their decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, 685, footnote.) It is important to bear in mind, in
this connection, that the United States Supreme Court is on the side of those which favor the rule.
(Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854; Field vs. Clark, 36 Law. ed., 294.)

If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to follow the rule.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be
proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided
for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case
of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."

But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.

This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries written with evident vehemence.
Arguments for and against the rule have been extensive and exhaustive. It would be presumptuous on our part to pretend
to add more, even if we could, to what has already been said. Which such vast mass of cases to guide our judgment and
discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent selection and borrowing of materials and arguments under the criterion of
adaptability to a sound public policy.

The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which opposed it are, in our opinion, almost
decisive. Some of these reasons are summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:

SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. — It has been declared that the rule against going behind the enrolled
bill is required by the respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government, and it would be
an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of
which must lead to endless confusion in the administration of the law. The rule is also one of convenience,
because courts could not rely on the published session laws, but would be required to look beyond these to the
journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments which might be found after the
adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills,
authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act
theretofore enforced had never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that these is quite enough
uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an act of the legislature has
become such until the issue has been determined by some court whose decision might not be regarded as
conclusive in an action between the parties.

From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we extract these passages:

I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation, few things would be more
mischievous than the introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for is that the Court should look at
the journals of the Legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the act attested and filed with the Secretary of
State conforms in its contents with the statements of such journals. This proposition means, if it has any legal
value whatever, that, in the event of a material discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled copy, the former
is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the act is to be rejected. This is the test which is to be applied not
only to the statutes now before the Court, but to all statutes; not only to laws which have been recently passed,
but to laws the most ancient. To my mind, nothing can be more certain than that the acceptance of this doctrine
by the Court would unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We have before us some evidence of the little
reliability of these legislative journals. . . . Can any one deny that if the laws of the State are to be tested by a
comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated, the stability of all written law will be shaken to
its very foundations? . . . We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be
apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely too much to say that the
legal existence of almost every legislative act would be at the mercy of all persons having access to these
journals. . . . ([1866], Beasley, C.J., in Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N.J.L., 29, 34.)

But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts, then less than a quorum of each House
may be the aid of corrupt presiding officers imposed laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the
Constitution. It must be admitted that the consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and political
power must of necessity be confided to officers, who being human may violate the trusts reposed in them. This
perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the Judiciary
should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high
places have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not constituted it with faculties to supervise
coordinate departments and correct or prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot authenticate a statute; that
power does not belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative journal. (1869, Frazer, J., in Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind.,
514, 524.)

Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence — considered a classic, and described by one who himself is a noted jurist,
author, and scholar, as "a permanent contribution to American law" and having "put the matured nineteenth-century law in
form to be used in a new era of growth" — unequivocally identifies himself with those who believe in the soundness of the
rule. The distinguished professor, in answer to the argument of Constitutional necessity, i.e., the impossibility of securing
in any other way the enforcement of constitutional restrictions on legislative action, says:

(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as it is urged, the Judiciary are bound to
enforce the constitutional requirements of three readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if therefore an act
must be declared no law which in fact was not read three times or voted upon by two-thirds, this duty is a duty to
determine according to the actual facts of the readings and the votes. Now the journals may not represent the
actual facts. That duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be shown beyond doubt that the facts
were otherwise than therein represented. The duty to uphold a law which in fact was constitutionally voted upon is
 quite as strong as the duty to repudiate an act unconstitutionally voted upon. The Court will be going as far wrong
in repudiating an act based on proper votes falsified in the journal as it will be in upholding an act based on
improper votes falsified in the enrollment. This supposed duty, in short, is to see that the constitutional facts did
exist; and it cannot stop short with the journals. Yet, singularly enough, it is unanimously conceded that an
examination into facts as provable by the testimony of members present is not allowable. If to support that it be
said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and impracticable, then it is answered that this concedes the
supposed constitutional duty not to be inexorable, after all; for if the duty to get at the facts is a real and inevitable
one, it must be a duty to get at them at any cost; and if it is merely a duty that is limited by policy and practical
convenience, then the argument changes into the second one above, namely, how far it is feasible to push the
inquiry with regard to policy and practical convenience; and from this point of view there can be but one answer.

(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is treated thus inconsistently and pushed
only up to a certain point suggests that it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption whose defect is
exposed only by carrying it to its logical consequences. Such indeed seems to be the case. It rests on the
fallacious motion that every constitutional provision is "per se" capable of being enforced through the Judiciary
and must be safeguarded by the Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet there is certainly a large field of
constitutional provision which does not come before the Judiciary for enforcement, and may remain unenforced
without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is not necessary to invoke in illustration such provisions as a clause
requiring the Governor to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature to pass a law for a certain purpose; here the
Constitution may remain unexecuted by the failure of Governor or Legislature to act, and yet the Judiciary cannot
safeguard and enforce the constitutional duty. A clearer illustration may be had by imagining the Constitution to
require the Executive to appoint an officer or to call out the militia whenever to the best of his belief a certain state
of facts exists; suppose he appoints or calls out when in truth he has no such belief; can the Judiciary attempt to
enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his belief? Or suppose the Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to
pass a law upon a certain subject whenever in their belief certain conditions exist; can the Judiciary declare the
law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the Legislature, or its majority, did not have such a belief? Or suppose
the Constitution commands the Judiciary to decide a case only after consulting a soothsayer, and in a given case
the Judiciary do not consult one; what is to be done?

These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of applying and enforcing the
Constitution ceases to operate. That situation exists where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect the
motives and judgment of a particular independent department of government, — Legislature, Executive, and
Judiciary. Such duties are simply beyond enforcement by any other department if the one charged fails to perform
them. The Constitution may provide that no legislator shall take a bribe, but an act would not be treated as void
because the majority had been bribed. So far as the Constitution attempts to lay injunctions in matters leading up
to and motivating the action of a department, injunctions must be left to the conscience of that department to obey
or disobey. Now the act of the Legislature as a whole is for this purpose of the same nature as the vote of a single
legislator. The Constitution may expressly enjoin each legislator not to vote until he has carefully thought over the
matter of legislation; so, too, it may expressly enjoin the whole Legislature not to act finally until it has three times
heard the proposition read aloud. It is for the Legislature alone, in the latter case as well as in the former, to take
notice of this injunction; and it is no more the function of the Judiciary in the one case than in the other to try to
keep the Legislature to its duty:

xxx xxx xxx

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a
second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check
an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and
mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution;
but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 699-702.)

The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case of United
States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued that this Court examined the journal in that case to find out whether or not the
contention of the appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in error.

It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that,
roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the
Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the documents offered
in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed before the Court;
and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have held the copyconclusive proof of the due
enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that the Court expressly stated that it "passed over the question" of whether
the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its passage.

Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court
on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of
a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the
journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such
copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been
noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed
it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators and
representatives who were ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members of Congress
within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.

The petition is dismissed without costs.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BENGZON, J., with whom concurs PADILLA, J., concurring:

Although I maintain that we have jurisdiction as petitioners contend, I can't vote for them, because the enrolled copy of the
resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us.

A. The overwhelming majority of the state courts are of the opinion that the question whether an amendment to the
existing constitution has been duly proposed in the manner required by such constitution properly belongs to the judiciary.
That is the position taken by Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin. (See 12 C. J., 880 and 16C.J.S., 437.) (See also 11
Am. Jur., 639.) Only North Dakota and Oklahoma have adopted a different view. (16 C.J.S., 437, notes 41 and 43.)

"The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has been properly
adopted according to the requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question."
(McConaughy vs. Secretary of State, 106 Minn., 392, 409; 119 N.W., 408.) (12 C.J., 880.)

"An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to determine
the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments. It has been judicially
determined whether a proposed amendment received the constitutional majority of votes. (Knight vs. Shelton, 134
Fed., 423; Rice vs. Palmer, 78 Ark., 432; 96 S. W. 396; Green vs. State Canvassers, 5 Ida., 130; 47 P., 259; 95
Am. S.R., 169; In re Denny, 156 Ind., 104; 59 N.E., 359; 51 L. R. A., 722; Dayton vs. St. Paul, 22 Minn., 400;
Tecumseh Nat. Bank vs. Saunders, 51 Nebr., 801; 71 N.W., 779; Bott vs. Wurts, 63 N.J.L., 289; 43 A., 744, 881;
45 L.R.A., 251; State vs. Foraker, 46 Oh. St., 677; 23 N.E., 491; 6 L.R.A., 422.)" (12 C.J., 880.)
As our constitutional system ("limitation" of powers) is more analogous to state systems than to the Federal theory of
"grant" of powers, it is proper to assume that the members of our Constitutional convention, composed mostly of lawyers,
and even the members of the American Congress that approved the Tydings-McDuffie enabling legislation, contemplated
the adoption of such constitutional practice in this portion of the world. Hence, my conclusion that in Philippine polity,
courts may and should take cognizance of the subject of this controversy.

B. The petitioners' grievance is that, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution (Article XV), the proposed amendment
was not approved "by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives."
They complain that certain Senators and some members of the House of Representatives were not allowed to participate
and were not considered in determining the required three fourths vote.

The respondents, besides denying our power to revised the counting, assert that the persons mentioned, for all practical
purposed did not belong to the Congress of the Philippines on the day the amendment was debated and approved.

Central target of attack is Republic Act No. 73 "to submit to the Filipino people, for approval or disapproval, the
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress of
the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, etc."

Petitioners would have a declaration of invalidity of that piece of legislation. Its first section provides that "the amendment
to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress of the
Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, adopted on September eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty-six, shall be
submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, at a general election which shall be held on March eleven, nineteen
hundred and forty-seven, in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

By this provision, the Legislative Department with the concurrence of the Executive, declares in the most solemn manner
that the resolution proposing the amendment was duly carried. Therefore, it would be pertinent to inquire whether those
petitioners who are members of the Congress that approved Republic Act No. 73 are not precluded from questioning its
validity or veracity, unless they assert and prove that in Congress they opposed its enactment. In default of a contrary
showing, it is not reasonable to suppose that as members of Congress they endorsed-- or at least are bound by — the
declarations of Republic Act No. 73? And if a private party is estopped from challenging the constitutional efficacy of a law
whose enactment he has procured (see 16 C.J.S., 198 and 11 Am. Jur., 767) should not a member of Congress be
estopped from impugning a statute he helped (presumably) to pass? Parenthetically it should be added that the remaining
petitioners, as mere citizens, would probably have no suable claim. (Cf. 16 C.J.S., 169.)

C. But perhaps these points should be left to future study and decision, because the instant litigation may be solved by the
application of other well-established principles founded mainly on the traditional respect which one department of the
Government entertains for the actions of the others.

On account of the separation of powers, which I firmly believe, I agree to the applicability and binding effect of section 313
of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2210, which, in my opinion, has not been abrogated by the Rules of Court. I
likewise believe the soundness of the doctrine expounded by the authoritative Wigmore on a question admittedly within
the domain of the law on evidence: conclusiveness of the enrolled bill of resolution upon the judicial authorities.

D. Withal, should that principle of conclusiveness be denied, the respondents could plausibly fall back on the time-
honored rule that the courts may not go behind the legislative journals to contradict their veracity. (United States vs. Pons,
34 Phil., 729.)

According to the minutes of the joint session Exhibit 3, in the Senate sixteenth (16) senators approved the resolution
against five (5), with no absences; whereas in the house sixty-eight (68) congressmen voted "yes", eighteen(18) voted
"no", one abstained from voting and one was absent. Therefore, 16 being three-fourths of the total membership of twenty-
one of the Senate (16 plus 5), and 68 being more than three-fourths of the total membership of eighty-eight (88) of the
House of Representatives (68 plus 18 plus 1 plus 1), it is crystal clear that the measure was upheld by the number of
votes prescribed by the Constitution.

True, there are in the said exhibit statements by two Senators and one congressman to the effect that the votes did not
constitute the majority required by the Constitution. However, in the fact of the incontestable arithmetical computation
above shown, those protests must be attributed to their erroneous counting of votes; none of them having then asserted
that "there were absent Senators or Congressmen who had not been taken into account. "Ford although we might have
judicial notice of the number of proclaimed members of Congress, still we are no better qualified than the Legislature to
determine the number of its actual membership at any given moment, what with demises or demissions, remotions or
suspensions.

HILADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result of the majority opinion as well as in the grounds supporting the same in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the applicable reasons supporting my concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). But I dissent
from that part of the majority opinion (page 3, ante) wherein it is stated that if the suspended members of the Senate and
House of Representatives had been counted "the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths of vote in either branch of Congress."

The basic theories underlying my aforesaid concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino, supra, are, first, that the questions
therein raised were political in nature within the exclusive province of the legislature, and, second, that the judiciary does
not possess jurisdiction over such questions. It is to me evidence that the questions involved in the present proceeding
are no less political than those involved in that former Senate case. It is deemed unnecessary to dwell at more length
upon the grounds of my said concurring opinion.

The ground for my dissent from the above-quoted statement of the majority opinion in the instant proceeding is that the
suspension of the said members of the Senate and the House of Representatives being a political question, the judiciary,
being without jurisdiction to interfere with the determination thereof by the proper political department of the government,
has perforce to abide by said determination if it were to go any further in the consideration of the case. In other words, any
further discussion of the case in this Court will have to start from the premise that said members have been suspended by
the respective Houses of Congress and that we, being powerless to interfere with the matter of said suspension, must
consider ourselves bound by the determination of said political branches of the government. As said by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Philipps vs. Payne (2 Otto. [U.S.], 130; 23 Law. ed., 649), "in cases involving the action of
the political departments of the government, the judiciary is bound by such action." (Williams vs. Insurance Co., 13 Pet.,
420; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet., 511; Kennel vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 209; Nabob of
Carnatio vs. East Ind. Co., Ves., Jr., 60; Lucer vs. Barbon, 7 How., 1; R.I. vs. Mass., 12 Pet., 714.)

If, then, we are to proceed, as I think we should, upon the premise that said members have been thus suspended, there
will be to my mind, absolutely no justification, ground nor reason for counting them in the determination of whether or not
the required three-fourths vote was attained. Their case was entirely different from that of members who, not having been
suspended nor otherwise disqualified, had the right to vote upon the resolution. In the case of the latter, they had, like all
other members similarly situated, three alternatives, namely, to vote in favor of the resolution, to vote against it, or to
abstain from voting. If they voted in favor, of course, their votes had to be counted amount those supporting the resolution.
If they voted against, of course, their votes had to be counted with those opposing. And if they abstained from voting,
there would be sound justification for counting them as not in favor of the resolution, because by their very abstention they
impliedly but necessarily would signify that they did not favor the resolution, for it is obvious that if they did, they would
have voted in favor of it. On the other hand, those suspended members who, by reason of the suspension, whose validity
or legality we are devoid of jurisdiction to inquire into, cannot be similarly treated. In their case there would be no way of
determining which way their votes would have gone or whether or not they would have abstained from voting. In this
connection, in considering the hypothesis of their voting in case they had not been suspended, I must go upon the
assumption that while those suspended members may belong to the political party which, as a party, was opposed to the
resolution, still they would have voted independently and following their individual convictions. In this connection, it might
not be amiss to mention that there were quite a number of minority members of the legislature who voted for the
resolution. Hence, we are not in a position to say that said suspended members, if they had not been suspended, would
have voted against the resolution, nor in favor of it either, nor that they would have abstained from voting. Why then
should they bed counted with the members who voted against the resolution or those who, having the right to vote,
abstained from doing so? Why should we count them as though we knew that they would have voted against the
resolution, or even that they would have abstained from voting? Soundly construed, I submit that the Constitution does
not, and could not, include suspended members in the determination of the required three-fourths vote.

I take it, that the drafters in providing in Article XV, section 1, of the Constitution that "The Congress in joint session
assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting (emphasis supplied) separately . . .", advisedly used the vital and all-important word "voting"
therein. I take it, that they meant to refer to the members voting, undoubtedly expecting that all members not suspended
or otherwise disqualified, would cast their votes one way or the other. But I am here even making a concession in favor of
the opponents when I say that those who, with the right to vote, abstain from voting, may be counted among those not in
favor of the measure. But what I cannot bring myself to conceive is that the quoted provision should have intended to
count suspended or disqualified members as opposed to the measure, or not being in favor of it, without it being possible
to know which way they would have voted or that they would have abstained from voting — that they would never have
voted in favor of the measure. If I should ask why we should not count such suspended or disqualified members among
those in favor of the measure, I am sure those who opine differently would answer, because we do not know that they
would have voted in favor of it. By the same token, if they should ask me why we should not count them among those
against the measure, I would answer that we do not know that they would have voted against it or that they would have
abstained from voting. All this inevitably leads to the conclusion — the only one possible — that such suspended or
disqualified members should not and cannot be counted due to that very impossibility of knowing which way they would
have voted or whether they would have abstained from voting. I stand for a sound and rational construction of the
constitutional precept.

PARAS, J.:

I fully concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Hilado.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

To surrender or not to surrender, that is the question.

The last bastion of democracy is in danger.

Those who are manning it are summoned to give up without the least resistance, and the banner of the Constitution is
silently and meekly hauled down from its pole to be offered as a booty to the haughty standard bearers of a new brand of
Farcism. In t he words of Cicero, "recedere de statu suae dignitatis."

Cardinal moral bearings have been lost in the psychological chaos suffered by those, throwing overboard all ideals as
burdensome and dangerous ballast, in desperate efforts to attain at all costs individual survival, even in ignominy, could
not stand the impact of initial defeats at the hands of invading fearsome military hordes.

The present is liable to confusion. Our minds are subjected to determinate and indeterminate ideological pressures. Very
often man walks in the darkness of a blind alley obeying the pullings and pushings of hidden and unhidden forces, or the
arcane predeterminations of the genes of human chromosomes. A rudderless ship floating in the middle of an ocean
without any visible shoreline, is bound to be wrecked at the advent of the first typhoon. From early youth we begin to hear
and learn about the true ideals. Since then we set them as the guiding stars in our actions and decisions, but in the long
travel of life, many times the clouds dim or completely darken those stars and then we have only to rely on our faith in
their existence and on habit, becoming unerring if long enough followed, of adjusting our conduct to their guidance in calm
and cloudless nights. We are sitting in judgment to pass upon the conflicts, disputes and disagreements of our fellowmen.
Let us not forget that the day shall come that we will be judged on how are are judging. Posterity shall always have the
final say. When the time solvent has dissolved the human snag, then shall be rendered the final verdict as to whether we
have faced our task fearlessly or whether our hearts have shrunk upon the magnitude of our duties and have chosen the
most comfortable path of retreat. Then it will be conclusively known whether did keep burning the tripod fire in the temples
of old. Some of us will just return into anonymity, covered by the cold mist of historical oblivion; others will have their
names as by words repeatedly pronounced with popular hate or general contempt; and still others will be remembered
with universal gratefulness, love and veneration, the guard on accorded to all those who remained faithful to the
fundamental tenets of justice. Winnowing time will sift the chaff from the grain.

This is one of the cases upon which future generations will decide if this tribunal has the sturdy courage to keep its
responsibility in proper high level. It will need the passing of decades and perhaps centuries before a conclusive verdict is
rendered, whether we should merit the scorn of our fellow citizens and our decision shall be cursed as the Dred Scot
decision of Chief Justice Taney, the one that plunged the United States into civil war, or whether in the heart of each
future Filipino citizen there will be a shrine in which our memory will be remembered with gratefulness, because we have
shown the far-reaching judicial statesmanship of Chief Justice Marshall, the legal genius who fixed and held the rock
bottom foundations which made of the American Constitution the veritable supreme law of the land and established the
role of the tribunals as the ultimate keepers of the Constitution. But for sure it will be rendered, and it will be impartial and
unbiased, exacting and pitiless, with unappealable finality, and for the one condemned Dante wrote this lapidary line:
"lasciate ogni speranza."

Unless the vision of our mental eyes should be shut up by the opaque cornea of stubborn refusal to see reality or should
be impaired by the polaroid visors of prejudice, there is no question that at the time when the resolution in question,
proposing an amendment to the Constitution, was adopted, the members of the Senate were 24 and the members of the
House of Representatives were 96, and that the 16 members of the Senate who voted in favor of the resolution, by
undisputable mathematical computation, do not constituted three-fourths of the 24 members thereof, and the 68 members
of the House of Representatives who voted for the resolution, by equally simple arithmetical operation, do not constitute
three-fourths of the 96 members of the said chamber. The official certifications made by the presiding officers of the two
houses of Congress to the effect that three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and three-fourths of all the members
of the House of Representatives voted for the resolution, being untrue, cannot change the facts. Nothing in existence can.
The certification, being a clear falsification of public document punished by article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000, cannot give reality to a fiction based in a narration of facts that is in
conflict with the absolute metaphysical reality of the events.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioners are citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers and electors, and besides some of them are members of the Senate,
others are members of the House of Representatives, and still others are presidents of political parties, duly registered,
with considerable following in all parts of the Philippines.

The first three respondents are chairman and members, respectively, of the Commission on Elections and the remaining
three are respectively the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of the Bureau of Printing.

Petitioners alleged that the Senate is actually composed of 24 Senators, 8 elected in 1941 and 16 in April 23, 1946, and
that the House of Representatives is composed of 98 members, elected on April 23, 1946, minus 2d who resigned to
assume other positions in the Government.

On September 18, 1946, there was presented for adoption by the Congress of the Philippines a resolution proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto, which reads as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote of
not less than three-fourths of all the Members of each House voting separately. To propose, as they do hereby
propose, the following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto:

ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION

"Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the
foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the
Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant
to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend
beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and
utilization, of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines,
and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all
forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the
same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines."

This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an
election at which it is submitted to the people for the ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

Sixteen Senators voted in favor of the resolution and 5 against it, and 68 Representatives voted in favor and 18 against.

Thereafter, Congress passed Republic Act No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on March 11, 1947, for the purpose of
submitting to the people the proposed amendment embodied in the resolution, and appropriating P1,000,000 for said
purpose.
Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 73 as unconstitutional because Congress may not, by said act, submit to
the people for approval or disapproval the proposed amendment to the Constitution embodied in resolution Exhibit B
inasmuch as, to comply with the express provisions of Article XV of the Constitution, requiring the affirmative votes of
three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, three-fourths of the
24 members of the Senate is constituted by at least 18 Senators, 2 more than those who actually voted for the resolution
in question, and three-fourths of the 98 members of the House of Representatives should at least be 72 Representatives,
or 4 more than those who actually voted for the resolution.

Respondents deny that the Senate is composed of 24 Senators, by excluding from them petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno and Jose E. Romero and allege that the House of Representatives is not composed of 98 members but of only 90.
They admit that at the joint session of Congress to consider the resolution Exhibit B, in favor of the resolution 16 votes
were cast in the Senate and in the House of Representatives 68 and 5 in the Senate and 18 in the House of
Representatives had voted against. They admit the approval of Republic Act No. 73 and that necessary steps to hold the
plebiscite therein provided are being taken, but deny that said act is unconstitutional, and byway of defense, allege that
the resolution Exhibit B was adopted by three-fourths of all the qualified members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately and, consequently, Republic Act No. 73, ordering its submission to the people for
approval or disapproval, fixing a date for a general election, and appropriating public funds for said purpose, is valid and
constitutional.

At the hearing of this case both parties submitted the following stipulation:

The parties through their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate the following facts:

1. That Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero were, by the majority vote of the Commission
on Elections, proclaimed elected senators in the election of April 23, 1946;

2. That when the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, the said senators-elect took part in the election of the
President of that body; but that before the senators-elect were sworn in by the President of the Senate, a
resolution was presented, and subsequently approved, to defer the administration of oath and the seating of
Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, pending the hearing and decision of the protest
lodged against their election;

3. That on the 25th of May, 1946, the said senators individually took their alleged oath of office before notaries
public, and not on the floor, and filed said oaths with the Secretary of the Senate during the noon recess of the
said date;

4. That Messrs. Vera and Romero filed with the Auditor of the Senate other oaths of office accomplished by them
outside of the floor before a notary public and the Secretary of the Senate, on September 5 and August 31, 1946,
respectively; and that their corresponding salaries from April 23, 1946, were paid on August 31, 1946;

5. That Mr. Diokno, having left for the United States, his son Jose W. Diokno filed a copy of Mr. Diokno's alleged
oath of office dated May 25, 1946, with the Auditor of the Senate on October 15,1946, and on said date his salary
was paid corresponding to the period from April 23 to October 15, 1946;

6. That all three have subsequently received their salaries every fifteen days;

7. That since the approval of the resolution deferring their seating and oaths up to the present time, the said
Messrs. Vera, Diokno, and Romero have not been allowed to sit and take part in the deliberations of the Senate
and to vote therein, not do their names appear in the roll of the Senate;

8. That before May 25, 1946, the corresponding provincial boards of canvassers certified as having been elected
in the election held on April 23, 1946, ninety-eight representatives, among them Messrs. Alejo Santos and Jesus
B. Lava for Bulacan, Jose Cando and Constancio P. Padilla for Nueva Ecija, Amado M. Yuson and Luis Taruc for
Pampanga, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental;

9. That the aforesaid eight members-elect of the House of Representatives took part in the election of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives held on May 25, 1946;
10. That before the members-elect of the House of Representatives were sworn in by the Speaker, Mr. Topacio
Nueno, representative for Manila, submitted a resolution to defer the taking of oath and seating of Luis Taruc and
Amado Yuson for Pampanga, Constancio P. Padilla and Jose Cando for Nueva Ecija, Alejandro Simpauco for
Tarlac, Alejo Santos and Jesus Lava for Bulacan, and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental "pending the
hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their election," copy of the resolution being attached to and
made part of this stipulation as Exhibit 1 thereof;

11. That the resolution Exhibit 1 was, upon motion of Representative Escareal and approved by the House,
referred for study to a committee of seven, which up to the present has not reported, as shown by the
Congressional Record for the House of Representatives;

12. That the eight representatives-elect included in the resolution were not shown in on the floor and have not
been so sworn in or allowed to sit up to the present time, nor have they participated in any of the proceedings of
the House of Representatives except during the debate of the Escareal motion referred to in paragraph 11 hereof,
nor cast any vote therein since May 25, 1946, and their names do not appear in the roll of the members of the
House except as shown by the Congressional Record of the House of Representatives, nor in the roll inserted in
the official program for the inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines hereto attached as Exhibit 2 hereof;

13. That the eight representatives-elect above mentioned took their alleged oaths of office on the date set
opposite their names, as follows:

Jose Cando May 25, 1946

Vicente Gustilo May 25, 1946
Constancio Padilla May 22, 1946
Alejo Santos May 23, 1946
Luis M. Taruc May 25, 1946
Amado M. Yuson May 25, 1946
Jesus B. Lava May 25, 1946
Alejandro Simpauco May 25, 1946

all of which oaths were taken before notaries public, with the exception of the first four who took their oaths before
Mr. Narciso Pimentel, Secretary of the House;

14. That said oaths were filed with the Auditor through the office of the Secretary of the House of
Representatives;

15. That the persons mentioned in paragraph 13 were paid salaries for the term beginning April 23, 1946, up to
the present, with the exception of Messrs. Luis Taruc and Jesus Lava, to whom payment was suspended since
August 16;

16. That Messrs. Alejo Santos and Vicente F. Gustilo took their oaths before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and were allowed to sit on September 30, 1946, the last day of the Special Sessions;

17. That in addition to the eight persons above mentioned, two members of the House, Representatives Jose C.
Zulueta and Narciso Ramos, had resigned before the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution was
discussed and passed on September 18,1946;

18. That the voting on the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution was made by the Secretary
calling the roll of each house and the votes cast were as shown in the attached certificate of the Secretary of the
House of Representatives hereto attached, marked Exhibit 3 and made a part hereof; and

19. That the Congressional Records for the Senate and House of Representatives and the alleged oaths of office
are made a part of this Stipulation by reference thereto, respondents reserving the right to question their
materiality and admissibility.

Manila, Philippines, November 25, 1946.

For the petitioners: For the respondents:

 JOSE E. ROMERO ROMAN OZAETA
ANTONIO BARREDO Secretary of Justice

JOSE B.L. REYES

First Asst. Solicitor General

PETITIONER'S PERSONALITY

Whether petitioners have or have not the personality to file the petition in this case is the first question we have to
consider.

No party raised the question, but it having arisen in the course of the Court's deliberation, we should not evade deciding it
and giving what in law and justice should be the answer.

To our mind there is no doubt that petitioners have the personality to institute the present recourse of prohibition. If
petitioners should lack that personality, such legal defect would not certainly have failed to be noticed by respondents
themselves.

Respondents' failure to raise the question indicates their conviction that petitioners have the necessary legal personality to
file the petition, and we do not see any reason why such personality should be put in doubt.

Petitioners are divided into three groups: the first is composed of senators; the second, of representatives; and the third,
of presidents of four political parties.

All of the individuals composing the first two groups, with the exception of Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and
Jose E. Romero, are members of either of the two houses of Congress and took part in the consideration of Resolution
Exhibit B and of Republic Act No. 73, while the above three excepted senators were the ones who were excluded in the
consideration of said resolution and act and were not counted for purposes of determining the three-fourths constitutional
rule in the adoption of the resolution.

In paragraph eight of the petition it is alleged that respondents have taken all the necessary steps for the holding of the
general election on March 11, 1947, and that the carrying out of said acts "constitute an attempt to enforce the resolution
and act aforementioned in open violation of the Constitution," is without or in excess of respondents' jurisdiction and
powers, "violative of the rights of the petitioners who are members of the Congress, and will cause the illegal expenditure
and disbursement of public funds and end in an irreparable injury to the taxpayers and the citizens of the Philippines,
among whom are the petitioners and those represented by them in their capacities mentioned above."

There should not be any question that the petitioners who are either senators or members of the House of
Representatives have direct interest in the legal issues involved in this case as members of the Congress which adopted
the resolution, in open violation of the Constitution, and passed the act intended to make effective such unconstitutional
resolution. Being members of Congress, they are even duty bound to see that the latter act within the bounds of the
Constitution which, as representatives of the people, they should uphold, unless they are to commit a flagrant betrayal of
public trust. They are representatives of the sovereign people and it is their sacred duty to see to it that the fundamental
law embodying the will of the sovereign people is not trampled upon.

The four political parties represented by the third group of petitioners, represent large groups of our population, perhaps
nearly one-half of the latter, and the numerous persons they represent are directly interested and will personally be
affected by the question whether the Constitution should be lightly taken and can easily be violated without any relief and
whether it can be amended by a process openly repugnant to the letter of the Constitution itself.

As a matter of fact, the vital questions raised in this case affect directly each and every one of the citizens and inhabitants
of this country. Whether our Constitution is, as it is supposed to be, a paramount law or just a mere scrap of paper, only
good to be thrown into a waste basket, is a matter of far-reaching importance to the security, property, personal freedom,
life, honor, and interests of the citizens. That vital question will necessarily affect the way of life of the whole people and of
its most unimportant unit. Each and every one of the individuals inhabiting this land of ours shall have to make plans for
the future depending on how the question is finally decided. No one can remain indifferent; otherwise, it will at his peril.

Our conclusion is that petitioners have full legal personality to institute the present action; and much more, those who are
members of Congress have the legal duty to institute it, lest they should betray the trust reposed in them by the electorate.
 24 SENATORS

The first question raised by respondents' answer refers to the actual number of the members of the Senate. According to
petitioners there are 24 of them while according to respondents there are only 21, excluding Senators Jose O. Vera,
Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, because, according to them, "they are not duly qualified and sworn in members of
the Senate."

This allegation appears to be belied by the first seven paragraphs of the stipulation of facts submitted by both parties.

No amount of sophism, of mental gymnastics or logo-daedaly may change the meanings and effects of the words placed
by respondents themselves in said seven paragraphs. No amount of argument may delude anyone into believing that
Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero are not senators notwithstanding their having been proclaimed as elected senators,
their having taken part in the election of the President of the Senate, their having taken their oaths of office, and their
receiving salaries as senators.

Such a paradoxical proposition could have been driven into acceptance in the undeveloped brains of the pithecanthropus
or gigantopithecus of five hundred millennia ago, but it would be unpardonably insulting o the human mind of the twentieth
century.

Our conclusion is that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero should be counted as members of the Senate, without taking
into consideration whatever legal effects the Pendatun resolution may have produced, a question upon which we have
already elaborated in our opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). Suspended or not suspended, they are senators
anyway, and there is no way of ignoring a fact so clear and simple as the presence of the sun at day time. Therefore,
counting said three Senators, there are 24 Senators in all in the present Senate.

96 REPRESENTATIVES

The next question raised by respondents is their denial of petitioners' allegations to the effect that the present House of
Representatives is composed of 98 members and their own allegation to the effect that at present "only 90 members have
qualified, have been fully sworn in, and have taken their seats as such."

Again respondents' allegations are belied by paragraphs eight to seventeen of the stipulation of facts.

The disagreement between the parties is as to whether or not Representatives Cando, Gustilo, Padilla, Santos, Taruc,
Yuson, Lava and Simpauco, mentioned in paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts, are members of the House of
Representatives.

The facts stipulated by the parties proved conclusively that said eight persons are actual members of the House of
Representatives. We may even add that the conclusiveness about said eight representatives is even greater than in the
case of Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero, because no resolution of suspension has ever been adopted by the House
of Representatives against said eight members, who are being deprived of the exercise of some of their official functions
and privileges by the unipersonal, groundless, dictatorial act of the Speaker.

That illegal deprivation, whose counterpart can only be found in countries where the insolence of totalitarian rulers have
replaced all constitutional guarantees and all concepts of decent government, raises again a constitutional question:
whether it is permissible for the Speaker of the House of Representatives to exercise the arbitrary power of depriving
representatives duly elected by the people of their constitutional functions, privileges, and prerogatives. To allow the
existence of such an arbitrary power and to permit its exercise unchecked is to make of democracy a mockery.

The exercise of such an arbitrary power constitutes a want on onslaught against the sovereignty itself of the people, an
onslaught which may cause the people sooner or later to take justice in their own hands. No system of representative
government may subsist if those elected by the people may so easily be silenced or obliterated from the exercise of their
constitutional functions.

From the stipulation of facts, there should not be any question that at the last national election, 98 representatives were
elected and at the time the resolution Exhibit B was adopted on September 18, 1946, 96 of them were actual members of
the House, as two (Representatives Zulueta and Ramos) has resigned.
Applying the three-fourth rule, if there were 24 senators at the time the resolution was adopted; three-fourths of them
should at least be 18 and not the 16 who only voted in favor of the resolution, and if there were 96 representatives, three-
fourths of them should certainly be more than the 68 who voted for the resolution. The necessary consequence is that,
since not three-fourths of the senators and representatives voting separately have voted in favor of the resolution as
required by Article XV of the Constitution, there can be no question that the resolution has not been validly adopted.

We cannot but regret that our brethren, those who have signed or are in agreement with the majority opinion, have
skipped the questions as to the actual membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, notwithstanding the fact
that they are among the first important ones squarely raised by the pleadings of both parties. If they had taken them into
consideration, it would seem clear that their sense of fairness will bring them to the same conclusion we now arrived at, at
least, with respect to the actual membership of the House of Representatives.

Upon our conclusions as to the membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, it appears evident that the
remedy sought for in the petition should be granted.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Without judging respondents' own estimate as to the strength of their own position concerning the questions of the actual
membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, it seems that during the oral and in the written arguments they
have retreated to the theory of conclusiveness of the certification of authenticity made by the presiding officers and
secretaries of both House of Congress as their last redoubt.

The resolution in question begins as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the members of each House voting separately, . . .."

Just because the adoption of the resolution, with the above statement, appears to be certified over the signatures of the
President of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the Secretaries of both Houses, respondents want us to
accept blindly as a fact what is not. They want us to accept unconditionally as a dogma, as absolute as a creed of faith,
what, as we have shown, appears to be a brazen official falsehood.

Our reason revolts against such an unethical proposition.

An intimation or suggestion that we, in the sacred temple of justice, throwing overboard all scruples, in the administration
of justice, could accept as true what we know is not and then perform our official functions upon that voluntary self-
delusion, is too shocking and absurb to be entertained even for a moment. Anyone who keeps the minimum sense of
justice will not fail to feel aghast at the perversion or miscarriage of justice which necessarily will result from the
suggestion.

But the theory is advanced as a basis to attack the jurisdiction of this Court to inquire behind the false certification made
by the presiding officers and the secretaries of the two Houses of Congress.

Respondents rely on the theory of, in the words of the majority opinion, "the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled
bill or resolution."

To avoid repeating the arguments advanced by the parties, we have made part of this opinion, as Appendices A, B, and
C,1 the memoranda presented by both petitioners and respondents, where their attorneys appear to have amply and ably
discussed the question. The perusal of the memoranda will show petitioners' contentions to be standing on stronger
ground and, therefore, we generally agree with their arguments.

In what follows we will try to analyze the positions taken in the majority opinion.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

The majority enunciates the proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the judiciary," except "by
express constitutional or statutory provision" to the contrary. Then argues that "a duly certified law or resolution also binds
the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' out of respect to the political departments."

The doctrine is predicated "on the principle of the separation of powers."

This question of separation of powers is the subject of discussion in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, supra. We deem
unnecessary to repeat what we have already said in our opinion in said case, where we have elaborated on the question.

Although the majority maintains that what they call the doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the
judiciary is "too well-established to need citation of authorities," they recognize the difficulty "in determining what matters
fall under the meaning of political questions."

This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its face value. We do not accept it even as a good doctrine. It is a general
proposition made without a full comprehension of its scope and consequences. No judicial discernment lies behind it.

The confession that the "difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question" shows
conclusively that the so-called doctrine has recklessly been advanced.

This allegedly "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of the confessed difficulty in determining what
matters fall within the designation of political question. The majority itself admits that the term "is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground,
on the courts to meddle with the acts of the political department of the government."

Doctrine is that "what is taught; what is held; put forth as true, and supported by a teacher, a school, or a sect; a principle
or position, or the body of principles, in any branch of knowledge; tenet; dogma; principle of faith. "It is a synonym of
principle, position, opinion, article, maxim, rule, and axiom. in its general sense, doctrine applies to any speculative truth
or working principle, especially as taught to others or recommended to their acceptance. Therefore, to be true, it should
be expressed on simple and self-evident terms. A doctrine in which one of the elemental or nuclear terms is the subject of
an endless debate is a misnomer and paradox.

A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting point for developing new propositions, as a
guiding principle in the solution of many problems. It is a groundwork for the building of an intellectual system. It is the
basis of a more or less complex legal structure. If not the cornerstone, it should at least be one of the main columns of an
architectonic construction. If that groundwork, cornerstone or column is supported by a thing whose existence still remains
in dispute, it is liable to fall.

