Rule 59 Receivership
1. Normandy vs Duque (1969) Pracuelles
FACTS: On September 6, 1960, appellant was
appointed receiver of the WARVETS by the lower
court in Civil Case No. 34998 1 "generally to do and
perform such acts respecting the property, assets and
transactions" of the organization "as the court may
authorize." Upon filing a bond in the sum of fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, he entered upon the
discharge of his functions.
During his term, appellant went to Japan by authority
of the lower court's order dated October 12, 1960 for
the purpose of checking on the reported
undervaluation of goods shipped to the WARVETS
and of preparing the shipment of the goods which had
not yet been committed. For expenses incurred by
him during this trip, which amounted to P9,431.48, he
was ordered reimbursed by the lower court on June 5,
1963. 2 The order authorizing reimbursement stated,
thus:
... . The order permits the claim for
reimbursement as part of the receiver's
compensation as such receiver. It dues not
prohibit the reimbursement of the expenses
before the payment of the receiver's
compensation, and it is only fair and just that
at least the expenses which the receiver
advanced, if found reasonable and necessary,
be reimbursed as soon as the funds of the
WARVETS permit.
Except for this reimbursed amount, appellant received
no other fee or compensation from the WARVETS. In
fact, for a continuous period of three (3) years, he
performed his duties as receiver without receiving any
compensation as such. Hence, on October 9, 1963,
he filed a motion in the lower court to fix not only his
compensation but also that of his co-receiver, Macario
Ofilada. 3 In his motion, he prayed further for such
amounts as attorney's fees and stenographer's fees
as the court may allow. After an opposition thereto
had been duly interposed, the lower court issued an
"Omnibus Order" on January 22, 1964, the second
paragraph of which denied the motion of appellant. A
reconsideration of the order of denial was immediately
sought by appellant.
Without awaiting action on his motion for
reconsideration, appellant filed another motion, on
May 28, 1964, resigning from his post as receiver and
praying that the lower court accept it and at the same
time fix the amount of his fees and compensation as
receiver.
RTC
Appellant was discharged as receiver and his
compensation was fixed at P10,000.00. The order of
the lower court approving his discharge reads as
follows:
Ramon E. Saura, first receiver, filed in his own
behalf on May 28, 1964, his motion to
withdraw as first receiver and for fixing of his
compensation. There being no objection to
this withdrawal, the same is hereby granted.
Respecting his compensation, neither is there
objection thereto. In fact, per joint motion filed
on May 28, by defendants, except Filipinas
Merchandising, which has been granted, they
asked the withdrawal of their joint motion
dated March 31, 1961, for the removal of
Saura as receiver; and per manifestation of
said defendants except Filipinas
Merchandising dated May 28, they
recommend P10,000.00 as Saura's fee, which
Jose and Susana Cochingyan are willing to
advance for the account of WARVETS.
WHEREFORE, Ramon E. Saura's withdrawal
as receiver in this case is hereby approved,
and his fee as such is hereby fixed at
P10,000.00, which Jose and Susana
Cochingyan shall advance for the account of
WARVETS.
Subsequently, one Atty. Anacleto Magno, on his own
behalf, presented before the lower court a motion
dated August 18, 1964, for the payment of attorney's
fees to him in the amount of P10,000.00 for his
alleged services as legal counsel for the appellant
when he was still a receiver. Appellant, himself, filed
another motion for the payment and cancellation of
his receiver's bond and for the reimbursement to him
of the sum of P2,030.00 which he paid out of his
personal funds as premium for said bond from
September 9, 1960 to September 9, 1964. On
September 24, 1964, the lower court disposed of both
motions in one order by allowing compensation to
Atty. Magno in the reduced amount of P1,000.00 and
granting reimbursement to appellant in the whole sum
prayed for by him as premium on his bond. In granting
fee to the counsel of appellant, the lower court said:
 The motion, to the mind of the Court, is not
well taken, because Ramon E. Saura is
himself a lawyer and he did not have to retain
legal counsel. If he did, the matter should be
for his own account, particularly because it
was a unilateral act on Saura's part to get
Magno as his lawyer in the receivership.
Nevertheless, the Court is not unaware that
Atty. Magno did in fact work for Saura, for the
former appeared in Court and signed
pleadings for Saura as receiver.
Wherefore, in fairness to Atty. Magno, it is
hereby ordered that he be paid P1,000.00
from the funds under receivership. If he is not
satisfied with this amount, he can go after
Saura.
Barely two months after the issuance of the last-
mentioned order, or on November 18, 1964, appellant
filed another motion for reimbursement, this time for
the amount he allegedly paid as compensation of a
clerk whom he employed when he was still a receiver
for the period September 9, 1960 to May 28, 1964,
inclusive, at the rate of P120.00 a month, or the total
sum of P5,236.00. Appellant alleged that in view of
the voluminous paper and legal work which he had to
attend to as receiver, it was necessary for him to
engage the service of a typist-stenographer, one
Melchor C. Ordoño, who doubled as messenger, filing
clerk, utility clerk and records clerk.
On March 5, 1965, although no party registered any
objection to appellant's last motion for reimbursement,
the lower court denied it in the appealed order,
reasoning thus:
The record shows that the Court had
previously ordered the payment of P10,000.00
as compensation for Ramon E. Saura for his
services as first receiver in this case.
Therefore, whatever amount he now seeks in
addition thereto would be improper. Moreover,
he is now estopped from claiming any further
amount as compensation for alleged clerical
services employed by him as such receiver
without prior approval or authority of this
Court.
NOTE: NO IAC (or CA) Appeal from the order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch I), dated March 5, 1965, denying the
motion of Ramon E. Saura, former First
Receiver of the World War II Veterans
Enterprises, inc. (hereinafter referred to
merely as WARVETS), asking for
reimbursement of the sum of P5,236.00,
representing the amount which he allegedly
paid in advance as compensation to a clerk
whose services he availed himself of while he
was still a receiver.
ISSUE: Whether Saura is entitled for compensation.
HELD: NO. A receiver is a representative of the court
appointed for the purpose of preserving and
conserving the property in litigation and prevent its
possible destruction or dissipation if it were left in the
possession of any of the parties. The receiver is not
the representative of any of the parties but of all of
them to the end that their interests may be equally
protected with the least possible inconvenience and
expense. It is inherent in the office of a receiver not
only that he should act at all times with the diligence
and prudence of a good father of a family but should
also not incur any obligation or expenditure without
leave of the court and it is the responsibility of the
court to supervise the receiver and see to it that he
adheres to the above standard of his trust and limits
the expenses of the receivership to the minimum. For
these reasons, it is generally the receivership court
that is in a better position to determine whether a
particular expenditure is reasonable and satisfied or
not and its ruling thereon may not be disturbed by this
Court.
It is true that in the case at bar, the motion in question
of the receiver was not opposed by any of the parties.
