THE OPENING STATEMENT OF

DR. RADOVAN KARADŽIû

BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
IN THE HAGUE
MARCH 1–2, 2010

UVODNA RE^
DR RADOVANA KARAXI]A
PRED
ME\UNARODNIM
KRIVI^NIM SUDOM
ZA BIV[U JUGOSLAVIJU U HAGU
1.–2. MART, 2010
 The Opening Statement of Dr. Radovan Karadžiü
THE OPENING STATEMENT OF before the International Criminal Tribunal
in The Hague ʊ March 1–2, 2010.
DR. RADOVAN KARADŽIû First published 2015.
Translation Copyright © 2015 by Milo Yelesiyevich.
BEFORE THE
The Publisher wishes to make this book as widely available as possi-
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL ble. Any properly attributed selection or part within the “Fair Use”
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA guidelines may be used without permission.

IN THE HAGUE Unwritten History, Inc.

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MARCH 1–2, 2010 PMB 199, Zeckendorf Towers
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UVODNA RE^ e-mail: unwrittenhistory@hotmail.com
website: www.unwrittenhistory.com
DR RADOVANA KARAXI]A ISBN: 978-0-9709198-5-4
PRED
ME\UNARODNIM
KRIVI^NIM SUDOM
ZA BIV[U JUGOSLAVIJU U HAGU
1.–2. MART, 2010
a definitive bilingual edition
transcribed and translated from the original Serbian

by

Milo Yelesiyevich

Unwritten History, Inc.

New York, New York
 “There are laws ʊ and then there are laws.” ................................ 191
CONTENTS The Serbian Role in the Formation of Yugoslavia ........................ 195
The Patriotic League ..................................................................... 197
ACRONYMS .......................................................................................... vii
The Crisis Centers ......................................................................... 199
TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION .......................................................... ix
Tuesday ʊ March 2, 2010 .............................................................. 209
Monday ʊ March 1, 2010 ................................................................... 3 The Serbs Reluctantly Establish the SDS ..................................... 209
The Usurpation of Governing Authority by the SDA ....................... 9 The Illegal Referendum and Proclamation of Independence ........ 225
No Balkan War Was ever Fought without the Component The Lisbon Agreement ................................................................. 229
of a Fratricidal Civil War.............................................................. 19
The Murder of Wedding Guests.................................................... 233
The Creation of the Republika Srpska ............................................ 23
Alija Izetbegoviü Reneges on the Lisbon Agreement ................... 235
Charges of a Joint Criminal Enterprise ........................................... 25
The Joint Croatian-Bosnian Muslim Attacks on Bosanski
Reasons for the Outbreak of War .................................................... 37 Brod, Sijekovac, and Kupres ...................................................... 241
Appeals Made by Prominent Muslims to Izetbegoviü .................... 49 The Crisis in Bijeljina ................................................................... 247
Statements Made by Prominent Authorities on the Break- Izetbegoviü Orders a General Mobilization .................................. 253
Up of Yugoslavia .......................................................................... 53
The Reign of Terror in Sarajevo ................................................... 255
The Role of Germany in the Break-Up of Yugoslavia.................... 61
The OTP’s Charges against Karadžiü Are False ........................... 259
The October 15 Session of the B-H Assembly ............................... 67
The Front Lines Match the Borders of Serbian Areas .................. 263
The Cunning of Warfare — Markale .............................................. 69
The Bosnian Muslims Usurp Control of the MUP........................ 265
The Testimony of Corporal Demurenko ......................................... 71
Bosnian Muslim Manipulations of the MUP ................................ 277
Supreme Injustice of the ICTY ....................................................... 75
The OTP’s Cornerstones of Serbian Guilt .................................... 287
Lord David Owen’s Observations................................................... 79
Sarajevo Was a Divided City ........................................................ 299
Propaganda War .............................................................................. 85
A Reply to the Charges of a Joint Criminal Enterprise ................. 337
Penny Marshall’s Mendacious Documentary for ITN .................... 87
Directives No. 4 & 7 ..................................................................... 359
The Serbian-Muslim Historic Agreement ....................................... 91
Srebrenica ..................................................................................... 363
Radovan Karadžiü’s October 15 Speech before the
Assembly ...................................................................................... 95 Charges of Taking Hostages ......................................................... 375
The Intercepted Telephone Conversation between Karadžiü Conclusion .................................................................................... 383
and Miloševiü .............................................................................. 103 (1'127(6
The ICTY’s Upside-Down Logic ................................................. 105 EXHIBITS ........................................................................................... 
A Brief History of Serbs in Croatia .............................................. 111 ANNEX I ʊ SAMPLE OF THE HAGUE TRANSLATION ...................... 
A Genuine Indictment ................................................................... 117
ANNEX II ʊ SAMPLE BLACKLINE OF CHANGES TO THE
Shocking Measures Taken against Serbs in Croatia ..................... 119 HAGUE TRANSLATION................................................................... 4
The Špegelj Tapes ......................................................................... 121
CHRONOLOGY OF THE BOSNIAN WAR ............................................. 
A Genuine Indictment II ............................................................... 129
Croatia’s New Constitution........................................................... 131 SUGGESTED READINGS ..................................................................... 4
The Serbs Were the Last to Form an Ethnic Political Party .......... 135 INDEX................................................................................................. 4
The OTP Needs to Present Karadžiü as a Monster ....................... 139 
An Overview of the Events of 1990.............................................. 143
The Formation of a Government of Experts ................................. 153
The SDA Brings Criminals into the MUP .................................... 157
Alija Izetbegoviü and the Islamic Declaration ............................. 161
The Aborted Council of Nationalities ........................................... 189
 ACRONYMS

B-H Bosnia-Herzegovina
BSL Bosnian Serb Leadership
HDZ Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, the Croatian
Democratic Union, Franjo Tuÿman’s political
party
JNA Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, the Yugoslav
People’s Army
MBO Muslimanska-Bošnjaþka Organizacija, the Mus-
lim-Bosniak Organization, a Muslim political
party which called for a democratic Yugoslavia
and supported Yugoslavia at the expense of the
sovereignty of individual republics.
MUP Ministarstvo Unutrašnji Poslova, the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, in charge of law enforcement
NDH Nezavisna Država Hrvatske, the Independent
State of Croatia, the Nazi government in power
during WWII
SDA Strana Demokratske Akcije, Alija Izetbegoviü’s
Muslim party
SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka, the Serbian Dem-
ocratic Party
SNB Savet nacionalna bezbednosti, the National Se-
curity Council [Bosnian Serbian]
TO Teritorialna Odbrana, Territorial Defense Units

TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION
Dr. Radovan Karadžiü, who has been defending himself pro
se at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (“ICTY”) in The Hague, delivered his Opening Defense
Statement (ɍɜɨɞɧɚ ɪɟɱ) on March 1 and 2, 2010. He has been
charged with two counts of genocide, as well as nine other
counts, including murder, extermination, persecution and forced
deportation. Dr. Karadžiü refers to the ICTY judges as “Your
Excellencies” instead of “Your Honors” because he believes the
ICTY is an illegal institution and that its charges against him are
false.
There is no need here to summarize the events of the Bosnian
War or to explain Dr. Karadžiü’s conduct. He does that authori-
tatively in his Opening Defense Statement. We must, instead,
ask: Why is a new translation necessary?
In Search of the Original Text
The ICTY posted an English translation1 of the Opening De-
fense Statement soon after Dr. Karadžiü delivered it; however,
the ICTY has never made the original Serbian version available
to the public.
It became apparent, after having examined this English ver-
sion of Dr. Karadžiü’s Opening Defense Statement, that it was an
unedited and uncorrected transcription of the work-product cre-
ated by the ICTY’s simultaneous translators. The text is often
garbled or simply unreadable, and it creates the unfortunate im-
pression, perhaps unintended, that Dr. Karadžiü is a garrulous
1. See http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/100301IT.htm
(last accessed 11/3/14).
x
criminal who does violence to the English language just as he
did violence unto others. The Opening Defense Statement, cast
in such language, is most prejudicial to any attempt by
Dr. Karadžiü to defend himself and it guarantees that his argu-
ments will remain unconvincing.
At length, I found a video version of the Opening Defense
Statement that was recorded during the live broadcast made by the
ICTY and was posted in forty-six parts on YouTube.2 This version
contained approximately ninety percent of Dr. Karadžiü’s Open-
ing Defense Statement. As I transcribed the Serbian text, I com-
pared it to the version created by the ICTY’s simultaneous transla-
tors. The comparison confirmed that the official translation pullu-
lates with errors, omissions, and mistranslations.
Attorneys, in order to make their cases, and judges, in order
to render their decisions, rely on a faithful transcript of legal pro-
ceedings, which is called the record. According to the Standards
for Performance and Professional Responsibility for Contract
Court Interpreters in the Federal Courts: 3
Interpreters shall render a complete and accurate in-
terpretation or sight translation that preserves the lev-
el of language used without altering, omitting, or
adding anything to what is stated or written, and
without explanation. The obligation to preserve accu-
racy includes the interpreter's duty to correct any er-
ror of interpretation discovered by the interpreter dur-
ing the proceeding.
2. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YW0VAmvYwIs (last ac-
cessed 11/3/14).
3. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Interpreter/
Standards_for_Performance.pdf.
 xi
The ICTY’s interpreters failed to fulfill these requirements.
Despite the apparently unlimited resources at the ICTY’s dispos-
al, no funds were allocated and no personnel were charged with
the responsibility to either transcribe the Serbian original of
Dr. Karadžiü’s Opening Defense Statement or to check the Eng-
lish work-product of the interpreters against it.
Such malfeasance, rather than being an oversight, appears to be
standard operating procedure for the ICTY. Historical precedent
for such judicial obscurantism was established by the Austro-
Hungarian Empire during the trial of Gavrilo Princip, which took
place in 1914. A German edition of the trial transcript (of uncer-
tain provenance) was published in 1918 by a pseudonymous au-
thor. This text was truncated and skewed in order to place the
blame on Serbia for starting WWI. A definitive Serbian text was
not published until 1954, forty years after the trial. A complete
translation did not appear in English until 1984, seventy years af-
ter the trial. If that were not enough, the Western media memorial-
ized the centennial anniversary of WWI by resurrecting many of
the old Austro-Hungarian arguments that blamed the Serbia for
causing the war. The EU, of course, considers itself to be the legit-
imate heir of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Stefan Karganoviü, an American attorney who has represent-
ed a number of Serbian defendants at the ICTY, put me in touch
with Peter Robinson, Dr. Karadžiü’s legal advisor, who, through
the agency of the case manager, Aleksandar Vujiü, was kind
enough to provide me with the ICTY’s official audio recording
of Dr. Karadžiü’s Opening Defense Statement. The initial tran-
scription of the YouTube video was checked and revised against
this official audio recording, and the missing passages were re-
stored.
A blackline comparison of a sample passage showing the
changes in the new translation against the ICTY’s official ver-
sion has been appended as Annex II.
xii
Reception of the Opening Defense Statement
Dr. Karadžiü’s Opening Defense Statement was met with scorn
by Western media. It was characterized as a performance for the
benefit of a domestic Serbian audience. Dr. Karadžiü’s exposition
of the Muslim strategy of cunning and deceit, such as the intention-
al bombardment and snipering of their own people, was treated as
scurrilous and reprehensible evasion of evident truth. His claim that
the Serbs did not start the war, but acted defensively, instead, was
dismissed. Several headlines summarize the reception of the Open-
ing Defense Statement: As Trial Resumes, Karadzic Calls Bosnian
Serb Cause ‘Just and Holy’ (The NYT); Karadzic Blames Muslims
for Bloodshed (CBSNews); Radovan Karadzic Denies Bosnian
Atrocities (BBC). These and other articles presumed Dr. Karadžiü
to be guilty and his conviction a foregone conclusion.
Marshall Freeman Harris, a former U.S. State Department of-
ficial, summarized the prevailing view of Karadžiü’s trial:
“The nature of the conflict is that Serb nationalists
tried to take the territory of others to create their own
state, and were willing to kill and drive out Muslims
to do so,” Mr. Harris said by phone. “That’s what
happened and everything else is obfuscation or con-
fusion. What Karadzic is saying is not only inaccu-
rate, but reprehensible. He is in the dock because
what he is saying is not true.”4
4. Radovan Karadzic denies genocide charges at war crimes tribu-
nal, Christian Science Monitor, March 2, 2010.
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0302/Radovan-
Karadzic-denies-genocide-charges-at-war-crimes-tribunal (last ac-
cessed 11/11/14).
 xiii
Widely quoted was Subra Kolenoviü, a member of the Moth-
ers of Srebrenica, who said: “He [Karadžiü] should be given the
Nobel Prize for lying.”
The BBC used the language of melodrama to portray
Karadžiü as a classic stage villain: “He smiled and joked with his
legal team, throwing back his head, with his silver mane of hair,
as he laughed.” The BBC also quoted Dr. Karadžiü as saying: “I
stand here before you not to defend the mere mortal that I am,
but to defend the greatness of a small nation….” This was widely
quoted to Dr. Karadžiü’s prejudice as an example of his bombas-
tic insolence. Comparison to the original Serbian text, however,
reveals that this bombastic turn of the phrase was manufactured
by the ICTY interpreters. A “mere mortal” in Serbian is ɨɛɢɱɚɧ
ɫɦɪɬɧɢɤ. What Dr. Karadžiü really said was ɦɚɥɟɧɤɨɫɬ ʁɟɞɧɨɝɚ
ɱɨɜɟɤɚ, which translates as: “I stand here before you not to de-
fend the insignificant person that I am but to defend the great-
ness of a small nation.... ” Is this bombastic?
Peter Robinson, Dr. Karadžiü’s legal advisor, remarked: “He
does not want a show trial. He wants a real trial.”
Revelations from the Trial that Remain Undisclosed by the Media
Momþilo Mandiü, the Deputy Minister of the Interior of B-H
(1991–1992), gave testimony at Dr. Karadžiü’s trial on July 8,
2010. His testimony related to the attack on unarmed Yugoslav
National Army (JNA) troops who were evacuating their barracks
on Dobrovoljaþka Street in Sarajevo. The withdrawal had been
negotiated and agreed to by Alija Izetbegovic and General
McKenzie, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Commander
for Sarajevo. Mr. Mandiü told the court:
xiv
The order to use all available fire-arms against the
convoy that was moving down Dobrovoljaþka Street
was issued by Ejup Ganiü.5 I heard it myself. This is
when about 20 young men, age 19 to 21, were killed.
They were military conscripts, doing their regular
military service. They worked at the command and
communications centre there, and they were going
home unarmed.
Dr. Karadžiü also on July 8, 2010 introduced an audio record-
ing (Exhibit D403) of a session of the Bosnian Muslim Presiden-
cy dated May 6, 1992. Alija Delimustafiü, the Bosnian Muslim
Minister of the Interior, is recorded saying:
Both we and his ministry made mistakes, like what
Bakir did or like [Deputy Minister of the Interior]
Avdo Hebib, what he did, when he ordered the war to
start, people to open fire, occupy barracks. He sent an
order to all centres without my knowledge. He de-
clared war.6
Major-General David Fraser, an assistant to UNPROFOR,
was called to the stand to testify as a Prosecution witness on Oc-
5. Ganiü was arrested on March 1, 2010 at Heathrow Airport in Lon-
don pursuant to an extradition warrant issued by a Serbian court
for the murder of forty Yugoslav People’s Army soldiers during
the attack on the Dobrovoljaþka Street barracks. In July 2010, a
UK court, ruling that the extradition proceedings against him were
being used for political purposes, refused to honor the extradition
warrant and set him free.
6. See It was Bosnian Muslims Who Declared War on the JNA (Yu-
goslav Army) in Bosnia, secret recordings reveal, posted by Grey
Carter on http://theremustbejustice.wordpress.com on April 30,
2014. For the Mr. Mandiü’s trial transcript, see
http://www.ictytranscripts.org/trials/karadzic/100708IT.htm (last
accessed 11/11/14).
 xv
tober 18, 2010. He was expected to deliver damaging testimony
against Dr. Karadžiü. But when cross-examined by Dr. Karadžiü,
Fraser disclosed that UN soldiers with whom he had served in
Sarajevo told him that the Muslim Army of B-H had deployed
sniper detachments to target Muslim children in order to blame
the Serbs for their deaths. “A protest was lodged against the
Muslims for these types of actions,” he testified.
Fraser, moving to the topic of the shelling of Sarajevo, de-
scribed an incident in which the shelling of Muslim civilians in
the Skenderia neighborhood had, in fact, been determined to
have been fired by Muslim forces. “It would appear that the in-
tent of the Muslims was to incite more casualties and put the
blame on the Serbs for the attack.” Fraser also testified that Bos-
nian Muslim forces, as a matter of policy, deliberately set up
mobile mortars next to UN installations and hospitals, and then
fired on Serbian positions in order to “draw a response from the
Serbs.” Regarding the Koševo Hospital, he said: “We would pro-
test against the Muslims for firing weapons near places like hos-
pitals or the use of mobile systems because it was trying to solic-
it a response not against the target itself but the collateral dam-
age and that was unacceptable.”7
On February 17, 2014, Witness KW586, a member of the
Bosnian Muslim Special Unit Biseri (Pearls), who had been de-
tailed to provide security for the Bosnian Muslim leadership,
testified that he had overheard Alija Izetbegoviü and Reis-ul-
7. See A spectre of Bosnia’s War, by Marcus Papadopoulos in Morn-
ing Star (UK), posted on
www.serbianna.com/analysis/archives/745 on November 23, 2010.
Major-General David Fraser’s complete testimony may be found at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/101018IT.htm (last
accessed 11/11/14).
xvi
Ulema Ceriü discussing “what would happen if a shell would hit
the Markale market.” A few days later on February 5, 1994, it
really did happen, and it became the basis for the NATO inter-
vention.8
Bloggers Julia Gorin and Nebojsa Malic, who have been fol-
lowing the Karadžiü Trial closely, reported that the ICTY had
even resorted to re-purposing Nazi anti-Serbian statements in or-
der to attribute them to the Serbs. Ms. Gorin quoted from an arti-
cle that appeared in the July 12, 2013 edition of The New York
Times to commemorate the alleged “genocide” in Srebrenica:
For example, the judge said, evidence presented dur-
ing the trial showed that in meetings with Karadzic
“it had been decided that one-third of Muslims would
be killed, one third would be converted to the Ortho-
dox religion and a third will leave on their own.”
As Ms. Gorin points out, this formula of murder, conversion, and
expulsion by thirds was “the stated and executed policy of Hit-
ler’s Croatian Ustashe regime.” Nebojsa Malic commented: “The
ultimate result of Ustasha crimes being suppressed, denied and
excused is that the SERBS get blamed for them.”9
8. See The ICTY Tribunal in Hague: The grenades at Sarajevo
Markale market (1994) were shelled by Muslim Army of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, by order of Alija Izetbegoviü, posted by Grey
Carter on http://theremustbejustice.wordpress.com on February 17,
2014. For KW586’s complete testimony, see
http://www.ictytranscripts.org/trials/karadzic/140217ED.htm (last
accessed 11/11/14).
9. See Julia Gorin’s “You know the Karadzic Trial Isn’t Going Well
When….” http://www.juliagorin.com/wordpress/?p=3066 (last ac-
cessed 11/26/14) and Nebojsa Malic’s “Big Lie”
http://grayfalcon.blogspot.com/2013/07/ICTY-Budak.html (last
accessed 11/26/14).
 xvii
A list of such revelations made during Dr. Karadžiü’s trial
could go on and on. It is clear now Dr. Karadžiü has been telling
the truth all along. Yet the Western media has a simple and ele-
gant way of dealing with unwelcome revelations from
Dr. Karadžiü’s trial that may force a reappraisal of the Bosnian
War and undermine US/EU/NATO arguments for intervention on
behalf of the Bosnian Muslims: It simply doesn’t report them.
Thus, the diligent reporting of independent journalists and blog-
gers is banished from the public forum.
The Fix Is On
Dr. Karadžiü’s trial ended on October 2, 2014 after he com-
pleted his ten-hour Closing Defense Statement. He submitted an
874-page brief10 on September 29, 2014 that showed the ICTY
had not a shred of evidence against him. The judges are expected
to render a verdict in a year’s time. Peter Robinson said that Dr.
Karadžiü remains hopeful of a not-guilty verdict. “What he ex-
pects, he’s optimistic, he says if this is a real court, he’ll be ac-
quitted, however, he’s not sure this is a real court under his defi-
nition so he might not be that optimistic about the outcome,” he
said.11
All of the original charges against Dr. Karadžiü were reiterat-
ed in the media coverage; none of the aforementioned revela-
tions were ever mentioned. The VOA and the BBC both cited
Dr. Karadžiü’s alleged responsibility in the alleged death of
“8,000 men and boys” at Srebrenica, a figure they accept uncriti-
cally, even though the ICTY has proof of only perhaps a tenth of
this number, approximately half of which, some 400 deaths, are
10. See: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/custom5/en/140929.pdf
11. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/karadzic-ready-for-trial-
to-end (last accessed 11/11/14).
xviii
attributable to extrajudicial execution, which is a war crime but
not genocide. (See Rethinking Srebrenica, by Stefan Karganoviü
and Ljubiša Simiü, in SUGGESTED READINGS at the end of this
volume.)
And the ICTY is up to its old tricks again. It has posted a
video of Dr. Karadžiü’s Closing Defense Speech, but the inter-
preters’ voices have been dubbed over Dr. Karadžiü’s voice, so
we don’t know what he’s really saying. And once again, there is
no Serbian transcript.
Serge Brammertz, who succeed Carla Del Ponte as Chief
Prosecutor for the ICTY, remarked: “I believe that Radovan
Karadžiü will receive life imprisonment.”
It is worth recalling Hanna Arendt’s essay, Lying in Politics.
The “political lie” does not obliterate reality but instead perma-
nently substitutes it. If our world “erases memory in the very act
of creating new events,” as Arendt says, then how will the origi-
nal text replace a corrupt copy or the truth the lie in the annals of
history? This question, however, may be too broadly framed.
Perhaps one should instead ask: How are the judges going to
make a ruling on the basis of an opening defense statement
whose translation is manifestly unsatisfactory, if not dishonest?
One may suppose that it does not tend in the Defendant’s favor.
Dr. Karadžiü said in his Closing Defense Statement:
I come from a system where it was clear for 50 years
that if somebody is sentenced to ten years in prison,
he must be guilty of something because for nothing
people got eight years in prison. That was our jus-
tice; however, the west hasn't faired [sic] much bet-
ter. When it was established that Dreyfus, totally in-
nocent, life imprisonment was reduced to ten years in
 xix
prison. So we've got two systems that have similar
results. They are particularly drastic and dangerous
when they meet one another: Western justice and our
Balkan fate.12

A NOTE ON THE TEXT

The text has been edited to eliminate repetitions and false

starts. All bracketed editorial matter, which was introduced for
clarity, is my own, as are the footnotes, except for those that
begin with the word SLIDE, which indicates that the text is taken
verbatim from the slide presentation that accompanied
Dr. Karadžiü’s Opening Defense Statement. Other slides, how-
ever, which introduce photographs and maps, have been marked
in the text by a bracketed [EXHIBIT NUMBER] and may be found
at the end of the present volume.
Any errors that may exist are, of course, my own.

Milo Yelesiyevich

12. http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/141001ED.htm (last

accessed 11/29/14).
 UVODNA RE^ THE OPENING STATEMENT OF
DR RADOVANA KARAXI]A DR. RADOVAN KARADŽIû
PRED BEFORE THE
ME\UNARODNIM KRIVI^NIM SUDOM INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
ZA BIV[U JUGOSLAVIJU U HAGU FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
1.–2. MART, 2010 IN THE HAGUE — MARCH 1–2, 2010

1. mart, 2010
[Ɂɚɫɟɞɚʃɟ ʁɟ ɨɬɜɨɪɟɧɨ]
[Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄ ɭɥɚɡɢ ɭ ɫɭɞɧɢɰɭ.]
ɋɭɻɟʃɟ ɩɨɱɢʃɟ ɭ 9.00 ɱɚɫɨɜɚ.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Ⱦɨɛɪɨ ʁɭɬɪɨ ɫɜɢɦɚ. ɉɨɡɢɜɚɦ ɫɭɞɫɤɨɝ
ɱɢɧɨɜɧɢɤɚ ɞɚ ɩɨɡɨɜɟ ɩɪɟɞɦɟɬ.
ɋȿɄɊȿɌȺɊ: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɢ ɞɨɛɚɪ ɞɚɧ, ɱɚɫɧɢ ɫɭɞɟ. Ɉɜɨ ʁɟ ɩɪɟɞɦɟɬ
ɂɌ-95-5/18-Ɍ, Ɍɭɠɢɥɚɰ ɩɪɨɬɢɜ Ɋɚɞɨɜɚɧɚ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄɚ.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɜɚɦ. Ⱦɚɧɚɫ ɧɚɫɬɚɜʂɚɦɨ ɫɭɻɟʃɟ
ɢɡʁɚɜɨɦ ɨɞɛɪɚɧɟ, ɤɨʁɚ ʁɟ ɡɚɤɚɡɚɧɚ ɡɚ ɰɟɥɨ ɩɪɟɩɨɞɧɟ ɞɚɧɚɫ ɫɚ
ɧɚɫɬɚɜʂɚʃɟɦ ɫɭɬɪɚ ɭʁɭɬɪɨ. ɉɪɟ ɧɟɝɨ ɲɬɨ ɧɚɫɬɚɜɢɦɨ, ʁɚ ɛɢɯ
ɠɟɥɟɨ ɞɚ ɫɟ ɫɬɪɚɧɟ ɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɟ. Ɂɚ Ɍɭɠɢɥɚɲɬɜɨ, ɦɨɥɢɦ.
ȽɈɋɉɈȾɂɇ ɌɂȽȿɊ: Ⱦɨɛɪɨ ʁɭɬɪɨ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ ɩɪɟɞɫɟɞɧɢɱɟ,
ɱɚɫɧɢ ɫɭɞɟ. Ⱥɥɚɧ Ɍɢɝɟɪ, ɏɢɥɞɟɝɚɪɞ ɍɟɪɰ-Ɋɟɰɥɚɮ ɢ ɂɚɧ Ɋɢɞ
ɡɚɫɬɭɩɚʁɭ Ɍɭɠɢɥɚɲɬɜɨ.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɜɚɦ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ɍɢɝɟɪ. Ƚɨɫɩɨɞɢɧe
Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄu, ɦɨɥɢɦ ɜɚɫ ɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɢɬɟ ɱɥɚɧɨɜɟ ɫɜɨɝ ɬɢɦɚ ɤɨʁɢ ɫɭ
ɩɪɢɫɭɬɧɢ ɭ ɫɭɞɧɢɰɢ.
ɄȺɊȺȹɂȶ: Ⱦɨɛɪɨ ʁɭɬɪɨ, ȿɤɫɟɥɟɧɰɢʁɟ. Sa mnom ɫɭ ɦɨʁɢ
ɩɪɚɜɧɢ ɫɚɜɟɬɧɢɰɢ, ɝ. ɉɢɬɟɪ Ɋɨɛɢɧɫɨɧ ɢ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧ Ɇɚɪɤɨ
ɋɥɚɞɨʁɟɜɢʄ.
Monday ʊ March 1, 2010
[Open session]
[Karadžiü enters the court room.]
— Upon commencing at 9:00 a.m.
JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Will the Court Of-
ficer please call the case?
THE REGISTRAR: Thank you and good morning, Your Honors.
This is case number IT-95-5/18-T, the Prosecutor versus Ra-
dovan Karadžiü.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Today we are continuing the trial
proceedings with the Defense opening statement, which has been
scheduled for the full morning today and continuing tomorrow
morning. Before we proceed, I would like to have the appearanc-
es. For the Prosecution, please.
MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honors. Alan
Tieger, Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff, and Iain Reid appear for the
Prosecution.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. Mr. Karadžiü, would
you introduce the members of your team present in the court-
room.
KARADŽIû: Good morning, Excellencies. With me are my le-
gal advisors, Mr. Peter Robinson, and Mr. Marko Sladojeviü.
4 5

ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɜɚɦ. Ɍɚɤɨɻɟ ɞɚʁɟɦ ɧɚ ɡɧɚʃɟ ɞɚ ʁɟ JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I also note that Mr. Richard Harvey
ɨɜɞɟ ɩɪɢɫɭɬɚɧ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧ Ɋɢɱɚɪɞ ɏɚɪɜɢ ɩɨ ɧɚɥɨɝɭ ɉɪɟɬɪɟɫɧɟ is present here upon the instruction of the Trial Chamber. His
Ʉɨɦɨɪɟ. ȵɟɝɨɜɚ ɭɥɨɝɚ ɭ ɩɪɨɰɟɫɭ ɬɟɤ ɬɪɟɛɚ ɞɚ ɫɟ ɭɬɜɪɞɢ ɢ ɦɢ role in the trial is yet to be determined and we will do so after
ʄɟɦɨ ɬɨ ɭɪɚɞɢɬɢ ɧɚɤɨɧ ɭɜɨɞɧɟ ɢɡʁɚɜɟ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɚ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄɚ ɢ Mr. Karadžiü’s opening statement and when the hearing of evi-
ɤɚɞɚ ɩɨɱɧɟ ɞɨɤɚɡɧɢ ɩɨɫɬɭɩɚɤ. Ƚɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ ɏɚɪɜɢ, ɞɚ ɥɢ ɛɢɫɬɟ dence begins. Mr. Harvey, I wonder if you could introduce the
ɦɨɝɥɢ ɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɢɬɢ ɱɥɚɧɨɜɟ ɫɜɨɝ ɬɢɦɚ ɤɨʁɢ ɫɭ ɞɚɧɚɫ other members of your team who accompany you today.
ɩɪɢɫɭɬɧɢ.
MR. HARVEY: Good morning, Mr. President and Your Honors.
ȽɈɋɉɈȾɂɇ ɏȺɊȼɂ: Ⱦɨɛɪɨ ʁɭɬɪɨ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ ɩɪɟɞɫɟɞɧɢɱɟ
I’m accompanied by Ms. Mirjana Vukajloviü today.
ɢ ɱɚɫɧɢ ɫɭɞɟ. ɋɚ ɦɧɨɦ ʁɟ ɞɚɧɚɫ ɝɨɫɩɨɻɚ Ɇɢɪʁɚɧɚ ȼɭɤɚʁɥɨɜɢʄ.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Harvey.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɜɚɦ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ ɏɚɪɜɢ.
MR. HARVEY: Thank you.
ȽɈɋɉɈȾɂɇ ɏȺɊȼȿɂ: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɜɚɦɚ.
JUDGE KWON: Before I give the floor to Mr. Karadžiü for his
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɉɪɟ ɧɟɝɨ ɲɬɨ ɞɚɦ ɪɟɱ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɭ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄɭ
opening statement, I would like to note that this opening state-
ɡɚ ʃɟɝɨɜɭ ɭɜɨɞɧɭ ɢɡʁɚɜɭ, ɠɟɥɢɦ ɞɚ ɧɚɝɥɚɫɢɦ ɞɚ ɋɟ ɨɜɚ
ment is being given pursuant to Rule 84 of the Tribunal’s Rules
ɭɜɨɞɧɚ ɢɡʁɚɜɚ ɞɚʁɟ ɧɚ ɨɫɧɨɜɭ ɉɪɚɜɢɥɚ 84 ɉɪɚɜɢɥɧɢɤɚ
of Procedure and Evidence rather than Rule 84 bis.
Ɍɪɢɛɭɧɚɥɚ ɨ ɉɨɫɬɭɩɤɭ ɢ Ⱦɨɤɚɡɢɦɚ, ɚ ɧɟ ɉɪɚɜɢɥɚ 84 ɛɢɫ.
Mr. Karadžiü, you will have the opportunity at a later stage,
Ƚɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄɭ, ɜɢ ʄɟɬɟ ɢɦɚɬɢ ɩɪɢɥɢɤɭ ɭ ɤɚɫɧɢʁɨʁ
should you so choose, to make a Rule 84 bis statement, in which
ɮɚɡɢ, ɭɤɨɥɢɤɨ ɬɚɤɨ ɨɞɥɭɱɢɬɟ, ɞɚ ɞɚɬɟ ɢɡʁɚɜɭ ɩɪɟɦɚ ɩɪɚɜɢɥɭ
case the provisions of that Rule shall apply and the Chamber can
84 ɛɢɫ, ɭ ɤɨɦ ɫɥɭɱɚʁɭ ʄɟ ɜɚɠɢɬɢ ɨɞɪɟɞɛɟ ɬɨɝ ɩɪɚɜɢɥɚ ɢ ȼɟʄɟ
decide what probative value, if any, to ascribe to your statement.
ɦɨɠɟ ɞɚ ɨɞɥɭɱɭʁɟ ɤɨʁɭ ɞɨɤɚɡɧɭ ɜɪɟɞɧɨɫɬ ʄɟ, ɚɤɨ ʁɟ ɢɦɚ,
There is one further matter to raise for [the] purpose of the
ɩɪɢɩɢɫɚɬɢ ɜɚɲɨʁ ɢɡʁɚɜɢ.
planning of the — today’s or tomorrow’s hearing. The Trial
ɉɨɫɬɨʁɢ ʁɨɲ ʁɟɞɧɚ ɫɬɜɚɪ ɤɨʁɭ ɬɪɟɛɚ ɩɨɦɟɧɭɬɢ ɡɚ ɩɨɬɪɟɛɟ
Chamber denied the Accused’s motion for the further postpone-
ɩɥɚɧɢɪɚʃɚ ɞɚɧɚɲʃɟɝ ɢɥɢ ɫɭɬɪɚɲʃɟɝ ɫɚɫɥɭɲɚʃɚ. ɋɭɞɫɤɨ
ment of the trial last Friday, 26th of February. In that decision,
ȼɟʄɟ ʁɟ ɩɪɨɲɥɨɝ ɩɟɬɤɚ, 26. ɮɟɛɪɭɚɪɚ, ɨɞɛɢɥɨ ɡɚɯɬɟɜ
the Trial Chamber set the dead-line for the Accused to make a
ɨɩɬɭɠɟɧɨɝ ɡɚ ɞɚʂɟ ɨɞɥɚɝɚʃɟ ɫɭɻɟʃɚ. ɍ ɬɨʁ ɨɞɥɭɰɢ, ɋɭɞɫɤɨ
request for certification to appeal the decision, if he so wishes,
ȼɟʄɟ ʁɟ ɪɨɤ ɡɚ ɨɩɬɭɠɟɧɨɝ ɞɚ ɩɨɞɧɟɫɟ ɡɚɯɬɟɜ ɡɚ ɫɟɪɬɢɮɢɤɚɰɢʁɭ
by today, and I was told just now that the Accused filed a request
ɡɚ ɩɨɞɧɨɲɟʃɟ ɠɚɥɛɟ ɧɚ ɨɞɥɭɤɭ, ɚɤɨ ɨɧ ɬɨ ɠɟɥɢ ɞɚ ɭɱɢɧɢ,
for certification to appeal the decision. Can I get the confirma-
ɩɨɫɬɚɜɢɥɨ ɞɨ ɞɚɧɚɫ, ɢ ɭɩɪɚɜɨ ɦɢ ʁɟ ɪɟɱɟɧɨ ɞɚ ʁɟ ɨɩɬɭɠɟɧɢ
tion? I see nodding.
ɩɨɞɧɟɨ ɡɚɯɬɟɜ ɡɚ ɫɟɪɬɢɮɢɤɚɰɢʁɭ ɞɚ ɩɨɞɧɟɫɟ ɠɚɥɛɭ ɧɚ ɨɞɥɭɤɭ.
We need some voice for the purpose of transcript. Is it Mr.
Ɇɨɝɭ ɥɢ ɞɚ ɞɨɛɢʁɟɦ ɩɨɬɜɪɞɭ? ȼɢɞɢɦ ɤɥɢɦɚɬɟ ɝɥɚɜɨɦ.
Robinson or Mr. Karadžiü?
Ɍɪɟɛɚ ɧɚɦ ɝɥɚɫ ɪɚɞɢ ɬɪɚɧɫɤɪɢɩɬɚ. Ⱦɚ ɥɢ ʁɟ ɬɨ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧ
Ɋɨɛɢɧɫɨɧ ɢɥɢ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄ?
6 7
ȽɈɋɉɈȾɂɇ ɊɈȻɂɇɋɈɇ: Ⱦɚ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ ɩɪɟɞɫɟɞɧɢɱɟ.
Ⱥɤɨ ɦɨɝɭ ɞɚ ɭɡɦɟɦ ɨɞɨɛɪɟʃɟ ɨɞ ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɚ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄɚ ɞɚ
ɨɞɝɨɜɨɪɢɦ ɧɚ ɜɚɲɟ ɩɢɬɚʃɟ, ʁɚ ɛɢɯ ɤɚɡɚɨ ɞɚ, ɦɢ ɫɦɨ ɬɚʁ ɡɚɯɬɟɜ
ɩɨɞɧɟɥɢ ʁɭɬɪɨɫ.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɜɚɦ. ȳɨɲ ʁɟɞɧɨɦ, ɞɨɛɪɨ ɞɨɲɥɢ. ɍ
ɬɨɦ ɫɥɭɱɚʁɭ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ɍɢɝɟɪ, ɠɟɥɟɨ ɛɢɯ ɞɚ ɡɧɚɦ ɞɚ ɥɢ ɦɢ,
ɬʁ. ȼɟʄɟ, ɦɨɠɟɦɨ ɞɨɛɢɬɢ ɜɚɲ ɨɞɝɨɜɨɪ ɭ ɬɨɤɭ ɞɚɧɚɲʃɟɝ ɞɚɧɚ
ɢɥɢ ɠɟɥɢɬɟ ɞɚ ɨɞɝɨɜɨɪɢɬɟ ɭɫɦɟɧɨ ɫɭɬɪɚ ɭʁɭɬɪɭ?
ȽɈɋɉɈȾɂɇ ɌɂȽȿɊ: Ɍɨ ʁɟ — ɬɨ ʁɟ ɭ ɪɟɞɭ, ɱɚɫɧɢ ɋɭɞɟ. Ɇɨɝɭ
ɜɟɪɨɜɚɬɧɨ ɨɞɝɨɜɨɪɢɬɢ ɫɭɬɪɚ ɭʁɭɬɪɭ ɢɥɢ ɭɛɪɡɨ ɩɪɟ ɡɚɤʂɭɱɟʃɚ
ɨɜɢɯ ɩɨɫɬɭɩɚɤɚ. Ɍɨ ɧɟʄɟ ɛɢɬɢ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦ.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɜɚɦ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ɍɢɝɟɪ. ɋɚɞɚ ɞɚʁɟɦ
ɪɟɱ ɜɚɦɚ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄɭ, ɡɚ ɫɜɨʁɭ ɭɜɨɞɧɭ ɢɡʁɚɜɭ.
ɂɦɚʁɬɟ ɧɚ ɭɦɭ ɞɚ ʄɟɦɨ ɢɦɚɬɢ ɩɪɜɭ ɩɚɭɡɭ ɨɞ 20 ɦɢɧɭɬɚ ɨɤɨ
10:20 ɢ ɞɪɭɝɭ ɩɚɭɡɭ ɨɞ ɩɨɥɚ ɫɚɬɚ ɭ 12.00 ɫɚɬɢ. Ɉɜɚʁ ɪɚɫɩɨɪɟɞ
ʄɟ ɫɟ ɩɪɢɦɟʃɢɜɚɬɢ ɭ ɛɭɞɭʄɢɦ ɪɚɫɩɪɚɜɚɦɚ ɤɨʁɟ ʄɟ ɫɟ
ɨɞɪɠɚɜɚɬɢ ɬɨɤɨɦ ɩɪɟɩɨɞɧɟɜɚ.
Ⱦɚ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ɍɢɝɟɪ.
ȽɈɋɉɈȾɂɇ ɌɂȽȿɊ: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɜɚɦ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ ɩɪɟɞɫɟɞɧɢɱɟ.
ɋɚɦɨ ɤɪɚɬɤɨ, ɠɟɥɟɨ ɛɢɯ ɞɚ ɩɨɦɟɧɟɦ ɩɪɟɞɥɨɝ Ɍɭɠɢɥɚɲɬɜɚ ɨɞ
23. ɮɟɛɪɭɚɪɚ ɭ ɜɟɡɢ ɫɚ ɦɟɪɨɦ ɨɩɪɟɡɧɨɫɬɢ ɢ ʁɚ ɧɟ ɡɧɚɦ ɞɚ ɥɢ
ɩɪɢɦɟɞɛɟ ɋɭɞɫɤɨɝ ȼɟʄɚ ɞɨ ɞɚɧɚɫ ɨɞɪɚɠɚɜɚʁɭ ɫɜɨʁɟ ɡɚɤʂɭɱɤɟ
ɭ ɬɨɦ ɩɨɝɥɟɞɭ, ɢɥɢ ɫɟ ɬɨ ɢɡɝɭɛɢɥɨ ɫɚ ɞɧɟɜɧɨɝ ɪɟɞɚ, ɚɥɢ ɫɚɦ
ɯɬɟɨ ɞɚ ɢɫɬɚɤɧɟɦ ɞɚ ʁɟ Ɍɭɠɢɥɚɲɬɜɨ ɩɨɞɧɟɥɨ ɬɚʁ ɩɪɟɞɥɨɝ ɢ
ɧɚɞɚɦ ɫɟ ɞɚ ɫɟ ɬɨ ɦɨɠɟ ɞɢɫɤɭɬɨɜɚɬɢ ɩɪɟ ɧɟɝɨ ɲɬɨ ɨɩɬɭɠɟɧɢ
ɩɨɱɧɟ.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɜɚɦ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ɍɢɝɟɪ, ɲɬɨ ɫɬɟ ɦɟ
ɩɨɞɫɟɬɢɥɢ. ȳɚ ɫɚɦ ɩɪɨɭɱɢɨ ɫɚɦɨ ɞɟɨ ʃɟɝɚ, ɚ ɨɫɬɚɬɚɤ ʄɟ ɫɟ
ɪɟɲɚɜɚɬɢ ɩɨɫɥɟ ɭɜɨɞɧɟ ɪɟɱɢ. Ƚɨɫɩɨɞɢɧe Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄu.
ɄȺɊȺȹɂȶ: Dozvolite mi da ɩɨɡɞɪɚɜɢɦ ɫɜɟ ɚɤɬɢɜɧɟ ɢ
ɩɚɫɢɜɧɟ ɭɱɟɫɧɢɤɟ ɨɜe sednice. Oɜɞɟ sam ɩɪɟɞ ɜɚɦɚ ɧɟ ɞɚ
MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. If I can take the indul-
gence of Mr. Karadžiü to answer your question, I would say that
yes, we have filed that this morning.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I welcome you again. In that case,
Mr. Tieger, I wonder whether we — the Chamber can have your
response by the end of today or you wish to respond orally first
thing tomorrow morning?
MR. TIEGER: That’s — that’s fine, Your Honor. I can probably
respond first thing tomorrow morning or shortly before the con-
clusion of these proceedings. It should be no problem.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. Then I now give the
floor to you, Mr. Karadžiü, for your opening statement. Please
bear in mind that we will need to break at approximately 10:20
a.m. for 20 minutes’ break for the first break, and at 12:00 noon
for half an hour for the second break. This regime will apply in
the future hearings that will take place in the morning session.
Yes, Mr. Tieger.
MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Just briefly, I wanted
to mention the Prosecution’s motion of February 23rd regarding
a cautionary measure, and I don’t know if the Trial Chamber’s
remarks to date reflect its conclusions in that regard or if that
was — if that slipped off the agenda, but I wanted to point out
that the Prosecution does have that motion pending, and would
hope that could be addressed before the Accused commenced.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger, for your reminder. I
dealt with only part of it, and the remainder will be dealt with
after the opening statement. Mr. Karadžiü.
KARADŽIû: I would first like to greet all the active and passive
participants of this session. I stand here before you not to defend
the insignificant person that I am but to defend the greatness of a
small nation in B-H which, for five hundred years, had to suffer
8 9
ɛɪɚɧɢɨ svoju malenkost jednog ~oveka, nego da ɛɪɚɧɢɦ
ɜɟɥɢɱɢɧɭ ʁɟɞɧɨɝ ɦɚɥɨbrojnog ɧɚɪɨɞɚ ɭ Ȼɨɫɧɢ ɢ
ɏɟɪɰɟɝɨɜɢɧɢ ɤɨʁɢ 500 ɝɨɞɢɧɚ trpi ɢ ɩɨɤɚɡuje ɜɟɥɢɤi
stepen izdr`qivosti i skromnosti ɞɚ ɨɩɫɬɚɧɟ ɭ ɫɥɨɛɨɞɢ.
Ne}u braniti sebe tvrdwama kako nisam bio va`an ili
nisam bio ili nisam vr{io neku funkciju dok sam
slu`io svome narodu, niti }u odgovornost prebacivati
na nekoga drugo. Ȼɪɚɧɢʄɭ ɬɚʁ ɧɚɲ ɧɚɪɨɞ ɢ ʃɟɝɨɜɭ ɫɬɜɚɪ,
ɤɨʁɚ ʁɟ ɩɪɚɜɟɞɧɚ ɢ ɫɜɟɬɚ, a ɢ ɧɚ ɬɚʁ ɧɚɱɢɧ ʄɭ ɦɨʄɢ ɞɚ se
odɛɪɚɧɢɦ ɢ ɫɟɛɟ ɢ taʁ ɧɚɪɨɞ, radi toga {to imam dobar
slu~aj. Iɦɚɦɨ ɞɨɛɪɟ ɞɨɤɚɡɟ, ɢ ɚɤɨ budem imao dovoqno
vremena i dovoqno sredstava da pripremim tu odbranu,
ona }e biti u na{u korist.
Dakle, jedino {to ja o~ekujem i `elim jeste da
dobijem priliku da spremnu odbranu izlo`im ovde i
predo~im {ta je sve su{tina koja jo{ nije otkrivena i
nije do{la do izra`aja.
Po~e}u jednom situacijom kod nas koja }e Vam odmah
mnogo toga re}i. Na izborima 1990. to su prvi
demokratski izobori na kojima su se pojavili mnogi
disidenti, jer pre toga nije bilo vi{e-partijskog
sistema. Imali smo u predsedni{tvu Bosne-
Hercegovine sedam ~lanova: dva Srbina, dva Hrvata, dva
Muslimana i jedan za mawine. Moja Srpska demokratska
stranka je na to sedmo mesto kandidovala predsednika
jevrejske zajednice u BiH koji nije bio ~lan SDS-a, ali
smo smatrali da on predstavqa u najboqem smislu te
ostale, a osim toga ta zajednica je zna~ajna za Sarajevo
jer je posle progona u [paniji veliki broj do{ao u
Sarajevo i ostavio zna~ajne tragove u razvoju Sarajeva.
Stranka demokratske akcije je presvukla vuka u
jagwe}u ko`u, Gospodina Ejuba Gani}a, nazvala ga
Jugoslovenom za ovu priliku. I naravno, on je izabran
and which has displayed a great deal of modesty and persever-
ance in order to survive in freedom. I don’t want to defend my-
self by claiming that I was not important or that I did not per-
form certain official duties while I was serving my people, nor
will I shift the responsibility to anyone else. I shall defend our
nation and its cause, which is just and holy, and that is how I will
be able to defend myself, as well as my nation, because my case
is good. We have solid proof, and if I should have sufficient time
and resources to prepare my defense, it will be to our advantage.
Therefore, the only thing that I want and expect to receive
here is the opportunity to present a well-prepared defense, to
confront the heart of the matter, which has yet to be discovered
and fully expressed.
The Usurpation of Governing Authority by the SDA
I will review the situation in my country, which will speak
volumes to you. The elections in 1990 were the first democratic
elections in which many dissidents appeared because there had
been no multi-party system prior to that. The Presidency of B-H
had seven members: two Serbs, two Croats, two Muslims, as
well as a representative for minorities. My party, the Serbian
Democratic Party [i.e., the “SDS,” Srpska demokratska stranka],
nominated for the seventh seat of the Presidency the President of
the Jewish community in B-H, who was not a member of the
SDS; however, we thought that he represented, in the best sense
of the word, the remaining members of national minorities, and
apart from that, the community is significant in Sarajevo because
a great many Jews came to Sarajevo after having been persecut-
ed in Spain, and because they have left a significant and lasting
mark on the development of Sarajevo.
The Party of Democratic Action [i.e., “SDA,” Strana demo-
kratske akcije, the Muslim party] put forth Mr. Ejup Ganiü, a
wolf in sheep’s clothing, and rebranded him as a Yugoslav for
this occasion. And, of course, he was elected to this position
10
na to mesto koje pripada mawinama, odnosno, ostalima.
To je onaj poznati gospodin koji se proslavio pokoqem
nevinih vojnika koji su se povla~ili kroz Sarajevo u
Dobrovoqa~koj ulici i wegova poznata radio komanda:
“^im Alija iza|e iz auta, pobij ih sve!” Tako su SDA i
muslimanska zajednica u BiH ostvarile premo} u
jedmom telu u kome je bio predvi|en paritet.
Srbi su imali jo{ boqeg kandidata kojeg su mogli
tako da presvuku i koji se zaista i smatrao i
izja{wavao jedno vreme kao Jugosloven, ali smatrali
smo da se to ne radi u pristojnim dru{tvima. To nije
demokratija i to nije po{tena i dobra osnova za
zajedna~ki `ivot i napredak. A to je gotovo nevina igra
u odnosu na ono {ta su dr`avni organi, zajedni~ki
dr`avni organi, radili u korist ratne politike
Stranke demokratske akcije usmerene na pribavqawe
koristi toj zajednici i nano{ewe {tete hri{}anskoj
ve}ini koju ~ine Srbi i Hrvati.
Za{to su to uradile vo|e Stranke demokratske
akcije? Ne samo zato {to je to osnovni model
fundamentalisti~kog mi{qewa i delovawa —
dominacija, prevladavawe, privilegije (sto-posto
vlasti kao u vreme Otomanske imperije), nego, pre
svega, da dobiju jo{ jedan glas u Predsedni{tvu za
postizawe islamisti~kog ciqa dr`ave kako su
zamislili pre pedeset godina akteri na{e drame.
Bilo je ranije u Komunizmu tih skup{tinskih igara,
kadrovskih itd., ali to ni{ta nije bilo prema ovome,
jer nisu ciqevi komunista bili takvi. Bili su
ideolo{ki, ali ovo su fundamenatlni ciqevi koji
mewaju sudbinu i izgled jednog regiona i sudbinu
nekoliko naroda. Dakle, secesija BiH ovoga puta bila
je ciq, i to ne samo secesija nepravna koja nije mogla da
11
which properly belonged to minorities, namely, the others. That
is the well-known gentleman who found fame with the slaughter
of innocent soldiers who were withdrawing from Sarajevo on
Dobrovoljaþka Street, when he gave the well-known order over
the radio: “As soon as Alija gets out of his car, kill them all!”
This is how the SDA and the Muslim community in B-H
achieved supremacy in a government body for which parity had
been foreseen.
The Serbs had an even better candidate whom they could
have dressed for the part, someone who had already been con-
sidered as, and had declared himself to be, a Yugoslav, but we
considered that such things were not done in a civil society. That
is not democracy and it is neither an honest nor sound basis for
communal life with other ethnic groups and for our general ad-
vancement. But this was practically child’s play in relation to
what the state organs — the joint [B-H] state organs — did for
the benefit of the SDA [by instituting] a policy of war that was
geared toward obtaining benefits for their own community while
inflicting damage on the Christian majority, composed of Serbs
and Croats.
Why did the leaders of the SDA do this? Not simply because
it was the basic model of fundamentalist theory and practice:
domination, supremacy, privileges (holding one hundred percent
of the governing authority, just as in the days of the Ottoman
Empire), but first and foremost, to gain one more vote in the
Presidency in order to achieve the Islamist objective with respect
to the government, just as those who played leading roles in our
national drama had envisioned it fifty years ago.
Such parliamentary games, as well as the manipulation of
staffing and personnel, had been played during the Communist
era, but it was nothing compared to this, because the Com-
munists had no such goals in mind. They had ideological goals;
however, these are fundamental goals that alter the destiny and
12
se izvede na pravni na~in — ne tako — nego i
uspostavqawe jednog sistema, jednog re`ima, jedne
dr`avne strukture koju }u Vam ovde argumentovano
predstaviti i za koju }e te na osnovu dokaza videti {ta
je to trebalo da bude i {ta smo mi trebali....
Dakle, ta potreba je bila da se ima glas vi{e, a i to
nije dovoqno, jer je su{tina zahteva stranke, zamisli iz
Stranke demokratske akcije bila — sto posto Bosna.
To je matrica razmi{qawa. Bosna je na{a. Srbi su ovde
gosti. Bogami i Hrvati sada, kada im ne trebaju da izi|u
iz Jugoslavije. I imaju da slu{aju. Tako se prema
Hri{}anskoj ve}ini odnose sada. A kako bi se odnosili
prema, kada bi wihovim politi~kim sredstvima
pove}ali svoj natalitet. Nema niko primedbu na
prirodan i normalan natalitet. A ako bi politi~kim
sredstvima forsiranim doseqavawem Muslimana iz
Sanxaka, doseqavawe ~etiri miliona Turaka koji su
navodno poreklom iz Bosne? To mo`ete sami da
zamislete kako bi izgledalo. A oni su nam rekli u
svojim novinama i svojim pisanim materijalima.
Kada su Sjediwene Ameri~ke Dr`ave 1995. odlu~ile
da zavr{e rat koji su vodile u BiH, Ambasador Holbruk
i Bilt pi{u kako je Holbruk rekao muslimanskom
vo|stvu: “[ta `elite da pregovaramo za vas? Da li da
imate sto posto vlasti u 30% Bosne? ili 30% vlasti u
sto posto Bosne? 100% vlasti u 100% Bosne ne mo`ete
imati.” Tu se jasno vidi, i to je su{tina cele na{e
krize i rata, i krize koja i danas traje. I to se jasno
vidi danas i Stejt Department i Ambasador Holbruk su
shvatili su{tinu, ali ba{ to {to nemogu dobiti, {to
im ne priznaje ~ak ni wihov najmo}niji saveznik, ba{
to {to su hteli 1914, 1941, sada ho}e, naravno, u drugim
konstelacijama i sa drugim akterima. Sada ho}e
13
appearance of a region as well as the destiny of several ethnic
groups. Therefore, the goal in this case was the secession of B-H
and it was not merely an illegal secession which could not have
been performed in a law-abiding manner — it was not that — it
was, instead, the establishment of a system, a regime, a state
structure which I shall depict for you here with my arguments so
that you will be able to see, on the basis of such proof, what had
to subsequently take place, and what we were compelled to do.
So, they needed to have one more vote ʊ but not even that
was enough because the essence of the SDA’s demand was the
plan to control one hundred percent of Bosnia. That was the pat-
tern of their thinking. Bosnia is ours. The Serbs are guests here.
By golly, the Croats now too, since they don’t have to leave Yu-
goslavia anymore. And so they must obey. That was how they
now behaved toward the Christian majority. And how would
they behave when the Muslims increase their birth rate by using
political means? No one can criticize a natural and normal birth
rate. But what would happen if, by political means, it came to a
forced settlement of Muslims from Sandžak and four million
Turks who are allegedly descended from Bosnians? You your-
selves can imagine what that would look like. They told us about
it in their newspapers and printed materials.
In 1995, when the United States decided to end the war that it
had been waging in B-H, Ambassadors Holbrooke and Bildt later
wrote that Holbrooke had asked the Muslim leadership: “What do
you want us to negotiate for you? Do you want to have one hun-
dred percent of the governing authority in thirty percent of Bosnia
or thirty percent of the governing authority in one hundred percent
of Bosnia? You cannot have one hundred percent of the governing
authority in one hundred percent of Bosnia.” This is clear, and it is
the essential reason for this entire crisis and war, which still con-
tinues today. It is clear that the U.S. State Department and Ambas-
sador Holbrooke understood the heart of the matter, but this was
14
islamski fundamentalisti od 1991–1995, i tako }e
hteti (a `ivi bili pa videli!) sve dok ne budu
kodifokovane granice i ingerencije tih entiteta. Dok
god iko u Bosni ima {ansu da uzme 100% Bosne, 100%
posto vlasti u 100% Bosne, tamo ne}e biti mirne
Bosne.
Da ne bude zabune, ja ne govorim o svim
Muslimanima, ne govorim ~ak ni o celoj Stranci
demokratske akcije. Ja govorim o jednom zavereni~kom
jezgru koje je bilo odgovorno za sve ovo. Da se razumemo.
Ja ne plediram na to da Muslimani treba da budu Srbi,
ali mi ih smatramo, mnogi ih smatraju Srbima. Svi
wihovi veliki umovi, duhovi od Mehmet-Pa{e
Sokolovi}a, Osmana \iki}a, Hasana Rebca, Me{e
Selimovi}a, do dana{wih dana i velikana, i bili su
Srbi i ostali su Srbi. I u srpskoj kulturi koja je
wihova koliko i moja, ostvarali su velika dela. Ali, o
tome ne govorimo. Prosto, nek bude ko {ta ho}e.
Me}utim, ~ak ni cela Stranka demokratske akcije
nije kriva i odgovorna za ovo {to se desilo. U Stranci
demokratske akcije postoji jedno zavereni~ko jezgro
koje su identifikovali vo|e Muslimanske bo{wa~ke
organizacije, jedne druge muslimanske partije.
Gospodin Zuflikarpa{i} i profesor Filipovi}, koji
su napustili SDA kad su videli to, i kad su shvatili o
~emu se radi. A jedan od muslimanskih intelektualaca
pre izbora je napisao Izetbegovi}u pismo kad je
napustio SDA. Rekao je: “Misli{ li ti da su Srbi
budale i da ne vide {ta ti radi{?” Dakle, to je bio
razlog wegovog distancirawa. On, svakako, je video
dalekovido {ta }e se de{avati.
Ko je bilo to zavereni~ko jezgro u centru SDA? To
su bili Mladi Muslimani. Oni su nastali kao
15
precisely what they [the Muslims] could not achieve — which
even their most powerful ally would not recognize — they want
now, of course, to achieve the very same thing they wanted to
achieve in 1914, in 1941 under a different constellation of condi-
tions and protagonists. This is what Islamic fundamentalists have
sought since 1991–1995, and they will keep on seeking it (and let
them live to see it!) until the borders as well as the jurisdictions in
these entities have been codified. There will be no peace in Bosnia
as long as anyone has a chance of seizing one hundred percent of
Bosnia and of seizing one hundred percent of the governing au-
thority in Bosnia.
In order to avoid any confusion, I’m not speaking about all
Muslims, and I am not speaking about the entire membership of
the SDA. I’m talking about a conspiratorial nucleus that was re-
sponsible for all this. Let’s be clear about this. I’m not making
the case that Muslims should be Serbs, but many of us do con-
sider them to be Serbs, and many of them consider themselves to
be Serbs. All of their great minds, from Mehmet-Paša
Sokoloviü,1 Osman Ðikiü,2 Hasan Repþiü [phonetic spelling],3
and Meša Selimoviü4 to their great minds of the present day,
were and remain Serbs. They did great things in the framework
of Serbian culture, which is as much theirs as it is mine. But, be
that as it may, we are simply not going to discuss it. Let people
simply identify themselves as they wish.
However, even the entire [membership of the] SDA is nei-
ther culpable nor responsible for what happened. The nucleus of
conspirators within the SDA has been identified by the leaders of
the Muslim Bosniak Organization,5 another Muslim political par-
ty. Mr. Zulfikarpašiü6 and Professor Filipoviü7 left the SDA
when they saw this, when they understood what it was all about.
And one Muslim intellectual, upon leaving the SDA before the
elections, wrote a letter to Izetbegoviü. He said: “Do you think
that the Serbs are such fools that they don’t see what you’re do-
16
afiliacija, odnosno, kao neki pandan Muslimanskoj
bra}i u Egiptu koji su, kao {to znate, ubili Sadata i
{ta sve nisu uradili. Tu`ili{tvo mo`e da ka`e nije
to va`no, to je tu quoque, wima se ne sudi. Ali za{to se
wima ne sudi? Za{to su wihovi neposredni izvr{ioci
ogromnih zlo~ina (krvavih ruku do lakata) ovde
oslaba|ani? Verovatno zahvaquju}i tome {to te
optu`nice nisu bile kako treba i nije ih bilo te{ko
osloboditi. To nije tu quoque. To je jednostavno
~iwenica koja se ne mo`e zaobi}i da je wihovo
pona{awe u najpresudnijoj meri, u sto-posto, uslovilo
na{e pona{awe.
Ja imam tu zaista iznena|ewe i zabrinut kako
Tu`ila{tvo nastupa u raznim situacijama, kako bi
vrlo rado da bude su|ewe bez corpus delicti, ubistvo da
bude bez le{a, da bude prosto, jednostavno: “‘Ajde, da se
dogovorimo da sudimo i osudimo.” Ali ova odbrana ima
primedbu na to, i ne}e dopustiti da se to tako odvija,
mada sve izgleda kao da Tu`ila{tvo ima veliku
saglasnosti, veliki sporazum, veliko slagawe sa na{im
ratnim protivnicima, ili ~ak kao {to se kod nas — bez
ikakve {ale — ka`e, da Tu`ila{tvo poku{ava da ovaj
sud pretvori u Disciplinsku Komisiju NATO-saveza. A
da nema preterivawa: ~u}ete od biv{ih visokih
funkcionera ovoga Tu`ila{tva kako svi koji su se
ogre{ili o NATO moraju da odgovaraju, i kako NATO
planira da Karaxi}a likvidira umesto da ga privede
sudu.
[PO~ETAK audio snimka]
KARLA DEL PONTE: @elim da govorim
samo o Karaxi}u. SFOR, i posebno
Sjediwene Ameri~ke dr`ave, oni }e
17
ing?” Therefore, this was the reason he distanced himself from
the party. He was a man of vision and foresight who saw what
was ultimately going to happen.
Who were the members of this conspiratorial nucleus in the
heart of the SDA? They were the Young Muslims.8 They began
as an organization that was modeled on and affiliated with the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,9 which, as you know, assassinat-
ed Sadat and did goodness knows what else. The Prosecution can
say that this is not important, that this is tu quoque.10 They are
not on trial here. But why aren’t they on trial? Why have the di-
rect perpetrators (their hands are soaked in blood up to their el-
bows) of these egregious crimes been set free by this Court?
Probably thanks to the fact that the indictments were faulty and
that it was not difficult to acquit them. This is not tu quoque. It is
simply an unavoidable fact that their conduct was prejudicial in
the highest degree, and it created one hundred percent of the
conditions that gave rise to our conduct.
I am surprised, as well as concerned, by how the Prosecution
acts in various situations; how delighted they would have been to
have had a trial without a corpus delecti, [a charge of] murder
without a corpse, and to have kept it simple by merely saying:
“Come on, let’s just make a deal and agree to prosecute and con-
vict anyone we charge.” But this Defense is critical of such a
stance and it will not allow the Prosecution to proceed in this
fashion, even though it appears that the Prosecution is largely in
agreement and has an understanding with our war-time oppo-
nents, or even as our people like to say in Serbia — all kidding
aside — that the Prosecution is trying to turn this Tribunal into a
disciplinary committee for the NATO alliance. This is no exag-
geration: you will hear from former high-ranking officials of this
very Tribunal how all those who offended NATO had to be held
to account for it, and how NATO was planning to liquidate
Karadžiü instead of bringing him to trial.
18 19

poku{ati da prona|u Karaxi}a. Karaxi} [START ʊ audio recording]