We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine which is based on the unsettled meaning of political
question. The general proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the judiciary" is just one of the
many numerous general pronouncements made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or uncourageous tribunals to
refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to them.

It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted principle of separation of powers, the handful of sand with which judicial
ostriches blind themselves, as if self-inflicted blindness may solve a problem or may act as a conjuration to drive away a
danger or an evil.

We agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and the process to make it effective, as provided
in Article XV of the Constitution, are matters of political nature, but we cannot agree with their conclusion that a litigation
as to whether said article has been complied with a violated is beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunals, because to arrive at
this conclusion we must accept as a major premise the pseudo-doctrine which we have precisely exposed as erroneous
and false.

Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all questions relating to it, therefore, betaken away
from the courts? Then, what about the constitutional provision conferring the Supreme Court with the power to decide "all
cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or a law?"

COLEMAN versus MILLER

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman vs. Miller (122 A. L. R., 625) is invoked as the mainstay of
the majority position.

No less than eight pages of the majority opinion are occupied by the exposition and analysis of the decision of the
Supreme Court.
The case is invoked as authority for the conclusion that "the efficacy of ratification by the State legislature of a proposed
amendment to the federal Constitution" and that "the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State of the
questions of whether an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the State
legislature," are political questions and not justiciable.

At the outset it must be noted that the two above mentioned questions have no similarity or analogy with the constitutional
questions herein discussed. The questions as to the efficacy of the ratification by the Senate of Kansas of the Child Labor
amendment proposed by the United States Congress in June, 1924, and upon the decision of said Congress, "in its
control of the Secretary of State," whether the amendment has been adopted "within a reasonable time from the date of
submission to the State legislature," either one of them does not raise a controversy of violation of specific provisions of
the Constitution as the ones raised in the present case.

No specific constitutional provision has been mentioned to have been violated because in January, 1925, the Legislature
of Kansas rejected the amendment, a copy of the rejection having been sent to the Secretary of State of the United
States, and in January, 1927, a new resolution ratifying the amendment was adopted by the Senate of Kansas on a 21-20
division, the Lieutenant Governor casting the deciding vote. Neither was there such mention of constitutional violation as
to the effect of the previous rejection and of the lapse of time after submission of the amendment to the State legislature.

No constitutional provision has been pointed out to have been violated because the Lieutenant Governor had cast his vote
or because by the lapse of time from June, 1924 to March, 1927, the proposed amendment had allegedly lost its vitality.

It is only natural that, in the absence of a constitutional provision upon the efficacy of ratification by a State legislature of a
proposed amendment, it was within the ultimate power of the United States Congress to decide the question, in its
decision rendered in the exercise of its constitutional power, to control the action of the Secretary of State, and the
promulgation of the adoption of amendment could not be controlled by the courts.

Evidently, the invoked authority has no bearing at all with the matters in controversy in the present case.

We note, as observed in the majority opinion, that the four opinions in Coleman vs. Miller, according to the American Law
Reports, show "interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the justices," and are the subject of an amusing article in
48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," asking how it happened that the nine-member United
States Supreme Court could not reach a decision on the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor of Kansas to
cast his vote, because the odd number of justices was "equally divided."

How such a "confusing" and "amusing" four-opinion decision in Coleman vs. Miller could be an authority is beyond our
comprehension.

GREEN versus WELLER

One of the authorities upon which the majority relies is the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court in Green vs. Miller
(32 Miss., 650), quoting one paragraph thereof.

Here again we have a case of inapplicable authority, unless taken in its reversed effect.

The Mississippi Supreme Court maintains that there is nothing in the nature of the submission to the people of a proposal
to amend the Constitution which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed or that could render it dangerous to
the stability of the government, but in making this pronouncement, it assumes that the submission is made "in a
established form," adding that the means provided for the exercise by the people of their sovereign right of changing the
fundamental law should receive such a construction as not to trample upon the exercise of their right, and that the best
security against tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of the state to change their
Constitution "in the mode prescribed by the instrument."

So the authority, if clearly interpreted, will lead us to the conclusion that the majority position is wrong because the
Mississippi Supreme Court, in making the pronouncement, upon the assumption that the submission to the people is
made "in a established form" and "in the mode prescribed" by the Constitution, namely, in accordance with the provisions
of the instrument, the pronouncements would be the opposite if, as in the present case, the submission of the proposal of
amendment to the people is made through a process flagrantly violative of the Constitution, aggravated by wanton
falsification of public records and tyrannical trampling of the constitutional prerogatives of duly elected representatives of
the people.
 MR. JUSTICE BLACK

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined in by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
Douglas, in the "confusing" and "amusing" decision in Coleman vs. Miller, is also invoked by the majority, but this other
authority seems equally reluctant to offer its helping hand to a helpless, desperate position.

The major premise of the concurring opinion is as follows: "The Constitution granted Congress exclusive power to control
submission of constitutional amendments."

Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited, unchecked, omnipotent power is granted by our fundamental law to
the Congress of the Philippines. Our Congress may propose amendments or call a convention to make the proposal, but
that is all. Nowhere in the Constitution can be found any word, any grammatical sign, not even the faintest hint that in
submitting the proposed amendments to the people, Congress shall have "exclusive power to control the submission."
That submission must be provided by law, and no law may be enacted and come into effect by the exclusive power of
Congress. It needs the concurring action of the President of the Philippines. And if the law happens to violate the
fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. After the law is enacted, its execution devolves
upon the Executive Department. As a matter of fact, it is the Executive Department which actually submits to the people
the proposed amendment. Congress fixes the date of submission, but the President of the Philippines may refuse to
submit it in the day fixed by law if war, rebellion, or insurrection prevents a plebiscite from proceeding.

After showing that Mr. Justice Black started his argument from a major premise not obtainable in the Philippines, his
conclusions cannot help the majority in anyway.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the "confusing" and "amusing" case of Coleman vs. Miller is the next
authority invoked by the majority, but the opinion does not offered much help. The justice maintains that the proceedings
for voting in legislative assemblies "are matters that concern not merely political actions but are also of the very essence
of political action," and then advances the following argument: "To open the law-courts to such controversies is to have
courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative assemblies."

The argument has no weight at all. The argument merely displays an attitude, one of simple distaste for the idea, but fails
to give any sensible reason for the attitude. Ina totalitarian regime, where decisions are rendered not in answer to the
promptings of a sense of justice, but as expressions of moods, caprices and whims of arbitrary rulers, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's attitude could be taken as the law, but then it would be necessary to elevate him first to the category of
a fuehrer.

In our jurisdiction personal attitudes are not the law. Here, justice must be founded on reason, but never on passing
unreasoned moods, judicial or otherwise.

We regret that we cannot agree with the majority's sharing Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views, which in their judgment are in
accord "with sound principles of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought on the workings of
constitutional and popular government. "Our regret is not for ourselves alone but for those who happen to accept as
authority the unreasoned and unexplained mental attitude of a judicial officer of a foreign country, praising it even with the
much-abused label as "liberal," notwithstanding the fact that it represents the whimsical rule of personal attitudes and not
the rule of well-matured reason.

THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY

This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of the parties attached hereto as Appendices A, B, and C. Although we
consider it unnecessary to enlarge the discussion, we deem it convenient to make a little analysis of what is stated in the
majority opinion. Respondents contend, with the full approval of the majority, that a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.

The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of the theory. How can we accept the absolute verity of the
presiding officers' certification that the resolution in question has been adopted by three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives, when as a matter of undisputable fact the certification is false? How can we
accept a theory which elevates a false-hood to the category of truth?
The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing in England. Because the English have committed the nonsense of
accepting the theory, is that reason for Filipinos to follow suit? Why, in the administration of justice, should our tribunals
not think independently? Our temple of justice is not presided by simians trained in the art of imitation but by human
beings, and human beings must act according to reason, never just to imitate what is wrong, although such mistakes may
happen to be consecrated as a judicial precedent. It would be inconceivable for our courts to commit such a blunder.

Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 685, footnote), the majority states that in the United States
the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con on the theory, although in petitioners' memorandum Appendix A
there appears more up-to-date evidence to the effect that there is a great majority for the rejection. But to our mind, mere
numbers as to pro and con seem to us immaterial in the decision as to whether the theory is or is not correct. Numbers do
not make reason nor justice.

The majority contends that the theory conforms to the express policy of our law-making body, invoking to said effect the
now obsolete section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210.

Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of deciding issues upon the authority of laws which have been
repealed or abolished, still the evidence pointed out by the majority does not support their contention. Section 313 alluded
to enumerates the evidence that may prove the procedures of the defunct Philippine Commission or of any legislative
body that may be provided for in the Philippines, with the proviso that the existence of a copy of acts of said commission
or the Philippine Legislature, signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, is a conclusive proof "of the
provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof."

This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court. Sections 5 and 41 of Rule 123 show
conclusively that this Supreme Court, in making the rules effective since July 1, 1940, rejected the proviso as
unreasonable and unjust. Section 5 provides that we may take judicial notice of the official acts of Congress and section
41 provides what evidence can be used to prove said official acts, but nowhere in the rules can a provision be found that
would make conclusive a certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both House of Congress even if we know
by conclusive evidence that the certification is false.

The allegation that the theory in question conforms to the express policy of our lawmaking body, upon the very evidence
used in support thereof, after a little analysis, has to banish as a mid-summer night's dream.

50 AMERICAN JURISDICTION, SECTION 150

In support of the theory of conclusiveness of the enrollment, the authority of 50 American Jurisprudence, 150 is invoked
as reasons for the theory.

We will analyze the reasons adduced:

1. Respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government. This must be the strongest one, when it is
first mentioned. It is so flimsy to require much discussion. Shall we sacrifice truth and justice for the sake of a social
courtesy, the mutual respect that must be shown between different departments of the government? Has our sense of
evaluation of spiritual values become so perverted that we can make such a blunder in our choice? Since when have the
social or official amenities become of paramount value to the extent of overshadowing the principles of truth and justice?

2. Because without the theory, courts would have to make "a n inquisition into the conduct of the members of the
legislature, a very delicate power." This second reason is premised not on a democratic attitude, but rather on a Fascistic
one. It is premised on the false belief that the members of the majority are a king of emperos of Japan, to be worshipped
but never to be discussed. The ideology depicted by the second reason should be relegated to where it belongs: the
archeological museum.

3. "The rule is also one of convenience." This reason again shows a perverted evaluation of human values. Is justice to be
sacrificed for the sake of convenience?

4. "Otherwise after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills authenticated as executed by the Constitution,
for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act heretofore enforced had never become a law." This last
reason personifies unreasonableness to the nth degree. So we leave it as it is, as a perpetual evidence of the extent to
which legal stupidity may reach.
 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE

Now let us examine the arguments of the next authority invoked by the majority, Wigmore on Evidence. We will also
analyzed the arguments relied upon.

1. That to go beyond the enrolled bill "would unsettle the entire statute law of the State." This argument, as it appears
quoted in the majority decision, is premised on the unreliability of legislative journals, and it seems to depict a mind
poisoned by prejudice, as shown by the following: "We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a
doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely too much to say
that the legal existence of almost every legislative action would be at the mercy of all persons having access to these
journals. . . ."

The argument should be taken into consideration in connection with American experience, which seems not to be too
flattering to our former metropolis.

Our own personal experience of more than a decade in legislative processes convinces us that Wigmore's assumption
does not obtain in the Philippines. It is true that in the pre-constitution legislative enactments we have seen few instances
in which there had been disagreement between what has actually been passed, as shown by the journal, and the
authenticated enrolled bill. But the instances were so few to justify entertaining here the same fears entertained by
Wigmore in America. Although those instances were few, we fought to correct the evil in the Constitutional Convention,
where we were able to introduce the following revolutionary provision in the Constitution: "No bill shall be passed by either
House unless it shall be printed and copies thereof in their final from furnished each member at least three calendar days
prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the
last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the journal." (Section 21 [2], Article VI of the Constitution.)

This provision is an effective guarantee against the situation depicted by Wigmore's fears.

2. To the argument that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the courts, then less than a quorum of each House
may by the aid of presiding officers impose laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution, Wigmore
answers: "This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the
judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high
places have not been disgraced."

The answer is unconvincing. Because there can be and there have been blundering, disgraceful, or corrupt judicial
officers is no reason why arbitrary presiding officers and members of the legislature should be allowed to have their way
unchecked. Precisely the system of checks and balances established by the Constitution presupposes the possibility of
error and corruption in any department of government and the system is established to put a check on them.

When the question of an unconstitutional, arbitrary or corrupt action by the legislature is placed at the bar of justice, the
judiciary must not shrink from its duty. If there is corruption in the judiciary, our laws provide the proper remedy. Even we,
the members of the highest tribunal, cannot with impunity commit "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
or other high crimes" without being liable to be removed from office on impeachment, and we hope, if there is such a
case, that the House of Representatives and the Senate will do their duty in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution,
and not follow the uncourageous example which is given under the intellectual tutelage of Wigmore.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL NUMERICAL RULES

The three-fourth rule has been provided in Article XV of the Constitution as a guarantee against the adoption of
amendments to the fundamental law by mere majorities.

The Constitution must be accorded more stability than ordinary laws and if any change is to be introduced in it, it must be
in answer to a pressing public need so powerful as to sway the will of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives. Said three-fourth rule has been adopted by the Constitutional Convention, as all the
other numerical rules, with the purpose of avoiding any doubt that it must be complied with mathematical precision, with
the same certainty of all numbers and fractions expressed or expressible in arithmetical figures.

Where the Constitution says three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, it means an exact number, not susceptible of any more or less. All the members means that no single member
should be excluded in the counting. It means not excluding three Senators and eight Representatives as respondents
want us to do in order not to cause any inconvenience to the presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses of
Congress who had the boldness of certifying that the three-fourth rule had been complied within the adoption of the
resolution in question, when such a certification is as false as any falsehood can be.

The three-fourth rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary majorities, otherwise it would be the death knell of
constitutionalism in our country. If a constitutional provision can be so trifled with, as has happened in the adoption of the
resolution in question, it would mean breaking faith with the vitality of a government of laws, to enthrone in its stead a
whimsical government of men.

The Constitution contains several numerical provisions. It requires that the Senate shall be composed of 24 Senators
(section 2, Article VI); that Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise (section 5, Article VI); that each House may expel a member with the concurrence of two-
third of all the members (section 10 [3], Article VI); that electoral tribunals shall each be composed of nine members, three
Justices of the Supreme Court and six legislature members (section 11, Article VI); that to overrun the veto of the
President, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House is necessary (section 20 [1], Article VI), and in
certain cases the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of each House is necessary (section 20 [2], Article VI);
that Congress shall, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House, have the sole power to declare
war (section 25, Article VI); that no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the members of the Supreme Court (section 10, Article VIII); that the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment by a vote of two-thirds of all its members (section 2, Article IX); and that the Senate shall have the
sole power to try all impeachments, but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate (section 3, Article IX).

So it can be seen that the numerical rules inserted in the Constitution affect matters not of momentary but of momentous
importance. Each and every one of them should be given effect with religious scruple, not only because our loyalty to the
sovereign people so requires, but also because by inserting them the Constitutional Convention had abided by the wise
teachings of experience.

By denying the petition and allowing those responsible for the unconstitutional adoption of the resolution in question to
have their way is to set up a precedent that eventually may lead to the supremacy of an empire of lawlessness. It will be
tantamount to opening Pandora's box of evils and disasters.

The power to declare was can only be exercised by Congress with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of
each House. From now on, by the simple expediency of certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both
Houses that two-thirds had voted where a bare majority had voted in fact, said majority may plunge our people into a
maelstrome of war.

The Constitution provides that the power of impeachment needs the vote of two-thirds of all the members of the House of
Representatives. From now on, a mere plurality of one will be enough to put impeachable high officials, including the
President, on the carpet.

To convict an impeached officer the fundamental law requires the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate. From now on, that three-fourth rule may be dispensed with or circumvented by not counting three actual
Senators, as has been done in the resolution in question, and thereby oust the President of the Philippines if he happens
not to be in the good graces of a senatorial majority.

Without entering into the merits of the proposed constitutional amendment, to submit which to the people high-handed
means have been resorted to, there can be no question that it is of vital importance to the people and it will affect future
generations to unimaginable extent. The Constitutional Convention had thought it wise that before such a momentous
proposal could be submitted to the people the three-fourth rule should be adhered to by Congress.

QUOTATION FROM THE JALANDONI CASE

Months ago we stated: "It is high time to sound the clarion call that will summon all the forces of liberalism to wage a
crusade for human freedom. They should put on the armor of righteousness and rally behind the banner for the
vindication of the principles and guarantees embodied in the Constitution and the high purposes of the Chapter of the
United Nations." This, we said in our dissenting opinion in People vs. Jalandoni, L-777. Concerning the judgment that the
future may pass upon the actuations of the Supreme Court, in that same opinion we ventured that the historian army,
under the heading of "Epoch of Great Reaction," write as follows:
 At no epoch of its history has the Supreme Court shown to be most reactionary and retrogressive. When the
victims of a constitutional violation, perpetrated by a group of the highest officials of the government, came to if for
redress, it adopted a hands-off policy, showing lack of the necessary vitality to grapple with the situation and
finding refuge in a comfortable retreat, completely disappointing those who have pinned their faith and hope in it
as the first pillar of the Constitution and the inexpugnable bulwark of human fundamental rights. The issue of
human freedom was disposed of by them most discouragingly by nullifying the right of an accused to be free on
bail on appeal, in flagrant violation of a constitutional guarantee and of one of the fundamental purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Upon touching the decision of this Court in the instant case, the same historian may record that the highest tribunal of the
new Republic of the Philippines has struck the hardest blow to the Philippine constitutional system, by refusing to do its
duty in giving redress in a clear case of violation of the fundamental law, to the great disappointment, despair and
apallment of millions of souls all over the world who are pinning their hopes on constitutionalism for the survival of
humanity.

The ideal of one world oftenly enunciated by progressive leaders in the deliberations of the several organs of the United
Nations is predicated in the adoption of a single standard of laws, compulsory within all jurisdictions of our planet. The
ethology of all mankind must be shaped under the pattern of that single legal standard. But the whole system is liable to
crash if it is not founded on the rock bed of the elemental principle that the majesty of the law must always be held
supreme.

To keep inviolate this primary principle it is necessary that some of the existing social organs, moral attitudes and habits
of thinking should undergo reforms and overhauling, and many fixed traditional ideas should be discarded to be replaced
with more progressive ones and inconsonance with truth and reason. Among these ideas are the wrong ones which are
used as premises for the majority opinion in this case.

The role of innovators and reformers is hard and often thankless, but innovation and reform should continuously be
undertaken if death by stagnation is to be avoided. New truths must be discovered and new ideas created. New formulas
must be devised and invented, and those outworn discarded. Good and useful traditions must be preserved, but those
hampering the progressive evolution of cultured should be stored in the museum of memory. The past and the present are
just stepping stones for the fulfilment of the promises of the future.

Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, physical science had progressed by leaps and bounds. Polonium and
radium were discovered by Madam Curie, Rontgen discovered the X-ray, and Rutherford the alpha, beta and gamma
particles. Atom ceased to be the smallest unit of matter to become an under-microscopic planetarian system of neutrons,
protons, and electrons.

Ion exchangers are utilized to make of electrons veritable lamps of Aladdin. Plants are grown in plain water, without any
soil, but only with anions and cations. Sawdust has ceased to be a waste matter, and from it is produced wood sugar,
weighing one-half of the sawdust processed. Inter-stellar space vacuum, almost absolute, is being achieved to serve ends
that contribute to human welfare. Bacteria and other microbes are harnessed to serve useful human purposes.
The aspergillus niger is made to manufacture the acetic to produce vinegar for the asking. The penicillum notatum and
the bacillus brevis are made to produce penicillin and tyrothricin, two wonder drugs that are saving many lives from
formerly lethal infections. DDT decimates harmful insects, thus checking effectively malaria, an illness that used to claim
more than one million victims a year in the world. The creation of synthetics had enriched the material treasures offered to
man by nature. Means of transportation are developed to achieve supersonic speeds. Many scientific dreams are fast
becoming marvelous realities. Thus, science marches on. There is no reason why the administration of justice should not
progress onward, synchronized with the rhythm of general human advancement towards a better future.

The fact that the majorities of the two chambers of Congress have without any qualm violated Article XV of the
Constitution and the majority of this Court, instead of granting the proper relief provided by law, preferred to adopt the
comfortable attitude of indifferent by-standers, creates a situation that seems to be ogling for more violations of the
fundamental law. The final results no one is in a position to foresee.

Our vote is for the granting of the petition.

BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., disidente:

Por segunda vez en menos de un año nos Ilaman a decidiry arbitrar sobre una violacion de la Constitucion — elcodigo
fundamental de nuestro pais. A media dos del año pasado se trataba del recurso interpuesto ante esta misma Corte
Suprema por tres Senadores1 que se quejaban dehaber sido privados injusta y arbitrariamente de su derecho a sentarse
en el Senado de Filipinas y a particular y votar en sus deliberaciones, con grave infraccion y detrimento de la Constitucion
que ampara tal derecho. Ahora esos mismos Senadores acuden de nuevo a esta Corte para quejarse de otra violacion
de la Constitucion, pero estavez no vienen solos: les acompañan otros cinco miembros del Senado, diecisiete miembros
de la Camarra de Representantes y tres jefes de aagrupaciones o partidos politicos — Democratic Alliance, Popular Front
y Philippine Youth Party. Jose O. Vera es recurrente en su doble capacidad de miembro del Senado y Presidente del
Partido Nacionalista. De modo que los recurrentes suman veintiocho: 8Senadores, 17 Representantes y 3 particulares.2
Tienenun comun denominador, a saber: que son todos ciudadanos de Filipinas, y, ademas, contribuyentes y electores.

Los recurridos son el Presidente y miembros de la Comision de Elecciones, el Tesorero de Filipinas, el Auditor General y
el Director del Buro de Imprenta.3

El objeto del recurso es recabar de esta Corte un mandamiento de prohibicion dirigigo a los recurridos para que estos,
sus agentes, empleados, subordinados y otras personas que actuen bajo su superintendencia o en su nombre "se
abstengan y desistan de dar los pasos tendentes haciala celebracion de un plebiscito e eleccion general el 11 de Marzo,
1947, y de imprimir la resolucion (sobre reformade los articulos 13.º y 14.º de la Constitucion), las balotas y otros papeles
necesarios en relacion con dicho plebiscito,y de desembolsar o de autorizar el expendio de fondos publicos para dicho
proposito."

Para la mejor comprension del asunto estimo necesariopublicar integro a continuacion el texto de la Resolucion conjunta
que contiene la propuesta reforma a la Constitucion, resolucion que constituye la materia u objeto de la consulta popular
en el referido plebiscito de 11 de Marzo, y es la misma que en el lexico corriente de la prensa y del publico se conoce por
resolucion sobre paridad o igualdad de derecdhos constitucionales a favor de los americanos, esdecir, que concede a
estos iguales derechos que a los filipinosen la propiedad y cultivo de terrenos publicos, en la explotacion de nuestros
recursos naturales como bosques,minas, pesca y fuerza hidraulica, y en la propiedad y operacion de utilidades publicas.
He aqui su texto:

RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT

TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO BE APPENDED AS AN ORDINANCE THERETO.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote of
not less than three-fourths of all the Members of each House voting separately, to propose, as they do hereby
propose, the following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto;

ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION

Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the
foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the
Philippines with the President of the United States on the Fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forth-six, pursuant
to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend
beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and
utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and
the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all
forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the
same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporation or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.

This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an
election at which it is submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) JOSE AVELINO

President of the Senate
 (Sgd.) EUGENIO PEREZ
Speaker of the House of Representatives

We hereby certify that the foregoing Resolution was adopted by both Houses in joint session assembled in the
Hall of the House of Representatives on September 18, 1946.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO ZACARIAS

Secretary of the Senate

(Sgd.) NARCISO PIMENTEL

Secretary of the House of Representatives

Para comprobar la voluntad popular sobre la reforma constitucional propuesta el Congreso de Filipinas ha aprobadola
Ley No. 73 de la Republica que dispone y ordena la celebracion de un plebiscito para el 11 de Marzo de esteano, provee
a la forma de celebrarlo y consigna el presupuesto necesario para sufragar los gastos del mismo. Siuna mayoria de los
electores votare afirmativamente, la reformaquedara ratificada y estara en vigor por un periodo de 28 años; en caso
contrario, quedara rechazada.

Los recurrentes alegan y sostiened que la resolucion conjuntade que se trate es ilegal y nula por no haberse
aprobadocon los votos de las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) del Congreso, conforme a lo provisto en el Articulo XV de la
Constitucion, a saber:

SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or
call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.

Se alega que cuando se considero y aprobo la citada Resolucion conjunta el Senado se componia actualmente de 24
miembros, es decir, el numero exacto fijado en la Constitucion, y la Camara de Representantes de 96 miembros, es
decir, dos menos que el numero señalado en la Constitucion, pues does dimitieron despues de las elecciones, uno para
aceptar un cargo en el ramo ejecutivo del gobierno y otro para aceptar un nombramiento en el servicio diplomatico. Sin
embargo, segun la demanda de los recurrentes, en el Senado solo se permitio votar a 21 miembros, excluyen dose de
las deliberaciones y votacionfina l de la Resolucion a tres miembros, a saber; los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero. De
los referidos 21 miembros, votaron a favor de la Resolucion 16 y en contra 5; asi que — arguyen los recurrentes — la
Resolucion no quedo aprobada, por parte del Senado, con el numero constitucionalde tres cuartas-partes (3/4) de los
miembros, elcual debia ser 18.

En la Camara de Representantes, segun los recurrentes, solo se permitio votar a 88 miembros, excluyen dose de las
deliberaciones y votacion final de la resolucion a 8 miembros, a saber: Representantes Alejo Santos y Jesus B. Lava, de
Bulacan; Reps. Jose Cando y Constancio P. Padilla, de Nueva Ecija; Reps. Amado M. Yuson y Luis Taruc, de
Pampanga; Rep. Alejandro Simpauco, de Tarlac; y Rep. Vicente F. Gustilo, de Negros Occidental. De los referidos 88
miembros votaron a favor de la Resolucion solo 68; asi que — arguyen los recurrentas — la Resolucion tampoco quedo
aprobada, por parte de la Camara, con el numero constitucional de tres cuartas-partes (3/4) partes de sus miembros, el
cual debia ser 72, por lo menos, y no 68, aun dando por descontados los dos miembros que despues de las elecciones
aceptaron cargos en otros ramosdel gobierno.

Siendo inconstitucional y nula la Resolucion basica deque se trata, consiguientemente los recurrentes tachantambien de
inconstitucional e invalida la referida Ley de la Republica No. 73 que convoca una eleccion general o plebiscito para el 11
de Marzo de 1947 a fin de someter alpueblo para su ratificacion o repudio la enmienda constitucional propuesta, y que
consigna la suma de P1,000,000 para los gastos en que se hubiere de incurrir con motivo dela celebracion de dicho
plebiscito, entre habilitacion deprecintos electorales, pago de dietas de los inspectores y costo de la a impresion,
publicacion, fijacion y distribucion gratuita de copias de la propuesta enmienda en ingles, español y otros dialectos del
pais.

Los recurridos, despues de admitir ciertas alegacioneses enciales de la demanda y negar otras, plantean las siguientes
defensas especiales:
Primera defensa especial: que una ley o resolucion impresa (enrolled Act or Resolution) de ambas Camaras del
Congreso, adverada o autenticada con las firmas de los Presidentes de dichas Camaras, es prueba concluyente deque la
misma fue aprobada por el Congreso; que, en virtud del respeto que se debe a un ramo igual y coordinado del gobierno,
no es permisible una investigacion judicial desi la misma a fue o no aprobada debida y propiamente por el Congreso; y
que, por tanto, esta Corte Suprema carecede jurisdiccion para conocer y enjuiciar los puntos suscitados por los
recurrentes en relacion con la validez y constitucionalidad de la resolucion en cuestion.

Empero si la primera defensa especial no fuese sostenida, los recurridos alegan, por via de segunda defensa
especial, que la resolucion controvertida fue aprobada a conlos votos de tres cuartas-partes (3/4) de todos los miembros
cualificados del Senado y de la Camara de Representantes votando separadamente, en consonancia con el Articulo XV,
apartado 1, de la Constitucion, y que consiguientementela ley de la Republica No. 73 que ordena suplanteamiento ante el
pueblo para su ratificacion o desaprobacion, senala una fecha para la celebracion de estaconsulta plebiscitaria y
consigna fondos publicos para talfin, es valida y constitucional.

Consta en autos una estipulacion de hechos concertadaentre las partes, pero no se extracta aqui para no alargar
innecesariamente esta disidencia, pero se hara particular referencia a ella mas adelante a medida que las exigenciasde
la argumentacion lo demanden.

Es preciso hacer constar que los abogados de ambas parteshan hecho cumplida justicia a la tremenda importancia del
asunto haciendo extensos estudios y pacientes investigaciones de la jurisprudencia pertinente, en particular la
americana, teniendo en cuenta la influencia profunda y decisiva de aquel pais en nuestras ideas politicas y
constitucionales en virtud de la historica y estrecha convivenciade casi medio siglo.

Es que la cosa no era para menos. Puede decirse, sinexageracion, que excepto en cuatro momentos culminantes de su
historia — el primer grito de rebelion contra España en Agosto de 1896, la ruptura de hostilidades contra Americaen
Febrero de 1899, la aceptacion de la Ley de Independencia en el plebiscito nacional de 1935, y la guerra contra el Japon
en 1941 — en ningun momento, en los ultimos 60 años, ha sido Ilamado el pueblo filipino a rendiruna decision tan
importante, de trascendencia e implicacionestan graves, tan tremendas, como la que tiene que hacer en el plebiscito de
11 de Marzo proximo con motivode la Resolucion congresional discutida en el presente asunto.

Es una de esas decisiones que hacen historia; que parabien o para mal sacuden los cimientos de un pais tal quesi fuese
un fenomeno cosmico; que determinan el curso desu existencia y deytinos nacionales; que deciden, en una palabra, de
la suerte de generaciones ya existentes y degeneraciones que no han nacido todaviaa. Es una de esas decisiones que
para hacerla los pueblos deben hincarse humildemente de rodillas, de cara al cielo, pidiendo al Dios de los pueblos y
naciones la gracia de una salvadora inspiracion de Su infinita sabiduria . . ..

II

Para los efector de una amplia perspectiva historica quepermita destacar en toda su plenitud los contornos de
losformidables "issues" o puntos constitucionales debatidos en el presente asunto, parece conveniente que repasemos,
siquiera brevemente (en las notas marginales lo que no cabeen el mismo texto de esta disidencia), 4 los preceptos
basicos de la Constitucion que se trate de reformar conla Resolucion congresional de que tantas veces se ha
hechomerito. Helos aqui:

ARTICLE XIII. — CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES.

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

ARTICLE XIV. — GENERAL PROVISIONS

xxx xxx xxx

 SEC. 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the
Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise
or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires.

Como queda dicho, la reofrma propuesta es en el sentidode que, no obstante lo dispuesto en los preceptos
arribatranscritos, "durante la efectividad del Convencio Ejecutivo perfeccionado entre el Presidente de Filipinas y el
Presidente de los Estados Unidos el 4 de Julio de 1946, al tenorde las disposiciones de la Ley del Commonwealth No.
733, pero que en ningun case se extendera mas alla del 3 de Julio de 1974, la disposicion, explotacion, desar rollo y
utilizacionde todos los terrenos agricolas, forestales y minerales de dominio publico, de aguas, minerales, carbon,
petroleo y otros minerales petroliferos, de todas las fuerzasy fuentes de energia potencial, asi como de otros recursos de
Filipinas, y la operacion de utilidades publicas, si abiertos para cualguier persona, quedan abiertos para los ciudadanos
de los Estados Unidos y para todas las formas de negocio y empresa de la propiedad o controladas, directao
indirectamente, por ciudad años de los Estados Unidos, de la misma manera y bajo las mismas condiciones impuestasa
los ciudadanos de Filipinas o a las corporaciones o asociaciones de la propiedad o controladas por ciudadanos de
Filipinas (Resolucion conjunta del Congreso filipino, supra).

Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial — pues, sobre ser historia contemporanea, se trata de las labores y procesos
deliberativos de la misma Asamblea Constituyente — de quelos preceptos capitales arriba transcritos constituyen la
expresion acabada de toda la madurez de juicio, de toda laprudencia y sabiduria de que eran capaces no solo los autores
de la Constitucion y los Delegados que la aprobaron, sino el pueblo filipino que la ratifico en el correspondiente plebiscito
nacional convocado al efecto. En pocas resoluciones ha habido tanta firmeza y tan fuerte unanimidadentre nuestros
partidos politicos y sus caudillos como enesa recia y constructiva afirmacion de nacionalismo. Nadamejor, creo yo, que
las siguientes palabras para definir elespiritu, la filosofia que informa esas provisiones:

This provision of the Constitution has been criticized as establishing the outworn Regalian doctrine which, it is
suggested, may serve to retard the economic development of the Philippines. The best encomium on this
provision is probably the very criticism launched against it. It is inconceivable that the Filipinos would liberalize the
acquisition, disposition and exploitation of our natural resources to the extent of permitting their alienation or of
depriving the people of this country of their heritage. The life of any nation depends upon its patrimony and
economic resources. Real freedom, if it is to be lasting, must go hand in hand with economic security, if not
economic prosperity. We are at most usufructuaries of ourdomains and natural resources and have no power to
alienate them even if we should want to do so. They belong to the generations yet unborn and it would be the
height of folly to even think of opening the door for their untrammelled disposition, exploitation, development or
utilization to the detriment of the Filipinos people. With our natural resources in the hands of foreigners what
would be there left except the idealism of living in a country supposedly free, but where freedom is, after all, an
empty dream? We would be living in a sumptuous palace that it not ours! We would be beggars in our own
homes, strangers in our own land!

Friendship and amity towards all nations are compatible with the protection of the legitimate interests of the
Filipino people. There is no antagonism or hostility towards foreigners but sane nationalism and self-protection
which every country of the world is practising today in the interest of self-preservation. (The Three Powers of
Government, by Laurel, pp. 117-118.)

Los criticos de la enmienda constitucional propuesta pueden discutir libremente, como cumple a los ciudadanos de un
pais democratico, los meritos y demeritos de lamisma. Pueden combatirla con toda clase de razones — morales,
politicas, economicas, financieras, internacionales, y hasta de decencia — y naturalmente defenderla tambiensus
partidarios desde todos los angulos. Podrian los opositoreshacer una minuciosa diseccion de su fraseologia yacaso hallar
en sus repliegues peligrosas implicaciones, posibles riesgos, como en ese par de adverbios "directa o indirectamente", a
cuyo socaire podrian acogerse corporacioneso asociaciones extranjeras controladas solo indirectamente por ciudadanos
americanos para concurrir en la explotacion de nuestros terrenos publicos y recursos naturales, y en la operacion de
utilidades publicas. Todo estolo pueden hacer, y algo mas. Pero es obvio, elemental quesemejante discusion no compete
a esta Corte Suprema, sinoen todo caso a otros poderes constituidos.

Nosotros no estamos para determinar y enjuiciar labondad o maldad de la enmienda propuesta. Lo unico quenos
incumbe hacer, ya que la cuestion se halla propiamente planteada ante nosotros, es resolver si la enmienda ha sido
aprobada por el Congreso de acuerdo con el mandato expreso de la Constitucion en materia de enmiendas; si
losrequisitos que la Constitucion señala para poder enmendarla — requisitos que son mandatorios, categorica
menteimperativos y obligatorios — se han cumplido o se han violado. Como se dijo bien en el asunto de Gray vs. Childs
([1934], 156 So., 274, 279), ". . . No podemos decir queel estricto requerimiento relativo a las enmiendas se puede
renunciar a favor de una buena enmienda e invocar encontra de otra mala. . . . No compete a los tribunales el determinar
cuando una enmienda propuesta es sabia y cuando no lo es. Los tribunales nada tienen que ver conla sabiduria de la
politica. Pero es deber de los tribunales, cuando se les pide que lo hagan, el determinar si o no el procedimiento
adoptado para la aprobacion de la enmiendaes el señalado por los terminos de la ley organica.

Todo lo que se lha dicho hasta aqui para poner de relievela filosofia de nuestra Constitucion en materia de recursos
naturales y utilidades publicas, se ha dicho no como expresion de un criterio propio, sino tan solo para subrayar todala
gravedad, toda la densidad del asunto, y prevenir entodo caso los peligros de una rutinaria y complacienteliviandad.
Como tambien se dijo en el citado asunto deGray vs. Childs, "la enmienda de la ley organica del Estado o nacion no es
una cosa para ser tomada ligeramente, ni para ser hecha de lance o al azar. Es una cosa seria. Cuando la enmienda es
aprobada, viene a ser parte de laley fundamental del pais y puede significar el bienestar omaldicion de las generaciones
de la nacion donde se haceparte del codigo fundamental."

Este pronunciamiento adquiere todo el valor y toda la resonancia de una consigna en el presente caso en que lareforma
propuesta afecta vitalisimamente al patrimonionacional del pueblo filipino. ¿No son los recursos naturalesy las utilidades
publicas el tesoro de una nacion, labase que sustenta su existencia, la espina dorsal de sueconomia? Por tanto, jamas se
podra exagerar el celo, la vigilancia que el pueblo y sus organos naturales ejercenpara que las salvaguardias impuestas
por la misma Constitucionen relacion con el proceso y tramitacion de todaenmienda constitucional se cumplan y
observen con el maximo rigor.

Aqui no caben excusas ni subterfugios. Ni siquiera cabeescudarse tras la doctrina de la separacion de poderes quela
mayoria de esta Corte invoca para justificar su inaccion, su pasividad, su politica de "manos fuera", alegando que el
presente asunto es coto vedado para nos otros, algo quecae fuera de nuestra jurisdiccion, eso que en derecho politico y
constitucional se llama materia politica no-justiciable.

