CRIM PRO REGALADO, J.
:
G.R. No. 103102. March 6, 1992.
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Information; Amendment and substitution, distinguished.—It may accordingly be posited that
both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in
the following respects: 1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily
involves a substantial change from the original charge; 2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected
without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be
dismissed; 3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the
retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the
accused has to plead anew to the new information; and 4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged
in the original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge,
hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of
the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other
hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include
or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
Same; Same; Identity of offenses charged in original and amended information.—Going now to the case at bar, it
is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of murder, hence the former is necessarily
included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances
such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an information for frustrated murder and for murder,
thereby meaning and proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed
for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of consummated murder likewise
constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder. In the present case,
therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information. What is involved
here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the
same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original
information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.
Same; Same; Substantial and formal amendments.—A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge
another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to
invoke prescription.
Same; Same; Nature of offense originally charged not changed in amended information.—An objective appraisal
of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense
originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death
of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused
committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution’s theory. There is no question that
whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to
the amended information for murder. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended
information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even during the trial of the case.
In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioner principally seeks: (1) to nullify the
order of respondent judge admitting the amended information for murder filed in Criminal Case No. 91-4606; (2)
to nullify the arraignment and the plea of not guilty entered by order of respondent judge when petitioner refused
to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of preliminary investigation therefor; (3) to nullify the
appointment of a counsel de oficio/ PAO lawyer to represent petitioner; (4) to prohibit respondent judge from
“over-speedy and preferential scheduling of the trial of the aforementioned criminal case;” and (5) to compel
respondent judge to order a preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the amended information.
Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information for the crime of frustrated murder
allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a handgun,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting
gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the death of said Maureen Navarro Hultman,
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of her will,
that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro Hultman which
prevented her death.”
After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an
amended information and to admit said amended information. The amended information, filed on October 31,
1991, reads:
“That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a
handgun, with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said
Maureen Hultman.”
Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, as well as a rejoinder to the reply of the prosecution. On November 13,
1991, the trial court issued the questioned order admitting the amended information.
At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended
information for lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. By reason of such refusal, respondent judge ordered
that a plea of “not guilty” be entered for petitioner.
Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. When petitioner’s counsel
manifested that he would not take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised, the trial court
appointed a counsel de oficio to represent herein petitioner.
Petitioner now raises the following issues before us:
“(a)Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary
investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be
admitted;
“(b)Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly be appointed to represent an accused who
is represented by counsel of choice who refuses to participate in the proceedings because of a perceived
 denial of due process and after a plea for appellate remedies within a short period is denied by the trial
court; and
“(c)Whether or not a particular criminal case may legally and validly be rushed and preferentially
scheduled for trial over and at the expense and sacrifice of other, specially older, criminal cases.”
In our resolution of January 14, 1992, we required the Solicitor General to file a comment to the basic petition. It
appearing from a further review of the record that the operative facts and determinant issues involved in this
case are sufficiently presented in the petition and the annexes thereto, both in regard to the respective positions
of petitioner and respondents, the Court has decided to dispense with the aforesaid comment to obviate
needless delay in fairness to petitioner.
I. Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information, as herein underscored, that the
accused “. . . did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said
handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly
caused the death of said Maureen Hultman x x x” constitutes a substantial amendment since it involves a
change in the nature of the offense charged, that is, from frustrated to consummated murder. Petitioner further
submits that “(t)here is a need then to establish that the same mortal wounds, which were initially frustrated (sic)
by timely and able medical assistance, ultimately caused the death of the victim, because it could have been
caused by a supervening act or fact which is not imputable to the offender.”9 From this, he argues that there
being a substantial amendment, the same may no longer be allowed after arraignment and during the trial.
Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for murder charges an entirely
different offense, involving as it does a new fact, that is, the fact of death whose cause has to be established, it is
essential that another preliminary investigation on the new charge be conducted before the new information can
be admitted.
We find no merit in the petition. There are sufficient legal and jurisprudential moorings for the orders of the
trial court.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
“Sec. 14. Amendment.—The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters
of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging
the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the
trial.”
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second
paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before
or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
1.Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a
substantial change from the original charge;
2.Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of
information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;
3.Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the
retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is
entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and
4.An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial
amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the
accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy.
On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different
offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused
cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule
110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second
information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an
offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would
be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or
when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged
in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in
another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime
of murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of
intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both
an information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning and proving that the same material
allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed for both. This is because, except for the death
of the victim, the essential elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to
convict herein petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.
In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended
information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change
in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we
hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended
information for murder is proper.
Petitioner would insist, however, that the additional allegation on the fact of death of the victim Maureen
Navarro Hultman constitutes a substantial amendment which may no longer be allowed after a plea has been
entered. The proposition is erroneous and untenable.
As earlier indicated, Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment, either of form or substance, may
be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge and, thereafter, as to all matters of form with
leave of court.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative
of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be
merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court
might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or
distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory
of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4)
an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription.

We repeat that after arraignment and during the trial, amendments are allowed, but only as to matters of
form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test of whether an amendment is
only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment has been said to be whether or not a defense
under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether
or not any evidence the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance.

Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily
show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation,
that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the
proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to
be the prosecution’s theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the
original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for murder. Under the
circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an
amendment as to form which is allowed even during the trial of the case.

It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second
information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of
the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner’s right to be
secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public
accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. The amended
information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it
charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we have
heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one
would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary
investigation is not necessary.

We find nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de oficio for herein petitioner
whose counsel of record refused to participate in the proceedings because of an alleged legal issue. Such issue
having been demonstrated herein as baseless, we apprehend his refusal to participate in the trial as causative of
or contributive to the delay in the disposition of the case. And, finally, for as long as the substantial rights of
herein petitioner and other persons charged in court are not prejudiced, the scheduling of cases should be left to
the sound discretion of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that respondent judge did not commit the errors speciously
attributed to him, the extraordinary writs prayed for are hereby DENIED and the instant petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Note.—The amendment of a complaint for physical injuries which does not change the material facts or the
nature of the offense charged is not prejudicial. (Caparas vs. Gonzales, 7 SCRA 182.)

