MUSTANG LUMBER v.

CA

G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784

Ponente: J. Davide Jr.

FACTS:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course
thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with
lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the
required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and
impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain
entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that
date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and
placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a
total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is
not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were
taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

HELD:
No,

The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or
lumber.

While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market."

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to
the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning.

And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located
in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels
of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-
in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to
the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind
nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact
that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or
timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain?

HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent
and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of
the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired
by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of
land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out
of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
 Tan vs. Director of Forestry
G.R. no. L-24548

Facts:

1. On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the license of logging
operations on a public forest land in Olongapo.
2. On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M.
Gozon promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power to the Director of Forestry to
grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more
than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for
areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares.
3. On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued by the acting
secretary, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry which incidentally
was the same date the license for petitioner was signed.
4. Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was revoked.

The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it directly to the Court.

Issue: 1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio; 2) Whether or not the Director of
Forestry gravely abused its discretion in revoking the license

Held:

1. Yes.

a. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was
ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry
was revoked.

b. While the timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was
released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the
licensee.

c. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority
to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not
acquired any legal right under such void license.

2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest
or public welfare as in this case. Petition denied.