III

La mayoria rehusa asumir jurisdiccion sobre el presente caso porque dice que versa sobre una cuestion politica, ylas
cuestiones politicas caen fuera de la competencia de los tribunales de justicia. Creo que esto es un error, dicho seacon
todos los respetos debidos a mis ilustres compañeros que sostienen tal opinion. ¿Hay acaso algun documento mas
politico que la Constitucion? Si la opinion de lamayoria fuese valida y acertada, practicamente ninguna violacion de la
Constitucion podria ser enjuiciada por los tribunales, pues cual mas, cual menos, casi todas las
transgresionesconstitucionales, sobre todo las que comete elpoder legislativo o el poder ejecutivo, tienen caracter
politico. Bajo esa opinion la Constitucion seria una letramuerta, un simple pedazo de papel: los poderes constituidos, los
individuos que los componen, podrian infringirim punemente la Constitucion sin que ningun arbitro constitucional pudiera
intervenir ordenadamente para restaurarla suprema majestad de la ley fundamental violada. Esclaro que esto podria
conducir facilmente al caos, a la anarquia, a la revolucion, dependiendo solo el resultado de lamayor o menor docilidad
del pueblo, del grado de elasticidad politica de las masas. Y es claro que ninguno puedequerer este triste destino para
nuestro pais.

Creo sinceramente que una mejor y mas correcta evaluacion de nuestro sistema de gobierno que esta esencial
mentecalcado en el americano, es que bajo la teoria relativa de las eparacion de poderes, ningun poder es superior al
pueblo cuya voluntad esta encarnada en la Constitucion. Los poderes no son mas que agentes, mandatarios, servidores:
el pueblo es el amo, el mandante, el soberano. Y el pueblo ordena y manda por medio de la Constitucion — esta es
suvoz el verbo hecho carne politica y social, el soplo vital quetraduce y transmuts su espiritu en postulados esenciales
deregulacion y gobierno.

Todo eso esta bien, no puede haber seria objecion a ello,dicen los sostenedores absolutistas de la teoria de la
sedparacion de poderes. Pero se pregunta: ¿quien señala lavoluntad del pueblo tal como esta plasmada en la
Constitucion? ?Quien es el profeta que desciende del Sinai para revelar las tablas de la ley? ¿Quien ha de arbitrar en los
conflictos constitucionales, o quien ha de decidir los litigios propiamente planteados en que se ventilan una infraccion de
la Constitucion? ¿Hay un peligroso vacio en nuestro mecanismo constitucional, o por el contrario, los resorteestan todos
bien situados, capaces de operar y funcionarade cuada y eficientemente? Esto es precisamente el busilis, la cuestion
batallona.

No puede haber duda en la contestacion a tales preguntas. Bajo nuestro sistema de gobierno el poder judiciales el
llamado a señalar, a interpretar la ley; y en los conflictoso transgresiones constitucionales esta Corte Suprematiene la
ultima palabra, le compete el arbitraje supremoy final. Bajo nuestra mecanica constitucional, igual quebajo la americana,
se da la aparente paradoja de que la superior facultad, el supremo negocio de interpretar la voluntad del pueblo tal como
esta expresada mas o menos permanentemente en la Constitucion, no corresponde propiamentea ninguno d e los
poderes electivos, los que se renuevanperiodicamente, sino al poder que si bien es denombramiento en su origen, tiene,
sin embargo, sentido deperpetuidad, quiero decir, es vitalicio en la complexion y funcion de los individuos que los
componen — el poder judicial. La sabiduria peculiar, la originalidad del sistemaconsiste precisamente en eso: en haber
alojado el supremo arbitraje con relacion a los conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales en un poder del Estado al cual
deliberadamentese le ha dotado de un clima psicologico y moral el maspropicio posible a la objetividad y desasimiento de
lasdisputas politicas y discordias civiles, situandosele por encimade los vaivenes de la politica al uso y las veleida desde
la suerte electora. "Esto es lo que va implicto en la expresion supremacia judicial, que propiamente es la facultad de
revision judicial bajo la Constitucion" (Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 171).

The very essence of the American conception of the separation of powers is its insistence upon the inherent
distinction between law-making and law-interpreting, and its assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a notion
which, when brought to bear upon the Constitution, yields judicial review." (Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme
Court, p. 146.)

En el famoso asunto de Marbury vs. Madison, supra, el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos, por boca de
sugran Chief Justice John Marshall, en terminos inequivocos definio y explico las facultades de la judicatura para poneren
vigor la Constitucion como la suprema ley del pais, y declaro que es terminantemente de la competencia y deberdel
departamento judicial el decidir cual es la ley querige.

The reasoning of Webster and Kent is substantially the same. Webster says: "The Constitution being the supreme
law, it follows of course, that every act of the Legislature contrary to the law must be void. But who shall decide
this question? Shall the legislature itself decide it? If so, then the Constitution ceases to be legal and becomes
only a moral restraint for the legislature. If they, and they only, are to judge whether their acts be conformable to
the Constitution, then the Constitution is advisory and accessory only, not legally binding; because, if the
construction of it rest wholly with them, their discretion, in particular cases, may be in favor of very erroneous
constructions. Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when the case arises, must decide upon the validity of
particular acts." Webster, Works, Vol. III, 30. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 1, 2d
edition, pp. 4, 5.)

En el citado asunto de Angara contra Comision Electoral dijimos tambien lo siguiente:

. . . Y la judicatura, a su vez, con el Tribunal Supremo por artbitro final, frena a con efectividad a los demas
departament of en elejercicio de su facultad de determinar la ley, y de aqui que pueda declarar nulos los actos
ejecutivos y legislativos que contravengan la Constitucion.

Esta doctrina reafirmo en el asunto de Planas contra Gil (67 Phil., 62), a saaber:

. . . As far as the judiciary is concerned, which it holds' neither the sword nor the purse' it is by constitutional
placement the organ called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme Court is entrusted
expressly or by necessary implication the obligation of determining in appropriate cases the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Section 2 [1], Art. VIII, Constitution of the
Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent, the judiciary restrains the other departments of the government and
this result is one of the necessary corollaries of the "system of checks and balances" of the government
established.

No es que con esto el poder judicial assume un complejode superioridad sobre los otros poderes del Estado, no. Setrate
simplemente de que, dentro de las limitaciones de todacreacion humana, alguien tiene que arbitrar y dirimir losconflictos
y las transgresiones a gue puede dar lugar la Constitucion, y se estima que el poder judicial, pro la razonde su ser y de
sus funciones, es el mas llamado a ser esearbitro. Se trate de una propia y graciosa inhibicion delos otros poderes en
virtud de una necesidad impuesta porunas teorias y practicas de gobiernio que han resistido la prueba del tiempo y el
choque con la realidad y la experiencia. En mi disidencia en el asunto de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192), hablando
sobre este particular dijelo siguiente y lo reitero ahora, a saber:

En parte, el argumento expuesto es correcto y acertado. No sepuede discutir que los tres poderes del Estado son
iguales e independientesentre si; que ninguno de ellos es superior al otro, mucho menos el poder judicial que
entre los tres es el menos fuerte y elmas precario en medios e implementos materiales. Tampoco se puede
discutir que bajo la Constitucion cada poder tiene una zona, una esferade accion propia y privativa, y dentro de
esa esfera un cumulode facultades que le pertenecen exclusivamente; que dentro de esaesfera y en el uso de
esas facultades cada poder tiene absoluta discreciony ningun otro poder puede controlar o revisar sus actos so
 pretexto de que alguien los cuestiona o tacha de arbitrarios, injustos, imprudentes o insensatos. Pero la
insularidad, la separacion llegasolo hasta aqui. Desde Montesquieu que lo proclamo cientificamente hasta
nuestros dias, el principio de la separacion de poderes hasufrido tremendos modificaciones y limitaciones. El
consenso doctrinal hoy es que la teoria es solo relativa y que la separacionde poderes queda condicionada por
una mecanica constitucional — lamecanica de los frenos y cortapisas. (Willoughby, On the Constitution of the
United States, tomo 3, pags. 1619, 1620, 2.ª edicion.) Como queda dicho, cada poder es absoluto dentro de la
esfera quele asigna la Constitucion; alli el juego de sus facultades y funcionesno se puede coartar. Pero cuando
se sale y extravasa de esa esferainvadiendo otras esferas constitucionales, ejerciendo facultades queno le
pertenecen, la teoria de la separacion ya no le ampara, la Constitucion que es superior a el le sale al encuentro,
le restringe uy leachica dentro de sus fronteras, impidiendo sus incursiones anti-constitucionales. La cuestion
ahora a determinar es si bajo nuestrosistema de gobierno hay un mecanismo que permite restablecer eljuego
normal de la Constitucion cuando surgen estos desbarajustes, estos conflictos que podriamos llamar de fronteras
constitucionales; tambien es cuestion a determinar si cuando surgen esos conflictos, un ciudadano sale
perjudicado en sus derechos, el mismo tiene algun remedio expedito y adecuado bajo la Constitucion y las leyes,
y quien puede concederle ese remedio. Y con esto llegamos a la cuestion basica, cardinal en este asunto.

Nuestra opinion es que ese mecanismo y ese remedio existen — son los tribunales de justicia.

La mayoria no define en su decision lo que llama cuestion politica no-justiciable ni las maaterials o casos que caen dentro
de su significado. "The difficulty lies" — dice la ponencia — "in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political
question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as
to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the
government." Pero razonando por analogia cita un precedente, una autoridad — el caso de Coleman vs. Miller decidido
no hace muchos años por la Corte Suprema Federal de los Estados Unidos. La mayoria cree que este es el caso mas
semejante al que nos ocupa. Creo que la mayoria padece error: el caso de Coleman contra Miller es precisamente un
buen argumento en favor del recurso.

Compendiado el caso es como sigue: En Junio, 1924, el Congreso de los Estados Unidos propuso una reforma ala
Constitucion, conocida por "Child Labor Amendment" (enmienda sobre el trabajo infantil). En Enero, 1925, la Legislatura
del Estado de Kansas adopto una resolucion rechazandola enmienda y una copia certificada de la resolucionse envio al
Secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos. En Enero, 1937, o sea 12 años despues, una resolucion conocida como
"Resolucion Concurrente del Senado No. 3" se presento en el Senado del Estado de Kansas pararatificar la propuesta
enmienda. Habia 40 Senadores. Alconsiderarse la resolucion 20 Senadores votaron en favor y 20 Senadores en contra.
El Teniente Gobernador, que era entonces el Presidente del Senado en virtud de la Constitucion estatal, emitio su voto
en favor de la resolucion, rompiendo asi el empate. La resolucion fue posteriormente adoptada por la Camara de
Representantes de Kandas mediante una mayoria de los votos de sus miembros.

Fued entonces cuando se interpuso ante la Corte Suprema de Kansas un recurso de mandamus por los 20 Senadores
adversos a la resolucion y por otros 3 miembros de la Camarade Representantes. El objeto del recurso era (a) compeler
al Secretario del Senado a borrar el endoso favorable de la resolucion y poner en su lugar las palabras "no ha sido
aprobada"; (b) recabar la expedicion de un interdicto contra los oficiales del Senado y Camara de Representantes
prohibiendo les que firmaran la resolucion y contra el Secretario de Estado de Kansad prohibiendole que autentic
aradicha resolucion y la entregara la Gobernador. La solicitud cuestionaba el derecho del Teniente Gobernadora emitir su
voto decisivo en el Senado. Tambien se planteabaen la solicitud el hecho de que la resolucion habiasido rechazada
originariamente y se alegaba, ademas, quedurante el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre Junio,1924, y Mayo, 1927, la
enmienda habia sido rechazada porambas Camaras de las Legislaturas de 26 Estados y solose habia ratificado en 5
Estados, y que por razon de dicho rechazamiento y por no haberse ratificado dentro de untiempo razonable la enmienda
habia perdido su validez y vitalidad.

La Corte Suprema de Kansas hallo que no habia ninguna disputa sobre los hechos, asumio competencia sobre el casoy
sostuvo que el Teniente Gobernador tenia derecho a emitirvoto decisivo, que la proyectada enmienda conservabasu
vitalidad original a pesar del tiempo transcurrido, y quela resolucion, "habiendo sido aprobada por la Camara de
Representantes y por el Senado, el acto de ratificacion dela propuesta enmienda por la Legislatura de Kansas erafinal y
complete." Consiguientemente el recurso de mandamus fue denegado.

Elevado el asunto en casacion para ante la Corte Suprema Federal, esta asumio jurisdiccion sobre el caso, conla
concurrencia y disidencia de algunos Magistrados que opinaban que el recurso debia rechazarse de plano, sin
masceremonias, por la razon, segun los disidentes, de que los recurrentes no tenian personalidad ni derecho de accion
para pedir la revision de la sentencia de la Corte Supremade Kansas, y porque ademas se trataba de una cuestion
puramente politica, por tanto no-justiciable. Bajo la ponenciade su Presidente el Sr. Hughes, la Corte Suprema Federal
conocio del caso a fondo, discutiendo y resolviendo las cuestiones planteadas. He aqui sus palabras: "Our authority to
issue the writ of certiorari is challenged upon the ground that the petitioners have no standing to seek to have the
judgment of the state court reviewed and hence itis urged that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.We are unable to
accept that view." Esto viene a ser comouna replica a las siguientes palabras de los disidentes: "It is the view of Mr.
Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and myself (Mr. Justice Frankfurter) that the petitioners have no
standing in the Court." Delo dicho resulta evidente que la Corte Federal no adoptola actitud de "manos fuera" (hands off),
sino que actuo positivamente sobre el caso, encarandolo.

La decision consta de tres partes. La primera parte, que es bastante extensa, esta consagrada enteramente adiscutir la
cuestion de la jurisdiccion de la Corte. Ya hemosvisto que esta cuestion se ha resuelto enteramente enfavor de la
jurisdiction, en virtud de las razones luminosas que alli se explanan y que no reproduzco por no ser necesario y para no
alargar indebidamente esta disidencia. La segunda parte es bien breve, apenas consta de dos parrafos. Se refiere a la
cuestion de si el voto del Teniente Gobernador, que rompio el empate, era o no valido. La Corte nolo resuelve, por que
dice que sus miembros se dividieron porigual sobre si era una cuestion politica y, por tanto, nojusticiable. La tercera
parte, tan extensa como la primera, esta dedicada a estudiar y discutir las siguientes proposiciones :(a) Si habiendo sido
rechazada originariamentela enmienda, una ratificacion posterior podia validamente dejar sin efecto dicho rechazamiento
y tomarse como unaratificacion legal al tenor de la Constitucion; (b) si ellargo tiempo transcurrido entre el rechazamiento
y la ratificacion — unos 13 años — no habia tenido el efecto de darcaracter final a la repudiacion de la enmienda,
causando estado juridico definitivo.

El analisis que hace el ilustrado ponente de las cuestiones planteadas es muy interesante y desde luego acabado. Se
estudian y comentan luminos amente los precedentes. Sobre la cuestion de si el rechazamiento de unaenmienda
propuesta impide que la misma sea ratificada posteriormente, se puntualiza lo siguiente: que el articulo V de la
Constitucion Federal sobre enmienda esta fraseadoen terminos positivos, es decir, habla de ratificacion y node
rechazamiento, y que por tanto "el poder para ratificarlo confiera al Estado la Constitucion, y que, como poder ratificante,
continua y persiste, a pesar de un previo rechazamiento. "Luego la Corte dice, examinando los precedentes, que el
Congreso, en el ejercicio de su control sobrela promulgacion de las enmiendas a la Constitucion, ha resuelto esta
cuestion repetidas veces en el sentido indicado, esto es, considerando inefectivo el previo rechazamientofrente a una
positiva ratificacion; y la Corte concluye que esta accion del Congreso es valida, constitucional; por consiguiente, los
tribunales no estan autorizados para revisarla. Es en este sentido, creo yo, como la Corte dice que se trate de una
cuestion politica no-justiciable, es decir una cuestion que cae dentro de la zona constitucional exclusion del Congreso;
por tanto, se trate deuna accion valida, constitucional. Pero no hay nada enesa decision que diga, o permita inferir, que
cuando el Congreso viola un mandato expreso de la Constitucion, como en el caso que nos ocupa, los tribunales no
pueden intervenir, bajo el principio de la supremacia judicial entratandose de interpretar la Constitucion, para resolver el
conflicto o enjuiciar la transgresion, y conceder el remedio propiamente pedido. En otras palabras, en el caso de
Coleman contra Miller la Corte Suprema Federal hallo que el Congreso, al declarar valida la ratificacion de la enmienda
constitucional sobre trabajo infantil (Child labor), no habia infringibo el articulo V de la Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, y la
Corte lo razona diciendo, con la vista delos precedentes, que el referido articulo V habla de ratificacion y no de
rechazamiento, y que, por tanto, "el poderpara ratificar continua y persiste a pesar de un previo rechazamiento." De
suerte que, en realidad de verdad, no escierto que la Corte Suprema Federal declaro injusticiablela materia, pues ¿que
mejor prueba de justiciabilidad que ese dictum categorico, positivo y terminante?

Sobre la proposicion de si el largo tiempo transcurrido entre el rechazamiento y la ratificacion — unos 136 años — no
habia tenido el efecto de dar caracter final a la repudiacion de la enmienda, causando estado juridico definitivo, la Corte
Suprema Federal fallo que no, es decir, declarovalida la ratificacion no obstante dicho lapso de tiempo, aduciendo
razones muy atinadas, entre ellas la de que las condiciones de caracter moral, medico, social y economico que
aconsejaban la prohibicion del trabajo infantil en las fabricas eran tan validas y existentes, si no mas, cuandose sometio
la enmienda por primera vez para su ratificacion como 13 años despues. Y luego la Corte cita autoridades y precedentes
en apoyo de su conclusion, entre ellosel caso tipico y decisivo de Dillon vs. Glass (256 U.S., 368; 65 Law.ed., 994; 41
Sup.Ct., 510). En este caso la Cortedeclaro que el Congreso, al proponer una enmienda a la Constitucion, pueded fijar un
tiempo razonable para su ratificacion, y sostuvo la accion del Congreso al disponer enla proyectada 18.ª Enmienda que la
misma seria ineficaza menos que se ratificase dentro de siete años.

Ahora bien, en el caso de Coleman contra Miller ocurre todo lo contrario: el Congreso no habia fijado ningun plazopara la
ratificacion. En vista de esto, los recurrentes pretendian que la Corte supliera la omision del Congreso declarandolo que
era tiempo razonable, teniendo en cuentalos precedentes judiciales y el precedente congresional de 7 años ya sostenido
en el caso citado de Dillon contra Glass; y que desde luego el periodo de 13 años era demasiado largo para ser
razonable. La Corte Suprema dijo que no, queno eran los tribunales los que debian fijar ese tiempo razonable; que en
esta cuestion entraban muchos factores denaturaleza varia y compleja — politicos, economicos y sociales — que solo el
Congreso estaba en condiciones de determinar ya mediante la correspondiente legislacion como enel caso de la 18.ª
Enmienda, ya en cada caso concreto deratificacion al ejercer su control sobre la promulgacion de las enmiendas. Ahora
bien, pregunto: ¿no es esto un dictum judicial? ¿no es esto justiciar? ¿no esta aqui la Corte Suprema Federal sentandose
en estrados y emitiendo judicialmente su opinion sobre una materia juridica y constitucional sometida a su consideracion?
En realidad, puede decirse que la unica cuestion que la Corte ha dejado de resolver es la validez o nulidad del voto
decisivo del Teniente Gobernador, por la razon de que sobre este punto, segun se dice en la misma decision, la opinion
del Tribunal estaba igualmente dividida. Todas las demas cuestiones han sido enjuiciadas, resueltes, y esta accion dela
mayoria, asumiendo plena jurisdiccion sobre el caso y las materias en el discutidas, es lo que ha motivado la disidencia
de 4 Magistrados los Sres. Black, Roberts, Frankfurter y Douglas. En efecto, estos disidentes no disimulansu desagrado
al ver que la Corte asume en el caso, siquier implicitamente, el poder de interpretacion judicial, y aunvan mas alla —
expresan un notorio desencanto al ver que la Corte "trata el proceso enmendatorio provisto por la Constitucion, como
sujeto a interpretacion judicial en algunos respectos, y en otros sujeto a la autoridad final del Congreso", y al ver tambien
que en la decision "no hay desaprobacion de la conclusion establecida en el asunto de Dillon contra Glass, de que la
Constitucion requiere tacitamente que una enmienda propiamente sometida debe darsepor muerta, a menos que se
ratifique dentro de un tiempo razonable." Es decir, los Magistrados disidentes esperaban que la Corte revocase y
abrogase lo hecho por ella en elcitado asunto de Dillo contra Glass en donde la Corte, envez de abstenerse de conocer
del caso por tratarse en el, segun los disidentes, de materia politica no-justiciable, ejercio plena jurisdiccion sobre el
mismo asumiendo supoder tradicional de interpretar la Constitucion y declarando valida la lay del Congreso que fijaba un
plazo de7 años para la ratificacion de la 18.ª Enmienda. No puedo resistir a la tentacion de reproducir las mismas
palabrasde la disidencia: ellas, mejor que todo lo que yo pueda decir, demuestran de modo inconcuso las irreconciliables
diferencias de criterio entre la mayoria, representada porel ilustre ponente Sr. Hughes, y los disidentes, pues mientraspor
un lado el ponente justicia decididamente el caso considerando, discutiendo y resolviendo todas las
cuestionesplanteadas, menos la cuestion del voto del Teniente Gobernador, citando profusamente autoridades y
precedentes, los disidentes, en su opinion, preconizan una actitudde absoluta abstencion, de "manos fuera" (hands off),
portratarse, segun ellos, de una materia politica no-justiciable que cae exclusivamente bajo el control del Congreso. He
aqui las palabras de los disidentes:

. . . To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial
interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification of
amendments, we are unable to agree.

The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is being followed between
submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed
limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly authorized
State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State may reverse its
action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are all consistent only with an ultimate
control over the amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the course of amendment
by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the
political branch of government.

The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as subject to judicial
construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the conclusion
arrived at in Dillon vs. Glass, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a property submitted amendment must
die unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior assumption of power to
make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has constitutional power to determine if
there is any such implication in article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion declares that
Congress has the exclusive power to decide the political questions of whether a State whose legislature has once
acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its position, and whether in the circumstances of
such a case as this, an amendment is dead because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such division
between the political and judicial branches of the government is made by article 5 which grants power over the
amending of the Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been given by the article
exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is "political" in its entirety, from submission until an
amendment becomes part of the Constitution and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any
point.

Since Congress has sole and complete control over the amending process, subject to no judicial review, the
views of any court upon this process cannot be binding upon Congress, and in so far as Dillon vs. Glass attempts
judicially to imposed a limitation upon the right of Congress to determine final adoption of an amendment, it
should be disapproved. . . . (Coleman vs. Miller, 122 A.L.R., 695, 708, 709.)

La distribucion de los votos con relacion a las cuestiones planteadas en el referido asundo de Coleman vs. Miller esalgun
tanto confusa, como han podido notar los mismos comentaristas; asi que necesita de alguna explicacion. Escierto que no
suscriben la ponencia mas que 3 Magistrados, a saber: el ponente Sr. Hughes y los Sres. Stone y Reed, pero en cuanto
a la jurisdiccion plena que la Corte asumio sobre el caso y la materia hay que añadir los votos de los Sres. McReynolds y
Butler. Estos dos ultimos no soloconcurrian implicitamente en la accion de la Corte al enjuiciarel caso, sino que inclusive
opinaban que debia concederse el recurso, esto es, que debia anularse la ratificacion tardia de la Enmienda sobre
Trabajo Infantil (Child Labor) hecha por la Legislatura de Kansas. De modo queen cuanto al "issue" de la jurisdiccion,
la justiciabilidad del caso, la votacion era de 5 contra 4 — por la jurisdiccion,la justiciabilidad, el ponente Sr. Hughes, y los
Magistrados Sres. Stone, Reed, McReynolds y Butler; por la actitud de absoluta abstencion, de "manos fuera" (hands
off), los Magistrados Sres. Black, Frankfurter, Roberts y Douglas.

Repito lo dicho mas arriba: el caso de Coleman vs. Miller, en vez de ser una autoridad a favor de los recurridos,
juntamente con el caso de Dillon vs. Glass constituyen precedentes decisivos en la jurisprudencia federal americana a
favor de los recurrentes.

Pero si la jurisprudencia federal milita en favor de latesis de que tenemos jurisdiccion para enjuiciar y decidirel presente
caso, en el ejercicio de nuestras supremas funciones como interprete de la Constitucion bajo el principio firmemente
establecido de la supremacia judicial en asuntos propiamente planteados sobre conflictos y transgresiones
constitucionales, la jurisprudencia de los Estados estodavia mas indubitable e inequivoca, mas terminante y decisiva. La
importancia de esto sube de punto si se tieneen cuenta que, mas que con el gobierno federal, nuestra analogia, nuestros
puntos de contacto en lo politico, constitucional y juridico es mas bien con los diferentes Estados de la Union americana.
Nuestro sistema de gobierna es unitario. Aqui nuestras provincias no son Estados autonomos y semi-independientes
como lo son los Estados americanos. Asi que la cedula, la unidad politica mas semejante a la nuestra no es la federal,
sino la estatal. Por eso si bienes cierto que las constituciones de los Estados, como lanuestra, todas estan
fundamentalmente calcadas en el patron de la Constitucion federal, se vera que en ciertosrasgos caracteristicos del
sistema unitario nuestra Constitucionse aproxima evidentemente mas a las de los Estados que a la federal. Esa
semejanza es sobre todo notabilisimaen la parte que se refiere al proceso enmendatorio de la Constitucion. Es que, en
realidad, los Estados de la Union americana, para todos los efectos de la vida interior, domestica, son practicamente
naciones independientes; asi que nuestra evolucion, nuestro transitode la condicion de Commonwealth a la de
Republicas oberana e independiente si bien nos distingue de ellos enel derecho internacional, ninguna diferencia, sin
embargo, ha operado en el campo constitucional, ora en la parte dogmatica de la Constitucion, ora en la parte organica.
Y la mejor prueba de esto es que con la independencia nohemos tenido necesidad de cambiar de Constitucion: lamisma
que nos servia cuando eramos simple Commonwealth, es decir, cuando estabamos sujetos a la soberania americana, es
la misma que nos sirve hoy cuando ya somos Republic; y no cabe duda de que nos serviria perfectamente bien si no la
tuvieramos asendereada y malparada en nuestras pecaadoras manos con repetidas violaciones, confrecuentes asaltos
contra su integridad . . ..

Ahora bien; sin petulancia se puede retar a cualquieraa que señale un caso, un solo caso en la jurisprudencia de los
Estados de la Union americana en que los tribunales de justicia se hayan negado a conocer y enjuiciaruna violacion
constitucional semejante a la que nos ocupapor la razon de que se trataba de una cuestion politica no-justiciable. No hay
absolutamente ninguno; por esoque los recurridos, a pesar de las pacientes y laboriosas investigaciones que denota su
habil y concienzudo alegato, no han podido citar ni un solo caso.

En cambio, los tomos de jurisprudencia de various Estados dan cuenta de casos indenticosd al que nos ocupa y entodos
ellos se ha declarado invariablemente que la violacion de la Constitucion en lo que se refiere al precepto que regula el
proceso de la enmiendas a la Ley organica esuna cuestion judicial, y ninguna Corte Suprema de Estados e ha lavado
jamas las manos bajo la teoria de la separacion de poderes. Es mas: creo que in siquiera seha planteado seriamente la
objecion fundada en el argumentod e la injusticiabilidad.

Para no alargar demasiado esta disidencia no voy a citarmas que algunos casos los mas conocidos y representativos,
tomados de la jurisprudencia de algunos Estados, a saber: Florida, Minnesota, Georgia e Indiana. De la Corte Suprema
de Florida tenemos dos casos: el de Crawford vs .Gilchrist y el de Gray vs. Childs.

En el asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist (64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 963l Ann. Cas., 1914B, 916), se trataba de una accionde
prohibicion interpuesta por el Gobernador del Estado, Albert W. Gilchrist, contra el Secretario de Estado, H. Clay
Crawford, para impedir que cierta propuesta enmiendaa la Constitucion se publicara y se sometiera al electorado en un
plebiscito para su ratificacion o rechazamiento. Esdecir, lo mismo de que se trate en el case que tenemos antenosotros.
La enmienda habia sido aprobada por la Camarade Representantes de Florida con el voto necesario y constitucional de
tres quintas (3/5), y fue enviada al Senado para su concurrencia. El Senado tambien la aprobo conel voto de tres quintos,
pero esta votacion fue reconsiderada posteriormente. Asi estaba el asunto, pendiente de reconsideracion cuando se
clausuro la Legislatura. Despues, sin embargo, diose por aprobada la propuesta enmienday el Secretario de Estado trato
de dar los pasos parasu publicacion y ratificacion plebiscitaria. De ahi la accionde interdicto prohibitorio, fundada en la
alegacion de quela enmienda no habia sido aprobada debidamente por la Legislatura de acuerdo con los metodos
prescritos en la Constitucion de Florida. Igual que en el presente casetambien hubo alli una batalla forense colosal, con
untremendo despliegue de habilidad y talento por cada lado. El ponente no se recata en alabar el esfuerzo de las partesy
dice: ". . . we think the parties to this litigationare to be commended, both for taking the proceedings that have brought
these unsual questions before the court for determination and for the great ability with which their counsel have presented
them to this court."

¿Se lavo las manos la Corte Suprema de Florida declarandose incompetente para conocer del asunto por la razonde que
se trataba de una cuestion politica y, por tanto, nojusticiable? De ninguna manera. La Corte asumio resueltamente su
responsabilidad y poder tradicional de interpretarla Constitucion y fallo el asunto en su fondo, declarando que la cuestion
era propiamente judicial y que laenmienda constitucional propuesta no se habia aprobada deconformidad con los
requisitos establecidos por la Constitucionpara el proceso y tramitacion de la enmiendas. Por tanto, se denego la peticion
de supersedeas interpuestapor el recurrido para enervar el recurso; es decir, al recurrentegano su inusitado e historico
pleito. Y las esferas politicas de Florida no se desorbitaron por esta decisivaderrota de la teoria de la separacion de
poderes. Vale la pena reproducir algunar de las doctrinas sentadas en elasunto, a saber:

Constitutional Law — Power of Courts to Determine Validity of Action by Legislature in Proposing Constitutional
Amendment.

A determination of whether an amendment to the constitution has been validly proposed and agreed to by the
Legislature is to be had in a judicial forum where the constitution provides no other means for such determination.

Injunction — Subject of Relief — Act of Secretary of State in Certifying Proposed Amendments.

The act of the secretary of state in publishing and certifying to the country commissioners proposed amendments
to the constitution is in its nature ministerial, involving the exercise of no discretion, and if the act is illegal it may
be enjoined in appropriate proceedings by proper parties, there being no other adequate remedy afforded by law.

Injunction — Governor as Complainant, Secretary of State as Defendant.

The governor of the state, suing as such, and also as a citizen, taxpayer, and elector, is a proper complainant in
proceedings brought to enjoin the secretary of state from publishing at public expense and certifying proposed
amendments to the constitution upon the ground that such proposed amendments are invalid because they have
not been duly "agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to each house" of the legislature.

Amendments to Constitution — Effect of Ignoring Mandatory Provisions of Constitution.

If essential mandatory provisions of the organic law are ignored in amending the constitution, it violates the right
of all the people of the state to government regulated by law.

Duty of Court to Enforce Constitution.

It is the duty of the courts in authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing constitution.

Mandatory Provisions of Constitutions as to Manner of Amending Constitution.

The provision of the organic law requiring proposed amendments of the constitution to "be agreed to by three-
fifths of all the members elected to each house" of the legislature is mandatory, and it clearly contemplates that
such amendments shall be agreed to by the deliberate, final, affirmative vote of the requisite number of the
numbers of each house at a regular session.

Construction of Constitution to Give Intended Effect — Mandatory Character of Provisions.

Every word of a state constitution should be given its intended meaning and effect, and essential provisions of a
constitution are to be regarded as being mandatory. (Crawford vs. Gilchrist, Ann. Cas., 1914 B, pp. 916, 917.)

El asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist se decidio en 1912. Enm 1934 otro asunto constitucional importante, el de
Gray contra Childs, se decidio en virtud de la autoridad y sentencia dictada en dicho asunto de Crawford.
En el caso citado de Gray contra Childs (156 So. Rep., 274; Fla.), tambien se trataba de una demanda de prohibicion
para impedir la publicacion de una propuesta enmienda constitucional que iba a ser sometida al electorado de Florida
para su ratificacion o rechazamiento en una eleccion general o plebiscito fijado para Noviembre, 1934. La enmienda
habia sido aprobada por la Camara de Representantes con el voto de tres quintos (3/5), pero en el Senado hubo cierta
confusion acerca del texto finalmente aprobado. La Legislatura, antes de clausurarse aprobo unafs resolucion conjunta
autotizando a ciertos oficiales de las Camaras para que despues de la clausura hiciesen ciertas correciones enlas actas y
en el diario de sesiones a fin de formar la verdaderahistoria de los procedimientos y compulsar el textode la enmienda tal
como habia sido aprobada. Se alegabaen la demanda que esto era ilegal y anticonstitucional. Eltribunal de circuito estimo
el recurso de prohibicion. Elevado el asunto en apelacion para ante la Corte Suprema del Estado, la misma confirmo la
sentencia apelada concediendo el interdicto prohibitorio. Hed aqui los pronunciamientos de la Corte que parecen
estereotipados para el caso que nos ocupa, a saber:

(4,5) Section 1 of article 17 of our Constitution provides the method by which the Constitution may be amended. It
requires that a proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective Journals of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate with the yeas and nays showing a three-fifths vote in favor of such
amendment by each House. The proposed amendment here under consideration nowhere appears upon the
Journals of the Senate, and therefore it is unnecessary for us to consider any other questions presented or any
authorities cited.

The amendment of the organic law of the state or nation is not a thing to be lightly undertaken not to be
accomplished in a haphazard manner. It is a serious thing. When an amendment is adopted, it becomes a part of
the fundamental law of the land, and it may mean the weal or woe of the future generations of the state wherein it
becomes a part of the fundamental law. We cannot say that the strict requirements pertaining to amendments
may be waived in favor of a good amendment and invoked as against a bad amendment. If the Constitution may
be amended in one respect without the amendment being spread upon the Journals of one of the respective
House of the Legislature, then it may be ameqnded in any other respect in the same manner. It is not for the
courts to determine what is a wise proposed amendment or what is an unwise one. With the wisdom of the policy
the courts have nothing to do. But it is the duty of the courts, when called upon so to do, to determine whether or
not the procedure attempted to be adopted is that which is required by the terms of the organic law.

Finding that the organic law has not been complied with, as above pointed out, the decree appealed from should
be, and the same is hereby, affirmed on authority of the opinion and judgment in the case of
Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 953; Ann. Cas., 1914B, 9156. (Gray vs. Childs, 156 Southern Reporter,
pp. 274, 279.)

Note se que la clausula sobre enmiendas en la Constitucion de Florida es semejante a la nuestra, a saber: (1) la
propuesta enmienda tiene que ser aprobada por la Legislatura, en Florida con el voto de tres quintos (3/5) de los
miembros, en Filipinas con el voto de tres cuartos (3/4); (2) los sies y los nos tienen que hacersesd constar en el diario de
sesiones (Articulo VI, seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20, inciso 1, Constitucion de Filipinas); (3) despues de aprobada la
enmienda por la Legislatura se somete al electorado en una eleccion o plebiscito, para su ratificacion orechazamiento.

El procedimiento sobre enmiendas prescrito en la Constitucion federal americana es diferente, a saber: el Congreso
puede proponer la enmienda bien (1) mediante la aprobacion de dos tercios (2/3) de sus miembros; bien (2) mediante
una convencion que se convocara al efecto apeticion de las Legislaturas de dos tercios (2/3) de los diferentes Estados.
En cualquiera de ambos casos la enmiendasera valida para todos los efectos y fines comoparte de la Constitucion
siempre que fuera ratificada porlas Legislaturas de tres cuartos (3/4) de los Estados, o porconvenciones de tres cuartas-
partes de los mismos, segun que uno u otro modo de ratificacion hubiera sido propuestopor el Congreso.

Esta diferencia de procedimientos es la que, segun digomas arriba, me inclina a sostener que la jurisprudencia
constitucional propiamente aplicable a Filipinas es la jurisprudencia de los Estados, puesto que es con estos con los
cuales tenemos analogia o paridad constitucional en lo que toca a la forma y manera como se puede reformar la
Constitucion.

Seguire ahora citando mas casos.

Tenemos un caso de Minnesota, identico a los ya citados de Florida. En el asunto de In re McConaughy (106 Minn., 392;
119 N.W., 408), tambin se suscito la cuestion de si una propuesta enmienda constitucional habia sido aprobada de
acuerdo con los requisitos señalados en la Constitucion de Minnesota. Alli como aqui tambien hubo disputa sobre si esto
era una cuestion judicial o una cuestion politica no justiciable. La Corte Suprema deaquel Estado declaro sin ambajes
que era una cuestion judicial. He aqui sus palabras que no tienen desperdicio:
 The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has been properly
adopted according to the requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question. There can be little doubt
that the consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine
whether the constitution has been amended in the manner required by the constitution, unless a special tribunal
has been created to determine the question; and even then many of the courts hold that the tribunal cannot be
permitted to illegally amend the organic law. There is some authority for the view that when the constitution itself
creates a special tribunal, and confides to it the exclusive power to canvass votes and declare the results, and
makes the amendment a part of the constitution as a result of such declaration by proclamation or otherwise, the
action of such tribunal is final and conclusive. It may be conceded that this is true when it clearly appears that
such was the intention of the people when they adopted the constitution. The right to provide a special tribunal is
not open to question; but it is very certain that the people of Minnesota have not done so, and this fact alone
eliminates such cases as Worman vs. Hagan, 78 Md., 152; 27 Atl., 616; 21 L. R. A., 716, and Miles vs. Badford,
22 Md., 170; 85 Am. Dec., 643, as authorities against the jurisdiction of the courts. (In re McConaughy, 106 Minn.,
392; 119 N. W., 408.)

Tambien tenemos un caso de Georgia. En el asunto de Hammond vs. Clark (136 Ga., 313; 71 S.E., 479; 38 L.R.A.[N.S.],
77), se suscito igualmente una disputa sobre siuna enmienda habia sido aprobada de acuerdo con los requisitos de la
Constitucion era una cuestion judicial o no. La Corte Suprema de aquel Estado declaro afirmativamente. He aqui su
inequivoca pronunciamiento:

Counsel for plaintiff in error contended that the proclamation of the governor declaring that the amendment was
adopted was conclusive, and that the courts could not inquire into the question. To this contention we cannot
assent. The constitution is the supreme state law. It provides how it may be amended. It makes no provision for
exclusive determination by the governor as to whether an amendment has been made in the constitutional
method, and for the issuance by him of a binding proclamation to that effect. Such a proclamation may be both
useful and proper, in order to inform the people whether or not a change has been made in the fundamental law;
but the constitution did not make it conclusive on that subject. When the constitution was submitted for ratification
as a whole, a provision was made for a proclamation of the result by the governor. Const. art. 13, section 2, par. 2
(Civ. Code 1910, section 6613). But in reference to amendment there is no such provision. Const. article 13,
section 1, par. 1 (Civ. Code 1910, section 6610). In the absence of some other exclusive method of determination
provided by the constitution, the weight of authority is to the effect that whether an amendment has been properly
adopted according to the requirements of the existing constitution is a judicial question. (Hammond vs. Clark, 136
Ga., 313; 71 S.E., 479;38 L.R.A. [N.S.], 77.)