——o0o——
 No. L-31665. August 6, 1975.
LEONARDO ALMEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as presiding judge of the
Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, and HON. GREGORIO PINEDA, City Fiscal of
Pasay City, respondents.
Bail bond; Purpose of giving bail.—The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until
his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trail.
Same; Right to bail guaranteed by Constitution.—This right, to bail, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may
not be denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention or by reason of his prior absconding.
Same; Supreme Court will exercise its supervisory powers where excessive bail is required.—We have thus held
that “where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory
the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy.”
Same; Bail bond may be reasonable when in form of surety or property bond, but may be unreasonable when
demanded in the form of cash bond.—The amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or
property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does not require an actual
financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be
obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium x x x Upon the other hand, the posting of a
cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its procurement could work untold
hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether denying him the constitutional right to bail.
Same; Trial court cannot require accused to post cash bond; Notion of bail presupposes the attendance of
sureties; cash bond is allowed only because the Rules so provide.—The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is
authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail
by depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail
presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is
allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused.
Same; Trial court may impose other conditions in granting bail where likelihood of accused jumping bail or of
committing other harm to citizenry in feared.—Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the
situation. First, it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of the power of the
court over the person of the accused and for the purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a
notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to
report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements. And third, the accused might be
warned, though this warning is not essential to the requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution “Trial
may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified”
Same; Factors to consider in fixing amount of bail bond.—The trial court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the
following factors, where applicable: (1) the ability of the accused to give bail; (2) the nature of the offense; (3) the penalty
for the offense charged; (4) the character and reputation of the accused; (5) the health of the accused; (6) the character
and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the accused’s appearance or non-appearance at the trial; (8)
forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) whether the
accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.
Criminal procedure; Double jeopardy; Information; Information may be amended after plea of not guilty had been
entered for the purpose of including other aggravating circumstances.—The amendment of the information to include
allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism, after a previous plea thereto by the accused, is valid and in no way
violates his right to be fully apprised before trial of the charges against him. . . The additional allegations of habitual
delinquency and recidivism do not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of
qualified theft (of a motor vehicle) contained in the information. Neither do they tend to correct any defect in the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter of the case. The said new allegations relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. They do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case nor
possibly prejudice the form of defense the accused has or will assume.
Same; Motion; Information; Motion to amend information should be in writing.—A motion to amend the
information, after the accused has pleaded thereto, is certainly one that should be placed in writing and properly set for
hearing. We are loath to give our imprimatur to the kind of shorcut devised by the respondents, especially as it relates to
an alteration in the information. Considering, however, that the petitioner was not deprived of his day in court and was in
fact given advance warning of the proposed amendment, although orally, we refrain from disturbing the said
amendment.
CASTRO, J.:
The petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others, with the crime of
qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided
by the respondent Judge Onofre Villauz. The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of
Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in
cash.
At the hearing of February 18, 1970, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of
the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and so was an oral motion for reconsideration, on the
ground that the amended information imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda.
At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal, thru his assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a
previous hearing for amendment of the information so as to include allegations of recidivism and habitual
delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The latter vigorously objected, arguing that (a) such an amendment
was premature since no copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in court, (b) the motion to amend
should have been made in writing in order to enable him to object formally, and (c) the proposed amendment
would place him in double jeopardy considering that he had already pleaded not guilty to the information. The
trial court nevertheless granted the respondent fiscal’s motion in open court. An oral motion for reconsideration
was denied.
Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then and there, entered
his amendment by annotating the same on the back of the document. The petitioner forthwith moved for the
dismissal of the charge on the ground of double jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for reconsideration were
denied in open court.
Hence, the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Two issues are posed to us for resolution: First, whether the respondent judge has the authority to require a
strictly cash bond and disallow the petitioner’s attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty,
and second, whether the amendment to the information, after a plea of not guilty thereto, was properly allowed in
both substance and procedure.
1. As defined by section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is “the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance
may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.” The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.
 In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except when he is charged
with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may
not be denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention, or by reason of his prior absconding.
In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that “excessive bail
shall not be required.” This is logical because the imposition of an unreasonable bail may negate the very right
itself. We have thus held that “where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a
refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory
powers to provide the required remedy.”
Coming to the issue at hand, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or
property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does not require
an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property owner, and in the case of the bondsman
the bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the reputation
or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which the property can be sold, is placed in
the hands of the court to guarantee the production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading
to his conviction or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets
into the possession of the court, and its procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to
have the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail.
Aside from the foregoing, the condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting
of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of bail
is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of
penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in
lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the
case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking,
the very nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be
delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily
belongs to the accused. This is clearly deducible from the language of section 14 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court:
“SEC. 14. Deposit of money as bail.—At any time after the amount of bail is fixed by order, the
defendant, instead of giving bail, may deposit with the nearest collector of internal revenue, or
provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the sum mentioned in the order, and upon delivering to the
court a proper certificate of the deposit, must be discharged from custody. Money thus deposited,
shall be applied to the payment of the fine and costs for which judgment may be given; and the
surplus, if any, shall be returned to the defendant.”
Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his
provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.
But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted by the respondent judge, we cannot fault the motive
that caused him to demur to the petitioner’s offer of a surety bond. Based on the petitioner’s past record, 7 the
range of his career in crime weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail. The
likelihood of his jumping bail or committing other harm to the citizenry while on provisional liberty is a
consideration that simply cannot be ignored.
Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation. First, it could increase the
amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the
accused and for the purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on
provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person
periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements. And third, the accused might be warned,
though this warning is not essential to the requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution “Trial
may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified.”
With respect to the amount of the bail bond, the trial court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the following
factors, where applicable: (1) the ability of the accused to give bail: (2) the nature of the offense; (3) the penalty
for the offense charged; (4) the character and reputation of the accused; (5) the health of the accused; (6) the
character and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the accused’s appearance or non-appearance at the
trial; (8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10)
whether the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.
It is not amiss, at this point, to remind all courts to exercise extreme care and caution in the screening of
bondsmen and sureties in regard to their reputation, solvency and promptitude. Aside from the other precautions
hitherto considered useful, courts should see to it that all surety bonds are accompanied by corresponding
clearances from the Office of the Insurance Commissioner. Bondsmen who cannot make good their
undertakings render inutile all efforts at making the bail system work in this jurisdiction.
2. Anent the second issue posed by the petitioner, the amendment of the information to include allegations
of habitual delinquency and recidivism, after a previous plea thereto by the accused, is valid and in no way
violates his right to be fully apprised before trial of the charges against him.
Under section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has discretion to allow amendments to the
information on all matters of form after the defendant has pleaded and during the trial when the same can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. What are prohibited at this stage of the proceedings are
amendments in substance. And the substantial matter in a complaint or information is the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form.
Under our law, a person is considered a habitual delinquent “if within a period of ten years from the date of
his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto,
estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.” The law imposes an
additional penalty based on the criminal propensity of the accused, apart from that provided by law for the last
crime of which he is found guilty. Habitual delinquency is not, however, a crime in itself; it is only a factor in
determining a total penalty. Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of habitual delinquency does not
establish a new crime, but only regulates the “effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and of habitual delinquency.” as its caption indicates. In fact, the provision on habitual
delinquency is found in a section of the Code prescribing rules for the application of penalties, not in a section
defining offense. A recidivist, upon the other hand, is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal
Code. Recidivism is likewise not a criminal offense; it is but one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated by
the said Code.
The additional allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism do not have the effect of charging another
offense different or distinct from the charge of qualified theft (of a motor vehicle) contained in the information.
Neither do they tend to correct any defect in the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter of the case.
The said new allegations relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction. They do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case nor possibly prejudice the form of defense the
accused has or will assume. Consequently, in authorizing the amendments, the respondent judge acted with due
consideration of the petitioner’s rights and did not abuse his discretion.
 Anent the petitioner’s claim that the amendment of the information by the State places him in double
jeopardy, it should be remembered that there is double jeopardy only when all the following requisites obtain in
the original prosecution; (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his consent.
Grant of bail by trial judge on request of a Congressman where the accused is charge with a capital offense
and evidence of guilt is strong is reprehensible. (Hadhirul Tahil vs. Eisma, 64 SCRA 379).
——o0o——

It is clear that the petitioner Almeda has not yet been convicted nor acquitted of the charge of qualified theft
of a motor vehicle contained in the original information. Neither has the case against him been dismissed or
otherwise terminated. The mere amendment of the information to include allegations of habitual delinquency and
recidivism does not have the effect of a dismissal of the criminal action for qualified theft alleged in the original
information.

It cannot likewise be said that the accused is being placed in jeopardy a second time for the past crimes of
which he had been convicted. The constitutional objection, on the ground of double jeopardy, to the statute
providing an additional penalty to be meted out to habitual delinquents, has long been rejected.

The procedure taken by the respondent fiscal and allowed by the respondent judge in the amendment of the
information does not, however, merit our approbation. Under section 2 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, “all
motions shall be made in writing except motions for continuance made in the presence of the adverse party, or
those made in the course of a hearing or trial.” A motion to amend the information, after the accused has
pleaded thereto, is certainly one that should be placed in writing and properly set for hearing. We are loath to
give our imprimatur to the kind of shortcut devised by the respondents, especially as it relates to an alteration in
the information. Considering, however, that the petitioner was not deprived of his day in court and was in fact
given advance warning of the proposed amendment, although orally, we refrain from disturbing the said
amendment.

ACCORDINGLY, the order of the respondent judge of February 18, 1970 denying the motion of the
petitioner Almeda that he be allowed to post a surety bond instead of a cash bond is hereby SET ASIDE, without
prejudice, however, to increasing the amount of the bail bond and/or the imposition of such conditions as the
respondent judge might consider desirable and proper for the purpose of insuring the attendance of the petitioner
at the trial, provided they are consistent with the views herein expressed. No costs.

Notes.—There is no need for the trial court to wait until the expiration of the 30-day period before it may
render judgment on the bond if the principal is produced before the period expires and the explanation is
submitted for his non-appearance. The only issue to be decided is whether or not the explanation is satisfactory
and whether or not the bondsman should be held liable. (People vs. Castillejos, 23 SCRA 108).

The bondsman is entitled to a mitigation of his liability if no permanent injury is caused to public interest by his
failure to produce the body of the accused in court for arraignment, as ordered, as when the accused is
subsequently arraigned and tried. (People vs. Weber, 7 SCRA 218).

The mere allegation of “long and continuous efforts to locate the whereabouts of the accused” does not
satisfy entirely the degree of diligence expected of a surety, in law the jailer of the principal. (People vs.
Ornales, 13 SCRA 133).