zna, savr{eno zna da je u opasnosti, jer
CARLA DEL PONTE:11 I want to speak with you
ako ga otkriju, on ne}e biti preba~en `iv
about Karadžiü. SFOR, and in particular the
u Hag. To }e biti operacija, i nakon {to
United States, they will try to locate Karadžiü
ubiju Karaxi}a, re}i }e da je bio
and Karadžiü knows perfectly that he is in dan-
naoru`an i da je to bila reakcija na to.
ger because if they locate him, he will not be
Za{to to ka`em? Zato {to istra`ujem
sent to The Hague alive. It will be an operation,
sporazum izme|u Karaxi}a i Holbruka.
and after he shot down, they say he was armed,
Istra`ujem i dobijam neke dobre dokaze
was reacting. And why I’m saying that? Because
da je to istina, ali ako je istina [kao
I’m investigating about the agreement between
{to] i ~ini se u mojoj istrazi, to je
Karadžiü and Holbrooke.12 I am investigating
element [vi{e] zbog kojeg bi se trebalo
and I’m getting some good evidence that it’s
pla{iti da }e ubiti Karaxi}a.
true. But if it is true, as it seems in my investiga-
NOVINAR: Su{tina, predaja je boqa nego tion, it a more element to fear that they will kill
ubistva. Karadžiü.
KARLA DEL PONTE: Da, jer nema vi{e JOURNALIST: The substance is that surrender is
Parlamenta, nema vi{e Federacije. To je better than murder.
samo Bosna i Hercegovina. Republika
DEL PONTE: Yes, yes. No any Parliament any
Srpska vi{e ne postoji. Zavr{ena je.
more or government any more. It’s Bosnia-
Zavr{ena je Republika Srpska. Sada je to
Herzegovina. Don’t exist anymore Republika
samo Bosna.
Srpska. It’s finished. Finished Republika Srpska.
[KRAJ audio snimka] Finished. Now it’s only Bosnia.
Izgleda da sam u Tu`ila{tvo imao i prijateqe, jer ovo [END ʊ audio recording]
je neka boqa varijanta nego da me likvidiraju. Ali u
It looks like I even had friends in the Office of the Prosecutor,
svakom slu~aju, verujem da ovo ne mo`e danas da ne
because this is a better alternative than my having been liquidat-
osvesti.
ed. But, in any case, I believe that today this cannot fail to bring
Tu`ila{tvo poku{ava da izme|u ovog optu`enoga i
us to our senses.
haoti~nih doga|aja jednog gra|anskog rata — a hteo bi
da vas podsetim da nijedan rat na na{em prostoru nije No Balkan War Was ever Fought without the Component
pro{ao bez komponente gra|anskog i bratoubila~kog of a Fratricidal Civil War
rata. Uvek je okupator mogao da — odnosno agresor — The Office of the Prosecutor is trying to connect the Accused
mogao da okrene jedno protiv drugih i to je tako otkad to the chaotic events of a civil war but I would like to call to your
20
postojimo, naro~ito u modernim vremenima, u
devetnaestom i dvadesetom veku. Dakle, Tu`ila{tvo
poku{ava da ovoga optu`enoga pove`e sa haoti~nim
doga|ajima jednog gra|anskog rata koji se mogao
o~ekivati i sa doga|ajima koji su se mogli o~ekivati i
koji su bili predvi|eni. Zna~i, mene poku{avaju da
optu`e da sam ~uv’o, provodio, planirao, pomagao,
podsticao i {ta sve ne, uklawawe Muslimana i Hrvata
sa teritorija u Bosni i Hercegovini na koje su Srbi
polagali prava, iako polagawe prava na sopstvene
teritorije, kao {to }ete videti, nije krivi~no delo i,
~ini mi se, da ga Tu`ila{tvo tako i ne tretira.
Tu`ila{tvo se pona{a kao da jeste i to krivi~no delo.
I ovo kao da }emo ~esto ~uti ovde, jer se ne mo`e
opisati la`nost cele situacije.
I Tu`ila{tvo brzo prelazi preko tog mosta i
pona{a se kao da je i polagawe prava na teritorije
sopstvene, i osnivawe politi~ke stranke i izlazak na
izbore, i politi~ka odbrana od politi~kih napada, i
oru`ana odbrana od oru`anih napada, i samoodbrana, i
samoorganizovawe uslovima raspada dr`avnog
organizma, i sve {to je bio srpski-demokratski odgovor
na napade sa druge strane — i sve {to su Srbi ~inili u
nu`noj odbrani, sve to se tretira kao krivi~no delo
radi toga {to se brzo prelazi na haoti~ne doga|aje koji
se u gra|anskim ratovima mogu predvideti. Bili su
predvi|eni i znalo se da }e tako biti.
E, sada, taj mali most izme|u optu`enoga i zbivawa
odbrana smatra jako va`nim i tra`i da se vratimo na
taj most, jer ta namera da se uklone ne-Srbi sa
teritorija na kojima su Srbi u Bosni i Hercegovini
polagali pravo. Odbrana ne `eli da pre|e i da u|e, {to
bi se kod nas reklo u sitna crevca tih doga|aja, ko je
21
attention that not one single war in our part of the world was ever
fought without the component of a fratricidal civil war. The in-
vader — namely, the aggressor — always managed to turn our
people against one another, and it has been that way as long as we
have existed but particularly so in modern times, in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. Therefore, the Office of the Prosecutor is
trying to connect the Accused to the chaotic events of a civil war
that could have been expected, as well as to [subsequent] events
that could have been expected, that had, in fact, even been fore-
seen. This means they are trying to accuse me of fostering, plan-
ning, aiding, abetting, instigating, and whatever else they have in
mind, the elimination of Muslims and Croats from the territories
in B-H to which the Serbs had laid claim, even though laying
claim to one’s own territories, as you will see, is not, it seems to
me, a criminal act and I do not think that the Office of the Prose-
cutor treats it as such. The Prosecution is behaving as if this, too,
were a criminal act. And we are going to hear this often enough,
because the falseness of the entire situation here cannot adequately
be described.
The Prosecution quickly crossed this bridge, and is behaving
as if laying claim to one’s own territory and establishing a politi-
cal party and taking part in elections and political defense against
political attacks and armed defense against armed attacks and
self-defense and self-organization under the conditions of a dis-
integrating state organism, and everything that was the Serbian-
democratic response to attacks from the other side, and every-
thing that the Serbs did as part of their own necessary defense,
all this is being treated as a criminal act because chaotic devel-
opments quickly occur, which can be expected in civil wars. All
this had been anticipated and everyone knew that it would turn
out this way.
Now, this fine little bridge between the Accused and those
events is something that the Defense considers extremely im-
22
koga ubijao. I kako su se pona{ale prva, druga, tre}a
ili ~etvrta strana, jer mi smo imali ~etiri strane
tamo u ratu, kao {to }e ovaj proces pokazati. Odbrana
o~ekuje da se vratimo na taj most i da Tu`ila{tvo
doka`e tu osnovnu stvar bez koje nema nikakvog
zlo~ina~kog poduhvata i nema zlo~ina koji bi bili
odgovornost Republike Srpske kao dr`avnog organizma
i wenih organa, vlade, vojske, itd.
A evo nekoliko stvari za po~etak. Prvo,
Repupblika Srpska nije bila politi~ki ciq Srba u
Bosni i Hercegovini. Taj ciq je bila Jugoslavija.
Drugo, Republika Srpska je stvorena iz nu`de, i kao
vrlo bolan kompromis srpske strane da pristane da
izi|e iz Jugoslavije. Ali evo, ja }u prioritete srpske
da nabrojim taksativno. Prvi je o~uvawe Jugoslavije
{to ve}e. Kolika god mo`e od {est republika i to je
bio ciq nad ciqevima. Ako Muslimani i Hrvati iz
BiH ne `ele da ostanu u Jugoslaviji, srpski ciq drugog
reda bio je da Srbi sa svojim teritorijama ostanu u
Jugoslaviji na na~in na koji je Zapadna Virxinija
odlu~ila u gra|anskom ratu da se ne prikqu}i
Konfederaciji, a do tad je bila jedinstvena Virxinija,
nego je odlu~ila da sa svojim teritorijama ostane uz
Uniju i veliki predsednik Linkon je to prihvatio i
~ak i nakon zavr{etka rata to je ostalo tako. Sada
imamo Zapadnu Virxiniju, a nemamo Isto~nu, nego samo
Virxiniju. E, sad, da li mi treba da `alimo {to nije
vreme velikih predsednika pa da imamo mirno re{ewe
Jugoslovenske krize i Srpskog pitawa u Bosni i na
Balkanu.
Zna~i, na taj na~in je isto tako Severna Irska
postala. Najve}i deo Irske je dobio nezavisnost, ali
jedan deo, sa izme{anim stanovni{tvom, nije dobio
23
portant, and we seek to revisit this bridge because of that inten-
tion to eliminate non-Serbs from territories to which the Serbs in
Bosnia had laid claim. The Defense does not wish to deal with
the minute details of these events, such as who killed whom.
And how the first, second, third, or fourth parties behaved, be-
cause, as this trial will demonstrate, there were four sides at war.
The Defense expects to revisit this bridge and it is expecting that
the Prosecution will prove that fundamental charge, without
which there would neither be any [joint] criminal enterprise nor
any crimes for which the Republika Srpska (as a governmental
body), its official organs, administration, and army, etc., would
be responsible.
The Creation of the Republika Srpska
I will present several matters to begin with. First of all, the
Republika Srpska was not the political objective of the Serbs in
B-H. Their objective was Yugoslavia.
Secondly, the Republika Srpska was created out of necessity
and as an extremely painful compromise on the part of the Serbs
in order to agree to leave Yugoslavia. But here, I am going to list
the Serbian priorities individually. The first was the preservation
of a Yugoslavia that was as large as possible. As large as it could
be from its six republics, and that was the most important objec-
tive. If the Muslims and Croats in B-H did not wish to remain in
Yugoslavia, the secondary Serbian objective was for the Serbs to
remain with their territories in Yugoslavia just as West Virginia
had decided not to join the Confederacy during the Civil War,
but until that time Virginia had been a unitary state, and it in-
stead decided to remain with its territories as part of the Union,
and Lincoln, the great president, accepted this, and it remained
so after the war. Now we have a West Virginia, but we haven’t
got an East Virginia; instead, there is only Virginia. Must we
now regret that this is not an age of great presidents, so that we
24
nezaviznost, ostao je kao jedinica u Ujediwenom
Kraqevstvu. Ovu varijantu sa Severnom Irskom, to
jeste, sa varijantom da Srbi sa srpskim teritorijama u
BiH, genuinim, jer su Srbi u BiH, kao {to }e te videti,
najstarije stanovni{tvo. I jesu i ostali i ve}ina
ostalih su bili Srbi, ostanu u Jugoslaviji.
Ta ideja potekla od g. Izetbegovi}a. On je tu ideju
~ak i potpisao u svom sporazumu sa odnosnom
deklaracijom — sa g. Kraji{nikom, u septembru 1993.
godine. Srpski prioritet tre}eg reda bila je
nezavisnost Srpske konstitutivne jedinice dr`ave u
BiH {to g. Izetbegovi} tako|e nije osporavao.
^etvrta veoma bolna varijanta bila je cela Bosna
da iza|e iz Jugoslavije pod uslovom da Srbi u BiH imaju
svoju konstitutivnu jedinicu u BiH u nekoj vrsti
konfederacije, saveza bosanskih dr`ava. Ovu varijantu,
ali nepovoqniju u pogledu stepena integrisanosti
BiH, predlo`ila nam je Evropska Zajednica u okviru
konferencije koju je vodio Lord Karington, a kod nas
podkonferenciju za Bosnu, vodio ambasador Kutilero.
To je poznati Lisabonski Sporazum i Kutiqerov Plan.
Ne treba da imate sumwe da }emo dokazati da je ovo
bila lista srpskih prioriteta. Svaka od ovih
varijanata je obezbe|ivala o~uvawe mira i ostvarewe i
hrvatskih i muslimanskih optimalnih ciqeva na ra~un
srpskog popu{tawa. To dakle nisu bili ni maksimalni
ni optimalni srpski ciqevi, nego minimalni. Koji
narodni udru`eni zlo~ina~ki poduhvat mo`e da
opstane pred ovom ~iwenicom? I ja ovde nameravam da
iznesem mermerne istine, ovo je jedna od tih mermernih
istina: da je sve ovo uspelo (vidite koliko varijanti
imamo), {ta bi bilo od udru`enih zlo~ina~kih
25
could have had a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and
of the Serbian question in Bosnia and in the Balkans?
Northern Ireland was established in the same manner. The
largest part of Ireland gained independence; however, one part of
Ireland, which had a mixed population, did not; it remained with-
in the United Kingdom. This variant with Northern Ireland is
identical to the one with the Serbs and their territories, genuine
Serbian territories, because, as you will see, the Serbs of B-H are
its oldest inhabitants. And they remain so, and most of the others
were Serbs in the first place, and [they wanted to] remain in Yu-
goslavia.
This idea originated with Mr. Izetbegoviü. He even ratified
this idea in his agreement with a related declaration which he
signed with Mr. Krajišnik in September 1993. The third Serbian
priority was the independence of a Serbian constitutive unit in the
state of B-H, which Mr. Izetbegoviü, likewise, did not oppose.
The fourth extremely painful option was for all of Bosnia to
leave Yugoslavia on the condition that the Serbs in B-H would
have a constituent unit of their own in some kind of a confedera-
tion, an alliance of Bosnian states. This option, though less favor-
able with respect to the degree of integration in B-H, was pro-
posed to us by the European Community within the framework of
the Conference13 conducted by Lord Carrington, where Ambassa-
dor Cutileiro was in charge of the subconference with us [i.e., the
various warring parties] on Bosnia. That was the well-known Lis-
bon Agreement and Cutileiro Plan.
Charges of a Joint Criminal Enterprise
Let there be no doubt that we will prove that this was the list
of Serbian priorities. Each of these options ensured the preserva-
tion of peace and the achievement of the optimal objectives of
both the Croats and the Muslims through Serbian concessions.
These were, therefore, neither maximal nor optimal Serbian ob-
jectives, but minimum ones. What national joint criminal enter-
26
poduhvata? [ta bi mogli Srbi da po~ine da su svi
srpski kompromisi prihva}eni?
Daqe, Tu`ila{tvo, konstrukciju na{e navodne
namere da isteramo Muslimane i Hrvate iz svoje ku}e,
zasniva na potpuno pogre{nom shvatawu da smo mi u to
vreme svojom ku}om smatrali Republiku Srpsku. U to
vreme, kazati za Srbe svoja ku}a, to je bila Jugoslavija,
a ne BiH, i pogotovo ne Republika Srpska, koja jo{ nije
bila nastala. Dokaza}emo da nikada nije postojala
namera, primisao, a kamoli plan koji bi se ostvarivao
da se Muslimani i Hrvati odstrane iz Republike
Srpske.
Evo {ta o tome ka`e jedno drugo Ve}e ovog
Tribunala u prvostepenoj presudi g. Kraji{niku.
Dakle, ovde, to se odnosi na re~i Radovana Karaxi}a od
14-og februrara, 1992-e godine. Neposredno pred rat,
gde Ve}e zakqu~uje da je Karaxi} na jednom partijskom
sastanku — zatvorenom plenumu — rekao da paze da se
vr{i vlast na terenu odgovorno i da paze da ne bude
neke be`anije. Jer, u tom trenutku je ve} bila u nekoj
fazi konferencija, postignuti sporazumi, jo{ nije
bila potpisana, ali je postignut sporazum sa
Holbrukom da }e biti tri Bosne. Dakle ova najbolnija,
najminimalnija Srpska varijanta, da }e biti tri Bosne,
ve} je bilo postignuto, i Karaxi} govori pred dvesta
qudi koji su odgovorni za `ivot na terenu da paze
dobro da ne budu neke be`anije iz na{ih zona. Ovo Ve}e
to priznaje i ka`e da je Karaxi} jo{ uvek 14-og
februara 1992-e godine vodio ra~una o interesima
drugih. Dakle, sve pre toga 14-og februara 1992-e godine
mora da otpadne. Do tada, nije bilo udru`enog
zlo~ina~kog poduhvata.
27
prise could exist in light of this fact? My intention here is to pre-
sent the rock solid truth, and this is one of those rock-sold truths:
if all this had succeeded (you will see how many options we
had), how could there have been a joint criminal enterprise?
What would the Serbs have done if all the Serbian compromises
had been accepted?
Furthermore, the Prosecution bases its construct of our alleged
intention to expel Muslims and Croats from their homes on the
completely mistaken presumption that we, at that time, considered
the Republika Srpska to be our home. At that time, the home of
the Serbs was Yugoslavia, and not B-H, let alone the Republika
Srpska, which did not even exist yet. We are going to prove that
there never was any such intention, any ulterior motive, let alone a
plan that would realize the expulsion of Muslims and Croats from
the Republika Srpska.
Here is what another Chamber of this Tribunal says in its ini-
tial judgment of Mr. Krajišnik.14 Consequently, it refers here to the
words of Radovan Karadžiü on February 14, 1992. The Trial
Chamber concluded that Karadžiü, at a closed plenary meeting of
the party [i.e., the SDS] just before the war, said that they should
exercise their authority carefully on the terrain for which they
were responsible so that no one should flee from our areas.15 Be-
cause, at that moment, a conference was taking place, already in
one of its later stages, where agreements had been reached but had
not yet been signed, yet an agreement was reached with
Holbrooke that there would be three Bosnias. Therefore, this was
the most painful, most minimal option for the Serbs, that there
would be three Bosnias, which had already been settled, and
Karadžiü gave a speech before two hundred people who were re-
sponsible for life on the terrain [and he advised them] to take pre-
cautions that no one should flee from our zones. This Trial Cham-
ber acknowledges this and states that Karadžiü, even on February
14, 1992, was looking after the interests of others. Therefore, eve-
28
Moramo sada da identifikujemo koji je trenutak
ro|ewa i koji je ro|endan ili ro|en sat udru`enog
zlo~ina~kog poduhvata koji se zove izbacivawe Hrvata
i Muslimana iz Republike Srpske. To je, dakle, deo
upozorewa Radovana Karaxi}a vr{iocima poslova.
Ovo je slede}i — mi, zna~i, moramo pomeriti da
14-og februara nije bilo udru`enog zlo~ina~kog
poduhvata. Jo{ nije bio ro|en. 18-og marta nije bio
ro|en radi toga {to je bio tada kad je bio postignut
Lisabonski Sporazum. Sporazum je postignut bio u tom
re{ewu.
Pa onda imamo 27-og marta, gde Karaxi} govori na
Skup{tini srpskog naroda, i, evo vidite {ta ka`e, da:
“Rat u BiH ne}e re{iti ni{ta. Moramo da prou~imo
situaciju, odnosno, moramo da sa~uvamo `ivote,
imovinu i teritoriju. Mi nemamo drugih planova.”
To je, zna}i, odgovor Karaxi}a na poslani~ko
pitawe: “[ta }e biti ako nas napadnu? Imate li vi
neki plan?” Jedini plan srpski u tom trenutku je bio
za{tititi teritoriju, za{tititi narod, za{tititi
imovinu i ~ekati politi~ko re{ewe.
Daqe moramo da pomerimo u vreme prema napred, da
pomerimo trenutak ro|ewa udru`enog zlo~ina~kog
poduhvata.
12-og aprila, kad je rat ve} izbio, mi smo potpisali
sa Ambasadorom Kutiqerom primirje, sve tri strane.
Mi smo 12-og marta potpisali primirje, a uve~e 12-og
marta, muslimanska strana, SDA, je poslala — Hasan
Efendi} je poslao poznatu naredbu — instrukciju, da se
napadne svim silama JNA i Srbi, i SDS svuda {irom
BiH. Dakle, sa srpske strane, ni 12-og aprila nema
urdru`enog zlo~ina~kog poduhvata.
29
rything [i.e., all charges] relating to events before February 14,
1992 must be dropped. There was no joint criminal enterprise up
to that time.
We must now establish the birthday, the date and time of the
birth of this joint criminal enterprise that is referred to as the ex-
pulsion of Croats and Muslims from the Republika Srpska. That
was, therefore, part of Radovan Karadžiü’s warning to those un-
dertaking these tasks.
This is next ʊ we must change the February 14, 1992 date;
there was no joint criminal enterprise [at such time]. It had not
yet been born. It was not born on March 18, 1992,16 either, be-
cause that was when the Lisbon Agreement had been reached.
The decision-making process resulted in an agreement.
Then we have March 27, when Karadžiü was giving a speech
at the Assembly of the Serbian People, and here you see what he
says, that: “A war in B-H will not solve anything.17 We must
study the situation closely with respect to the saving of lives,
property, and territory. We have no other plans. [We should
strive to maintain peace.]”
It was Karadžiü’s response to a question posed by one of the
representatives: “What will happen if they attack us? Do you
have a plan?” The only plan the Serbs had at the time was to pro-
tect territory, protect the people, protect private property, and
wait for a political solution.
We must shift the time-frame forward and re-date the time of
birth of the joint criminal enterprise.
On April 12, when the war had already broken out, we
signed a cease-fire agreement with Ambassador Cutileiro with
all three sides. We signed the cease-fire agreement on March 12,
but on the evening of March 12, the Muslim side, the SDA, sent
— Hasan Efendiü18 sent this well-known order — instructions to
launch an all-out attack against the JNA, the Serbs, and the SDS
30
22-oga aprila, Karaxi} iznosi platformu za
obustavu neprijateqstava i za re{ewe krize. Moram da
Vam napomenim da je 12-og aprila, u sklopu tog
primirja, zakqu~eno da se ubrzaju radovi u okviru
Konferencije, radovi na mapama u okviru Kutiqerovog
plana. Dakle, ni 22-og aprila, nema tog udru`enog
zlo~ina~kog poduhvata.
Pa vide}ete u avgustu, recimo, kako se Karaxi}
bori da se izaberu u Skup{tini, u sudovima, Muslimani
i Hrvati. Do tada je predsednik predsedni{tva mogao
da imenuje i ja sam imenovao do tada osamnaest
Muslimana i Hrvata u sudove. ^im je po~ela Skup{tina
da se redovno sastaje, ta ingerencija je ponovo vra}ena
Skup{tini.
E, ovde ka`e: “Kao {to smo ju~e rekli, treba da
gledamo da li je pogodna li~nost, a ne ko je on.” I ovde
se identifikuje Karaxi} i Kosi}, a {to se ti~e drugih,
morate biti svesni, uvek }e imati proporcionalno
u~e{}e u vlasti. Rat je ve} po~eo nekolko meseci.
Mnogo je krvi, mnogo je sukoba, i tu je veliki problem.
Ima jedno uzdr`avawe, ustezawe, da se izabere znatan
broj Muslimana i Hrvata. Na primer, ako se wihova
deca i ro|aci bore, kako treba on da sudi. Sada i to je
jedino bilo. Me|utim, i tu, Karaxi} i Popovi} i drugi
koji tra`e da se sudije brzo izaberu, tra`e da se ne vodi
ra~una o nacionalnoj pripadnosti, nego samo o
sposobnosti i po podobnosti, a uz to upozorava da mora
biti zastupqena svaka nacionalna zajednica.
Dakle, moram da podsetim: Kako je to izgledalo 18-
og marta? Vide}ete kako je cela ’91-a pro{la u te{kim
me|unacionalnim tenzijama i srpskim popu{tawima i
predlozima najboqe vrste i najkvalitetnije od kojih bi
svaki obezbe|ivao mir u BiH.
31
throughout all of B-H. Therefore, on the Serbian side, there was
no joint criminal enterprise even on April 12.
On April 22, Karadžiü presented a platform for the cessation
of hostilities and for a resolution of the crisis. I want to remind
you that on April 12, in accordance with the terms of that cease-
fire, we decided to accelerate our work within the framework of
the Conference as well as to accelerate our work on the maps
within the framework of the Cutileiro Plan. There was, therefore,
no joint criminal enterprise even as of April 22.
Then you will see in August, for instance, how Karadžiü was
fighting to have Muslims and Croats elected to positions in the
Assembly and selected for positions in the judiciary. Until that
time, the President of the collective Presidency could make ap-
pointments, and I appointed eighteen Muslims and Croats to po-
sitions in the judiciary. Once the Assembly began meeting regu-
larly, these powers reverted to the Assembly.19
It says here: “As we said yesterday, we should determine
whether we have the right person for the right job regardless of
ethnic background.” And Karadžiü and Kosiü are identified here,
but as far as the others are concerned, you have to bear in mind the
fact that there will always be proportionate participation in the
government. The war had already begun some months earlier.
Plenty of bloodshed, plenty of clashes, and that was a big problem.
There was an aspect of restraint, and some hesitation about ap-
pointing a significant number of Croats and Muslims. For exam-
ple, if their children and relatives were fighting [against us], then
what kind of decisions were these judges going to render? And
that was the only question. However, Karadžiü and Popoviü, in
this case, as well as others who sought to have these judges select-
ed quickly, sought to have ethnic background not taken into ac-
count; instead, only personal capability and suitability, and along
with that, they cautioned that all the ethnic communities had to be
represented.
32
18-og marta smo prihvatili da }e biti tri BiH u
okviru jedne BiH — dakle, da se izvr{i {vajcarizacija
BiH. Odnosno, da BiH bude ure|ena po tipu [vajcarske
i da bude izvan Jugoslavije. To je najbolniji kompromis
srpski. Tada smo sve tri strane i prihvatili i izrazili
veliko zadovoqstvo.
Sve tri strane su imale mape, iako je jedna strana,
SDA, tvrdila da nema mape. Imali su mape, i
zakqu~ili smo da na tim mapama 80% teritorije nije
sporno. Srbi priznaju do 80% {ta je nesporno
muslsimansko, hrvatsko, i obrnuto. Muslimani, Hrvati
priznaju do 80% {ta je srpsko.
E, sada, Muslimani su ~ak pro{li i najboqe i to
ovaj gospodin, Ifran Ajanovi}, ka`e: da }e skoro cela
muslimanska zajednica `iveti u wihovoj konstitu-
tivnoj jedinici. Osta}e dvadesetak procenata u Srpskoj
i u Hrvatskoj konstitutivnoj jedinici i niko nikad ne
pomiwe nikakvu razmenu stanovni{tva niti
preseqewa, osim dobrovoqnih ako neko bude `eleo da
se radi. Gospodin Izetbegovi} je imao vrlo dobre
odnose sa mnom tokom rada na mapama — mi rekao — ja
sam to ponovio na tom sastanku — molio me da pazim, da
ne dr`im se op{tinskih granica, nego ako neko selo,
srpsko ili muslimansko, da mo`e da bude prikqu~eno
susednoj op{tini, jer to je administrativna
organizacija — ne}e to biti Berlinski zid — i wegovo
je bilo stanovi{te da pazimo da {to mawe nas bude kod
wih i {to mawe wih kod nas. Zna~i, da se {to ve}i
procenat nacionalne zajednice zatekne, odnosno, `ivi
u svojoj konstitutivnoj jedinici. Niko nikada ne
pomiwe nikakvu razmenu stanovni{tva.
^ak Karaxi} to ka`e otvoreno na 3. maja na
povratku iz Brisela, na pitawe novinara: “Da li }e
33
So, I must call this to your attention: How did this look on
March 18? You will see how all of 1991 was spent in [dealing
with] serious inter-ethnic tensions and [making] Serbian conces-
sions, and [we made] first-rate proposals of the highest quality by
which each side could have secured peace in B-H.
On March 18, we agreed that there would be three B-Hs
within the framework one B-H — that is to say, to recast B-H on
the Swiss model. In other words, B-H was going to be organized
according to Swiss principles, and it was going to be outside Yu-
goslavia. This was the most painful compromise that the Serbs
had to make. At that moment, we, all three parties, accepted this
and expressed our great satisfaction.
All three parties had maps, although one side, the SDA,
claimed that it had no maps. They did have maps, and we came
to the conclusion that up to 80% of the territory was undisputed.
The Serbs acknowledged up to 80% of what was indisputably
Muslim, Croat, and vice-versa.20 Muslims and Croats acknowl-
edged up to 80% of what is Serbian.
Well, you know the Muslims fared better than the others, and
here is what this gentleman, Irfan Ajanoviü, said: that almost the
entire Muslim community would live in its own ethnically consti-
tuted unit. Twenty percent would remain in Serbian and Croatian
ethnically constituted units, and no one ever mentioned any ex-
changes of population or any kind of migration, except for those
who would want to move voluntarily. Mr. Izetbegoviü enjoyed
excellent working relations with me while we were working on
the maps, and he told me — and I repeated this at that meeting —
he asked me to make sure that I did not adhere too closely to coun-
ty borders; instead, some Serbian or Muslim village ought to be
able to join a neighboring county — because it was just adminis-
trative organization — it wasn’t going to be the Berlin Wall —
and his point of view was that we had to take care that the least
possible number of our people should end up with their people,
34
biti razmene stanovni{tva?” Neko je pomenuo Indiju i
Pakistan. Ja sam rekao: “Mi to ne predvi|amo i to ne
preporu~ujemo. Bi}e mawina i wihova prava }e biti
za{ti}ena recipro~no, i ne}e biti nikakvih
problema.”
Kako pri ovoj mermernoj istini koja je poznata i
lako je dokazati — treba samo pogledati medije iz tog
vremena — koji je udru`eni zlo~ina~ki poduhvat na umu
bosanskim Srbima? Koji nikada nisu izneverili
nijedan sporazum koji smo postigli tokom ovog vremena,
~ak ni sporazume o primirju — to }e vas Ujediwene
Nacije uveriti svojim dokumentima — da je od dvanaest
primirja, recimo, u Sarajevu jedanaest prekr{ila
vojska Stranke demokratske akcije. Da li se iz svega
ovoga {to se do sada de{avalo do 18-og marta pa i daqe,
gde se predvi|a i pretpostavqa i nema nikakve sumwe
na Srpskoj strani, da }e to re{ewe biti tako. Da li se
mo`e iz toga izvu}i ta konstrukcija, namere Srba da
elimini{u ne-Srbe iz delova BiH koji ne}e pripasti
Srbima? Ali, uva`eni protivnici iz Tu`ila{tva
izbegavaju da doga|aje stave u kontekst, ne samo u Bosni
nego i u Jugoslaviji, ali i u Jugoslovenski kontekst
bosanske doga|aje. Tada bi se jasno videlo ko je {ta
radio i ko je za {ta odgovoran i bilo bi jasno da su
Srbi bili strana koja je popu{tala u ime o~uvawa
mira, a ne u ime ratnog re{ewa za koje je bila jedna
druga strana.
Ovde moram da ponovo uka`em na to da je za nas ovaj
sudski sistem pora`avaju}i, neuobi~ajen u odsustvo
objektivne sudske istrage. Tu`ilastvo ima odre{ene
ruke i neiscrpne resurse da asambluje, sastavi sastav
optu`nice i prate}ih dokumenata kako ono samo `eli.
I sada se ovde Srbin — a ne samo Srbin — nego bilo
35
and that the least number of their people should end up with us.
That means the largest possible percentage [of concentration] of a
national community should be attained, in other words, so that
they may live in their own constitutive unit. No one ever brought
up any kind of population exchange.
Even Karadžiü said that publicly on May 3, upon his return
from Brussels, when answering a question posed by a journalist:
“Is there going to be an exchange of populations?” Someone had
brought up India and Pakistan. I said, “We do not envisage or
recommend population exchange. There are going to be minori-
ties and they will have their rights protected on a reciprocal ba-
sis, and there won’t be any problems.”21
Faced with this truth which is written in stone, which is well
known and easily proven — one only has to take a look at the me-
dia reports from the time — what kind of joint criminal enterprise
did the Bosnian Serbs have in mind? The Serbs never violated any
agreement reached at that time, not to mention a truce — the UN
will confirm this with its own documents — that of twelve cease-
fire agreements, for instance, in Sarajevo, eleven were violated by
the Army of the SDA. With all that was happening up to March 18
and afterward [i.e., at the Conference], when it had been foreseen
and presumed, there was no doubt on the Serbian side that this
solution was certainly going to work. Is it possible to extract such
a [legal] construct of the Serbs’ [purported] intention to eliminate
non-Serbs from the parts of B-H that were not going to belong to
the Serbs? But my esteemed opponents from the Prosecution are
reluctant to place these events in context, not only in Bosnia and
Yugoslavia, but also in the Yugoslav context of the events taking
place in Bosnia. Then it would be clear who did what and who
was responsible for what, and it would be clear that the Serbs were
the party that was making concessions for the sake of preserving
peace, and that they were not in favor of war as a solution, because
another party actually was actually in favor of it.
36
koji Balkanac — pojavi i brani se kao od nevidqivih
sila. Ne mo`e da se sna|e, nego po~iwe da se brani
ovako i onako. Da, jer nema na~ina da parira svojom
istragom.
Ali, da je Tu`ila{tvo uradilo objektivnu istragu,
pore|alo hronolo{ki ovo {to se de{avalo u Bosni i
na Balkanu, ta hronologija bi odmah pokazala pravu
su{tinu. Ovako ispada da je rat po Tu`ila{tvu izbio
zato {to je ovaj optu`eni osnovao Srpsku demokratsku
stranku u julu 1990. godine sa namerom da se otarasi ne-
Srba sa teritorija na kojoj }e Srbi jednog dana u
neizvesnoj budu}nosti polagati pravo u Bosni koja u
tom trenutku ne pokazuje nikakve secesionisti~ke
namere. E, pa sad, ovo je, verujte, i kreativno i
fleksibilno i sa mnogo ma{te.
Va{oj pa`wi preporu~ujem razloge za izbijawe
rata koje je ovo isto Tu`ila{tvo navelo u jednoj drugoj
optu`nici. Zna~i, u mojoj optu`nici, rat je izbio zato
{to ja sam formirao Srpsku demokratsku stranku sa
ciqevima koji su Vam ovde predo~eni, a u ovoj drugoj
optu`nici ka`e se: “Slovenija je 25-og juna 1991. godine
proglasila nezavisnost od SFRJ, {to je doveo do
izbijawe rata.” Sla`em se. “Hrvatska je svoju
nezavisnost proglasila 25-og juna 1991. godine, {to je
dovelo do borbe izme|u Hrvatskih vojnih snaga sa jedne
strane i JNA, paravojnih jedinica vojske Republike
Srpske Krajine sa druge strane.” Ne sla`em se za
paravojne jedinice, ali sla`em se. “B-H je proglasila
nezavisnost 6-og aprila 1992. godine {to je posle 6-og
aprila dovelo do rata {irokih razmera.” Za{to u mom
slu~aju odustaje od ove istine?
I za uzrok rata progla{ava ne{to drugo, ali da
vidimo {ta jo{ jedna istaknuta li~nost, koja je bila
37
I must now once again declare that this [legal] system, unu-
sual by its absence of objective judicial investigation, is destruc-
tive for us. The Prosecution’s hands are untied and it has inex-
haustible resources [at its disposal] to assemble, to compose an
indictment, and to provide supporting documents as it alone sees
fit. Now, you have a Serb — not just a Serb — but anyone from
the Balkans — who appears here and defends himself as if
against invisible powers. He cannot orient himself, but begins to
defend himself any way he can. Yes, because there is no way he
can parry with his own investigation.
If the Prosecution, however, had conducted an objective in-
vestigation and had arranged chronologically the events that had
taken place in Bosnia and in the Balkans, such a chronology
would have immediately presented the heart of the matter. Now, it
turns out, according to the Prosecution, that the war broke out be-
cause the Accused had established the Serbian Democratic Party
in July 1990 with the intention of getting rid of non-Serbs from the
territories to which the Serbs would one day, in the indefinite fu-
ture, lay claim in Bosnia, which at that moment had not yet ex-
pressed any secessionist intentions. Well, now, believe me, this
was done with a lot of creativity, flexibility, and a great deal of
imagination.
Reasons for the Outbreak of War
I would like to call your attention to the reasons for the out-
break of the war which this same Office of the Prosecutor cited in
another indictment. My indictment states the war broke out be-
cause I founded the SDS with the expressed aims it points out
here, but this other indictment states that: “On 25 June, 1991 Slo-
venia declared independence from the SFRY, which led to the
outbreak of war.” I agree. “Croatia declared its independence on
25 June, 1991, leading to fighting between Croatian military forc-
es on the one side and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), para-
military units, and the Army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina.” I
38
predsednik ovog Tribunala, profesor Kaseze, ka`e:
“Dobro je poznato da je u Hrvatskoj i BiH, kao i u
nekoliko biv{ih Sovjetskih republika, secesija
o`ivela stare mr`we i dovela do u`asnog
krvoproli}a.”
Dakle, u mom slu~aju prema Tu`ila{tvu, rat nisu
izazvale secesije i tu mr`wu, nego Karaxi} sa svojih
osirotelih i osiroma{enih, pauperizovanih milion i
po Srbi u B-H i bez jednog saveznika osim Gospoda Boga
na svetu i nekolke male i neuticajne zemqe. I ustao je
taj Karaxi} sa milion i po Srba na rat protiv sila
nemerqivih i to na rat koji je bio suprotan svim
srpskim interesima, pa ~ak i suprotan i onim
kriminalnim ciqevima koje je nam Tu`ila{tvo
pripisuje. Ni ti ciqevi se nisu mogli ratom ostvariti.
Za{to bi Srbima bio potreban rat da bi wime
postigli ne{to {to ve} imaju i {to ve} `ele? A to je
`ivot u Jugoslaviji u kojoj `ive svi Srbi, svi Hrvati,
svi Slovenci, svi Muslimani, svi Makedonci, itd.
Za{to je Srbima potreban rat? Imaju to ve} {to `ele.
Za{to bi Srbi ono {to su imali, to je Savezna
Jugoslovenska dr`ava, koju mogu o~uvati jedino u miru,
bili za rat, kada ta Jugoslovenska dr`ava mo`e nestati
jedino u ratu? A sa~uvati se jedino u miru? Gde je tu
razumno pona{awe? Gde je tu motiv na srpskoj strani da
to urade?
Jugoslavija je mogla biti razbijena jedino u ratu, i
to }e se ovde pokazati. To je isto tako jedna mermerna
istina koju ne}e mo}i nikakve magle da pomere. Ona je
mermerna, za sva vremena.
Nasuprot Srbima, koji su hteli da sa~uvaju
Jugoslaviju, oni koji su hteli da dobiju nezavisnost
republika, to su mogli samo da postignu ratom, i o tome
39
don’t agree with these paramilitary units, but I agree [with the
statement]. “On 6 March, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared
its independence, resulting in wide-scale war after 6 April, 1992.”
22
Why, in my case, does it omit this truth?
The Tribunal declared something else to be the cause of the
war, but let’s see what another eminent figure, Professor
Cassese, who served as President of this Tribunal, says: “It is
well known that the secession in Croatia and Bosnia revived old
animosities and led to terrible bloodshed.”
Therefore, in my case, according to the OTP [i.e., Office of
the Prosecutor], secession and such hatred did not cause the war
but Karadžiü alone provoked it with his 1.5 million impover-
ished, destitute, and pauperized Serbs in B-H, and without a sin-
gle ally except the Good Lord and a few small uninfluential
countries. And Karadžiü rose to fight with a million and a half
Serbs against immeasurably greater forces in a war that was con-
trary to all Serbian interests, contrary even to those criminal ob-
jectives that the Prosecution has ascribed to us. Not even those
objectives could have been achieved through war.
Why should war have been necessary for the Serbs in order to
achieve something they already had? That was life in Yugoslavia
where all Serbs lived along with all Croats, all Slovenes, all Mus-
lims, all Macedonians, etc. Why did the Serbs need war? They
already had what they wanted. Why would the Serbs, who had the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which could only have been pre-
served in peace, have been in favor of war when that Yugoslav
state could disappear only in a war? Where is the rational con-
duct? What could motivate the Serbs to do such a thing?
Yugoslavia could only have been destroyed by war, and this
will be shown here. This is another truth that is written in stone
that no fog will ever obscure. It is written in stone for all time
and eternity.
40
nema nikakve sumwe — ne samo da je Nema~ka
ohrabrila, i rekla: “A, ako bude daqe sukoba, mi }emo
vas priznati.” [to je, naravno, ohrabrewe da se ide u
sukobe. Ali, to su nam priznali i potvrdili i
neposredni na{i ratni protivnici u to vreme.
Predsednik Tu|man je rekao da: “Rata ne bi bilo da ga
Hrvatska nije htela.” I to je na Trgu u maju 1992. godine,
kad je wihov rat — tako re}i — bio zavr{en, ona prva
faza, a rat u Bosni se razbuktao.
Ja sam zahvalan Predsedniku Tu|manu i na ovome i
na mnogim drugim stvarima koje }e biti mi od koristi u
ovoj odbrani, a mogu biti zahvalan i Tu`ila{tvu {to
raste`e moju odgovornost i na Hrvatsku, radi toga {to
mi to pru`a priliku da poka`em kako to sve je
izgledalo i kako su nam iz Hrvatske tokom 1991. — pa
~ak i 1990-e — ali 1991., stizale kolone i kolone Srba
koji su isterani, koji su navrat-nanos be`ali preko
srpskih prostora u BiH, jer bi ih u drugim prostorima
ubijali kao ze~eve, a za tim Srbima su stizale i
granate. Na ovoj slici mo`ete da pogledate kako pre
izbijawa rata u BiH, BiH polako nagoreva na rubovima,
a bogami, i u dubini. Ali [u] pograni~ni[m] gradovi[ma]
gine se u to vreme, dolaze izbeglice, a dolaze i granate
i ginu i gra|ani BiH.
I na ovu }emo se mapu vratiti, i ona }e pokazati,
kao {to ovde pi{e: “Ko je ginuo do 6. aprila?” A za taj
period mene Tu`ila{tvo tereti, a vide}ete da su do
1-og aprila ginuli uglavnom samo Srbi. No, ja dugujem
zahvalnosti i g. Izetbegovi}u za otvorenost i
iskrenost kojom me osloba|a, na najdirektniji mogu}i
na~in, skida sa mene odgovornost. On je to rekao 1993.
godine:
41
Opposed to the Serbs, who wanted to preserve Yugoslavia,
were those who wanted to gain independence as republics, which
they could achieve only by going to war, and there is absolutely
no doubt about it — not only did Germany encourage them, but
even said: “If the conflict continues, we will recognize you.”
This, of course, is encouragement to keep on fighting. But even
our direct adversaries in the war acknowledged and confirmed
this at that time. President Tuÿman said: “There would not have
been a war if Croatia had not wanted it.”23 And that is what he
said at a public rally [held in Ban Jelaþiü] Square in May 1992,
when their war — so to speak — was over, its first phase, while
the war Bosnia was bursting into full flame.
I am grateful to President Tuÿman for this as well as for many
other things that are going to be instrumental in my defense, but I
can also express my gratitude to the Prosecution for extending my
responsibility to Croatia, because that gives me the opportunity to
show what all that looked like and how in 1991 — well, even in
1990 — but in 1991, when column after column of Serbs were
arriving who had been expelled, who were fleeing helter-skelter
across Serbian areas in B-H because they were going to be killed
off like rabbits elsewhere, and after that even mortar shells were
reaching the Serbs. And in this picture you can see that before the
war broke out, B-H was smoldering along the edges but it was
burning deep inside, as well. [EXHIBIT I] People were dying in
border towns at that time, refugees were arriving, but so were
mortar shells and the citizens of B-H were dying.
We’re going to return at this map, and it will show, as it is
written here: “Who were the people who were being killed up to
April 6?” The OTP is charging me [with responsibility for events
that took place] in that time period, but you will see that Serbs
were for the most part being killed up until April 1. I also owe
thanks and gratitude to Mr. Izetbegoviü for his candor and hon-
42
Mi smo napravili na{ izbor, a mogli smo
vrlo lako da krenemo i drugim putem.
Cijena koju smo platili je visoka, ali je
morala biti pla}ena. Ako mene treba za
to kriviti, onda ne treba Karaxi}a.
Mogli smo da izbegnemo ovaj konflikt da
smo ostali ujediweni kao Jugoslavija, ali
mi smo `eleli nezavisnost. Krajem 1991
godine, formirali smo Patriotsku Ligu
itd.
On je to vite{ki uzeo na sebe. A mene abolirao, ali
Tu`ila{tvo, po svoj prilici, ne `eli Izetbegovi}evo
vite{tvo. Ono uzima sve {to dobije od Izetbegovi}a
ako je to lukavstvo, trik, prevara, itd. Vite{ko
priznawe koje potpuno ~ini izli{nim ovaj proces, nisu
ni zapazili. Ima nekoliko ispravki za g. Izetbegovi}a.
Nije Patriotska Liga formirana krajem 1991-e
godine nego 31. marta 1991. godine. Tokom ovog izlagawa
}e te videti da je formirana, zna}i, dva meseca nakon
{to smo mi formirali zajedni~ku vladu. I jo{
nekoliko ispravki, ali jedna najkrucialnija ispravka,
nije samo ostanak Bosne u Jugoslaviji — i Muslimana
bosanskih u Jugoslaviji obezbe|ivao mir — nego i na{
ostanak u Jugoslaviji, a da Muslimani i Hrvati iza|u
iz Jugoslavije po tipu Zapadne Virxinije. Zatim, i
Lisabonski sporazum, odnosno Kutiqerov plan, po kome
smo i mi Srbi dobili tek deli} onoga {to su imali
Muslimani i BiH u Jugoslaviji, da mi dobijemo u BiH
deli} te za{tite i tih prava. I u tom slu~aju se
izbegavao rat. Tada bi Srbi u BiH iza{li na
43
esty because he absolves me of responsibility in the most direct
fashion. He said that in February 1993:
We made our choice, and we could have easily
done things differently. The price we paid is
high, but it had to be paid. If I am to be blamed
for it, then Karadžiü should not [be blamed for
it]. We could have avoided this conflict had we
remained united as Yugoslavia, but we wanted
independence. Toward the end of 1991, we es-
tablished the Patriotic League….24
He chivalrously took the blame upon himself. And he ab-
solved me [of responsibility], but the OTP, taking this occasion
as it sees fit, has no use for Mr. Izetbegoviü’s chivalry. It takes
everything it gets from Mr. Izetbegoviü at face value, even if it is
cunning deceit, a trick, a con, etc. It ignores his chivalrous act of
acknowledgment which renders this trial superfluous. There are
quite a few corrections [to be made] to Mr. Izetbegoviü’s [state-
ments].
The Patriotic League was not established at the end of 1991
but on March 31, 1991. Over the course of my presentation, you
will see that it was established two months after we formed a joint
government. There are several other corrections to come, but one
of the most crucial is not simply Bosnia remaining within Yugo-
slavia — and securing peace for the Bosnian Muslims in Yugosla-
via — but even our remaining part of Yugoslavia, while the Mus-
lims and the Croats could leave Yugoslavia according to the mod-
el of West Virginia. Afterwards came the Lisbon Agreement,
namely, the Cutileiro Plan — by which we Serbs received only a
fraction of what the Muslims and Croats had already enjoyed in
the former Yugoslavia — so that we could receive in B-H a small
portion of such protection and such rights. And, in that case, the
war could have been avoided.25 The Serbs in B-H would have then
44
referendum, dali mu legitimitet. Kako god se glasalo,
dali bi mu legitimitet.
Mir se mogao sa~uvati — i na ovaj na~in —
uprili~en referendum za nezavisnost. Radovan
Karaxi} i Muhamed ^engi}, podpredsednik SDA, na
o~igled svih poslanika posti`u sporazum u Skup{tini
da vlada BiH hitno izvr{i regionalizaciju, a da Srbi
iza|u na referendum. Neko iz poslani~kih grupa kome
se ne dopada sporazumevawe sa Srbima upita ^engi}a:
“Ko te ovlastio da to predla`e{?” A ~uje se lepo na
snimku, ^engi} ka`e: “Alija Izetbegovo}, ako ba{
ho}e{ da zna{.”
Dakle, Alija Izetbegovi} je ovlastio Muhameda
^engi}a da Srbima ponudi jedno re{ewe koje spasava i
Bosnu i mir. Srbi ga prihvataju oberu~ke, za petnaest
dana }e biti donoseni akti o reorganizacija i Srbi
izlaze na referendum, ali tu opet postoji neka
demonska sila koja g. Izetbegovi}a, po stoti put,
natera da odustane i posle pauze je taj dogovor
Karaxi}a i ^engi}a pred celom Skup{tinom
poni{ten.
Jo{ jedna ispravka Gospodina Izetbegovi}a.
Zahvaquju}i srpskoj fleskibilnosti, brojnim
koncesijama koji su Srbi ~inili, bilo je jo{ vi{e
re{ewa koja su garantovala mir, izbegavawe rata, i
cene koju pomiwe g. Izetbegovi}. A samo jedno re{ewe,
samo jedno jedino re{ewe je vodilo u rat. I
muslimansko vo|stvo, vo|stvo SDA, zavereni~ko jezgro
u SDA od Mladih Muslimana, ~vrsto se dr`alo samo
tog re{ewa koje obezbe|uje rat. A to re{ewe glasi:
“Suverena i nezavisna Bosna sto posto na{a.” To jest,
onih Holbrukovih sto posto vlasti u sto posto Bosne,
ne mo`ete to dobiti. A oni ba{ ho}e. To je kqu~no
45
come out and voted in the referendum and they would have given
it legitimacy.26 Whatever way they may have voted, they would
have conferred legitimacy upon it.
Peace could have been preserved — even in this fashion — by
arranging a referendum on independence. On the eve of the Refer-
endum on independence, Radovan Karadžiü and Muhamed
ýengiü, the Vice President of the SDA,27 in the full view of all the
representatives, reached an agreement in the Assembly for the
government of B-H to take urgent steps to regionalize the country,
and for the Serbs to vote in the Referendum.28 But someone from
a group of representatives who were not pleased with the agree-
ment with the Serbs asked ýengiü: “Who authorized you to pro-
pose this?” And you can clearly hear on the videotape recording
ýengiü saying: “Alija Izetbegoviü, if you really want to know.”
So it was Alija Izetbegoviü who authorized Muhamed ýengiü
to offer the one solution to the Serbs that would have both rescued
Bosnia and secured peace. The Serbs accepted it whole-heartedly,
and in fifteen days’ time legislative acts were going to be adopted
for regionalization, and the Serbs were going to vote on the Refer-
endum, however, once again, for the hundredth time, some de-
monic force compelled Mr. Izetbegoviü to renege [on what he had
promised], and after a recess, this agreement between Karadžiü
and ýengiü was annulled before the entire [B-H] Assembly.
One more correction for Mr. Izetbegoviü. Thanks to Serbian
flexibility, and thanks to the numerous concessions that the Serbs
had made, there were still more decisions [to be made] that would
have guaranteed peace, avoided war, as well as the price [that had
to be paid] mentioned by Mr. Izetbegoviü. But only one decision,
only one single decision led to war. And the Muslim leadership,
the SDA leadership, the conspiratorial core of the SDA composed
of Young Muslims, firmly held to the decision that made war in-
evitable. And that decision proclaimed: “Sovereign and independ-
ent Bosnia is one-hundred percent ours.” That was the one hun-
46
mesto koje je Tu`ila{tvu promaklo. Muslimani su
hteli za sebe, a to ho}e danas, i to }e hteti uvek, dok se
ne kodifikuju granice entiteta u BiH-e i ingerencija
ili se ne razi|amo na miran na~in, uvek }e hteti ako
imaju {ansu.
Neke sile ih mra~ne, a vide}ete i koje, teraju na to.
Zahtevaju od wih da isporu~e, da obezbede jedan
mostobran za te interese u Evropi. Koji bi se to
Srpski udru`eni zlo~ina~ki poduhvat mogao zamisliti
ili ostvariti ili razvijati da je g. Izetbegovi}
prihvatio predlog koji je bio tokom celog rata na
stolu, predlog koji je tek 1995-e doneo g. Holbruk? Do
1995-e su svi drugi donosili te predloge, i Evropska
Unija i Kontakt grupa, i Vens i Oven, i Oven i
Stoltenberg. Svi su donosili taj predlog, i Srbi su sve
te predloge prihvatali.
Imali smo pet konferencija, Ekcelencije. Pet
konferencija. Pet mirovnih planova. Od tih pet
mirovnih planova, ovaj optu`eni je prihvatio ~etiri.
Koji bi udru`eni zlo~ina~ki poduhvat bio mogu} da je
i druga strana prihvatila jedan od ta ~etiri? I kako je,
molim Vas, Tu`ila{tvu moglo pasti na pamet onoga
trena kada smo predali svoju krizu u ruke me|unarodne
zajednice? Od toga trena, nije bilo dana kad nije bilo
konferencije. Nije bilo {anse za fait accompli.
Nije bilo {anse za uti possidetis juris: {to poseduje{,
to }e{ zadr`ati. Re{ewe je moralo biti politi~ko. I
za{to bi Srbi sada uzimali teritorije koje nemogu da
overe kroz konferenciju? I za{to bi Srbi uradili
ne{to {to na konferenciji ne}e biti prihva}eno? I
za{to bi Srbi uradili ne{to {to }e morati da vrate
na sve mogu}e na~ine? Zna~i, to je osnovno pitawe.
Kako je mogu}e da Tu`ila{tvo ne vidi da Srbi
47
dred percent of the governing authority in one hundred percent of
Bosnia that Holbrooke had said they could not obtain. But that
was what they really wanted. This is the key area that has eluded
the Tribunal. The Muslims wanted it for themselves, and they still
want it today, and they will always want it until the borders of the
entities and their jurisdictions in B-H are codified or until we sepa-
rate in a peaceful manner, they will always want it as long as they
stand a chance of getting it.
Certain dark forces, and you will see which ones, drove them
to behave this way. They were demanding that they [the Bosnian
Muslims] deliver and secure a bridgehead for their interests in Eu-
rope. What kind of joint Serbian criminal enterprise could have
been imagined or realized or developed if Mr. Izetbegoviü had ac-
cepted the proposal that had been on the table throughout the entire
war, the proposal that was finally submitted by Mr. Holbrooke in
1995? Up until 1995, everyone else submitted these proposals —
the European Union and the Contact Group, Vance and Owen, then
Lord Owen and Stoltenberg. All of them made this proposal, and
the Serbs accepted each of these proposals.
Your Excellencies, we had five [peace] conferences. Five
conferences. Five peace plans. Of these five peace plans, I, the
Accused, agreed to four of them. What kind of joint criminal
enterprise would have been possible if the other party had ac-
cepted one of those four? And how could the Prosecution have at
all come up with this idea at the very moment we turned our cri-
sis over to the International Community for resolution? From
that moment on, there was not a single day that went by without
a conference. There was no chance of a fait accompli.
There was no chance for uti possedetis juris:29 What you pos-
sess, you may lawfully hold. The solution had to be a political
one. And why should the Serbs now take territories that they could
not validate through a peace conference? And why should the
Serbs do anything that would not be accepted at a [peace] confer-
48
prihvataju sve osim sto posto vlasti u sto posto Bosne,
i vra}awe u ropstvo iz vremena Otomanske imperije,
jednog naroda skromnog, tihog, trpeqivog koji zaista
trpi i ~uva svoju veru i svoju su{tinu i svoju kulturu
pet stotina godina u najnepovoqniji uslovima u
Evropi? Najnepovoqniji uslovi za Bosanske Srbe, i ja
se pred wima klawam ovde pred Vama — klawam se pred
tom wihovom sudbinom i oni zaslu`uju da i mi svi
slu`imo, jer je to zaista ne{to {to se ne mo`e
zamisliti.
Naravno, moram da Vam ka`em da su Srbi prelazili
na Islam naj~e{}e u dogovoru. Jedan brat pre|e da
{titi drugog i tre}eg brata. A onda ve} wihova deca su
daleko, a wihovi unuci su neprijateqi. Dakle, oni prvi
konvertiti koji su pre{li na Islam nisu bili sre}ni
{to prelaze na Islam, ali tako se to desilo. E, sada,
onaj deo, onaj brat koji nije pre{ao na Islam uz sve
trpwe, sve pritiske, sve nevoqe, ~uva sve to i sada neko
treba da ga izda i neko da ga ponovo vrati u ta stawa.
Ja bih preporu~io va{oj pa`wi pozive, apele,
istaknutih muslimanskih prvaka g. Izetbegovi}u da
promeni, odnosno, politiku i da se druga~ije pona{a.
Rabija [ubi}, poti~e iz muslimanskog kruga, ali je
predsednica Socijalisti~ke partije BiH bila (i to je
multietni~ka partija i nije bila fundamentalisti~ki
orijentisana) naprotiv. Ona je napisala pismo na
samom po~etku rata Izetbegovi}u i rekla je, nabrojala :
Odbili ste formirawe Vije}a naroda u
Skup{tini. Ve}a naroda u Skup{tini
B-H tra`ila je Srpska strana.
(Li~no ovaj optu`eni i Profesor Koqevi}. I jo{ za
vreme Komunizma kad su pravqeni amandmani na Ustav,
49
ence? And why should the Serbs do anything that they would then
have to undo by all possible means? That is the fundamental ques-
tion. How is it possible for the Prosecution not to see that the
Serbs would have accepted anything except for [the Muslims hav-
ing] one-hundred percent of the governing authority over one
hundred percent of Bosnia, a remission [of the Serbs] — a modest,
peaceful, tolerant, and suffering people who did, indeed, endure
and preserved their faith, their essence, and their culture through
five hundred years of the most unfavorable conditions in Europe
— to the slavery [they endured] during the era of the Ottoman
Empire? These were conditions most unfavorable to the Bosnian
Serbs, as well — and I bow to them here before you — I bow to
their destiny, and they are even worthy of having all of us serve
them, because it [i.e., their destiny] has been unimaginable.
Of course, I must tell you that Serbs did convert to Islam, but
most frequently it was based on an agreement. One brother con-
verted to protect a second and third brother. And then their chil-
dren grew distant from one another, and their grandchildren be-
came enemies. Therefore, the first converts to Islam were not
happy about the conversion, but that was how it happened. Well,
now, this part of the population, the brother who did not convert
to Islam, had to endure suffering, all the pressures [to convert],
and all manner of misfortune to preserve all that [i.e., faith, iden-
tity, and culture], and now someone has to betray him and once
again reduce him to such circumstances.
Appeals Made by Prominent Muslims to Izetbegoviü
I would like to call your attention to all the invitations and ap-
peals that were made by prominent Muslims to Mr. Izetbegoviü to
change his policy and to amend his behavior. Rabija Šubiü, who
hails from a Muslim background, but who was also the President
of the Socialist Party in B-H (and that was a multi-ethnic party
that was not oriented to fundamentalism), was one of his oppo-
50
Ve}e naroda smo tra`ili koje bi moglo da spre~i bilo
kakav rat i bilo kakvo nasiqe. Dobili smo umesto toga
neki Savet za nacionalnu ravnopravnost koji nije
nikad radio.)
Odbili ste istorijski sporazum sa
Srpskim narodom —
O kome }ete Vi ovde ~uti.
Odbili ste Beogradsku inicijativu.
Pozivom za mobilizaciju svih Muslimana
i Hrvata. 4-og aprila ste inicirali rat.
Pokrenuli ste sve svoje veze u Islamskog
svetu da do toga do|e, itd.
Na kraju pisma, Rabija [ubi} ka`e:
Pozivamo Vas da pristupite po primeru
Vlasenice i Bratunca, gde su postignuti
dogovori izme|u Srba i Muslimana, i bez
ispaqenog metka i nasiqa, bez kriminala
i terora.
E, vidite. U Bratuncu i u Vlasenici su prema
srpskim predlozima reorganizovali, postigli
saglasnost da reorganizuju svoje op{tine da na tom
prostoru postaju dve op{tine. Vide}ete i za{to. I da
je to mogu}e. Ova civilizovana `ena, evropske
orijentacije, {ef multietni~ke partije, vidi tu
situaciju i vidi da je to re{ewe. I u sli~nim
situacijama su to videli i govorili i Adil
Zuflikarpa{i} i Muhamed Filipovi} i Fikret Abdi}
(koji je bio pobednik izbora 1990-e) i Nijaz Durakovi},
i mnogi drugi, pa ~ak i neki Srbi kao Pejanovi}, koji
zastupa onih 1.5% Srba koji su bili za nezavisnu Bosnu
bez entiteta. Ovo podse}awe —
51
nents. She wrote a letter to Izetbegoviü at the very beginning of
the war, in which she said, enumerating her points:
You rejected the formation of a Council of Peo-
ples in the [B-H] Assembly, which the Serbian
side sought.
(The Accused, along with Prof. Koljeviü, personally [sought
such a Council]. And even during the Communist era, when
amendments were made to the Constitution, we sought a Council
of Peoples that would have prevented the outbreak of war or any
other kind of violence. Instead, we got some sort of Council on
National Equality that never functioned.)
You rejected a historic agreement with the Ser-
bian people.
Of which you will hear more during this trial.
You rejected the Belgrade initiative. You started
the war on April 4 by calling for the mobiliza-
tion of all Muslims and Croats. You relied on all
your ties with the Muslim world so it would
come to that, etc.
At the end of her letter, Rabija Šubiü says:
We call upon you to act according to the exam-
ples set by Vlasenica and Bratunac, where
agreements were reached between Serbs and
Muslims without a single bullet having been
fired, without any violence, and without crimi-
nals and terror.
There, you see. Bratunac and Vlasenica were reorganized ac-
cording to Serbian proposals, and they reached an agreement to
reorganize their county so that two counties now existed in that
area. You will see why. And that it was possible. This civilized
52
SUDIJA KVAN: G. Karaxi}, ovo }ete ~uti vi{e puta.
Molim Vas, usporite zbog prevodilaca. Izvolite,
nastavite.
KARAXI]: Ovo podse}awe na sporazum u Bratuncu i
Vlasenici inicira}e Stranku demokratske akcije da
otka`e te sporazume, koji su tako|e ~uvali mir u tim
op{tinama, i posle {ta se desilo u Bratuncu i u
Vlasenici — vide}ete i ~u}ete — a Srebrenica je
susedna op{tina — vide}ete i ~uti ovde tokom ovog
procesa. A sve se to moglo izbe}i ovim {to je G|a.
Rabija [ubi} identifikovala kao sporazum u tim
op{tinama i u svim op{tinama {irom Bosne su bili
vo|eni pregovori o administrativnoj reorganizaciji
tih op{tina tako da se izbegnu tenzije i svako vodi
svoje poslove.
Koji bi srpski udru`eni zlo~ina~ki poduhvat u
ovom trenutku bio mogu} kad se vidi {ta je sve u tom
trenutku kad Rabija [ubi} pi{e g. Izetbegovi}u, {ta
je sve na snazi, {ta je sve na stolu?
Tu`ila{tvo ka`e da se Jugoslavija raspala, i treba
sada zaista da posumwamo da li se Jugoslavija raspala
— ili je razbijena. Ove strane koje su bile za razbijawe
Jugoslavije sasvim sigurno ne bi mogle do toga dovesti
da nije bilo uticaja sa strane i to presudnog uticaja.
Evo, sada bismo mogli da vidimo kako su i {ta su rekli
istaknuti autoriteti u me|unarodnoj zajednici o ovoj
stvari.
Pa su, zna~i, ja sam iz prve ruke video
kako je neposobnost i nesnala`qivost
zapadne diplomatije ubrzala raspadawe
Jugoslavije, i doprinelo `estokom
nasiqu i krvoproli}u koje je pratilo
53
lady, orientated to Europe, the leader of a multi-ethnic party, saw
the situation and saw that this was the solution. And in similar sit-
uations Adil Zulfikarpašiü, Muhamed Filipoviü, and Fikret Abdiü
(who was the winner of the 1990 elections), and Nijaz Durakoviü,
and many others, even some Serbs like Pejanoviü, who represent-
ed the 1.5% of Serbs who were in favor of an independent Bosnia
without entities, saw and said this too. This is a reminder —
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadžiü, you will be hearing this very
often. Please slow down for the benefit of the interpreters. Please
proceed.
KARADŽIû: This is a reminder that the agreement in Bratunac
and Vlasenica prompted the SDA to cancel those agreements,
which had secured peace in those counties, and what happened
next in Bratunac and Vlasenica — you will see and hear plenty
— and Srebrenica is the neighboring county — and you will hear
about and see [what happened there] over the course of this trial.
But all this could have been avoided if what Ms. Šubiü had iden-
tified as the agreement in those counties, and there were negotia-
tions taking place in counties throughout Bosnia on the adminis-
trative reorganization of those counties in order to avoid ten-
sions, so that people could go about their business.
What Serbian joint criminal enterprise could have been pos-
sible at that moment when one can see everything that was going
on when Rabija Šubiü wrote to Izetbegoviü, when all those forc-
es were exerting their influence, and when all these things were
on the table?
Statements Made by
Prominent Authorities on the Break-Up of Yugoslavia
The Prosecution states that Yugoslavia disintegrated, but we
must now, indeed, doubt that Yugoslavia disintegrated as the OTP
suggests — or was it broken up? The parties that were in favor of
the break-up of Yugoslavia certainly could not have brought it
54
dezintegracije zemqe.... Evo par primera:
prerano priznavawe Hrvatske pre nego
{to su bile kakve garancije, gra|anska i
qudska prava date srpskom stanovni{tvu
u Hrvatskoj, koja je zbog monstruoznih
doga|aja koji su se tamo desili tokom
Drugog svetskog rata, stvorilo to da
gra|anski rat bude neizbe`an....
Podstrehivawe Alije Izetbegovi}a da
povu~e svoj potpis sa takozvanog
Lisabonskog sporazuma i da nastavi sa
referendumom za nezavisnost B-H za koji
su svi znali da }e dovesti do smrti i
preme{tawa desetine hiqade qudi.
Xemz Biset, Kanadski Ambasador u Jugoslaviji.
Najve}a gre{ka je bila priznavawe svih
onih mali zemaqa koje su po~ele
odlu~ivati da su nezavisne. Srbi su
imali dobrih razloga da se brinu da }e se
na}i u zemqi pod muslimanskom
dominacijom. Nije to bila samo paranoja.
Kolin Pauel, Ameri~ki General.
Prerano priznavawe od strane Evropske
Zajednice je uni{tilo mogu}nost za
sveokupno dogovorno re{ewe za
Jugoslaviju i doprinelo je gra|anskom
ratu u Bosni. Odgovornost Nema~ke i
Vatikana za razbuktavawe krize je
ogromno.
Rolan Duma, francuski minister spoqnih poslova.
55
about unless there had been outside influences and unless those
influences had been decisive. Now we can see what prominent
authorities in the International Community had to say about this.
I witnessed at first-hand how Western diplomat-
ic ineptitude and clumsiness hastened the break-
up of Yugoslavia and contributed to the dreadful
violence and bloodshed that followed the disin-
tegration of the country. Here are a few exam-
ples.... The premature recognition of Croatia…
before any guarantees of civil and human rights
were given to the Serbian population in Croatia
which, because of the horrendous events that oc-
curred there during the Second World War,
made civil war inevitable….
The encouragement of Alija Izetbegoviü to
withdraw his signature from the so-called Lis-
bon Agreement and proceed with a referendum
on independence in Bosnia, which everyone
knew would lead to the death and displacement
of thousands of people.30
James Bissett, the Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia.
The greatest — biggest mistake was recognizing
all these little countries when they started to de-
cide they were independent. The Serbs had very
good reason to be worried about being in a Mus-
lim-dominated country. It wasn’t just paranoia.31
Colin Powell, American General.
The EC’s premature recognition had destroyed
the possibility of preventing an all-
encompassing negotiated position for Yugosla-
via and contributed to the civil war in Bosnia.
56
Ja sam duboko zabrinut da bilo kakvo
rano selektivno priznavawe mo`e
ra{iriti postoje}i konflikt i doliti
uqe na vatru na eksplozivnu situaciju,
pogotovu u B-H.
Perez de Kuejar.
Nagrada obe}ana od strane Gen{era je
imala svoj uticaj. Hrvatski separatisti
su intenzivirali svoja oru`ana
delovawa. Blokirali kasarne JNA, wihov
pristup vodi i struji. Krvoproli}e se
nastavilo, i na kraju godine Nema~ka je
isforsirala priznavawe Hrvatske. B-H,
ta divna, mala Jugoslavija, je gurnuta u
katastrofalni gra|anski rat koji je
trajao vi{e godina.
Ralf Hartman, Ambasador Nema~ke u Jugoslaviji.
slavia.
Mi smo rekli, ako se Jugoslavija ne
raspadne mirno, bi}e stra{an gra|anski
rat. Pravi problem je to {to je do{lo do
jednostrane deklaracije o nezavisnosti i
upotrebe sile da se dobije ta nezavisnost
umesto mirnih pregovora o nezavisnosti
{to je na~in na koji je trebao da se
odradi.
Xems Beker, tada{wi dr`avni sekretar Amerike.
Prerano priznavawe Slovenije i The premature recognition of Slovenia and Cro-
Hrvatske bila je garancija da se raspad
Jugoslavije ne}e re{iti mirnim putem.
Jo{ jednom je zapadna intervencija
pogor{ala, iskomplikovala ozbiqan
57
The responsibility of Germany and the Vatican
for the escalation of the crisis is enormous.32
Ronald Dumas, French Foreign Minister.
I’m deeply worried that any early selective
recognition could widen the present conflict and
fuel an explosive situation, especially in B-H.33
Perez de Cuellar.
The prize promised by Genscher had its effect.
The Croat separatists intensified their armed ac-
tivities, blockaded the JNA barracks, their ac-
cess to water and electricity. The bloodshed
went on, and at the year’s end, Germany pushed
through the recognition of Croatia. B-H, the
wonderful small-scale Yugoslavia, was driven
into a disastrous civil war lasting several years.34
Ralph Hartmann, the German [GDR] Ambassador to Yugo-
We said if Yugoslavia does not break up peace-
fully, there’s going to be one hell of a civil war.
The real problem was that there was a unilateral
declaration of independence and a use of force
to gain that independence rather than a peaceful
negotiation of independence, which is the way it
should have happened.35
James Baker, the U.S. Secretary of State at the time.
atia was a guarantee that the break-up of Yugo-
slavia would not be resolved by peaceful means.
Once again, Western intervention had exacer-
bated and complicated a serious Balkan prob-
58
Balkanski problem. Jo{ jednom je
Nema~ka intervencija imala vrlo malo
veze sa stvarnim problemima koji su
postojali na terenu Jugoslavije.
Jemz Biset, tako|e [kanadski] ambasador.
Moje mi{qewe je bilo da tvrdoglavo
prihvatawe unutra{wih granica tih
{est republika u okviru biv{e
Jugoslavije, kao granica nezavisnih
dr`ava, pre nego {to je postavqeno
pitawe priznawa tih republika, bila je
mnogo ve}a glupost nego samo prerano
priznavawe.
David Oven, posrednik.
Cimerman je rekao Izetbegovi}u: “Vidi,
za{to ti ne sa~eka{ i ne vidi{ {ta SAD
mo`e da u~ini za tebe,” {to je zna~ilo:
Mi }emo te priznati, a zatim pomo}i
tako da ne nastavqa{ sa Lisabonskim
sporazumom, ne prihvataj Kutiqerov
plan. Sa~ekaj neku vrstu unitarne
Bosanske dr`ave. Ovo je bila velika
prekretnica u na{im diplomatskim
naporima.
\or| Keni, zvani~nik, Stejt Department, koji je
radio na ovim pitawima.
I ja ne znam da li sve da ~itam ili se mo`e ~itati
sa ekrana. Zna~i, imamo jo{ dva/tri.
Ova Ameri~ka intervencija je
garantovala gra|anski rat u Bosni, i
smrti, pomerawa hiqadu qudi. Delovalo
59
lem. Again, the German intervention had little to
do with the actual problem faced on the ground
in Yugoslavia.36
James Bissett, [Canadian] Ambassador.
My view has always been that to have stuck un-
yieldingly to the internal boundaries of the six
republics within the former Yugoslavia before
there was any question of any recognition of
these republics as being the boundaries for inde-
pendent states, was a folly far greater than that
of premature recognition itself.37
David Owen, Mediator, Balkan Envoy.
Zimmermann told Izetbegoviü the following:
“Look, why don’t you wait and see what the
U.S. can do for you,” meaning we will recognize
you and then help you out, so don’t go ahead
with the Lisbon Agreement, don’t accept the
Cutileiro Plan and just hold out for some kind of
unitary Bosnian state. So this is a major turning
point in our diplomatic efforts.38
George Kenney, an official of the U.S. State Department
who worked on these matters.
I don’t know myself whether to read all these statements or
whether they can be read on your screens. We have two or three
more to go.
Anyway, this kind of American intervention
guaranteed civil war in Bosnia and the death of
thousands of people, and it acted as if the U.S.
had decided to implement a policy which would
prevent a solution to the conflict in a way which
would not be violent.
60
je kao da su Sjediwene Dr`ave bile
odlu~ile da sprovode politiku koja je
spre~ila re{ewe konflikta na na~in
koji nije nasilan.
Xems Biset, kanadski Ambasador.
Prerano priznavawe Slovenije, Hrvatske
i Bosne od strane Evropske zajednice i
Sjediwenih Dr`ava je dovela do rata koji
se sada vodi.
Sajrus Vens, posrednik, zaslanik Ujediwenih
Nacija za Jugoslaviju.
Nema~ka vlada je forsirala priznawe
protiv otpora drugih Evropskih zemaqa
i rezultat je bio katastrofa.
Na{ doma}in, Rud Luberz, Premijer Holandije.
Jednom, kad se g. Izetbegovi} vratio iz Nema~ke,
gotovo skrhano je meni i Profesoru Koqevi}u,
wegovom kolegi iz Predsedni{tvo, je rekao da je dobio
takvu ponudu da ne mo`e da je odbije i da mora da ide u
nezavisnost. Mada, te{ka srca, ja ovde optu`ujem te
vlade, od kojih su neke bile i prijateqske, koje su
zapalile tre}i po`ar na Balkanu u dvadesetom veku.
Dokazi }e pokazati da su neke od tih vlada — a pre
svega Nema~ka — jo{ za vreme `ivota Josipa Broza
Tita, predvidele izbijawe rata, wegovu `estinu,
sadr`aje, ishode, koji su za wih povoqni, ishode koje ne
`ele. Dakle, bile su vidovite. Jedan izvor te
vidovitosti bio je ovaj koji sam napomenio, da nikad
nijedan rat kod nas nije pro{ao bez gra|anske
komponente, bez bratoubila~kog rata. Ako }e biti
ratova na Balkanu, bi}e i gra|anska komponenta, i bi}e
61
James Bissett, Canadian Ambassador.
The premature recognition of Slovenia, Croatia
and Bosnia by the EC and U.S. brought about
the war that is going on now.39
Cyrus Vance, Mediator, UN Envoy for Yugoslavia.
The German government was pushing for
recognition against the resistance of other Euro-
pean countries and the result was a catastrophe.40
Our host, Ruud Lubbers, Dutch Prime Minister.
The Role of Germany in the Break-Up of Yugoslavia
Once, when Izetbegoviü returned from Germany, he, nearly
heartbroken, told Professor Koljeviü and me that he had received
an offer that he could not refuse and that he had to go for inde-
pendence. I accuse, albeit with a heavy heart, those governments,
some of which had even been friendly, that ignited the third con-
flagration in the Balkans in the twentieth century. The evidence
will show that some of these governments — first and foremost
Germany — had foreseen, even during the time of Josip Broz Ti-
to, the outbreak of war, its brutality, its content, and its results,
those which were advantageous for them, as well as those for
which they did not wish. So, they were clairvoyant. One source of
such clairvoyance I have already mentioned: there never was a
war in our country without a civil war, a fratricidal war as a com-
ponent. If there is going to be a war in the Balkans, then there is
also going to be a civil war as a component and there is going to
be internecine killing. How then can the Prosecution place the re-
sponsibility for the content of the outbreak of civil war, and the
content of the civil war which Western governments and Western
[secret] services foresaw with such clairvoyance long before they
had ever heard of Karadžiü and the Serbian Democratic Party —
62
me|usobno ubijawe. Kako onda mo`e Tu`ila{tvo da
odgovornost za sadr`aj, izbijawe gra|anskog rata i
sadr`aj gra|anskog rata, koje su zapadne vlade i zapadne
slu`be predvidele, na gotovo vidovit na~in daleko pre
nego {to su ~uli za Karaxi}a i Srpsku demokratsku
stranku — kako mo`e da ve`e za ovoga optu`enog i da
stavqa wemu na teret?
Drugi izvor vidovitosti bio je kod tih vlada {to su
ta~no znale kako su Jugoslavije nastajale i nestajale.
Ovo nije bila ni prva Jugoslavija, ni prvo nastajawe ni
prvo nestajawe. O tome }emo, ako stignemo, govoriti,
ali ho}u da Vam ka`em Jugoslavija je i nastajala i
nestajala iskqu~ivo iz interesa Zapadnih sila. Kada je
posle Prvog svetskog rata Srbija, kao sila pobednica,
mogla da odredi kakva }e izgledati Srbija, onda su
Hrvati i Slovenci tra`ili da utr~e u tu Srbiju, da se
ujedine, a zapad je video {ansu da o{teti Nema~ku, da
joj uzme ispod uticaja Sloveniju i Hrvatsku, i odbaci je
od toplog mora, od Jadrana. Kad je Nema~ka prevladala
Zapadne saveznike 1941-e godine, Jugoslavija se raspala.
Kad su saveznici nadvladali Tre}i Rajh, Jugoslavija je
obnovqena 1945-e. Kad je Nema~ka nadvladala Zapadne
saveznike 1991-e, Jugoslavija se raspala. Ali, sada za
razliku od 1941-e, izvo|a~i radova te Nema~ke namene
su na{i saveznici iz Drugog svetskog rata. E, to
Nema~ku pobedu ~ini kompletnom i definitivnom, da
weni protivnici iz Drugog svetskog rata obavqaju
wene poslove koja ona u Drugom svetskom ratu nije
uspela da uradi i bila pora`ena. Zna~i, te vlade su
odgovorne. Jugoslavia je bila pre igla, pokazateq,
kazaqka stawa u Evropi i odnosa izme|u Nema~ke i
drugih Evropskih zemaqa, nego {to je bila genuina
potreba tih naroda. Ho}u vas da posetim da pre nego
63
how can it link this to the Accused and place the entire burden on
him?
The second source of clairvoyance that these governments
possessed was that they knew exactly how Yugoslavias came into
existence and vanished. This was not even the first Yugoslavia,
and it was neither its first appearance nor disappearance. We’ll
address that matter, if we get to it, in due course, but what I want
to tell you is that Yugoslavia came into existence and then disap-
peared exclusively according to the interests of Western countries.
After World War I, when Serbia was a victorious power that could
determine what Serbia was going to look like, then Croats and
Slovenes rushed into that Serbia and united with it; the West saw
an opportunity to cause Germany damage by having Croatia and
Slovenia come under Yugoslavia’s influence, and thus evicting
Germany from warm water ports in the Adriatic. When Germany
prevailed over the Western Allies in 1941, Yugoslavia disintegrat-
ed. When the Allies conquered the Third Reich, Yugoslavia was
renewed in 1945. When Germany conquered the Western Allies in
1991, Yugoslavia disintegrated. But now, in contrast to 1941,
those who executed this Germany’s intentions are our own World
War II Allies. And this is just what makes the German victory
complete and definitive, the fact that their World War II adver-
saries did the job for them, the job that Germany had not succeed-
ed in finishing during World War II after it was defeated. This
means those governments are responsible. Yugoslavia was just an
arrow, an indicator, the hand of a clock pointing to the mood in
Europe and the current relationship between Germany and other
European countries instead of being a genuine need of its peoples.
I would like to call to your attention that before the Croats, who,
acting in their own interest, barged into Yugoslavia in 1918, the
Serbs and Croats were not enemies. There was no reason for them
to be enemies.
64 65