Tambien tenemos el siguiente case de Indiana:

(1) In the beginning we are confronted with the contention on the part of appellees that this court has no
jurisdiction to determine the questions in issue here. In the case of Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind., 336, 391; 99 N.E.,
1, 21 (Ann. Cas. 1915C, 200), this court, after reviewing many decisions as to the power of the courts to
determine similar questions, sums up the whole matter as follows:

"Whether legislative action is void for want of power in that body, or because the constitutional forms of conditions
have not been followed or have been violated (emphasis supplied) may become a judicial question, and upon the
courts the inevasible duty to determine it falls. And so the power resides in the courts, and they have, with
practical uniformity, exercised the authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of
change in the organic law. Such is the rule in this state" — citing more than 40 decisions of this and other states.

(2) Appellees further contend that appellant has not made out a case entitling him to equitable relief. The trial
court found that the officers of the state, who were instructed with the execution of the law, were about to expend
more than $500,000 under the law, in carrying out its provisions; indeed, it was suggested, in the course of the
oral argument, that the necessary expenditures would amount to more than $2,000,000. This court, in the case of
Ellingham vs. Dye, supra, involving the submission to the people of the Constitution prepared by the Legislature,
answered this same question contrary to the contention of appellees. See pages 413 and 414 of that opinion.
(186 Ind., 533; Bennett vs. Jackson, North Eastern Reporter, Vol. 116, pp. 921, 922.)

Creo que la posicion de la jurisprudencia americana tanto federal como de Estado sobre este punto, esto es, cuandoes
judicial la cuestion y cuando no lo es, se halla bien definida en el tomo 12 del Corpus Juris, en la parte que llevael
encabezamiento de "Constitutional Law" y bajo el subepigrafe que dice: "Adoption of Constitution and Amendments" (12
Corpus Juris, 880, 881). Es un compendiocuidados amente elaborado en que se da un extracto de la doctrina con las
citas sobre autoridades al pie. Reproducire el compendio, pero omitiendo las citas para no alargar demasiado esta
disidencia: el que desee comprobarlas no tienemas que consultar el tomo. En realidad, leyendo este extracto se ve que
parece un resumen del extenso analisis que llevo hecho sobre la doctrina tanto federal como estatal. Su meollo es, a
saber: la cuestion de si o no una nueva constitucion se ha adoptado la tienen que decidir los departamentos politicos del
gobierno; pero la cuestion de si una enmienda a una constitucion existente ha sido debidamente propuesta, adoptada y
ratificada de acuerdo con los requisitos provistos por la Constitucion, para que vengaa ser parte de la misma, es
una cuestion que los tribunales de justicia tienen que determinar y resolver, excepto cuandola materia ha sido referida
por la Constitucion a un tribunale special con poder para llegar una conclusion final. He aqui el sinopsis:

SEC. 382. b. Adoption of Constitution and Amendments. — Whether or not a new constitution has been adopted
is a question to be decided by the political departments of the government. But whether an amendment to the
existing constitution has been duly proposed, adopted, and ratified in the manner required by the constitution, as
as to become part thereof, is a question for the courts to determine, except where the matter has been committed
by the constitution to a special tribunal with power to make a conclusive determination, as where the governor is
vested with the sole right and duty of ascertaining and declaring the result, in which case the courts have no
jurisdiction to revise his decision. But it must be made clearly to appear that the constitution has been violated
before the court is warranted in interfering. In any event, whether an entire constitution is involved, or merely an
amendment, the federal courts will not attempt to pass on the legality of such constitution or amendment where its
validity has been recognized by the political departments of the state government, and acquiesced in by the state
judiciary. (12 C.J., pp. 880, 881.)

VI

Otra razon que aduce la mayoria para desestimar el recusro es que la copia impresa de la resolucion en cuestionaparece
certificada por los presidentes de ambas Camaras del Congreso; que en esa certificacion consta que dicha resolucion fue
debidamente aprobada por el Congreso conlos votos de las tres quintas-partes (3/5) de sus miembros; que, por tanto, la
debida aprobacion de dicha resolucion nose puede cuestionar, es una prueba concluyente para todoel mundo y para los
tribunales de justicia particularmente. Este argumento se funda en la doctrina inglesa llamada "enrolled act doctrine,"
cuya traduccion mas aproximada al español es "doctrina de la ley impresa." Esto, por unlado.

Por otro lado, la representacion de los recurrentes arguye que lo que rige y prevaleced en esta jurisdiccion noes la
doctrina inglesa o "enrolled act doctrine," sino ladoctrina americana que se conoce con el nombre de "journalentry
doctrine," en virtud de la cual la prueba de siuna ley o una resolucion ha sido debidamente aprobadapor el Congreso
debe buscarse en el diario de sesiones mismo del Congreso. Lo que diga el diario de sesiones esconcluyente y final.

Los recurrentes tienen la razon de su parte. Este punto legal ya se resolvio por esta Corte en la causa de los Estados
Unidos contra Pons (34 Jur. Fil., 772), que ambaspartes discuten en sus respectivos informes. Una de las defensas del
acusado era que la Ley No. 2381 de la Legislatura Filipina en virtud de la cual habia sido condenado era nula e ilegal
porque so aprobo despues ya del cierrede las sesiones especiales que tuvo lugar el 28 de Febrero de 1914, a las 12 de
la noche; es decir, que, en realidad de verdad, la aprobacion se efectuo el 1.º de Marzo, puesla sesion sine die del dia
anterior se prolongo mediante una ficcion haciendose parar las manecillas del reloj a las 12 en punto de la noche. Esta
Corte, sin necesidad deninguna otra prueba, examino el diario de sesiones correspondientea la referida fecha 28 de
Febrero, y habiendo hallado que alli constaba inequivocamente haberse aprobadola mencionada ley en tal fecha, fallo
que esta pruebaera final y concluyente para las partes, para los tribunales y para todo el mundo. La Corte desatendio por
completoel "enrolled act," la copia impresa de la ley, pues dijo, asaber: "Pasando por alto la cuestion relativa as si la Ley
Impresa (Ley No. 2381), que fue aprobada por autorizacion legal, constituye prueba concluyente sobre la fecha desu
aprobacion, investigaremos si los Tribunales pueden consultar otras fuestes de informacion, ademas de los diarios de las
sesiones legislativas, para determinar la fecha enque se cerraron las sesiones de la Legislatura, cuando talesdiarios
son claros y explicitos." Y la Corte dijo que nohabia necesidad de consultar otras fuestes, que el diario de sesiones era
terminante, definitivo; y asi fallo la causaen contra del apelante.

Y no era extraño que asi ocurriese: habia en la Corte una mayoria americana, familiarizada y compenetrada naturalmente
con la jurisprudencia pertinente de su pais ¿Quede extrano habia, por tanto, que aplicasen la doctrina americana, la
doctrina del "journal entry," que es mas democratica, mas republicana, en vez de la doctrina inglesa, el "enrolled act
doctrine," que despues de todo tiene ciertotinte monarquico, producto del caracter peculiar e influencia tradicionalista de
las instituciones inglesas? (Vease Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., 371; Del.) Firman, como se sabe, la decision el ponente
Sr. Trent, y los Magistrados Sres. Torres, Johnson, Moreland y Araullo, sin mingun disidente.Y notese que cuando se
promulgo esta sentencia todavia estaba en vigor el articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil, tal como estaba
reformado por la Ley No. 2210. que entre otras cosas proveia lo siguiente: ". . . Entendiendose, que en el caso de las
Leyes de la Comisionde Filipinas o de la Legislatura Filipina, cuando existeuna copia firmada por los Presidentes y los
secretarios de dichos cuerpos, sera prueba concluyente de las dispociones de la ley en cuestion y de la debida
aprobacion delas mismas." ¿Que mejor prueba de la voluntad expresa, categorica, de hacer prevalecer la doctrina
americana sobrela doctrina inglesa? Lo mas comodo para esta Cortehubiera sido aplicar el citado articulo 313 del Codigo
de Procedimiento Civil. No lo hizo, paso por alto sobreel mismo, yendo directamente al diario de sesiones dela
Legislatura, tomando conocimiento judicial del mismo. Si aqui hay algun respeto a la regla del stare decisis, estaes una
magnifica ocasion para demostrarlo. Una regla bien establecida no ha de abrogarse asi como asi; sobretodo cuando de
por medio anda la Constitucion como enel presente caso en que se ha formulado ante nosotros la queja de que la ley
fundamental ha sido violada en unrespecto muy importante como es el capitulo sobre enmiendas, y la queja no solo no
es temeraria sino que se hallaapoyada en buenas y solidas razones.

Mas todavia: cuando se establecio la doctrina en lacitada causa de los Estados Unidos contra Pons (1916, Agosto 12)
adoptando en esta jurisdiccion la doctrina americana del "journal entry" en lugar de la inglesa del "enrolled act," en
nuestra Ley Organica que, por cierto, no era aun la Ley Jones sino la Ley del Congreso de 1902, no habia ninguna
disposicion que proveyera mandatoriamente que en el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura sehiciesen constar los sies y
los nos en la votacion de cualquier proyecto de ley o resolucion, consignando especifica mentelos nombres de los
miembros que hayan votado enpro y en contra, ni tampoco habia ninguna disposicione statutoria a dicho efecto. De modo
que en aquella epoca el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura carecia aun de las fuertes garantias de veracidad que ahora
posee en virtud de esa disposicion que hace obligatoria la constancia oconsignacion de los sies y nos, disposicion
incorporada enla Constitucion del Commonwealth, ahora de la Republica. (Vease Constitucion de Filipinas, Articulo VI,
seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20, incico 1; seccion 21, inciso 2.)

Sobre la derogacion del articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil no puede haber duda. Ese articulo, que equivale a
una regla de prueba, no se ha incorporado enel Reglamento de los Tribunales. No tratandose de una regla fundada en un
principio general y unanimemente establecido, sino de algo peculiar aislado, acerca del cuallas autoridades estan
divididas, con una mayoria de los Estados de la Union americana decididamente en contra, suno inclusion en el
Reglamento de los Tribunales tiene queconsiderarse necesariamente como una derogacion. Indudablemente esta Corte,
al no incluir dicho articulo en el Reglamento de los Tribunales, ha querido derogarlo en vistade los resuelto en la citada
causa de Estados Unidos contraPons y de la novisima disposicion insertada en la Constitucion del Commonwealth, ahora
de la Republica, que exige la consignacion en el diario de sesiones de los sies y nos en cada votacion final de proyecto
de ley o resolucion conjunta, con especificacion de los nombres de los que hasvotado.

Resulta evidente de lo expuesto que ahora existen masrazones para reafirmar en esta jurisdiccion la doctrina americana
del "journal entry" o "constancia en el diario desesiones" (1) porque el citado seccion 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento
Civil ya no rige con la vigencia del Reglamento de los Tribunales; (2) porque esa disposicion denuestra Constitucion que
hace obligatoria la consignacion de los sies y nos en la votacion de cada bill o resolucion, con especificacion de los
nombres de los que hayan votado enfavor y en contra, hace del diario de sesiones la mejor prueba sobre autenticidad de
los actos legislativos y es, porconsiguiente, la ley sobre la materia en este pais, con entera exclusion de la doctrina
inglesa o "enrolled act doctrine."Las autoridades americanas son contestes en que siempreque en un Estado de la Union
Federal la Constitucioncontiene una disposicion semejante a la nuestra sobre sies y nos la regla de prueba no es la copia
impresa de la leyo "enrolled act," sino el "journal entry" o constancia enel diario de sesiones.
(Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra.)

Aqui se podria dar por terminada toda discusion sobre este punto si no fuera porque los abogados de los recurridos
arguyen fuertemente en favor de la doctrina de la copia impresa o "enrolled act doctrine," y la mayoria de esta Corte
acepta sus argumentos. Se cita, sobre todo, el asunto federal de Field vs. Clark en apoyo de la doctrina.

He examinado la jurisprudencia americana sobre este particular con toda la diligencia de que he sido capaz y he llegado
a la conclusion de que nuestros predecesores enesta Corte merecen todo encomio por su indubitable aciertoal adoptar
en esta jurisdiccion, en la causa de los Estados Unidos contra Pons, supra, la doctrina americana del "journal entry" o
constancia en el diario de sesiones legislativas. No cabe duda de que esta doctrina es mas democratica, mas liberal, y
tambien mas humana y mas concorde con la realidad. La doctrina inglesa del "enrolled act" ocopia impresa de la ley esta
basada en el derecho comun y se adopto en Inglaterra donde, como se sabe, no hay constitucion escrita y la forma de
gobierno es monarquica,y se adopto en un tiempo en que el poder del Parlamento que era tambien el mas alto tribunal
de justicia, era absoluto y transcendente y las restricciones sobre el mismo eran muy ligeras. Por eso un tribunal
americano ha dicho: "Because such a rule obtains as to the Parliament of Great Britain, under a monarchial form of
government, that cannot be regarded as a very potent reason for its application in this state, where the will of the
sovereign power hasbeen declared in the organic act." (Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra, pag. 379; cito con frecuencia este
asunto famoso de Delaware porque es en el mismo donde he hallado una discusion mas acabada y comprensiva sobre
ambas doctrinas: la americana del "journal entry" y la inglesa del "enrolled act.")

Es indudable que el sesgo de la jurisprudencia americana hoy en dia es a favor de la doctrina del "journal entry." Lo
resuelto en el asunto federal de Field contra Clark, enque tanto enfasis ponen los recurridos, no ha hecho mas que
fortalecer ese giro, pues en dicho asunto va en vuelta lainferencia de que cuando la Constitucion establece ciertos
requisitos para la aprobacion de una ley o resolucion, conla consignacion de los sies y nos y los nombres de los que han
votado afirmativa y negativamente, el diario de sesioneses el que rige y prevalece como modo e instrumento de
autenticacion. Por eso que en el asunto tipico y representativode Union Bank vs. Commissioners of Oxford (199 N.C.,
214; 25 S.E., 966; 34 L.R.A., 487), la Corte Supremade North Carolina ha declarado lo siguiente.

According to the law it is well settled in nearly 100 well-adjudicated cases in the courts of last resort in 30 states,
and also by the Supreme Court of the United States, that when a state Constitution prescribes such formalities in
the enactment of laws as require a record of the yeas and nays on the legislative journals, these journals are
conclusive as against not only a printed statute, published by authority of law, but also against a duly enrolled
act. The following is a list of the authorities, in number 93, sustaining this view either directly or by very close
analogy. . . . It is believed that no federal or state authority can be found in conflict with them.

Decisions can be found, as, for instance, Carr. vs. Coke (116 N.C., 223; 22 S.E. 16; 28 L.R.A., 737; 47 Am. St.
Rep., 801, supra, to the effect that, where the Constitution contains no provision requiring entries on the journal of
particular matters — such, for example, as calles of the yeas and nays on a measure in question — the enrolled
act cannot, in such case, be impeached by the journals. That, however, is very different proposition from the one
involved here, and the distinction is adverted to in Field vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 671 (12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed.,
294. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 377.)

Y en el asunto de Ottawa vs. Perkins la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos ha dicho lo siguiente:

But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of South Ottawa vs. Perkins, 94 U.S., 260; 24 Law., ed.,
154, on appeal from the United States court for the Northern district of Illinois (Mr. Justice Bradley delivering the
opinion), said: "When once it became the settled construction of the Constitution of Illinois that no act can be
deemed a valid law, unless by the journals of the Legislature it appears to have been regularly passed by both
houses, it became the duty of the courts to take judicial notice of the journal entries in that regard. The courts of
Illinois may decline to take that trouble, unless parties bring the matter to their attention, but on general principles
the question as to the existence of a law is a judicial one and must be so regarded by the courts of the United
States." (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 387.)

Se dice que el interest publico exige que el "enrolled act" o copia impresa de la ley firmada por los Presidentes deambas
Camaras del Congreso de declare concluyente y final, porque de otra manera habria caos, confusion: cualquierase
creeria con derecho a atacar la validez de una ley o resolucion, impugnando la autenticidad de su aprobacion ode su
texto. Pero esto pone en orden las siguientes preguntas que se contestan por si mismas: ?no es el diariode sesiones un
documento constitucional, exigido por la Constitucion que se lleve por las dos camaras del Congreso, controlado y
supervisado por dichas camaras y por los oficiales de las mismas? ¿que mejor garantia de autenticidad, contra la
falsificacion, que ese requerimiento constitucional de consignar obligatoriamente en el diario, en la votacionde todo bill o
resolucion, los sies y los nos, y haciendoconstar los nombres tanto afirmativos como negativos? ¿se ha producido por
ventura caos y confusion en los Estados americanos que han adoptado esta regla y que, segun admiten los mismos
recurridos, forman una decisiva mayoria? ¿se acaso posible concebir que el sentido americano, tan practico, tan utilitario,
tan, realista, optase poruna regla que fuese origen de caos y confusion? Prescindiendo ya de la jurisprudencia que, ya
hemos visto, estadecididamente inclinada a favor de la doctrina americana del "journal entry" ?que dicen los tratadistas
mas autorizados, los de nombradia bien establecida, y sobre todolos especialistas en derecho constitucional?

El Juez Cooley, en su celebrada obra sobre Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 193, dice lo siguiente a favor del "journal
entry rule":

Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed., 193), says: "Each house keeps a journal of its
proceedings which is a public record, and of which the courts are at liberty to take judicial notice. If it would
appear from these journals that any act did not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to it the Legislature
did not follow any requirement of the Constitution or that in any other respect the act was not constitutionally
adopted, the courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute void. But whenever it is acting in
apparent performance of legal functions, every reasonable presumption is to be made in favor of the action of a
legislative body. It will not be presumed in any case, from the mere silence of the journals, that either house has
exceeded its authority, or disregarded a constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative acts, unless when
the Constitution has expressly required the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance, where it requires
the yeas and nays to be entered."

Sutherland, en su tambien celebrada obra sobre Statutory Construction, seccion 46 y siguientes, tambien sedeclara a
favofr del "journal entry rule" con el siguiente pronunciamiento:
 The presumption is that an act properly authenticated was regularly passed, unless there is evidence of which the
courts take judicial notice showing the contrary. The journals are records, and, in all respects touching
proceedings under the mandatory provisions of the Constitution, will be effected to impeach and avoid the acts
recorded as laws and duly authenticated, if the journals affirmatively show that these provisions have been
disregarded. . . . The journals by being required by the Constitution or laws, are record . . ..

When required, as is extensively the case in this country, by a paramount law, for the obvious purpose of showing
how the mandatory provisions of that law have been followed in the methods and forms of legislation, they are
thus made records in dignity, and are of great importance. The legislative acts regularly authenticated are also
records. The acts passed, duly authenticated, and such journals are parallel records; but the latter are superior,
when explicit and conflicting with the other, for the acts authenticated speak decisively only when the journals are
silent, and not even then as to particulars required to be entered therein. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 378.)

Desde luego la opinion de Wigmore, en que se apoya la mayoria, merece toda clase de respetos. Pero creo no seme
tachara de parcial ni ligero si digo que sobre el punto constitucional que estamos discutiendo, me inclino mas y doy
mayor peso a la opinion del Juez Cooley y de Sutherland, por razones obvias. Wigmore nunca pretendio serespecialista
en derecho constitucional. Con mucho tino elponente en el tantas veces citado asunto de Rash contra Allen dice lo
siguiente de la opinion del celebrado constitucionalista:

We have quoted Judge Cooley's language because of the great respect that his opinions always command, and
also because of the fact that it is upon the authority of his opinion that many of the decisions in support of
the American rule have been based. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 378.)

Un detenido y minucioso examen de la jurisprudencia y de los tratados sobre el particular lleva a uno al convencimiento
de que la tendencia actual en America es a tomar la substancia, el fondo mismo de las cosas en vez de la simpleforma,
el caparazon, a prescindir del artificio, de la ficcion legal, para ir a la realidad misma. Y no cabe duda deque el "enrolled
act" se presta a veces a tener mas apoyo en el artificio y ficcion legal, mientras que el diario desesiones, con las fuertes
garantias de autenticidad como las que se proveen en nuestra Constitucion y en Constituciones similares americanas,
reproduce y refleja la realidad de los hechos relativamente con mas exactitud y fidelidad. Tomemos como ejemplo el
presente caso. La copia impresade la resolucion cuestionada, firmada por los Presidentes de ambas Camaras del
Congreso, reza que la misma fueaprobada debidamente con los votos de las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) del Congreso, pero
esto no es mas que unaopinion, una conclusion legal de los presidentes, pues noconsta en dicha copia impresa el
numero concreto de votos emitidos, ni el numero concreto de la totalidad de miembros actuales de cada camara.
Tampoco constan en dichacopia impresa, tal como manda la Constitucion, los sies y nos de la votacion, con los nombres
de los que votaron afirmativa y negativamente. Asi que, con solo esa copiaimpresa a la vista, no podemos resolver la
importantisima cuestion constitucional que plantean los recurrentes, a saber: que la votacion fue anticonstitucional; que
arbitrariamente fueron excluidos de la votacion 11 miembros debidamente cualificados del Congreso — 3 Senadores y 8
Representantes; que, por virtud de la exclusion ilegal y arbitraria de estos 11 miembros, el numero de votos emitidosen
cada camara a favor de la resolucion no llegani constituye las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) que requiere la Constitucion; y
que, por tanto, la resolucion es ilegal, anti-constitucional y nula. Para resolver estas cuestiones, todastremendas, todas
transcedentales, no hay mas remedio queir al fondo, a las entrañas de la realidad, y todo ello no sepuede hallar en el
"enrolled act," en la copia impresa dela ley, que es incolora, muda sobre el particular, sino enel diario de sesiones donde
con profusion se dan tales detalles. ¿No es verdad que todo esto demuestra graficamentela evidente, abrumadora
superioridad del "journalentry" sobre el "enrolled act," como medio de prueba?

Mi conclusion, pues, sobre este punto es que el giro dela legislacion jurisprudencia en los diferentes Estados de la Union
es decididamente en favor de la doctrina americana del "journal entry"; que en Filipinas desde 1916 en que se promulgo
la sentencia en la causa de Estados Unidos contra Pons la regla es el "journal entry rule"; que esta regla se adopto por
este Supremo Tribunal enun tiempo en que estaba vigente el articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil y cuando el
diario de sesiones de la Legislatura no gozaba de los prestigios de que goza hoy, en virtud de las rigidas y fuertes
garantias sobre autenticidad de las votaciones legislativas provistas en nuestra Constitucion; que ahora que el referido
articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil ya ha sido derogado porel Reglamento de los Tribunales y se hallan
vigentes esasgarantias constitucionales que son mandatorias, la reglaindiscutible y exclusiva sobre la materia es el
"journal entry rule"' que la regla americana es mas liberal y mas democratica que la regla inglesa, la cual tiene un
evidente sabormonarquico; que el puebo filipino jamas tolerara un sistemamonarquico o algo semejante; que el cambiar
de regla ahora es un paso muy desafortunado, un injustificado retroceso, un apoyo a la reaccion y puede dar lugar a la
impresionde que las instituciones de la Republica filipina tienden a ser totalitarias; que la doctrina inglesa del "enrolled
act" es un instrumento harto inadecuado, ineficaz, para resolver conflictos constitucionales que se iran planteando ante
los tribunales, e inclusive puede fomentargroseros asaltos contra la Constitucion; que, por el contrario, la doctrina
americana del "journal entry" es amplia, eficaz, y permite que con toda libertad y desembarazose puedan resolver los
conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales, sin evasivas ni debilidades; y, por ultimo, que nuestro deber, el deber de esta
Corte, es optar por la doctrina que mejor asegure y fomente los procesos ordenadosde la ley y de la Constitucion y evitef
situaciones en que el ciudadano se sienta como desamparado de la ley y dela Constitucion y busque la justicia por sus
propias manos.

VII

La mayoria, habiendo adoptado en este asunto una posicion inhibitoria, estima innecesario discutir la cuestion de si los 3
Senadores y 8 Representantes que fueron excluidos de la votacion son o no miembros del Congreso. Es decir, lo que
debiera ser cuestion fundamental — el leitmotiff, la verdadera ratio decidendi en este caso — se relegaa termino
secundario, se deja sin discutir y sin resolver. No puedo seguir a la mayoria en esta evasion: tengo que discutir este
punto tan plenamente como los otros puntos, si no mas, porque es precisamente lo principal — el meollo del caso.

Comencemos por el Senado. Los 3 Senadores excluido seran miembros actuales del Senado cuando se voto la
resolucion cuestionada, por las siguientes razones:

(a) Segun la estipulacion de hechos entre las partes y los ejemplares del diario de sesiones que obran en autoscomo
anexos, dichos Senadores fueron proclamados por la Comision de Elecciones como electos juntamente con sus 21
compañeros. Despues de la proclamacion participaron en la organizacion del Senado, votando en la eleccion del
Presidente de dicho cuerpo. De hecho el Senador Vera recibio 8 votos para Presidente contra el Senador Avelino que
recibio 10. Tambien participaron en algunos debates relativos a la organizacion.

(b) Tambien consta en la estipulacion de hechos y enel diario de sesiones que prestaron su juramento de cargo ante
Notarios particulares debidamente autorizados y calificados para administrarlo, habiendose depositado dicho juramento
en la secretaria del Senado. Se dice, sin embargo, que ese juramento no era valido porque no se presto colectivamente,
en union con los otros Senadores. Esto es unerror. La Ley sobre la materia es el articulo 26 del Codigo Administrativo
Revisado, a saber:

By whom oath of office may be administered. — The oath of office may be administered by any officer generally
qualified to administer oath; but the oath of office of the members and officers ofeither house of the legislature
may also be administered by persons designated for such purpose by the respective houses.

Este articulo es demasiado claro para necesitar mas comentarios. Es evidente que el Senador y Representante puede
calificarse prestando el juramento de su cargo antecualquier funcionario autorizado para administrarlo; y la disposicion de
que tambien pueden administrar ese juramento personas designadas por cada camara es solo decaracter permisivo,
opcional. Y la mejor prueba de estoes que antes del advenimiento de la Republica el Senadodhabia reconocido la validez
del juramento de cargo prestadoante un Notario Publico por otros Senadores de la minoria los Sres. Mabanag, Garcia,
Confesor y Cabili. Amenos que estas cosas se tomen a broma, o la arbitrariedadse erija en ley — la ley de la selva, del
mas fuerte — no esconcebible que el juramento ante Notario se declare validoen un caso y en otro se declared invalido,
concurriendo lasmismas circunstancias;

(c) Tambien consta, en virtud de la estipulacion de hechos y de los ejemplares del diario de sesiones que obran en autos
como anexos, que los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero han estado cobrando todos sus sueldos y emolumentos como
tales Senadores desde la inauguracion del Senado hasta ahora, incluso naturalmente el tiempo en quese aprobo la
resolucion cuestionada. Es violentar demasiadola argucia el sostener que un miembro de una camara legislativa puede
cobrar todos sus haberes y emolumentos y, sin embargo, no ser legalmente miembro de la misma. El vulgo, maestro en
la ironia y en el sarcasmo, tiene unamanera cruda para pintar esta situacion absurda: "Tiene, pero no hay". ¿Como es
posible que las camaras autoricen el desembolso de sus fondos a favor de unos hombres que, segun se sostiene
seriamente, no estan legalmente cualificados para merecer y recibir tales fondos?

(d) Se arguye, sin embargo, que los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero no son miembros del Senado porque, envirtud de
la Resolucion Pendatun, se les suspendio el juramento y el derecho a sus asientos. Respecto del juramento, ya hemos
visto que era valido, segun la ley. Respecto dela suspension del derecho al asiento, he discutido extensamente este
punto en mi disidencia en el asunto de Vera contra Avelino, supra, calificando de anticonstitucional ynula la suspension.
Pero aun suponiendo que la mismafuera valida, los recurrentes alegan y arguyen que no poreso han dejado de ser
miembros los suspendidos. La alegaciones acertada. La suspension no abate ni anula lacalidad de miembro; solo la
muerte, dimision o expulsion produce ese efecto (vease Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil., 100, 101; vease
tambien United States vs. Dietrich,126 Fed. Rep., 676). En el asunto de Alejandrino contra Quezon hemos declarado lo
siguiente:
 Es cosa digna de observar que el Congreso de los Estados Unidos en toda su larga historia no ha suspendido a
ninguno de sus miembros.Y la razon es obvia. El castigo mediante reprension o multavindica la dignidad
ofendida de la Camara sin privar a los representados de su representante; la expulsion cuando es
permisiblevindica del mismo modo el honor del Cuerpo Legislativo dando asi oportunidad a los representados de
elegir a otro nuevo; pero la suspension priva al distrito electoral de una representacion sin quese le de a ese
distrito un medio para llenar la vacante. Mediante la suspension el cargo continua ocupado, pero al que lo ocupa
se le ha impuesto silencio. (Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil.,100, 101.)

La posicion juridica y constitucional de los 8 Representantes excluidos de la votacion es todavia mas firme.Consta
igualmente, en virtud de la estipulacion de hechos y de los ejemplares del diario de sesiones obrantes en autos, que
dichos 8 Representantes tambien se calificaron, alinaugurarse el Congreso, prestando el juramento de sucargo ante
Notarios Publicos debidamente autorizados; quesu juramento se deposito en la Secretaria de la Camara; que han estado
cobrando desde la inauguracion hasta ahoratodos sus sueldos y emolumentos, excepto dos los Representantes Taruc y
Lava que han dejado de cobrar desde hacealgun tiempo; que tambien han participado en algunas deliberaciones, las
relativas al proyecto de resolucion parasuspenderlos.

Pero entre su caso y el de los Senadores existe estadiferencia fundamental: mientras con respecto a estos ultimosla
Resolucion Pendatun sobre suspension llego aaprobarse adquiriendo estado parlamentario, en la Camarade
Representantes no ha habido tal cosa, pues la resolucionde suspension se endoso a un comite especial para su estudioe
investigacion, y hasta ahora la Camara no ha tomadosobre ella ninguna accion, no favorable ni adversa. Demodo que en
el caso de los Representantes hasta ahora nohay suspension, porque de tal no puede calificarse la acciondel Speaker y
del macero privandoles del derecho detomar parte en las deliberaciones y votaciones. Para queuna suspension produzca
efectos legales y, sobre todo, constitucionales, tiene que decret arla la Camara misma, pormedio de una resolucion
debidamente aprobada, de acuerdocon los requisitos provistos en la Constitucion. Nada deesto se ha hecho en la
Camara.

El Articulo XV de nuestra Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, dice que "El Congreso, en sesion conjunta, por el voto detres
cuartas partes de todos los miembros del Senado y dela Camara de Representantes votando separadamente, puede
proponer enmiendas a esta Constitucion o convocar unaconvencion para dicho efecto." Donde la ley no distingueno
debemos distinguir. La frase todos los miembros debeinterpretarse como que incluye todos los miembros elegidos, no
importa que esten ausentes o esten suspendidos; mas naturalmente cuando no estan suspendidos como en el casode
los ya citados 8 Representantes. El Juez Cooley, ensu ya citada obra Constitutional Limitations, hace sobreeste particular
los siguientes comentarios que son terminantes para la resolucion de este punto constitucional, a saber:

For the votre required in the passage of any particular law the reader is referred to the Constitution of his State. A
simple majority of a quorum is sufficient, unless the Constitution establishes some other rule; and where, by the
Constitution, a two-thirds of three-fourths vote is made essential to the passage of any particular class of bills,
two-thids or three-fourths of a quorum will be understood, unless the terms employed clearly indicate that this
proportion of all the members, or of all those elected, is intended. (A constitutional requirement that the assent of
two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill appropriating the
public money or property for localor private purposes, is mandatory, and cannot be evaded by calling a bill a "joint
resolution".)

(Footnote: "Such a requirement is too clear and too valuable to be thus frittered away." Allen vs. Board of State
Auditors, 122 Mich., 324; 47 L.R.A., 117.)

(Footnote: "By most of the constitutions either all the laws, or laws on some particular subjects, are required to be
adopted by a majority voted, or some other proportion of "all the members elected," or of "the whole
representation." These and similar phrases require all the members to be taken into account whether present or
not. Where a majority of all the members elected is required in the passage of a law, an ineligible person is not on
that account to be excluded in the count. (Satterloo vs. San Francisco, 23 Cal.,314.)" (Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, Vol. 1, p. 291.)

VIII

Los recurridos no cuestionan la personalidad o derecho de accion de los recurrentes para plantear el presente litigio. Sin
embargo, en nuestras deliberaciones algunos Magistrados han expresado dudas sbore si los recurrentestien en interes
legal suficiente y adecuado para demandar y, por tanto, para invocar nuestra jurisdiccion en el presentecaso. La duda es
si el interes que alegan los recurrentesno es mas bien el general y abstracto que tiene cualquier otro ciudadano para
defender la integridad de la Constitucion, en cuyo caso seria insuficiente para demandarante los tribunales, los cuales,
segun el consenso de las autoridades, no estan establecidos para considerar y resolver controversias academicas y
doctrinales, sino conflictos positivos, reales, en que hay algun dano y perjuicioo amago de dano y perjuicio.

Creo que la personalidad o derecho de accion de losrecurrentes es incuestionable. En primer lugar, 11 de ellosson
miembros del Congreso, y alegan que se les privo delderecho de votar al considerarse la resolucion cuestionaday que si
se les hubiese permitido votar dicha resolucion no hubiese obtenido la sancion de las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) que
requiere la Constitucion. ¿Que mayor interes legalque este? Ellos dicen que sus votos hubieran sido decisivos, que con
su intervencion parlamentaria hubies en salvado alpaid de lo que consideran amago de una tremenda calamidad publica
— la concesion de iguales derechos a los americanos para explotar nuestros recursos naturales y utilidades publicas.
¿No es este amago de dano, para ellos individualmente y para el pais colectivamentem, adecuado y suficiente para crear
un interes legal? En el asunto de Coleman vs. Miller, supra, se suscito esta misma cuestion y se resolvio a favor de los
recurrentes. Como ya hemos visto, estos eran 20 Senadores del Estado de Kansas que alegaban que en la propuesta
ratificacion de la 18.ª Enmienda a la Constitucion Federal sus votos que daron abatidos por elvoto decisivo del Teniente
Gobernador. La Corte Federal declaro que esto constituia interes legal suficiente y adecuado.

En segundo lugar, los recurrentes alegan ser ciudadanos, electores y contribuyentes de Filipinas. Naturalmente, como
tales tienen derecho a participar en la explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales y operacion de utilidades publicas, con
exclusion de los americanos y otros extranjeros. De ello se sigue logicamente que cualguier actolegislativo que anule y
abrogue esa exclusividad afectarapersonalmente a sus derechos, amagandolos de un probable perjuicio. Esto, a mi
juicio, crea un interes legalade cuado u suficiente para litigar. Esto no es un interesmeramente academico, abstracto.
(Vease Hawke vs.Smith, 253 U.S., 221, 227; 64 Law. ed., 871, 875; 40 Sup.Ct., 495; 10 A. L. R., 1504; veanse
tambien Leser vs.Garnett, 258 Ud.S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 571; 42 Sup.Ct., 217; Coleman vs. Miller, 122 A. L. R.,
698.)

En el asunto de Hawke vs. Smith, supra, el demandante alegaba ser "ciudadano y elector del Estado de Ohio, y
comoelector y contribuyente del Condado de Hamilton, en sunombre y en el de otros similarmente situados, presento una
solicitud de prohibicion ante el tribunal del Estado para que se prohibiera al Secretario de Estado a que gastara fondos
publicos en la preparacion e impresion de balotaspara la sumision al electorado de la 18.ª Enmienda a la Constitucion
Federal para su ratificacion. La Corte Suprema Federal fallo que el demandante tenia intereslegal y, por tanto,
personalidad y derecho de accion para demandar.

En el asunto de Leser vs. Garnett, supra, los demandantes alegaban ser electores cualificados de Maryland y solicitaban
la exclusion de ciertas mujeres del censo electoralpor el fundamento de que la Constitucion de Maryland limitaba el
sufragio a los varones y la 19.ª Enmiendaa la Constitucion Federal no habia sido validamente ratificadaa. Lo Corte
Suprema Federal fallo tambien que los demandantes tenian interes legal suficiente y adecuado.

IX

Cuando se celebraron las audiencias en este asunto sele pregunto a uno de los abogados de los recurridos, creo que el
mismo Secretario de Justicia, cual seria el remedio legal para los recurrentes, ya que se sostiene que en elpresente caso
se trate de una materia no judicial, injusticiable, y, que, por tanto, los tribunales nada tienen que hacer. El Secretario de
Justicia contesto: ninguno. Lounico que los recurrentes pueden hacer es esperar las elecciones y plantear el caso
directamente ante el pueblo, unico juez en las controversias de caracter politico. Esto mismose dijo en el caso de
Vera contra Aveino, supra, y reiterolo que alli he dicho sobre este argumento, a saber:

Solo nos queda por considerar el argumento deprimente, desalentadorde que el caso que nos ocupa no tiene
remedio ni bajo la Constitucion ni bajo las leyes ordinarias. A los recurrentes se lesdice que no tienen mas que
un recurso: esperar laas elecciones y plantear directamente la cuestion ante el pueblo elector. Si los recurrentes
tienen razon, el pueblo les reivindicara eligiendoles o elevandoa su partido al poder, repudiando, en cambio, a los
recurridoso a su partido. Algunas cosas se podrian decir acerca de este argumento. Se podria decir, por ejemplo,
que el remedio no es expeditoni adecuado porque la mayoria de los recurridos han sido elegidos para un periodo
de seis anos, asi que no se les podra exigir ninguna responsabilidad por tan largo tiempo. Se podria decir
tambien que en una eleccion politica entran muchos factores, y es posible quela cuestion que se discute hoy, con
ser tan fervida y tan palpitante, quede, cuando llegue el caso, obscurecida por otros "issues" maspresionantes y
decisivos. Tambien se podria decir que, independientemente de la justicia de su cuasa, un partido minoritario
siemprelucha con desventaja contra el partido mayoritario.