It is to be observed, however, that the records show
that the court a quo had previously allowed or
approved reimbursements to the receiver of
expenditures made by him in connection with the
performance of his duties, more particularly, for a trip
made to Japan and for the fees of a lawyer who had
allegedly assisted him, notwithstanding he is a lawyer
himself. Besides, the court a quo fixed the total
compensation to the appellant receiver at P10,000.00
for his services as such and said amount, from all
appearances, is agreeable to everyone, including
appellant.
The receivership court's reasons for withholding
approval of the reimbursement in question are
precisely because "whatever amount he (the receiver)
now seeks in addition thereto (P10,000) would be
improper. Moreover, he is now estopped from
claiming any further amount as compensation for
alleged clerical services employed by him as such
receiver without prior approval or authority of this
Court." We find these reasons to be cogent enough in
the premises, specially because appellant's alleged
employment of a clerk was made without prior leave
of court. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that
the court a quo abused its discretion, much less
gravely.
Rule 60 Replevin
1. BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ROBERTO M. REYES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 102998. July 5, 1996.] Religioso
I. FACTS
The spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Manahan
executed, on 15 May 1980, a promissory note
binding themselves to pay Carmasters, Inc., the
amount of P83,080.00 in thirty-six monthly
installments. To secure payment, the Manahan
spouses executed a deed of chattel mortgage over a
motor vehicle, a Ford Cortina 1.6 GL. Carmasters
later assigned the promissory note and the chattel
mortgage to petitioner BA Finance Corporation with
the conformity of the Manahans. When the latter
failed to pay the due installments, petitioner sent
demand letters. The demands not having been
heeded, petitioner, filed a complaint for replevin with
damages against the spouses, as well as against a
John Doe, praying for the recovery of the vehicle with
an alternative prayer for the payment of a sum of
money should the vehicle not be returned. Upon
petitioner's motion and the filing of a bond in the
amount of P169,161.00 the lower court issued a writ
of replevin. The court, however, cautioned petitioner
that should summons be not served on the
defendants within thirty (30) days from the writ's
issuance, the case would be dismissed to failure to
prosecute. The warning was based on what the court
perceived to be the deplorable practice of some
mortgagees of "freezing (the) foreclosure or replevin
cases" which they would so "conveniently utilize as a
leverage for the collection of unpaid installments on
mortgaged chattels."
The service of summons upon the spouses Manahan
was caused to be served by petitioner at No. 35
Lantana St., Cubao, Quezon City. The original of the
summons had the name and the signature of private
respondent Roberto M. Reyes indicating that he
received, on 14 October 1987, a copy of the
summons and the complaint. Forthwith, petitioner,
through its Legal Assistant, Danilo E. Solano, issued
a certification to the effect that it had received from
Orson R. Santiago, the deputy sheriff of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20, the Ford Cortina
seized from private respondent Roberto M. Reyes,
the John Doe referred to in the complaint, in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon. On 20 October 1987, the lower
court came out with an order of seizure.
Alleging possession in good faith, private respondent
filed, on 26 October 1987, a motion for an extension
of time within which to file his answer and/or a motion
for intervention. The court granted the motion.
A few months later, or on 18 February 1988, the court
issued an order which, in part, stated that, an order
for the seizure of personal property was issued on
October 20, 1987 in pursuance to a previous order of
the Court dated October 13, 1987. However, to date,
there is no showing that the principal defendants were
served with summons inspite of the lapse of four (4)
months.
"Considering, this is a replevin case and to forestall
the evils that arise from this practice, plaintiff failing to
heed the Order dated October 13, 1987, particularly
second paragraph thereof, the above- entitled case is
hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure to prosecute
and further ordering the plaintiff to return the property
seized with all its accessories to defendant John Doe
in the person of Roberto M. Reyes.
On 26 February 1988, petitioner filed a notice of
dismissal of the case "without prejudice and without
pronouncement as to costs, before service of
Summons and Answer, under Section 1, Rule 17, of
the Rules of Court." It also sought in another motion
the withdrawal of the replevin bond. In view of the
earlier dismissal of the case (for petitioner's failure to
prosecute), the court, on 02 March 1988, merely
noted the notice of dismissal and denied the motion to
withdraw the replevin bond considering that the writ of
replevin had meanwhile been implemented.
On 09 March 1988, private respondent filed a motion
praying that petitioner be directed to comply with the
court order requiring petitioner to return the vehicle to
him. In turn, petitioner filed, on 14 March 1988, a
motion for the reconsideration of the orders of 18
February 1988 and 02 March 1988 contending that:
(a) the dismissal of the case was tantamount to
adjudication on the merits that thereby deprived it with
the remedy to enforce the promissory note, the chattel
mortgage and the deed of assignment, under Section
3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court; (b) the order to
return the vehicle to private respondent was a
departure from jurisprudence recognizing the right of
the mortgagor to foreclose the property to respond to
the unpaid obligation secured by the chattel
mortgage, and (c) there were no legal and factual
bases for the court's view that the filing of the replevin
case was "characterized (by) evil practices."
On 20 April 1988, the court granted petitioner's motion
for reconsideration and accordingly recalled the order
directing the return of the vehicle to private
respondent, set aside the order dismissing the case,
directed petitioner "to cause the service of summons
together with a copy of the complaint on the principal
defendants within five (5) days from receipt" thereof at
petitioners expense, and ordered private respondent
to answer the complaint.
A few months later, or on 02 August 1988, petitioner
filed a motion to declare private respondent in default.
The court granted the motion on that same day and
declared private respondent "in default for his failure
to file the . . . answer within the reglementary period."
The court likewise granted petitioner's motion to set
the case for the presentation, ex parte, of evidence.
Petitioner, thereupon, submitted the promissory note,
the deed of chattel mortgage, the deed of assignment,
a statement of account in the name of Florencia
Manahan and two demand letters.
On 27 February 1989, the trial court rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint against the
Manahans for failure of petitioner to prosecute the
case against them. It also dismissed the case against
private respondent for failure of petitioner to show any
legal basis for said respondent's liability.
II. APPEAL TO THE CA
Petitioner has asserted that a suit for replevin aimed
at the foreclosure of the chattel is an action quasi in
rem which does not necessitate the presence of the
principal obligors as long as the court does not render
any personal judgment against them.
III. CA
Petitioner’s argument did not persuade the appellate
court, the latter holding that, In action quasi in rem an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property, such as
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or
disposition of the property of the defendant, whether
by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy.
In the case at bar, the court cannot render any
judgment binding on the defendants spouses for
having allegedly violated the terms and conditions of
the promissory note and the contract of chattel
mortgage on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction over their persons, no summons having
been served on them. That judgment, it rendered, is
void for having denied the defendants spouses due
process of law which contemplates notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
affecting one's person or property.
"It is an undisputed fact that the subject motor vehicle
was taken from the possession of said Roberto M.
Reyes, a third person with respect to the contract of
chattel mortgage between the appellant and the
defendants spouses Manahan. The appellate court,
subsequently, denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
IV. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
assails the decision of the Court of
Appeals
Petitioner insists that a mortgagee can maintain an
action for replevin against any possessor of the object
of a chattel mortgage even if the latter were not a
party to the mortgage.