{to su Hrvate iz svojih interesa ugurali u Jugoslaviju Now let’s take a closer look at this — yes, such foresight ex-
1918-e godina, Srbi i Hrvati nisu bili neprijateqi. isted even during Tito’s time — let’s see what Lord Carrington
Nije bilo nikakvog razloga da budu neprijateqi. has to say about the meddling of the European Union — namely,
Da vidimo {ta je o toj stvari — da, to predvi|awe je the European Community — at that time.
bilo jo{ i za vreme Tita — da vidimo {ta Lord [START ʊ video clip]
Karington govori o me{awu Evropske unije — odnosno
If the Europeans, the Americans, and the UN
Evropske zajednice — u tom trenutku.
had not intervened in Yugoslavia, there would
[PO~ETAK video klipa] have been far fewer people killed, and there
would have been far less ethnic cleansing. There
Da Evropqani, Amerika i UN nisu
would have been some extremely unhappy and
intervenisali u Jugoslaviji, mawe qudi
dissatisfied people who felt that they had been
bi stradalo i bilo bi mawe etni~kog
done out of their country or their livelihood or
~i{}ewa. Bilo bi nekih jako
whatever it might be, but there was going to be a
nezadovoqnih qudi koji bi smatrali da su
very large number of dissatisfied and unhappy
uskra}eni za dr`avu... ali }e na kraju
people at the end of all this. And perhaps the
svega ovoga biti jako mnogo nezadovoqnih
moral of the goal is that you should think very
i nesre}nih qudi. Pouka svega ovoga je da
carefully before you intervene in a civil war.
treba biti jako obazriv prije nego {to se
umije{ate u gra|anski rat. [END ʊ video clip]
[KRAJ video klipa] Truth and reason always win in the end, and small nations can
only hope to win at the beginning instead of at the end, when it’s
Istina i pamet uvek pobede na kraju, a mali narodi
already too late for small nations.
mogu samo da pri`eqkuju da pobe|uju na po~etku, a ne na
Now I would like to call to your attention the interference by
kraju, kada je za te male narode kasno.
Western countries — not only in provoking the war but also in
E, sada, da, podsetio bih vas da je ta ume{anost
conducting it, prolonging it, ending it, and determining the out-
zapadnih zemaqa — ne samo izazivawe nego i u vo|ewe
come — was even confirmed recently by Ambassador Richard
rata, produ`avawe, zavr{etak, odre|ivawe ishoda —
Holbrooke.41 And all I can say to him is what the poet Njegoš,
ovih dana je potvr|eno i od strane ambasadora Ri~arda
once said: “Effendi, this is how I thank you for such acknowl-
Holbruka. I ja mogu samo da mu ka`em {to bi rekao
edgment.”
veliki srpski pesnik Wego{: “Efendijo, ovako ti
It will be indisputably proven that certain governments even
hvala na ovome priznawu.”
sabotaged each and every opportunity for agreements to be
Pokaza}e se ta~nim da su neke vlade ~ak i kvarile
reached between political parties and ethnic groups.
svaku {ansu za sporazumevawe naroda i strana u sukobu
tamo.
66 67