The hearing in the application for bail in capital offenses should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court. A summary hearing for such purpose means such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely
to determine the weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. (Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court,
16th Judicial District vs. Siazon, 42 SCRA 184).
 [ G.R. No. 207711, July 02, 2018 ]
MARIA C. OSORIO petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Persons who receive money for investment in a particular company but divert the same to another without the
investor's consent may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in scope intended to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling
under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code.
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the January 30, 2013 Decision and June 14,
2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34274. The assailed judgments affirmed Maria C.
Osorio's (Osorio) conviction for the crime of estafa.
In an Information, Osorio was charged with estafa, punished under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That in or about and sometime during the period comprised from November 19, 2001 to January 11, 2002,
in the City of Manila[,] Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL, prior to
and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect that her money, if invested with
Philamlife Fund Management will earn 20% interest per annum, and by means of other similar deceits,
induced and succeeded in inducing the said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL to give and deliver, as in fact, she
gave and delivered to the said accused the total amount of Php200,000.00, on the strength of the
manifestations and representations of said accused well knowing that the said manifestation and
representation were false and fraudulent and were made solely for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact
she did obtain the total amount of Php200,000.00, which amount once in her possession, with intent to
defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL in the
aforesaid amount Php200,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.
Osorio pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses private complainant, Josefina O. Gabriel (Gabriel), and Alberto G.
Fernandez (Fernandez), head of Philam Life's Business Values and Compliance Department. Their collective
testimonies produced the prosecution's version of the incident.
Gabriel was a proprietor of a stall in Paco Market, Manila. Sometime in December 2000, Osorio visited Gabriel's
store and introduced herself as an agent of the Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company
(Philam Life). As proof, Osorio presented her company ID and calling card. During their meeting, Osorio offered
insurance coverage to Gabriel. Gabriel told Osorio to come back at a later date as she needed more time to think
about the offer.
When Osorio returned, Gabriel availed Philam Life's Tri-Life Plan and Excelife Gold Package. Gabriel
consistently paid the quarterly premiums from February 2001 to November 2001.
On November 19, 2001, Osorio offered Gabriel an investment opportunity with Philam Life Fund Management.
The proposed investment would be placed under a time deposit scheme and would earn 20% annually. Osorio
informed Gabriel that the proceeds of her investment may be channeled to pay for her insurance premiums.
Enticed by the offer, Gabriel tendered P200,000.00 to Osorio, who in tum issued Philam Life receipts.
A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance policies had lapsed due to non-payment of premiums.
When Gabriel confronted Osorio about the matter, Osorio assured Gabriel that she would take responsibility.
Meanwhile, in May 2002, Gabriel received a letter from Philippine Money Investment Asset Management
(PMIAM), thanking her for investing in the company. In the same letter, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her
investment would earn interest on a semi-annual basis starting June 20, 2002. Gabriel confronted Osorio on why
her investment was diverted to PMIAM. Osorio explained that PMIAM investments would yield a higher rate of
return. Displeased with what had happened, Gabriel asked for a refund of her initial investment.
On August 2, 2002, Gabriel received P13,000.00 from PMIAM as evidenced by PMIAM Voucher No. 001854. In
spite of this, Gabriel insisted on the refund.
Later, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her initial investment and unpaid interest income would be released to her
on May 14, 2004. Unfortunately, she was unable to recover it. She then visited the Philam Life office to see
Osorio but she was nowhere to be found. Philam Life referred Gabriel to a certain Atty. Cabugoy who sent a
demand letter to Osorio.
Fernandez testified that Osorio was a Philam Life agent and that she was allowed to engage in other lines of
work. He stated that Osorio should not have issued Philam Life receipts for Gabriel's P200,000.00 investment.
Although the receipts were genuine, Fernandez claimed that they should only be issued for insurance premium
payments.
The defense presented Osorio as its sole witness. Osorio admitted that aside from being a Philam Life agent,
she was also a referral agent of PMIAM. She received P4,000.00 from the company as commission for Gabriel's
investment. She asserted that she initially planned to place Gabriel's investment in Philam Life but decided later
on to divert it to PMIAM since the latter offered a higher rate of return. When Osorio informed Gabriel of her
decision, Gabriel allegedly gave her consent. Osorio claimed that her husband also failed to recover his
P300,000.00 investment in PMIAM due to internal problems with its mother company in the United States.
On April 19, 2011, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Osorio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
estafa. It ruled that Gabriel was induced to part with her money through Osorio's misrepresentation that it would
be invested in Philam Life, a company with an established reputation. It rejected Osorio's defense that Gabriel
later on consented to the placement. When she was informed of the placement with PMIAM, Gabriel had no
other choice but to agree.
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court April 19, 2011 Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused MARIA C. OSORIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Estafa punishable under Article 315 par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences her to
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused MARIA C. OSORIO is also directed to reimburse the private complainant, Josefina Gabriel the
sum of Php200,000.00, with legal rate of interest fixed at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the
complaint until the same is fully settled, which the accused received from the offended party.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Osorio was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prisión correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusión temporal as maximum. She was also directed to pay
P200,000.00 plus six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint until
satisfaction.
Osorio appealed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, arguing that her act of investing Gabriel's money with
PMIAM was done in good faith.
On January 30, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming Osorio's conviction. Osorio moved for
reconsideration but her motion was denied.
On August 8, 2013, Osorio filed a Petition for Review before this Court to which the People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment.
In its February 10, 2014 Resolution, this Court required petitioner to file a reply to the comment on the petition.
On April 24, 2014, petitioner manifested that she would no longer file a reply.
On June 18, 2014, this Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their respective
memoranda. However, both parties manifested that they would no longer file their memoranda.
In praying for her acquittal, petitioner asserts that not all the elements of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code were established by the prosecution. Only damage on the part of the private complainant
was proven. Petitioner argues that she did not employ any deceit in soliciting private complainant's investment
as nothing in the records shows that she used a fictitious name or that she pretended to possess power, agency,
or certain qualifications. Fernandez, one of the prosecution's witnesses, even admitted that she was a Philam
Life agent.
Furthermore, petitioner claims that she acted in good faith when she decided to place private complainant's
investment in PMIAM. She adds that she did not conceal this from private complainant, who later on agreed to
the placement.
In its Comment, respondent claims that the main issue raised by petitioner is factual in nature. Thus, it is beyond
the scope of review in a Rule 45 petition. Respondent argues that even if this Court undertakes a factual review
in this case, the lower courts did not err in convicting petitioner of estafa. Petitioner misrepresented to private
complainant that the latter's investment would be placed in Philam Life and that its proceeds would be channeled
to pay for her insurance premiums. This misrepresentation caused private complainant to part with her money.
The principal issue presented by this case is whether or not petitioner's acts constitute estafa as defined and
punished under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The rule with respect to petitions for review brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is that only questions of
law may be raised. The factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this
Court and will not be disturbed on appeal.
There is a question of law when "doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or
circumstances." On the other hand, there is a question of fact when "the issue raised on appeal pertains to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts." This includes an assessment of the probative value of evidence presented
during trial. If the principal issue may be resolved without reviewing the evidence, then the question before the
appellate court is one of law.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the ground that she
did not employ deceit in soliciting private complainant's funds. The determination of whether the element of
deceit or fraud is present in a charge for estafa is a question of fact as it involves a review of the lower court's
appreciation of the evidence.
Petitioner concedes that the case involves mixed questions of fact and law. However, she claims that this Court
is authorized to undertake a factual review if the findings of the lower courts do not conform to the evidence on
record.[52] Her contention is well-taken.
Petitioner was charged with estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 315. Swindling (Estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
....
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
In sustaining a conviction under this provision, the following elements must concur:
(a) [T]hat there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense
or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was
induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.
There are different modalities of committing the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a). The false pretense or
fraudulent representation referred to under the first element exists when the accused uses a fictitious name,
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary
transactions, or when the accused commits other similar deceits.
There is no evidence to prove that petitioner committed any of these acts when she obtained private
complainant's money.
Petitioner neither used a fictitious name nor misrepresented herself as an agent of Philam Life. During her first
meeting with private complainant, petitioner presented her company ID and calling card as proof of her identity
and employment. Fernandez, head of Philam Life's Business Values and Compliance Department, even
admitted during trial that petitioner had been a Philam Life agent as of December 2000.
There is also no proof that petitioner pretended to possess the authority to solicit investments for Philam Life
Fund Management. All that Fernandez stated was that the issuance of Philam Life receipts to private
complainant was improper because the receipts only cover insurance premium payments. [56] Thus, in the
absence of contrary evidence, it is presumed that petitioner was authorized to solicit money for investment
purposes.
In estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the element of deceit consisting
of the false pretense or representation must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, criminal liability will
not attach. In Aricheta v. People, the accused was charged of estafa for selling property that she had previously
sold to a third party. She allegedly misrepresented to the buyer that she was still the owner at the time of the
sale. In acquitting the accused, this Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged false
representation she made:
 As can be gleaned from the allegations in the information, petitioner was charged with Estafa for
allegedly selling to private complainant the subject property knowing fully well that she had already sold
the same to a third party. From this, it is therefore clear that the supposed false representation or false
pretense made by petitioner to private complainant was that she was still the owner of the property when
she sold it to private complainant.
....
The question to be resolved is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the alleged false representation or false pretense contained in the information.
As above explained, the alleged false representation or false pretense made by petitioner to private
complainant was that she was still the owner of the property when she sold it to private complainant. To
prove such allegation, the prosecution should first establish that the property was previously sold to a
third party before it was sold to private complainant. The prosecution utterly failed to do this. The
fundamental rule is that upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof. It made this allegation but it failed
to support it with competent evidence. Except for private complainant's bare allegation that petitioner told
her that she (petitioner) sold the property to another person, the records are bereft of evidence showing
that the property was indeed previously sold to a third person before it was sold again to private
complainant. What was shown by the prosecution and admitted by the defense is the fact that the property
is being currently occupied by a person other than private complainant. This fact does not prove that the
property was previously sold to another person before being sold again to private complainant. (Citation
omitted)
In this case, although there is no proof that petitioner used a fictitious name or pretended to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business in soliciting private complainant's money, petitioner
should nevertheless be held criminally liable for misrepresenting to private complainant that the latter's money
would be invested in Philam Life Fund Management and that its proceeds may be utilized to pay for private
complainant's insurance premiums.
Private complainant accepted the investment opportunity offered by petitioner due to the promise that her money
would be invested in Philam Life, a company with which she had existing insurance policies. She parted with her
funds because of the representation that her investment's earnings would be conveniently channeled to the
payment of her insurance premiums. As a result of petitioner's representations, private complainant no longer
saw the need to pay for the succeeding insurance premiums as they fell due. Moreover, petitioner's issuance of
Philam Life receipts led private complainant to believe that her money was already as good as invested in the
company.
The false representations committed by petitioner in this case fall beyond the scope of "other similar deceits"
under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase "other similar deceits" in Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code has been interpreted in Guinhawa v. People as limited to acts of the same nature as those
specifically enumerated. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "other similar deceits" cannot be construed in
the broadest sense to include all kinds of deceit:
[T]he petitioner's reliance on paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is misplaced. The said
provision reads:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
The fraudulent representation of the seller, in this case, that the van to be sold is brand new, is not the
deceit contemplated in the law. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statement ascribes things
of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually
be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated unless there be something in
the context to the contrary. (Citation omitted)
Nevertheless, petitioner may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in application. It is intended as a catch-all provision to cover all
other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code.
For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements
must exist:
(a) [The accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in [Articles 315,
316, and 317]; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage
or prejudice. (Citation omitted)
All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case.
Petitioner, in soliciting private complainant's money, falsely represented that it would be invested in Philam Life
and that its proceeds would be used to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums. This false
representation is what induced private complainant to part with her funds and disregard the payment of her
insurance premiums. Since petitioner deviated from what was originally agreed upon by placing the investment
in another company, private complainant's insurance policies lapsed.
The present case is different from money market transactions where dealers are usually given full discretion on
where to place their client's investments. In MERALCO v. Atilano, this Court explained the nature of money
market transactions and the corresponding liabilities that dealers may face when dealing with their clients'
investments:
[I]n money market transactions, the dealer is given discretion on where investments are to be
placed, absent any agreement with or instruction from the investor to place the investments in specific
securities.
Money market transactions may be conducted in various ways. One instance is when an investor
enters into an investment contract with a dealer under terms that oblige the dealer to place investments
only in designated securities. Another is when there is no stipulation for placement on designated
securities; thus, the dealer is given discretion to choose the placement of the investment made. Under
the first situation, a dealer who deviates from the specified instruction may be exposed to civil and criminal
prosecution; in contrast, the second situation may only give rise to a civil action for recovery of the amount
invested. (Emphasis in the original)
Although petitioner was charged of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
she may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or she is charged. This rule proceeds
from the Constitutional guarantee that an accused shall always be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him or her. An exception to this is the rule on variance under Rule 120, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states:
RULE 120
Judgment
Section 4. Judgment in Case of Variance Between Allegation and Proof. — When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged
 is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is necessarily
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense included in the crime of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore,
proved. petitioner may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure simply means that if there is a variance between The imposable penalty for other deceits under paragraph 1 of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code has been
the offense charged and the offense proved, an accused may be convicted of the offense proved if it is included retained by Republic Act No. 10951. Accordingly, petitioner should suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and pay a
in the offense charged. An accused may also be convicted of the offense charged if it is necessarily included in fine, which should neither be less than nor more than twice the amount of the damage caused. The amount of
the offense proved. damage caused against private complainant in this case is P200,000.00.