V. ISSUE
Whether or not a mortgagee can maintain an action
for replevin against any possessor of the object of a
chattel mortgage even if the latter were not a party to
the mortgage.
VI. SUPREME COURT’S RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. It
ruled that The appellate court, accordingly, acted well
in arriving at the questioned judgment.
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of
principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may
refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the
possession of personal chattels being wrongfully
detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the
provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to
retain the thing during the pendency of the action and
hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily
possessory in nature and generally determines
nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is
so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in
rem and partly in personam — in rem insofar as the
recovery of specific property is concerned, and in
personam as regards to damages involved. As an
"action in rem," the gist of the replevin action is the
right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific
personal property by reason of his being the owner or
of his having a special interest therein. Consequently,
the person in possession of the property sought to be
replevied is ordinarily the proper and only necessary
party defendant, and the plaintiff is not required to so
join as defendants other persons claiming a right on
the property but not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of
the Rules of Court allows an application for the
immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff
must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear
title thereto, for seeking such interim possession.
In effect then, the mortgagee, upon the mortgagor's
default, is constituted an attorney-in- fact of the
mortgagor enabling such mortgagee to act for and in
behalf of the owner. Accordingly, that the defendant is
not privy to the chattel mortgage should be
inconsequential. By the fact that the object of replevin
is traced to his possession, one properly can be a
defendant in an action for replevin. It is here assumed
that the plaintiffs right to possess the thing is not or
cannot be disputed.
A chattel mortgagee, unlike a pledgee, need not be in,
nor entitled to the possession of the property unless
and until the mortgagor defaults and the mortgagee
thereupon seeks to foreclose thereon. Since the
mortgagee's right of possession is conditioned upon
the actual fact of default which itself may be
controverted, the inclusion of other parties, like the
debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in
order to allow a full and conclusive determination of
the case. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in
order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the
mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the
mortgagor's default on, the chattel mortgage that,
among other things, can properly uphold the right to
replevy the property. The burden to establish a valid
justification for that action lies with the plaintiff. An
adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot
just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound
by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply
because the mortgagee brings up an action for
replevin.
2. CHIAO LIONG TAN v IAC, G.R. No. 106251,
November 19, 1993 ACOSTA
I. Established Facts
Petitioner Chiao Liong Tan instituted a suit for
replevin and damages against his brother, Tan Ban
Yong, in the RTC of Manila.
Chiao alleges that he is the owner of an Isuzu Elf van
as shown in its Certificate of Registration. He alleged
that he let his brother use the van as it was being
used in his company, CLT Industries. Lastly, he
claims that his brother refused to return it.
Tan Ban Yong alleged that CLT Industries is a family
industry. He explained that he paid for the vehicle
amounting to P140,000 which he loaned from Tan Pit
Sin, his friend and classmate. He adds that Chiao
only paid P5,000 as down payment. The Certificate of
Registration shows Chiao’s name because Tan Ban
Yong would be leaving for the United States and that
Chaio would be the one remaining in the Philippines.
Tan Ban Yong’s testimony was corroborated by Tan
Pit Sin and Gina Lu, an employee of Balintawak
Isuzu. According to Gina Lu, the name on the receipt
of the vehicle is Chiao because the latter paid for the
deposit but the full payment was made by Tan Ban
Yong.
The RTC of Manila declared Tan Ban Yong as the
owner and ordered Chiao to deliver possession of
vehicle to his brother or, alternatively, pay P138,000.
In addition, damages are awarded amounting to
P20,000.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC of Manila.
SC
Chiao alleges that the CA erred in finding Tan Ban
Yong’s witnesses credible and disregarding the
Certificate of Registration

II. ISSUE: 1. [Procedural] W.O.N Replevin can
pass upon the question of ownership
2. [Substantive] W.O.N Tan Ban
Yong is the owner of the vehicle
III. Ruling
1. Yes.
Replevin is only a provisional remedy where the
replevin plaintiff claims immediate delivery of personal
property pending the judgment of the trial court in a
principal case.
GENERAL RULE: the action of replevin is
possessory in character and determines nothing
more than the right of possession
EXCEPTION: when the title to the property is
distinctly put in issue by the defendant's plea, the
question of ownership may be resolved in the
same proceeding. The reason behind this is the
policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims
of the parties to the possession of the property in
controversy
Although a "replevin" action is primarily one for the
possession of property, yet it is sufficiently flexible to
authorize a settlement of all equities between the
parties, arising from or growing out of the main
controversy. Thus, in an action for replevin where the
defendant is adjudged entitled to possession, he need
not go to another forum to procure relief for the return
of the replevied property or secure a judgment for the
value of the property in case the adjudged return
thereof could not be had.
In this case, the petitioner should have filed in the trial
court an action to recover possession of the Isuzu Elf
van as a main case which was in the possession of
the private respondent. Logically, the basis of
petitioner's cause of action should have been his
ownership of said van.
2. Yes.
The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trust
other than those enumerated therein. Thus, although
no specific provision could be cited to apply to the
parties herein, it is undeniable that an implied trust
was created when the certificate of registration of the
motor vehicle was placed in the name of the petitioner
although the price thereof was not paid by him but by
private respondent.
Rule 61 Support Pendente Lite
1. MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON,
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
Marycris V. Baldevia, petitioner, vs. JOSE
ANTONIO F. ROXAS and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. Justiniano
Facts:
1. Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and
private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas,
were married on December 4, 1985 and their
union produced four children.
I. Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City
1. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended
Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
2. On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an
Order granting petitioner's application for
support pendente lite. Said order states in part:
. . . Accordingly, the defendant is
hereby ordered to contribute to the
support of the above-named minors,
(aside from 50% of their school
tuition fees which the defendant has
agreed to defray, plus expenses for
books and other school supplies),
the sum of P42,292.50 per month,
effective May 1, 1998, as his share
in the monthly support of the
children, until further orders from this
Court. The first monthly
contribution, i.e., for the month of
May 1998, shall be given by the
defendant to the plaintiff within five
(5) days from receipt of a copy of
this Order. The succeeding monthly
contributions of P42,292.50 shall be
directly given by the defendant to
the plaintiff without need of any
demand, within the first five (5) days
of each month beginning June 1998.
All expenses for books and other
school supplies shall be shouldered
 by the plaintiff and the defendant,
share and share alike. Finally, it is
understood that any claim for
support-in-arrears prior to May 1,
1998, may be taken up later in the
course of the proceedings proper.
3. On February 11, 2003, private respondent filed a
Motion to Reduce Support citing, among other
grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support for the
children as fixed by the court was even higher than
his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor.
4. After hearing, the trial court issued an Order dated
March 7, 2005 granting the motion to reduce support
and denying petitioner's motion for spousal support,
increase of the children's monthly support pendente
lite and support-in-arrears. (1st IMPORTANT DATE)
5. Petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration of the
March 7, 2005 Order was denied on May 4, 2005.