Skup{tinu bih presko~io. Zbog prevodilaca I would like to skip the part relating to the Assembly. I have
moramo sporije da — to speak more slowly for the benefit of the interpreters so that —
Uva`eni protivnik g. Tiger u svojoj uvodnoj re~i
The October 15 Session of the B-H Assembly
ka`e da i ~ak povr{an pogled u dokumente na sednicu,
My esteemed adversary, Mr. Tieger, even says in his open-
recimo, iz oktobra, sednicu Skup{tine 15-og oktobra,
ing statement — that a mere cursory glance at the documents
na kojoj se re{avao krucialne odluke oko budu}nosti
from the October session, for instance, of the Assembly’s session
BiH — da i povr{an pogled na taj transkript i na tu
of October 15 at which crucial decisions were made about the
sedmicu dokazuje srpsku krivicu, srpsku odgovornost. E,
future of B-H — that even a cursory glance at the transcript of
pa ja mislim da je taj povr{an pogled na{ najve}i
the session demonstrates Serbian culpability and Serbian respon-
problem u svemu ovome. Odbrana se protivi povr{nom
sibility. But I think that such a cursory glance is our greatest
gledawu ovih stvari i ~ini }e sve da ti pogledi vi{e ne
problem in all these matters at hand. The Defense is opposed to
budu povr{ni nego da se sagleda su{tina.
casting a cursory glance at these matters and it will do every-
Ovo je sednica, tekst koji vidite na ekranu. To je
thing in its power to avoid such superficiality and get to the heart
sednica na kojoj muslimanska strana — odnosno SDA —
of the matter.
na kraju uspela da na nezakonit, neustavan na~in donese
This is the text from the session that you see on the screen.42
Deklaraciju o suverenosti — bez Srpskih poslanika i
This is the session at which the Muslim side — that is to say the
bez predsednika Parlamenta koji je zakqu~io sednicu —
SDA — finally succeeded in passing, unlawfully and unconstitu-
i oni su zakazali novu bez prava na to. Dakle, potpuno,
tionally, the declaration on sovereignty without any Serbian rep-
apsolutno je svaka brana kr{ewu propisa ustava, zakona
resentatives in the Assembly and without the Parliamentary
bila uklowena. Na toj skup{tini sam ja dr`ao govor
Chairman [being present], who had closed the session — and
koji je najvi{e eksploatisani govor od strane
they convened a new session without the right to do so. There-
Tu`ila{tva. To je najte`e {to imaju protiv mene. A taj
fore, all the barriers against the violation of the provisions of the
govor je, Ekselencije, jedan izrazito anti-ratni govor u
Constitution, as well as of the law, were fully and absolutely re-
kome Srpska strana — odnosno ja — moli i prekliwe za
moved. At that session, I delivered a speech which is the one
varijante koje ~uvaju mir i nudi sve mogu}e koncesije.
most exploited by the Prosecution. This is the most serious
Ako odbrani bude pru`ena uobi~ajena prilika i
charge they have against me. But that speech, Your Excellencies,
uslovi da dovr{i istrage, iznese sve relevantno,
is a pointedly anti-war speech in which the Serbian side is — in
vide}ete kako je ono {to se de{avalo na terenu u haosu
other words, I am — entreating and imploring [them] for alterna-
gra|anskog rata oboga}eno posebnom vrstom zlo~ina,
tives that would keep the peace and that I would offer all possi-
masovnog ubijawa sopstvenog stanovni{tva usred
ble concessions.
Sarajeva u redu za hleb, u Ulici Vase Miskina u redu za
vodu, na igrali{tu u Dobriwi, Markale I i Markale II.
To su neverovatni primeri, drska i neverovatna
68
inovacija takozvanog ratnog lukavstva na koje su
wegovi akteri ponosni.
Ako bacimo, {to ka`e uva`eni g. Tiger, povr{an
pogled na ovo {to imamo od materijala oko Markala,
mo`emo da vidimo kako ta stvar izgleda.
[PO~ETAK video klipa — Markale]
Ovo je normalni dan kada ima robe i kada ima i
naroda na toj pijaci. Ovo je pijaca pre navodne
eksplozije srpske mine. Podne je, zimsko, februar 5.
1994. Ovo je noga koja je predvi|ena da bude odbijena —
da je srpska mina odbije od tela ne~ijega — to je
naravno ve{ta~ka noga, proteza. Nigde nema robe, nema
qudi, nema ni~ega. A tu treba da se na|e 300–400 qudi
od kojih }e 200 biti zaka~eno gelerima.
Evo je ona proteza po{to je odbijena srpskom
granatom. Pogledajte, Va{oj pa`wi preporu~ujem ove
stolove. Nigde robe nema. U ovo zimsko popodne jedno
mra~no mesto, neprijatno, bez robe, bez i~ega, skupilo
je 300-400 qudi. [ta su oni tu radili?
Kako Tu`ila{tvo o~ekuje da mu iskusne sudije
prihvate ovo podmetawe?
U sudnici }emo videti da je ovakvih — evo, to su
le{evi poginulih boraca, koje su oni posejali odre|eni
broj — evo, ovaj, ovaj najlon — na tom najlonu je donesen
ovaj poginuli borac. A ovo je le{ koji ima uko~enost
mrtva~ku i star je ko zna koliko — i borac, naravno!
Vidite da nema robe.
[KRAJ video klipa — Markale]
Evo, da ~ujemo {ta {ef...
69
The Cunning of Warfare — Markale
Now, if the typical opportunities and conditions to conduct
investigations, to present all the relevant evidence, are granted to
me for my defense, you will be able to see that what happened
on the ground in the chaos of a civil war that was enriched by its
own particular kinds of crime: the mass killing of one’s own
population in the center of Sarajevo in a bread line, on Vasa
Miskin Street in a line for water, on the athletic field in Dobrinja,
Markale I, and Markale II. These are incredible examples, inso-
lent and incredible innovations in the so-called cunning of war-
fare, of which the protagonists are proud.
If we reject what the esteemed Mr. Tieger says, the cursory
glance cast upon the material we have concerning the Markale
incident, we can see how this incident really happened.43
[START ʊ video clip of Markale]
This is a normal day when there is a lot of merchandise on
sale and there are plenty of people attending the market. [EXHIB-
IT II] This is the Market before the alleged explosion of the Ser-
bian mortar shell. [EXHIBIT III] It is a wintery afternoon, Febru-
ary 5, 1994. This is a leg that was set up to be blown off — it
was supposed to be a Serbian mortar shell that tore this limb
from someone’s body — it is, of course, an artificial limb — a
prosthetic. [EXHIBIT IV] There is no merchandise anywhere, no
people. There’s nothing at all. But 300–400 people are supposed
to have been there, of whom 200 were supposed to have been hit
by shrapnel from a mortar shell.
And here’s that same artificial limb that was supposed to
have been blown off by a Serbian mortar shell. [EXHIBIT V]
Now, I call your attention to the tables. Take a close look at
them. There is no merchandise. It was a dark winter afternoon,
an uninviting place, and there was no merchandise or anything at
70
[PO~ETAK Video klipa — Pukovnik
Demurenko]
@elim da se predstavim. Ja sam Pukovnik
Demurenko. Ja sam na~elnik {taba
sektora Sarajeva. Ja }u obja{wavati
detaqe istrage koji su dati za takozvanu
ekspertizu UN-a. Kao profesionalac, ne
mogu da se slo`im sa argumentima
specijalista UN-a o razlozima i izvorima
ovog granatirawa. Ovaj je materijal — to
je samo dio cjelog materijala specijalista
UN-a o granatirawu, ali sa vrlo ~udnim
zakqu~kom u kojem su ideje o tome da je
granatirawe bilo sa srpske strane. Jedna
mala slika koja opisuje ugao. Ovo je pravac
vatre, a ovo je mesto eksplozije. I u skladu
sa istragom, pravac vatre, paqbe je bio 176
stepeni.
A danas na temequ istrage — vrlo male
specijalisti~ke grupe, me|u kojima je bilo
nekoliko oficira — bili smo na ovim
mjestima — pje{ke smo i{li — i mogu
apsolutno potvrditi, van svake sumwe, da
su ova mjesta neprihvatqiva i nepogodna
za izbacivawe minobaca~ke granate.
Prema tome, zakqu~ak ove istrage je bio
pogre{an. Govorim samo o ovom terenu
gdje se nalaze srpske trupe. Oni su radili
istragu samo o uglu i pravcima vatre, i
automatski su razmi{qali o takozvanoj
srpskoj agresiji na civilno stanovni{t-
71
all when 300 or 400 hundred people suddenly gathered. [EXHIB-
IT VI] What were they doing there?
How does the OTP expect experienced judges to accept such
fabricated evidence?
We will see in the courtroom that such — there, those are the
corpses of — dead soldiers — of which they scattered a pre-
determined number. Here, take a look at this plastic [body] bag —
the dead soldier was brought here in that plastic [body] bag. [EX-
HIBIT VII] And this is a corpse in which rigor mortis has already
set in, and who knows how long he has been dead — and he’s a
soldier, of course!
You see that there is no merchandise.
[END ʊ video clip of Markale]
The Testimony of Corporal Demurenko
Let’s hear what the Chief….
[START ʊ video clip]
I would like to introduce myself. I am Corporal
Demurenko, Chief of Staff, Sector Sarajevo. I
want to explain any details of [the] investigation
which was provided by so-called UN expertise.
As a professional man, I cannot agree with [the]
argument of UN specialist about [the] reasons
and sources of this shelling. This is a material —
maybe one portion of whole [sic] material of UN
specialist about this shelling, but with [a] very
strange conclusion: include [the] idea about the
shelling was from [the] Serbian side. [A] small
picture which explained [the] angle. This is the
line of fire, this is [the] place of explosion. And
in accordance with [the] investigation, [the] di-
rection of fire was 176 degrees.
72
vo Sarajeva. A mislim da to nije
ispravno.
Zaustavimo ih! Zaustavimo la`ne izjave
o srpskoj agresiji na Sarajevo. Treba
obaviti apsolutno korektnu istragu sa
punom argumentacijom ili je zaustaviti.
[KRAJ video klipa — Pukovnik Demurenko]
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Ƚɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄ, ɤɚɞ ɝɨɞ Vam je zgodan
trenutak za pauzu.
KARAXI]: Ⱥɤɨ dopustite samo da zavr{im svoj pogled
na ovu ɫɬɜɚɪ. Ovo je jedno ratno lukavstvo koje je dovelo
do ka`wavawa Srba kao ratuju}e strane i wene vojske.
Ka`u da je u ratu i u qubavi sve dozvoqeno. Ja ne
mislim ni da je u ratu ni da je u qubavi sve dozvoqeno.
Ali sasvim sigurno, ako je u ratu dozvoqeno ovakvo
ratno lukavstvo, postavqa mi se pitawe da li je ono
dozvoqeno u sudovima? Kako se usu|uje Tu`ila{tvo da
ovo Vama ponudi da to prihvatite kao istinu? A nema
nijednog elementa, nema toga ni{anxije koji }e jednom
granatom minobaca~kom — koja je indirektna vatra —
pogoditi tu pijacu, na kojoj nema qudi, na kojoj nema
robe, na kojoj se odjednom pojavquje dvesta pogo|enih —
i hajmo re}i bar stotinu nije pogo|eno. Je su li oni
stolovi za{tili nekoga?
E, ja mislim da je to vrhunac da se ovo donese u sud i
da se tu u sudu mo`e desiti vrhunski zlo~in koji se zove
nepravda. Jer pravda i nepravda stanuju u istoj zgradi u
palatama pravde. Hajmo u ratno lukavstvo, u redu.
Prevarili ste nas, {ta ste sve uradili, ali
Tu`ila{tvo nastavqa to ratno lukavstvo na strani
mojih ratnih protivnika i donosi to ovde da osudi
jednog generala na do`ivotni zatvor, jer to je bilo u
73
Today, personally, with my special — not spe-
cial — very small investigation group, including
upper [sic] officers — we was [sic] on this
place — this place, this, this and this. Really by
my foot [sic]. And I can affirm absolutely with-
out, beyond any doubts. This is place unaccepta-
ble or unsuitable for [the] firing position [of a]
mortar shell.
For conclusion of material of [this] investigation
was wrong. Now I said [sic] only about terrain
where is located Serbian troops. They investi-
gate only angles and directions and [are] auto-
matically thinking about Serbian so-called ag-
gressions against [the] civilian population in Sa-
rajevo. But I think it’s not correct.
Let’s stop them! Stop false and falsehood and
lie[s] about Serbian aggressions in this area.
Please! Or investigate it absolutely correctly
with full argumentation or stop it.
[END ʊ video clip]
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadžiü, whenever you find it convenient.
KARADŽIû: If you permit me, I would just like to conclude my
views on this particular matter. This was an act of wartime cun-
ning which led to the punishment of the Serbs and their Army as
warring parties. It is said that all is fair in love and war. I don’t
think that all is fair in either love or war. But it is certain that if
such cunning is permissible in warfare, I must pose the question
whether it is also permissible in a court of law? How dare the
Prosecution present this to you as if it were the truth? And there is
not one single element, there is not a single artilleryman who can,
with a single shell from a mortar — which is indirect fire — hit
74 75

