06. ICASIANO VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 95642, May 28, 1992

FACTS

Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint against Judge Icasiano for grave abuse of authority,
partiality and incompetence. Meanwhile Magbago also filed in the Ombudsman against Judge Icasiano
for anti-graft and corruption practices act. TanodBayan received another complaint from Magbago
docketed as TBP 546. Prosecutor Cruz was assigned to investigate TBP 546. An information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan docket as crim case no. 14563. Judge Icasiano filed a motion for reconsideration
that he has already exonerated in admin matter no. MTJ-87-81. Special prosecutor Querubin responded
that there were no records of such administrative matter, hence Sandiganbayan denied motion for
reinvestigation. Petitioner moved to quash the information because he was already exonerated in admin
matter no. MTJ-87-81. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash.

ISSUE

Whether or not double jeopardy applies in this case.

HELD

No. Sandiganbayan should continue proceedings. Distinction between an administrative and criminal case
should be upheld. An administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules and substantial
evidence is sufficient. A criminal case in Sandiganbayan, although may involve same acts as in the
administrative case, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. The requisites for double jeopardy to be
available are 1.) a valid complain or information; 2.) a competent court; 3.) a valid arraignment; 4.) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and 5.) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. All these elements does no apply
in an administrative case which should take care of petitioner’s contention that said administrative case
against him before the Supreme Court.
 07. PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN
GR No. L-26376, August 31, 1966

FACTS

Defendant-appellee Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte. The information alleged is with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that
immediately caused his death. The accused upon arraignment entered a plea of guilty. However at his
counsel de oficio’s petition was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Accused
testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense, because the latter was strangling him,
and he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On
the basis of the above testimony of the accused, the court rendered a decision acquitting the accused. The
prosecution appealed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the instant appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.

HELD

No. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It
forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to
impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an
essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the present case, it is true; the accused had first entered a plea of
guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating
circumstances, which he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore as the court a quo
recognized in its decision - had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have
required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for
him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a
quo. it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the
course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances that he acted in complete self-defense. Said
testimony, therefore - as the court a quo recognized in its decision had the effect of vacating his plea of
guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct that a
new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no
standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal; there can be no double
jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.