6. On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its
Decision in Civil Case No. 97-0608 decreeing thus:
(2nd IMPORTANT DATE)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring (sic):
1. Declaring null and void the
marriage between plaintiff [Ma.]
Carmina C. Roxas and defendant
Jose Antonio Roxas solemnized on
December 4, 1985 at San Agustin
Convent, in Manila…
2. Awarding the custody of the
parties' minor children Maria
Antoinette Roxas, Julian Roxas and
Richard Roxas to their mother
herein petitioner, with the
respondent hereby given his
visitorial and or custodial rights at
[sic] the express conformity of
petitioner.
3. Ordering the respondent Jose
Antonio Roxas to provide support to
the children in the amount of
P30,000.00 a month, which support
shall be given directly to petitioner
whenever the children are in her
custody, otherwise, if the children
are in the provisional custody of
respondent, said amount of support
shall be recorded properly as the
amounts are being spent. For that
purpose the respondent shall then
render a periodic report to petitioner
and to the Court to show compliance
and for monitoring. In addition, the
respondent is ordered to support the
proper schooling of the children
providing for the payment of the
tuition fees and other school fees
and charges including transportation
expenses and allowances needed
by the children for their studies.
4. Dissolving the community
property or conjugal partnership
property of the parties as the case
may be, in accordance with law.
Let copies of this decision be
furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Parañaque City, and the
City Civil Registrar of Parañaque
City and Manila.
SO ORDERED.
7. Petitioner, through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal
from the Orders dated March 7, 2005 and May 4,
2005. In her appeal brief, petitioner emphasized that
she is not appealing the Decision dated May 16, 2005
which had become final as no appeal therefrom had
been brought by the parties or the City Prosecutor or
the Solicitor General. Petitioner pointed out that her
appeal is "from the RTC Order dated March 7, 2005,
issued prior to the rendition of the decision in the main
case", as well as the May 4, 2005 Order denying her
motion for partial reconsideration.
II. Court of Appeals:
1. CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that
granting the appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of
May 16, 2005 which had long become final and
executory. The CA further noted that petitioner failed
to avail of the proper remedy to question an
interlocutory order.
2. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the CA.
III. Supreme Court:
1. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 assailing the Decision dated
September 9, 2008 and Resolution dated December
15, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 85384. The CA affirmed the Orders dated March
7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260 in Civil Case
No. 97-0608.
ISSUE: Whether the March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005
Orders on the matter of support pendente lite are
interlocutory or final.
Held: The Rules of Court provide for the provisional
remedy of support pendente lite which may be availed
of at the commencement of the proper action or
proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or
final order. On March 4, 2003, this Court promulgated
the Rule on Provisional Orders which shall govern
the issuance of provisional orders during the
pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal
separation. These include orders for spousal support,
child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold
departure, protection and administration of common
property.
Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize
that the interlocutory aspect of the assailed orders
pertains only to private respondent's motion to reduce
support which was granted, and to her own motion to
increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points
out that the ruling on support in arrears which have
remained unpaid, as well as her prayer for
reimbursement/payment under the May 19, 1998
Order and related orders were in the nature of final
orders assailable by ordinary appeal considering that
the orders referred to under Sections 1 and 4 of Rule
61 of the Rules of Court can apply only prospectively.
Thus, from the moment the accrued amounts became
due and demandable, the orders under which the
amounts were made payable by private respondent
have ceased to be provisional and have become final.
We disagree.
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening
between the commencement and the end of the suit
which decides some point or matter but is not a final
decision of the whole controversy. An interlocutory
order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves
something more to be done to resolve the merits of
the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is
considered final if the order disposes of the action or
proceeding completely, or terminates a particular
stage of the same action. Clearly, whether an order
or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent
on compliance or non-compliance by a party to its
directive, as what petitioner suggests. It is also
important to emphasize the temporary or provisional
nature of the assailed orders.
Provisional remedies are writs and processes
available during the pendency of the action which
may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests therein pending
rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a
final judgment in the case. They are provisional
because they constitute temporary measures availed
of during the pendency of the action, and they are
ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are
dependent upon the result of the main action. The
subject orders on the matter of support pendente
lite are but an incident to the main action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Moreover, private respondent's obligation to give
monthly support in the amount fixed by the RTC in the
assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as
what transpired in the early stage of the proceedings
when the court cited the private respondent in
contempt of court and ordered him arrested for his
refusal/failure to comply with the order granting
support pendente lite. A few years later, private
respondent filed a motion to reduce support while
petitioner filed her own motion to increase the same,
and in addition sought spousal support and support in
arrears. This fact underscores the provisional
character of the order granting support pendente lite.
Petitioner's theory that the assailed orders have
ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages
incurred by private respondent is therefore untenable.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, appeal from
interlocutory orders is not allowed. Said provision
reads:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. —
An appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or
of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
 No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for
new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for
relief or any similar motion seeking
relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or
dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set
aside a judgment by consent,
confession or compromise on the
ground of fraud, mistake or duress,
or any other ground vitiating
consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or
against one or more of several
parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and
third-party complaints, while the
main case is pending, unless the
court allows an appeal therefrom;
and
(h) An order dismissing an action
without prejudice;
In all the above instances where
the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65.
(Emphasis supplied.) CDEaAI
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject
of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong
remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders
of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly
dismissed by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED, for lack of merit. The
Decision dated September 9, 2008 and Resolution
dated December 15, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 85384 are AFFIRMED.
Rule 62 Interpleader
1. Ocampo vs Tirona (2005) Nieto
I. Established Facts
Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of
land (subject land) described in Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 134359, with an approximate area of
500 square meters, located at Alvarez Street, Pasay
City. Ocampo bought the subject land from Rosauro
Breton, heir of the subject lands registered owner
Alipio Breton Cruz. Possession and administration of
the subject land are claimed to be already in
Ocampos management even though the TCT is not
yet in his name. Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee
occupying a portion of the subject land.
According to [Ocampo], upon acquisition of ownership
of the subject premises, a formal written notice was
given to [Tirona] which was received by the latter on 9
March 1995. In recognition of [Ocampos] right of
ownership over the subject premises, [Tirona] paid
some monthly rentals due, however, on July 5, 1995,
[Ocampo] received a letter from Callejo Law Office of
Room 513 Borja Bldg., 645 Sta. Cruz, Manila stating
among others, that, in view of the fact that the subject
premises was declared under area for priority
development, [Tirona] is invoking her right of first
refusal and in connection thereto [Tirona] will
temporarily stop paying her monthly rentals until and
unless the National Housing Authority have
processed the pertinent papers as regards the
amount due to [Ocampo] by reason of the
implementation of the above law.
On 7 August 1995, [Ocampo] wrote a letter to [Tirona]
demanding upon [Tirona] to pay the rentals in arrears
for the months of April, May, June, July and August at
the rate of P1,200 a month and to vacate the
premises. Despite receipt of said letter, [Tirona] failed
and refused and still fails and refuses to heed
[Ocampos] demands.
II. MTC
On 11 September 1995, Ocampo filed a complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. 754-95 for unlawful
detainer and damages against Tirona before the
MTC.