vreme generala Gali}a. I sada poku{ava da i mene this market where there aren’t any people, where there isn’t any
osudi kao wegovog vrhovnog komandanta za stvar koju merchandise, where all of a sudden two hundred wounded appear
nismo uradili. — let’s at least say that a hundred people were not hit. Did those
Jedno Ve}e je dobilo za tu varijantu. U tom Ve}u je market stalls protect anyone?
bilo kod Radi}a jedno izuzetno mi{qewe. Ali je na
Supreme Injustice of the ICTY
`albenom dobilo — pet sudija je ovo Tu`ila{tvo
I think it is a supreme injustice that this [case] was brought to
uverilo da su ovo Srbi uradili. A zlo~in — pored toga
trial, and that here in court a capital crime could be committed,
{to je zlo~in nepravde, zlo~in nad zlo~inama ve}i od
which is called injustice. Because justice and injustice dwell in the
ovoga, i jo{ ve}i od ovoga je zlo~in uveriti
same edifice in the palace of justice. Let’s return to the subject of
muslimanske mase da su im ovo Srbi uradili. Kako se
wartime cunning. You deceived us with everything you have
o~ekuje pomirewe Srba i Muslimana ako Muslimani
done, but the Prosecution is continuing this wartime cunning on
veruju da su im ovo Srbi uradili? A nisu uradili. Vidi
behalf of my wartime adversaries and introduces it here to convict
se da nisu uradili. I mo`emo da doka`emo da nisu
a general to life imprisonment — I’m talking about the trial of
uradili. I ovo i sve incidente masovnih stradawa u
General Galiü.44 And now the Prosecution is trying to convict me
Sarajevu, to }emo ovde dokazati da nisu Srbi uradili.
as his supreme commander for something we did not do.
Eto, Ekselencije, mislim da je o ovom incidentu za
One Trial Chamber already succeeded with this tactic. In the
uvodnu re~ dovoqno, ali moram da preporu~im Va{oj
Radiü Trial Chamber, there was an instance of exceptional think-
pa`wi trikove ratne koje je Tu`ila{tvo preuzelo i
ing. However, the OTP won on appeal — the OTP convinced
nastavqa s wima kao da rat nije zavr{en. Time
five appellate judges that this crime was committed by the Serbs.
Tu`ila{tvo postaje u~esnik u ratu i ono poku{ava i
But the crime — besides the crime of injustice, a crime greater
ovaj sud da u~ini u~esnikom u ratu u korist jedne od
than all others, even this one — and the even greater crime of
zara}enih strana.
convincing the Muslim masses that Serbs did this. How can one
Mo`emo na pauzu, Ekcelencije, ako vi odlu~ujeɬɟ.
expect a reconciliation between Serbs and Muslims if the Mus-
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Napraviʄɟɦɨ ɩɚɭɡɭ ɨɞ 20 ɦɢɧɭɬɚ. lims believe that the Serbs did this to them? But they didn’t do it.
It is evident that they didn’t do it. And we can prove that the
ȽɈɋɉɈȾɂɇ ɌɂȽȿɊ: ɑɚɫɧɢ ɋɭɞɟ, ɨɩɪɨɫɬɢɬɟ, ɚɥɢ ɚɤɨ ɛɢɯ
Serbs didn’t do this. We are going to prove that the Serbs were
ɦɨɝɚɨ ɜɪɥɨ ɤɪɚɬɤɨ ɞɚ ɩɨɦɟɧɢɦ ʁɟɞɧɭ ɩɨɬɟɧɰɢʁɚɥɧɭ ɬɚɱɤɭ
not responsible for this as well as all the other instances of mass
ɪɚɡʁɚɲʃɟʃɚ ɩɪɟ ɩɚɭɡɟ. Ɇɨʁ ɪɚɧɢʁi ɡɚɯɬɟɜ ɭ ɜɟɡɢ ɫɚ ɦɟɪɨɦ
killing in Sarajevo.
ɨɩɪɟɡɧɨɫɬɢ, ɩɪɟɞɥɨɝ ɤɨʁɢ ʁɟ ɩɨɞɧɟɬ 13. ɮɟɛɪɭɚɪɚ, ɜɟɪɭʁɟɦ,
There you have it, Excellencies. I think that this will suffice as
ɧɢʁɟ ɛɢɨ ɨ ɭɩɨɡɨɪɟʃɭ — ɨɩɪɨɫɬɢɬɟ — ɨɩɬɭɠɟɧɨɦɟ ɭ ɩɨɝɥɟɞɭ
far as the opening statement is concerned with respect to this par-
ɧɚɫɬɚɜɤɚ ɫɭɻɟʃɚ, ɲɬɨ ʁɟ ɛɢɥɚ ʁɟɞɧɚ ɪɚɧɢʁɚ ɬɟɦɚ, ɧɟɝɨ ɨ
ticular incident, but I must call your attention to these wartime
ɩɪɟɞɥɨɝɭ ɡɚ ɭɩɭɬɫɬɜɨ ɭ ɜɟɡɢ ɫɚ ɩɪɢɯɜɚɬʂɢɜɨɲʄɭ ɩɨɞɧɟɫɚɤɚ.
tricks that the OTP simply adopted and continues to use as if the
Ɍɨ ʁɟ ɦɨɠɞɚ ɛɢɥɨ ʁɚɫɧɨ, ɚɥɢ ɫɚɦ ɢɩɚɤ ɯɬɟɨ ɞɚ ɪɚɡʁɚɫɧɢɦ ʁɟɪ ʁɟ
war were not over. In this fashion, the OTP becomes a participant
76
ɤɨɞ ɦɟɧɟ ɩɨɡɢɜɚʃɟ ɋɭɞɚ ɧɚ ɩɪɟɬɯɨɞɧɭ ɞɢɫɤɭɫɢʁɭ ɢɡɚɡɜɚɥɨ
ɡɚɛɪɢɧɭɬɨɫɬ ɞɚ ɋɭɞɫɤɨ ȼɟʄɟ ɫɦɚɬɪɚ ɞɚ ɫɚɦ ʁɚ ɦɢɫɥɢɨ ɧɚ
ɦɨɝɭʄɧɨɫɬ ɭɩɨɡɨɪɟʃɚ ɨ ɧɚɫɬɚɜɤɭ, ɚ ɧɟ ɩɪɟɞɥɨɝ ɡɚ ɭɩɭɬɫɬɜɨ ɨ
ɩɪɢɯɜɚɬʂɢɜɨɫɬɢ ɢɫɤɚɡɚ.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɉɪɢɯɜɚɬʂɢɜɨɫɬ ɩɨɞɧɟɫɚɤɚ.
ȽɈɋɉɈȾɂɇ ɌɂȽȿɊ: Ɉɞ ɩɨɞɧɟɫɚɤɚ, ɱɚɫɧɢ ɋɭɞɟ, ɬɚɱɧɨ. ɂ ɬɨ
ʁɟ ɛɢɨ ɩɪɟɞɥɨɝ ɩɨɞɧɟɬ 23. ɮɟɛɪɭɚɪɚ. ȼɟɪɭʁɟɦ ɞɚ ʁɟ ɨɞɛɪɚɧɚ
ɪɟɚɝɨɜɚɥɚ ɭɤɚɡɭʁɭʄɢ ɞɚ ɧɟɦɚʁɭ ɫɬɚɜ ɨ ɬɨɦɟ.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɉɨɝɥɟɞɚʄɟɦɨ ɡɚ ɜɪɟɦɟ ɩɚɭɡɟ.
Ⱦɜɚɞɟɫɟɬ ɦɢɧɭɬɚ.
— ɉɚɭɡɚ ɩɨɱɟɥɚ ɭ 10:29.
77
in the war, and it is trying to draft this Chamber and this Tribunal
into the war as a participant for the benefit of one of the warring
parties.
We may pause now, Excellencies, if this is convenient.
JUDGE KWON: We’ll break for 20 minutes.
MR. TIEGER: Your Honor, excuse me, but if I could raise one
potential point of clarification before you break very quickly. My
earlier request in connection with a cautionary measure, that is the
motion filed on February 13th, I believe, was not about a warning
— excuse me — to the Accused concerning the continuance of
trial, which was the earlier subject, but instead to the motion for an
instruction regarding admissibility of submissions. It may well
have been understood but I wanted to clarify that because the
Court’s reference to previous discussion caused me some concern
that the Bench may have been thinking I was referring to the pos-
sibility of a warning about continuance rather than the motion for
an instruction regarding the admissibility of statements.
JUDGE KWON: Admissibility of submissions.
MR. TIEGER: Of submissions instead, Your Honor, yes. And
that was a motion filed on February 23rd. I believe the Defense
responded by indicating they had no position on that.
JUDGE KWON: We’ll take a look over the break. Twenty
minutes.
— Recess taken at 10:29 a.m.
78
— ɇɚɫɬɚɜɚɤ ɭ 10:53.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Ƚɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ɍɢɝɟɪ, ɦɢ ɫɦɨ ɩɪɟɝɥɟɞɚɥɢ
ɩɪɟɞɥɨɝ ɤɨʁɢ ɫɬɟ ɫɩɨɦɟɧɭɥɢ ɢ ȼɟʄɟ ʁɟ ɡɚɤʂɭɱɢɥɨ ɞɚ ʁɟ ɭ ɨɜɨʁ
ɟɬɚɩɢ ɞɨɜɨʂɧɨ ɢɫɬɚʄɢ ɞɚ ɨɩɬɭɠɟɧɢ ɞɚʁɟ ɫɜɨʁɭ ɢɡʁɚɜɭ ɭ
ɫɤɥɚɞɭ ɫɚ ɩɪɚɜɢɥɨɦ 84, ɚ ɞɚ ʄɟ ɨɫɬɚɬɚɤ ɛɢɬɢ ɪɚɡɦɚɬɪɚɧ ɩɨɫɥɟ
ʃɟɝɨɜɟ ɢɡʁɚɜɟ.
ȽɈɋɉɈȾɂɇ ɌɂȽȿɊ: ɋɯɜɚɬɚɦ, ɱɚɫɧɢ ɋɭɞɟ, ɚ ʁɚ ɧɢɫɚɦ
ɨɫɩɨɪɚɜɚɨ ɋɭɞ ɧɚ ɛɢɥɨ ɤɨʁɢ ɧɚɱɢɧ. ɋɚɦɨ ɫɚɦ ɫɟ ɩɥɚɲɢɨ ɞɚ
ɩɨɫɬɨʁɢ ɦɨɝɭʄɧɨɫɬ ɡɚɛɭɧɟ. ɏɜɚɥɚ.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɜɚɦ. Ƚɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄɭ, ɦɨɥɢɦ
ɜɚɫ ɧɚɫɬɚɜɢɬɟ.
KARAXI]: @eleo bi sada da vidimo {ta Lord Oven,
koji je bio posrednik u tra`ewu mira, govori o
Markalama.
[PO~ETAK video klipa]
Lord Oven, biv{i {ef Britanske
diplomatije, predstavqa Evropu kao ko-
predsednik Konferencije o biv{oj
Jugoslaviji zajedno sa g. Stoltenbergom,
predstavnikom Ujediwenih Nacija. 12-og
februara, uve~e, dvanaestorica
ministara spoqnih poslova su primili
izve{taj, koji smo mi fotokopirali, a
posebno paragraf 7 koji se odnosi na
atentat 5-og februara u Sarajevu. Lord
Oven pi{e, citiram: “Mesto sa kojega je
ispaqen ovaj projektil nalazi se na jedan
do jedan i po kilometar unutar
teritorije pod kontrolom Muslimana,
izmeren od demarkacione linije koja ga
deli od Vojske Republike Srpske.”
79
— On resuming at 10:53 a.m.
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, we looked at the motion you re-
ferred to, and the Chamber found it sufficient to note that [at]
this stage that it is pursuant to Rule 84 that the Accused is mak-
ing his statement, and then the remainder will be taken care of
after his statement.
MR. TIEGER: I understand, Your Honor, and I wasn’t disputing
the Court in any way. I just was concerned about the possibility
of some confusion. Thank you.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Mr. Karadžiü, please continue.
Lord David Owen’s Observations
KARADŽIû: I would now like for us to see what Lord Owen,
who was a mediator in the search for peace, has to say about
Markale.
[START ʊ video clip]
Lord Owen, the former chief of British diplo-
macy. He represents Europe as Co-Chairman of
the Conference on the former Yugoslavia to-
gether with Mr. Stoltenberg, a representative of
the UN. On the evening of February 12, a doz-
en or so foreign ministers received reports,
which we have photocopied, specifically Para-
graph 7 which is related to the Sarajevo attack
on February 5. Lord Owen wrote, I quote: “The
position from which this shell was launched is
located one to one-and-a-half kilometers inside
Muslim-held territory, as measured from the
line of demarcation which separates this territo-
ry from that held by the Army of Republika
Srpska.”
80
[KRAJ video klipa]
Vide}ete, Ekselencije, u ovoj sudnici mno{tvo
sli~nih `alosnih inscenacija, koje je suprotna strana
~inila svome narodu, a vide}ete i za{to u wihovoj
ideologiji je to zapisano kao obaveza.
Sad bi preporu~io Va{oj pa`wi jo{ jedan takav
trik koji je nama tamo naneo zna~ajne {tete, a evo
Tu`ila{tvo poku{ava da iz wih izvu~e jo{ neki
benefit:
[PO~ETAK video klipa]
“Nema smisla pretvarati se da ovde ima
nevinih, da je jedna strana ~ista dok je
druga agresorska. To nije tako.”
Lord Dejvid Oven je do{ao u BiH u
avgustu 1992-e godine da bi zamenio Lorda
Karingtona kao posrednika Evropske
zajednice. On je do{ao sa reputacijom
`estokog kriti~ara Bosanskih Srba.
Ali, Oven je brzo shvatio da Muslimani
~esto izmi{qaju incidente da bi
pokrenuli javno mwewe protiv Srba.
Mediji su, na primer, optu`ili Srbe za
granatirawe bolnice Ko{evo u Sarajevu.
“Posmatra~i UN-a su videli grupu
vojnika u uniformama muslimanske vojske
kako unose minobaca~e u bolnicu i
ispaquju granatu u pravcu gde su bile
Srpske snage. Posle toga su se jako brzo
spakovali i oti{li. Stigle su TV ekipe
nekoliko minuta kasnije i to je sve
81
[END ʊ video clip]
Excellencies, you will see in this courtroom a multitude of simi-
lar sorrowful incidents that the other side committed against its
own people, and you will see why this has been written into their
ideology as an obligation.
Now I’d like to call your attention to yet one other such trick
that caused us serious damage, and now the Prosecution is trying
to extract some further benefit from it.
[START ʊ video clip]
“There is no use in anybody pretending that
there are innocents in this business, and that
there is one side that is pure white, the victims,
and other side pure-on black, the aggressors.
That is not the case.”
Lord David Owen came to B-H in August of
1992 to replace Lord Carrington as mediator for
the European Community and with a reputation
as a hardline critic of the Bosnian Serbs. But
Owen quickly learned that Muslim forces rou-
tinely staged incidents to turn world opinion
against the Serbs. Media reports, for instance,
had accused the Serbs of targeting Koševo Hos-
pital in Sarajevo.
“The UN monitors actually saw a mortar bomb,
a mortar crew come into the hospital in Bosnian
government military forces uniform and fire
over the Koševo Hospital into an area, presuma-
bly Serb. The mortar was packed up pretty
quickly. A television crew arrives, set up on the
grounds of the hospital. A few minutes later, re-
taliatory fire from the place where the mortar
82
snimqeno, i neko vreme kasnije su pale
granate sa Srpskih polo`aja.”
Oven je ~uo da je vladi Aliji
Izebegovi}a, komandant UN snage u
Sarajevo, General Filip Morijon, poslao
izuzetno o{tro pismo. U wemu je pisalo:
“Jedan konkretan dokaz od svedoka ovog
gnusnog ~ina. Moram da vas upozorim na
posledice koje mo`e imati ovakvo
o~igledno kr{ewe @enevske Konven-
cije.”
Jer, General Morijon je mislio da je to
tako. Kad sam pitao Generala Morijona,
on mi je rekao u svakom pogledu: “Za{to
niste objavili ovo pismo?” On je samo
slegnuo ramenima i rekao: “Moramo da
`ivimo ovde.”
Lord Oven i posrednik UN Sajrus Vens su
shvatili da su wihovi napori da postignu
kompromis stalno sabotirani propagand-
nim ratom, namewenim Ameri~koj pub-
lici.
“U Americi jo{ uvek imaju predstavu da
su to Kauboji i Indijanci, dobri i lo{i
momci. Oni vole da vide stvari na
jednostavan na~in. Tu je bila od koristi i
`estoka propaganda i to je bio isto-
vremeno i propagandni i pravi rat. Bilo
je spektakularnih doga|aja.”
[KRAJ video klipa]
83
came and, of course, landed on the hospital, all
filmed on television.”
Owen learned a strongly worded letter had been
sent to the government of Alija Izetbegoviü by
the UN commander in Sarajevo, General
Philippe Morillon, stating: “I have concrete evi-
dence from witnesses of this disreputable and
cowardly act. I must point out to you the harm
that such blatant disregard for the Geneva Con-
vention does to your cause.”
Then I said to General Morillon, who is, I think,
an exceptionally able soldier in every way:
“Why don’t you make all this public?” He
shrugged his shoulders in a sort of Gallic way
and he said: “We have to live here.”
Lord Owen and UN mediator Cyrus Vance
found that their efforts to negotiate a compro-
mise to end the conflict were undermined by the
propaganda war that targeted U.S. public opin-
ion.
“In America they have a press and a television
presentation that is still Cowboys and Indians,
good and bad guys. They like to see things in
simple terms. There’s no doubt about that, and it
has been helped by some very strongly motivat-
ed propaganda. It’s a propaganda war as well as
an actual physical war. There were spectacular
events.”
[END ʊ video clip]
84
Da. Ovo {to ka`e Wegovo Vo|stvo propagandni rat. Taj
propagandni rat se nije mogao voditi i zamisliti i sva
ova lukavstva nisu mogla da se kwi`e kao srpska
krivica i srpska odgovornost bez pomo}i svih onih koji
su bili tamo u ime me|unarodne zajednice. Vide}ete u
ovoj sudnici tokom vremena, tokom procesa, kako su
nisko pale humanitarne organizacije, pa ~ak i neke od
najvi{ih i neke od dosada potpuno nespornih, preko
nekih obskurnih koji su bez ikakvih granica — i dobar
im je naziv, oni su zaista bez ikakvih granica — koje su
upropastile i samu ideju humanitarnosti. Bavile se
klasi~nim {pijunskim radom za svoje zemqe u korist
jedne zara}ene strane. Krilale la`i u svojim
izve{tajima. Lagale u javnim saop{tewima, posu|ivala
svoja privilegovana vozila pripadnicima nacionalnih
oru`anih snaga nekih zemaqa koji su tamo bile na
nezakonit na~in prisutne, prolazile na{e linije pod
firmom tih organizacija i za{ti}enih kola. A posle,
kada na{i vojnici to posumwaju i po~nu kontrolu, onda
mi dobijamo optu`be da smo neprijatni prema tim
organizacijama. [vercovali su oru`je u tim kolima.
[vercovali su borce suprotne strane. Jednom re~ju,
bili su ratuju}a strana.
A kada se na{a vojska legitimno po~ne braniti od
tih diverzantskih akcija, nezakonitih akcija pojedinih
organizacija humanitarnih koje, ili to rade same ili
dadnu svoja za{ti}ena vozila, onda imamo prqavi rat
protiv nas iz svih oru|a u medijima, ovo {to je Lord
Oven rekao, tako|e, to ne bi moglo biti bez medija.
Vide}ete tokom ovog perioda, tokom ovog procesa,
kako su la`ni novinari upropastili ideju novinarstva.
Objektivno. Kako su ti la`ni novinari proizveli
smrti mnogih novinara {irom sveta po rati{tima. I
85
Propaganda War
Yes. What His Lordship calls a propaganda war. This propa-
ganda war could not have been waged or imagined, and all this
cunning could not have been booked against the Serbs if it were
not for the assistance of all of those who were there on behalf of
the International Community. In due course during this trial, you
will see in this courtroom the low level to which humanitarian
organizations have fallen, from some of the most esteemed, some
of which up until now had been incontestable, to other obscure
ones that, unimpeded by borders — and that’s a good name for
them because they are not restricted by any borders — destroyed
the very essence of humanitarianism.45 They performed classic
espionage work for their countries on behalf of one warring party.
They concealed lies in their reports. They lied in press releases.
They lent their protected vehicles to members of armed nationalist
forces of some countries who were present illegally, who also
crossed our lines under the aegis of those organizations by means
of their protected vehicles. And later, when our soldiers became
suspicious and began conducting inspections, we were then
charged with being hostile to such organizations. They smuggled
weapons in those vehicles. They smuggled in enemy combatants.
In short, they were a warring party.
When our troops legitimately began defending themselves
from these acts of sabotage, illegal acts committed by individual
humanitarian organizations, whether they were doing this on
their own or whether they were simply lending their protected
vehicles, then we had this dirty war being conducted against us
[which utilized] all the media tools, and as Lord Owen said, it
could not have happened without the media.
You will see during this period of time, during the course of
these proceedings, how fake journalists ruined the very idea of
journalism. Objectively. How these fake journalists brought
about the deaths of many [genuine] journalists in many theatres
86
jesu upropastili ideju o nepristrasnosti novinara i
zloupotrebili su tu svetu poziciju da nisu pristrasni i
da nisu ratuju}a strana i da im treba biti pristup
otvoren svuda, kao {to smo im mi otvorili svuda.
Kao {to smo, recimo, ekipu jedne Britanske
televizije doveli svojim avionom na povratku sa
konferencije u Londonu. Otvorili im zemqu da idu gde
ho}e, a onda su napravili jedne druge Markale — to je
bilo 1992-e godine. Vide}ete sada u ovom video iz
Trnopoqa za koje }emo dokazati da nije bio logor, nego
je bio prihvatili{te kojim su upravqali same
izbeglice. Evo kako se pojavila ona slika sa
bodqikavom `icom u svetu.
[PO~ETAK video klipa]
Selo Trnopoqe. Centar su koristili
qudi koji su bili u prolazu, koji su hteli
da se sklone od borbi.
“…. Niza{ta. Za{to se ja borim? ȳɚ ɫɚɦ —
imao sam sre}u — do{‘o sa malom djecom,
bilo prete`e male dece. Tu niz poqe.
Nije niko nas maltretirao. Nije niko nas
ni dirao. Ja sam potpuno [nerazumqivo] u
selo ….”
Izbegli~ki Centar u Trnopoqu je imao i
lekarske prostorije. Muslimanski dok-
tor je tamo radio.
“Od prvog dana smo ovde bili zajedno. Sa
ovog terena su dobrovoqno dolazili.
Verovatno iz nesta{ice hrane.”
Ƚɨɫɩɨɻɚ Ɇɚɪɲɚɥ ʁɟ ɨɞɥɭɱɢɥɚ ɞɚ ɧɟ snima
ovo. Umesto toga, ona i wena ekipa su se
87
of war throughout the world. And they did ruin the idea of im-
partial journalism, and they abused this sacred position of impar-
tiality, of not being a warring party, and they [abused their privi-
lege of having to] have open access everywhere, just as we gave
them unrestricted access anywhere they wanted to go.
Penny Marshall’s Mendacious Documentary for ITN
Just as we, for instance, brought a UK TV crew on our own
plane on our way back from the London Conference. We allowed
them to go anywhere in the country they wanted to go, and then
they perpetrated a second Markale. That was in 1992. You will
now see this video footage from Trnopolje which will prove that it
was not a concentration camp; it was, instead, a refugee shelter
that was run by the refugees themselves. This is how that picture
with the barbed wire was broadcast throughout the world.46
[START ʊ video clip of Judgment]
The village of Trnopolje. The center was mainly
used by people in transit. They were trying to
get away from the fighting, and needed a place
to stay during their travels.
“We have nothing to fight for. I came with chil-
dren, young children, here down the field. No-
body harassed us. Nobody laid a finger on us. I
stayed in the village.”
The refugee center in Trnopolje included a med-
ical facility. The Yugoslav and ITN crews inter-
viewed Dr. Mestroniü, Idris, a Muslim doctor
there.
“We have been here from the very first day.
People came here of their own free will, proba-
bly because of food shortages.”
88
pomerili u deo koje je slu`io za
skladi{tewe. Stavila ɫɜɨʁɟ ɤɚɦɟɪɟ ɢ
ɫɧɢɦɚ ɭ ɨɜɨɦ ɨɬɜɨɪɟɧɨɦ ɩɪɨɫɬɨɪɭ. ɍɦɟɫɬɨ
ɬɨɝɚ, ɨɧɚ ɢ ʃɟɧɚ ɟɤɢɩɚ ɫɭ ɭɲɥɢ ɭ ɞɟɥɢɦɢɱɧɨ
ɡɚɬɜɨɪɟɧ ɩɪɨɫɬɨɪ ɤɨʁɢ ʁɟ ɛɢɨ ɤɨɪɢɲʄɟɧ ɤɚɨ
ɫɤɥɚɞɢɲɧɢ ɩɪɨɫɬɨɪ ɡɚ ɤɨɥɢɰɚ ɢ ɫɥɢɱɧɨ.
Ɉɪɨɧɭɥɚ ɨɝɪɚɞɚ ʁɟ ɢɦɚɥɚ ɠɢɱɚɧɭ ɨɝɪɚɞɭ ɩɪɢ
ɞɧɭ ɢ ɧɟɤɨɥɢɤɨ ɪɟɞɨɜɚ ɛɨɞʂɢɤɚɜɟ ɠɢɰɟ ɧɚ
ɜɪɯɭ ɞɚ ɫɟ ɫɩɪɟɱɢ ɤɪɚɻɚ. ɇɚɲɚ ɟɤɢɩɚ ʁɟ
ɫɧɢɦɚɥɚ ɂɌɇ ʂɭɞɟ ɞɨɤ ɫɭ ɫɟ ɨɧɢ ɭɥɚɡɢɥɢ ɭ
ɬɚʁ ɨɝɪɚɻɟɧɢ ɩɪɨɫɬɨɪ ɤɪɨɡ ɪɭɩɭ ɭ ɨɪɨɧɭɥɨʁ
ɨɝɪɚɞɢ. ɇɟɤɨ ɢɡ ɝɪɭɩɟ ɢɡɛɟɝɥɢɰɚ ʁɟ ɪɟɤɚɨ,
'ȿɜɨ, ɨɜɚʁ ɝɨɜɨɪɢ ɟɧɝɥɟɫɤɢ,' ɩɨɤɚɡɭʁɭʄɢ ɧɚ
ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɚ Ɇɟɯɦɟɬɚ.”
“Ja mislim da je ovde veoma bezbedno.”
Evo ovde imate jedan dijagram koji
pokazuje, koji dokazuje da su ITN qudi
ozna~eni plavom, a ovi drui crvenom
bojom.
[Nerazumqivo]
Peni Mar{al je postavila svoje kamere
iza bodqikave `ice. Ona je gde treba
biti. Sada tra`i u gu`vi ~oveka koji ima
izgled koji wojzi treba. Treba joj zvezda
za ovu pri}u koju }e prodati {irom svetu.
[KRAJ video klipa]
Ekselencije, dokaza}emo pomo}u dokaza koje
Tu`ila{tvo poku{ava da upotrebi protiv nas.
Dokaza}emo ono {to mi ho}emo da ka`emo.
Ovo je bio prihvatni centar. Bio je to logor,
prolazno mesto, za qude koji nisu zbog borbi imali gde.
89
Ms. Marshall chose not to set up her cameras
and film in this open area. Instead, she and her
crew maneuvered into a partly enclosed space
used as a storage area for wheelbarrows and the
like. The dilapidated fence had chicken wire on
the bottom, a few strands of barbed wire on top
to discourage theft. Our crew filmed the ITN
people as they maneuvered into this area through
a hole in the broken-down fence. Someone in
front of the crowd of refugees said, “Here, this
one speaks English,” pointing to Mr. Mehmet
[phonetic spelling].
“I think it’s very safe.”
Here is a little diagram showing the position the
position of the two crews. [EXHIBIT VIII] The
ITN people are the blue circle on the left; we’re
the red circle on the right.
[Unintelligible]
Penny Marshall had set up her cameras behind
the barbed wire. She was in position. Now she
searched the crowd for that perfect look. She
wanted a star for the story, the story she would
sell the world.
[END ʊ video clip of Judgment]
Your Excellencies, we will prove this with the aid of evidence
that the Prosecution has been trying to use against us. We will
prove what we are trying to say.
This was a refugee center. It was a camp, a temporary shelter
for people who had nowhere to go because of the fighting. This
will clearly demonstrate that even the evidence that the Prosecu-
90
To }e Vam zorno pokazati i dokazi koje Tu`ila{tvo
poku{ava da upotrebi protiv nas — ali }emo mi to
upotrebiti u na{u odbranu.
Ekipa koju ste videli u{la je u mesto gde se ~uva
alate. To mesto je ogra|eno bodqikavom `icom. Oni su
sebe zatvorili u bodqikavu `icu i snimali su slobodne
qude. Kroz tu bodqikavu `icu, ta slika je obi{la svet.
Mi smo `estoko patili zbog toga. Mi smo ka`wavani
na stotine na~ina zbog ove slike, i molim vas, ne
zanima me kako spava Gospo|ica Peni Mar{al posle
toga {ta nam je nanela ovom slikom. Ali vas molim, da
li to sme da do|e u sud? I da se u sudu nastavqa ratno
lukavstvo i naprosto od toga, stvara slika o Srbima, i
Srbi optu`uju i osu|uju.
Spomiwao sam ovde da smo u~inili sve {to smo
mogli da se sklopi mir, da se izbegne rat. Podseti}u vas
da je 1991-e godine bilo mnoga tenzija: rat je u
Hrvatskoj; u Bosni su nesporazumi. Onda ova mawa
muslimanska stranka, MBO (Muslimanska-Bo{wa~ka
Organizacija) koju su vodili Zulfikarpa{i} i
Filipovi}, do{la kod nas i rekla: “Ovo nevaqa. Nije
dobro {ta se de{ava. Ho}ete li vi da odustanete od
ovih reorganizacija, od Srpskih autonomnih oblasti?”
Od svih onih mera koji smo mi preduzimali iskqu~ivo
kao odgovor na mere koje su SDA protiv nas
upotrebqavala. Mi smo prihvatili. Evo {ta svedo~i
jedan od vo|a, potpresednik te strane, koji su smislili
i predlo`ili istorijski Srpsko-Muslimanski
sporazum po kome se rat izbegava, i sve se sre|uje, da
Muslimani i Srbi `ive sasvim dobro i mo`emo da
zamislimo sada gde bi bili Srbi i gde bi bili
Muslimani. Koliko bi bilo vi{i `ivih i koliko bi
bilo mawe siroma{nih, i koliko bi bilo boqe da je
91
tion is trying to use against us — but we are going to use it in our
own defense.
The TV crew that you saw went into the area where tools
were stored. It was surrounded by barbed wire. They enclosed
themselves in barbed wire, but were videotaping people who were
free. This image went through that barbed wire and then traveled
all over the world. We suffered bitterly because of this. We were
punished a hundred different ways for these images, yet please
note that I am unconcerned as to how Ms. Penny Marshall sleeps
at night after all the harm she inflicted on us with those images.
But I ask you, is it permissible to admit such things [as evidence]
in court? And to have this wartime cunning continued in a court of
law simply to create an [fake] image of Serbs in order to condemn
and indict them?
The Serbian-Muslim Historic Agreement
I have said here that we had done everything in our power to
achieve peace and to avoid war. Let me remind you that there was
a great deal of tension in 1991: there was a war going on in Croa-
tia; there were misunderstandings in Bosnia. Then this junior Mus-
lim party, the MBO [the Muslim-Bosniak Organization], led by
Zulfikarpašiü and Filipoviü, came to see us and said: “This is bad.
What’s going on is no good. Will you abandon the idea of the re-
organization of Serbian autonomous counties?” And all those oth-
er measures that we undertook exclusively as a response to the
measures undertaken against us by the SDA. And we accepted
[their proposal]. Here is the testimony of one of their leaders, the
Vice President of the party which designed and proposed the his-
toric Serbian-Muslim Agreement by which war had been avoided,
and had arranged everything so that Muslims and Serbs could live
alongside each other very well, and we can now only imagine
where the Serbs would be and where the Muslims would be [i.e.,
if that agreement had been implemented]. How many more people
would still be alive and how many fewer impoverished people
92
ovaj sporazum prihva}en. A mi smo, podse}am, sve mere
koje smo doneli kao odgovor na nezakonito pona{aawe
SDA i HDZ, kao odgovor na kr{ewe na{ih ustavnih
prava i zakonskih prava i prava po osnovu
me|unarodnih akata koji i nas {tite, sve smo to
napustili onoga trena kada su do{li Zulfikarpa{i} i
Filipovi} da predlo`e ovo.
E, sada je tu trenutak da uka`emo na jednu iluziju
koju Tu`ila{tvo ho}e da stvori jer bez toga ne mo`e,
bez te iluzije, bez te metonimije, bez tog trika, ne
mo`e nas da optu`i, ne mo`e optu`nica protiv mene.
Oni ka`u da Srbi ne}e da `ive sa Muslimanima. A mi
~inimo sve da Muslimani ostanu s nama u Jugoslaviji.
Srbi ho}e da `ive sa Muslimanima; Srbi ne}e da `ive
pod Muslimanima. Srbi ne}e da `ive i nikada to ne}e,
i to je na{e pravo. Nikada ne}emo `iveti pod tim
re`imom u koji bi nas li{io na{ih osnovnih prava.
Dakle, optu`nica bi morala odmah da padne kad
utvrdimo da Srbi ho}e da `ive sa Muslimanima. Da su
sve u~inili da ih zadr`e u Jugoslaviji, ne bi bili drugi
narod koji to ~ini? Neko vreme bi bili drugi. Mo`da
bi uskoro bili i prvi. Ali, imali svu za{titu — {ta
bi Muslimani u Jugoslaviji imali? Imali bi za{titu
kao narod i imali bi za{titu u svojoj republici. A
kada Muslimani ka`u: “Ho}emo da iza|emo iz
Jugoslavije,” onda mi ka`emo: “U redu. Dajte nama {to
vi imate u Jugoslaviji. Dajte nam na{u konstituitivnu
jedinicu u Bosni, i mi izlazimo iz Jugoslavije.” Samo
da imamo neku za{titu. Ne mo`e. Sto-posto vlasti u
sto-posto Bosne.
A evo sada govora koji je najvi{e eksploatisan zato
{to kad se sakati i uzme se samo jedna re~enica — taj
govor je poznat — jer je najvi{e eksploatisan protiv
93
there would be had this agreement been accepted.47 And, as I said,
we abandoned all the measures that we had employed as a re-
sponse to the illegal conduct undertaken by the SDA and the
HDZ, as a response to the violations of our constitutional rights,
lawful rights, based on international covenants that protected us,
the moment Zulfikarpašiü and Filipoviü made this proposal.
Now is a good time to point out the illusion that the Prosecu-
tion wants to create, because without such an illusion, without
such metonymy, and without such trickery they cannot indict
me, and charges against me are impossible. They claim that
Serbs would not live with Muslims. On the other hand, we were
doing everything possible to keep the Muslims with us in Yugo-
slavia. The Serbs want to live with Muslims, but they don’t want
to live under Muslim rule. The Serbs will not live [under such
conditions] and they will never accept it, and this is our right.
We shall never live under such a regime that would restrict our
fundamental rights.
Therefore, once we have established that Serbs were willing
to live with Muslims, the Indictment should collapse immediate-
ly. If they [the Serbs] had done everything to keep them in Yu-
goslavia, wouldn’t there have been another people who would
have done the same thing? At some time there would have been
others. Perhaps in a short time they would have been the first.
But they [the Muslims] had complete protection [of their rights]
— what would the Muslims have had in Yugoslavia? They
would have enjoyed protection as a people, and they would have
enjoyed the protection of their own republic. But when the Mus-
lims said, “We want to leave Yugoslavia,” then we just said:
“Fine. Give us what you had in Yugoslavia. Give us our own
constituent unit in Bosnia and we’ll leave Yugoslavia, too.” Just
so we could have some protection. Impossible. One-hundred
percent of the governing authority in one hundred percent of
Bosnia.
94
mene. Molim vas, preporu~ujem Va{oj pa`wi da
pogledamo taj govor i da ga onda da ocenimo. Radi se o
15-om oktobru, definitivnom nasilnom usvajawu
Deklaracije o nezavisnosti, o suverenosti.
[PO~ETAK video klipa]
Jer ovo {to vi predla`ete zadire u
integritet Jugoslavije, a integritet
Jugoslavije se mo`e poremetiti, mada ne
mo`e ni to, ali mo`e ako se dogovorite u
Saveznoj Skup{tini i saveznim
institucijama. Ovde se mije{aju mnogi
planovi. Pozivate se na zakone kad vam
treba, a kad vam ne treba onda idete sa
politi~kim proklamacijama. Srbi u BiH
mogu da spre~e i Hrvate i Muslimane ako
je stani-pani da iza|u iz Jugoslavije. Ali,
mi ne}emo da vas spre~avamo. Mi ne}emo
da vas spre~avamo. Jer smo suvereni
narod. Gospodo, nisam ja ovde nastupio
kao bog rata, kao {to kako me neko
po~astio epitetom iz Hrvatske demo-
kratske zajednice, nego vam ka`em po
stoti put, u na{im razgovorima sam to
rekao, ne kreira Srpska demokratska
stranka voqu srpskog naroda. Ona je
tuma~i. Mi bismo vas krvavo slagali kad
bih smo rekli da vi ovo mo`ete da
izglasate i da mo`ete sa ovim ne{to da
uradite u Evropi.
Evo gospode iz SDA-a. Mi tri meseca
govorimo o drugim stvarima. Razgovaramo
slobodno i otvoreno o posebnoj i
95
Radovan Karadžiü’s October 15 Speech before the Assembly
Now, here is a speech which has been exploited to the great-
est possible extent, because when it is butchered and when one
sentence is taken [out of context] — this speech is well known
— because it was exploited to the greatest possible extent to my
prejudice. Please, I would like to call your attention to this
speech in order to examine it and then assess it. It was delivered
on October 15, and it concerns the definitive and forcible adop-
tion of the Declaration of Independence, of sovereignty.
[START ʊ video clip]
Because what you are proposing encroaches upon
the interests of Yugoslavia, and the integrity of
Yugoslavia could be undermined, even though
that is not possible, but it is possible if it is agreed
upon in the Federal Parliament and other federal
institutions. Many plans are being mixed up here.
You resort to laws when it suits you, but when it
doesn’t suit you, you come out with political
proclamations. Serbs in B-H can prevent the Cro-
ats and Muslims, if push comes to shove, from
leaving Yugoslavia. But we will not prevent you
from doing so. Because we are a sovereign peo-
ple. Gentleman, I did not come here as a god of
war, as someone from the Croatian Democratic
Party has honored me with this epithet, but I am
telling you for the hundredth time, which I spoke
of in our negotiations, that the Serbian Democrat-
ic Party does not create the will of the Serbian
people. It interprets it. We would be telling you a
bloody lie if we had said that you could pass this
as legislation and that you could do something
with this in Europe.
96
druga~ijoj organizaciji BiH, gde }e
mo`da neka trostepenost omogu}iti da
Bosna ostane cela, i da u Jugoslaviji budu
Srbi kol’ko oni ho}e, Muslimani kol’ko
oni ho}e, a Hrvati kol’ko oni ho}e. To je
jedno trostepeno re{ewe, jer bi se
suverenitet naroda, kao {to je Gospodin
Bjelobrk ta~no pro~itao, ostvarivao ne
samo na nivou republike i nivou savezne
te dr`ave, nego i na nivou oblasti ili
autonomije, kako smo mi predlagali. Ako
ne}ete to, mo`emo se dogovoriti da mi
vas ne sprije~avamo da iza|ete iz
Jugoslavije, plebiscitom naroda, ali
istim plebiscitom i po istom pravu, mi
}emo sprije~iti vas da vi nas izvedete iz
Jugoslavije. Mi ne branimo da vi
podnesete inicijativu i da se promjeni
ustav BiH, ali to ne ide ovako. To mora
da ide kroz ustavnu komisiju pa na Vije}e
gra|ana, pa da se tamo o tome glasa.
Ja poku{avam na najmirniji na~in i to da
Vam ka`em. Srpski narod zna {ta Vi
ho}ete. Vi ho}ete u Hagu da postignete da
je ovo tre}a ili ~etvrta republika koja
ne}e da `ivi u Jugoslaviji, a to ne
mo`ete, jer mi ho}emo da `ivimo u
Jugoslaviji. To mo`ete da ka`ete za sebe.
Suvereni narodi u BiH mogu da ka`u za
sebe; ne mogu za drugi narod. ^ak smo
takav zakqu~ak donijeli na ovoj
Skup{tini. Mi }emo vas onemogu}iti
pred doma}om i svjetskom javno{}u da
97
Here are the gentlemen from the SDA. We have
been discussing other matters for the last three
months. We are freely and openly discussing a
different and special organization of B-H, where
some kind of a three-tiered approach would ena-
ble Bosnia to remain united and for Serbs, Mus-
lims and Croats to remain in Yugoslavia as long
as they want to. This is one three-tiered solution,
because the sovereignty of the peoples, as Mr.
Bjelobrk correctly stated, would be exercised not
only at the level of the republic and the federal
state, but also on the regional level or autonomy,
as we had proposed. If you don’t want this, we
could agree not to prevent you from leaving Yu-
goslavia by means of a plebiscite, but we have the
same right to resort to the same plebiscite in order
to prevent you from taking us out of Yugoslavia.
We do not forbid you to submit an initiative to
change the constitution of B-H, but it cannot be
done this way. It must go through a constitutional
commission, then a civil council of citizens, and
then it would be put to a vote.
I’m trying to explain this to you in the calmest
possible way. The Serbian people know what you
want. You want to make a successful case in The
Hague that this is the third or fourth republic that
does not want to live in Yugoslavia, but it is im-
possible because we want to live in Yugoslavia.
You can speak for yourselves. All the sovereign
people of Bosnia can speak for themselves, but
they cannot speak for other peoples. We have
even reached such a conclusion in this Assembly.
We will prevent you in national and international
98
izvr{ite nasiqe nad Srpskim narodom —
ustavno nasiqe. A nakon ustavnog nasiqa
slede sva druga nasiqa. Mi se vi{e ne
pitamo za situacijom. To je ovde tako|e,
za ovom govornicom sto puta re~eno. Ne
pitamo se za situaciju ako dospijemo u
stawu koje su dospijele Slovenija i
Hrvatska, naro~ito Hrvatska. S tim {to
bi u BiH, taj pakao bio bi hiqadu puta
te`i i ne bi bilo na~ina da se zaustavi.
Ja Vas jo{ jedanput molim — ne prijetim
— nego molim, da ozbiqno shvatite
tuma~ewe politi~ke voqe Srpskoga
naroda koju ovde zastupa Srpska
demokratska stranka i Srpski pokret
obnove, a poneki Srbin iz drugih
stranaka. Molim Vas da ozbiqno
shvatite, ovo nije dobro {to vi radite.
Ovo je put na kojim vi ho}ete da izvedete
BiH, ista ona autostrada pakla i
stradawa kojom su po{li Slovenija i
Hrvatska. Nemojte da mislite da ne}ete
odvesti BiH u pakao, a muslimanski
narod mo`da u nestanak, jer muslimanski
narod ne mo`e da se odbrani ako bude rat
ovde.
Molim Vas, neka su velike rije~i. Velike
situacije zahtijevaju velike rije~i. Kako
}ete vi sprije~iti da svak’ svakoa ne
ubija u BiH? Kako se mo`e sprije~iti
rat u Hrvatskoj, pogotovo tamo u rubnim
krajevima gde su na dodiru Srbi i
99
public opinion from committing violence against
the Serbian people — constitutional violence.
Constitutional violence breeds all other kinds of
violence. We are no longer wondering about the
situation. This has been repeated at this rostrum a
hundred times. We won’t be wondering about the
situation if we find ourselves in the same condi-
tion as Croatia and Slovenia, especially Croatia.
Because in B-H such a hell would be a thousand
times worse, and there would be no way to stop
it.
I ask of you once again — I am not making a
threat — rather I am pleading that you take seri-
ously the political will of the Serbian people as
represented here today by the Serbian Democrat-
ic Party, the Serbian Renewal Movement, and
some Serbs from the other political parties. I am
making a plea that you seriously understand that
what you are doing is not good. You want to
lead B-H down this path, the same highway to
hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia have
already taken. Do not think that you will not
lead B-H to hell, and the Muslim people perhaps
into extinction, because the Muslim people will
not be able to defend themselves if there is a war
here.
Please, let these important words stand. Serious
situations demand important words. How are
you going to prevent people from killing each
other in B-H? How can the war in Croatia be
prevented, especially in border areas where
Serbs and Croats are in contact with each other?
100
Hrvati? ^ije se dvije politi~ke voqe
sudarile, a nisu realizovane na jedan
pravni na~in, na jedan na~in na koji se
jedino mo`e realizovati.
[KRAJ video klipa]
Jo{ sam na delu koji se ovde ne vidi rekao: “Moramo
spre~iti haos. Red je u na{im rukama, a mi smo u rukama
haosa. Mi ne mo`emo upravqati haosom.”
Dok dr`imo red, dotle mo`emo da upravqamo. To je
u na{im rukama. E, sada, vidite kada uzmemo sve u obzir,
kada vidimo {ta su rekli o ovoj situaciji izuzetni
autoriteti svetski, ono {to smo videli o priznawu,
itd., mo`emo onda da se pitamo, {ta je to mala Srpska
zajednica u BiH mogla da uradi? [ta je, osim da
odustane od sebe i da se preda? Dakle, mi imamo ovde
priliku da razlu~imo da li je ovo bilo zakonito
pona{awe sa strane HDZ-a i SDA? A Srbi su kr{ili
wihova prava i wihove zakone? Ili su oni prekr{ili,
a Srbi su se branili minimalnim sredstvima, stalnim
popu{tawima, koncesijama, itd.
Videli ste da se kr{i Ustav kada je potrebno, a da
skr{en Ustav ne postoji, poziva.
I sada, {to bi rekao hrvatski pisac Krle`a, ova
kriza se u ovoj fazi odvijala po tipu ga{ewa svetla u
balkanskoj kr~mi, i onda ko {ta uhvati, ko {ta
postigne, i onda, posle toga, }e se upaliti svetlo i
nastavi}e se sa po{tovawem reda i zakona. Srbi to nisu
mogli sebi da dozvole. A opet, podse}amo da je podela
BiH tu|a ideja, pre svega ideja g. Izetbegovi}a, koji je
bio zainteresovan, a to }e potvrditi i svi wegovi
saradnici i ovaj razgovor koji }ete sada ~uti. Wega je
zanimalo da ima mawu BiH, a da u woj postigne
101
Their political wills have clashed, but have not
been realized in a legal fashion, which is the on-
ly way they can be realized.
[END ʊ video clip]
I also said in a segment not shown here: “We must prevent cha-
os. We hold order in our hands, but we are in the hands of chaos.
We cannot manage chaos.”
We can manage things to the extent we can keep order. It is
in our hands. So, now you see that when we take all this into
consideration, when we see what eminent authorities throughout
the world have said about this situation, about recognition, and
other issues, we may then ask ourselves what could this small
Serbian community in B-H have done? What could they have
done except give up and surrender? Therefore, we now have the
opportunity here to determine whether this was lawful conduct
on the part of the HDZ and the SDA or not. And whether or not
the Serbs were violating their rights and laws or whether they
were violating the rights of Serbs, who were defending them-
selves by minimal means, by continually making accommoda-
tions and concessions, etc.
You have seen that the Constitution was violated when it
was necessary, and the Constitution thus violated does not exist;
it issues a challenge.
And now, as the Croatian writer Krleža would say, this crisis
developed into this phase in much the same way as when the lights
are turned off in a Balkan tavern, when who grabs what or who
gets whatever, and after everything is over, the lights are turned
back on and law and order is respectfully reintroduced. The Serbs
couldn’t allow that to happen. Then again, let us recall that the
division of B-H was someone else’s idea, first and foremost the
idea of Mr. Izetbegoviü, who was quite interested, and this will be
confirmed by all of his associates as well as these intercepts that
102
Islamski kvalitet `ivota, kakav su od wega o~ekivali
wegovi arapski i islamski prijateqi.
E, sada, ja Vas molim da ~ujemo ovaj razgovor izme|u
Karaxi}a i Milo{evi}a, koji nije namewen javnosti,
gde se autenti~no i iskreno govori.
[PO~ETAK audio snimka]
KARAXI]: Preksino} iza{ao sam sa
jednim, i posle toga ru~ao sa wim.
Potpuno iznena|ewe. Izetbegovi} je
govorio jasno i otvoreno, i nikad nije
bio otvoreniji da podjelimo Bosnu. Ja, mi
smo se zapawili, pa kako to? O tome
nismo razmi{qali. Ja mislim da on ne bi
`elio da se udru`i sa Hrvatskom, nego
ho}e da pomo}u Hrvatske da iza|e iz
Juguslavije, jer bi on hteo jednu enklavu
ovde u doline reke Bosne — Islamsku. Ja
mislim da mu ona treba za arapski svijet.
I jo{ mislimo da bi bila {teta da se
Bosna cjepa — to je na{ na~elan stav.
MILO[EVI]: Pa ne}e, ne}e ti
Muslimani da rade {ta Alija
Izetbegovi} radi. Ja ti ka`em.
KARAXI]: Dobro, a sad je — Boga mi
ova situacija, mislim — i on je vrlo
lukav. On ne govori one ultima poteze.
On je posledwe poteze ove, one posledwe
poteze svoje islamskoj republici. Nego,
on se sad zaklawa iza dr`ave gra|ana.
[KRAJ audio snimka]
103
you will now to hear. He was only interested in having a smaller
B-H, while establishing in it a Muslim way of life, as his Arab and
Muslim friends were expecting him to do.
The Intercepted Telephone
Conversation between Karadžiü and Miloševiü
Can we now please listen to this conversation between
Karadžiü and Miloševiü, which was not intended for public con-
sumption, but a candid and authentic conversation took place.
[START ʊ audiotape]
KARADŽIû: That evening the day before yes-
terday, I went out with one of them and then we
had lunch. It was a complete surprise. Izetbe-
goviü spoke clearly and openly, and he was nev-
er more explicit about dividing up Bosnia. I was
— we were shocked. So how did this come up?
We hadn’t thought about it. I don’t think he
[Izetbegoviü] wanted to unite with Croatia; in-
stead, he wants Croatia’s help to leave Yugosla-
via, because what he’d like is to have an Islamic
enclave in the Bosna River Valley. I think he
needs it for the Arab world. We still believe that
it would be very bad if Bosnia were torn apart
— that is our fundamental position.
MILOŠEVIû: They won’t — those Muslims
won’t do what Alija Izetbegoviü is doing. I’m
telling you.
KARADŽIû: Fine, but now — for Christ’s sake,
I think — he is quite cunning. He’s not talking
about his ultimate moves. Those ultimate moves
— his final moves are for an Islamic republic.
104
E, sada, imaju}i pristup svemu ovome, Tu`ila{tvo
poku{ava da me okarakteri{e kao vo|u koji je
formulisao i realizovao zlo~ina~ki plan da se stvori
zaseban etni~ki entitet sade na velikim delovima
teritorije BiH-ne. A to se nije desilo dok nas nisu
naterali da uzmemo {ta daju, da se spasavamo glavu.
Ka`u Karaxi} je vrhovni vo|a. Kada bi Tu`ila{tvo
poznavalo srpski narod, moralo bi da ka`e Karaxi} je
vrhunski sluga svog naroda, a to, ustvari, i treba da
bude tako, i tako pi{e u Jevan|eliju. Ko ho}e da bude
prvi, da Vam slu`i.
Drugi deo re~enice nije samo sporan nego je
neta~an, i sli~an je onom stavu Tu`ila{tva iz
paragrafa broj 11, ka`e Tu`ila{tvo: “Kako se
Jugoslavija raspadala, republike su krenule prema
nezavisnosti.” Ovo je prili~no lukavo. Nema {ta.
Republike su krenule ka nezavisnosti zato {to se
Jugoslavija raspada. Ja Vama, i svima koji se bave ovom
optu`nicom preporu~ujem jednu zabavu. Sve {to
Tu`ila{tvo ka`e protiv mene i protiv Srba samo
okrenite druga~ije. I vide}ete da je ta~nije, i vide}ete
da je zabavno.
Ovu naglava~ke, “upside-down” logiku treba vratiti.
Onda bi ovaj paragraf izgledao ovako: “Kada su
republike krenule ka nezavisnosti, Jugoslavija je
po~ela da se raspada.” I to je ta~no, a ne ono {to
Tu`ila{tvo ka`e. Prvo su republike krenule u
nezakonite, nelegalne jednostrane secesije. ^uli smo
od veliki svetskih autoriteta, svetske politike i
nauke, da je to bilo tako, ali Tu`ila{tvo ovde ho}e da
vas ubedi da je “other way around,” — obrnuto. I onda,
naravno, u tom slu~aju se mo`e govoriti o Srpskoj
krivici, ali u prvom slu~aju, kada je jasno da nije se
105
Instead, he’s now hiding behind the citizens of
the state, the citizenry.
[END — audiotape]
Now, having access to all this, the Prosecution is trying to re-
characterize me as a leader who formulated and implemented a
criminal plan now to create a separate ethnic entity on large parts
of the territories of B-H.48 But this did not happen until they
forced us to take what was offered in order to save our lives.
They say Karadžiü was the supreme leader. If the Prosecu-
tion knew the Serbian people properly, they would then have to
say that Karadžiü was the supreme servant of his people, and
that, in fact, must be so, and it is thus written in the Gospels: Let
him who wishes to be [first among you] serve you.
The ICTY’s Upside-Down Logic
The second part of this sentence is not only debatable but it is
also inexact, and it is identical to the position taken by the Prose-
cution in Paragraph 11,49 where the Prosecution says: “As Yugo-
slavia disintegrated, republics moved toward independence.” This
is rather cunning. No doubt about it. The republics were moving
toward independence because Yugoslavia was disintegrating. I
advise you, as well as everyone else who is dealing with this In-
dictment, to perform this entertaining task. Just invert everything
the Prosecution says against me and the Serbs. And you will see
it’s more accurate, and that it’s entertaining.
This inverted, upside-down logic must be rectified. Then,
this numbered paragraph would read as follows: “When the re-
publics moved toward independence, Yugoslavia began to disin-
tegrate.” And this is accurate; what the OTP claims is not. First
the republics moved toward illegal, unilateral secession. We
heard this from prominent authorities in world politics and aca-
demia that this was so; however, the OTP here wants to convince
you this took place the other way around — the inverse. And
106
Jugoslavija raspala, pa se spasavale republike, nego su
republike krenule u nezavisnost i tako ugrozile
opstanak ove dr`ave. Na stranu ~iwenice da se
Jugoslavija nije raspala, iako se ceo svet na wu
navalio, nego je razbijena. Bosna se raspala, iako je ceo
svet hteo da je sa~uva, ali weni narodi nisu to hteli.
Dakle, Bosna se raspala, a Jugoslavija se nije raspala.
Jugoslaviju su razbili.
Kako je mogla Bosna da se uputi ka nezavisnosti bez
Srba i protiv voqe Srba? Kada budete videli mapu
rasporeda gde sve Srbi `ive od vajkada, vide}ete kako
ta stvar izgleda. Ovde }emo dokazati da SDA nije
trebala Srbe u Bosni. Nego je trebala tih dve tre}ine
srpske teritorije u Bosni. Zna~i, Tu`ila{tvo ka`e
Srbi su jedna tre}ina stanovni{tva, na to }emo do}i
kako se to desilo da Srbi, koji su uvek bili ve}ina,
ve}insko stanovni{tvo u Bosni, postane jedna tre}ina,
ali ta jedna tre}ina `ivi na dve tre}ine teritorje u
BiH.
E, da je SDA htela srpske teritorije, a ne Srbe,
Tu`ila{tvu je bilo dostupan dokaz prvorazredan
zahvaquju}i hrvatskom predsedniku Tu|manu sa kojim
sam imao dosta razgovora, a ovo sam dobio od
Tu`ila{tva. Evo dela transkirpta razgovora
predsednika Tu|mana sa ameri~kom delegacijom, vrlo
visokom. “Kao {to su mi Muslimani jednom kazali, da
}emo ih sve istrijebiti ({to se Srba ti~e). A ja ih
pitam, kako }ete istjerati milion i po Srba iz Bosne?”
I slede}i deo: “Prema tome i u okviru muslimanskog
vodstva,” ka`e predsendik Tu|man, “koje nije
jedinstveno da }e imati te razboritosti da ne mogu
vi{e ra~unati na rat do isterivawa Srba iz Bosne.
Nego da se mire, da je wima, Muslimanima, ne preostaje
107
then, of course, in that case, one can speak of Serbian culpabil-
ity; however, in the first instance, when it is clear that Yugosla-
via did not disintegrate, which led to the republics saving them-
selves; instead, the republics moved to independence, and in this
fashion they threatened the existence of the state. It is a fact that
Yugoslavia did not disintegrate, even though the whole world
had ganged up against it — it was broken up, instead. Bosnia
disintegrated, even though the whole world wanted to save it, but
its peoples did not want this. Therefore, Bosnia disintegrated but
Yugoslavia did not disintegrate. They broke Yugoslavia apart.
How could Bosnia embark on the road to independence
without the Serbs and against the will of the Serbs? When you
look at the map and the layout of the areas where Serbs have
been living since time immemorial, you will see the matter clear-
ly. We’re going to prove here that the SDA had no need of Serbs
in Bosnia. They instead needed two thirds of the Serbian territo-
ries in Bosnia. The OTP says that the Serbs constitute one-third
of the population, but we shall come to that, how it turned out
that the Serbs, who had always formed the majority of the Bos-
nian population, became only one-third, but that one-third of the
population lives on two-thirds of the territory of B-H.
Well, that the SDA wanted Serbian territories without the
Serbs, first-class evidence is available to the OTP, thanks to Cro-
atian President Tuÿman with whom I had plenty of talks, but this
I obtained from the OTP. Here is part of a transcript of a conver-
sation between President Tuÿman and a high-ranking American
delegation:50 “As the Muslims once told me, we’re going to ex-
terminate all of them [i.e., the Serbs]. I asked them — how are
you going to expel one and a half million Serbs from Bosnia?”
And in the next part Tuÿman says: “Accordingly, and in the
framework of the Muslim leadership,” says President Tuÿman,
“which is not unified to possess such reasonableness, it can no
longer count on a war that will result in the expulsion of the
108
ni{ta drugo nego da se oslone na Hrvatsku, a da }e Srbi
prije ili kasnije oti}i iz Bosne.”
Ovo Tu`ila{tvo mene optu`uje da sam hteo da
Muslimani odu iz Republike Srpske. A Muslimani na
koje oni misle, SDA Muslimani, Mladi Muslimani,
Fundamentalisti, hteli su da svi Srbi odu iz Bosne. I
sada vidimo kolika je iskrenost i kol’ko je vite{ki
potez g. Izetbegovi}a, predsedhika SDA, kada je rekao:
“Ako mene za ovo treba optu`iti, onda ne treba
Karaxi}a.” I, u jednom drugom trenutku rekao: “Ja
uzimam to na sebe,” potpuno me oslaba|uju}i,
aboliraju}i me od svake odgovornosti.
Predsednik Tu|man je g. Izetbegovi}a sa~uvao u
ovom ratu. On ga je sa~uvao od poraza, mada, mi nismo
hteli wegov poraz, a mi smo hteli wegov politi~ki
poraz, poraz wegove ideje sto posto vlasti u sto posto
Bosne, i ovo je potpuno autenti~an dokaz.
Tu`ila{tvo daqe ide po istoj pogre{noj stazi i
ka`e u jednom paragrafu da je Karaxi} u~estvovao u
pregovorima i ciqu stvarawa zajedni~ke dr`ave i
istovremeno pripremaju}i organe i uslove za prisilno
razdvajawe po etni~koj osnovi, stvarawe Srpske dr`ave
na jednom delu teritorije BiH, sli~no procesu koji je
ve} zapo~eo u Hrvatskoj. Kakvo stvarawe zajedni~ke
dr`ave kad je ta zajedni~ka dr`ava ve} postojala?
Ali, daqe u paragrafu ka`e Tu`ila{tvo: Srbi u
Hrvatskoj, po{to ona sada ve`e, odredili su podru~ja
koja su smatrali srpskim, stvorili zasebne srpske
institucije radi pru`awa otpora hrvatskim vlastima,
proglasili autonomiju, a po tom i nezavisnost, i silom
preuzeli vlast nad pribli`no jednom tre}inom
hrvatske teritorije.
109
Serbs from Bosnia. Rather than making peace, the Muslims have
no other choice than to rely on Croatia, and [hope] that the Serbs
will leave Bosnia sooner or later.”
The OPT has charged me with wanting the Muslims to leave
the Republika Srpska. But the Muslims they are referring to, the
SDA Muslims, the Young Muslims, the Fundamentalists, wanted
all Serbs to leave Bosnia. And now we see just how sincere
Mr. Izetbegoviü, the President of the SDA, was and how valiant
his move, when he said: “If I must be accused of this, then you
don’t have to accuse Karadžiü.” And at another moment, he said:
“I take it upon myself,” completely absolving me, acquitting me
of all responsibility.
President Tuÿman protected Mr. Izetbegoviü during this war.
He protected him from being defeated even though we did not
want his defeat, but we did want to see his political defeat and the
defeat of his idea of having one-hundred-percent rule in one hun-
dred percent of Bosnia, and this is completely authentic evidence.
The Prosecution then continues further along the same erro-
neous path and states in one paragraph51 that Karadžiü participated
in negotiations with the intent of creating a joint state and that at
the same time he prepared the organs and conditions for forcible
ethnic division, the creation of a Serbian state on a part of the terri-
tory of B-H, identical to the process that had already begun in
Croatia. What kind of creation of a joint state are you talking
about when such a joint state already existed?
But further in the paragraph, the Prosecution states: The Serbs
in Croatia, since they are now consolidating [their territories],
have determined what territories they consider to be Serbian; have
created separate Serb institutions in order to resist Croatian author-
ity; have declared autonomy and then even independence; and
they, according to such independence, have forcibly taken control
of approximately one-third of Croatian territory.
110
E, pa vidite kako. Videli smo da je Hrvatska
secesija nelegalna, i toj nelegalnosti Srbi u Hrvatskoj
pru`aju otpor. Pa, to je potpuno legimitno. Ali, za
Tu`ila{tvo, to nije legitimno. Ali zbog ovakvih
stvari, Tu`ala{tvo vi{e li~i na portparola mojih
protivnika ratnih nego na Tu`ila{tvo ovoga suda.
Nigde nijedna nau~na ili pravna instanca nije
utvrdila da je Hrvatska postupila zakonito i da Srbi
nisu imali pravo da pru`e otpor toj nazakonosti.
Da vas malo podsetim {ta je sa Srbima u Hrvatskoj.
Srbi u BiH su najstarije stanovni{tvo. Sva teritorija
je bila wihova. Srbi u Hrvatskoj su do{li pre 350
godina i dobili su Krajinu ne od Hrvatske nego od
Austro-Ugarske — Austrije. Oni su tamo bili borci,
Vojna Krajina, dobili su privilegije, autonomne
privilegije, autonomna prava. Dobili su tu teritoriju.
Da je re~eno bilo Srbima u Krajini 1918-e godine da }e
jednog dana iza}i iz te zajedni~ke dr`ave i biti u
Hrvatskoj, Krajina ne bi bila u Hrvatskoj, a mo`da bi
Hrvatska bila u Jugoslaviji, i opet bismo bili
prijateqi. Ili, da je 1945-e godine Kraji{nicima
re~eno da }e ta Hrvatska, u kojoj oni unose Krajinu kao
miraz, jednog dana oti}i, uzeti miraz a wih isterati,
Krajina ne bi bila u Hrvatskoj.
PREVODILAC: Prevodioci Vas mole da usporite.
KARAXI]: Zna~i, Kraji{nici su prevareni. Dobili
su Krajinu od Austrije, zaradili su je borbama,
odbranom cele Evrope od Turske najezde, od Turskog
talasa, a onda su u{li u tu Hrvatsku, i kada su u 1945-e
godine u{li u Hrvatsku i uneli Krajinu kao miraz,
dobili su u Ustavu da je Hrvatska dvonarodna
republika. Dvonarodna dr`ava, Srba i Hrvata, Hrvata
111
Well, you see how [this goes]. We have seen that Croatian
secession was illegal, unlawful; the Serbs in Croatia resisted this
illegal act. Well, that’s completely legitimate. But as far as the
Prosecution is concerned, it is not legitimate. But, because of
such things, the Prosecution rather resembles a spokesman for
my wartime opponents instead of the Prosecution of this Tribu-
nal. Not one single instance of jurisprudence or scholarship ever
established that Croatia acted lawfully or that the Serbs had no
right to resist such illegality.
A Brief History of Serbs in Croatia
Let me call to your attention what happened to Serbs in Cro-
atia. The Serbs in B-H are the oldest [indigenous] population.
The entire territory was theirs. The Serbs in Croatia arrived 350
years ago and they were granted Krajina not by Croatia but by
Austro-Hungary — Austria, in fact. They served as soldiers [i.e.,
for the Austro-Hungarian Empire] — on the Military Frontier
[i.e., Vojna Krajina] and they were granted privileges, autono-
mous privileges and rights. They were given the territory. And if,
in 1918, the Serbs of Krajina had been told that one day they
would have to leave this joint state and live in Croatia, Krajina
would not have been in Croatia, but Croatia might still be in Yu-
goslavia and we would be friends again. Or, if in 1945 the people
of Krajina had been told that the Croatia to which they were
bringing Krajina as a wedding dowry would one day be taken
away from them and that they would be expelled, Krajina would
not have been in Croatia at all.
INTERPRETER: The translators kindly request that you slow
down.
KARADŽIû: This means the people of Krajina were deceived.
They received Krajina from Austria, they earned it by defending
the whole of Europe in battles against the Turkish invasion, the
Turkish onslaught, and then they entered that Croatia, and when
112 113