In Sales v. Court of Appeals, the accused was charged with estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(d) of As a final note, the defense that private complainant eventually consented to the investment in PMIAM deserves
the Revised Penal Code. She was convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. In scant consideration. Records show that private complainant asked petitioner for a refund of her initial investment
holding that there was no violation of the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against when she discovered that her investment was placed in PMIAM. The ratification allegedly given by private
her, this Court held that the elements of the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code complainant hardly qualifies as genuine consent. When private complainant discovered the transaction, her
also constitute one (1) of the elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal insurance policies had already lapsed. She was trapped in a difficult situation where she could potentially lose
Code: another investment. Thus, she had no other choice but to agree to the placement. The lack of genuine consent is
In the information filed against her, the petitioner with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph further evidenced by private complainant's repeated requests for a refund of her initial investment even after she
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code which reads: received the first tranche of interest income.
....
"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals January 30, 2013 Decision and the June 14, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R.
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
CR No. 34274 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Maria C. Osorio is GUILTY BEYOND
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
REASONABLE DOUBT of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no
within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said
check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of two (2) months and (1)
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, approved day to four (4) months of arresto mayor in its medium period, and to pay a fine of P200,000.00.
June 17, 1967.)" SO ORDERED.
Under the aforequoted provision, the elements of estafa as defined therein are as follows: (1)
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; ——o0o——
(2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof . . . Basically,
the two essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or injury must be established by sufficient and
competent evidence in order that the crime of estafa may be established.
On the other hand, Article 318 of the same Code partly provides that:
"Other deceits. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the
damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who
shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of
this chapter."
....
Clearly, the principal elements of deceit and damage are likewise present in the preceding article cited.
The petitioner's conviction under the latter provision instead of that with which she was charged was
merely an application of the rule on variance between allegation and proof defined under Rule 120,
Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that:
"Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between
the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the
evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the
offense charged included in that which is proved."
Simply put, an accused may be convicted of an offense proved provided it is included in the charge or of
an offense charged which is included in that which is proved. In the case at bar, the petitioner was
convicted of the crime falling under "Other deceits" which is necessarily included in the crime of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) considering that the elements of deceit and damage also constitute the
former. Hence, the petitioner's right to be properly informed of the accusation against her was never
violated. (Citation omitted)
 G.R. No. 175602. January 18, 2012.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ,
accused-appellants.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; The only time when a reviewing court was not bound by the trial court’s
assessment of credibility arises upon a showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that was overlooked
and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case.—Considering that the CA thereby affirmed the trial court’s
findings of fact, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight, as well as its
conclusions, the Court accords high respect, if not conclusive effect, to the CA’s findings. The justification for this is that
trial court was in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses by virtue of its firsthand observation of the
demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses under grilling examination. The only time when a reviewing court was
not bound by the trial court’s assessment of credibility arises upon a showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and
influence that was overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case. No such fact or circumstance
has been brought to the Court’s attention. It is not trite to remind that a truth-telling witness is not always expected to
give an error-free testimony because of the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory; and that inaccuracies
noted in testimony may even suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed. To properly
appreciate the worth of testimony, therefore, the courts do not resort to the individual words or phrases alone but seek
out the whole impression or effect of what has been said and done.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Unlawful Aggression; Question of Fact; It is fundamental that the question as to who
between the accused and the victim was the unlawful aggressor is a question of fact addressed to the trial court for
determination based on the evidence on record.—It is fundamental that the question as to who between the accused
and the victim was the unlawful aggressor is a question of fact addressed to the trial court for determination based on
the evidence on record. The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts and
circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai alai betting station of
Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily attending to bettors inside the booth; that
because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out of the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of
them threatened Moises: Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired
several shots at Moises, causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the fallen Moises; that
Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains;
that somebody shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and that
Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims were apparently fired from short distances.
Same; Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony.—Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement to
commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. Herein, both lower
courts deduced the conspiracy between the accused from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings.
We are satisfied that their deduction was warranted. Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal
responsibility for the fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have
acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in
concert was manifest not only from their going together to the betting station on board a single motorcycle, but also from
their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and immediately followed by Edwin’s
shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other. It was also significant that they fled together on board the same
motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common purpose. To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in
every detail of the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the execution
of the criminal acts. Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred
and proved through their acts that were indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to
the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might make.—Treachery is the employment of
means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially
insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It
encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime
committed. Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied
and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the State to specifically aver the
factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the
crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Pleadings and Practice; The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information.—The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information,
or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. In People v. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647 (2005), the Court
elaborated: For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged
and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.
Same; Evidence; A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to
prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail.—A practical
consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration
against the accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in
the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. In that
regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Criminal Law; Penalties; Pursuant to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal.—Pursuant to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There
being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its medium period (i.e., 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence is taken from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the
Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum for each count of homicide.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the crime
charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the ever-present obligation of the State to duly inform
the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.
 The accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder on January 20, 2005 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. They were penalized with reclusion perpetua for each count, and
ordered to pay to the heirs of each victim P93,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that
each accused pay to the heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of suit.
The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007, however, accused Edwin Valdez filed
a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal
closed and terminated. Hence, the Court hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez.
Antecedents
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the RTC with three counts of
murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson, alleging:
Criminal Case No. 00-90718
“That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one FERDINAND
SAYSON y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his head, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said FERDINAND SAYSON y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Criminal Case No. 00-90719
“That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one MOISES SAYSON,
JR. y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him several times with a gun, hitting him on his face and
chest, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause
of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said MOISES SAYSON, JR. y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Criminal Case No. 00-90720
“That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one JOSELITO
SAYSON y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his back, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said JOSELITO SAYSON y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the State’s evidence of guilt as follows:
“On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was at the
canteen (which also includes a jai alai betting station) located at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay,
Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband, Wilfredo
Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrella’s son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former
policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the betting station.
At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella’s other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand
Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrella’s family and other visitors ate
and enjoyed themselves at the party (pp. 3-5, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 3-6, TSN, February 6, 2001;
pp. 3-4, TSN, July 31, 2001).
At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and
Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai
alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then attending to customers who were
buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella saw
Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo.
Moises did not heed his mother’s warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force
Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants threaten Moises with
the words “Gusto mo unahin na kita?” Moises replied “huwag.” Successive shots were thereafter heard.
Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand
immediately approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left
temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while
running. Joselito fell on a burger machine (pp. 7-11, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 6-10, TSN, February
6, 2001; pp. 5-10, TSN, July 31, 2001; pp. 2-6, September 5, 2001).
After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime (p. 10,
TSN, February 6, 2001).”
In turn, the appellant’s brief filed by the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) rendered the version of the accused,
to wit:
“xxx [A]t about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, Heidi dela Cruz (a barbecue vendor) and Noel Valad-on
(a tricycle driver) saw accused Edwin Valdez alight from a bus. The latter bought P100.00 worth of
barbecue from Heidi then proceeded towards home. He was walking along Corregidor Street when Heidi
saw Jun Sayson (Moises), then holding a gun, block his (Edwin’s) way. Jun Sayson poked a gun at
accused Edwin, shouting, ‘Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita’. The latter raised both his hands and said ‘Wag
kuya Jun, maawa ka.’
Accused Eduardo Valdez (a policeman), then carrying his 6-year old child, was walking when his
way was likewise blocked but this time, by the siblings Joselito and Ferdinand as well as their stepfather.
Joselito twisted one of his (Eduardo’s) hands at his back while his (Joselito’s) stepfather held the other.
Ferdinand fired a gun but accused Eduardo was able to evade. Joselito, who was positioned behind
Eduardo, was hit. He slumped and bled. He asked Heidi to inform his family that he was hit. Heidi ran
away. She saw Jun (Moises) and accused Edwin grappling. Thereafter, she heard gunshots.
Accused Eduardo ducked during the firing. He pretended to be dead. Ferdinand stopped firing.
Accused Eduardo’s son approached him crying. Accused thereafter, brought his son home, took his
service firearm and on his way back to the scene of the incident when he met General Jesus Almadin, his
commanding officer (CO). He reported the incident and sought for advice. He was told to take a rest and
go back on (sic) the following day. He accompanied his CO to Camp Crame. He surrendered his firearm
to Sr./Insp. Rodolfo Araza of the CIU. Accused Edwin Valdez likewise surrendered (TSN dated 05
February 2003; pp. 3-9; 12 March 2003, pp. 2-16; 11 August 2003, pp. 2-18, 1 September 2003, pp. 3-
10; 15 October 2003, pp. 2-8; 03 December 2003, pp. 2-4; 18 February 2004, pp. 2-9; 24 March 2004,
pp. 3-9; 10 April 2004, pp. 2-7; 07 June 2004, pp. 2-25).”
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced them to suffer reclusion
perpetua for each count of murder.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.
Issues
In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the State’s witnesses by pointing to inconsistencies and
weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges the finding of conspiracy between the accused; and contends that
the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Ruling
 The Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez guilty only of three counts of homicide due to the
failure of the informations to allege the facts and circumstances constituting treachery.
First of all, PO2 Valdez insists that the State’s witnesses (Susan Sayson, Marites Sayson and Estrella
Sayson) did not really see the events as they transpired; and that they wrongly identified the two accused as the
persons who had shot and killed the victims; and that the victims were themselves the aggressors.
The CA rejected PO2 Valdez’s insistence, holding thus:
“In their Brief, the accused-appellants desperately attempted to discredit the testimonies of witnesses
Susan, Marites and Estrella. They claimed that a perusal of Estrella’s testimony would cast doubt on her
statement that she actually witnessed the shooting incident. The accused-appellants claimed that Estrella
Sayson did not actually see who allegedly threatened her son Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin
na kita?” The accused-appellants also claimed that Estrella also failed to see who shot Moises. They
likewise assailed the testimonies of Susan and Marites as being incredible. They said that Susan testified
that she was in a state of shock after the incident and that she could not speak; yet she was still able to
give her statement on the same day the incident allegedly happened. The accused-appellants also said
that Marites testified that she was only about five (5) meters away from them (accused-appellants) when
they alighted from their motorcycle; but that, “interestingly,” she only learned from her husband Joselito
that the accused-appellants were looking for a certain Jonathan.
We are not persuaded. In her testimony, Estrella satisfactorily explained her purported failure to see
who between the accused-appellants threatened Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin kita?” and who
shot her son Moises, by pointing out that she was then facing Moises because she was preventing him
from approaching the accused-appellants, who were armed with short firearms. Estrella categorically
stated that she saw the accused-appellants alight from their motorcycle on March 1, 2000. She could not
have been mistaken about the identity of the accused-appellants for the simple reason that they are her
neighbors and that their (the accused-appellants’) father is her “cumpadre.” When the incident happened,
the accused-appellants were about eight (8) to ten (10) meters away from where she and her son Moises
were standing. She also saw with her own eyes how her son Moises fell after she heard successive
bursts of gunshots (approximately [9] shots) coming from where the accused-appellants were standing.”
Considering that the CA thereby affirmed the trial court’s findings of fact, its calibration of the testimonies of
witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight, as well as its conclusions, the Court accords high
respect, if not conclusive effect, to the CA’s findings. The justification for this is that trial court was in the best
position to assess the credibility of witnesses by virtue of its firsthand observation of the demeanor, conduct and
attitude of the witnesses under grilling examination. The only time when a reviewing court was not bound by the
trial court’s assessment of credibility arises upon a showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that
was overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case. No such fact or circumstance has been
brought to the Court’s attention.
It is not trite to remind that a truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony because
of the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory; and that inaccuracies noted in testimony may even
suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed. To properly appreciate the worth of
testimony, therefore, the courts do not resort to the individual words or phrases alone but seek out the whole
impression or effect of what has been said and done.
Secondly, PO2 Valdez argues that the three victims were themselves the aggressors who had attacked to
kill him and his brother. He narrated during the trial that he dodged the bullet fired from the gun of Ferdinand
(one of the victims), causing the bullet to fatally hit Joselito (another victim); that he played dead to avoid being
shot at again, and walked away with his terrified son only after the way was clear for them to leave; and that he
heard gunshots while Edwin and Jun (the third victim) grappled for control of a gun, and assumed that the
gunshots had hit and killed Jun and Ferdinand.
The argument of PO2 Valdez is bereft of factual merit.
It is fundamental that the question as to who between the accused and the victim was the unlawful
aggressor is a question of fact addressed to the trial court for determination based on the evidence on record.
The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts and circumstances
showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai alai betting station of Moises to
confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily attending to bettors inside the booth; that
because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out of the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one
of them threatened Moises: Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2
Valdez fired several shots at Moises, causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the
fallen Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the
head, spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito
twice in the back; and that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims were apparently
fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the State’s witnesses entirely jibed with the physical evidence. Specifically, the
medico-legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head; that two gunshot wounds
entered Joselito’s back and the right side of his neck; and that Moises suffered a gunshot wound in the head and
four gunshot wounds in the chest. Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the
presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the gunshot wounds were inflicted at close
range. Given that physical evidence was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all
witnesses put together, the congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical evidence
rendered the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct
because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. Herein, both lower courts deduced the conspiracy
between the accused from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We are satisfied that
their deduction was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting by Edwin
of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common
purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from
their going together to the betting station on board a single motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2
Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and immediately followed by Edwin’s shooting of
Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other. It was also significant that they fled together on board the same
motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither did he have to
know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts. Accordingly, the
existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their acts
that were indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of
three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against
persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant
circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the
appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular
instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances or
particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the
interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. In People
v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated:
“For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein
the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of
law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court
to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and
clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement
of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is
that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.” [emphasis
supplied]
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused “with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal
violence upon” the victims “by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]” on various parts of their
bodies “which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]” did not sufficiently set forth the facts and
circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely
averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the
crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make.
Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that
could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for
that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular
acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the
informations.
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the information the details
of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual
averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable
him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is
always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To
have the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for
which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, for, as
the Court fittingly said in United States v. Lim San:
“From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits.
xxx. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should
be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in
the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a
matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts
constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts
alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation
of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete
defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the
protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, “Did you perform
the acts alleged in the manner alleged?” not “Did you commit a crime named murder.” If he
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime
is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or
what it is named. xxx.” (emphasis supplied)
A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit the
introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The allegations
in the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the offense
charged in the information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged included in the offense proved. In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information,
constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
We now fix the penalty for each count of homicide.
Pursuant to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There
being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its medium period (i.e., 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is taken from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion
temporal. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding
PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to
suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises
Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense to be warranted.
(Ronquillo vs. People, 614 SCRA 704 [2010])
The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim which renders the latter unable and
unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack; This criterion applies whether the
attack is frontal or from behind. (People vs. Roxas, 628 SCRA 378 [2010])
——o0o——
 G.R. No. 183652. February 25, 2015.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO
STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES ALQUIZOLA, respondents.
Statutory Construction; Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.—
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of
proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose
is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed.
Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of
procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist or when
the purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
sheer technicalities.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring
error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment
of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.—As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of
acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides: Section 21. No person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Despite acquittal,
however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision.
Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also
exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby
rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner’s prayer is not
tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration; A motion for reconsideration is a condicio
sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari; Exceptions.—True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine
qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is
not absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Same; Same; Same; An acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the
prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.—For the writ of certiorari to
issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the prosecution’s right
to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly
demonstrate and establish that the respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very
power to dispense justice.
Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.—The term “grave abuse of discretion” has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only
be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. There is grave abuse of discretion
when the disputed act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice.
Judgments; Due Process; Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire
evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same.—Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a
tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same. It simply cannot
acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate one party’s cause and brush
the other aside. This rule becomes particularly significant in this case because the parties tendered contradicting
versions of the incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous.
Thus, the CA’s blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense
constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to due process.
Criminal Law; Rape; Elements of.—The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. Here, the accused intentionally made AAA
consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously
inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or
unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to
the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she
was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. The appellate court never
provided any reason why AAA’s testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any
credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a
judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes
the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense,
the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony itself.
The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the
rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she
narrated her harrowing experience.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Evidence; Words and Phrases; Burden of evidence is that logical necessity
which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one
when created against him.—Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element
of the crime and that it is the accused who is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases,
conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at
any particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created against
him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a
finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation. However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual
congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or
sexual relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the
complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by substantial evidence.
Same; Same; When it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence.—When it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and
binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court
is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. Matters of credibility are
addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and
evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him. The appellate courts are far
detached from the details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the
matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the
advantage of the trial court whose findings must be given due deference. Since the CA and the private respondents
failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court, these findings
deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding.
Criminal Law; Rape; No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim were not true.—No woman,
especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and be
subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim were not true. And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at
such a young age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a complainant who was a
woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victim’s moral
character in rape is immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was rendered
unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape
is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent. A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential elements.
Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by
entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for
rape. To repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman’s genitalia is not indispensable to a
conviction for rape.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Different people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.—Neither
does AAA’s mother’s act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove anything. It is a truism that “the workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react differently.” Different people
react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. At most, it merely indicates the frustration and dismay of a
mother upon learning that her daughter had been defiled after partying late the night before. It is a settled rule that when
there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by improper motive in making the accusation against the
accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and credence.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous
agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective.—The trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his participation in the
crime was uncertain, citing People v. Jabonero, 358 SCRA 73 (2001). It found that his participation was not in
furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape. The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that
Alquizola’s liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that
there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in
concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the
malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert. Proof of conspiracy need
not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or
after the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of
the offense.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; While it is true that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found
Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court, he waived the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then
called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-
appellant.—Alquizola’s participation in the crime is not at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House,
he provided a room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room,
intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts
of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was
conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act
of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found
Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court, he waived the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then
called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-
appellant.
Same; Same; Information; As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one (1) offense,
otherwise, the same is defective.—The Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it,
however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only
one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently
prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in
his defense. Noncompliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule
117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his
plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply
because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus,
they are deemed to have waived their right to question the same.
Criminal Law; Rape; Penalties; Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two (2) or more
persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—Anent the
appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and
the absence of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon them, for each count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower
to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be
within the range of prisión mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which
shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance.
Same; Same; Same; Children in Conflict With the Law; Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under
Section 51, Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21)
years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child.—The Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape committed. However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate
disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344, which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one
(21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child, and provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows: Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities.—A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may
be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June
6, 2008 in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211,
and acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of
rape for the prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola were charged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda,
Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA, to wit:
That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alson’s Palace, Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and
once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house,
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and once inside
said lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having
carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed
her against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged.
Following pretrial, trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however, remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony. Afterwards, they
had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her
mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an election
campaign. She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she
would be attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and
Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim
invited them to go to Alson’s Palace, which was merely a walking distance away from Gemeno’s house. Outside
the Alson’s Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while,
they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw Montesco with Harold
Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas
suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks — two (2) bottles of Emperador
Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed
around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA
refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems
with each other. When it was AAA’s turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her
first shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador
Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started kissing her head
and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her
face with the cap.
But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still
forced her to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her drink. She even heard Lim say,
“Hubuga na, hubuga na,” (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise heard someone say, “You
drink it, you drink it.” She leaned on Oporto’s lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her
the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she
drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she was asleep
again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She
recognized that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up
again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different
parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in
her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her.
At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told
him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body felt heavy and
exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. The upper half of her body was
on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she
hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was already
furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala
Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March 26, 2004, and
found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The
vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense witnesses, in the evening
of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at Gemeno’s house. Gemeno then invited
Oporto to attend the graduation party hosted by Montesco at Alson’s Palace, owned by the latter’s family. When
they reached the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie
Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alson’s Palace but could not find AAA and
Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim,
and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda,
Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia,
Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but
the latter did not listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested on
Oporto’s lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoy’s crotch,
she remarked, “What was that, penis?” Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back.
Oporto did the same and AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the Alquizola Lodging House
drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested
Alquizola to accompany her to Alson’s Palace to see her friends there.
They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw AAA lying on Oporto’s lap. Fiel told AAA to go home
because her mother might get angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, “I just
stay here.” Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house. After thirty minutes, they went to Alson’s
Palace again, and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck.
Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead instructed them to take her
to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle
to the lodging house. When they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, “Kuya, I want to sleep here for
the meantime.” Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There were
two beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at
Carampatana. The latter approached her and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised
her hands to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of the
bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her
underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed
himself in between AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts and went
back to Alson’s Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then
entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said, “Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem.”
Alquizola thus started kissing AAA’s breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and
performed fellatio on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto went outside
and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he
went back to Alson’s Palace to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging
house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went home. Alquizola had gone
outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and
Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA
the amount of P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and the
court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years also of prisión mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE in the
commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages and another
sum of P30,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy and
Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and
e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of
P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola shall
be credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided they comply with the requirements of
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then
up to the present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since
then up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004
was ordered released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and
subsequently posted cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this
court, thus resulted to an order of even date for his release from the custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the prosecution to
prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On June 6, 2008, the
appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling and, consequently, acquitted
private respondents. The decretal portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are
instead ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the sexual
congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She
never showed any physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers.
The appellate court further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration
on AAA’s genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA
also stressed that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to her
daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just had premarital sex rather
than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari9 under Rule 65,
questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents’ conviction and ardently contending that the
same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated November 7, 2008 to
assail the petition:
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE
PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED.
IV.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It assigns the following
errors:
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE
CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN
RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
 At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly
conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long
as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be
liberally construed. Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. The
relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when
compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible,
be decided on their merits and not on sheer technicalities.
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in
favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy be violated. Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with respect to the
civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave
abuse of discretion, granting petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in double
jeopardy.
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in People v. Santiago:
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution
of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case
is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may
be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However,
the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein
it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person
aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such
special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional
grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State through the OSG. True, in
criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the
Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the authority to represent the State in appeals of
criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG.
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private counsel, primarily
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved
party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has
an immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of the violation. Further,
as held in Dela Rosa v. CA, where the Court sustained the private offended party’s right in a criminal case to file
a special civil action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor
General’s intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper since it was
brought in her own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s
cause in its Comment, thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that AAA can file the
special civil action for certiorari without violating their right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for
petitioner’s failure to previously file a motion for reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its
purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by
reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits
well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Here, petitioner’s case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the private respondents. There is also an
urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any further delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the
petitioner, but likewise that of the Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity
for lack of due process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of
discretion when it is shown that the prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted
was a sham. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent court
blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice.
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial discretion, totally
disregarded her testimony as well as the trial court’s findings of fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the
private respondents’ narration of facts.
The term “grave abuse of discretion” has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. There is
grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus
effecting an injustice.
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the respondent
appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents.
 mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually
utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of the facts of the case was be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony itself. The trial court correctly ruled
meticulously culled from the evidence of both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a
lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto, Carampatana, and public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her
Alquizola, the accused-appellants in the case before it. The appellate court merely echoed the private harrowing experience.
respondents’ testimonies, particularly those as to the specific events that transpired during the crucial period —
from the dinner at Gemeno’s house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to resist, but
presented the private respondents’ account and allegations as though these were the established facts of the because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found AAA’s testimony simple and
case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal. candid, indicating that she was telling the truth. The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy
and humiliating questions were simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed testimony.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented, Thus:
regardless of the party who offered the same.32 It simply cannot acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate one party’s cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes xxxx
particularly significant in this case because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the incident. The victim Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did you regain your
is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CA’s blatant consciousness?
disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle of Emperador
Brandy.
abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to due process.
xxxx
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of the bottle of
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made its own flimsy
Emperador Brandy?
findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal. The fact that she A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never fought against the private Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?
respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual. A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault. Article 266-A of the A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides: Q: When did you regain your consciousness?
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.—Rape is committed — A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you?
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; A: Yes, sir.
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; Q: Who?
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
the circumstances mentioned above be present; A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall xxxx
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any Q: After that, what happened, if any?
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the A: Yes, sir.
victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?
or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. Here, the accused intentionally made A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the flash of light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash of light.
AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already
A: Yes, sir.
obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived
Q: Where?
of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.
that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding
xxxx
her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?
crime. The appellate court never provided any reason why AAA’s testimony should deserve scant or no weight A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is Q: So, you fell asleep again?
and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been A: Yes, sir.
established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to xxxx
 Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again? On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It noted that their
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir. account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible. Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see? belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never mentioned
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir. about the same at the pretrial stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was their turn to take the
Q: He was on top of you? witness stand, catching the court by surprise. More importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in
A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
a rape case claims that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, as in this
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?
case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?
evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensual. Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to
A: I was saying don’t because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words? establish each and every element of the crime and that it is the accused who is responsible for its commission.
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused me. This is because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. Burden of evidence is that
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is crying. logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his
xxxx favor or to overthrow one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor. of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.
COURT: Continue. However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes,
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else was there mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship between the offender and his
inside that room? supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir. to prove his defense by substantial evidence.
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?
A: He was at my feet while looking at us. Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but unfortunately failed to
Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?
discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that upon reaching the room at the lodging house,
A: Dressed up, sir.
AAA lay down on the bed and looked at him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and
Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?
brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAA’s lower garments and then went to kiss AAA. Carampatana
A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.
Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?
then placed himself in between AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her. 46 On the other hand, Oporto himself
A: I could not remember, sir. testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. While Carampatana was removing AAA’s shirt and
xxxx brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and AAA
Q: After that, what happened? even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When Carampatana left after having
A: I went asleep again, sir. sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis so
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up? that AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. Afterwards,
A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund Carampatana, sir. Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and went back to
Q: On top of you? the room and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after some time, he woke up to the
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir. sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and last time.47 Despite said
Q: What was your reaction? shameless admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical resistance
A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don’t. on AAA’s part amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA had sexual intercourse with
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund Carampatana? them out of her own volition, and not simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore
A: Only the three of them, sir.
could not have given a valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.
Q: Including Moises Alquizola?
A: Yes, sir.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and exaggerated when testifying,
Q: What was he doing?
even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness. To
A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.
Q: Where in particular? be believed, the testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in
A: In my face, sir. itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the attending
Q: Then after that, what happened? circumstances.
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that you feel (sic) When it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and
something in your private part when you saw Raymund Carampatana? binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir. reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again? testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.
A: Yes, sir. Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)? to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared
A: I woke up at about 7:00 o’clock a.m. in the next (sic) day, sir. before him. The appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial and have to rely solely
on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the
Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose findings must be
given due deference. Since the CA and the private respondents failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness,
or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed
conclusive and binding.
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal laceration on
AAA’s private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected to be present when the alleged
sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr.
Acusta, when sex is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not cause any
laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent considering the presence of old
hymenal laceration that could have resulted from her previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed
to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be
noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just graduated from high
school on that same day. In a similar case, the Court held:
x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse with two men — or
three, according to Antonio Gallardo — in the presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute
or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication that Farmacita, a
14-year-old, first year high school student, can be so characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in
court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest
any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission of the crime charged.
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim were not true. And even if she were
indeed highly promiscuous at such a young age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually
committed. Even a complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a
prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victim’s moral character in rape is immaterial where, as in this case, it is
shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the
private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman
against her consent. A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential elements. Even if the hymen of the victim
was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the
vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat,
rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman’s genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for
rape.
Neither does AAA’s mother’s act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove anything. It is a truism that
“the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react
differently.” Different people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. At most, it merely
indicates the frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that her daughter had been defiled after partying
late the night before. It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by
improper motive in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and
credence. So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to immediately tell her parents
about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did she ever have to shout rape? She was not caught in
the act of making love with any of the private respondents, nor was she shown to have been in a relationship with
any of them of which her family disapproved. She never became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA
cried rape to save her reputation, why would she have to drag the private respondents into the case and identify
them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating the contrary, she brought the charge against the private
respondents simply because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting
the case, even after the CA had already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that she merely
seeks justice for her honor that has been debased. Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these telling pieces of
evidence. Its findings are against the logic and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in support of her
complaint, contrary to common human experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence
on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his participation in
the crime was uncertain, citing People v. Jabonero. It found that his participation was not in furtherance of the
plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape. The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola’s
liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that
there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have
acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a
finding that the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert. Proof
of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of
the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them
with respect to the commission of the offense.
In Jabonero, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio’s and Dominador’s participation
in the crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during the mauling
and whether they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated that they
did not, Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary. In this case, the rule
is not applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven. Their exact
participation in the crime is uncertain. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre, the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there was conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on the testimony
of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her private parts and that
Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private parts, accused
[D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three
of them conspired and mutually helped one another in raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and spontaneous participation
and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to prevent
the commission of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a
principal in the commission of the crime.
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Jabonero, Alquizola’s participation in the crime is not at all uncertain.
As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could be accomplished with
ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana
sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to
kissing AAA’s lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among Carampatana,
Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them,
Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as
mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court, he waived the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called
upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-
appellant.
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it, however, actually
charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one
offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another
sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages of P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by
might confuse him in his defense. Noncompliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint way of an example and to deter others from committing the same bestial acts.
or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a
motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. The accused herein, WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 6,
however, cannot avail of this defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity 2008 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court
of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to question the hereby renders judgment:
same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts specifying the a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of. There is likewise counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case;
no violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against them because the Information, in b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape,
fact, stated that they “took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA” on March 25, 2004. Further, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and
allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled one (1) day of prisión mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
several times. Here, according to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned maximum, in each case; and
himself in between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of
intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case.
but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the amounts of
and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each
then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant of the four (4) counts of rape. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
among the three of them during the commission of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
held liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of judgment.
sexual organ into AAA’s mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor because SO ORDERED.
the same was not included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape
through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in. Notes.—The rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been
deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is punishable discretion under exceptional circumstances. (Villareal vs. Aliga, 713 SCRA 52 [2014])
by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the If it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial court shall
dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be
lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them,84 for each count. With regard to Oporto,
placed in double jeopardy. (Ocampo vs. Abando, 715 SCRA 673 [2014])
appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon
him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be ——o0o——
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of prisión mayor (the
penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the range
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance. With that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape committed. However, Oporto shall be
entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344, which extends even to one who has
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child,
and provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities.—A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.

Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision should be taken into
consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond
twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment envisioned by law.
 G.R. No. 206632. February 14, 2018
EDEN ETINO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; When it appears that the assailed
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, and the findings of the lower courts are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based, the Supreme Court (SC) may probe questions of fact in a Rule 45
proceeding.—At the outset, we clarify that questions of fact, as a rule, cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition, where
the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law that might have been committed by the lower
courts. Nevertheless, when it appears that the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, and the
findings of the lower courts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based, as in this
case, the Court may probe questions of fact in a Rule 45 proceeding.
Criminal Law; Homicide; Physical Injuries; Parricide; Murder; In order to determine whether the crime committed
is attempted or frustrated parricide, murder or homicide, or only lesiones (physical injuries), the crucial points to consider
are: a) whether the injury sustained by the victim was fatal, and b) whether there was intent to kill on the part of the
accused.—In order to determine whether the crime committed is attempted or frustrated parricide, murder or homicide,
or only lesiones (physical injuries), the crucial points to consider are: a) whether the injury sustained by the victim was
fatal, and b) whether there was intent to kill on the part of the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is settled that “where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the
wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful,” and such doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused.—It is settled that “where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would
be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful,” and such doubt should be resolved in
favor of the accused. In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the victim would
have died from his wound without timely medical assistance, as his Medical Certificate alone, absent the testimony of
the physician who diagnosed and treated him, or any physician for that matter, is insufficient proof of the nature
and extent of his injury. This is especially true, given that said Medical Certificate merely stated the victim’s period of
confinement at the hospital, the location of the gunshot wounds, the treatments he received, and his period of healing.
Without such proof, the character of the gunshot wounds that the victim sustained enters the realm of doubt, which the
Court must necessarily resolve in favor of petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Intent to Kill; The assailant’s intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of
physical injuries from the crime of homicide.—“The assailant’s intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the
crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide. The crime can only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven.” The
intent to kill must be proven “in a clear and evident manner [so as] to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal
intent of the aggressor.” In Rivera v. People, 480 SCRA 188 (2006), the Court ruled that “[i]ntent to kill is a specific intent
which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence,” which may consist of: [a)] the means used by
the malefactors; [b)] the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; [c)] the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; [d)] the circumstances under which the
crime was committed; and, [e)] the motives of the accused. Moreover, the Court held in Rivera that intent to kill is only
presumed if the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the intent to kill is lacking, but wounds are shown to have been inflicted upon
the victim, the crime is not frustrated or attempted homicide but physical injuries only.—When the intent to kill is lacking,
but wounds are shown to have been inflicted upon the victim, as in this case, the crime is not frustrated or attempted
homicide but physical injuries only. Since the victim’s period of incapacity and healing of his injuries was more than
30 days — he was confined at the hospital from November 5 to 25, 2001, or for 20 days, and his period of healing was
“two (2) to four (4) weeks barring complications” — the crime committed is serious physical injuries under Article 263,
par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Alibi; Denials; Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the
prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused.—Given these circumstances, we find
petitioner’s identification as the victim’s assailant to be positive and conclusive. As a result, the defenses of denial
and alibi raised by petitioner must necessarily fail. After all, “[a]libi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be
brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. And it is only
axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Complaints; It is settled that the failure to file a complaint to the proper
authorities would not impair the credibility of the complainant if such delay was satisfactorily explained.—We likewise
reject petitioner’s claim that the delay in the filing of the complaint against him generates doubt as to his guilt. It is settled
that the failure to file a complaint to the proper authorities would not impair the credibility of the complainant if such delay
was satisfactorily explained. In this case, the victim testified that he filed the case after noticing that petitioner was still
after him.
Same; Same; Same; The victim’s initial reluctance to file the complaint is not uncommon, considering “the natural
reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case.”—The victim’s initial reluctance to file the complaint is not
uncommon, considering “the natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case.” Fear of reprisal, too, is
deemed as a valid excuse for the temporary silence of a prosecution witness (or in this case, the victim) and has been
judicially declared to not have any effect on his credibility. Finally, we find no sufficient evidence on record to support
petitioner’s claim that the victim had ill motives to falsely institute the complaint and testify against him. Even
assuming arguendo that the victim held a grudge against petitioner for having testified against him in another case, the
existence of such grudge would not automatically render his testimony in this case false and unreliable. “In the absence
of any showing that a witness was actuated by malice or other improper motives, his positive and categorical
declarations on the witness stand under a solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.”
Criminal Law; Serious Physical Injuries; Penalties; Under Article 263, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
“[a]ny person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall
suffer” “[t]he penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period [which ranges
from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months], if the physical injuries inflicted shall have
caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty (30) days.”—Under Article 263, par. 4
of the Revised Penal Code, “[a]ny person who shall wound, beat or assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of
serious physical injuries and shall suffer” “[t]he penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión
correccional in its minimum period [which ranges from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months], if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for
more than thirty days.”
Same; Moral Damages; Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be awarded in criminal
cases resulting in physical injuries.—Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be awarded in
criminal cases resulting in physical injuries, as in this case. Although the victim did not testily on the moral damages that
he suffered, his Medical Certificate constitutes sufficient basis to award moral damages, since “ordinary human
experience and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on [him] would naturally cause physical suffering,
fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injury.” Thus, we affirm the CA’s award of moral damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 in the victim’s favor.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
We resolve this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August
29, 2012 Decision and the March 11, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 00896.
The CA affirmed with modification the January 14, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29,
Iloilo City, which found petitioner Eden Etino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide,
in that the CA ordered petitioner to pay the victim P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as temperate
damages.
The Antecedent Facts
 Petitioner was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an Information dated June 19, 2003 which
reads:
That on or about the 5th day of November 2001, in the Municipality of Maasin, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, armed with an
unlicensed firearm of unknown caliber, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot JESSIEREL LEYBLE with said
unlicensed firearm he was then provided at the time, hitting and inflicting upon the victim gunshot wounds
on the different parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime
of homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause or
causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely medical attendance rendered to the
said Jessierel Leyble which prevented his death.
In its January 14, 2008 Decision, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
frustrated homicide. It ruled that petitioner was positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime charged
against him, especially so, when the complainant, Leyble, was alive to tell what actually happened.
Accordingly, the RTC sentenced petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prisión correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor,
as maximum. Notably, it did not award any damages in favor of Leyble, as it found that the prosecution had
failed to discharge its burden of presenting evidence on the civil aspect of the case.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