Tirona filed her answer on 27 September 1995.
Tirona asserted that Doa Lourdes Rodriguez
Yaneza actually owns the subject land.
Ocampo filed a motion to strike out the answer filed
and a motion for judgment on 10 October 1995.
Ocampo claimed that the answer was not verified;
therefore, it was as if no answer was filed.
On 12 October 1995, Tirona filed a motion with leave
to amend defendants answer. She alleged that she
filed her answer without the assistance of a lawyer
due to fear that she might be unable to file the
required pleading on time.
In her amended answer, Tirona maintained that
Ocampo is not the owner of the subject land. She
stated that the certificate of title to the subject land is
not even registered under Ocampos name. Tirona
also alleged that she has a right of first refusal in case
of sale of the land, pursuant to Presidential Decree
(PD) Nos. 1517, 1893 and 1968.
The MTC ruled that Tirona does not have any
reason to suspend payment of rents until after PD
No. 1517, in relation to PD Nos. 1893 and 1968, is
implemented in her favor. Tironas non-payment of
rents rendered her occupation of the subject land
illegal. As owner of the subject land, Ocampo is
entitled to its use and enjoyment, as well as to
recover its possession from any person
unlawfully withholding it.
Ocampo filed a motion for execution pending appeal
on 24 January 1996,
while Tirona filed a notice of appeal on 25 January
1996.
The MTC directed its clerk of court to transmit the
records of the case, as well as the motion for
execution pending appeal, through an order issued on
29 January 1996.
The RTC issued an order on 26 February 1996
ordering both parties to file their respective
memoranda.
On 4 March 1996, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola,
who claimed to be the owner of the subject land,
filed a motion with leave to file intervention before
the RTC.
III. RTC
In an order dated 11 March 1996, the RTC issued a
writ of execution pending appeal for the enforcement
of the MTCs decision.
In a separate order issued on the same date, the RTC
denied Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiolas motion with
leave to file intervention. The RTC stated that granting
the motion to intervene would violate the 1964 Rules
of Court and jurisprudence.
Ocampo filed his memorandum on 21 March 1996.
He emphasized that Tironas assertion of a
preferential right of first refusal is a recognition of the
sale by Rosauro Breton of the subject land to him.
Moreover, Tirona is not qualified to claim this
preferential right because she is no longer a
legitimate tenant. The payment of Tironas monthly
rent was already in arrears at the time Ocampo filed
the complaint against Tirona.
Tirona filed her memorandum also on 25 March 1996.
For the first time, Tirona disclosed that Alipio Breton is
the registered owner of the subject land and that he is
her landlord since 1962. When Alipio Breton died in
1975, his children, Rosauro Breton and Maria
Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, inherited the subject land.
Tirona claims she has never stopped paying her rent
to Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. Tirona also stated
that Rosauro Breton could not transfer ownership to
the subject land to Ocampo. On 14 July 1978,
Rosauro Breton executed a deed of conveyance and
waiver in favor of his sister, Maria Lourdes Breton-
Mendiola. Rosauro Breton executed another deed of
conveyance and waiver in favor of Maria Lourdes
Breton-Mendiola on 9 March 1995. Thus, Tirona
claims, Ocampo cannot legally acquire title from
Rosauro Breton in view of the waivers. Maria
Lourdes Breton-Mendiola is Tironas lessor, and is
the only person who can validly file an ejectment
suit against Tirona.
RTC AFFIRMED THE RULING OF THE MTC that
there is therefore nothing in the record which
would warrant the Court to disturb the findings of
fact and law and the conclusions reached by the
MTC.
IV. CA
The appellate court considered partition of the estate
of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite to Ocampos action.
The appellate court ruled that [u]ntil the partition of the
estate is ordered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City in the pending partition proceedings and the
share of each co-heir is determined by metes and
bounds, [Ocampo] cannot rightfully claim that what he
bought is part of the property occupied by [Tirona].
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent
court is hereby SET ASIDE and judgment is
hereby rendered dismissing the complaint of the
private respondent in the court below.
Hence, this instant petition for review.
ISSUE: whether interpleader is necessary in this
case.
V. SC
When Tirona filed her answer before the MTC, she
raised the issue of ownership and ascribed ownership
of the subject lot to one Doa Lourdes Rodriguez
Yaneza. Tirona later changed her strategy and filed
an amended answer that ascribed ownership of the
subject lot to Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. Tirona
justified the amendment by stating that she did not
ask for the assistance of a lawyer for fear of not being
able to file her answer on time. This excuse is flimsy
considering that Tirona first communicated to
Ocampo through Callejo Law Office. However, the
MTC still allowed Tirona to amend her answer. Tirona
stated that there was no violation of the lease
agreement because she paid her rent to the real
owner, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.
Contrary to Tironas position, the issue of ownership is
not essential to an action for unlawful detainer. The
fact of the lease and the expiration of its term are the
only elements of the action. The defense of ownership
does not change the summary nature of the action.
The affected party should raise the issue of ownership
in an appropriate action, because a certificate of title
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.
Unlawful detainer being a summary proceeding, it
was error for the appellate court to include the issue
of ownership. Had the appellate court limited its ruling
to the elements to be proved in a case of unlawful
detainer, Ocampo need not even prove his
ownership. When the appellate court ruled that the
case of unlawful detainer had to wait for the results of
the partition proceedings, it effectively put ownership
as the main issue in the case. The issue of ownership
opens a virtual Pandoras Box for Tirona and her
supposed intervenor, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.
The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her
preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As
a stakeholder, Tirona should have used
reasonable diligence in hailing the contending
claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited
actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her
before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for
interpleader is proper when the lessee does not
know the person to whom to pay rentals due to
conflicting claims on the property.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a
person who has property whether personal or
real, in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right in
both, or claims an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants,
comes to court and asks that the persons who
claim the said property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with
the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is
entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double vexation in
respect of one liability. When the court orders that the
claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in
reality a new action and the former are styled
interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which
initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader
and not a cross-complaint.
Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject
land. All the elements required for an unlawful
detainer case to prosper are present. Ocampo notified
Tirona that he purchased the subject land from
Tironas lessor. Tironas continued occupation of the
subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampos
terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent
to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.
2. Wack Wack Golf and Country Club vs Lee
E. Won (L-23851, 30 SCRA 165) Pracuelles
 Interpleader
FACTS: (NOTE) This is an appeal from the order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in civil case 7656,
dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint of
interpleader upon the grounds of failure to state a
cause of action and res judicata.
In its amended and supplemental complaint of
October 23, 1963, the Wack Wack Golf & Country
Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation
duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, with
principal office in Mandaluyong, Rizal (hereinafter
referred to as the Corporation), alleged, for its first
cause of action, that the defendant Lee E. Won claims
ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by
virtue of the decision rendered in civil case 26044 of
the CFI of Manila, entitled "Lee E. Won alias Ramon
Lee vs. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc." and
also by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial
no. 1478 issued on October 17, 1963 by Ponciano B.