i Srba. A 1990-e godine, prva stvar koju je HDZ uradio u

in 1945 they entered Croatia and brought Krajina as their dowry,
Hrvatskoj, izbacio je Srbe iz Ustava i pretvorio ih u
they received the right, as expressed in the Constitution, that
nacionalnu mawinu da bi mogao da im uzme Krajinu.
Croatia was bi-national republic, a bi-national state composed of
Evo, mo`emo da vidimo {ta profesor Antonio
Serbs and Croats, of Croats and Serbs. Whereas in the 1990s, the
Kaseze, Vama poznat, ka`e o ovim nezakonitim
first thing that the HDZ did in Croatia was to throw the Serbs out
potezima:
of the Constitution and to turn them into a national minority so
Hrvatska, za koje Tu`ila{tvo spre~ava that they could then take Krajina away from them.
Srbe iz Krajine da se odupru kao da su te Now let’s see what Professor Antonio Cassese, whom you
mere zakonite. know well,52 says about these unlawful steps:
Tu`ila{tvo nama stavqa na teret neki Croatia, for which the Prosecution prevents the
etnocentrizam i ka`e da smo sa etni~kim motivima Serbs from Krajina from resisting, as if these
hteli da stvorimo svoje prostore i u Hrvatskoj i u BiH. were legal measures.
Molim Vas lepo, iskqu~ivo etni~ki motivi bili su na
The Prosecution is charging us with some kind of ethnocen-
strani Slovenaca, Hrvata i Muslimana da iza|u iz
trism, and it states that we, being ethnically motivated, wished to
Jugoslavije. To nisu bili ni politi~ki, ni ekonomski,
create our own territories both in Croatia and in B-H. Please, ex-
ni rasni, ni verski — to su bili etni~ki motivi. A
clusively ethnic motives were [expressed] on the side of the Slo-
Srbima se osporava pravo da pri naletu tu|ih etni~kih
venes, Croats, and Muslims in order to leave Yugoslavia. These
interesa svoje etni~ke interese za{tite. Etni~ki
were neither political nor economic nor racial nor religious mo-
motivisane su bile sve mogu}e krize posle Drugog
tives — these were purely ethnic motives. Whereas the Serbs, fac-
svetskog rata, naro~ito od 1968–1971 u Hrvatskoj, kad je
ing an onslaught of other ethnic interests, are being denied the
Tito posmewivao celo Hrvatsko rukovodstvo etni~ki.
right to protect their own ethnic interests. Ethnic motivations were
Karaxi} je sada, posle 1968-e, bio van politike, jer je
the source of each crisis after World War II, especially the 1968–
u~estvovao u studentskom pokretu i posle toga bio
1971 period in Croatia when Tito ethnically replaced the entire
vrsta disidenta u struci i bez ikakvog politi~kog
Croatian leadership. Now, Karadžiü, after 1968, had not been in-
delovawa.
volved in politics since he took part in the student movement; he
Etni~ki nacionalizam je 1990–1991 doveo do svega
was the kind of dissident who worked as a professional without
ovoga {to se de{avalo, a Srbi odgovaraju.
being involved in politics.
Da Vas podsetim da u Hrvatskoj Srbi nisu glasali u
Ethnic nationalism in 1990 and 1991 led to everything that
ve}ini za Srpsku demokratsku stranku, nego za multi-
took place, but the Serbs are held responsible.
etni~ku stranku za reformisanih komunista Ivica
Allow me to call to your attention that a majority of the
Ra~ana. Hrvatska je imala mnogo stranaka, i imala
Serbs in Croatia did not vote for the Serbian Democratic Party,
mnogo sesecionisti~kih stranaka, ali su Hrvati
but for the multi-ethnic party of Ivica Raþan’s reformed Com-
114
glasali za HDZ, za najetni~kiju. A Srbi su glasali za
najmawe etni~ku, koja potpuno uop{te ne mo`e da se
smatra kao srpskom. A ti Srbi u Hrvatskoj su optu`eni
od ovog Tu`ila{tva, naravno, zajedno u paketu i mi sa
wima, da smo mi etnocentristi ili {ta sve ne.
E, sada, ako imamo vremena, ja bih Vam pokazao {ta
su Srbi u Hrvatskoj i Srbi u BiH — jer Bosna je bila u
sastavu Hrvatske tokom Drugog Svetskog Rata — {ta su
mogli da o~ekuju. Pa }emo videti {ta o Jasenovcu, koji
je preko puta nas, preko Save, ka`e Vizentalov Centar.
Usta{e, koje su osnovane 1930-e godine, po tom centru,
ubili su 500,000 Srba, proterali 250,000, i 250,000
pokrstili — to je teorija od tri tre}ine Mile Budaka,
hrvatskog pisca i ideologa. Tri tre}ine: tre}inu }emo
pokrstiti, tre}inu }emo proterati, a tre}inu }emo
pobiti. A kada jedan Srbin u BiH ka`e to kao
alegoriju, odnosno, kao utuk na utuk, Tu`ila{tvo to
stavi u optu`nicu kao srpski stav. A to je op{ta
poznata stvar da }e biti tri tre}ine, ali Tu`ila{tvo
nema dobre saradnike na terenu da im ka`e {ta zna~i
preneseni govor.
Evo {ta ka`e Nema~ki — ovo je jo{ Vizental, je’l
tako? — {ta ka`e jedan nema~ki obave{tajac? Skre}em
pa`wu Va{im Ekselencijama da vidite da je do
17. februara 1942-e godine — precizna procena
nema~kog obave{tajca da je ve} do tog trenutka —
300,000 pravoslavnih Srba ubijeno, iskasapqeno
sadisti~kim metodima. Ovaj broj do kraja rata nije
mogao opadati; on je samo mogao rasti. Po~eo je da opada
tek kada su Komunisti do{li na vlast. Opadati,
opadati, opadati dok nije do{lo do 80,000, kao da je
80,000 malo, a tih 80,000 Hrvatska bi rado priznala. A
sigurno je vi{e od 500,000, jer ako je za godinu dana
115
munists. Croatia had many political parties and it had many se-
cessionist parties, but the Croats voted for the HDZ, the most
ethnically oriented party. The Serbs, however, voted for the least
ethnically oriented party, which cannot be considered Serbian at
all. And those Serbs in Croatia were then accused, of course, by
the Tribunal as a group, and they throw all of us into a package
with them as ethnocentrics or goodness knows what else.
And now, if we have time, I would like to show you what the
Serbs in Croatia and the Serbs in B-H — because B-H had been
united with Croatia during World War II — could expect. We’re
going to see what the Wiesenthal Center has to say about Jaseno-
vac, which is just across the Sava River. The Ustaše, founded in
1930, killed 500,000 Serbs, expelled 250,000, and converted
250,000 others [to Roman Catholicism] — this was Mile Budak’s,
a Croatian writer and ideologue’s, theory of the three thirds.53
Three thirds: We’re going to convert one third, expel one third,
and kill one third. And when a Serb in B-H says this allegorically,
namely, in an endless dispute, the OTP puts it in the Indictment as
a Serb position. But this is common knowledge that there would
be three thirds, however, the Prosecution does not have good advi-
sors in the field to inform them of what this figurative speech ac-
tually means.
Now, this is what the German — this is still Wiesenthal on
the screen, isn’t that so? — let’s see what a German intelligence
officer says.54 And I’d like to call Your Excellencies’ attention to
the fact that the German intelligence officer made an accurate
appraisal, according to which 300,000 Orthodox Serbs had al-
ready been killed, butchered by sadistic methods, by February
17, 1942. This figure could not have fallen during the course of
the war; it could only have risen. The figure began to fall only
when the Communists came to power. And they fell and they fell
until they reached 80,000, as if 80,000 were an insignificant fig-
ure, but Croatia would happily acknowledge 80,000 [deaths].
116 117

300,000, to je moralo samo daqe da raste. Vizentalov But the figure is certainly more than 500,000 because, if over the
Centar tvrdi da je oko milion Srba iz Hrvatske i course of one year it was 300,000, then the number could have
Bosne bilo ubijeno. only risen. The Wiesenthal Centre claims that about a million
E sada, ovo {to meni stavqa Tu`ila{tvo na teret Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia were killed.
la`nom optu`nicom. Ja poku{avam da formiram pravu
A Genuine Indictment
optu`nicu onom malom igrom, da sve ostane isto, a samo
Now, what the OPT is charging me with in this false indict-
da zamenimo aktere i mesto. Umesto srpski vo|a,
ment. I am trying to create a genuine indictment with that little
hrvatski ili muslimanski vo|a. Evo, pogledajte,
game [I showed you earlier], in which everything remains the
recimo, kako to izgleda.
same except that the locations and perpetrators are switched. In-
“Tu|man ili Izetbegovi} u periodu 1990–1995-a
stead of a Serbian leader, a Croatian or Muslim leader would
rukovodio formulisawe i realizaciju zlo~ina~kog
stand accused. Here, let’s see what that looks like.
plana da se stvori zaseban etni~ki entitet na velikim
“As the paramount leader of the Croats (Muslims) from
delovima teritorija SFR Jugoslavije.” Ili, “Tu|man i
1990–1995, Tuÿman (Izetbegoviü) led the formulation and im-
Izetbegovi} u~estvovali su u pregovorima sa ciqem
plementation of a criminal plan to create an ethnic entity on large
o~uvawa zajedni~ke dr`ave — i jesu zaista — i
portions of SFR Yugoslavia.”55 Or: “Tuÿman (Izetbegoviü) en-
istovremeno pripremaju}i organe, entitete i uslove za
gaged in negotiations to secure a common state” — they did,
prisilno razdvajawe po etni~koj osnovi i stvarawe
indeed — “while simultaneously preparing the organs, entities
hrvatske (odnosno muslimanske) dr`ave od jednog dela
and conditions for the forcible ethnic separation and creation of a
teritorije Jugoslavije, sli~no procesu koji je ve}
Croat (Muslim) state carved out of Yugoslavia, similar to the
zapo~eo u Sloveniji, odnosno Hrvatskoj, u odnosu na
process that had started in Slovenia.”56
BiH.”
From there on in, everything in Paragraph 13 remains the
Daqe, paragraf 13, sve je isto. Samo su zameweni
same. Only the actors have changed roles.57 Croats (or Muslims)
akteri. Hrvati (odnosno Muslimani) u BiH su odredili
earmarked territories considered Croatian (or Muslim), created
podru~ja Jugoslavije, koja su smatrali hrvatskim
separate Croatian (or Muslim) institutions in order to resist Yu-
(odnosno muslimanskim), stvorili zasebne hrvatske
goslav authorities who strove to preserve the unity of the coun-
(odnosno muslimanske) institucije radi pru`awa
try, forcibly declared independence and took control of a large
otpora vlastima Jugoslavije da o~uvaju celovitost
part of Yugoslav territory, where the Yugoslav population did
zemqe, proglasili nezavisnosti silom, preuzeli vlast
not accept such decisions.
na velikom delu jugoslovenske teritorije, na kojima
Now, Excellencies of the Trial Chamber and gentlemen of
jugoslovensko stanovni{tvo nije prihvatilo takve
various governments who support this project, the prosecution of
odluke.
Serbs, my variant reading of these paragraphs in the Pre-Trial
Ekselencije u Ve}u, uva`eni u Tu`ila{tvu, gospodo
Brief [summarizing the] criminal charges is far more credible and
u vladama, koje podr`avate ovakav projekat, su|ewe
exact than what the Prosecutor has charged me with. To these my
118
Srbima, moja varijanta ovih paragrafa predpretresnog
podneska Tu`ila{tva je daleko uverqivija i ta~nija
nego ono {to meni Tu`ila{tvo stavqa na teret. Ovim
paragrafima mojim bi trebalo jo{ dodati da su ove
vo|e Hrvata i Muslimana jo{ — {to nama ne mogu da
stave na teret — oni jo{ radili, formirali tajne
slu`be, tajne republi~ke armije, naoru`avali se javno
i tajno, kr{e}i rezolucije Ujediwenih Nacija, pravili
planove za obnovu imperija. Hrvatska i Sredwa Evropa
sawaju o obnovi Habzbur{kog carstva, a vide}ete kako
i Bosna muslimanska i Turska sawaju o povratku Turske
na Balkan, koji je navodno za vreme Turske okupacije
petsto godina procvetao i bio stabilan. Stabilan jeste
bio, bio stabilan kao {to je grobqe stabilno. Niko
ni{ta ne radi, nema mrdawa, ali je srpska kultura, koja
je do dolaska Turaka bila vode}a u Evropi, a Stefan
Lazarevi} bio vode}i vladar, pesnik, vitez, omiqeni
kod svojih prijateqa u Evropi — sve je to stalo kad je
Turska do{la.
E, sad Turska ponovo ho}e iz usta najodgovornijih
Turskih dr`avnika od 1990-e da se to ~uje od Turgut
Auzala, do neki dan, Ministra Dautogu-a, da je Bosna
Turska i Turska Bosanska. Mi smo jedno i mi }emo
ponovo da do|emo. Imamo interes za obnovu Otomanske
imperije. To Srbi ne prihvataju.
Da ima vi{e vremena, pokazao bih Vam kako je ritam
u`asnih promena u Hrvatskoj odmah posle izbora bio.
Svakog meseca jedna {okantna mera protiv Srba. Prvo,
amandmani kojima ih izbacuju iz Ustava, onda Ustav u
kome su oni svedeni na nacionalnu mawinu. Onda druge
mere: naoru`avawe tajno, onda proterivawe, ubijawe, i
po gradovima i po srpskim krajevima gde su Srbi
ve}ina, i tada mi ve} imamo kolone izbeglica,
119
paragraphs, we should add that these leaders of the Croats and
Muslims — and they can’t accuse us of this — worked to set up
secret services, clandestine republican armies; armed themselves
openly and secretly; violated United Nations resolutions; and
made plans to revive an empire on this territory. Croatia and Cen-
tral Europe are dreaming of reviving the Habsburg Empire, and
you will see how the Muslim populations of Bosnia and Turkey
are dreaming of Turkey’s return to the Balkans, which, during the
five-hundred-year Turkish occupation, allegedly flourished and
remained stable. Yes, it was stable, alright, just as a cemetery is
stable. No one does anything, there is no room to move at all, but
Serbian culture which, until the arrival of the Turks, was a leading
culture in Europe, while Stefan Lazareviü was a leading ruler, a
poet, a knight, cherished by his friends in Europe — all this ended
once Turkey came on the scene.
Well, now Turkey — and you could hear such things
(straight out of the mouths of the most responsible Turkish
statesmen of the 1990s) from [Minister] Turgut Özal and as re-
cently as a few days ago from [Foreign Minister Ahmet]
Davutoglu — [who said] that Bosnia is Turkish and Turkey is
Bosnian. We are all one and we are coming back again. We are
interested in reviving the Ottoman Empire. The Serbs do not ac-
cept this.
Shocking Measures Taken against Serbs in Croatia
If there were more time, I could show you the rhythm of the
horrifying changes in Croatia immediately after the elections. Eve-
ry month there was a shocking new measure taken against the
Serbs. First of all, the amendments that expunged them from the
constitution, then a constitution in which they were reduced to a
national minority. Then other measures were taken: [the Croa-
tians] arming themselves secretly, then expulsions, killings both
in towns and in Serbian territories where Serbs were in the majori-
ty, so, by then, we already had columns of refugees, people who
120
otpu{tawe sa posla na etni~koj osnovi u Hrvatskoj.
Sve to Tu`ilastvo zna. Sve je to ~ak i govoreno u ovom
sudu od strane odre|enih svedoka. Ja sam li~no mogao
videti kako izgledaju te izbeglice.
Vidite, predsednik Tu|man je rehabilitovao NDH,
i mi smo mislili da je to, jer on nije bio Usta{a — on
je bio Partizan — mislili da on to ho}e da navu~e
saradwu Usta{a. Me|utim, Usta{e su mu do{li na
vlast. On ih je postavio na visoke polo`aje. I sve je
rezultiralo ve} 1991-e godine ogromnim brojem
izbeglica koje smo mi do~ekali u Bosanskoj Krajini i u
Bawa Luci. Tu`ila{tvo ho}e da ka`e da to nije imalo
uticaja na stawe svesti Bosanskih Srba. Da vide
najbogatije doma}ine u Evropi kako sa zave`qajem
le`e na podu sportske hale, i nemaju vi{e ni sela, ni
pro{losti, ni budu}nosti.
Jedna od tih mera je bila odmah uvo|ewe usta{kih
simbola, insignija iz Usta{ke dr`ave, i Tu`ila{tvo
misli da to nije od zna~aja, a da vidimo {ta ka`e Lord
Oven od kakvoga je to zna~aja:
“Za Srbe u Hrvatskoj je bilo veoma provokativno to
{to je Tu|manova vlada za zastavu nezavisne Hrvatske
usvojila isti simbol koji je koristio Paveli}, crveno-
belu {ahovnicu.” Pod ovim insignijama su Srbi
stradali. Onaj milion Srba je stradao u Drugom
svetskom ratu. Ovo su lucidna i ta~na zapa`awa
Wegovog Lordstva, ali sa malim dodatkom. Ovo nije
bilo provokativno; ovo je bilo zastra{uju}e i za Srbe
i za Jevreje, i potpuno odgovara naslovnu kwige jednog
hrvatskog Jevrejina, Gold{tajna, “1941. godina, koja se
vra}a.”
Ali, da Tu`ila{tvo ne ka`e: “Nemojte obra}ati
pa`wu na insignije. To je prazna gesta, i iza toga ne
121
had been fired from their jobs on an ethnic basis in Croatia. The
Prosecution knows all about it.58 We have even heard testimony
about it from subpoenaed witnesses in this very courtroom. I was
personally able to see what those refugees looked like.
You see, President Tuÿman rehabilitated the NDH,59 and that
was what we thought it was, because he was not an Ustasha him-
self — he was a Partizan — we thought that he wanted to do this
in order to draw Ustaše [into his party]. However, the Ustaše came
to power through him. He appointed them to high-ranking posi-
tions. And by 1991, it all resulted in a vast number of refugees
whom we took in in Bosanska Krajina and Banja Luka. [EXHIB-
IT IX] The Prosecution wants to say that this did not influence the
state of mind of the Bosnian Serbs: to see the wealthiest house-
holders of Europe lying on the floor of a sports arena with a hasti-
ly wrapped bundle at their side, with no village, no past, and no
future.
And one of those measures was the immediate introduction
of Ustaša symbols, insignias from the Ustaša state, and the Pros-
ecution considers this to be insignificant, but let’s see what Lord
Owen60 has to say about what significance it did have.
“It was extremely provocative,” he says, “for the Serbs in
Croatia that Tuÿman’s government adopted the independent
Croatian (NDH) flag with the same symbol used by Paveliü, the
red and white checkerboard.” Serbs were killed under this insig-
nia. That is the million Serbs who were killed during World War
II. His Lordship’s observations are lucid and accurate, but a
small addendum is in order. This was not merely provocative;
this was terrifying for both Serbs and Jews, and it entirely suits
the title of the book written by [Slavko] Goldštajn, a Croatian
Jew, 1941: The Year That Is Returning.
The Špegelj Tapes
But in order to prevent the Prosecution from saying: “Don’t
pay any attention to insignias. It is just an empty gesture, and
122
stoji ni{ta.” Da vidimo {ta stoji iza toga. Da vidimo
{ta ka`u Ministri [Martin] [pegeq i [Josip]
Boqkovac, Ministar Odbrane i Ministar Unutra{wi
Poslova.
[PO~ETAK video snimka]
MARTIN [PEGEQ: Ima tu vojnih
slu`benika i muzi~ara i {ta ja znam. To
je sve 9.000 i 18.000 vojnika na cijeloj
teritoriji Pete vojne oblasti:
Slovenije, cele Hrvatske i deo Bosne. A
mi imamo sad naoru`ano 80.000 sa
kala{wikovima. Pa nek’ je samo 10.000
wih naoru`anih. A Knin }emo rije{iti
na taj na~in {to }emo pokasapiti. U
tome imamo me|unarodno priznawe za to,
onda }emo ih pokasapiti, pogotovo sada
kada je ova kurva pobjedio u Srbiji.
BOQKOVAC: Milo{evi}?
MARTIN [PEGEQ: Da. Sad nam
Amerikanci, drugi dan kada je on
pobjedio, ponudili su pomo}, a do tada su
sve spekulirali, bi ne bi. Ka`u sad
ovako: Hiqada komada transportera
oklopnih, ovakvih, onakvih, te
automobile, {ta ja znam. Za 100.000
vojnika kompletno naoru`awe. Bes-
platno.
[KRAJ video snimka]
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Ⱦɚ ɥɢ ɱɭʁɟɦɨ ɩɪɟɜɨɞ? Ɇɨɠɟmo ɥɢ ɞɚ
ɡɚɭɫɬɚɜɢmo ɜɢɞɟɨ snimak?
123
there’s nothing to it.” Let’s take a look and see what stands be-
hind this insignia. Let’s see what Ministers [Martin] Špegelj and
[Josip] Boljkovac, the Ministers of Defense and of the Interior,
respectively, [of Croatia] have to say.61
[START ʊ video clip]
MARTIN ŠPEGELJ: You’ve got military employ-
ees and musicians, and I don’t know what else.
That’s 9,000 of them and 18,000 [JNA] soldiers
in all of Region 5: Slovenia, Croatia and parts of
Bosnia. But now we’ve got 80,000 people armed
with Kalashnikovs. So what if there are only
10,000 of them. We’ll solve the problem in Knin
the same way, by slaughtering them. This is how
we’ll get international recognition, and then
we’ll slaughter them, especially now since this
whore won [the election] in Serbia.
BOLJKOVAC: Miloševiü?
MARTIN ŠPEGELJ: Yes, two days after he won,
the Americans offered us help, but up until then
they had only been speculating whether to go
ahead with it nor not. They now say it’s going to
go like this: 1,000 armored transport vehicles of
one kind or another, and automobiles, who
knows what else. And they will completely arm
and equip 100,000 soldiers. No charge.
[END ʊ video clip]
JUDGE KWON: Are we hearing the interpretation? Can you
stop the video?
124 125

ɄȺɊȺȹɂȶ: Ɂɚɲɬɨ to ɧɢʁɟ ɩɪɟɜɟɞɟɧo? To bi trebalo da KARADŽIû: Why isn’t it being translated? That should be a live
bude prevod u`ivo. Ove re~i Ministra [pegela sad se translation. Minister Špegelj’s words are being represented here
jasno ponavqaju. I to bi trabalo prevesti u`ivo — clearly and they should be translated live, simultaneously.
simultano.
JUDGE KWON: I take it that what we heard is the interpretation
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɉɪɟɬɩɨɫɬɚɜʂɚɦ ɞɚ ʁɟ ɨɧɨ ɲɬɨ ɫɦɨ ɱɭɥɢ je of what was just heard now. Let’s proceed.
bio prevod onoga {to je rekao Ministar [pegel. ɂɞɟɦɨ
[START ʊ video clip]
ɞɚʂɟ.
[PO~ETAK video snimka] MARTIN ŠPEGELJ: The Army will be useless. It
will be decimated, plus, all of them will be killed
[PEGEQ: Armija nema {ta da tra`i,
at home. Kill them on the spot, on the street, in
bi}e posje}ena do Boga... i svi }e biti
the barracks, anywhere else they may be, just a
posje}eni jo{ kod ku}e. Ubijati na licu
pistol in the stomach … show now mercy to an-
mjesta, na ulici, usred kruga kasarne,
yone. Not even to women and children. When
bilo gde drugde, samo pi{tolj i u
they’re at home, it’s simple — a bomb in the
stomak... Nema milosti ni prema kome. Ni
family home. Physical liquidation. A messenger
prema `eni, ni prema deci. U stan,
comes to the home, shows up at the front door,
jednostavno — bombe u stan porodi~ni.
and bang bang and he goes back down the
Fizi~ku likvidaciju. Do|e u stan kurir,
stairs…. Then [another messenger] goes to an-
pojavi se na vratima i dum, dum i si|e
other home simultaneously. The most dangerous
dole stepenicama.... Ide se kod drugog,
ones can be killed right on their own doorsteps.
odnosno istovremeno. Koji su najopasniji
You can forget about the women and the chil-
mogu biti ubijeni na vratima. Nije u
dren. Nothing there. Forget about it.
pitanju niti `ena niti djeca, ni{ta to.
To se ne pita. We will use all means. We will use weapons and
Serbs in Croatia will never again be what they
Mi }emo upotrebiti sva sredstva. Mi
once were. Their supremacy is history.
}emo upotrebiti oru`je i Srbi u
Hrvatskoj vi{e nikada ne}e biti ono {to [END ʊ video clip]
su bili, njihova supremacija i historija. KARADŽIû: Believe me, Your Excellencies, that they did all
[KRAJ video snimka] this and worse from the moment they announced it at the end of
1990, when they were still deeply involved in Yugoslavia. They
KARAXI]: Verujte, Ekselencije, da su sve uradili i
were still in Yugoslavia. They were setting up part of their popu-
gore od ovoga {to su najavili krajem 1990-e godine dok
lation, Serbs, to be massacred, which in the end they carried out.
su bili duboko u Jugoslaviji. Bili su u Jugoslaviji. A
And then what was promised, for example, at the inauguration of
126
spremili su delu svoga stanovni{tva srpske
nacionalnosti kasapqewe, koje su na kraju i izveli. I
ovo {to je tada obe}ano kao {to je, recimo, na osnivawu
Stranke demokratske akcije, Dalibor Brozovi}, obe}ao
da }e se Hrvatska braniti na Drini, kao u Drugom
Svetskom Ratu — i recimo neki nesre}ni [ime \ogan
srpskog porekla, hrvatski ekstremista, rekao da }e se
iznad Sarajeva na jednoj srpskoj planini vihoriti ova
{ahovnica za pet godina. E, za pet godina se nije
vijorila, ali za pet godina je do{lo do potpunog
ponavqawa onoga {to je bilo u Drugom svetskom ratu, i
do izbacivawa od onih kolona koje ste videli kako
be`e iz Hrvatske.
To je sve dostupno i Tu`ila{tvu i celom svetu. Svi
znaju i kad se to de{avalo i kako je to zavr{ilo i
koliko je bilo autenti~no i ta~no. Ali, Tu`ila{tvo
tvrdi da sam ja posmatrao {ta se de{ava Srbima u
Hrvatskoj i da sam na osnovu toga Bosanske Srbe
upozoravao i mobilisao, podsticao da budu oprezni i da
se brane, itd.
Dakle, ja sam bez osnove, bez razloga uznemiravao
Kraji{ke Srbe, odnosno, od wih u~io {ta se mo`e
wima i Bosanskim Srbima, kao wihov lider,
predo~avao {ta im se mo`e desiti i {ta treba da urade
da im se to ne desi. Tu`ila{tvo ka`e da je to bilo bez
osnova. Bez uvrede, a ovo je zaista — ovaj predpretresni
podnesak protiv mene morao biti boqi ili ove
optu`nice nije trebalo biti.
Ako mine, granate, mno{tvo izbeglica, i ovakva
obe}awa od dva ministara sile u Hrvatskoj, Ministar
unutra{wih poslova i Ministar odbrane, nisu
opasnost za Srbe u Hrvatskoj i opasnost za Srbe u BiH,
onda zna~i, trebalo je da mi budemo u dubokoj anesteziji
127
the SDA by Dalibor Brozoviü,62 who vowed that Croatia would
defend itself along the Drina River as it had done during World
War II — and, for instance, the unfortunate Šimo Ĉogan, a Croa-
tian extremist of Serbian descent, who said a checker-board flag
would be fluttering atop a Serbian mountain above Sarajevo in
five years’ time. Well, five years have passed and it’s still not
fluttering up there, but over the course of those five years, there
was a complete repetition of what had taken place during World
War II, even including the expulsion of those columns of people
whom you saw fleeing Croatia.
All of this is available to the Office of the Prosecutor as well
as to the entire world. [EXHIBIT X] Everyone knows this hap-
pened and how it ended and how authentic and accurate it is.
However, the Prosecution claims that it is I [alone] who ob-
served what was happening to the Serbs in Croatia, on the basis
of which I warned the Bosnian Serbs, mobilized them, urged
them to defend themselves, etc.
Therefore, I, without having the grounds to do so, unreason-
ably agitated the Krajina Serbs and allegedly taught them and the
Bosnian Serbs, as their leader — foresaw what would happen to
them and what had to be done63 in order for them to avoid it. The
OTP says this is groundless. But really — no insult intended —
this Pre-Trial Brief against me should have been better or there
should have been no indictment against me in the first place.
If shells, grenades, waves of refugees and such pledges from
the Ministers of Violence in Croatia, the Ministers of Defense
and of the Interior, were not dangerous for the Serbs in Croatia
and Serbs in B-H, then that means that we ought to have been in
a deep state of anesthesia and that we ought to have done nothing
while they butchered us like the Serbs in Knin. Here is how the
OTP qualifies this.
128
i da ne radimo ni{ta dok nas ne pokasape kao Kninske
Srbe. Evo kako Tu`ila{tvo to kvalifikuje.
A evo kako bi — kada se to preokrene, samo zamenom
imena i aktera. Ovo je prava optu`nica.
Karaxi} i rukovodstvo bosanskih Srba
bili su upoznati sa prirodom i svrhom
hrvatske kampawe naoru`avawa, for-
mirawe ilegalne vojske kroz hiper-
trofiju policije, i zbora narodne garde,
kao i otpu{tawe Srba sa posla na
etni~koj osnovi, ubistava po gradovima,
ustavnih amandmana koje je jo{
komunisti~ka Skup{tina donela i
ote`ala polo`aj Srba. Bili su upoznati
da hrvatski Srbi `ive u strahu zbog
povratka poznatih Usta{a iz emigracije
na visoke polo`aje u Hrvatskoj, zbog
nezadr`ivih priprema za jednostrano
ocepqewe Hrvatske od Jugoslavije, zbog
budu}eg polo`aja Srba u toj ocepqenoj
republici, koja taj polo`aj ve} nazna~ava
promenama ustava na {tetu Srba.
Karaxi} je bio upoznat sa brigom
Kraji{nih Srba zbog ~iwenice da nova
hrvatska vlast kao najhitniji posao
smatra promene ustavnog polo`aja Srba.
Otpu{tawe Srba sa posla, gomilawe
novih policijskih stanica i snaga u
srpskim krajevima.
Karaxi} je Kraji{ke Srbe podr`ao u
wihovom nastojawu da osiguraju svoju
bezbednosti i navodio ih kao primer
129
A Genuine Indictment II
And here’s how [things would look] if we were to turn
things around just by switching the names and protagonists. This
is the genuine indictment.64
Karadžiü and the Bosnian Serb leadership were
aware of the nature and purpose of the Croat ar-
mament campaign, the formation of an illegal
army through the creation of an illegal army by
means of a hypertrophied police force, the as-
sembly of a national guard, as well as the dismis-
sal of Serbs from their jobs on ethnic grounds,
killings in [Serbian] towns, constitutional
amendments which the Communist Assembly in-
troduced to exacerbate the position of Serbs.
They were well aware of the fact that Croatian
Serbs were living in fear: because of the return of
notorious Ustaša émigrés and their appointment
to high official positions in Croatia; because of
the unrestrained preparations for Croatia’s unilat-
eral secession from Yugoslavia; because of the
future position of the Serbs in that torn off scrap
of a republic, whose status has already been des-
ignated by alterations to the Croatian Constitution
that were disadvantageous for Serbs. Karadžiü
was well acquainted with the concerns of the
Serbs from Krajina because the new Croatian
government considered changes in the Constitu-
tion with respect to the status of Serbs as its most
urgent task. They fired Serbs from their jobs; they
clustered new police stations and forces in Serbi-
an areas.
130 131