Pero, a nuestro juicio, la mejor contestacion al argumento esque no cabe concebir que los redactores de la
Constitucion filipina hayan dejado en medio de nuestro sistema de gobierno un peligros ovacio en donde quedan
paralizados los resortes de la Constituciony de la ley, y el ciudadano queda inerme, impotente frente a lo que el
 considera flagrante transgresion de sus derechos. Los redactoresde la Constitucion conocian muy bien nuestro
sistema de gobierno — sistema presidencial. Sabian muy bien que este no tiene la flexibilidaddel tipo ingles — el
parlamentario. En Inglaterra y en lospaises que siguen su sistema hay una magnifica valvula de seguridad
politica; cuando surge una grave crisis, de esas que sacudenlos cimientos de la nacion, el parlamento se
disuelve y se convocanelleciones generales para que el pueblo decida los grandes "issues" del dia. Asi se
consuman verdaderas revoluciones, sin sangre, sin violencia. El sistema presidential no tiene esa valvula. El
periodo que media de eleccion a eleccion es inflexible. Entre nosotros, porejemplo, el periodo es de seis años
para el Senado, y de cuatro años para la Camara de Representantes y los gobiernos provinciales y municipales.
Solamente se celebran elecciones especiales para cubrir vacantes que ocurran entre unas elecciones generalesy
otras. Se comprendera facilmente que bajo un sistema asi esharto peligroso, es jugar con fuego el posibilitar
situaciones dondeel individuo y el pueblo no puedan buscar el amparo de la Constitucion y de las leyes, bajo
procesos ordenados y expeditos, paraprotegar sus derechos. (Vera contra Avelino, pags. 363, 364.)

Fued Jefferson quien dijo que como medida de higiene politicaera conveniente que el pueblo americano tuviera una
revolucion cada veinte años. Parece que el gran democratadijo esto no por el simple prurito de jugar con laparadoja, con
la frase, sino convencido de que la revoluciones el mejor antidoto para la tirania o los amagos de tirania.

Grande como es el respeto que merecen las opiniones delinmortal autor de la Decaraction de Independencia, creoque la
revolucion es siempre revolucion, la violencia es siempre violencia: caos, confusion, desquiciamiento de los resortes
politicos y sociales, derramamiento de sangre, perdidade vidas y haciendas, etcetera, etcetera. Asi que normalmente
ninguno puede desear para su pais la violencia, aun en nombre de la vitalidad, de la salud publica.

Estoy convencido de que el mejor ideal politico es la revolucionsin sangre, esa que no pocas veces se ha consumado v.
gr. en la historia contemporanea de Inglaterra, yaun de America misma. Y ese ideal es perfectamente realizable
permitiendo el amplio juego de la Constitucion y delas leyes, evitando pretextos a la violencia, y no posibilitando
situaciones de desamparo y desesperacion.

Por eso creo sinceramente que la mejor politica, la mejordoctrina judicial es la que en todo tiempo encauza y fomentalos
procesos ordenados de la Constitucion y de la ley.

Footnotes

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

1 Omitted.

BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., dissidente:

1 Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno y Jose E. Romero.

2Senadores: Alejo Mabanag, Carlos P. Garcia, Eulogio Rodriguez, Tomas Confesor, Tomas Cabili, Jose O. Vera,
Ramon Diokno, y Jose E. Romero.

Representantes: Juvenal Almendras, Paulino Alonzo, Apolinario Cabigon, Floro Crisologo, Gabriel Dunuan,
Cosme B. Garcia, Agustin Y. Kintanar, Vicente Logarta, Francisco A. Perfecto, Cipriano P. Primicias, Nicolas
Rafols, Jose V. Rodriguez, Juan de G. Rodriguez, Felixberto M. Serrano, Conrado Singson, George K. Tait, y
Leandro A. Tojong.

Presidentes de Partido: Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Emilio Javier y Sofronio Quimson, Nacionalista Party,
Democratic Alliance, Popular Front y Philippine Youth Party, respectivamente.

3 Comision de Elecciones: Jose Lopez Vito, Francisco Enage y Vicente de Vera, respectivamente.

Marciano Guevara, Paciano Dizon y Pablo Lucas, Tesorero, Auditor y Director de Imprenta, respectivamente.
4 La politica de nacionalizacion de la recursos naturales yutilidades publicas incorporada en nuestra Constitucion
no es unapolitica nueva, sino que trae su origen de nuestro pasado remoto, dela historia colonial misma de
España en Filipinas. Los primeros conflictos de los filipinos con los conquistado es tenian por causala propiedad
de la tierra; los filipinos se esforzaban por reivindicarel dominio del suelo que creian detentado por los
colonizadores. Estos conflictos fueron agravandose con el tiempo condensan dose enla formidable cuestion
agraria que en las postrimerias del siglo diecinueve fue enm gran parte la causa de la revolucion contra España.
Lass campanas de Rizal y de los laborantes, y el Katipunan de Bonifacio tomaron gran parte de su fuerza, de su
valor combativo, delos agravios provocados por la cuestion agraria. La Liga Filipinade Rizal estaba
fundamentalmente basada en un ideario economico nacionalista, de control y dominio sobre la riqueza y recursos
delpais.

"Cuando America establecio aqui su soberania su mayor acierto consistio en echar los cimientos de su politica
fundamental de 'Filipinas para los filipinos.' Primero el Presidente McKinley, y despues los Presidentes Taft y
Wilson, consolidaron esta politica. El congresoaprobo leyes tendentes a la conservacion de terrenos publicos
yrecursos naturales, entre ellas la Ley de 1.º de Julio de 1902 conocida por Ley Cooper. En estas leyes se
limitaba y restringia la adquisiciony uso de bienes de dominio publico por particulares.

"Una pruebaf palmaria del celo del Congreso americano por mantener rigidamente la politica de conservacion del
patrimonio delos filipinos fue la investigacion congresional provocada por el Congresista Martin, de Colorado, en
relacion con la venta de terrenos delos frailes en Mindoro, a una compañia americana en exceso de las 1,024
hectareas fijadas en las leyes de terrenos publicos. Esto diolugar a uno de los episodios mas famosos en la
carrera del Comisionado Residente Quezon. Este relata su campaña en su autobiografia 'The Good Fight,' a
saber:

"'My next address to Congress took place when a congressional investigation was being urged by Congressman
Martin of Colorado to determine how the Government of the Philippines was carrying out the policy laid down by
Congress, that limited to 1024 acres the maximum area of government land that could be sold to corporations or
individuals. This law had been enacted soon after the United States has taken the Philippines to prevent the
exploitation of the Filipino people by capitalists, whether foreigners or natives. American capital interested in the
sugar industry has acquired two very large tracts of land which the Philippine Government had bought from the
friars with the funds bonds issued under the security of the Philippine Government. The avowed purpose in
buying these extensive properties from the Spanish religious orders was to resell them in small lots to Filipino
farmers, and thus to do away with absentee landlordism which had been the most serious cause of the Philippine
rebellion against Spain. The reason given for the sale of these lands to American capital by the American official
in charge of the execution of the congressional policy were two-fold: First, that the act of Congress referred only
to lands of the public domain not to lands acquired by the Government in some other way. And second, that the
sale of these lands was made in order to establish the sugar industry in the Philippines on a truly grand scale
under modern methods, as had been done in Cuba. It was further alleged that such a method would bring great
prosperity to the Philippines.

"'I spoke in support of the proposed investigation, contending that the establishment of the sugar industry under
those conditions would mean the debasement of the Filipinos into mere peons. 'Moreover,' I argued, 'large
investments of American capital in the Philippines will inevitably result in the permanent retention of the
Philippines by the United States.' At the climax of ny speech I roared: If the preordained fate of my country is
either to be a subject people but rich, or free but poor, I am unqualifiedly for the latter.'

"'The investigation was ordered by the House of Representatives, and although the sales already made were not
annulled, no further sales were made in defiance of the Congressional Act. (The Good Fight, by President
Quezon, pp. 117-119.)'

"Para implementar la politica de nacionalizacion el gobierno filipino bajo la Ley Jones y la Ley del Commonwealth
fundo con una gruesa capitalizacion las corporaciones economicas del Estado comoel Philippine National Bank,
National Development Company, National Cement Company, National Power Corporation, y otras.

"Para reglamentar y supervisar las utilidades y servicios publicos se creo la Comision de Servicios Publicos."
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947

Facts:

This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both
houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto." Three of
the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed as having been elected senators and
representatives. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of
Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their
election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House. As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives
did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation
of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.

Issue: Whether or not the issue is justiciable

Ruling: No. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with
such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. If ratification of an
amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps
complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process
as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal
to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and
committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be
needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of
ratification.

J. Perfecto
J. Perfecto alleged that the "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of the confessed difficulty in determining
what matters fall within the designation of political question. The majority itself admits that the term "is not susceptible of
exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the acts of the political department of the government." According to him, it is a
pseudo-doctrine which is based on the unsettled meaning of political question. The general proposition that "political
questions are not within the province of the judiciary" is just one of the many numerous general pronouncements made as
an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or uncourageous tribunals to refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues
submitted to them.

He agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and the process to make it effective, as provided in
Article XV of the Constitution, are matters of political nature, but we cannot agree with their conclusion that a litigation as
to whether said article has been complied with a violated is beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunals, because to arrive at
this conclusion we must accept as a major premise the pseudo-doctrine which we have precisely exposed as erroneous
and false.

(NOTE: ruling no longer supported by the 1987 Constitution) → IMP’T: Read also the scathing dissent of J. Perfecto,
especially on the political question doctrine

Mabanag vs. Vito Case Digest (Consti-1)

Mabanag vs. Vito

[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]

En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed separate opinion

Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections
as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were
suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of
alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower
House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally
suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution
had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three
senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional resolution, designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which
is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it
is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines,
the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives,
and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.

Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to
the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not within the province
of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by
express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a
principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters
fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities
are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions
of the political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the
political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that
respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that
the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct
parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character
from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent
of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to
safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito

G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947
Ponente: Justice Tuason

Facts:
Instant petition is for prohibition of a congressional resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. 3 of petitioner
senators were proclaimed elected in the April 1946 elections, but were then suspended on alleged irregularities. The 8
petitioner representatives had not been allowed to sit. Thus, the mentioned did not take part in the passage of the
resolution. If their votes had been counted, the affirmative votes would have been short of the necessary.

Issue:
Whether or not the issue is justiciable.

Held:
No. Enrolled bill doctrine. Political questions are not subject to judicial review, except when dealing with questions
conferred upon the courts by constitutional/statutory proivision. This is predicated upon the separation of powers.
According to a US case, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of proposed amendment to Federal Constitution is a
political question. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question. 1935 Constitution provides two distinct parts for amendments: proposal and ratification. Proposal to
amend is highly political performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity, and there is less reason for judicial
inquiry into a proposal’s validity rather than ratification. A duly authenticated bill/resolution imports absolute verity and is
binding on the courts. The courts cannot mandate the President to use his calling out power when the situation permits it,
or the legislature to pass a certain kind of law. Such duties are beyond judicial review if the one charged fails to perform
them. Motives are beyond the courts. The sensible solution is not to patch casual errors by asking the Judiciary to
circumvent the Constitution, but to represent ourselves with competent legislators. The Code of Civil Procedure provides
proving legislative proceedings 1) journals, clerk/secretary certified; 2) copy signed by presiding officers and secretaries,
conclusive proof. But this Court chooses to pass over the question. The journals have no signs of irregularity.
Mabanag vs Lopez Vito (1947)

Facts:

Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution
of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto."

Petitioners are 3 senators and 8 house representatives who had been proclaimed as elected winners by in the 1946
elections, but who were not allowed to sit and participate in the legislative proceedings by their respective Houses on
account of alleged irregularities in their election.

Consequently, they did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned
within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If they had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short
of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.

Respondents, on the other hand, claims that the court is without jurisdiction on the matter, and relies on the
conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution.

Held:

Political Question

1. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal

with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision.

This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers.

2. In Coleman vs. Miller, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the efficacy of ratification by state
legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable.

3. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that
the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct
parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character
from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign
legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent
of any intervention by the Chief Executive.

4. The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments. Final
determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place 'is conclusive upon the courts.'
In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However, whether submission,
intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the commands of the Constitution [are]
questions of a type which this Court has frequently designated 'political.' (citing the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black
in Miller vs Coleman)

Enrolled Bill doctrine

5. The enrolled bill doctrine pertains to the rule that, in the case of Acts of the Philippine Legislature, when there is
an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. (based on Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure)

(Note: this means that courts are not to look behind the enrolled copy of the legislative bill and examine the pertinent
journals of the legislative proceedings to determine if the bill was indeed passed in compliance with the Constitution and
legislative rules)

6. It has been declared that the rule against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the respect due to a coequal
and independent department of the government. (citing American Jurisprudence)

7. The rule is also one of convenience, because , otherwise, courts could not rely on the published session laws, but
would be required to look beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments
which might be found after the adjournment of the legislature. (citing American Jurisprudence)

8. Section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides two methods of proving
legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or
secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding Officers and
secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

9. The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the documents
offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed before the
Court. Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. More
importantly, the court did not say that if a discrepancy existed, it would give greater weight to the journals.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, respondents.

G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997

EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TANADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS
FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as
the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation and PILIPINAS SHELL
Corporation, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream
Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".1 R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the
downstream oil industry. Few cases carry a surpassing importance on the life of every Filipino as these petitions for the
upswing and downswing of our economy materially depend on the oscillation of oil.

First, the facts without the fat. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than those
dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the market without any government
interference. There were four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six
(6) petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating in the country. 2

In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis. The government, realizing that petroleum and its
products are vital to national security and that their continued supply at reasonable prices is essential to the general
welfare, enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act.3 It created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business
of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing, marketing and
selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas and other refined petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to
fix the market prices of petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to
regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry. 4

In addition to the creation of the OIC, the government saw the imperious need for a more active role of Filipinos in the oil
industry. Until the early seventies, the downstream oil industry was controlled by multinational companies. All the oil
refineries and marketing companies were owned by foreigners whose economic interests did not always coincide with the
interest of the Filipino. Crude oil was transported to the country by foreign-controlled tankers. Crude processing was done
locally by foreign-owned refineries and petroleum products were marketed through foreign-owned retail outlets. On
November 9, 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos boldly created the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to
break the control by foreigners of our oil industry.5 PNOC engaged in the business of refining, marketing, shipping,
transporting, and storing petroleum. It acquired ownership of ESSO Philippines and Filoil to serve as its marketing arm. It
bought the controlling shares of Bataan Refining Corporation, the largest refinery in the country. 6 PNOC later put up its
own marketing subsidiary — Petrophil. PNOC operated under the business name PETRON Corporation. For the first time,
there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine oil market.

In 1984, President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956, created the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by exchange rate adjustments or
increase in the world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. The fund is used (1) to reimburse the oil
companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment
and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil, and (2) to reimburse oil companies for cost underrecovery incurred as
a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products. Under the law, the OPSF may be sourced from:

1. any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum products
subject to tax under P.D. No. 1956 arising from exchange rate adjustment,

2. any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations,
as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy,

3. any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the fund
through an appropriate order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or
companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products, or

4. any resulting peso costs differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the
importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the reference
foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.7

By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country — Caltex, Shell and the government-owned PNOC.

In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to
regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and
distributing energy resources "when warranted and only when public necessity requires." The Board had the following
powers and functions:

1. Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;

 2. Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be charged by duly
franchised gas companies which distribute gas by means of underground pipe
system;

3. Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaries under the provisions of
R.A. No. 387, as amended . . . ;

4. Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional capacities of existing

refineries and license refineries that may be organized after the issuance of (E.O.
No. 172) under such terms and conditions as are consistent with the national
interest; and

5. Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any petroleum
product, or when public interest so requires, it may take such steps as it may
consider necessary, including the temporary adjustment of the levels of prices of
petroleum products and the payment to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund . . . by
persons or entities engaged in the petroleum industry of such amounts as may
be determined by the Board, which may enable the importer to recover its cost of
importation.8

On December 9, 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare, integrate,
coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects, and activities of the government in relation to energy
exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation. 9 The thrust of the Philippine energy program under the
law was toward privatization of government agencies related to energy, deregulation of the power and energy industry
and reduction of dependency on oil-fired plants.10 The law also aimed to encourage free and active participation and
investment by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from
the effectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of
deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry."

Pursuant to the policies enunciated in R.A. No. 7638, the government approved the privatization of Petron Corporation in
1993. On December 16, 1993, PNOC sold 40% of its equity in Petron Corporation to the Aramco Overseas Company.

In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry. It enacted R.A. No. 8180,
entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person or
entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease
or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own
requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of
Energy.11

The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase. During the transition
phase, controls of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The following were to be accomplished: (1)
liberalization of oil importation, exportation, manufacturing, marketing and distribution, (2) implementation of an automatic
pricing mechanism, (3) implementation of an automatic formula to set margins of dealers and rates of haulers, water
transport operators and pipeline concessionaires, and (4) restructuring of oil taxes. Upon full deregulation, controls on the
price of oil and the foreign exchange cover were to be lifted and the OPSF was to be abolished.

The first phase of deregulation commenced on August 12, 1996.

On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through
E.O. No. 372.

The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.

In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad seeks the annulment of section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180. Section 5(b)
provides:

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed
and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at
the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported
 crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum
products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.

The petition is anchored on three arguments:

First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the
equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries
and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and
will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.

Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but instead controls the
oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff differential between imported crude oil
and imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of other players in the oil industry because it effectively protects
the interest of oil companies with existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly
competitive market."

Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the
imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry.

In G.R. No. 127867, petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights
Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and Sanlakas contest the constitutionality of section 15 of R.A. No.
8180 and E.O. No. 392. Section 15 provides:

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. — Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE
shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than
March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the
US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is
deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed:

xxx xxx xxx

E.O. No. 372 states in full, viz.:

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638, otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of 1992," provides that, at
the end of four years from its effectivity last December 1992, "the Department (of Energy) shall, upon approval of
the President, institute the programs and time table of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of
the energy sector;"

WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Act of 1996," provides that "the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry not later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable;"

WHEREAS, pursuant to the recommendation of the Department of Energy, there is an imperative need to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry because of the following recent developments: (i)
depletion of the buffer fund on or about 7 February 1997 pursuant to the Energy Regulatory Board's Order dated
16 January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil had been stable at $21-$23 per barrel since October 1996 while prices
of petroleum products in the world market had been stable since mid-December of last year. Moreover, crude oil
prices are beginning to soften for the last few days while prices of some petroleum products had already declined;
and (iii) the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar has been stable for the past twelve (12) months,
averaging at around P26.20 to one US dollar;

WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 377 dated 31 October 1996 provides for an institutional framework for the
administration of the deregulated industry by defining the functions and responsibilities of various government
agencies;
 WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry will foster a truly competitive
market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of
environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by the powers vested in
me by law, do hereby declare the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following submissions:

First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary
of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does
not define when it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it practicable to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does
not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be
declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry is arbitrary
and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund — a condition not found in R.A.
No. 8180.

Third, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among the three existing oil
companies — Petron, Caltex and Shell — in violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition.

Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. In addition,
respondents contend that the issues raised by the petitions are not justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the law.
Respondents further aver that petitioners have no locus standi as they did not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as
a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.

The petitions were heard by the Court on September 30, 1997. On October 7, 1997, the Court ordered the private
respondents oil companies "to maintain the status quo and to cease and desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and
other petroleum fuel products for a period of thirty (30) days . . . subject to further orders as conditions may warrant."

We shall now resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural and substantive issues bearing on the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. The procedural issues are: (1) whether or not the petitions raise a
justiciable controversy, and (2) whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and
executive order. The substantive issues are: (1) whether or not section 5 (b) violates the one title — one subject
requirement of the Constitution; (2) whether or not the same section violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution; (3) whether or not section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power; (4) whether
or not E.O. No. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable; and (5) whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

We shall first tackle the procedural issues. Respondents claim that the avalanche of arguments of the petitioners assail
the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180. They aver that deregulation of the downstream oil industry is a policy decision made by
Congress and it cannot be reviewed, much less be reversed by this Court. In constitutional parlance, respondents contend
that the petitions failed to raise a justiciable controversy.

Respondents' joint stance is unnoteworthy. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.12 The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine
whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute
violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and
void.13 We held in the recent case of Tanada v. Angara:14

xxx xxx xxx

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
 infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide.

Even a sideglance at the petitions will reveal that petitioners have raised constitutional issues which deserve the
resolution of this Court in view of their seriousness and their value as precedents. Our statement of facts and definition of
issues clearly show that petitioners are assailing R.A. No. 8180 because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not
because the law lacks wisdom. The principle of separation of power mandates that challenges on the constitutionality of a
law should be resolved in our courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom of a law should be debated in the halls of
Congress. Every now and then, a law may be denounced in court both as bereft of wisdom and constitutionally infirmed.
Such denunciation will not deny this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of the said law while prudentially
refusing to pass on its wisdom.

The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too lucid
to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able
to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. 15 In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,16 we stressed:

xxx xxx xxx

Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main
procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.

There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching importance of the
validity of RA No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry. Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical on
the standing of petitioners for they pose issues which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright
resolution.

We shall now track down the substantive issues. In G.R. No. 124360 where petitioner is Senator Tatad, it is contended
that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision17 of the Constitution requiring every law to
have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. We do not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court
has adopted a liberal construction of the one title — one subject rule. We have consistently ruled18 that the title need not
mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in
the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.19 We hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the
subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.20 We shall,
however, return to the validity of this provision when we examine its blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market.

We shall now slide to the substantive issues in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners assail section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 which
fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. We restate its pertinent portion for
emphasis, viz.:

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation — Pursuant to section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall,
upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than
March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the
US dollar is stable . . .

Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market" and "stability of
the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they do not
provide the "determinate or determinable standards" which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the
downstream oil industry. In addition, they contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full deregulation is void
for it illegally considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor.
The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court. As early as 1916
in Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners,21 this Court thru, Mr. Justice
Moreland, held that "the true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." Over the years, as the legal
engineering of men's relationship became more difficult, Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating the
execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies. Two tests have been developed to determine
whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We
delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA,22 thus:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are
intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As sagely observed,
delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government.
Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating
legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United States23 as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz states "that even if the
law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to
spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity." 24

Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue
delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end
of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and
the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the
final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the
end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President — he is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been defined in R.A. No.
8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration.
The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster
defines "practicable" as meaning possible to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a downward direction, and
"stable" as meaning firmly established.25 The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive
discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more
general standards in other cases.26

It ought to follow that the argument that E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on indeterminate standards set by
R.A. 8180 must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack against the validity of E.O. No. 392, the issue need not further
detain our discourse. But petitioners further posit the thesis that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it
considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in February 1997.
A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the
Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive
before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted
to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. 27 We therefore hold that
the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous
factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the
Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the
exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive
department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction
or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to
make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power
is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In
the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price
of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is
impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be
the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance
could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication
of R.A. No. 8180.

We now come to grips with the contention that some provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violate section 19 of Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. These provisions are:

(1) Section 5 (b) which states — "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this
Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported
refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be
the same as that for imported crude oil. Provided, that beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported
crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same. Provided, further, that this provision may be amended
only by an Act of Congress."

(2) Section 6 which states — "To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the
DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower," and

(3) Section 9 (b) which states — "To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the
downstream oil industry, the following acts shall be prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably
below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No.
8180 mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed."

A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive
right or power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole
supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales
of a product or service.28 On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between
two or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the purpose
of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its, production,
distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority.29 Combination in restraint
of trade refers to the means while monopoly refers to the end.30

Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 28 of the New Civil Code breathe life to this constitutional policy. Article
186 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes monopolization and creation of combinations in restraint of
trade, 31 while Article 28 of the New Civil Code makes any person who shall engage in unfair competition liable for
damages.32

Respondents aver that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) implement the policies and objectives of R.A. No. 8180. They explain that
the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries. They stress that the inventory
requirement is meant to guaranty continuous domestic supply of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They
also submit that the prohibition against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective entrants. Respondents
manifested to the Court that new players have entered the Philippines after deregulation and have now captured 3% —
5% of the oil market.

The validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8180 has to be decided in light of the letter and spirit of our Constitution,
especially section 19, Article XII. Beyond doubt, the Constitution committed us to the free enterprise system but it is a
system impressed with its own distinctness. Thus, while the Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed,
it did not prohibit per se the operation of monopolies which can, however, be regulated in the public interest. 33 Thus too,
our free enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a
strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil devour the hindmost rule. Combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competitions are absolutely proscribed and the proscription is directed both against the State as well as the private
sector.34 This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to achieve the goals of our national economy as
defined by section 1, Article XII of the Constitution which are: more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people;
and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. It also calls for
the State to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices.

Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses competition. The desirability of
competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition,
and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article
XII of our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the observation of Prof. Gellhorn that
the objective of anti-trust law is "to assure a competitive economy, based upon the belief that through competition
producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition
among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services, and thus matches their desires with society's
opportunity costs."35 He adds with appropriateness that there is a reliance upon "the operation of the 'market' system (free
enterprise) to decide what shall be produced, how resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to whom
the various products will be distributed. The market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be
produced, and on competition, among producers to determine who will manufacture it."

Again, we underline in scarlet that the fundamental principle espoused by section 19, Article XII of the Constitution is
competition for it alone can release the creative forces of the market. But the competition that can unleash these creative
forces is competition that is fighting yet is fair. Ideally, this kind of competition requires the presence of not one, not just a
few but several players. A market controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of players (oligopoly) is
hardly the market where honest-to-goodness competition will prevail. Monopolistic or oligopolistic markets deserve our
careful scrutiny and laws which barricade the entry points of new players in the market should be viewed with suspicion.

Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we shall proceed to examine whether the provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on
tariff differential, inventory reserves, and predatory prices imposed substantial barriers to the entry and exit of new players
in our downstream oil industry. If they do, they have to be struck down for they will necessarily inhibit the formation of a
truly competitive market. Contrariwise, if they are insignificant impediments, they need not be stricken down.

In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a
foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other
players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of
various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the
tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of
new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of
their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the
huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that
the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before
the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy
disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil
industry is an idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players.
Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing
storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a
prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players.
Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the
market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as ". . . selling or offering to sell any product at a
price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors."
Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on
predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on
the entry of new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the dominant oil
companies is encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-writer
Hovenkamp,36 gives the authoritative answer and we quote:

xxx xxx xxx

 The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the
future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as
the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market contains
significant barriers to new entry.

As aforediscsussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which discourage new
players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players
with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory
pricing and succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners' charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not
without reason.

Respondents belittle these barriers with the allegation that new players have entered the market since deregulation. A
scrutiny of the list of the alleged new players will, however, reveal that not one belongs to the class and category of
PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX. Indeed, there is no showing that any of these new players intends to install any refinery
and effectively compete with these dominant oil companies. In any event, it cannot be gainsaid that the new players could
have been more in number and more impressive in might if the illegal entry barriers in R.A. No. 8180 were not erected.

We come to the final point. We now resolve the total effect of the untimely deregulation, the imposition of 4% tariff
differential on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products, the requirement of inventory and the prohibition on
predatory pricing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180. The question is whether these offending provisions can be
individually struck down without invalidating the entire R.A. No. 8180. The ruling case law is well stated by
author Agpalo,37 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause
in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the
statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally
enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. . . .

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute
dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a
whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.

R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any reason, any section or provision of this
Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect." This
separability clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offending provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that
the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the
principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these
provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing
inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces. R.A. No.
8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for these vouchsafing provisions cannot be
overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors but did not have a free run of the
market because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After deregulation,
PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by
government with respect to their pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated
market where competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies.

The fall out effects of the defects of R.A. No. 8180 on our people have not escaped Congress. A lot of our leading
legislators have come out openly with bills seeking the repeal of these odious and offensive provisions in R.A. No. 8180.
In the Senate, Senator Freddie Webb has filed S.B. No. 2133 which is the result of the hearings conducted by the Senate
Committee on Energy. The hearings revealed that (1) there was a need to level the playing field for the new entrants in
the downstream oil industry, and (2) there was no law punishing a person for selling petroleum products at unreasonable
prices. Senator Alberto G. Romulo also filed S.B. No. 2209 abolishing the tariff differential beginning January 1, 1998. He
declared that the amendment ". . . would mean that instead of just three (3) big oil companies there will be other major oil
companies to provide more competitive prices for the market and the consuming public." Senator Heherson T . Alvarez,
one of the principal proponents of R.A. No. 8180, also filed S.B. No. 2290 increasing the penalty for violation of its section
9. It is his opinion as expressed in the explanatory note of the bill that the present oil companies are engaged in
cartelization despite R.A. No. 8180, viz,:

xxx xxx xxx

Since the downstream oil industry was fully deregulated in February 1997, there have been eight (8) fuel price
adjustments made by the three oil majors, namely: Caltex Philippines, Inc.; Petron Corporation; and Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation. Very noticeable in the price adjustments made, however, is the uniformity in the
pump prices of practically all petroleum products of the three oil companies. This, despite the fact, that their
selling rates should be determined by a combination of any of the following factors: the prevailing peso-dollar
exchange rate at the time payment is made for crude purchases, sources of crude, and inventory levels of both
crude and refined petroleum products. The abovestated factors should have resulted in different, rather than
identical prices.

The fact that the three (3) oil companies' petroleum products are uniformly priced suggests collusion, amounting
to cartelization, among Caltex Philippines, Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to
fix the prices of petroleum products in violation of paragraph (a), Section 9 of R.A. No. 8180.

To deter this pernicious practice and to assure that present and prospective players in the downstream oil
industry conduct their business with conscience and propriety, cartel-like activities ought to be severely penalized.

Senator Francisco S. Tatad also filed S.B. No. 2307 providing for a uniform tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined
petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, he declared in no uncertain terms that ". . . the present set-up has
raised serious public concern over the way the three oil companies have uniformly adjusted the prices of oil in the
country, an indication of a possible existence of a cartel or a cartel-like situation within the downstream oil industry. This
situation is mostly attributed to the foregoing provision on tariff differential, which has effectively discouraged the entry of
new players in the downstream oil industry."

In the House of Representatives, the moves to rehabilitate R.A. No. 8180 are equally feverish. Representative Leopoldo
E. San Buenaventura has filed H.B. No. 9826 removing the tariff differential for imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Buenaventura explained:

xxx xxx xxx

As we now experience, this difference in tariff rates between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products, unwittingly provided a built-in-advantage for the three existing oil refineries in the country and
eliminating competition which is a must in a free enterprise economy. Moreover, it created a disincentive for other
players to engage even initially in the importation and distribution of refined petroleum products and ultimately in
the putting up of refineries. This tariff differential virtually created a monopoly of the downstream oil industry by
the existing three oil companies as shown by their uniform and capricious pricing of their products since this law
took effect, to the great disadvantage of the consuming public.

Thus, instead of achieving the desired effects of deregulation, that of free enterprise and a level playing field in
the downstream oil industry, R.A. 8180 has created an environment conducive to cartelization, unfavorable,
increased, unrealistic prices of petroleum products in the country by the three existing refineries.

Representative Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr., filed H.B. No. 9981 to prevent collusion among the present oil companies by
strengthening the oversight function of the government, particularly its ability to subject to a review any adjustment in the
prices of gasoline and other petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Punzalan, Jr., said:

xxx xxx xxx

To avoid this, the proposed bill seeks to strengthen the oversight function of government, particularly its ability to
review the prices set for gasoline and other petroleum products. It grants the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) the
authority to review prices of oil and other petroleum products, as may be petitioned by a person, group or any
entity, and to subsequently compel any entity in the industry to submit any and all documents relevant to the
imposition of new prices. In cases where the Board determines that there exist collusion, economic conspiracy,
 unfair trade practice, profiteering and/or overpricing, it may take any step necessary to protect the public,
including the readjustment of the prices of petroleum products. Further, the Board may also impose the fine and
penalty of imprisonment, as prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. 8180, on any person or entity from the oil industry who
is found guilty of such prohibited acts.

By doing all of the above, the measure will effectively provide Filipino consumers with a venue where their
grievances can be heard and immediately acted upon by government.

Thus, this bill stands to benefit the Filipino consumer by making the price-setting process more transparent and
making it easier to prosecute those who perpetrate such prohibited acts as collusion, overpricing, economic
conspiracy and unfair trade.

Representative Sergio A.F . Apostol filed H.B. No. 10039 to remedy an omission in R.A. No. 8180 where there is no
agency in government that determines what is "reasonable" increase in the prices of oil products. Representative Dente
O. Tinga, one of the principal sponsors of R.A. No. 8180, filed H.B. No. 10057 to strengthen its anti-trust provisions. He
elucidated in its explanatory note:

xxx xxx xxx

The definition of predatory pricing, however, needs to be tightened up particularly with respect to the definitive
benchmark price and the specific anti-competitive intent. The definition in the bill at hand which was taken from
the Areeda-Turner test in the United States on predatory pricing resolves the questions. The definition reads,
"Predatory pricing means selling or offering to sell any oil product at a price below the average variable cost for
the purpose of destroying competition, eliminating a competitor or discouraging a competitor from entering the
market."

The appropriate actions which may be resorted to under the Rules of Court in conjunction with the oil deregulation
law are adequate. But to stress their availability and dynamism, it is a good move to incorporate all the remedies
in the law itself. Thus, the present bill formalizes the concept of government intervention and private suits to
address the problem of antitrust violations. Specifically, the government may file an action to prevent or restrain
any act of cartelization or predatory pricing, and if it has suffered any loss or damage by reason of the antitrust
violation it may recover damages. Likewise, a private person or entity may sue to prevent or restrain any such
violation which will result in damage to his business or property, and if he has already suffered damage he shall
recover treble damages. A class suit may also be allowed.

To make the DOE Secretary more effective in the enforcement of the law, he shall be given additional powers to
gather information and to require reports.

Representative Erasmo B. Damasing filed H.B. No. 7885 and has a more unforgiving view of R.A. No. 8180. He wants it
completely repealed. He explained:

xxx xxx xxx

Contrary to the projections at the time the bill on the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation was discussed and
debated upon in the plenary session prior to its approval into law, there aren't any new players or investors in the
oil industry. Thus, resulting in practically a cartel or monopoly in the oil industry by the three (3) big oil companies,
Caltex, Shell and Petron. So much so, that with the deregulation now being partially implemented, the said oil
companies have succeeded in increasing the prices of most of their petroleum products with little or no
interference at all from the government. In the month of August, there was an increase of Fifty centavos (50¢) per
liter by subsidizing the same with the OPSF, this is only temporary as in March 1997, or a few months from now,
there will be full deregulation (Phase II) whereby the increase in the prices of petroleum products will be fully
absorbed by the consumers since OPSF will already be abolished by then. Certainly, this would make the lives of
our people, especially the unemployed ones, doubly difficult and unbearable.

The much ballyhooed coming in of new players in the oil industry is quite remote considering that these
prospective investors cannot fight the existing and well established oil companies in the country today, namely,
Caltex, Shell and Petron. Even if these new players will come in, they will still have no chance to compete with the
said three (3) existing big oil companies considering that there is an imposition of oil tariff differential of 4%
between importation of crude oil by the said oil refineries paying only 3% tariff rate for the said importation and 7%
 tariff rate to be paid by businessmen who have no oil refineries in the Philippines but will import finished
petroleum/oil products which is being taxed with 7% tariff rates.

So, if only to help the many who are poor from further suffering as a result of unmitigated increase in oil products
due to deregulation, it is a must that the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996, or R.A. 8180 be
repealed completely.

Various resolutions have also been filed in the Senate calling for an immediate and comprehensive review of R.A. No.
8180 to prevent the downpour of its ill effects on the people. Thus, S. Res. No. 574 was filed by Senator Gloria
M. Macapagal entitled Resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy to Inquire Into The Proper Implementation of the
Deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry and Oil Tax Restructuring As Mandated Under R.A. Nos. 8180 and 8184, In
Order to Make The Necessary Corrections In the Apparent Misinterpretation Of The Intent And Provision Of The Laws
And Curb The Rising Tide Of Disenchantment Among The Filipino Consumers And Bring About The Real Intentions And
Benefits Of The Said Law." Senator Blas P. Ople filed S. Res. No. 664 entitled resolution "Directing the Committee on
Energy To Conduct An Inquiry In Aid Of Legislation To Review The Government's Oil Deregulation Policy In Light Of The
Successive Increases In Transportation, Electricity And Power Rates, As well As Of Food And Other Prime Commodities
And Recommend Appropriate Amendments To Protect The Consuming Public." Senator Ople observed:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, since the passage of R.A. No. 8180, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) has imposed successive
increases in oil prices which has triggered increases in electricity and power rates, transportation fares, as well as
in prices of food and other prime commodities to the detriment of our people, particularly the poor;

WHEREAS, the new players that were expected to compete with the oil cartel-Shell, Caltex and Petron-have not
come in;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that a review of the oil deregulation policy be made to consider appropriate
amendments to the existing law such as an extension of the transition phase before full deregulation in order to
give the competitive market enough time to develop;

WHEREAS, the review can include the advisability of providing some incentives in order to attract the entry of
new oil companies to effect a dynamic competitive market;

WHEREAS, it may also be necessary to defer the setting up of the institutional framework for full deregulation of
the oil industry as mandated under Executive Order No. 377 issued by President Ramos last October 31, 1996 . .
.

Senator Alberto G. Romulo filed S. Res. No. 769 entitled resolution "Directing the Committees on Energy and Public
Services In Aid Of Legislation To Assess The Immediate Medium And Long Term Impact of Oil Deregulation On Oil Prices
And The Economy." Among the reasons for the resolution is the finding that "the requirement of a 40-day stock inventory
effectively limits the entry of other oil firms in the market with the consequence that instead of going down oil prices will
rise."

Parallel resolutions have been filed in the House of Representatives. Representative Dante O. Tinga filed H. Res. No.
1311 "Directing The Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, Into The Pricing Policies And
Decisions Of The Oil Companies Since The Implementation of Full Deregulation Under the Oil Deregulation Act (R.A. No.
8180) For the Purpose of Determining In the Context Of The Oversight Functions Of Congress Whether The Conduct Of
The Oil Companies, Whether Singly Or Collectively, Constitutes Cartelization Which Is A Prohibited Act Under R.A. No.
8180, And What Measures Should Be Taken To Help Ensure The Successful Implementation Of The Law In Accordance
With Its Letter And Spirit, Including Recommending Criminal Prosecution Of the Officers Concerned Of the Oil Companies
If Warranted By The Evidence, And For Other Purposes." Representatives Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr. Dante O. Tinga and
Antonio E. Bengzon III filed H.R. No. 894 directing the House Committee on Energy to inquire into the proper
implementation of the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. House Resolution No. 1013 was also filed
by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Enrique T . Garcia, Jr. and Joker P. Arroyo urging the President to immediately
suspend the implementation of E.O. No. 392.