Jacinto, deputy clerk of court of the said CFI of
Manila, for and in behalf of the president and the
secretary of the Corporation and of the People's Bank
& Trust Company as transfer agent of the said
Corporation, pursuant to the order of September 23,
1963 in the said case; that the defendant Bienvenido
A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to be lawful owner
of its aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by
virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no.
1199 issued to him on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an
assignment made in his favor by "Swan, Culbertson
and Fritz," the original owner and holder of
membership fee certificate 201; that under its articles
of incorporation and by-laws the Corporation is
authorized to issue a maximum of 400 membership
fee certificates to persons duly elected or admitted to
proprietary membership, all of which have been
issued as early as December 1939; that it claims no
interest whatsoever in the said membership fee
certificate 201; that it has no means of determining
who of the two defendants is the lawful owner thereof;
that it is without power to issue two separate
certificates for the same membership fee certificate
201, or to issue another membership fee certificate to
the defendant Lee, without violating its articles of
incorporation and by-laws; and that the membership
fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 held by the
defendant Tan and the membership fee certificate
201-serial No. 1478 issued to the defendant Lee
proceed from the same membership fee certificate
201, originally issued in the name of "Swan,
Culbertson and Fritz".
3. For its second cause of action. it alleged that
the membership fee certificate 201-serial no.
1478 issued by the deputy clerk of court of
court of the CFI of Manila in behalf of the
Corporation is null and void because issued in
violation of its by-laws, which require the
surrender and cancellation of the outstanding
membership fee certificate 201 before
issuance may be made to the transferee of a
new certificate duly signed by its president
and secretary, aside from the fact that the
decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case
26044 is not binding upon the defendant Tan,
holder of membership fee certificate 201-serial
no. 1199; that Tan is made a party because of
his refusal to join it in this action or bring a
separate action to protect his rights despite
the fact that he has a legal and beneficial
interest in the subject matter of this litigation;
and that he is made a part so that complete
relief may be accorded herein.
The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued
requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate their
conflicting claims; and (b) judgment. be rendered,
after hearing, declaring who of the two is the lawful
owner of membership fee certificate 201, and ordering
the surrender and cancellation of membership fee
certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of
Lee.
In separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure
of the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by
prescription. 1 These motions were duly opposed by
the Corporation. Finding the grounds of bar by prior
judgment and failure to state a cause of action well
taken, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with
costs against the Corporation.
In this appeal, the Corporation contends that the
court a quo erred (1) in finding that the allegations in
its amended and supplemental complaint do not
constitute a valid ground for an action of interpleader,
and in holding that "the principal motive for the
present action is to reopen the Manila Case and
collaterally attack the decision of the said Court"; (2)
in finding that the decision in civil case 26044 of the
CFI of Manila constitutes res judicata and bars its
present action; and (3) in dismissing its action instead
of compelling the appellees to interplead and litigate
between themselves their respective claims.
The Corporations position may be stated elsewise as
follows: The trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint, instead of compelling the appellees to
interplead because there actually are conflicting
claims between the latter with respect to the
ownership of membership fee certificate 201, and, as
there is not Identity of parties, of subject-matter, and
of cause of action, between civil case 26044 of the
CFI of Manila and the present action, the complaint
should not have been dismissed upon the ground
of res judicata.
On the other hand, the appellees argue that the trial
court properly dismissed the complaint, because,
having the effect of reopening civil case 26044, the
present action is barred by res judicata.
ISSUE: Whether the interpleader is the proper action.
HELD: NO. The action of interpleader, under section
120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 2 is a remedy
whereby a person who has personal property in his
possession, or an obligation to render wholly or
partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to
court and asks that the persons who claim the said
personal property or who consider themselves entitled
to demand compliance with the obligation, be required
to litigate among themselves in order to determine
finally who is entitled to tone or the one thing. The
remedy is afforded to protect a person not against
double liability but against double vexation in respect
of one liability. 3 The procedure under the Rules of
Court 4 is the same as that under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 5 except that under the former the remedy
of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of
the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under
the latter an interpleader suit is proper only if the
subject-matter of the controversy is personal property
or relates to the performance of an obligation.
There is no question that the subject matter of the
present controversy, i.e., the membership fee
certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What
is here disputed is the propriety and timeliness of the
remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances
obtaining.
A stakeholder 6 should use reasonable diligence to
hale the contending claimants to court. 7 He need not
await actual institution of independent suits against
him before filing a bill of interpleader. 8 He should file
an action of interpleader within a reasonable time
after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued
by either of the contending claimants. 9 Otherwise, he
may be barred by laches 10 or undue delay. 11 But
where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the
environmental circumstances, the remedy is not
barred. 12
Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence,
in view of all the circumstances, such that it may
properly invoke the remedy of interpleader? We do
not think so. It was aware of the conflicting claims of
the appellees with respect to the membership fee
certificate 201 long before it filed the present
interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the
lawful owner thereof. It was sued by Lee who also
claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it
did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the
litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself
therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was
rendered against it and said judgment has already
been executed. It is not therefore too late for it to
invoke the remedy of interpleader.
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of
interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has
been rendered against him in favor of one of the
contending claimants, 13 especially where he had
notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of
the judgment and neglected the opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where
judgment was entered. This must be so, because
once judgment is obtained against him by one
claimant he becomes liable to the latter.
Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of
the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed
to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have
that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader
suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil
case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it
offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to
implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual
situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot
prosper because it was filed much too late.
To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court
after the latter's successful establishment of his rights
in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate
201, is to increase instead of to diminish the number
of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of
interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would
lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This
cannot be done because having elected to take its
chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full
knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must submit
to the consequences of defeat.
Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be
impleaded by his defeated adversary in an
interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim
anew against other adverse claimants, as that would
in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper
because the Corporation had already been made
independently liable in civil case 26044 and,
therefore, its present application for interpleader
would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final
judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had
already established his rights to membership fee
certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and,
therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to
establish his rights anew, and thereby increase
instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the
purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possiblity
that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil
case might eventually be taken away from him; and
because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to
final judgment in the said case, its action of
interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which
reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable
delay.
Rule 63 Declaratory Relief
1. DBM vs Manila’s Finest Retirees
Association (2007)
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
represented by SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, represented by
POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO L.
LOMIBAO, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION,
represented by CHAIRMAN ANGELO T. REYES,
AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, represented
by CHAIRPERSON KARINA C. DAVID, petitioners,
vs. MANILA'S FINEST RETIREES ASSOCIATION,
INC., represented by P/COL. FELICISIMO G.
LAZARO (RET.), AND ALL THE OTHER INP
RETIREES, respondents.
I. FACTS
In 1975, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 765 was
issued constituting the Integrated National Police
(INP) to be composed of the Philippine Constabulary
(PC) as the nucleus and the integrated police forces
as components thereof. Complementing P.D. No. 765
was P.D. No. 1184 dated August 26, 1977 (INP Law,
hereinafter) issued to professionalize the INP and
promote career development therein.