On appellate review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s Decision in that, it ordered petitioner to
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
pay Leyble the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as temperate damages.
The Evidence for the Prosecution
The CA ruled that “the trial court did not err in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Evaluation of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses amply [showed] that Jessierel
The prosecution’s evidence consists mainly of the testimonies of complainant Jessierel Leyble (Leyble),
Leyble succinctly but clearly narrated how he was shot and he also categorically identified [petitioner] as his
Isidro Maldecir (Maldecir), and Nida Villarete Sonza (Sonza), the Administrative and Medical Officer of the West
assailant.”
Visayas State University Medical Center (WVSUMC).

In addition, the CA held that the mere delay in the filing of the complaint did not necessarily undermine the
During the trial, Leyble testified that, “at about 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of November 5, 2001, while he
credibility of witnesses; and in this case, the fear of reprisal explained why it took some time for Leyble to file the
and his companions[,] Isidro Maldecir and Richard Magno[,] were walking on their way home to Brgy. [sic] Pispis,
complaint and to finally reveal the identity of his assailant.
Maasin, Iloilo, he was shot with a 12 gauge shotgun by the [petitioner,] Eden Etino[,] hitting the back portion of
his right shoulder and other parts of his body.”
The CA also rejected petitioner’s claim that Leyble filed the case against him because he testified against
the latter in the COMELEC gun ban case. It explained that “[e]ven assuming that there was a grudge between
Leyble’s testimony was corroborated by Maldecir who categorically stated that Leyble was shot by petitioner
Leyble and [petitioner], that [did] not automatically render the testimony of Leyble unbelievable. Moreover,
from behind, and was thereafter brought to the Don Benito Lopez Memorial Hospital (now known as the
considering that Leyble had positively identified [petitioner], whom he [knew] from childhood, as his assailant,
WVSUMC) for treatment.
motive [was] no longer essential or relevant.”
To prove the injuries suffered by Leyble, the prosecution presented Sonza “in her capacity as [the officer]-in-
Finally, the CA held that Leyble was entitled to moral damages, as it was clear from his testimony that he
charge of the security of all the medical records of the patients [in the WVSUMC] for the reason that Dr. Rodney
sustained gunshot wounds on his shoulder; and to temperate damages for the medical treatment he received but
Jun Garcia, then Chief Resident, Surgery Department [WVSUMC], who treated [Leyble was] unable to testify as
for which no documentary evidence was presented to prove the actual costs thereof.
he is now based in General Santos City.”

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated March 11, 2013.
In compliance with the Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by the RTC on February 22, 2005, Sonza brought
As a consequence, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court, assailing the
the medical records of Leyble to court which included: a) Medical Certificate dated December 20, 2001, b)
CA’s August 29, 2012 Decision and the March 11, 2013 Resolution.
Trauma Sheet dated November 5, 2001, c) Admission and [Discharge] Record, and d) Operative Records dated
November 16, 2001, and certified the same to be true and faithful reproductions of the original documents.
The Issues
The Evidence for the Defense
Petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
First, whether the CA erred in holding that his guilt for the charged crime of frustrated homicide was
The defense presented the testimonies of Bautista Etino, Wenifred Besares, Joeseryl Masiado and of
proven beyond reasonable doubt, since the physician who examined the victim was not presented in
petitioner himself to prove his alibi.
court;
The witnesses testified that, “at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 5, 2001, [petitioner] was with Brgy. Second, whether the CA erred when it found the testimonies of petitioner and his witnesses to be
[sic] Captain Manuel Bornejan, Wenifredo Besares and [Bautista Etino at] the house of the latter which was incredible and unbelievable; and
situated about one kilometer away from where they heard shots that afternoon.” They also alleged that the filing Third, whether the CA erred when it disregarded petitioner’s defenses, i.e., the lapse of unreasonable
of the criminal complaint was precipitated by a pending COMELEC gun ban case before the RTC filed against time for Leyble to file the complaint against him, the failure of Leyble to positively identify him as the
Leyble, wherein petitioner was the witness. assailant, and Leyble’s motive in filing the case against him.