In recent memory there is no law enacted by the legislature afflicted with so much constitutional deformities as R.A. No.
8180. Yet, R.A. No. 8180 deals with oil, a commodity whose supply and price affect the ebb and flow of the lifeblood of the
nation. Its shortage of supply or a slight, upward spiral in its price shakes our economic foundation. Studies show that the
areas most impacted by the movement of oil are food manufacture, land transport, trade, electricity and water. 38 At a time
when our economy is in a dangerous downspin, the perpetuation of R.A. No. 8180 threatens to multiply the number of our
people with bent backs and begging bowls. R.A. No. 8180 with its anti-competition provisions cannot be allowed by this
Court to stand even while Congress is working to remedy its defects.

The Court, however, takes note of the plea of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX to lift our restraining order to enable them to
adjust upward the price of petroleum and petroleum products in view of the plummeting value of the peso. Their plea,
however, will now have to be addressed to the Energy Regulatory Board as the effect of the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 is to revive the former laws it repealed. 39 The length of our return to the regime of
regulation depends on Congress which can fasttrack the writing of a new law on oil deregulation in accord with the
Constitution.

With this Decision, some circles will chide the Court for interfering with an economic decision of Congress. Such criticism
is charmless for the Court is annulling R.A. No. 8180 not because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but
because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call therefor should be for
Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms with the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of
striking down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down R.A. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to the
oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More
worthy of protection than the supra-normal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles of
the Constitution. Indeed when confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down
dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and guarantees both the political and economic rights of
the people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the people's political rights but their
economic rights as well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance to
them for they are concerned more with the exoterics of living and less with the esoterics of liberty. Hence, for as long as
the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people
especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the people's economic rights may appear heartless because
it cannot be half-hearted.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:

I concur with the lucid and convincing ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I write to stress two points:

1. The Issue Is Whether Oil Companies May Unilaterally

Fix Prices, Not Whether This Court May
Interfere in Economic Questions

With the issuance of the status quo order on October 7, 1997 requiring the three respondent oil companies —
Petron, Shell and Caltex — "to cease and desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and other petroleum fuel
products for a period of thirty (30) days," the Court has been accused of interfering in purely economic policy
matters1 or, worse, of arrogating unto itself price-regulatory powers.2 Let it be emphasized that we have no desire
— nay, we have no power — to intervene in, to change or to repeal the laws of economics, in the same manner
that we cannot and will not nullify or invalidate the laws of physics or chemistry.
 The issue here is not whether the Supreme Court may fix the retail prices of petroleum products, Rather, the
issue is whether RA 8180, the law allowing the oil companies to unilaterally set, increase or decrease their prices,
is valid or constitutional.

Under the Constitution,3 this Court has — in appropriate cases — the DUTY, not just the power, to determine
whether a law or a part thereof offends the Constitution and, if so, to annul and set it aside.4 Because a serious
challenge has been hurled against the validity of one such law, namely RA 8180 — its criticality having been
preliminarily determined from the petition, comments, reply and, most tellingly, the oral argument on September
30, 1997 — this Court, in the exercise of its mandated judicial discretion, issued the status quo order to prevent
the continued enforcement and implementation of a law that was prima facie found to be constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, after careful final deliberation, said law is now ruled to be constitutionally defective thereby disabling
respondent oil companies from exercising their erstwhile power, granted by such defective statute, to determine
prices by themselves.

Concededly, this Court has no power to pass upon the wisdom, merits and propriety of the acts of its co-equal
branches in government. However, it does have the prerogative to uphold the Constitution and to strike down and
annul a law that contravenes the Charter.5 From such duty and prerogative, it shall never shirk or shy away.

By annulling RA 8180, this Court is not making a policy statement against deregulation. Quite the contrary, it is
simply invalidating a pseudo deregulation law which in reality restrains free trade and perpetuates a cartel, an
oligopoly. The Court is merely upholding constitutional adherence to a truly competitive economy that releases
the creative energy of free enterprise. It leaves to Congress, as the policy-setting agency of the government, the
speedy crafting of a genuine, constitutionally justified oil deregulation law.

2. Everyone, Rich or Poor, Must Share

in the Burdens of Economic Dislocation

Much has been said and will be said about the alleged negative effect of this Court's holding on the oil giants'
profit and loss statements. We are not unaware of the disruptive impact of the depreciating peso on the retail
prices of refined petroleum products. But such price-escalating consequence adversely affects not merely these
oil companies which occupy hallowed places among the most profitable corporate behemoths in our country. In
these critical times of widespread economic dislocations, abetted by currency fluctuations not entirely of domestic
origin, all sectors of society agonize and suffer. Thus, everyone, rich or poor, must share in the burdens of such
economic aberrations.

I can understand foreign investors who see these price adjustments as necessary consequences of the country's
adherence to the free market, for that, in the first place, is the magnet for their presence here. Understandably,
their concern is limited to bottom lines and market share. But in all these mega companies, there are also Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers. I am sure there are patriots among them who realize that, in times of economic
turmoil, the poor and the underprivileged proportionately suffer more than any other sector of society. There is a
certain threshold of pain beyond which the disadvantaged cannot endure. Indeed, it has been wisely said that "if
the rich who are few will not help the poor who are many, there will come a time when the few who are filled
cannot escape the wrath of the many who are hungry." Kaya't sa mga kababayan nating kapitalista at may
kapangyarihan, nararapat lamang na makiisa tayo sa mga walang palad at mahihirap sa mga araw ng
pangangailangan. Huwag na nating ipagdiinan ang kawalan ng tubo, o maging and panandaliang pagkalugi. At sa
mga mangangalakal na ganid at walang puso: hirap na hirap na po ang ating mga kababayan. Makonsiyensya
naman kayo!

KAPUNAN, J., separate opinion:

Lately, the Court has been perceived (albeit erroneously) to be an unwelcome interloper in affairs and concerns
best left to legislators and policy-makers. Admittedly, the wisdom of political and economic decisions are outside
the scrutiny of the Court. However, the political question doctrine is not some mantra that will automatically cloak
executive orders and laws (or provisions thereof) with legitimacy. It is this Court's bounden duty under Sec. 4(2),
Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution to decide all cases involving the constitutionality of laws and under Sec. 1 of the
same article, "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

In the instant case, petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provisions found in R.A. No 8180, otherwise
known as the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996" To avoid accusations of undue interference
with the workings of the two other branches of government, this discussion is limited to the issue of whether or not
the assailed provisions are germane to the law or serve the purpose for which it was enacted.

The objective of the deregulation law is quite simple. As aptly enunciated in Sec. 2 thereof, it is to "foster a truly
competitive market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous
supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products." The key, therefore, is free
competition which is commonly defined as:

The act or action of seeking to gain what another is seeking to gain at the same time and usually under or
as if under fair or equitable rules and circumstances: a common struggle for the same object especially
among individuals of relatively equal standing . . . a market condition in which a large number of
independent buyers and sellers compete for identical commodity, deal freely with each other, and retain
the right of entry and exit from the market. (Webster's Third International Dictionary.)

and in a landscape where our oil industry is dominated by only three major oil firms, this translates primarily into
the establishment of a free market conducive to the entry of new and several and oil companies in the business.
Corollarily, it means the removal of any and all barriers that will hinder the influx of prospective players. It is a
truism in economics that if there are many players in the market, healthy competition will ensue and in order to
survive and profit the competitors will try to outdo each other in terms of quality and price. The result: better
quality products and competitive prices. In the end, it will be the public that benefits (which is ultimately the most
important goal of the law). Thus, it is within this framework that we must determine the validity of the assailed
provisions.

The 4% Tariff Differential

Sec. 5. Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff Treatment.—

xxx xxx xxx

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be
imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined
petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be
the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on
imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this
provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress;

Respondents are one in asserting that the 4% tariff differential between imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products is intended to encourage the new entrants to put up their own refineries in the country. The
advantages of domestic refining cannot be discounted, but we must view this intent in the proper perspective. The
primary purpose of the deregulation law is to open up the market and establish free competition. The priority of
the deregulation law, therefore, is to encourage new oil companies to come in first. Incentives to encourage the
building of local refineries should be provided after the new oil companies have entered the Philippine market and
are actively participating therein.

The threshold question therefore is, is the 4% tariff differential a barrier to the entry of new oil companies in the
Philippine market?

It is. Since the prospective oil companies do not (as yet) have local refineries, they would have to import refined
petroleum products, on which a 7% tariff duty is imposed. On the other hand, the existing oil companies already
have domestic refineries and, therefore, only import crude oil which is taxed at a lower rate of 3%. Tariffs are part
of the costs of production. Hence, this means that with the 4% tariff differential (which becomes an added cost)
the prospective players would have higher production costs compared to the existing oil companies and it is
precisely this factor which could seriously affect its decision to enter the market.

Viewed in this light, the tariff differential between imported crude oil and refined petroleum products becomes an
obstacle to the entry of new players in the Philippine oil market. It defeats the purpose of the law and should thus
be struck down.
Public respondents contend that ". . . a higher tariff rate is not the overriding factor confronting a prospective
trader/importer but, rather, his ability to generate the desired internal rate of return (IRR) and net present value
(NPV). In other words, if said trader/importer, after some calculation, finds that he can match the price of locally
refined petroleum products and still earn the desired profit margin, despite a higher tariff rate, he will be attracted
to embark in such business. A tariff differential does not per se make the business of importing refined petroleum
product a losing proposition."1

The problem with this rationale, however, is that it is highly speculative. The opposite may well hold true. The
point is to make the prospect of engaging in the oil business in the Philippines appealing, so why create a barrier
in the first place?

There is likewise no merit in the argument that the removal of the tariff differential will revive the 10% (for crude
oil) and 20% (for refined petroleum products) tariff rates that prevailed before the enactment of R.A. No. 8180.
What petitioners are assailing is the tariff differential. Phrased differently, why is the tariff duty imposed on
imported petroleum products not the same as that imposed on imported crude oil? Declaring the tariff differential
void is not equivalent to declaring the tariff itself void. The obvious consequence thereof would be that imported
refined petroleum products would now be taxed at the same rate as imported crude oil which R.A. No. 8180 has
specifically set at 3%. The old rates have effectively been repealed by Sec. 24 of the same law. 2

II

The Minimum Inventory Requirement

and the Prohibition Against Predatory Pricing

Sec. 6. Security of Supply. — To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products
supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. Prohibited Acts. — To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the
downstream oil industry, the following acts are hereby prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the
industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

The same rationale holds true for the two other assailed provisions in the Oil Deregulation law. The primordial
purpose of the law, I reiterate, is to create a truly free and competitive market. To achieve this goal, provisions
that show the possibility, or even the merest hint, of deterring or impeding the ingress of new blood in the market
should be eliminated outright. I am confident that our lawmakers can formulate other measures that would
accomplish the same purpose (insure security and continuity of petroleum crude products supply and prevent fly
by night operators, in the case of the minimum inventory requirement, for instance) but would not have on the
downside the effect of seriously hindering the entry of prospective traders in the market.

The overriding consideration, which is the public interest and public benefit, calls for the levelling of the playing
fields for the existing oil companies and the prospective new entrants. Only when there are many players in the
market will free competition reign and economic development begin.

Consequently, Section 6 and Section 9(b) of R. A. No. 8180 should similarly be struck down.

III

Conclusion

Respondent oil companies vehemently deny the "cartelization" of the oil industry. Their parallel business
behaviour and uniform pricing are the result of competition, they say, in order to keep their share of the market.
This rationale fares well when oil prices are lowered, i.e. when one oil company rolls back its prices, the others
 follow suit so as not to lose its market. But how come when one increases its prices the others likewise follow? Is
this competition at work?

Respondent oil companies repeatedly assert that due to the devaluation of the peso, they had to increase the
prices of their oil products, otherwise, they would lose, as they have allegedly been losing specially with the
issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Court. However, what we have on record are only the self-
serving lamentations of respondent oil companies. Not one has presented hard data, independently verified, to
attest to these losses. Mere allegations are not sufficient but must be accompanied by supporting evidence. What
probably is nearer the truth is that respondent oil companies will not make as much profits as they have in the
past if they are not allowed to increase the prices of their products everytime the value of the peso slumps. But in
the midst of worsening economic difficulties and hardships suffered by the people, the very customers who have
given them tremendous profits throughout the years, is it fair and decent for said companies not to bear a bit of
the burden by forgoing a little of their profits?

PREMISES CONSIDERED, I vote that Section 5(b), Section 6 and Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 8180 be declared
unconstitutional.

MELO, J., dissenting:

With all due respect to my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Puno, who has, as usual, prepared a well-written and
comprehensive ponencia, I regret I cannot share the view that Republic Act No. 8180 should be struck down as
violative of the Constitution.

The law in question, Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996,
contains, inter alia, the following provisions which have become the subject of the present controversy, to wit:

Sec. 5. Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff Treatment. —

xxx xxx xxx

(b). — Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this act, tariff duty shall
be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of (3%) and imported refined petroleum
products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same
as that for imported crude
oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined
petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an
Act of Congress. . .

Sec. 6. Security of Supply. — To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products
supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. Prohibited Acts. — To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the
downstream oil industry, the following acts are hereby prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the
industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. — Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the
DOE [Department of Energy] shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full
deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and
when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US Dollar is stable. . .
In G. R. No. 124360, petitioners therein pray that the aforequoted Section 5(b) be declared null and void.
However, despite its pendency, President Ramos, pursuant to the above-cited Section 15 of the assailed law,
issued Executive Order No. 392 on 22 January 1997 declaring the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry
effective February 8, 1997. A few days after the implementation of said Executive Order, the second consolidated
petition was filed (G.R. No. 127867), seeking, inter alia, the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 15 of
the law on various grounds.

I submit that the instant consolidated petitions should be denied. In support of my view, I shall discuss the
arguments of the parties point by point.

1. The instant petitions do not raise a justiciable controversy as the issues raised therein pertain to the wisdom
and reasonableness of the provisions of the assailed law. The contentions made by petitioners, that the
"imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products will not foster a
truly competitive market, nor will it level the playing fields" and that said imposition "does not deregulate the
downstream oil industry, instead, it controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law," are clearly
policy matters which are within the province of the political departments of the government. These submissions
require a review of issues that are in the nature of political questions, hence, clearly beyond the ambit of judicial
inquiry.

A political question refers to a question of policy or to issues which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. Generally, political questions are concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular measure (Tañada vs. Cuenco, 100 Phil 101 [1957]).

Notwithstanding the expanded judicial power of this Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, an
inquiry on the above-stated policy matters would delve on matters of wisdom which are exclusively within the
legislative powers of Congress.

2. The petitioners do not have the necessary locus standi to file the instant consolidated petitions. Petitioners
Lagman, Arroyo, Garcia, Tanada, and Tatad assail the constitutionality of the above-stated laws through the
instant consolidated petitions in their capacity as members of Congress, and as taxpayers and concerned
citizens. However, the existence of a constitutional issue in a case does not per se confer or clothe a legislator
with locus standi to bring suit. In Phil. Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) v. Enriquez (235 SCRA 506 [1994]),
we held that members of Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the
government only upon showing that the assailed official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as
legislators. In Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Morato, et al. (246 SCRA 540 [1995]), this Court further clarified that "if
the complaint is not grounded on the impairment of the power of Congress, legislators do not have standing to
question the validity of any law or official action."

Republic Act No. 8180 clearly does not violate or impair prerogatives, powers, and rights of Congress, or the
individual members thereof, considering that the assailed official act is the very act of Congress itself authorizing
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Neither can petitioners sue as taxpayers or concerned citizens. A condition sine qua non for the institution of a
taxpayer's suit is an allegation that the assailed action is an unconstitutional exercise of the spending powers of
Congress or that it constitutes an illegal disbursement of public funds. The instant consolidated petitions do not
allege that the assailed provisions of the law amount to an illegal disbursement of public money. Hence,
petitioners cannot, even as taxpayers or concerned citizens, invoke this Court's power of judicial review.

Further, petitioners, including Flag, FDC, and Sanlakas, can not be deemed proper parties for lack of a
particularized interest or elemental substantial injury necessary to confer on them locus standi. The interest of the
person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only
that the jaw is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of Petitioners
have not established such kind of interest.

3. Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 8180 is not violative of the "one title-one subject" rule under Section 26 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution. It is not required that a provision of law be expressed in the title thereof as long as
the provision in question is embraced within the subject expressed in the title of the law. The "title of a bill does
not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each
other and may be inferred from the title." (Association of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. vs. Sec. of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]) An "act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means
of carrying out the general object." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 11th ed., p. 225).

The questioned tariff provision in Section 5 (b) was provided as a means to implement the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry and hence, is germane to the purpose of the assailed law. The general subject of
Republic Act No. 8180, as expressed in its title, "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry, and for the
Other Purposes", necessarily implies that the law provides for the means for such deregulation. One such means
is the imposition of the differential tariff rates which are provided to encourage new investors as well as existing
players to put up new refineries. The aforesaid provision is thus germane to, and in furtherance of, the object of
deregulation. The trend of jurisprudence, ever since Sumulong vs. COMELEC (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), is to give the
above-stated constitutional requirement a liberal interpretation. Hence, there is indeed substantial compliance
with said requirement.

Petitioners claim that because the House version of the assailed law did not impose any tariff rates but merely set
the policy of "zero differential" and that the Senate version did not set or fix any tariff, the tariff changes being
imposed by the assailed law was never subject of any deliberations in both houses nor the Bicameral Conference
Committee. I believe that this argument is bereft of merit.

The report of the Bicameral Conference Committee, which was precisely formed to settle differences between the
two houses of Congress, was approved by members thereof only after a full deliberation on the conflicting
provisions of the Senate version and the House version of the assailed law. Moreover, the joint explanatory
statement of said Committee which was submitted to both houses, explicitly states that "while sub-paragraph (b)
is a modification, its thrust and style were patterned after the House's original sub-paragraph (b)." Thus, it cannot
be denied that both houses were informed of the changes in the aforestated provision of the assailed law. No
legislator can validly state that he was not apprised of the purposes, nature, and scope of the provisions of the
law since the inclusion of the tariff differential was clearly mentioned in the Bicameral Conference Committee's
explanatory note.

As regards the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee to include in its report an entirely new provision
that is neither found in the House bill or Senate bill, this Court already upheld such power in Tolentino vs. Sec. of
Finance (235 SCRA 630 [1994]), where we ruled that the conference committee can even include an amendment
in the nature of a substitute so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bill before it.

Lastly, in view of the "enrolled bill theory" pronounced by this Court as early as 1947 in the case of Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1 [1947]), the duly authenticated copy of the bill, signed by the proper officers of each
house, and approved by the President, is conclusive upon the courts not only of its provisions but also of its due
enactment.

4. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 does not constitute undue delegation of legislative power. Petitioners
themselves admit that said section provides the Secretary of Energy and the President with the bases of (1)
"practicability", (2) "the decline of crude oil prices in the world market", and (3) "the stability of the Peso exchange
rate in relation to the US Dollar", in determining the effectivity of full deregulation. To my mind, said bases are
determinate and determinable guidelines, when examined in the light of the tests for permissible delegation.

The assailed law satisfies the completeness test as it is complete and leaves nothing more for the Executive
Branch to do but to enforce the same. Section 2 thereof expressly provides that "it shall be the policy of the State
to deregulate the downstream oil industry to foster a truly competitive market which can better achieve the social
policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high-quality
petroleum products." This provision manifestly declares the policy to be achieved through the delegate, that is, the
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry toward the end of full and free competition. Section 15 further
provides for all the basic terms and conditions for its execution and thus belies the argument that the Executive
Branch is given complete liberty to determine whether or not to implement the law. Indeed, Congress did not only
make full deregulation mandatory, but likewise set a deadline (that is, not later than March 1997), within which full
deregulation should be achieved.
Congress may validly provide that a statute shall take effect or its operation shall be revived or suspended or shall
terminate upon the occurrence of certain events or contingencies the ascertainment of which may be left to some
official agency. In effect, contingent legislation may be issued by the Executive Branch pursuant to a delegation of
authority to determine some fact or state of things upon which the enforcement of a law depends (Cruz, Phil.
Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 96; Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 [1931]). This is a valid delegation since what the
delegate performs is a matter of detail whereas the statute remains complete in all essential matters. Section 15
falls under this kind of delegated authority. Notably, the only aspect with respect to which the President can
exercise "discretion" is the determination of whether deregulation may be implemented on or before March, 1997,
the deadline set by Congress. If he so decides, however, certain conditions must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the exchange rate of the
peso in relation to the US Dollar is stable. Significantly, the so-called "discretion" pertains only to the
ascertainment of the existence of conditions which are necessary for the effectivity of the law and not a discretion
as to what the law shall be.

In the same vein, I submit that the President's issuance of Executive Order No. 392 last January 22, 1997 is valid
as contingent legislation. All the Chief Executive did was to exercise his delegated authority to ascertain and
recognize certain events or contingencies which prompted him to advance the deregulation to a date earlier than
March, 1997. Anyway, the law does not prohibit him from implementing the deregulation prior to March, 1997, as
long as the standards of the law are met.

Further, the law satisfies the sufficient standards test. The words "practicable", "declining", and "stable", as used
in Section 15 of the assailed law are sufficient standards that saliently "map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and
effected." (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 98). Considering the normal and ordinary definitions of these
standards, I believe that the factors to be considered by the President and/or Secretary of Energy in implementing
full deregulation are, as mentioned, determinate and determinable.

It is likewise noteworthy that the above-mentioned factors laid down by the subject law are not solely dependent
on Congress. Verily, oil pricing and the peso-dollar exchange rate are dependent on the various forces working
within the consumer market. Accordingly, it would have been unreasonable, or even impossible, for the legislature
to have provided for fixed and specific oil prices and exchange rates. To require Congress to set forth specifics in
the law would effectively deprive the legislature of the flexibility and practicability which subordinate legislation is
ultimately designed to provide. Besides, said specifics are precisely the details which are beyond the competence
of Congress, and thus, are properly delegated to appropriate administrative agencies and executive officials to "fill
in". It cannot be gainsaid that the detail of the timing of full deregulation has been "filled in" by the President, upon
the recommendation of the DOE, when he issued Executive Order No. 329.

5. Republic Act No. 8180 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade, and unfair competition. The three provisions relied upon by petitioners (Section 5 [b] on tariff
differential; Section 6 on the 40-day minimum inventory requirement; and Section 9 [b] on the prohibited act of
predatory pricing) actually promote, rather than restrain, free trade and competition.

The tariff differential provided in the assailed law does not necessarily make the business of importing refined
petroleum products a losing proposition for new players. First, the decision of a prospective trader/importer
(subjected to the 7% tariff rate) to compete in the downstream oil industry as a new player is based solely on
whether he can, based on his computations, generate the desired internal rate of return (IRR) and net present
value (NPV) notwithstanding the imposition of a higher tariff rate. Second, such a difference in tax treatment does
not necessarily provide refiners of imported crude oil with a significant level of economic advantage considering
the huge amount of investments required in putting up refinery plants which will then have to be added to said
refiners' production cost. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the additional cost imputed by higher tariff can
anyway be overcome by a new player in the business of importation due to lower operating costs, lower capital
infusion, and lower capital carrying costs. Consequently, the resultant cost of imported finished petroleum and
that of locally refined petroleum products may turn out to be approximately the same.

The existence of a tariff differential with regard to imported crude oil and imported finished products is nothing
new or novel. In fact, prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 8180, there existed a 10% tariff differential resulting
from the imposition of a 20% tariff rate on imported finished petroleum products and 10% on imported crude oil
(based on Executive Order No. 115). Significantly, Section 5 (b) of the assailed law effectively lowered the tariff
rates from 20% to 7% for imported refined petroleum products, and 10% to 3% for imported crude oil, or a
reduction of the differential from 10% to 4%. This provision is certainly favorable to all in the downstream oil
industry, whether they be existing or new players. It thus follows that the 4% tariff differential aims to ensure the
 stable supply of petroleum products by encouraging new entrants to put up oil refineries in the Philippines and to
discourage fly-by-night importers.

Further, the assailed tariff differential is likewise not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is
germane to the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8180 which is to achieve (1) fair prices; and (2) adequate and
continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products. Said adequate and continuous
supply of petroleum products will be achieved if new investors or players are enticed to engage in the business of
refining crude oil in the country. Existing refining companies, are similarly encouraged to put up additional refining
companies. All of this can be made possible in view of the lower tariff duty on imported crude oil than that levied
on imported refined petroleum products. In effect, the lower tariff rates will enable the refiners to recoup their
investments considering that they will be investing billions of pesos in putting up their refineries in the Philippines.
That incidentally the existing refineries will be benefited by the tariff differential does not negate the fact that the
intended effect of the law is really to encourage the construction of new refineries, whether by existing players or
by new players.

As regards the 40-day inventory requirement, it must be emphasized that the 10% minimum requirement is based
on the refiners' and importers' annual sales volume, and hence, obviously inapplicable to new entrants as they do
not have an annual sales volume yet. Contrary to petitioners' argument, this requirement is not intended to
discourage new or prospective players in the downstream oil industry. Rather, it guarantees "security and
continuity of petroleum crude and products supply." (Section 6, Republic Act No. 8180) This legal requirement is
meant to weed out entities not sufficiently qualified to participate in the local downstream oil industry.
Consequently, it is meant to protect the industry from fly-by-night business operators whose sole interest would
be to make quick profits and who may prove unrealiable in the effort to provide an adequate and steady supply of
petroleum products in the country. In effect, the aforestated provision benefits not only the three respondent oil
companies but all entities serious and committed to put up storage facilities and to participate as serious players
in the local oil industry. Moreover, it benefits the entire consuming public by its guarantee of an "adequate
continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products." It ensures that all companies in
the downstream oil industry operate according to the same high standards, that the necessary storage and
distribution facilities are in place to support the level of business activities involved, and that operations are
conducted in a safe and environmentally sound manner for the benefit of the consuming public.

Regarding the prohibition against predatory pricing, I believe that petitioners' argument is quite misplaced. The
provision actually protects new players by preventing, under pain of criminal sanction, the more established oil
firms from driving away any potential or actual competitor by taking undue advantage of their size and relative
financial stability. Obviously, the new players are the ones susceptible to closing down on account of intolerable
losses which will be brought about by fierce competition with rival firms. The petitioners are merely working under
the presumption that it is the new players which would succumb to predatory pricing, and not the more
established oil firms. This is not a factual assertion but a rather baseless and conjectural assumption.

As to the alleged cartel among the three respondent oil companies, much as we suspect the same, its existence
calls for a finding of fact which this Court is not in the position to make. We cannot be called to try facts and
resolve factual issues such as this (Trade Unions of the Phils. vs. Laguesma, 236 SCRA 586 [1994]); Ledesma
vs. NLRC, 246 SCRA 247 [1995]).

With respect to the amendatory bills filed by various Congressmen aimed to modify the alleged defects of
Republic Act No. 8180, I submit that such bills are the correct remedial steps to pursue, instead of the instant
petitions to set aside the statute sought to be amended. The proper forum is Congress, not this Court.

Finally, as to the ponencia's endnote which cites the plea of respondent oil companies for the lifting of the
restraining order against them to enable them to adjust the prices of petroleum and petroleum products in view of
the devaluation of our currency, I am pensive as to how the matter can be addressed to the obviously defunct
Energy Regulatory Board. There has been a number of price increase in the meantime. Too much water has
passed under the bridge. It is too difficult to turn back the hands of time.

For all the foregoing reasons, I, therefore, vote for the outright dismissal of the instant consolidated petitions for
lack of merit.

FRANCISCO, J., dissenting:

The continuing peso devaluation and the spiraling cost of commodities have become hard facts of life nowadays.
And the wearies are compounded by the ominous prospects of very unstable oil prices. Thus, with the goal of
rationalizing the oil scheme, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996, the policy of which is "to foster a truly competitive market which can better achieve the
social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality
petroleum products".1 But if the noble and laudable objective of this enactment is not accomplished, as to date oil
prices continue to rise, can this Court be called upon to declare the statute unconstitutional or must the Court
desist from interfering in a matter which is best left to the other branch/es of government?

The apparent thrust of the consolidated petitions is to declare, not the entirety, but only some isolated portions of
Republic Act No. 8180 unconstitutional. This is clear from the grounds enumerated by the petitioners, to wit:

G.R. No. 124360

4.0. Grounds:

4.1.

THE IMPOSITION OF DIFFERENT TARIFF RATES ON IMPORTED CRUDE OIL AND IMPORTED
REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

4.2.

THE IMPOSITION OF DIFFERENT TARIFF RATES DOES NOT DEREGULATE THE DOWNSTREAM
OIL INDUSTRY, INSTEAD, IT CONTROLS THE OIL INDUSTRY, CONTRARY TO THE AVOWED
POLICY OF THE LAW.

4.3.

THE INCLUSION OF A TARIFF PROVISION IN SECTION 5(b) OF THE DOWNSTREAM OIL

INDUSTRY DEREGULATION LAW VIOLATES THE "ONE SUBJECT-ONE TITLE" RULE EMBODIED IN
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (1) OF THE CONSTITUTION.2

G.R. No. 127867

GROUNDS

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FULL DEREGULATION PRIOR TO THE EXISTENCE OF A TRULY

COMPETITIVE MARKET VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITING MONOPOLIES, UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND PRACTICES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

R.A. No. 8180 CONTAINS DISGUISED REGULATIONS IN A SUPPOSEDLY DEREGULATED

INDUSTRY WHICH CREATE OR PROMOTE MONOPOLY OF THE INDUSTRY BY THE THREE
EXISTING OIL COMPANIES.

THE REGULATORY AND PENAL PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 8180 VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AN
ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.3

And culled from petitioners' arguments in support of the above grounds the provisions of Republic Act No. 8180
which they now impugn are:

A. Section 5(b) on the imposition of tariff which provides: "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and
starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at
the rate of three percent (3%), and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%),
except fuel oil and LPB, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That
beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be
the same: Provided further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress." [Emphasis
added].
 B. Section 6 on the minimum inventory requirement, thus: "Security of Supply. — To ensure the security
and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers
to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume
or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower."

C. Section 9(b) on predatory pricing: "Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product
at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of
competitors.

Any person, including but not limited to the chief operating officer or chief executive officer of the
corporation involved, who is found guilty of any of the said prohibited acts shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for three (3) years and fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) to One
million pesos (P1,000,000).

D. Section 10 on the other prohibited acts which states: "Other Prohibited Acts. — To ensure compliance
with the provisions of this Act, the failure to comply with any of the following shall likewise be prohibited:
1) submission of any reportorial requirements; 2) maintenance of the minimum inventory; and, 3) use of
clean and safe (environment and worker-benign) technologies.

Any person, including but not limited to the chief operating officer or chief executive officer of the
corporation involved, who is found guilty of any of the said prohibited acts shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for two (2) years and fine ranging from Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000) to
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000).

E. Section 15 on the implementation of full deregulation, thus: "Implementation of Full Deregulation. —

Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7683, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President,
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March, 1997. As far as
practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products
in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable. Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is
deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed: . . . [Emphasis added].

F. Section 20 on the imposition of administrative fine: "Administrative Fine. — The DOE may, after due
notice and hearing impose a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000)
but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000) upon any person or entity who violates any of its
reportorial and minimum inventory requirements, without prejudice to criminal sanctions."

Executive Order No. 392, entitled "Declaring Full Deregulation Of The Downstream Oil Industry" which declared
the full deregulation effective February 8, 1997, is also sought to be declared unconstitutional.

A careful scrutiny of the arguments proffered against the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 betrays the
petitioners' underlying motive of calling upon this Court to determine the wisdom and efficacy of the enactment
rather than its adherence to the Constitution. Nevertheless, I shall address the issues raised if only to settle the
alleged constitutional defects afflicting some provisions of Republic Act No. 8180. To elaborate:

A. On the imposition of tariff . Petitioners argue that the existence of a tariff provision violated the "one subject-
one title"4 rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) as the imposition of tariff rates is "inconsistent with" 5 and not at all
germane to the deregulation of the oil industry. They also stress that the variance between the seven percent
(7%) duty on imported gasoline and other refined petroleum products and three percent (3%) duty on crude oil
gives a "4% tariff protection in favor of Petron, Shell and Caltex which own and operate refineries here". 6 The
provision, petitioners insist, "inhibits prospective oil players to do business here because it will unnecessarily
increase their product cost by 4%."7 In other words, the tariff rates "does not foster 'a truly competitive
market'."8 Also petitioners claim that both Houses of Congress never envisioned imposing the seven percent (7%)
and three percent (3%) tariff on refined and crude oil products as both Houses advocated, prior to the holding of
the bicameral conference committee, a "zero differential". Moreover, petitioners insist that the tariff rates violate
"the equal protection of the laws enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution"9 since the rates and their
classification are not relevant in attaining the avowed policy of the law, not based on substantial distinctions and
limited to the existing condition.
The Constitution mandates that "every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof".10 The object sought to be accomplished by this mandatory requirement has been
explained by the Court in the vintage case of Central Capiz v. Ramirez,11 thus:

The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision are
well known. Legislative assemblies, for the dispatch of business, often pass bills by their titles only
without requiring them to be read. A specious title sometimes covers legislation which, if its real character
had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature
is one of the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision the
title of a statute was often no indication of its subject or contents.

An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same
statute of such things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all
the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage of several measures no one of which could have
succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities defining the objects
of this provision: "It may therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was: First, to
prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by
means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through
such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being
considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they
shall so desire." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143).12

The interpretation of "one subject-one title" rule, however, is never intended to impede or stifle legislation. The
requirement is to be given a practical rather than a technical construction and it would be sufficient compliance if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the enactment are germane and material to the
general subject.13 Congress is not required to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. 14 All that is required is that the
title should not cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as
having a necessary or proper connection.15 Hence, the title "An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act
Numbered One Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines" was declared by the Court sufficient to contain a provision empowering the Secretary of Justice,
acting through a tenancy mediation division, to carry out a national enforcement program, including the mediation
of tenancy disputes.16 The title "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" was similarly declared valid
and sufficient to embrace a regulatory tax provision, i.e., the imposition of a thirty percent (30%) tax on the
purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program with fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax
collected accruing to the province and the other fifty percent (50%) to the municipality where the tax is
collected.17 Likewise, the title "An Act To Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as
amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One" was declared sufficient to cover a
provision limiting the allowable margin of profit to not more than twelve percent (12%) annually of its investments
plus two-month operating expenses for franchise holder receiving at least fifty percent (50%) of its power from the
National Power Corporation.18

In the case at bar, the title "An Act Deregulating The Downstream Oil Industry, And For Other Purposes" is
adequate and comprehensive to cover the imposition of tariff rates. The tariff provision under Section 5 (b) is one
of the means of effecting deregulation. It must be observed that even prior to the passage of Republic Act No.
8180 oil products have always been subject to tariff and surely Congress is cognizant of such fact. The imposition
of the seven percent (7%) and three percent (3%) duties on imported gasoline and refined petroleum products
and on crude oil, respectively, are germane to the deregulation of the oil industry. The title, in fact, even included
the broad and all-encompassing phrase "And For Other Purposes" thereby indicating the legislative intent to
cover anything that has some relation to or connection with the deregulation of the oil industry. The tax provision
is a mere tool and mechanism considered essential by Congress to fulfill Republic Act No. 8180's objective of
fostering a competitive market and achieving the social policy objectives of a fair prices. To curtail any adverse
impact which the tariff treatment may cause by its application, and perhaps in answer to petitioners' apprehension
Congress included under the assailed section a proviso that will effectively eradicate the tariff difference in the
treatment of refined petroleum products and crude oil by stipulating "that beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff
rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same."
The contention that tariff "does not foster a truly competitive market"19 and therefore restrains trade and does not
help achieve the purpose of deregulation is an issue not within the power of the Court to resolve. Nonetheless,
the Court's pronouncement in Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board appears to be worth reiterating:

Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory,
and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid
merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to
impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to
declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority
which exercise it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. 20 [Emphasis added]

Anent petitioners' claim that both House Bill No. 5264 and Senate Bill No. 1253, [the precursor bills of Republic
Act No. 8180], "did not impose any tariff rates but merely set the policy of 'zero differential' in the House version,
and nothing in the Senate version"21 is inconsequential. Suffice it to state that the bicameral conference
committee report was approved by the conferees thereof only "after full and free conference" on the disagreeing
provisions of Senate Bill No. 1253 and House Bill No. 5264. Indeed, the "zero differential" on the tariff rates
imposed in the House version was embodied in the law, save for a slight delay in its implementation to January 1,
2004. Moreover, any objection on the validity of provisions inserted by the legislative bicameral conference
committee has
been passed upon by the Court in the recent case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,22 which, in my view, laid
to rest any doubt as to the validity of the bill emerging out of a Conference Committee. The Court in that case,
speaking through Mr. Justice Mendoza, said:

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been
explained:

Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any material
change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed
or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one
house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting
clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether
different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. . .

The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only
requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate
bills:

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its
report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it
cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After
all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act
of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third
legislative chamber is thus without any basis.

xxx xxx xxx

To be sure, nothing in the Rules [of the Senate and the House of Representatives] limits a conference
committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLVI, (Sec.) 112 of the Rules of the
Senate is cited to the effect that "If there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the
Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules
contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is then quoted from the Jefferson's Manual:

The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them . . . and
may not include subjects not within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.

Note that, according to Rule XLIX, (Sec.) 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be
to the legislative practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in
 Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane, have not been
committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No.
115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's
Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in the
practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision
but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, (Sec.) 16(3) of the Constitution provides that
"Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . ."

This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise
disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a
"detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure." The
Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-
drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the
Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal
Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
their observance the courts have no concern." Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the
Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that
they have been faithfully observed in these cases.23

The other contention of petitioners that Section 5(b) "violates the equal protection of the laws enshrined in Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution"24 deserves a short shrift for the equal protection clause does not forbid
reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions where the classification is germane to the purpose of
the law and applies equally to all the members of the class. The imposition of three percent (3%) tariff on crude
oil, which is four percent (4%) lower than those imposed on refined oil products, as persuasively argued by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is based on the substantial distinction that importers of crude oil, by necessity,
have to establish and maintain refinery plants to process and refine the crude oil thereby adding to their
production costs. To encourage these importers to set up refineries involving huge expenditures and investments
which peddlers and importers of refined petroleum products do not shoulder, Congress deemed it appropriate to
give a lower tariff rate to foster the entry of new "players" and investors in line with the law's policy to create a
competitive market. The residual contention that there is no substantial distinction in the imposition of seven
percent (7%) and three percent (3%) tariff since the law itself will level the tariff rates between the imported crude
oil and refined petroleum products come January 1, 2004, to my mind, is addressed more to the legislative's
prerogative to provide for the duration and period of effectivity of the imposition. If Congress, after consultation,
analysis of material data and due deliberations, is convinced that by January 1, 2004, the investors and importers
of crude oil would have already recovered their huge investments and expenditures in establishing refineries and
plants then it is within its prerogative to lift the tariff differential. Such matter is well within the pale of legislative
power which the Court may not fetter. Besides, this again is in line with Republic Act No. 8180's avowed policy to
foster a truly competitive market which can achieve the social policy objectives of fair, if not lower, prices.