On December 13, 1990, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975
, entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
hereinafter referred to as PNP Law, was enacted.
Under Section 23 of said law, the Philippine National
Police (PNP) would initially consist of the members of
the INP, created under P.D. No. 765, as well as the
officers and enlisted personnel of the PC.
A little less than eight (8) years later, or on February
25, 1998, R.A. No. 6975 (/laws/8490) was amended
by R.A. No. 8551 (/laws/10438), otherwise known as
the "PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE REFORM AND
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1998 (/laws/10438)."
Among other things, the amendatory law
reengineered the retirement scheme in the police
organization. Relevantly, PNP personnel, under the
new law, stood to collect more retirement benefits
than what INP members of equivalent rank, who had
retired under the INP Law, received.
Hence, on June 3, 2002, in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, all INP retirees, spearheaded by the
Manila's Finest Retirees Association, Inc., or the
MFRAI (hereinafter collectively referred to as the INP
Retirees), filed a petition for declaratory relief,
thereunder impleading, as respondents, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), the
PNP, the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM),
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
The petition alleged in gist that INP retirees were
equally situated as the PNP retirees but whose
retirement benefits prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
6975 (/laws/8490), as amended by R.A. No. 8551
(/laws/10438), were unconscionably and arbitrarily
excepted from the higher rates and adjusted benefits
accorded to the PNP retirees. Accordingly, in their
petition, the petitioning INP retirees pray that a
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT be rendered in their
favor, DECLARING with certainty that they, as INP-
retirees, are truly absorbed and equally considered as
PNP-retirees and thus, entitled to enjoy the SAME or
IDENTICAL retirement benefits being bestowed to
PNP-retirees by virtue of said PNP Law or Republic
Act No. 6975 (/laws/8490), as amended by Republic
Act 8551 (/laws/10438), with the corollary mandate for
the respondents- government agencies to effect the
immediate adjustment on their previously received
disparate retirement benefits, retroactive to its
effectivity, and with due payment thereof.
The GSIS moved to dismiss the petition on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. On the other
hand, the CSC, DBM, NAPOLCOM and PNP, in their
respective answers, asserted that the petitioners
could not claim the more generous retirement benefits
under R.A. No. 6975 because at no time did they
become PNP members, having retired prior to the
enactment of said law. DBM, NAPOLCOM and PNP
afterwards filed their respective pre-trial briefs.
 II. RTC
The RTC came out with a decision holding that R.A.
No. 6975, as amended, did not abolish the INP but
merely provided for the absorption of its police
functions by the PNP, and accordingly rendered
judgment for the INP retirees, DECLARING the INP
Retirees entitled to the same or identical retirement
benefits and such other benefits being granted,
accorded and bestowed upon the PNP Retirees under
the PNP Law. The trial court issued what it
denominated as Supplement to the Decision
whereunder it granted the GSIS' motion to dismiss
and thus considered the basic petition as withdrawn
with respect to the latter.
III. APPEAL to the CA by the remaining
respondents namely, DBM, PNP,
NAPOLCOM and CSC
DBM, PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC, interposed an
appeal to the CA whereat their appellate recourse
was docketed.
IV. CA
The CA, in its decision of July 7, 2005, affirmed
that of the trial court upholding the entitlement of
the INP retirees to the same or identical
retirement benefits accorded upon PNP retirees
under R.A. No. 6975 (/laws/8490), as amended.
Their motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the CA in its equally assailed
resolution of August 24, 2005.
V. Petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45
Sought to be set aside the issuances of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, a suit for declaratory
relief, declaring the herein respondents entitled to the
same retirement benefits accorded upon retirees of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6975 , as amended by R.A. No. 8551 ,
and ordering the herein petitioners to implement the
proper adjustments on respondents' retirement
benefits. In the main, it is petitioners' posture that R.A.
No. 6975, clearly abolished the INP and created in its
stead a new police force, the PNP. Prescinding
therefrom, petitioners contend that since the PNP is
an organization entirely different from the INP, it
follows that INP retirees never became PNP
members. Ergo, they cannot avail themselves of the
retirement benefits accorded to PNP members under
R.A. No. 6975 and its amendatory law, R.A. No. 8551.
The petitioners also fault the trial court for ordering
the immediate adjustments of the respondents'
retirement benefits when the basic petition filed before
it was one for declaratory relief. To the petitioners,
such petition does not essentially entail an
executory process, the only relief proper under
that setting being a declaration of the parties'
rights and duties.
VI. ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is correct in saying that
petition for declaratory relief does not essentially
entail an executory process, the only relief proper
under that setting being a declaration of the
parties' rights and duties.
VII. RULING
The Petition for review on certiorari filed by the
petitioner was DENIED and the assailed decision and
resolution of the CA was AFFIRMED
The INP was never, as posited by the petitioners,
abolished or terminated out of existence by R.A.
No. 6975. For sure, nowhere in R.A. No. 6975
does the words "abolish" or "terminate" appear in
reference to the INP. Instead, what the law
provides is for the "absorption," "transfer," and/or
"merger" of the INP, as well as the other offices
comprising the PC-INP, with the PNP. To
"abolish" is to do away with, to annul, abrogate or
destroy completely; to "absorb" is to assimilate,
incorporate or to take in. "Merge" means to cause
to combine or unite to become legally absorbed or
extinguished by merger while "transfer" denotes
movement from one position to another. Clearly,
"abolition" cannot be equated with "absorption."
True it is that Section 90 of R.A. No. 6975 speaks
of the INP "[ceasing] to exist" upon the effectivity
of the law. It ought to be stressed, however, that
such cessation is but the logical consequence of
the INP being absorbed by the PNP. Far from
being abolished then, the INP, at the most, was
merely transformed to become the PNP, minus of
course its military character and complexion.
Even the petitioners' effort at disclosing the
legislative intent behind the enactment of R.A. No.
6975 cannot support their theory of abolition.
Rather, the Senate and House deliberations on
the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 6975
reveal what has correctly been held by the CA in
its assailed decision: that the PNP was precisely
created to erase the stigma spawned by the
militarization of the police force under the PC-INP
structure.
With the conclusion herein reached that the INP
was not in fact abolished but was merely
transformed to become the PNP, members of the
INP which include the herein respondents are,
therefore, not excluded from availing themselves
of the retirement benefits accorded to PNP
retirees under Sections 74 and 75 of R.A. No.
6975 , as amended by R.A. No. 8551. It may be
that respondents were no longer in the
government service at the time of the enactment
of R.A. No. 6975. This fact, however, without
more, would not pose as an impediment to the
respondents' entitlement to the new retirement
scheme set forth under the aforecited sections.
The Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of
the CA stating that R.A. No. 6975 was not a
retroactive statute since it did not impose a new
obligation to pay the INP retirees the difference
between what they received when they retired
and what would now be due to them after R.A.