The Regional Trial Court’s Ruling The Court’s Ruling


At the outset, we clarify that questions of fact, as a rule, cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition, where
the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law that might have been committed by the
lower courts. Nevertheless, when it appears that the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts,
and the findings of the lower courts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based,30 as in this case, the Court may probe questions of fact in a Rule 45 proceeding.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages of a felony as follows:
ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.—Consummated felonies, as well as
those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. (Emphasis supplied)
In Palaganas v. People, the Court outlined the distinctions between a frustrated and an attempted felony:
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution.
2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason
for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own
spontaneous desistance.
In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several cases that when the accused intended
to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained
fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is
frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying
circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if the wound/s
sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only
attempted murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused
and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious,
less serious or slight physical injury. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in order to determine whether the crime committed is attempted or frustrated parricide, murder or
homicide, or only lesiones (physical injuries), the crucial points to consider are: a) whether the injury sustained
by the victim was fatal, and b) whether there was intent to kill on the part of the accused.
No proof of the extent of injury sustained by the victim
It is settled that “where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not
medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful,” and such doubt should be resolved in favor
of the accused.
In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the victim would have died
from his wound without timely medical assistance, as his Medical Certificate alone, absent the testimony of the
physician who diagnosed and treated him, or any physician for that matter, is insufficient proof of the
nature and extent of his injury. This is especially true, given that said Medical Certificate merely stated the
victim’s period of confinement at the hospital, the location of the gunshot wounds, the treatments he received,
and his period of healing.
Without such proof, the character of the gunshot wounds that the victim sustained enters the realm of doubt,
which the Court must necessarily resolve in favor of petitioner.
The intent to kill was not sufficiently established
“The assailant’s intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the
crime of homicide. The crime can only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven.” The intent to kill must be proven
“in a clear and evident manner [so as] to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the
aggressor.”
In Rivera v. People,4 the Court ruled that “[i]ntent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove
by direct or circumstantial evidence,” which may consist of:
[a)] the means used by the malefactors;
[b)] the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
[c)] the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim;
[d)] the circumstances under which the crime was committed; and,
[e)] the motives of the accused.
Moreover, the Court held in Rivera that intent to kill is only presumed if the victim dies as a result of a
deliberate act of the malefactors.
‘Although it was sufficiently shown that petitioner fired a 12 gauge shotgun at the victim, there was simply no
other evidence on record that tended to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to kill the victim.
On the contrary, none of the prosecution’s witnesses testified that petitioner had indeed aimed and fired the
shotgun to kill the victim.
It is to be noted, likewise, that petitioner only fired a single shot at close range, but did not hit any vital part of
the victim’s body — the victim’s wounds, based on his Medical Certificate, were located at the right deltoid
(through and through) and the left shoulder — and he immediately fled the scene right after the shooting. These
acts certainly do not suggest that petitioner had intended to kill the victim; for if he did, he could have fired
multiple shots to ensure the latter’s demise.
Besides, by the victim’s own narration of events, it appears that he did not sustain any fatal injury as a result
of the shooting considering that he and his companions even went in pursuit of petitioner after the incident, viz.:
[ASST. PROV. PROS. GUALBERTO BALLA]:
Q: After Eden Etino shot you, what happened afterwards?
A: I shouted to my companion to help me because I have injuries.
Q: Did they help you at that particular instance?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about Eden Etino, what did he do Mr. Witness?
A: When we ran to the hilly portion, they were no longer there. (Emphasis supplied)
Under these circumstances, we cannot reasonably conclude that petitioner’s use of a firearm was sufficient
proof that he had intended to kill the victim. After all, it is settled that “[i]ntent to kill cannot be automatically drawn
from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life.” Rather, “[a]nimus interficendi must be
established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of
intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond
reasonable doubt.”
 This is not to say that petitioner is without any criminal liability. When the intent to kill is lacking, but wounds
are shown to have been inflicted upon the victim, as in this case, the crime is not frustrated or attempted
homicide but physical injuries only. Since the victim’s period of incapacity and healing of his injuries was more
than 30 days — he was confined at the hospital from November 5 to 25, 2001, or for 20 days, and his period of
healing was “two (2) to four (4) weeks barring complications” — the crime committed is serious physical
injuries under Article 263, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner’s Defenses
We reject petitioner’s contention that the prosecution failed to identify him as the victim’s assailant, given
that he “was not identified and never mentioned [in the police blotter] as the one who shot the victim” even
though it was the victim himself who personally reported the incident to the authorities.
Based on the Police Blotter dated January 18, 2002, the victim had identified petitioner and his companions
as his assailants during the November 5, 2001 shooting incident, viz.:
9:20 AM — (Shooting Incident) Jessirel Leyble y Subade, 25 years old, single, and a resident of Brgy[.]
Pispis, Maasin, Iloilo reported personally to this Office alleging that last November 5, 2001 at around 4:30
p.m. while he was on their [sic] way home at Brgy[.] Pispis, this Municipality[,] was waylaid and shot with
a firearms [sic] by the group of Eden Etino, Bautista Etino, Joeserel Masiado, Alfredo Jabadan,
Wiliam Besarcs and Wenefredo Besares, all resident [sic] of the same place. As a result, he sustained
gunshot wounds on the back portion of his body and was confined at West Visayas State University
Hospital, Jaro, Iloilo City.
In addition, the prosecution’s witnesses never wavered in their positive identification of petitioner as the
victim’s assailant. The pertinent portion of the victim’s testimony is quoted below:
[ASST. PROV. PROS. GUALBERTO BALLA]:
Q: Do you know the accused Eden Etino?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If he is inside the courtroom[,] can you point to him?
A: There.
Court Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a person inside the courtroom who, when asked[,] answered to the name Eden
Etino.
PROS. BALLA:
Q: For how long have you known the accused in this case?
A: Since childhood.
xxxx
Q: Who shot you Mr. Witness?
A: Eden Etino[.] (Emphasis supplied)
We also consider the following pieces of evidence which amply support petitioner’s positive identification as
the assailant in this case: first, the manner of attack was done at close range; and the victim was able to turn
around right after the shot was fired; second, the shooting incident happened in broad daylight (at around 4:30
in the afternoon) in an open field, so the assailant could clearly be seen; and third, the victim could readily
identify petitioner as his assailant because they had known each other since childhood.
Given these circumstances, we find petitioner’s identification as the victim’s assailant to be positive and
conclusive. As a result, the defenses of denial and alibi raised by petitioner must necessarily fail. After all,
“[a]libi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently
and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. And it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails
over negative testimony.”
We likewise reject petitioner’s claim that the delay in the filing of the complaint against him generates doubt
as to his guilt. It is settled that the failure to file a complaint to the proper authorities would not impair the
credibility of the complainant if such delay was satisfactorily explained. In this case, the victim testified that he
filed the case after noticing that petitioner was still after him:
[ATTY. EDGAR SUMIDO]
Q: This incident happened on November 5, 2001 and it was only filed March 6, 2003?
A: At first, I did not intend to file a case against him because I thought they will settle the case,
but later I noticed that he was after me.
Q: What do you mean by the word that the accused is after you, Mr. Witness?
A: Because when I met him, he waylaid me.
xxxx
Q: But you stated before that the reason you filed this case [was] because the accused is after you?
The reason that you filed this case [was] because you thought that the accused [was] after you?
A: Because last month, he even intended to do something against me. (Emphasis supplied)
The victim’s initial reluctance to file the complaint is not uncommon, considering “the natural reticence of
most people to get involved in a criminal case.” Fear of reprisal, too, is deemed as a valid excuse for the
temporary silence of a prosecution witness (or in this case, the victim) and has been judicially declared to not
have any effect on his credibility.
Finally, we find no sufficient evidence on record to support petitioner’s claim that the victim had ill motives to
falsely institute the complaint and testify against him. Even assuming arguendo that the victim held a grudge
against petitioner for having testified against him in another case, the existence of such grudge
would not automatically render his testimony in this case false and unreliable.69 “In the absence of any showing
that a witness was actuated by malice or other improper motives, his positive and categorical declarations on the
witness stand under a solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.”
The Proper Penalty
Under Article 263, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, “[a]ny person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer” “[t]he penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period [which ranges from four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months], if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused
the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.”
“Under the Indeterminate Sentence law, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken, in
view of the attending circumstances that could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code,
and the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code.”
In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence in this case
shall be taken within the medium period of the penalty prescribed under Article 263, par. 4, or one (1) year and
one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prisión correccional. The minimum term shall be taken within
the range of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods or from one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4)
months.
The Civil Liabilities
Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be awarded in criminal cases resulting in
physical injuries, as in this case. Although the victim did not testify on the moral damages that he suffered, his
Medical Certificate constitutes sufficient basis to award moral damages, since “ordinary human experience and
common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on [him] would naturally cause physical suffering, fright,
serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injury.” Thus, we affirm the CA’s award of moral damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 in the victim’s favor.

We also agree with the CA that the victim is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P10,000.00, as
it is clear from the records that the victim received medical treatment at the WVSUMC and was, in fact, confined
at the hospital for twenty days, although no documentary evidence was presented to prove the cost thereof.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The August 29, 2012 Decision and the
March 11, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 00896
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that, petitioner Eden Etino is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prisión
correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of the means
used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the
victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim. (Josue vs. People, 687 SCRA 675
[2012])

Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of the means used by
the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and
the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim. (Guevarra vs. People, 715 SCRA 384 [2014])

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