B. On the minimum inventory requirement. Petitioners' attack on Section 6 is premised upon their belief that the
inventory requirement is hostile and not conducive for new oil companies to operate here, and unduly favors
Petron, Shell and Caltex, companies which according to them can easily hurdle the requirement. I fail to see any
legal or constitutional issue here more so as it is not raised by a party with legal standing for petitioners do not
claim to be the owners or operators of new oil companies affected by the requirement. Whether or not the
requirement is advantageous, disadvantageous or conducive for new oil companies hinges on presumptions and
speculations which is not within the realm of judicial adjudication. It may not be amiss to mention here that
according to the Office of the Solicitor General "there are about thirty (30) new entrants in the downstream
activities . . . , fourteen (14) of which have started operation . . . , eight (8) having commenced operation last
March 1997, and the rest to operate between the second quarter of 1997 and the year 2000"25. Petitioners did not
controvert this averment which thereby cast serious doubt over their claim of "hostile" environment.

C. On predatory pricing. What petitioners bewail the most in Section 9(b) is "the definition of 'predatory pricing'
[which] is too broad in scope and indefinite in meaning"26 and the penal sanction imposed for its violation.
Petitioners maintain that it would be the new oil companies or "players" which would lower their prices to gain a
foothold on the market and not Petron, Shell or Caltex, an occasion for these three big oil "companies" to control
the prices by keeping their average cost at a level which will ensure their desired profit margin. 27 Worse, the penal
sanction, they add, deters new "players" from entering the oil market and the practice of lowering prices is now
condemned as a criminal act.

Petitioners' contentions are nebulous if not speculative. In the absence of any concrete proof or evidence, the
assertion that it will only be the new oil companies which will lower oil prices remains a mere guess or suspicion.
And then again petitioners are not the proper party to raise the issue. The query on why lowering of prices should
be penalized and the broad scope of predatory pricing is not for this Court to traverse the same being reserved for
Congress. The Court should not lose sight of the fact that its duty under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code is not
to determine, define and legislate what act or acts should be penalized, but simply to report to the Chief Executive
the reasons why it believes an act should be penalized, as well as why it considers a penalty excessive, thus:

Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are nor covered by
the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may
deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.

In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

Furthermore, in the absence of an actual conviction for violation of Section 9 (b) and the appropriate appeal to this
Court, I fail to see the need to discuss any longer the issue as it is not ripe for judicial adjudication. Any
pronouncement on the legality of the sanction will only be advisory.

D. On other prohibited acts. In discussing their objection to Section 10, together with Section 20, petitioners assert
that these sanctions "even provide stiff criminal and administrative penalties for failure to maintain said minimum
requirement and other regulations" and posed this query: "Are these provisions consistent with the policy
objective to level the playing [field] in a truly competitive answer?"28 A more circumspect analysis of petitioners'
grievance, however, does not present any legal controversy. At best, their objection deals on policy
considerations that can be more appropriately and effectively addressed not by this Court but by Congress itself.

E. On the implementation of full deregulation under Section 15, and the validity of Executive Order No. 392.
Petitioners stress that "Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 delegates to the Secretary of Energy and to the
President of the Philippines the power to determine when to fully deregulate the downstream oil
industry"29 without providing for any standards "to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are
considered to be
'declining'"30 and when may the exchange rate be considered "stable" for purposes of determining when it is
"practicable" to declare full deregulation.31 In the absence of standards, Executive Order No. 392 which
implemented Section 15 constitute "executive lawmaking," 32 hence the same should likewise be struck down as
invalid. Petitioners additionally decry the brief seven (7) month transition period under Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8180. The premature full deregulation declared in Executive Order No. 392 allowed Caltex, Petron, and Shell
oil companies "to define the conditions under which any 'new players' will have to adhere to in order to become
competitive in the new deregulated market even before such a market has been created."33 Petitioners are
emphatic that Section 15 and Executive Order No. 392 "have effectively legislated a cartel among respondent oil
companies, directly violating the Constitutional prohibition against unfair trade practices and combinations in
restraint of trade".34

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 provides for the implementation of full deregulation. It states:

Section 15 on the implementation of full deregulation, thus: "Implementation of Full Deregulation. —

Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7683, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President,
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March, 1997. As far as
practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products
in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable. Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is
deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed: . . . [Emphasis added].

It appears from the foregoing that deregulation has to be implemented "not later than March 1997." The provision
is unequivocal, i.e., deregulation must be implemented on or before March 1997. The Secretary of Energy and the
President is devoid of any discretion to move the date of full deregulation to any day later than March 1997. The
second sentence which provides that "[a]s far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the
peso in relation to the US dollar is stable" did not modify or reset to any other date the full deregulation of
downstream oil industry. Not later than March 1997 is a complete and definite period for full deregulation. What is
conferred to the Department of Energy in the implementation of full deregulation, with the approval of the
President, is not the power and discretion on what the law should be. The provision of Section 15 gave the
President the authority to proceed with deregulation on or before, but not after, March 1997, and if implementation
is made before March, 1997, to execute the same, if possible, when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and the peso-dollar exchange rate is stable. But if the implementation
is made on March, 1997, the President has no option but to implement the law regardless of the conditions of the
prices of oil in the world market and the exchange rates.

The settled rule is that the legislative department may not delegate its power. Any attempt to abdicate it is
unconstitutional and void, based on the principle of potestas delegata non delegare potest. In testing whether a
statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislative so that nothing was left to the
judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.35 An enactment is said to be incomplete and
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. 36 In People v. Vera,37 the Court laid down a guideline on how
to distinguish which power may or may not be delegated by Congress, to wit:

"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77,
88 See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 68.)

Applying these parameters, I fail to see any taint of unconstitutionality that could vitiate the validity of Section 15.
The discretion to ascertain when may the prices of crude oil in the world market be deemed "declining" or when
may the peso-dollar exchange rate be considered "stable" relates to the assessment and appreciation of facts.
There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the
taking into effect of a
law38 so as to make the provision an undue delegation of legislative power. The alleged lack of definitions of the
terms employed in the statute does not give rise to undue delegation either for the words of the statute, as a rule,
must be given its literal meaning.39 Petitioners' contentions are concerned with the details of execution by the
executive officials tasked to implement deregulation. No proviso in Section 15 may be construed as objectionable
for the legislature has the latitude to provide that a law may take effect upon the happening of future specified
contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingency has
arisen.40 The instant petition is similarly situated with the past cases, as summarized in the case of People
v. Vera, where the Court ruled for the validity of several assailed statutes, to wit:

To the same effect are decisions of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of
Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil. 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39 Phil. 660), and Cruz
vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil. 234). In the first of these cases, this court sustained the validity of a law
conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the
second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their
habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial
board. In the third case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to
suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle, such prohibition to be
raised "if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if disease among foreign cattle has ceased
to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands." 41

If the Governor-General in the case of Cruz v. Youngberg42 can "suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition
of the importation of cattle, such prohibition to be raised 'if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if
disease among foreign cattles has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands" then with
more reason that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 can pass the constitutional challenge as it has mandatorily
fixed the effectivity date of full deregulation to not later than March 1997, with or without the occurrence of stable
peso-dollar exchange rate and declining oil prices. Contrary to petitioners' protestations, therefore, Section 15 is
complete and contains the basic conditions and terms for its execution.

To restate, the policy of Republic Act No. 8180 is to deregulate the downstream oil industry and to foster a truly
competitive market which could lead to fair prices and adequate supply of environmentally clean and high-quality
petroleum products. This is the guiding principle installed by Congress upon which the executive department of
the government must conform. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 sufficiently supplied the metes and bounds
for the execution of full deregulation. In fact, a cursory reading of Executive Order No. 39243 which advanced
deregulation to February 8, 1997 convincingly shows the determinable factors or standards, enumerated under
Section 15, which were taken into account by the Chief Executive in declaring full deregulation. I cannot see my
way clear on how or why Executive Order No. 392, as professed by petitioners, may be declared unconstitutional
for adding the "depletion of buffer fund" as one of the grounds for advancing the deregulation. The enumeration of
factors to be considered for full deregulation under Section 15 did not proscribe the Chief Executive from
acknowledging other instances that can equally assuage deregulation. What is important is that the Chief
Executive complied with and met the minimum standards supplied by the law. Executive Order No. 392 may not,
therefore, be branded as unconstitutional.

Petitioners' vehement objections on the short seven (7) month transition period under Section 15 and the alleged
resultant de facto formation of cartel are matters which fundamentally strike at the wisdom of the law and the
policy adopted by Congress. These are outside the power of the courts to settle; thus I fail to see the need to
digress any further.

F . On the imposition of administrative fine. The administrative fine under Section 20 is claimed to be inconsistent
with deregulation. The imposition of administrative fine for failure to meet the reportorial and minimum inventory
requirements, far from petitioners' submission, are geared towards accomplishing the noble purpose of the law.
The inventory requirement ensures the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, 44 while
the reportorial requirement is a mere devise for the Department of Energy to monitor compliance with the law. In
any event, the issue pertains to the efficacy of incorporating in the law the administrative sanctions which lies
outside the Court's sphere and competence.

In fine, it seems to me that the petitions dwell on the insistent and recurrent arguments that the imposition of
different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported petroleum products is violative of the equal protection
clause of the constitution; is not germane to the purpose of the law; does not foster a truly competitive market;
extends undue advantage to the existing oil refineries or companies; and creates a cartel or a monopoly of sort
among Shell, Caltex and Petron in clear contravention of the Constitutional proscription against unfair trade
practices and combinations in restraint of trade. Unfortunately, this Court, in my view, is not at liberty to tread
upon or even begin to discuss the merits and demerits of petitioners' stance if it is to be faithful to the time
honored doctrine of separation of powers — the underlying principle of our republican state.45 Nothing is so
fundamental in our system of government than its division into three distinct and independent branches, the
executive, the legislative and the judiciary, each branch having exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and supreme within its own sphere. It is true that there is sometimes an inevitable overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between these departments. But this elementary tenet remains: the legislative
is vested with the power to make law, the judiciary to apply and interpret it. In cases like this, "the judicial branch
of the government has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
which is challenged and to decide whether the letter squares with the former."46 This having been done and
finding no constitutional infirmity therein, the Court's task is finished. Now whether or not the law fails to achieve
its avowed policy because Congress did not carefully evaluate the long term effects of some of its provisions is a
matter clearly beyond this Court's domain.

Perhaps it bears reiterating that the question of validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative
department of the government, and the courts will resolve every presumption in favor of its validity. The courts will
assume that the validity of the statute was fully considered by the legislature when adopted. The wisdom or
advisability of a particular statute is not a question for the courts to determine. If a particular statute is within the
constitutional power of the legislature to enact, it should be sustained whether the courts agree or not in the
wisdom of its enactment.47 This Court continues to recognize that in the determination of actual cases and
controversies, it must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative branches of government. Thus, the presumption is always in favor of constitutionality
for it is likewise always presumed that in the enactment of a law or the adoption of a policy it is the people who
speak through their representatives. This principle is one of caution and circumspection in the exercise of the
grave and delicate function of judicial review48. Explaining this principle Thayer said,

It can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a
mistake, but have made a very clear one-so clear that it is not open to rational question. That is the
standard of duty to which the courts bring legislative acts; that is the test which they apply-not merely their
own judgment as to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to what judgment is permissible to another
department which the constitution has charged with the duty of making it. This rule recognizes that,
having to the great, complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of regard government, much will seem
unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; that the
 constitution often admits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and judgment;
that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but
leaves open their range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional. 49

The petitions discuss rather extensively the adverse economic implications of Republic Act No. 8180. They put
forward more than anything else, an assertion that an error of policy has been committed. Reviewing the wisdom
of the policies adopted by the executive and legislative departments is not within the province of the Court.

It is safe to assume that the legislative branch of the government has taken into consideration and has carefully
weighed all points pertinent to the law in question. We cannot doubt that these matters have been the object of
intensive research and study nor that they have been subject of comprehensive consultations with experts and
debates in both houses of Congress. Judicial review at this juncture will at best be limited and myopic. For
admittedly, this Court cannot ponder on the points raised in the petitions with the same technical competence as
that of the economic experts who have contributed valuable hours of study and deliberation in the passage of this
law.

I realize that to invoke the doctrine of separation of powers at this crucial time may be viewed by some as an act
of shirking from our duty to uphold the Constitution at all cost. Let it be remembered, however, that the doctrine of
separation of powers is likewise enshrined in our Constitution and deserves the same degree of fealty. In fact, it
carries more significance now in the face of an onslaught of similar cases brought before this Court by the
opponents of almost every enacted law of major importance. It is true that this Court is the last bulwark of justice
and it is our task to preserve the integrity of our fundamental law. But we cannot become, wittingly or unwittingly,
instruments of every aggrieved minority and losing legislator. While the laudable objectives of the law are put on
hold, this Court is faced with the unnecessary burden of disposing of issues merely contrived to fall within the
ambit of judicial review. All that is achieved is delay which is perhaps, sad to say, all that may have been intended
in the first place.

Indeed, whether Republic Act No. 8180 or portions thereof are declared unconstitutional, oil prices may continue
to rise, as they depend not on any law but on the volatile market and economic forces. It is therefore the political
departments of government that should address the issues raised herein for the discretion to allow a deregulated
oil industry and to determine its viability is lodged with the people in their primary political capacity, which as
things stand, has been delegated to Congress.

In the end, petitioners are not devoid of a remedy. To paraphrase the words of Justice Padilla in Kapatiran ng mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas v. Tan,50 if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and continued
application of Republic Act No. 8180 are prejudicial to the general welfare or the interests of the majority of the people,
they should seek recourse and relief from the political branches of government, as they are now doing by moving for an
amendment of the assailed provisions in the correct forum which is Congress or for the exercise of the people's power of
initiative on legislation. The Court following the time honored doctrine of separation of powers, cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Congress as to the wisdom, justice and advisability of Republic Act No. 8180.51

ACCORDINGLY, finding no merit in the instant petitions I vote for their outright dismissal.

Separate Opinions

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:

I concur with the lucid and convincing ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I write to stress two points:

1. The Issue Is Whether Oil Companies May Unilaterally

Fix Prices, Not Whether This Court May
Interfere in Economic Questions

With the issuance of the status quo order on October 7, 1997 requiring the three respondent oil companies —
Petron, Shell and Caltex — "to cease and desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and other petroleum fuel
products for a period of thirty (30) days," the Court has been accused of interfering in purely economic policy
matters1 or, worse, of arrogating unto itself price-regulatory powers.2 Let it be emphasized that we have no desire
 — nay, we have no power — to intervene in, to change or to repeal the laws of economics, in the same manner
that we cannot and will not nullify or invalidate the laws of physics or chemistry.

The issue here is not whether the Supreme Court may fix the retail prices of petroleum products, Rather, the
issue is whether RA 8180, the law allowing the oil companies to unilaterally set, increase or decrease their prices,
is valid or constitutional.

Under the Constitution,3 this Court has — in appropriate cases — the DUTY, not just the power, to determine
whether a law or a part thereof offends the Constitution and, if so, to annul and set it aside. 4 Because a serious
challenge has been hurled against the validity of one such law, namely RA 8180 — its criticality having been
preliminarily determined from the petition, comments, reply and, most tellingly, the oral argument on September
30, 1997 — this Court, in the exercise of its mandated judicial discretion, issued the status quo order to prevent
the continued enforcement and implementation of a law that was prima facie found to be constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, after careful final deliberation, said law is now ruled to be constitutionally defective thereby disabling
respondent oil companies from exercising their erstwhile power, granted by such defective statute, to determine
prices by themselves.

Concededly, this Court has no power to pass upon the wisdom, merits and propriety of the acts of its co-equal
branches in government. However, it does have the prerogative to uphold the Constitution and to strike down and
annul a law that contravenes the Charter.5 From such duty and prerogative, it shall never shirk or shy away.

By annulling RA 8180, this Court is not making a policy statement against deregulation. Quite the contrary, it is
simply invalidating a pseudo deregulation law which in reality restrains free trade and perpetuates a cartel, an
oligopoly. The Court is merely upholding constitutional adherence to a truly competitive economy that releases
the creative energy of free enterprise. It leaves to Congress, as the policy-setting agency of the government, the
speedy crafting of a genuine, constitutionally justified oil deregulation law.

2. Everyone, Rich or Poor, Must Share

in the Burdens of Economic Dislocation

Much has been said and will be said about the alleged negative effect of this Court's holding on the oil giants'
profit and loss statements. We are not unaware of the disruptive impact of the depreciating peso on the retail
prices of refined petroleum products. But such price-escalating consequence adversely affects not merely these
oil companies which occupy hallowed places among the most profitable corporate behemoths in our country. In
these critical times of widespread economic dislocations, abetted by currency fluctuations not entirely of domestic
origin, all sectors of society agonize and suffer. Thus, everyone, rich or poor, must share in the burdens of such
economic aberrations.

I can understand foreign investors who see these price adjustments as necessary consequences of the country's
adherence to the free market, for that, in the first place, is the magnet for their presence here. Understandably,
their concern is limited to bottom lines and market share. But in all these mega companies, there are also Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers. I am sure there are patriots among them who realize that, in times of economic
turmoil, the poor and the underprivileged proportionately suffer more than any other sector of society. There is a
certain threshold of pain beyond which the disadvantaged cannot endure. Indeed, it has been wisely said that "if
the rich who are few will not help the poor who are many, there will come a time when the few who are filled
cannot escape the wrath of the many who are hungry." Kaya't sa mga kababayan nating kapitalista at may
kapangyarihan, nararapat lamang na makiisa tayo sa mga walang palad at mahihirap sa mga araw ng
pangangailangan. Huwag na nating ipagdiinan ang kawalan ng tubo, o maging and panandaliang pagkalugi. At sa
mga mangangalakal na ganid at walang puso: hirap na hirap na po ang ating mga kababayan. Makonsiyensya
naman kayo!

KAPUNAN, J., separate opinion:

Lately, the Court has been perceived (albeit erroneously) to be an unwelcome interloper in affairs and concerns
best left to legislators and policy-makers. Admittedly, the wisdom of political and economic decisions are outside
the scrutiny of the Court. However, the political question doctrine is not some mantra that will automatically cloak
executive orders and laws (or provisions thereof) with legitimacy. It is this Court's bounden duty under Sec. 4(2),
Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution to decide all cases involving the constitutionality of laws and under Sec. 1 of the
same article, "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
In the instant case, petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provisions found in R.A. No 8180, otherwise
known as the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996" To avoid accusations of undue interference
with the workings of the two other branches of government, this discussion is limited to the issue of whether or not
the assailed provisions are germane to the law or serve the purpose for which it was enacted.

The objective of the deregulation law is quite simple. As aptly enunciated in Sec. 2 thereof, it is to "foster a truly
competitive market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous
supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products." The key, therefore, is free
competition which is commonly defined as:

The act or action of seeking to gain what another is seeking to gain at the same time and usually under or
as if under fair or equitable rules and circumstances: a common struggle for the same object especially
among individuals of relatively equal standing . . . a market condition in which a large number of
independent buyers and sellers compete for identical commodity, deal freely with each other, and retain
the right of entry and exit from the market. (Webster's Third International Dictionary.)

and in a landscape where our oil industry is dominated by only three major oil firms, this translates primarily into
the establishment of a free market conducive to the entry of new and several and oil companies in the business.
Corollarily, it means the removal of any and all barriers that will hinder the influx of prospective players. It is a
truism in economics that if there are many players in the market, healthy competition will ensue and in order to
survive and profit the competitors will try to outdo each other in terms of quality and price. The result: better
quality products and competitive prices. In the end, it will be the public that benefits (which is ultimately the most
important goal of the law). Thus, it is within this framework that we must determine the validity of the assailed
provisions.

The 4% Tariff Differential

Sec. 5. Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff Treatment.—

xxx xxx xxx

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be
imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined
petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be
the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on
imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this
provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress;

Respondents are one in asserting that the 4% tariff differential between imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products is intended to encourage the new entrants to put up their own refineries in the country. The
advantages of domestic refining cannot be discounted, but we must view this intent in the proper perspective. The
primary purpose of the deregulation law is to open up the market and establish free competition. The priority of
the deregulation law, therefore, is to encourage new oil companies to come in first. Incentives to encourage the
building of local refineries should be provided after the new oil companies have entered the Philippine market and
are actively participating therein.

The threshold question therefore is, is the 4% tariff differential a barrier to the entry of new oil companies in the
Philippine market?

It is. Since the prospective oil companies do not (as yet) have local refineries, they would have to import refined
petroleum products, on which a 7% tariff duty is imposed. On the other hand, the existing oil companies already
have domestic refineries and, therefore, only import crude oil which is taxed at a lower rate of 3%. Tariffs are part
of the costs of production. Hence, this means that with the 4% tariff differential (which becomes an added cost)
the prospective players would have higher production costs compared to the existing oil companies and it is
precisely this factor which could seriously affect its decision to enter the market.
Viewed in this light, the tariff differential between imported crude oil and refined petroleum products becomes an
obstacle to the entry of new players in the Philippine oil market. It defeats the purpose of the law and should thus
be struck down.

Public respondents contend that ". . . a higher tariff rate is not the overriding factor confronting a prospective
trader/importer but, rather, his ability to generate the desired internal rate of return (IRR) and net present value
(NPV). In other words, if said trader/importer, after some calculation, finds that he can match the price of locally
refined petroleum products and still earn the desired profit margin, despite a higher tariff rate, he will be attracted
to embark in such business. A tariff differential does not per se make the business of importing refined petroleum
product a losing proposition."1

The problem with this rationale, however, is that it is highly speculative. The opposite may well hold true. The
point is to make the prospect of engaging in the oil business in the Philippines appealing, so why create a barrier
in the first place?

There is likewise no merit in the argument that the removal of the tariff differential will revive the 10% (for crude
oil) and 20% (for refined petroleum products) tariff rates that prevailed before the enactment of R.A. No. 8180.
What petitioners are assailing is the tariff differential. Phrased differently, why is the tariff duty imposed on
imported petroleum products not the same as that imposed on imported crude oil? Declaring the tariff differential
void is not equivalent to declaring the tariff itself void. The obvious consequence thereof would be that imported
refined petroleum products would now be taxed at the same rate as imported crude oil which R.A. No. 8180 has
specifically set at 3%. The old rates have effectively been repealed by Sec. 24 of the same law. 2

II

The Minimum Inventory Requirement

and the Prohibition Against Predatory Pricing

Sec. 6. Security of Supply. — To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products
supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. Prohibited Acts. — To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the
downstream oil industry, the following acts are hereby prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the
industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

The same rationale holds true for the two other assailed provisions in the Oil Deregulation law. The primordial
purpose of the law, I reiterate, is to create a truly free and competitive market. To achieve this goal, provisions
that show the possibility, or even the merest hint, of deterring or impeding the ingress of new blood in the market
should be eliminated outright. I am confident that our lawmakers can formulate other measures that would
accomplish the same purpose (insure security and continuity of petroleum crude products supply and prevent fly
by night operators, in the case of the minimum inventory requirement, for instance) but would not have on the
downside the effect of seriously hindering the entry of prospective traders in the market.

The overriding consideration, which is the public interest and public benefit, calls for the levelling of the playing
fields for the existing oil companies and the prospective new entrants. Only when there are many players in the
market will free competition reign and economic development begin.

Consequently, Section 6 and Section 9(b) of R. A. No. 8180 should similarly be struck down.

III

Conclusion
 Respondent oil companies vehemently deny the "cartelization" of the oil industry. Their parallel business
behaviour and uniform pricing are the result of competition, they say, in order to keep their share of the market.
This rationale fares well when oil prices are lowered, i.e. when one oil company rolls back its prices, the others
follow suit so as not to lose its market. But how come when one increases its prices the others likewise follow? Is
this competition at work?

Respondent oil companies repeatedly assert that due to the devaluation of the peso, they had to increase the
prices of their oil products, otherwise, they would lose, as they have allegedly been losing specially with the
issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Court. However, what we have on record are only the self-
serving lamentations of respondent oil companies. Not one has presented hard data, independently verified, to
attest to these losses. Mere allegations are not sufficient but must be accompanied by supporting evidence. What
probably is nearer the truth is that respondent oil companies will not make as much profits as they have in the
past if they are not allowed to increase the prices of their products everytime the value of the peso slumps. But in
the midst of worsening economic difficulties and hardships suffered by the people, the very customers who have
given them tremendous profits throughout the years, is it fair and decent for said companies not to bear a bit of
the burden by forgoing a little of their profits?

PREMISES CONSIDERED, I vote that Section 5(b), Section 6 and Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 8180 be declared
unconstitutional.

MELO, J., dissenting:

With all due respect to my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Puno, who has, as usual, prepared a well-written and
comprehensive ponencia, I regret I cannot share the view that Republic Act No. 8180 should be struck down as
violative of the Constitution.

The law in question, Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996,
contains, inter alia, the following provisions which have become the subject of the present controversy, to wit:

Sec. 5. Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff Treatment. —

xxx xxx xxx

(b). — Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this act, tariff duty shall
be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of (3%) and imported refined petroleum
products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same
as that for imported crude
oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined
petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an
Act of Congress. . .

Sec. 6. Security of Supply. — To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products
supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. Prohibited Acts. — To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the
downstream oil industry, the following acts are hereby prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the
industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. — Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the
DOE [Department of Energy] shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the
 downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full
deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and
when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US Dollar is stable. . .

In G. R. No. 124360, petitioners therein pray that the aforequoted Section 5(b) be declared null and void.
However, despite its pendency, President Ramos, pursuant to the above-cited Section 15 of the assailed law,
issued Executive Order No. 392 on 22 January 1997 declaring the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry
effective February 8, 1997. A few days after the implementation of said Executive Order, the second consolidated
petition was filed (G.R. No. 127867), seeking, inter alia, the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 15 of
the law on various grounds.

I submit that the instant consolidated petitions should be denied. In support of my view, I shall discuss the
arguments of the parties point by point.

1. The instant petitions do not raise a justiciable controversy as the issues raised therein pertain to the wisdom
and reasonableness of the provisions of the assailed law. The contentions made by petitioners, that the
"imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products will not foster a
truly competitive market, nor will it level the playing fields" and that said imposition "does not deregulate the
downstream oil industry, instead, it controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law," are clearly
policy matters which are within the province of the political departments of the government. These submissions
require a review of issues that are in the nature of political questions, hence, clearly beyond the ambit of judicial
inquiry.

A political question refers to a question of policy or to issues which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. Generally, political questions are concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular measure (Tañada vs. Cuenco, 100 Phil 101 [1957]).

Notwithstanding the expanded judicial power of this Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, an
inquiry on the above-stated policy matters would delve on matters of wisdom which are exclusively within the
legislative powers of Congress.

2. The petitioners do not have the necessary locus standi to file the instant consolidated petitions. Petitioners
Lagman, Arroyo, Garcia, Tanada, and Tatad assail the constitutionality of the above-stated laws through the
instant consolidated petitions in their capacity as members of Congress, and as taxpayers and concerned
citizens. However, the existence of a constitutional issue in a case does not per se confer or clothe a legislator
with locus standi to bring suit. In Phil. Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) v. Enriquez (235 SCRA 506 [1994]),
we held that members of Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the
government only upon showing that the assailed official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as
legislators. In Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Morato, et al. (246 SCRA 540 [1995]), this Court further clarified that "if
the complaint is not grounded on the impairment of the power of Congress, legislators do not have standing to
question the validity of any law or official action."

Republic Act No. 8180 clearly does not violate or impair prerogatives, powers, and rights of Congress, or the
individual members thereof, considering that the assailed official act is the very act of Congress itself authorizing
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Neither can petitioners sue as taxpayers or concerned citizens. A condition sine qua non for the institution of a
taxpayer's suit is an allegation that the assailed action is an unconstitutional exercise of the spending powers of
Congress or that it constitutes an illegal disbursement of public funds. The instant consolidated petitions do not
allege that the assailed provisions of the law amount to an illegal disbursement of public money. Hence,
petitioners cannot, even as taxpayers or concerned citizens, invoke this Court's power of judicial review.

Further, petitioners, including Flag, FDC, and Sanlakas, can not be deemed proper parties for lack of a
particularized interest or elemental substantial injury necessary to confer on them locus standi. The interest of the
person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only
that the jaw is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of Petitioners
have not established such kind of interest.

3. Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 8180 is not violative of the "one title-one subject" rule under Section 26 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution. It is not required that a provision of law be expressed in the title thereof as long as
the provision in question is embraced within the subject expressed in the title of the law. The "title of a bill does
not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each
other and may be inferred from the title." (Association of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. vs. Sec. of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]) An "act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means
of carrying out the general object." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 11th ed., p. 225).

The questioned tariff provision in Section 5 (b) was provided as a means to implement the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry and hence, is germane to the purpose of the assailed law. The general subject of
Republic Act No. 8180, as expressed in its title, "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry, and for the
Other Purposes", necessarily implies that the law provides for the means for such deregulation. One such means
is the imposition of the differential tariff rates which are provided to encourage new investors as well as existing
players to put up new refineries. The aforesaid provision is thus germane to, and in furtherance of, the object of
deregulation. The trend of jurisprudence, ever since Sumulong vs. COMELEC (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), is to give the
above-stated constitutional requirement a liberal interpretation. Hence, there is indeed substantial compliance
with said requirement.

Petitioners claim that because the House version of the assailed law did not impose any tariff rates but merely set
the policy of "zero differential" and that the Senate version did not set or fix any tariff, the tariff changes being
imposed by the assailed law was never subject of any deliberations in both houses nor the Bicameral Conference
Committee. I believe that this argument is bereft of merit.

The report of the Bicameral Conference Committee, which was precisely formed to settle differences between the
two houses of Congress, was approved by members thereof only after a full deliberation on the conflicting
provisions of the Senate version and the House version of the assailed law. Moreover, the joint explanatory
statement of said Committee which was submitted to both houses, explicitly states that "while sub-paragraph (b)
is a modification, its thrust and style were patterned after the House's original sub-paragraph (b)." Thus, it cannot
be denied that both houses were informed of the changes in the aforestated provision of the assailed law. No
legislator can validly state that he was not apprised of the purposes, nature, and scope of the provisions of the
law since the inclusion of the tariff differential was clearly mentioned in the Bicameral Conference Committee's
explanatory note.

As regards the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee to include in its report an entirely new provision
that is neither found in the House bill or Senate bill, this Court already upheld such power in Tolentino vs. Sec. of
Finance (235 SCRA 630 [1994]), where we ruled that the conference committee can even include an amendment
in the nature of a substitute so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bill before it.

Lastly, in view of the "enrolled bill theory" pronounced by this Court as early as 1947 in the case of Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1 [1947]), the duly authenticated copy of the bill, signed by the proper officers of each
house, and approved by the President, is conclusive upon the courts not only of its provisions but also of its due
enactment.

4. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 does not constitute undue delegation of legislative power. Petitioners
themselves admit that said section provides the Secretary of Energy and the President with the bases of (1)
"practicability", (2) "the decline of crude oil prices in the world market", and (3) "the stability of the Peso exchange
rate in relation to the US Dollar", in determining the effectivity of full deregulation. To my mind, said bases are
determinate and determinable guidelines, when examined in the light of the tests for permissible delegation.

The assailed law satisfies the completeness test as it is complete and leaves nothing more for the Executive
Branch to do but to enforce the same. Section 2 thereof expressly provides that "it shall be the policy of the State
to deregulate the downstream oil industry to foster a truly competitive market which can better achieve the social
policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high-quality
petroleum products." This provision manifestly declares the policy to be achieved through the delegate, that is, the
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry toward the end of full and free competition. Section 15 further
provides for all the basic terms and conditions for its execution and thus belies the argument that the Executive
Branch is given complete liberty to determine whether or not to implement the law. Indeed, Congress did not only
make full deregulation mandatory, but likewise set a deadline (that is, not later than March 1997), within which full
deregulation should be achieved.

Congress may validly provide that a statute shall take effect or its operation shall be revived or suspended or shall
terminate upon the occurrence of certain events or contingencies the ascertainment of which may be left to some
official agency. In effect, contingent legislation may be issued by the Executive Branch pursuant to a delegation of
authority to determine some fact or state of things upon which the enforcement of a law depends (Cruz, Phil.
Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 96; Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 [1931]). This is a valid delegation since what the
delegate performs is a matter of detail whereas the statute remains complete in all essential matters. Section 15
falls under this kind of delegated authority. Notably, the only aspect with respect to which the President can
exercise "discretion" is the determination of whether deregulation may be implemented on or before March, 1997,
the deadline set by Congress. If he so decides, however, certain conditions must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the exchange rate of the
peso in relation to the US Dollar is stable. Significantly, the so-called "discretion" pertains only to the
ascertainment of the existence of conditions which are necessary for the effectivity of the law and not a discretion
as to what the law shall be.

In the same vein, I submit that the President's issuance of Executive Order No. 392 last January 22, 1997 is valid
as contingent legislation. All the Chief Executive did was to exercise his delegated authority to ascertain and
recognize certain events or contingencies which prompted him to advance the deregulation to a date earlier than
March, 1997. Anyway, the law does not prohibit him from implementing the deregulation prior to March, 1997, as
long as the standards of the law are met.

Further, the law satisfies the sufficient standards test. The words "practicable", "declining", and "stable", as used
in Section 15 of the assailed law are sufficient standards that saliently "map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and
effected." (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 98). Considering the normal and ordinary definitions of these
standards, I believe that the factors to be considered by the President and/or Secretary of Energy in implementing
full deregulation are, as mentioned, determinate and determinable.

It is likewise noteworthy that the above-mentioned factors laid down by the subject law are not solely dependent
on Congress. Verily, oil pricing and the peso-dollar exchange rate are dependent on the various forces working
within the consumer market. Accordingly, it would have been unreasonable, or even impossible, for the legislature
to have provided for fixed and specific oil prices and exchange rates. To require Congress to set forth specifics in
the law would effectively deprive the legislature of the flexibility and practicability which subordinate legislation is
ultimately designed to provide. Besides, said specifics are precisely the details which are beyond the competence
of Congress, and thus, are properly delegated to appropriate administrative agencies and executive officials to "fill
in". It cannot be gainsaid that the detail of the timing of full deregulation has been "filled in" by the President, upon
the recommendation of the DOE, when he issued Executive Order No. 329.

5. Republic Act No. 8180 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade, and unfair competition. The three provisions relied upon by petitioners (Section 5 [b] on tariff
differential; Section 6 on the 40-day minimum inventory requirement; and Section 9 [b] on the prohibited act of
predatory pricing) actually promote, rather than restrain, free trade and competition.

The tariff differential provided in the assailed law does not necessarily make the business of importing refined
petroleum products a losing proposition for new players. First, the decision of a prospective trader/importer
(subjected to the 7% tariff rate) to compete in the downstream oil industry as a new player is based solely on
whether he can, based on his computations, generate the desired internal rate of return (IRR) and net present
value (NPV) notwithstanding the imposition of a higher tariff rate. Second, such a difference in tax treatment does
not necessarily provide refiners of imported crude oil with a significant level of economic advantage considering
the huge amount of investments required in putting up refinery plants which will then have to be added to said
refiners' production cost. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the additional cost imputed by higher tariff can
anyway be overcome by a new player in the business of importation due to lower operating costs, lower capital
infusion, and lower capital carrying costs. Consequently, the resultant cost of imported finished petroleum and
that of locally refined petroleum products may turn out to be approximately the same.

The existence of a tariff differential with regard to imported crude oil and imported finished products is nothing
new or novel. In fact, prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 8180, there existed a 10% tariff differential resulting
from the imposition of a 20% tariff rate on imported finished petroleum products and 10% on imported crude oil
(based on Executive Order No. 115). Significantly, Section 5 (b) of the assailed law effectively lowered the tariff
rates from 20% to 7% for imported refined petroleum products, and 10% to 3% for imported crude oil, or a
reduction of the differential from 10% to 4%. This provision is certainly favorable to all in the downstream oil
industry, whether they be existing or new players. It thus follows that the 4% tariff differential aims to ensure the
stable supply of petroleum products by encouraging new entrants to put up oil refineries in the Philippines and to
discourage fly-by-night importers.

Further, the assailed tariff differential is likewise not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is
germane to the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8180 which is to achieve (1) fair prices; and (2) adequate and
continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products. Said adequate and continuous
supply of petroleum products will be achieved if new investors or players are enticed to engage in the business of
refining crude oil in the country. Existing refining companies, are similarly encouraged to put up additional refining
companies. All of this can be made possible in view of the lower tariff duty on imported crude oil than that levied
on imported refined petroleum products. In effect, the lower tariff rates will enable the refiners to recoup their
investments considering that they will be investing billions of pesos in putting up their refineries in the Philippines.
That incidentally the existing refineries will be benefited by the tariff differential does not negate the fact that the
intended effect of the law is really to encourage the construction of new refineries, whether by existing players or
by new players.

As regards the 40-day inventory requirement, it must be emphasized that the 10% minimum requirement is based
on the refiners' and importers' annual sales volume, and hence, obviously inapplicable to new entrants as they do
not have an annual sales volume yet. Contrary to petitioners' argument, this requirement is not intended to
discourage new or prospective players in the downstream oil industry. Rather, it guarantees "security and
continuity of petroleum crude and products supply." (Section 6, Republic Act No. 8180) This legal requirement is
meant to weed out entities not sufficiently qualified to participate in the local downstream oil industry.
Consequently, it is meant to protect the industry from fly-by-night business operators whose sole interest would
be to make quick profits and who may prove unrealiable in the effort to provide an adequate and steady supply of
petroleum products in the country. In effect, the aforestated provision benefits not only the three respondent oil
companies but all entities serious and committed to put up storage facilities and to participate as serious players
in the local oil industry. Moreover, it benefits the entire consuming public by its guarantee of an "adequate
continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products." It ensures that all companies in
the downstream oil industry operate according to the same high standards, that the necessary storage and
distribution facilities are in place to support the level of business activities involved, and that operations are
conducted in a safe and environmentally sound manner for the benefit of the consuming public.