No. 6975 was enacted. Even so, that did not
render the RTC's interpretation of R.A. No. 6975
any less valid. The [respondents'] retirement prior
to the passage of R.A. No. 6975 did not exclude
them from the benefits provided by R.A. No. 6975
, as amended by R.A. No. 8551 , since their
membership in the INP was an antecedent fact
that nonetheless allowed them to avail
themselves of the benefits of the subsequent
laws. R.A. No. 6975 considered them as PNP
members, always referring to their membership
and service in the INP in providing for their
retirement benefits.
In a further bid to scuttle respondents' entitlement
to the desired retirement benefits, the petitioners
fault the trial court for ordering the immediate
adjustments of the respondents' retirement
benefits when the basic petition filed before it was
one for declaratory relief. To the petitioners,
such petition does not essentially entail an
executory process, the only relief proper
under that setting being a declaration of the
parties' rights and duties.
Supreme Cour ruled that Petitioners' above
posture is valid to a point. However, the execution
of judgments in a petition for declaratory relief is
not necessarily indefensible. In Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation[PDIC] v. Court of Appeals,
wherein the Court affirmed the order for the
petitioners therein to pay the balance of the
deposit insurance to the therein respondents, we
categorically ruled:
Now, there is nothing in the nature of
a special civil action for declaratory
relief that proscribes the filing of a
counterclaim based on the same
transaction, deed or contract subject
of the complaint. A special civil action
is after all not essentially different from
an ordinary civil action, which is
generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of
the Rules of Court, except that the
former deals with a special subject
matter which makes necessary some
special regulation. But the identity
between their fundamental nature is
such that the same rules governing
ordinary civil suits may and do apply
to special civil actions if not
inconsistent with or if they may serve
to supplement the provisions of the
peculiar rules governing special civil
actions.
Similarly, in Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal
Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur: the Court upheld
the lower court's order for a party to refund the
amounts paid by the adverse party under the
municipal ordinance therein questioned, stating:
. . . Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the
action for declaratory relief may be
converted into an ordinary action and
the parties allowed to file such
pleadings as may be necessary or
proper, if before the final termination
of the case "a breach or violation of an
. . . ordinance, should take place." In
the present case, no breach or
violation of the ordinance occurred.
 The petitioner decided to pay "under
protest" the fees imposed by the
ordinance. Such payment did not
affect the case; the declaratory relief
action was still proper because the
applicability of the ordinance to future
transactions still remained to be
resolved, although the matter could
also be threshed out in an ordinary
suit for the recovery of taxes paid . . .
In its petition for declaratory relief,
petitioner-appellee alleged that by
reason of the enforcement of the
municipal ordinance by respondents it
was forced to pay under protest the
fees imposed pursuant to the said
ordinance, and accordingly, one of the
reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was
that the respondents be ordered to
refund all the amounts it paid to
respondent Municipal Treasurer
during the pendency of the case. The
inclusion of said allegation and prayer
in the petition was not objected to by
the respondents in their answer.
During the trial, evidence of the
payments made by the petitioner was
introduced. Respondents were thus
fully aware of the petitioner's claim for
refund and of what would happen if
the ordinance were to be declared
invalid by the court.
The Court sees no reason for treating this case
differently from PDIC and Matalin. This disposition
becomes all the more appropriate considering that the
respondents, as petitioners in the RTC, pleaded for
the immediate adjustment of their retirement benefits
which, significantly, the herein petitioners, as
respondents in the same court, did not object to.
Being aware of said prayer, the petitioners then
already knew the logical consequence if, as it turned
out, a declaratory judgment is rendered in the
respondents' favor.
At bottom then, the trial court's judgment forestalled
multiplicity of suits which, needless to stress, would
only entail a long and arduous process. Considering
their obvious advanced years, the respondents can
hardly afford another protracted proceedings. It is
thus for this Court to already write finis to this case.
2. Martelino v National Home Mortgage
Finance Corp., G.R. No. 160208, June 30,
2008 ACOSTA
I. Established Facts
Petitioners Rafael Martelino et al obtained housing
loans from respondents, the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) and the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF). The loans were
released to Shelter Philippines Inc. (Shelter) who
would develop the subdivision. However, Shelter
failed to develop the subdivision. Then, NHMFC and
HDMF initiated foreclosure proceedings.
Petitioners RAFAEL R. MARTELINO et al. filed a
petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with
urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before
the RTC of Caloocan.
They sought a declaration from the RTC:
(1) that their right as house and lot buyers to suspend
payment to Shelter for its failure to fully develop the
subdivision also applied to respondents who released
their loans directly to Shelter; and
(2) that during the suspension of payment,
respondents should not assess them accrued
interests and penalties. Petitioners further prayed that
they be allowed to pay their housing loans without
interest and penalties.
II. RTC of Caloocan
The RTC of Caloocan set the preliminary injunction
hearing but the summons were served on the NHMFC
and Sheriff Castillo only. Then, the RTC issued the
writ of preliminary injunction to prevent respondents
from foreclosing the mortgage.
NHMFC filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the
ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over its
person or over the subject matter of the case.
HDMF moved to set aside the preliminary injunction
on ground that it was not notified of the hearing.
Thus, the RTC of Caloocan set aside its order
granting the writ of preliminary injunction and
dismissed the case on ground that the petition was there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify
vague. short of a judgment or final order.”

III. CA In this case, petitioners had already suspended

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC of Caloocan.
IV. ISSUES:
1. [Procedural] W.O.N the preliminary injunction
order against HDMF is valid
2. [Procedural] W.O.N the petition for declaratory
relief and prohibition was properly dismissed
3. [Procedural] W.O.N the Court may allow
conversion of petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition into an ordinary action.
V. Ruling
1. No.
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court expressly
states that no preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or person
sought to be enjoined.
In this case, petitioners even admit that the HDMF
was not notified of the preliminary injunction hearing.
2. Yes.
Section 1, Rule 63, provides “a person must file a
petition for declaratory relief before breach or violation
of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument,
statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any
other governmental regulation.”
paying their amortization payments. Their actual
suspension of payments defeated the purpose of the
action to secure an authoritative declaration of their
supposed right to suspend payment, for their
guidance. Thus, the RTC could no longer assume
jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief
because its subject was breached before filing the
action.
3. It depends.
In De La Llana, etc., et al. v. Alba, etc., et al., where
this Court considered a petition erroneously entitled
Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition as
an action for prohibition. That case involved the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Citing De La
Llana, Justice Florenz D. Regalado opined in his book
“that if the petition has far-reaching implications
and it raises questions that should be resolved, it
may be treated as one for prohibition.”
In this case, although Section 6, Rule 63 might allow
such course of action, the respondents did not argue
the point, and we note petitioner’s failure to specify
the ordinary action they desired. Furthermore, they
raised it for the first time in appeal. Thus, it cannot be
entertained.

In the case of Tambunting Jr. v Sumabat, the Court

stated:
“The purpose of the action [for declaratory relief] is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or
compliance and not to settle issues arising from its
alleged breach. It may be entertained only before
the breach or violation of the statute, deed,
contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or
contract has already been contravened prior to the
filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can
no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Under
such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action
has already accrued in favor of one or the other party,