Regarding the prohibition against predatory pricing, I believe that petitioners' argument is quite misplaced. The
provision actually protects new players by preventing, under pain of criminal sanction, the more established oil
firms from driving away any potential or actual competitor by taking undue advantage of their size and relative
financial stability. Obviously, the new players are the ones susceptible to closing down on account of intolerable
losses which will be brought about by fierce competition with rival firms. The petitioners are merely working under
the presumption that it is the new players which would succumb to predatory pricing, and not the more
established oil firms. This is not a factual assertion but a rather baseless and conjectural assumption.

As to the alleged cartel among the three respondent oil companies, much as we suspect the same, its existence
calls for a finding of fact which this Court is not in the position to make. We cannot be called to try facts and
resolve factual issues such as this (Trade Unions of the Phils. vs. Laguesma, 236 SCRA 586 [1994]); Ledesma
vs. NLRC, 246 SCRA 247 [1995]).

With respect to the amendatory bills filed by various Congressmen aimed to modify the alleged defects of
Republic Act No. 8180, I submit that such bills are the correct remedial steps to pursue, instead of the instant
petitions to set aside the statute sought to be amended. The proper forum is Congress, not this Court.

Finally, as to the ponencia's endnote which cites the plea of respondent oil companies for the lifting of the
restraining order against them to enable them to adjust the prices of petroleum and petroleum products in view of
the devaluation of our currency, I am pensive as to how the matter can be addressed to the obviously defunct
Energy Regulatory Board. There has been a number of price increase in the meantime. Too much water has
passed under the bridge. It is too difficult to turn back the hands of time.

For all the foregoing reasons, I, therefore, vote for the outright dismissal of the instant consolidated petitions for
lack of merit.
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting:

The continuing peso devaluation and the spiraling cost of commodities have become hard facts of life nowadays.
And the wearies are compounded by the ominous prospects of very unstable oil prices. Thus, with the goal of
rationalizing the oil scheme, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996, the policy of which is "to foster a truly competitive market which can better achieve the
social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality
petroleum products".1 But if the noble and laudable objective of this enactment is not accomplished, as to date oil
prices continue to rise, can this Court be called upon to declare the statute unconstitutional or must the Court
desist from interfering in a matter which is best left to the other branch/es of government?

The apparent thrust of the consolidated petitions is to declare, not the entirety, but only some isolated portions of
Republic Act No. 8180 unconstitutional. This is clear from the grounds enumerated by the petitioners, to wit:

G.R. No. 124360

4.0. Grounds:

4.1.

THE IMPOSITION OF DIFFERENT TARIFF RATES ON IMPORTED CRUDE OIL AND IMPORTED
REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

4.2.

THE IMPOSITION OF DIFFERENT TARIFF RATES DOES NOT DEREGULATE THE DOWNSTREAM
OIL INDUSTRY, INSTEAD, IT CONTROLS THE OIL INDUSTRY, CONTRARY TO THE AVOWED
POLICY OF THE LAW.

4.3.

THE INCLUSION OF A TARIFF PROVISION IN SECTION 5(b) OF THE DOWNSTREAM OIL

INDUSTRY DEREGULATION LAW VIOLATES THE "ONE SUBJECT-ONE TITLE" RULE EMBODIED IN
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (1) OF THE CONSTITUTION.2

G.R. No. 127867

GROUNDS

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FULL DEREGULATION PRIOR TO THE EXISTENCE OF A TRULY

COMPETITIVE MARKET VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITING MONOPOLIES, UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND PRACTICES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

R.A. No. 8180 CONTAINS DISGUISED REGULATIONS IN A SUPPOSEDLY DEREGULATED

INDUSTRY WHICH CREATE OR PROMOTE MONOPOLY OF THE INDUSTRY BY THE THREE
EXISTING OIL COMPANIES.

THE REGULATORY AND PENAL PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 8180 VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AN
ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.3

And culled from petitioners' arguments in support of the above grounds the provisions of Republic Act No. 8180
which they now impugn are:

A. Section 5(b) on the imposition of tariff which provides: "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and
starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at
the rate of three percent (3%), and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%),
except fuel oil and LPB, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That
 beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be
the same: Provided further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress." [Emphasis
added].

B. Section 6 on the minimum inventory requirement, thus: "Security of Supply. — To ensure the security
and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers
to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume
or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower."

C. Section 9(b) on predatory pricing: "Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product
at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of
competitors.

Any person, including but not limited to the chief operating officer or chief executive officer of the
corporation involved, who is found guilty of any of the said prohibited acts shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for three (3) years and fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) to One
million pesos (P1,000,000).

D. Section 10 on the other prohibited acts which states: "Other Prohibited Acts. — To ensure compliance
with the provisions of this Act, the failure to comply with any of the following shall likewise be prohibited:
1) submission of any reportorial requirements; 2) maintenance of the minimum inventory; and, 3) use of
clean and safe (environment and worker-benign) technologies.

Any person, including but not limited to the chief operating officer or chief executive officer of the
corporation involved, who is found guilty of any of the said prohibited acts shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for two (2) years and fine ranging from Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000) to
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000).

E. Section 15 on the implementation of full deregulation, thus: "Implementation of Full Deregulation. —

Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7683, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President,
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March, 1997. As far as
practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products
in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable. Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is
deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed: . . . [Emphasis added].

F. Section 20 on the imposition of administrative fine: "Administrative Fine. — The DOE may, after due
notice and hearing impose a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000)
but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000) upon any person or entity who violates any of its
reportorial and minimum inventory requirements, without prejudice to criminal sanctions."

Executive Order No. 392, entitled "Declaring Full Deregulation Of The Downstream Oil Industry" which declared
the full deregulation effective February 8, 1997, is also sought to be declared unconstitutional.

A careful scrutiny of the arguments proffered against the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 betrays the
petitioners' underlying motive of calling upon this Court to determine the wisdom and efficacy of the enactment
rather than its adherence to the Constitution. Nevertheless, I shall address the issues raised if only to settle the
alleged constitutional defects afflicting some provisions of Republic Act No. 8180. To elaborate:

A. On the imposition of tariff . Petitioners argue that the existence of a tariff provision violated the "one subject-
one title"4 rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) as the imposition of tariff rates is "inconsistent with"5 and not at all
germane to the deregulation of the oil industry. They also stress that the variance between the seven percent
(7%) duty on imported gasoline and other refined petroleum products and three percent (3%) duty on crude oil
gives a "4% tariff protection in favor of Petron, Shell and Caltex which own and operate refineries here". 6 The
provision, petitioners insist, "inhibits prospective oil players to do business here because it will unnecessarily
increase their product cost by 4%."7 In other words, the tariff rates "does not foster 'a truly competitive
market'."8 Also petitioners claim that both Houses of Congress never envisioned imposing the seven percent (7%)
and three percent (3%) tariff on refined and crude oil products as both Houses advocated, prior to the holding of
the bicameral conference committee, a "zero differential". Moreover, petitioners insist that the tariff rates violate
"the equal protection of the laws enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution" 9 since the rates and their
classification are not relevant in attaining the avowed policy of the law, not based on substantial distinctions and
limited to the existing condition.

The Constitution mandates that "every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof".10 The object sought to be accomplished by this mandatory requirement has been
explained by the Court in the vintage case of Central Capiz v. Ramirez,11 thus:

The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision are
well known. Legislative assemblies, for the dispatch of business, often pass bills by their titles only
without requiring them to be read. A specious title sometimes covers legislation which, if its real character
had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature
is one of the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision the
title of a statute was often no indication of its subject or contents.

An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same
statute of such things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all
the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage of several measures no one of which could have
succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities defining the objects
of this provision: "It may therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was: First, to
prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by
means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through
such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being
considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they
shall so desire." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143). 12

The interpretation of "one subject-one title" rule, however, is never intended to impede or stifle legislation. The
requirement is to be given a practical rather than a technical construction and it would be sufficient compliance if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the enactment are germane and material to the
general subject.13 Congress is not required to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. 14 All that is required is that the
title should not cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as
having a necessary or proper connection.15 Hence, the title "An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act
Numbered One Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines" was declared by the Court sufficient to contain a provision empowering the Secretary of Justice,
acting through a tenancy mediation division, to carry out a national enforcement program, including the mediation
of tenancy disputes.16 The title "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" was similarly declared valid
and sufficient to embrace a regulatory tax provision, i.e., the imposition of a thirty percent (30%) tax on the
purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program with fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax
collected accruing to the province and the other fifty percent (50%) to the municipality where the tax is
collected.17 Likewise, the title "An Act To Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as
amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One" was declared sufficient to cover a
provision limiting the allowable margin of profit to not more than twelve percent (12%) annually of its investments
plus two-month operating expenses for franchise holder receiving at least fifty percent (50%) of its power from the
National Power Corporation.18

In the case at bar, the title "An Act Deregulating The Downstream Oil Industry, And For Other Purposes" is
adequate and comprehensive to cover the imposition of tariff rates. The tariff provision under Section 5 (b) is one
of the means of effecting deregulation. It must be observed that even prior to the passage of Republic Act No.
8180 oil products have always been subject to tariff and surely Congress is cognizant of such fact. The imposition
of the seven percent (7%) and three percent (3%) duties on imported gasoline and refined petroleum products
and on crude oil, respectively, are germane to the deregulation of the oil industry. The title, in fact, even included
the broad and all-encompassing phrase "And For Other Purposes" thereby indicating the legislative intent to
cover anything that has some relation to or connection with the deregulation of the oil industry. The tax provision
is a mere tool and mechanism considered essential by Congress to fulfill Republic Act No. 8180's objective of
fostering a competitive market and achieving the social policy objectives of a fair prices. To curtail any adverse
impact which the tariff treatment may cause by its application, and perhaps in answer to petitioners' apprehension
Congress included under the assailed section a proviso that will effectively eradicate the tariff difference in the
treatment of refined petroleum products and crude oil by stipulating "that beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff
rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same."
The contention that tariff "does not foster a truly competitive market"19 and therefore restrains trade and does not
help achieve the purpose of deregulation is an issue not within the power of the Court to resolve. Nonetheless,
the Court's pronouncement in Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board appears to be worth reiterating:

Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory,
and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid
merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to
impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to
declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority
which exercise it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.20 [Emphasis added]

Anent petitioners' claim that both House Bill No. 5264 and Senate Bill No. 1253, [the precursor bills of Republic
Act No. 8180], "did not impose any tariff rates but merely set the policy of 'zero differential' in the House version,
and nothing in the Senate version"21 is inconsequential. Suffice it to state that the bicameral conference
committee report was approved by the conferees thereof only "after full and free conference" on the disagreeing
provisions of Senate Bill No. 1253 and House Bill No. 5264. Indeed, the "zero differential" on the tariff rates
imposed in the House version was embodied in the law, save for a slight delay in its implementation to January 1,
2004. Moreover, any objection on the validity of provisions inserted by the legislative bicameral conference
committee has
been passed upon by the Court in the recent case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,22 which, in my view, laid
to rest any doubt as to the validity of the bill emerging out of a Conference Committee. The Court in that case,
speaking through Mr. Justice Mendoza, said:

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been
explained:

Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any material
change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed
or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one
house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting
clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether
different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. . .

The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only
requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate
bills:

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its
report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it
cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After
all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act
of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third
legislative chamber is thus without any basis.

xxx xxx xxx

To be sure, nothing in the Rules [of the Senate and the House of Representatives] limits a conference
committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLVI, (Sec.) 112 of the Rules of the
Senate is cited to the effect that "If there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the
Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules
contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is then quoted from the Jefferson's Manual:

The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them . . . and
may not include subjects not within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.

Note that, according to Rule XLIX, (Sec.) 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be
to the legislative practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in
 Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane, have not been
committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No.
115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's
Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in the
practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision
but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, (Sec.) 16(3) of the Constitution provides that
"Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . ."

This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise
disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a
"detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure." The
Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-
drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the
Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal
Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
their observance the courts have no concern." Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the
Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that
they have been faithfully observed in these cases.23

The other contention of petitioners that Section 5(b) "violates the equal protection of the laws enshrined in Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution"24 deserves a short shrift for the equal protection clause does not forbid
reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions where the classification is germane to the purpose of
the law and applies equally to all the members of the class. The imposition of three percent (3%) tariff on crude
oil, which is four percent (4%) lower than those imposed on refined oil products, as persuasively argued by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is based on the substantial distinction that importers of crude oil, by necessity,
have to establish and maintain refinery plants to process and refine the crude oil thereby adding to their
production costs. To encourage these importers to set up refineries involving huge expenditures and investments
which peddlers and importers of refined petroleum products do not shoulder, Congress deemed it appropriate to
give a lower tariff rate to foster the entry of new "players" and investors in line with the law's policy to create a
competitive market. The residual contention that there is no substantial distinction in the imposition of seven
percent (7%) and three percent (3%) tariff since the law itself will level the tariff rates between the imported crude
oil and refined petroleum products come January 1, 2004, to my mind, is addressed more to the legislative's
prerogative to provide for the duration and period of effectivity of the imposition. If Congress, after consultation,
analysis of material data and due deliberations, is convinced that by January 1, 2004, the investors and importers
of crude oil would have already recovered their huge investments and expenditures in establishing refineries and
plants then it is within its prerogative to lift the tariff differential. Such matter is well within the pale of legislative
power which the Court may not fetter. Besides, this again is in line with Republic Act No. 8180's avowed policy to
foster a truly competitive market which can achieve the social policy objectives of fair, if not lower, prices.

B. On the minimum inventory requirement. Petitioners' attack on Section 6 is premised upon their belief that the
inventory requirement is hostile and not conducive for new oil companies to operate here, and unduly favors
Petron, Shell and Caltex, companies which according to them can easily hurdle the requirement. I fail to see any
legal or constitutional issue here more so as it is not raised by a party with legal standing for petitioners do not
claim to be the owners or operators of new oil companies affected by the requirement. Whether or not the
requirement is advantageous, disadvantageous or conducive for new oil companies hinges on presumptions and
speculations which is not within the realm of judicial adjudication. It may not be amiss to mention here that
according to the Office of the Solicitor General "there are about thirty (30) new entrants in the downstream
activities . . . , fourteen (14) of which have started operation . . . , eight (8) having commenced operation last
March 1997, and the rest to operate between the second quarter of 1997 and the year 2000" 25. Petitioners did not
controvert this averment which thereby cast serious doubt over their claim of "hostile" environment.

C. On predatory pricing. What petitioners bewail the most in Section 9(b) is "the definition of 'predatory pricing'
[which] is too broad in scope and indefinite in meaning"26 and the penal sanction imposed for its violation.
Petitioners maintain that it would be the new oil companies or "players" which would lower their prices to gain a
foothold on the market and not Petron, Shell or Caltex, an occasion for these three big oil "companies" to control
the prices by keeping their average cost at a level which will ensure their desired profit margin.27 Worse, the penal
sanction, they add, deters new "players" from entering the oil market and the practice of lowering prices is now
condemned as a criminal act.

Petitioners' contentions are nebulous if not speculative. In the absence of any concrete proof or evidence, the
assertion that it will only be the new oil companies which will lower oil prices remains a mere guess or suspicion.
And then again petitioners are not the proper party to raise the issue. The query on why lowering of prices should
be penalized and the broad scope of predatory pricing is not for this Court to traverse the same being reserved for
Congress. The Court should not lose sight of the fact that its duty under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code is not
to determine, define and legislate what act or acts should be penalized, but simply to report to the Chief Executive
the reasons why it believes an act should be penalized, as well as why it considers a penalty excessive, thus:

Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are nor covered by
the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may
deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.

In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

Furthermore, in the absence of an actual conviction for violation of Section 9 (b) and the appropriate appeal to this
Court, I fail to see the need to discuss any longer the issue as it is not ripe for judicial adjudication. Any
pronouncement on the legality of the sanction will only be advisory.

D. On other prohibited acts. In discussing their objection to Section 10, together with Section 20, petitioners assert
that these sanctions "even provide stiff criminal and administrative penalties for failure to maintain said minimum
requirement and other regulations" and posed this query: "Are these provisions consistent with the policy
objective to level the playing [field] in a truly competitive answer?"28 A more circumspect analysis of petitioners'
grievance, however, does not present any legal controversy. At best, their objection deals on policy
considerations that can be more appropriately and effectively addressed not by this Court but by Congress itself.

E. On the implementation of full deregulation under Section 15, and the validity of Executive Order No. 392.
Petitioners stress that "Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 delegates to the Secretary of Energy and to the
President of the Philippines the power to determine when to fully deregulate the downstream oil
industry"29 without providing for any standards "to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are
considered to be
'declining'"30 and when may the exchange rate be considered "stable" for purposes of determining when it is
"practicable" to declare full deregulation.31 In the absence of standards, Executive Order No. 392 which
implemented Section 15 constitute "executive lawmaking," 32 hence the same should likewise be struck down as
invalid. Petitioners additionally decry the brief seven (7) month transition period under Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8180. The premature full deregulation declared in Executive Order No. 392 allowed Caltex, Petron, and Shell
oil companies "to define the conditions under which any 'new players' will have to adhere to in order to become
competitive in the new deregulated market even before such a market has been created."33 Petitioners are
emphatic that Section 15 and Executive Order No. 392 "have effectively legislated a cartel among respondent oil
companies, directly violating the Constitutional prohibition against unfair trade practices and combinations in
restraint of trade".34

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 provides for the implementation of full deregulation. It states:

Section 15 on the implementation of full deregulation, thus: "Implementation of Full Deregulation. —

Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7683, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President,
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March, 1997. As far as
practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products
in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable. Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is
deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed: . . . [Emphasis added].

It appears from the foregoing that deregulation has to be implemented "not later than March 1997." The provision
is unequivocal, i.e., deregulation must be implemented on or before March 1997. The Secretary of Energy and the
President is devoid of any discretion to move the date of full deregulation to any day later than March 1997. The
second sentence which provides that "[a]s far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the
peso in relation to the US dollar is stable" did not modify or reset to any other date the full deregulation of
downstream oil industry. Not later than March 1997 is a complete and definite period for full deregulation. What is
conferred to the Department of Energy in the implementation of full deregulation, with the approval of the
President, is not the power and discretion on what the law should be. The provision of Section 15 gave the
President the authority to proceed with deregulation on or before, but not after, March 1997, and if implementation
is made before March, 1997, to execute the same, if possible, when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and the peso-dollar exchange rate is stable. But if the implementation
is made on March, 1997, the President has no option but to implement the law regardless of the conditions of the
prices of oil in the world market and the exchange rates.

The settled rule is that the legislative department may not delegate its power. Any attempt to abdicate it is
unconstitutional and void, based on the principle of potestas delegata non delegare potest. In testing whether a
statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislative so that nothing was left to the
judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.35 An enactment is said to be incomplete and
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.36 In People v. Vera,37 the Court laid down a guideline on how
to distinguish which power may or may not be delegated by Congress, to wit:

"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77,
88 See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 68.)

Applying these parameters, I fail to see any taint of unconstitutionality that could vitiate the validity of Section 15.
The discretion to ascertain when may the prices of crude oil in the world market be deemed "declining" or when
may the peso-dollar exchange rate be considered "stable" relates to the assessment and appreciation of facts.
There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the
taking into effect of a
law38 so as to make the provision an undue delegation of legislative power. The alleged lack of definitions of the
terms employed in the statute does not give rise to undue delegation either for the words of the statute, as a rule,
must be given its literal meaning.39 Petitioners' contentions are concerned with the details of execution by the
executive officials tasked to implement deregulation. No proviso in Section 15 may be construed as objectionable
for the legislature has the latitude to provide that a law may take effect upon the happening of future specified
contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingency has
arisen.40 The instant petition is similarly situated with the past cases, as summarized in the case of People
v. Vera, where the Court ruled for the validity of several assailed statutes, to wit:

To the same effect are decisions of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of
Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil. 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39 Phil. 660), and Cruz
vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil. 234). In the first of these cases, this court sustained the validity of a law
conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the
second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their
habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial
board. In the third case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to
suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle, such prohibition to be
raised "if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if disease among foreign cattle has ceased
to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands." 41

If the Governor-General in the case of Cruz v. Youngberg42 can "suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition
of the importation of cattle, such prohibition to be raised 'if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if
disease among foreign cattles has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands" then with
more reason that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 can pass the constitutional challenge as it has mandatorily
fixed the effectivity date of full deregulation to not later than March 1997, with or without the occurrence of stable
peso-dollar exchange rate and declining oil prices. Contrary to petitioners' protestations, therefore, Section 15 is
complete and contains the basic conditions and terms for its execution.

To restate, the policy of Republic Act No. 8180 is to deregulate the downstream oil industry and to foster a truly
competitive market which could lead to fair prices and adequate supply of environmentally clean and high-quality
petroleum products. This is the guiding principle installed by Congress upon which the executive department of
the government must conform. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180 sufficiently supplied the metes and bounds
for the execution of full deregulation. In fact, a cursory reading of Executive Order No. 392 43 which advanced
deregulation to February 8, 1997 convincingly shows the determinable factors or standards, enumerated under
Section 15, which were taken into account by the Chief Executive in declaring full deregulation. I cannot see my
way clear on how or why Executive Order No. 392, as professed by petitioners, may be declared unconstitutional
for adding the "depletion of buffer fund" as one of the grounds for advancing the deregulation. The enumeration of
factors to be considered for full deregulation under Section 15 did not proscribe the Chief Executive from
acknowledging other instances that can equally assuage deregulation. What is important is that the Chief
Executive complied with and met the minimum standards supplied by the law. Executive Order No. 392 may not,
therefore, be branded as unconstitutional.

Petitioners' vehement objections on the short seven (7) month transition period under Section 15 and the alleged
resultant de facto formation of cartel are matters which fundamentally strike at the wisdom of the law and the
policy adopted by Congress. These are outside the power of the courts to settle; thus I fail to see the need to
digress any further.

F . On the imposition of administrative fine. The administrative fine under Section 20 is claimed to be inconsistent
with deregulation. The imposition of administrative fine for failure to meet the reportorial and minimum inventory
requirements, far from petitioners' submission, are geared towards accomplishing the noble purpose of the law.
The inventory requirement ensures the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, 44 while
the reportorial requirement is a mere devise for the Department of Energy to monitor compliance with the law. In
any event, the issue pertains to the efficacy of incorporating in the law the administrative sanctions which lies
outside the Court's sphere and competence.

In fine, it seems to me that the petitions dwell on the insistent and recurrent arguments that the imposition of
different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported petroleum products is violative of the equal protection
clause of the constitution; is not germane to the purpose of the law; does not foster a truly competitive market;
extends undue advantage to the existing oil refineries or companies; and creates a cartel or a monopoly of sort
among Shell, Caltex and Petron in clear contravention of the Constitutional proscription against unfair trade
practices and combinations in restraint of trade. Unfortunately, this Court, in my view, is not at liberty to tread
upon or even begin to discuss the merits and demerits of petitioners' stance if it is to be faithful to the time
honored doctrine of separation of powers — the underlying principle of our republican state.45 Nothing is so
fundamental in our system of government than its division into three distinct and independent branches, the
executive, the legislative and the judiciary, each branch having exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and supreme within its own sphere. It is true that there is sometimes an inevitable overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between these departments. But this elementary tenet remains: the legislative
is vested with the power to make law, the judiciary to apply and interpret it. In cases like this, "the judicial branch
of the government has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
which is challenged and to decide whether the letter squares with the former."46 This having been done and
finding no constitutional infirmity therein, the Court's task is finished. Now whether or not the law fails to achieve
its avowed policy because Congress did not carefully evaluate the long term effects of some of its provisions is a
matter clearly beyond this Court's domain.

Perhaps it bears reiterating that the question of validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative
department of the government, and the courts will resolve every presumption in favor of its validity. The courts will
assume that the validity of the statute was fully considered by the legislature when adopted. The wisdom or
advisability of a particular statute is not a question for the courts to determine. If a particular statute is within the
constitutional power of the legislature to enact, it should be sustained whether the courts agree or not in the
wisdom of its enactment.47 This Court continues to recognize that in the determination of actual cases and
controversies, it must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative branches of government. Thus, the presumption is always in favor of constitutionality
for it is likewise always presumed that in the enactment of a law or the adoption of a policy it is the people who
speak through their representatives. This principle is one of caution and circumspection in the exercise of the
grave and delicate function of judicial review48. Explaining this principle Thayer said,

It can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a
mistake, but have made a very clear one-so clear that it is not open to rational question. That is the
standard of duty to which the courts bring legislative acts; that is the test which they apply-not merely their
own judgment as to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to what judgment is permissible to another
department which the constitution has charged with the duty of making it. This rule recognizes that,
having to the great, complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of regard government, much will seem
unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; that the
 constitution often admits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and judgment;
that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but
leaves open their range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional. 49

The petitions discuss rather extensively the adverse economic implications of Republic Act No. 8180. They put
forward more than anything else, an assertion that an error of policy has been committed. Reviewing the wisdom
of the policies adopted by the executive and legislative departments is not within the province of the Court.

It is safe to assume that the legislative branch of the government has taken into consideration and has carefully
weighed all points pertinent to the law in question. We cannot doubt that these matters have been the object of
intensive research and study nor that they have been subject of comprehensive consultations with experts and
debates in both houses of Congress. Judicial review at this juncture will at best be limited and myopic. For
admittedly, this Court cannot ponder on the points raised in the petitions with the same technical competence as
that of the economic experts who have contributed valuable hours of study and deliberation in the passage of this
law.

I realize that to invoke the doctrine of separation of powers at this crucial time may be viewed by some as an act
of shirking from our duty to uphold the Constitution at all cost. Let it be remembered, however, that the doctrine of
separation of powers is likewise enshrined in our Constitution and deserves the same degree of fealty. In fact, it
carries more significance now in the face of an onslaught of similar cases brought before this Court by the
opponents of almost every enacted law of major importance. It is true that this Court is the last bulwark of justice
and it is our task to preserve the integrity of our fundamental law. But we cannot become, wittingly or unwittingly,
instruments of every aggrieved minority and losing legislator. While the laudable objectives of the law are put on
hold, this Court is faced with the unnecessary burden of disposing of issues merely contrived to fall within the
ambit of judicial review. All that is achieved is delay which is perhaps, sad to say, all that may have been intended
in the first place.

Indeed, whether Republic Act No. 8180 or portions thereof are declared unconstitutional, oil prices may continue
to rise, as they depend not on any law but on the volatile market and economic forces. It is therefore the political
departments of government that should address the issues raised herein for the discretion to allow a deregulated
oil industry and to determine its viability is lodged with the people in their primary political capacity, which as
things stand, has been delegated to Congress.

In the end, petitioners are not devoid of a remedy. To paraphrase the words of Justice Padilla in Kapatiran ng mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas v. Tan,50 if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and continued
application of Republic Act No. 8180 are prejudicial to the general welfare or the interests of the majority of the people,
they should seek recourse and relief from the political branches of government, as they are now doing by moving for an
amendment of the assailed provisions in the correct forum which is Congress or for the exercise of the people's power of
initiative on legislation. The Court following the time honored doctrine of separation of powers, cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Congress as to the wisdom, justice and advisability of Republic Act No. 8180. 51

ACCORDINGLY, finding no merit in the instant petitions I vote for their outright dismissal.

Footnotes

1 Downstream oil industry refers to the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping,
transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing, marketing and/or selling crude oil, gasoline, diesel,
liquefied petroleum gas, kerosene and other petroleum and crude oil products.

2 Paderanga & Paderanga, Jr., The Oil Industry in the Philippines, Philippine Economic Journal, No. 65,
Vol. 27, pp. 27-98 [1988].

3 Section 3, R.A. No. 6173.

4 Section 7, R.A. No. 6173.

5 P.D. No. 334.

6 Makasiar, G., Structural Response to the Energy Crisis: The Philippine Case. Energy and Structural
Change in the Asia Pacific Region: Papers and Proceedings of the 13th Pacific Trade and Development
Conference. Published by the Philippine Institute for Development Studies/Asian Development Bank and
edited by Romeo M. Bautista and Seiji Nava, pp. 311-312 (1984).

7 P.D. 1956 as amended by E.O. 137.

8 Section 3, E.O. No. 172.

9 R.A. No. 7638.

10 Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7638.

11 Section 5, R.A. No. 8180.

12 Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

13 Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991); Osmena v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991).

14 G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997.

15 E.g. Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 (1922); Osmena v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA (1991);
Basco v. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989), Araneta v. Dinglasan,
84 Phil. 368 (1949).

16 163 SCRA 371 (1988).

17 Section 26(1) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

18 Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994); Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703
(1993); Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496 (1967).

19 Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208 (1987).

20 Journal of the House of Representatives, December 13, 1995, p. 32.

21 34 Phil. 136 citing Cincinnati, W. & Z. R.R. Co. vs. Clinton Country Commrs. (1 Ohio St. 77).

22 166 SCRA 533, 543-544.

23 320 US 99.

24 Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., p. 99.

25 Webster, New third International Dictionary, 1993 ed., pp. 1780, 586 and 2218.

26 See e.g., Balbuena v. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 used the standard "simplicity and dignity."
People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 ("public interest"); Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 ("public welfare");
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 669 ("interest of law and order").

27 See for example TSN of the Session of the Senate on November 14, 1995, p. 19, view of Senator
Gloria M. Arroyo.

28 Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition, p. 1007.

29 Id., p. 266.
30 54 Am Jur 2d 669.

31 Art. 186. Monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who shall enter into any contract or agreement or shall take part in any conspiracy or
combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, in restraint of trade or commerce to prevent by artificial
means free competition in the market.

2. Any person who shall monopolize any merchandise or object of trade or commerce, or shall combine
with any other person or persons to monopolize said merchandise or object in order to alter the price
thereof by spreading false rumors or making use of any other article to restrain free competition in the
market;

3. Any person who, being a manufacturer, producer, or processor of any merchandise or object of
commerce or an importer of any merchandise or object of commerce from any foreign country, either as
principal or agent, wholesaler or retailer, shall combine, conspire or agree in any manner with any person
likewise engaged in the manufacture, production, processing, assembling or importation of such
merchandise or object of commerce or with any other persons not so similarly engaged for the purpose of
making transactions prejudicial to lawful commerce, or of increasing the market price in any part of the
Philippines, or any such merchandise or object of commerce manufactured, produced, or processed,
assembled in or imported into the Philippines, or of any article in the manufacture of which such
manufactured, produced, processed, or imported merchandise or object of commerce is used.

If the offense mentioned in this article affects any food substance, motor fuel or lubricants, or other
articles of prime necessity the penalty shall be that of prision mayor in its maximum and medium periods,
it being sufficient for the imposition thereof that the initial steps have been taken toward carrying out the
purposes of the combination.

xxx xxx xxx

Whenever any of the offenses described above is committed by a corporation or association, the
president and each one of the directors or managers of said corporation or association, who shall have
knowingly permitted or failed to prevent the commission of such offenses, shall be held liable as
principals thereof.

32 Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the
use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall
give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

33 Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers (1995), p. 877; Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 190 SCRA 717 (1990); Northern Cement
Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 158 SCRA 408 (1988); Philippine Ports Authority v.
Mendoza, 138 SCRA 496 (1985); Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 (1983).

34 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume III, p. 258.

35 Gellhorn, Anti Trust Law and Economics in a Nutshell, 1986 ed. p. 45.

36 Economics and Federal Anti-Trust Law, Hornbook Series, Student ed., 1985 ed., p. 181.

37 Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., pp. 28-29.

38 IBON Facts and Figures, Vol. 18, No. 7, p. 5, April 15, 1995.

39 Cruz v. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 (1931).

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:

1 Consolidated Memorandum of Public Respondents, dated October 14, 1997.

2 Petron Corporation's Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order, dated October 9, 1997, p. 16;
Pilipinas Shell Corporation's Memorandum, dated October 15, 1997, pp. 36-37.

3 Sections 1 & 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over . . . petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxx xxx xxx

4 Osmeña vs. Comelec, 199 SCRA 750, July 30, 1991; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139,
July 15, 1936.

5 Tañada vs. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, p. 26.

KAPUNAN, J., separate opinion:

1 Public respondents' Comment, G.R. No. 127867, p. 39.

2 Sec. 24. Repealing Clause. — All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, issuances, rules and
regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

FRANCISCO, J., dissenting:

1 Section 2, Republic Act No. 8180.

2 Petition in G.R. No. 124360, p. 8.

3 Supplement to the Petition in G.R. No. 127867, p. 2.

4 Petition in G.R. No. 124360, p. 14.

5 Id.

6 Supplement to the Petition in G.R. No. 127867, p. 6.

7 Id.
8 Id.

9 Petition in G.R. No. 124360, p. 11.

10 Article VI, Section 26(1), Constitution.

11 40 Phil. 883.

12 40 Phil. at p. 891.

13 Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291.

14 Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 496, 501.

15 Blair v. Chicago, 26 S. Ct. 427, 201 U.S. 400, 50 L. Ed. 801.

16 Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418.

17 Tio V. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208.

18 Alalayan v. National Power Corp., 24 SCRA 172.

19 Petition in G.R. No. 124360, p. 14.

20 151 SCRA at 215.

21 Petition in G.R. No. 124360, p. 15.

22 235 SCRA 632.

23 235 SCRA at pp. 667-671.

24 Petition in G.R. No. 124360, p. 11.

25 Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General in G.R. No. 127867, p. 33; Rollo, p. 191.

26 Supplement to the Petition in G.R. No. 127867, p. 8.

27 Id.

28 Supplement to the Petition in G.R. No. 127867, p. 7.

29 Petition in G.R. No. 127867, p.8.

30 Id.

31 Id.

32 Id., p. 10.

33 Petition in G.R. No. 127867, p. 13.

34 Id.

35 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 115, citing 6, R.C.L., p. 165.

36 Id., at p. 116, citing Scheter v. U.S., 295 U.S., 495; 79 L. Ed., 1570; 55 Supt. Ct. Rep. 837; 97 A.L.R.
947; People ex rel.; Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co., 364 III, 406; 4 N.E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500.

37 Id., at p. 117.

38 Id., at p. 118.

39 Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 701, 711.

40 People v. Vera, supra, at pp. 119-120.

41 Id., at pp. 117-118.

42 56 Phil. 234.

43 Executive Order No. 392 provides in full as follows:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 392

DECLARING FULL DEREGULATION OF THE DOWNSTREAM OIL INDUSTRY

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638, otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of 1992,"
provides that, at the end of four years from its effectivity last December 1992, "the Department [of Energy]
shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate
energy projects and activities of the energy sector;"

WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996," provides that "the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE
shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market
are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable;"

WHEREAS, pursuant to the recommendation of the Department of Energy, there is an imperative need to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry because of the following recent
developments; (i) depletion of the buffer fund on or about 7 February 1997 pursuant to the Energy
Regulator Board's Order dated 16 January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil had been stable at $21 — $23
per barrel since October 1996 while prices of petroleum products in the world market had been stable
since mid-December of last year. Moreover, crude oil prices are beginning to soften for the last few days
while prices of some petroleum products had already declined; and (iii) the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar has been stable for the past twelve (12) months, averaging at around P26.20 to
one US dollar;

WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 377 dated 31 October 1996 provides for an institutional framework for
the administration of the deregulated industry by defining the functions and responsibilities of various
government agencies;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry will foster a truly
competitive market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate,
continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby declare the full deregulation, of the downstream oil industry.

This Executive Order shall take effect on 8 February 1997.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 22nd day of January in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and
Ninety-Seven.
 Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)

PUNO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners assailed §5(b) and §15 of R.A. No. 8180, the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.

§5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent
(3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . . .” On the other hand, §15 provided that
“[t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later
than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar
is stable . . .”

Petitioners argued that §5(b) on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to
have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

They also contended that the phrases “as far as practicable,” “decline of crude oil prices in the world market” and
“stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete since they do not provide
determinate or determinable standards that can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil
industry.

Petitioners also assailed the President’s E.O. No. 392, which proclaimed the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry in February 1997. They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion
of the OPSF fund as a factor in the implementation of full deregulation.

Finally, they asserted that the law violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition

II. THE ISSUES

1. Did §5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution?
2. Did §15 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power?
3. Was E.O. No. 392 arbitrary and unreasonable?
4. Did R.A. No. 8180 violate §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and
unfair competition?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition. It DECLARED R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.]

1. NO, §5(b) DID NOT violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution.

As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. [T]he title need not
mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in
the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject. [S]ection 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of
R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective
investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.

2. NO, §15 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.

Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not
involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a
total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress
expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence
of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it
for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion
given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the
standard to guide the judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar
is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words “as far as practicable,” “declining” and “stable” should have been defined in
R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant
consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable
intelligence. Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a
downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the
exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of
similar, if not more general standards in other cases.

3. YES, E.O. No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable.

A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by
the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF as a factor to be given weight by the Executive
before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted
to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We therefore hold that
the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous
factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the
Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the
exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive
department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction
or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to
make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated
power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of
agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline
of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O.
No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It
could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal
significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O.
No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.

4. YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations
in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign
oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players
belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various
capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff
differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new
players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their
own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the
4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the
horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives.
Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an
idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new
players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their
existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a
prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players.
Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the
market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as “. . . selling or offering to sell any
product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of
competitors.” Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants.
The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A.
No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the
dominant oil companies is encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-
writer Hovenkamp gives the authoritative answer and we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the
future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the
successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant
barriers to new entry.

As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which
discourage new players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by R.A. No. 8180 and the
lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to
engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners’ charge that this provision on predatory pricing is
anti-competitive is not without reason.

[R.A. No. 8180 contained a separability clause, but the High Tribunal held that the offending provisions of the law
so permeated its essence that it had to be struck down entirely. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and
predatory pricing were among the principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream
oil industry without these provisions.]
Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, Nov. 5, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes” which ends 26 years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry.

In March 1996, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996." Under
the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and
market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.

Petitioners claim that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President
and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive
Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the
President the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it practicable to declare
full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the
world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market" and "stability of
the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they do not
provide the "determinate or determinable standards" which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the
downstream oil industry.

Issue: Given the fact that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide
the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, WON it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy.

Ruling: No

Section 15, RA 8180 provides:

“Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation - Pursuant to section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon
approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later

than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar
is stable ...”

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As sagely observed,
delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government.
Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating
legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United States, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz states "that even if the law does not
expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the
statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity."

Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue
delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end
of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and
the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the
final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the
end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been defined in R.A. No.
8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration.
The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster
defines "practicable" as meaning possible to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a downward direction, and
"stable" as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive
discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more
general standards in other cases.