pona{awa za slu~aj da Bosna krene istim Karadžiü supported the Krajina Serbs in their ef-
putem kojim je krenula i Hrvatska. fort to exist and to ensure their security and he
cited their exemplary conduct in case Bosnia
To je prava optu`nica, ali Tu`ila{tvo ne}e da je
chooses [to follow] the same path as Croatia
potpi{e. Ono mene optu`uje zato {to sam bio
had.
odgovoran, kao {to sam morao, jer sam bio na odgovornoj
funkciji. That is the authentic indictment, but the OTP will not sign it.
Evo paragraf 15 i 16, kako to izgleda. It is indicting me because I was responsible, as I had to be be-
Vidite kako po novom Ustavu Hrvatska izgleda. cause I held a position of responsibility.
Ustanovila se kao nacionalna dr`ava hrvatskog naroda Now, here is what Paragraphs 15 and 16 look like.
i dr`ava pripadnika autohtonih nacionalnih mawina
Croatia’s New Constitution
Srba, ^eha, itd. A Srbi su se udru`ili u Hrvatsku
You see what Croatia looks like according to its new Consti-
zajedno sa Krajinom koja je wihova i koju su dobili od
tution. It established itself as the national state of the Croatian
Austrije, a ne od Hrvatske. Ministar Boqkovac, koga
people and the state of the members of autochthonous national
smo ~uli na po~etku krize 1990-e, odnosno u januaru
minorities, Serbs, Czechs, etc.65 But the Serbs joined Croatia
1991-e, sada ima jedan stav, moralniji, pokajni~kiji.
together with Krajina, which belongs to them, which they re-
Nisu ni Jugoslavija ni Srbi napali Hrvatsku, nego je
ceived from Austro-Hungary — and not from Croatia. Minister
bilo obrnuto. A da vidite kako je to izgledalo, vojnik u
Boljkovac, whom we have heard at the very beginning of the
Splitu, Sa{o Ger{ovski, Makedonac u svojoj zemqi
crisis in 1990 — January 1991 — has now taken a more moral
slu`i, u maju 1991-e godine.
and penitent position.66 Neither the Serbs nor Yugoslavia at-
[PO~ETAK video snimka] tacked Croatia — it was the opposite. And in order for you to see
what that looked like, a solder, Sašo Geršovski, a Macedonian
... ɧɚɩɚɞɢ, ʃɢɯɨɜɟ ɩɨɪɨɞɢɰɟ ɫɭ ɢɡɥɨɠɟɧɟ
conscript who was doing his [obligatory] military service in his
ɫɜɢɦ ɜɪɫɬɚɦɚ ɩɪɢɬɢɫɚɤɚ ɞɚ ɢɯ ɧɚɬɟɪɚʁɭ ɞɚ ɫɟ
own country, in Split, in May 1991. [EXHIBIT XI]
ɢɫɟɥɟ ɢɡ ɋɥɨɜɟɧɢʁɟ ɢ ɏɪɜɚɬɫɤɟ. ɋɟʄɚɬɟ ɫɟ ɞɚ
ɫɭ ɩɪɜɢ ɧɚɩɚɞɢ ɧɚ ɩɪɢɩɚɞɧɢɤɟ ȼɨʁɫɤɟ ɛɢɥɢ [START ʊ video clip]
ɧɚɩɚɞɢ ɪɚɡɛɟɫɧɟɥɢɯ ɰɢɜɢɥɚ, ɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɢɫɬɚ,
... attacks, their families are being exposed to all
ɧɚ ɜɨʁɧɢɤɟ ɤɨʁɢ ɫɭ ɫɥɭɠɢɥɢ ɜɨʁɧɢ ɪɨɤ ɭ
sorts of pressures to compel them to move out of
ɋɩɥɢɬɭ. Ɍɨɦ ɩɪɢɥɢɤɨɦ ɜɨʁɧɢɤ ɋɚɲɚ
Slovenia and Croatia. You remember the first at-
Ƚɟɪɲɨɜɫɤɢ ʁɟ ɭɛɢʁɟɧ. Ɉɜɞɟ ɫɭ ɫɚɦɨ ɧɟɤɢ ɨɞ
tacks on members of the Army were made by in-
ɡɥɨɱɢɧɚ ɩɨɱɢʃɟɧɢɯ ɧɚ ɨɮɢɰɢɪɢɦɚ ɭ Ɂɚɞɪɭ ɨɞ
furiated civilians, nationalists, on soldiers who
ɫɬɪɚɧɟ ɭɫɬɚɲɤɢɯ ɐɪɧɢɯ Ʌɟɝɢʁɚ.
were doing their military service in Split. On one
[KRAJ video snimka] such occasion, soldier Sašo Geršovski was
killed. Here are only some of the atrocities
132
Bjelovar, Split, vojska u svojoj zemqi, i ovako gine.
Ovo su ne~ija deca, tako|e. Sa{o Ger{ovski ima
roditeqe, ima porodicu u Makedoniji.
A da vidimo {ta ka`e Voren Cimerman, koji nije
bio Srbima ba{ nimalo naklowen, {ta ka`e o ovoj
situaciji. “JNA je bila legitimna sila vojska svoje
zemqe.” A Tu`ila{tvo meni stavqa na teret da sam
podr`avao odazivawe na mobilizaciju i odlazak
regruta u jedinu legitimnu vojsku. I nalazi vezu izme|u
Srpske demokratske stranke i vojske.
Re}i }u Vam, Ekselencije, vojska je na Srpsku
demokratsku stranku, kao na nekomunisti~ku, gledala
isto kao na SDA i HDZ. Dok nisu videli da ne smeju
zano}iti u mestima gde vlada SDA i HDZ, tek tada su
shvatili da moraju svoja oru`ja i sve izmestiti u
Srpske krajeve — ne radi Srba. Ovde }e Tu`ila{tvo da
vas uverava kako su to oni uradili radi Srba. Ne. To su
bili komunisti~ki generali koji nas nisu voleli. Ali
su videli da ne smeju ni zano}iti, ni oni ni wihova
oprema, tamo gde vlada SDA i HDZ. I zbog sebe su — i
jedino smo mi popuwavali tu vojsku celu godinu dana.
Hrvati i Muslimani nisu i{li u vojsku. Povukli su i
oficire, i stvarali svoje armije. Tu`ila{tvo }e Vam
posle da ka`e kako se JNA pretvorila u vojske
Republiku Srpske. Sve vojske u Jugoslaviji, u svim
republikama, nastale se od JNA. Samo {to su ostale
nastajale postepeno, jer su oni stvarali svoje oru`ane
formacije u dugom periodu, a Srbi su odbili da
stvaraju svoje oru`ane formacije dok nije nare|eno da
se vojska Jugoslavije, kao wihove domovine, povu~e iz
Bosne. Tada su, normalno, ti qudi pri{li svom narodu.
Evo pogledajte kako je Nema~ka i 1991-e, kao i 1941-
e, ~estitala svojoj saveznici Hrvatskoj. Moram da
133
committed on officers in Zadar by the Ustaša
Black Legions.67 [EXHIBIT XII]
[END ʊ video clip]
Bjelovar, Split: the Army is in its own country, and this is how
they died. These are somebody’s children, as well. Sašo Geršov-
ski has parents; he has a family in Macedonia.
And now let’s see what Warren Zimmermann, who was not at
all friendly to the Serbs, had to say about this situation.68 “The
JNA was a legitimate force in its own country.” But the Prosecutor
is charging me with supporting a call for mobilization and the
conscription of recruits who went into the only legitimate army
[that then existed]. And it finds a connection between the Serbian
Democratic Party [SDS] and the Army.
I shall tell you, Excellencies, that since the SDS was a non-
Communist Party, the Army viewed us the same way as they did
the SDA and the HDZ. It was only when they realized that they
did not dare spend a single night in areas controlled by the HDZ
and the SDA, only then did they realize that they had to move
their weapons into Serbian areas — and not for the Serbs’ sake.
Here the OTP will assure you that they did this for the Serbs’ sake.
No. Those were Communist generals who did not like us. But they
understood that they couldn’t even dare spend a night with their
equipment in areas controlled by the HDZ and the SDA. And for
their own sake they — and it was only we Serbs who filled the
ranks of the Army for an entire year. Croats and Muslims did not
join the Army. They withdrew their own respective officers and
created their own armies. The OTP is then going to tell you that
the JNA turned into the Army of the Republika Srpska. All the
armies in all the republics of [the former] Yugoslavia originated
with the JNA. Except that the others came into existence gradually
because they created their own respective armed formations over a
longer period of time; whereas the Serbs refused to create their
134
ka`em na{im zapadnim saveznicima iz Prvog i Drugog
svetskog rata da mo`da moramo Hrvatima da zavidimo
na “saveznicima.” Nema~ka se pokazuje kao mnogo
pouzdaniji saveznik nego na{i saveznici iz Prvog i
Drugog svetskog rata, koji su se okrenuli protiv Srba i
naneli nam mnogo bola. Dakle, i to pokazuje da je
Nema~ka pobeda 1991-e potpuna i definitivna.
E, sada vidite {ta Tu`ila{tvo meni stavqa na
teret. Ka`u da je osnovni greh na{ {to smo hteli da
imamo politiku — zna~i, moj greh je {to sam osnivao i
odr`avao kontinuitet SDS i dr`avnih struktura.
Dakle, osnivawe politi~ke partije kod Srba je
krivi~no delo.
Podseti}u Vas da su Srbi posledwi formirali
politi~ku stranku, etni~ku u BiH. ^etiri meseca pre
izbora. Pre toga su svi drugi formirali. I gde su
pokazali {ta su programi tih stranaka — i mnogo su
zabrinuli Srbe koji su onda zahtevali da dobiju svoju
stranku. Zna~i, sve {to su Srbi uradili, formirali
stranku, formirali Skup{tinu, u~estvovali na
izborima — sve su to radili, prema Tu`ila{tvu, sa
namerom da jednog dana naprave svoju dr`avu u Bosni i
da isteraju iz te dr`ave Muslimane i Hrvate. Umesto
da Tu`ila{tvo izoluje neko krivi~no delo koje je ovaj
optu`eni napravio, ono kriminalizuje kompletan jedan
nardod i svaku wegovu aktivnost, legalnu, legitimnu,
politi~ku aktivnost, progla{ava za udru`eni
zlo~ina~ki poduhvat bilo {ta {to su Srbi hteli.
A hteli su i pona{ali su se ne kako su oni hteli.
Srbi nisu imali ɚɤɰɢʁɟ; Srbi su imali ɪɟɚɤɰɢʁɟ.
Tu`ila{tvo propu{ta da to shvati u kontekstu i
propu{ta da zakqu~i {ta bi bilo da nije bilo akcije.
Da li bi bila takva srpska reakcija?
135
own armed formations until the order had been given for the Yu-
goslav Army, as the army of their homeland, to withdraw from
Bosnia. These individuals naturally joined their own people.
Now, I urge you to see how Germany congratulated its ally
Croatia in 1991 just as it had done in 1941.69 I have to say to our
Western Allies from the First and Second World Wars that per-
haps we ought to be envious of the Croats for their “allies.”
Germany proved to be a far more reliable ally than our allies
from the First and Second World Wars, who turned against the
Serbs and who inflicted a great deal of pain on us. This, there-
fore, demonstrates that the German victory in 1991 was complete
and definitive.
Now, you see what charges the OTP has brought against me.
They say that our fundamental transgression was the fact that we
wanted to have a policy of our own — that means my sin was
establishing and upholding the continuity of the [SDS] and state
structures.70 Therefore, establishing a political party is, for Serbs,
a criminal act.
The Serbs Were the Last to Form an Ethnic Political Party
I would like to remind you that the Serbs were the last to
form an ethnic political party in B-H. Four months before the
elections. All the others formed their own parties well before
that. And wherever these political parties went to promote their
political programs, it caused great concern among the Serbs who
then demanded the formation of their own party. This means
everything that the Serbs did, forming a political party, establish-
ing an assembly, participating in elections — everything that
they have done, according to the OTP, was with the intention of
one day creating a state of their own in B-H and expelling from
that state Muslims and Croats. Instead of isolating a particular
crime that was committed by the Accused, the OTP is criminal-
izing an entire people, and each and every legal and legitimate
activity in which they engaged, as well as political activities,
136
Ko mo`e da ka`e: “Ovde smo ~uli na pro{loj
[nerazumqivo], da je legitimna bila akcija vojske
Republike Srpske na @epu i Srebrenicu”? Pa kako
onda mo`e da se izvu~e zakqu~ak da bi Srbi do{li do
krivi~nih dela, da nije bilo legitimnih akcija, da nisu
bile provokacije? Ovde se uzima da je Srpska
demokratska stranka formirana sa namerom da uradi
ono {to nikad nije palo joj na pamet. Niti u tom
trenutku to op{te izgledalo da }e se ne{to raditi.
Ovde su na osnovu napora ovog Tu`ila{tva osu|eni
izvanredni qudi koje ja dobro znam. Gospodin
Kraji{nik, dvadeset godina robije kao da je vodio bandu
razbojni~ku. Osu|en je po zakonima koji su mafija{ki,
a on je vodio jednu demokratsku skup{tinu. Osu|eni su
generali — sjajni, divni qudi — kao da su nasrtali na
mirno stanovni{tvo, a ne kao da su nasrnuli na
trostruko brojniju armiju u kojoj je bilo takvih
stravi~nih bestijalnosti i ubica.
Evo, zna se ime ovoga momka ~ija je glava — ovde. To
je u Bosni. I to je armija protiv koje su se borili moji
generali samo na svojim teritorijama, brane}i te
teritorije protiv ovakvih boraca koji su bili spremni
da ovo rade i da se slikaju.
Ali, Tu`ila{tvo se dr`i kao da su Srbi, umesto
{to su se suo~ili sa razjarenim bikom, da su nasrnuli
na umiqato jagwe i nanosili mu bol i nanosili mu
{tetu.
Osnovni problem Tu`ila{tva je da je postajala
Srpska demokratska stranka. Ka`u centralisti~ka,
ka`u vo|a o{tar, vo|a autokrata, itd.
A pogledajte za{to prvo se kod Srba ne mo`e bez
vojske i policije, i jedne partije, biti autokrata. Ne
mo`e. Oni su vrlo protestni. Nemogu}e Srbima
137
which have all been proclaimed a joint criminal enterprise, re-
gardless of what the Serbs wanted.
They [the Serbs] did not act and behave the way they wanted
to. The Serbs did not act; they reacted. The Prosecution fails to
understand this in context and it fails to determine what would
have happened had no such actions occurred to begin with.
Would the Serbian reaction have been the same?
Who can say: “We heard on the last [unintelligible] that the
Army of the Republika Srpska acted legitimately with respect to
Žepa and Srebrenica”? So how could a conclusion be drawn that
the Serbs committed crimes, that these actions were not legiti-
mate, and that there were no provocations? It is held here that the
Serbian Democratic Party was created with the intention of do-
ing something that had never crossed its mind. Even at that time,
it did not look as though it would happen. Here, on the basis of
the efforts made by the OTP, outstanding individuals, whom I
know well, have been convicted. Mr. Krajišnik was sentenced to
twenty years in prison as if he had been leading a gang of
thieves. He was sentenced according to mafia-like laws even
though he had led a democratic parliament. Generals — wonder-
ful men — have been sentenced as if they had attacked peaceful
inhabitants instead of having attacked an army that was three
times larger than their own, and one that had committed horrible
bestial acts and killings.
We know the name of this young man whose head — is here.
[Exhibit XIII] This is in Bosnia. This is the army against which
my generals fought exclusively on their own territory, and defend-
ed those territories from such combatants, who were prepared to
do such things and then pose to have their pictures taken.
But the OTP maintains that the Serbs, instead of having con-
fronted a raging bull, had attacked an adorable lamb and had in-
flicted pain and irreparable harm on it.
138 139

vladati ako ne nasilno. A pogledajte za {to se taj vo|a The OTP’s basic problem is the existence of the Serbian
zalagao. Democratic Party. They claim it was a centralist party, that the
Potreba Tu`ila{tva da mene prika`e kao leader was harsh, that the leader was an autocrat, etc.
monstruma poti~e zbog toga {to oni nemaju dokaza, pa I invite you to see why, first of all, one cannot be an autocrat
}e se lak{e verovati ako se optu`eni prika`e kao among Serbs without the army and the police, and one party
monstrum nego ako se prika`e ako realna li~nost. [rule]. It’s impossible. Serbs are quick to go out and protest. It is
Veoma je zna~ajno priznawe Tu`ila{tva da ja li~no impossible to rule Serbs without force.71 And take a look at what
nisam napravio nijedno krivi~no delo. Ali, ja mislim this leader advocated.
da je to i veoma riskantno. Riskantno sa stanovi{ta
The OTP Needs to Present Karadžiü as a Monster
interesa Tu`ila{tva. Ako ja nisam napravio nijedno
The OTP needs to present me as a monster because it doesn’t
krivi~no delo, nego su to napravili oni koji su sa mnom
have any evidence, so it would be easier for it to make its case if it
delili iste vrednosti, onda se mora postavqati pitawe
portrays the Accused as a monster rather than a real person.72, 73
za{to su oni to napravili. Oni su to, prema
It is significant that the OTP has admitted that I personally
stanovi{tu Tu`ila{tva, napravili da bi se postigli
committed not one single crime.74 But I think that is quite risky.
odre|eni ciqevi. Ali, apsolutno je apsurdno i
Risky from the standpoint of the Prosecution’s interests. If I did
paradoksalno da se srpskoj strani pripisuje pona{awe
not commit one single crime, but crimes had, instead, been
koje je direktno suprostavqeno tim ciqevima. Tim
committed by those who shared the same values as I did, then
pona{awem se ne mogu posti}i nijedni srpski ciqeve,
the question must be posed: Why did they do such things? They,
pa ~ak niti kriminalni koje Tu`ila{tvo pripisuje
from the OTP’s standpoint, set it up that way in order to achieve
srpskoj strani.
predetermined objectives. However, it is positively absurd and
Etni~ko ~i{}ewe. Srpska demokratska stranka i
paradoxical to ascribe such behavior to the Serbian side, which
Radovan Karaxi} i Srpski narod u BiH su u~inili sve,
had been directly opposed to such goals. Not one Serbian goal
sve, sve {to se moglo u~initi da se rat izbegne.
could have been achieved by such conduct, not even the criminal
Ovde }emo, Ekselencije, postaviti stvari na svoje
objectives that the OTP ascribes to the Serbian side.
mesto. Postavi}emo hronolo{ki {ta se de{avalo, {ta
Ethnic cleansing.75 The Serb Democratic Party and Radovan
je bio uzrok, {ta je bila posledica, {ta je iz svega
Karadžiü and the Serbian people in B-H did their utmost — eve-
proisticalo, pa }emo onda videti da takva hronolo{ka
rything, everything that could have been done to avoid war.
analiza koja }e dokazati kauzalnost, sekvencijalnost,
Here, Excellencies, we are going to put things in their proper
opcije koje su stajale. Da vidimo da li su Srbi mogli
place. We are going to present what happened chronologically,
ne{to drugo da urade sa tim istinski —
what was the cause, and what was the effect, and what resulted
SUDIJA KVAN: G. Karaxi}, molim vas. from this, and then we are going to see that such a chronological
analysis is going to demonstrate causality, sequentiality, and the
KARAXI]: Imam pet sekundi, Ekselencije.
140
Tada }emo videti da ova optu`nica nije smela da se
pojavi, jer je sve u samoj stvari, u samoj krizi, u samom
ratu postoje potpuna obja{wewa za sve koja potpuno
iskqu~uju srpsku odgovornost. Ali to je, zahvaquju}i
takvom pristupu Tu`ila{tva zamagqeno i na`alost u
nekim Ve}ima ovo Tu`ila{tvo uspelo da pridobije, da
uveri neke sudije da je onako kako oni ka`u.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɂɞɟɦɨ ɧɚ ɩɚɭɡɭ ɨɞ ɩɨɥɚ ɫɚɬɚ.
— ɉɚɭɡɚ ɩɨɱɟɥɚ ɭ 12.02 ɱɚɫɨɜɚ
141
options that were then available.76 Let us see whether or not the
Serbs could have truly done anything else —
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadžiü, please.
KARADZIû: I have five seconds, Your Excellencies.
Then we are going to see that this Indictment should never
have been issued in the first place because there is ample expla-
nation in the events themselves, in the crisis, in the war itself, for
which they have determined the Serbs to be held responsible.
But thanks to such obscurantist acts by the Tribunal, the Tribunal
has, unfortunately, succeeded in some Chambers to win over and
convince some judges that things stand just as they portrayed
them.
JUDGE KWON: We will break for half an hour.
— Recess taken at 12:02 p.m.
142 143

— ɇɚɫɬɚɜɚɤ ɭ 12.33 ɱɚɫɨɜɚ — On resuming at 12:33 p.m.

ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Ⱦɚ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄɭ. JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadžiü.
KARAXI]: Hvala, Ekselencije. Malo smo i{li u KARADŽIû: Thank you, your Excellencies. We briefly revisited
Hrvatsku, jer je Tu`ila{tvo uvelo Hrvatsku. Ja nemam Croatia because the OTP had introduced Croatia. I have nothing
ni{ta protiv, jer je to jedan narod i jedan kraj i jedna against it because it involves one people, one region, and one
kriza. crisis.
Da malo pogledamo, da vas malo podsetim kako sve
An Overview of the Events of 1990
ukupno ovo izgleda sa po~etkom. Zna~i, 1990-a godina
Let us take a closer look, so that I may call to your attention
po~iwe propa{}u Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. Oni ne
how all this looks cumulatively from the beginning. In 1990, the
uspevaju da zavr{e svoj ~etrnaesti Kongres. Raspadaju
League of Communists began to disintegrate. They failed to con-
se na nacionalne saveze komunista. Dakle, ponovo
clude their Fourteenth Convention. They disintegrated along na-
etni~ki se dele. U tom trenutku Karaxi} je disident
tional lines within the League of Communists. Therefore, they
ve} od 1968-e godine. Pravo da Vam ka`em, `ivim sa
were divided once again along ethnic lines. At that time,
svojim prijateqima, porodi~no, i radim i ne verujem da
Karadžiü had been a dissident since 1968. To tell you the truth, I
}e komunisti ikad oti}i sa vlasti. A oni, o~igledno,
was living with friends, my family, and I was working, and I
idu sa vlasti, i odobrava se stvarawe vi{epartijskog
didn’t believe that the Communists would ever leave power. But,
sistema.
obviously, they relinquished power, and the creation of a multi-
27. marta, 1990-e godine, grupa Mladih Muslimana
party system was permitted.
poznati po vi{egodi{wim robijama u vi{e procesa,
On March 27, 1990, a group of Young Muslims, who were
objavquje da }e formirati muslimansku partiju, koja je
known to have served lengthy prison sentences resulting from
i otvorena i za druge, ali je to muslimanska partija sa
various trials, announced that they were going to form a Muslim
ciqevima muslimanskim, i to Srbe ne zabriwava, jer u
party that would be open to non-Muslims, but it was going to be
programu pi{e da ne}e ni da razgovaraju sa strankama
a Muslim party with Muslim objectives, and this did not overly
koje su protiv Jugoslavije. Ali, ve} sutradan, na staroj
concern the Serbs because their program stated that they were
srpsoj crkvi, osvanuli su grafiti protiv Srba, na domu
not even going to hold talks with anti-Yugoslav parties. Howev-
JNA protiv Srba. Dakle, to je ve} jedna — za brigu.
er, the very next day, graffiti targeting Serbs appeared on the Old
Stvara se muslimanska partija, a neprijateqi }e biti
Serbian Church and on the JNA building. So, this was already
JNA, Dom vojska, je li, i Srbi.
one cause for concern. A Muslim party was being created and its
15. maja 1990-e godine, formira se Forum za za{titu
enemies were going to be the JNA, the Army Headquarters, and
individualnih i tradicionalnih prava Muslimana. Ve}
the Serbs. Isn’t that so?
su bili izbori u Hrvatskoj 22. aprila. HDZ, kao
On May 15, 1990, a Forum for the Protection of Individual
najetni~kija i najekstremnija politi~ka partija koja je
and Traditional Rights of Muslims was established. The Croatian
144
veoma ve{to asimilovala politiku Prava{kih
stranaka koje su i doveli do Usta{a, ali su
asimilovali i pobedili su.
Sad smo do 26-og maja. SDA, Stranka demokratske
stranke, ima svoju osniva~ku skup{tinu koja je
najavqena 27-og marta. Srbi ni ne pomi{qaju da imaju
bilo kakvu politi~ku stranku.
Rekli smo da je na toj sednici, na toj osniva~koj
skup{tini — je Dalibor Brozovi} rekao da }e se
Hrvatska braniti na Drini, a niko ih nije napao, niti
se najavquje i{ta. To je maj 1990-e, to je mesec dana —
mawe od mesec dana — od izbora u Hrvatskoj. Tek 28.
juna, Srbi u Sarajevu i u Bosni, jedna jaka zajednica,
obnavqa rad zabrawene Prosvete. To je srpsko
prosvetno kulturno dru{tvo Prosveta, poznato jo{ iz
vremena Austro-Ugarske, zabrawivano i tokom Prvog
Svestskog Rata, i odmah nakon Drugog Svetskog Rata, i
na`alost, moram da ka`em, da su se po srpskom pitawu
Komunisti vrlo ~esto slagali, odnosno nalazili
saglasnost i sa Usta{ama i nema~kim Nacistima. [to
je smetalo wima, to je smetalo i Komunistima.
Tek 12-og jula, Srpska demokratska stranka
formira grupa intelektualna, elitna, nau~na elita
srpska, naterana od naroda koji ne zna {ta }e sada.
Mora }e da glasa za reformisane Komuniste jer ovi svi
— HDZ se ve} prelio u Bosnu. Pobedio je u Hrvatskoj,
deluje u Bosni, ve`u zastave HDZ i SDA mitinzima,
zajedno nastupaju kao jedna koalicija, a Srbi nemaju
ni{ta, i zahtev je prema inteligencijoj srpskoj da se
formira srpska stranka. 12-og jula se formira Srpska
demokratska stranka. Izetbegovi} dolazi, pozdravqa,
ka`e da smo trebali ranije, da su o~ekivali partnera iz
srpskog naroda. Na pitawe iz publike kako gleda na
145
elections had already taken place on April 22. The HDZ, which
was the most ethnically oriented and extremist party, had suc-
cessfully assimilated the policies of the Pravaška strana77 which
led directly to the Ustaše, yet they did manage to assimilate their
policies and win elections.
Now we come to May 26. The Party of Democratic Action
[SDA] held its Inaugural Assembly, which had been announced
on March 27. The Serbs, at that moment, had not even enter-
tained the notion of establishing any kind of political party.
We have said before that at this meeting — the Inaugural
Assembly — Dalibor Brozoviü said that Croatia was going to
defend [i.e., its alleged border] on the Drina River even though
no one had attacked it, and even though no one had announced
any plans to do so. That was in May 1990, a month — less than a
month — after the elections in Croatia. It was only on June 28
that the Serbs in Sarajevo and Bosnia, a strong community, re-
sumed the operation of Prosveta,78 which had been banned.
Prosveta is a Serbian educational and cultural society that had
been well known since the days of the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire, and that had been banned both during World War I and
immediately after World War II, and I have to say, unfortunate-
ly, that when it came to the Serbian question, the Communists
very often acted in unison — i.e., found agreement — with the
Ustaše and the German Nazis. Whatever bothered them also
bothered the Communists.
It was only on July 12 that a group of intellectuals — a
scholarly elite — formed the Serbian Democratic Party under
pressure from the people, who did not know what they were go-
ing to do next. They would either have to vote for the reformed
Communists because all the others — the HDZ had already
spilled over into Bosnia. It had already won elections in Croatia
and was active in Bosnia. They were hoisting the banners of the
HDZ and SDA at rallies, and they were acting together as a sin-
146
Jugoslaviju, on je rekao, “Ja sam za razumnu federaciju,”
{to i pi{e u wegovom programu. I time je
g. Izetbegovi} postavio osnove za na{u post-izbornu
koaliciju, uveriv{i nas da nema razlika u na{im
programima.
Tu`ila{tvo propu{ta da iznese — a ina~e traga za
elementima mens rea iz karaktera ovih aktera i vo|a
Srpske demokratske starnke i srpskog naroda, ali
propu{ta da nam predstavi ko su ti osniva~i Srpske
demokratske stranke. Da li su to ekstremisti, luzeri,
probisveti, ili su to prosto qudi iz univerziteta,
pisci po nekoliko kwiga, filozofi, nau~nici, koji }e
posle, `rtvuju}i sve i `ive}i tri-~etiri godine u
planinama i u pusto{i, slu`e}i svome narodu,
predstavqati jedna od najobrazovanijih vlada u Evropi.
Nijedna vlada u Evropi nije imala toliko ne-
politi~kih, nepartijskih li~nosti koje su bile — sa
visokim znawima, i moralnim autoritetom, i stru~nim
znawima, vodili jednu malu zajednicu u najte`im
vremenima.
To ne odgovara Tu`ila{tvu, zato ne}e da iznese
takvu stvar.
Tragaju}i za mens rea, uva`eni protiv-Jugosloven
Tiger se`e ~ak do Cara Du{ana. Nema izme|u Cara
Du{ana i mene ni{ta, {to bi se moglo staviti na
teret, nego se nalazi u primer kod Cara Du{ana da sam
ja hteo {ta je i Car Du{an imao, etni~ki ~istu srpsku
dr`avu, itd. Car Du{an je imao titulu Stefan Du{an,
Car Srba, Grka, i Arbanasa. Srpska dr`ava je u vreme
Cara Du{ana, ~etrnaesti vek, bila multi-etni~ka
dr`ava. I Srbija je danas najmultietni~kija dr`ava u
isto~noj Evropi, a mo`da u Evropi. Nema nigde toliko
mawina koliko `ive i rade i napreduju i integrisani
147
gle coalition, whereas the Serbs had nothing, and the Serbian
intelligentsia faced the necessity of establishing a Serbian politi-
cal party. The Serbian Democratic Party was established on July
12. Izetbegoviü came to the rally, greeted us, and said that we
ought to have founded the party sooner; that he was awaiting a
partner from the Serbian people. He fielded a question from the
audience about his views on Yugoslavia, and he said, “I’m in
favor of a reasonable federation,” which had been written into
his [party’s] platform. And Izetbegoviü thereby laid down the
foundations for our post-election coalition by convincing us that
there were no major differences between our political platforms.
The Prosecution omitted stating — although it was searching
for elements of mens rea79 from the character of the protagonists
and leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party as well as from the
Serbian people — but it omitted stating who the founders of the
Serbian Democratic Party were. Whether they were extremists,
losers, good-for-nothings or whether they were simply university
professors, authors, philosophers, and scientists who would sub-
sequently, after having lived for three or four years in mountains
and in wastelands [i.e., during WWII] and survived to serve their
people, represented one of the most educated administrations in
Europe. Not one single government in Europe had so many non-
political personalities, independent of party affiliations as did the
SDA — with a very high level of knowledge, moral authority,
and specialized expertise, who were leading a small community
in very difficult times.
This does not suit the Prosecution, and that is why they dis-
regarded this matter.
In his search for mens rea, the esteemed anti-Yugoslav Tieg-
er reaches [far into the past] all the way back to Tsar Dušan.
There is nothing that Tsar Dušan and I share that could be added
to the charges against me, but, in the example of Tsar Dušan, one
may find instead that I wanted what he had achieved, an ethni-
148
su ali nisu asimilovane, nego se ~uva wihov identitet
nigde kao u Srbiji. Car Du{an nije primer za etni~ku
~istu dr`avu.
U prvim nastupima, kao politi~ar, ovaj optu`eni o
jugoslovenskoj krizi najavama secesija, predla`e
skandinavizaciju. Svi znamo — sve su vlade ve}
objavqivale, i pre Titove smrti da }e — ako se
Jugoslavija raspada, pre svega Bosna nastradati. I
pi{em i pismo i Milanu Ku~anu i predla`em svima da
se izvr{i skandinavizacija. Skandinavske zemqe su se
1905-e godine dogovirile da se razi|u. Mirno su
dogovorile granice, ostavile su {est meseci
op{tinama da se odlu~e u kojoj zemqi }e da `ive, i
danas su te zemqe i sre}ne i bogate i veoma bliske.
Istovremeno se ovaj optu`eni zala`e protiv
cepawa BiH. Kad je krenuo secesionizam u BiH,
Karaxi} se zala`e za [vajcarizaciju, i naziva je: “Neka
Bosna bude ju`na [vajcarska.” Gde god ima
trideset/pedeset hiqada jednih, drugih, ili tre}ih, nek
naprave sebi kanton. Ne moraju kantoni da imaju
kontinuitet teritorijalni, jer nije bilo rata u tom
trenutku. Va`no je da svako obavqa svoje poslove i
administrira i da se me|usobno ne sukobqavaju oko
permanentnih poku{aja dominacije i eksploatacije i
zloupotreba.
Moram da ka`em da je pitawe kantonizacije prvi
put pomenuto u jednim novinama u Zagrebu, ali smo mi
to odmah prihvatili kao spasonosno ako }e Bosna ve}
ne{to da ~ini.
Kada se Tu`ila{tvo, u potrazi za mens rea namerama
Srpske demokratske stranke, kad ho}e da doka`e da se
Srpska demokratska stranka formirala da bi izvela
rat i da bi izvela formirawe srpske dr`ave i da bi
149
cally pure Serbian state, etc. Tsar Dušan held the title Stefan
Dušan, Tsar of the Serbs, Greeks, and Albanians. The Serbian
state during Tsar Dušan’s reign in the fourteenth century was a
multi-ethnic state. Even today, Serbia is the most multi-ethnic
state in Eastern Europe, perhaps even in Europe. Nowhere else
are there so many minorities who live and work and advance
themselves and who have integrated but who have not assimilat-
ed, who instead have preserved their identity in Serbia as they
have nowhere else. Tsar Dušan is not an example for an ethnical-
ly pure state.
In his initial actions as a politician, the Accused, in response
to the Yugoslav crises caused by the announcement of seces-
sions, proposed Scandinavian-ization. We all know — all of our
previous governments had made it public it even before Tito’s
death — that if Yugoslavia were to fall apart, Bosnia would be at
the forefront as a victim. I even wrote to Milan Kuþan and pro-
posed for one and all to carry out [a plan of] Scandinavian-
ization. The Scandinavian countries agreed to part ways in 1905.
They agreed to their borders peacefully; they gave counties six
months to decide in which country they wanted to live, and to
this today all these countries live happily, prosper, and remain
close.
At the same time, the Accused came out against the break-up
of B-H. When secessionism began in B-H, Karadžiü was in favor
of Helveticizing Bosnia, and he said: “Let Bosnia be the south-
ern Switzerland.” Wherever there might be thirty/fifty thousand
of one or the other, or a third, let them create a canton. The can-
tons did not need territorial continuity because there was no war
going on at the time. It was important for everyone to go about
their business and administer the country and avoid internal
clashes over permanent attempts to dominate, exploit, and mis-
treat.
150
oterala druge, itd., onda se ne poziva ni na {ta, nego na
stvari koje su se desile po logici gra|anskog rata, a ne
po nameri Srpske demokratske stranke. Na izborima,
Srpska demokratska stranka je dobila skoro sve glasove
srpskog naroda, kao uostalom i druge ostale nacionalne
stranke, 98 i ne{to posto — jedan i po posto bilo za
neke druge stranke. To je ogromna odgovornost. Dobili
smo to na demokratskom programu iz koga Tu`ila{tvo
ne mo`e da prika`e nijedan elemenat na{e
odgovornosti ili nijedan elemenat na kome bi
po~ivali doga|aji koji su do{li. Ne mo`e da na|e u tim
na{im programima, dokumentima, ne mo`e da na|e
povod za to.
A trebalo bi Tu`ila{tvo da ne gleda {ta je neki
poslanik rekao u qutini, ili negde, nego da uzme
dokumente i da ka`e: “Evo {ta je htela Srpska
demokratska stranka!”
Mi smo vlast podelili u BiH i napravili smo jednu
koaliciju koja je bila mogu}a napraviti. Srpska
demokratska stranka, u ime srpskog naroda kojeg je
predstavqala, dobila je, uzela je, i prihvatila je mesto
predsednika Skup{tine. To nije izvr{na vlast.
Muslimani su dobili predsednika predsedni{tva,
Hrvati predsednika vlade, i ako su oni
sedamnaest/osamnaest posto, ali nije bitno. Koliko je
god, oni su ravnopravni i konstitutivni narod. U
podeli ministarstava, Srpska demokratska stranka ne
tra`i ni Minstarstvo Unutra{wih poslova ni
Ministarstvo odbrane. Srbi tra`e Ministarstvo
poqoprivrede, jer vide}ete na mapi kada ona do|e, i
vide}ete da je — evo, ovo su, Ekcelencije, ovo su
prostori — plavi prostori gde Srbi su i danas posle
raznih genocida, ve}insko stanovni{tvo. Zato Srpska
151
I must say that the issue of cantonization was mentioned for
the first time in one of the Zagreb newspapers, but we accepted it
immediately as beneficial if Bosnia were going to do something.
When the OTP, in its search for mens rea in the intentions of
the Serbian Democratic Party, wants to prove that the SDS was
formed in order to start a war and form a Serbian state and to
expel others in the process, etc., it cites absolutely nothing ex-
cept what unfolded according to the logic of the civil war, but
not the intentions of the SDS. After all, just as other national par-
ties, the SDS won nearly all the votes of the Serbian people,
around 98% of the vote — the remaining 1½ percent voted for
other parties. That was an enormous responsibility. We won on a
democratic program in which the Prosecution is unable to show
one single element of our responsibility or one single element on
which subsequent events were based. It can’t find one in our
program, our documents — the OTP is unable to find any motive
for that.
The OTP ought not take into consideration what a repre-
sentative said somewhere in a fit of anger; instead, it ought to
have taken documents and said: “Here, this is what the SDS
wanted!”
We shared power in B-H, and we created the only coalition
that was possible to create. The Serbian Democratic Party, in the
name of the Serbian people that it represented, won, assumed,
and accepted the post of the Presidency of the Assembly. That is
not the executive branch. The Muslims won the Chairmanship of
the Presidency,80 and the Croats won the Prime Minister’s post,
even though they constituted only 17% or 18% [of the popula-
tion], but that did not matter. Regardless of their number, they
are a constituent people who possess equal rights. In the alloca-
tion of ministerial positions, the SDS did not seek either the Min-
istry of the Interior or the Ministry of Defense. The Serbs sought
the Ministry of Agriculture, because you will see on the map
152
demokratska stranka tra`i Ministarstvo poqo-
privrede.
Kad smo ve} kod ove mape, hteo bi da podsetim i
Ve}e i Tu`ila{tvo, da li ovaj narod, kome je ovo
domovina od vajkada, bezna~ajni faktor u Bosni da se
mo`e protiv wega i mimo wega donositi odluka o
wegovoj sudbini? Zato {to je nekom stalo da prekr{i
Ustav i zakone i da ~ak ni po osnovu broj~ane premo}i
jednostavno, i kad nema uslova da demokratski donese
takvu odluku, ovaj narod na ovim prostorima treba da
proguta i da prihvati diktat druge dve strane? Mi smo
uzeli Ministarstvo nauke, mi smo uzeli Ministartstvo
informisawa. Jednostavno, nije bilo ni jednog
ministarstva ni~ega {to bi bilo potrebno za rat.
A, odmah nakon izbora, ovaj optu`eni je zbog
tenzija u dru{tvu, iza{ao sa predlogom da se formira
ekspertska vlada, da se strana~ki qudi ne upu{taju u
vlast. Sve su to dugogodi{wi disidenti. Nemaju
iskustva u vr{ewu vlasti. Kod Komunista nisu bili
omiqeni. Da se uzmu eksperti. Ovaj optu`eni tako|e se
nigde nije kandidovao, jer je svojim strana~kim
kolegama preporu~io da strana~ki qudi ne idu u vlast,
nego da idu u tehnokrate. Druge dve partije nisu to
prihvatile, ali Srpska demokratska stranka je ostala
pri tome. Jedan jedini ministrar srpski bio je ~lan
Srpske demokratske stranke — Ministar inform-
isawa. Svi ostali su bili — neki su bili za vreme
komunista — dvojica su bili ministari za vreme
Komunista. Uzeli smo Ministarstvo pravde, uzeli smo
ovo {to sam rekao, finansija, poqoprivrede, itd.
ɉɊȿȼɈȾɂɅȺɐ: ȴɭɛɚɡɧɨ ɦɨɥɢɦɨ ɨɩɬɭɠɟɧɨɝ ɞɚ ɝɨɜɨɪɢ
ɫɩɨɪɢʁɟ ɞɚ ɨɦɨɝɭʄɢ ɩɪɟɜɨɻɟʃɟ ɢ ɜɨɻɟʃɟ ɡɚɩɢɫɧɢɤɚ.
153
when it appears, you will see — here, there they are, Excellen-
cies — these areas, these blue areas [EXHIBIT XIV] are where
the Serbs remain a majority of the population even today after
various genocides. That is why the SDS sought the Ministry of
Agriculture.
Since we already have the map before us now, I would like
to call the attention of the Chamber and the Prosecution [to this
question]: Is this people, whose homeland this has been since
time immemorial, such an insignificant factor in Bosnia that de-
cisions may be made about their fate against their will or by cir-
cumventing them? Because someone was determined to violate
the Constitution and laws simply to overwhelm them with statis-
tics when there were no conditions to democratically render such
a decision which these people in these areas had to swallow and
had to accept as the diktat of the other two parties? We took the
Ministry of Science and the Ministry of Information. Simply put,
there was not one single ministry in our hands that would have
been necessary for war.
The Formation of a Government of Experts
Immediately after the elections, the Accused, on account of
social tensions, came out with a proposal to form a government
of experts, and to disallow party members in government. Those
were all people who had been dissidents for many years. They
did not have experience running an administration. They were
disliked by the Communists. Let’s get experts. The Accused
likewise did not put himself forth as a candidate, because he and
his party associates proposed that party members should not be
in the government but proposed, instead, to go with technocrats.
The other two parties did not accept this, but the SDS stood by
its position. Only one Serbian minister was a member of the SDS
— the Minister of Information. All the rest were — some had
been ministers during the Communist era — two were ministers
who had served during the Communist era. We took the Minis-
154
KARAXI]: Dakle, kako Tu`ila{tvo mo`e da previdi
ta nastojawa Srpske demokratske stranke, i kako mo`e
namere za rat koje se`u od jula 1990-e godine, s kojim
ciqem je i formirana Srpska demokratska stranka?
Kako mo`e da saobrazi sa izborom ministarstava i sa
pona{awem Srpske demokratske stranke da vlast
prepusti tehnokratama?
Isto Tu`ila{tvo upada u jednu zamku zbog
nepoznavawa, neznawa jezika.
Pa kada Srpska demokratska stranka uo~i samog
rata, u uo~i najve}e krize, a u sklopu konferencije, gde
je dobila pravo na konstitutivnu jedinicu, na policiju,
na nacionalnu gardu, }e dobiti na vladu, re~i ovoga
optu`enoga:
Ovo smo dogovorili. Idite na teren.
Uzmite vlast u svoje ruke. Budite
odgovorni, itd.
Tu`ila{tvo prevodi kao “preuzmite”. Jedan od
glavnih stvari u ovoj optu`nici je kako su Srbi
preuzeli vlast u op{tinama. A pogledajte, Ekselencije,
ovu mapu. Srbi nisu imali potrebe da preuzimaju vlast,
nego samo da vr{e odgovorno vlast koju su dobili na
izborima. Za{to bi preuzeli? Od koga da preuzmu kad
su tamo ve} na vlasti? Na ovoj mapi vidite gde su sve
Srbi bili na vlasti.
Od koga bismo mi u Bijeqini preuzimali vlasta? A
Bijeqina }e se ovde pojaviti kao nasilno preuzeta
op{tina, a mi smo tamo, kao uostalom i svuda. Ali to
nepoznavawe jezika. Kada neko preuzima neki alat, onda
to je wegov alat pa ga ja preuzimam. A kada neko uzima
alat, to uzima svoj alat, koji tu stoji, i uzima ga. Dakle,
155
try of Justice, we took what I said before, Finance, Agriculture,
etc.
INTERPRETER: The Accused is kindly asked to slow down for
the benefit of the translation and the record.
KARADŽIû: Therefore, how is it possible that the Prosecution
overlooked these efforts made by the Serbian Democratic Party,
and how can [it impute] an intention to wage war, the purpose
for which the SDS was [allegedly] established, that goes back to
July 1990? How can it conform this with the SDS’s choice of
ministries, and its conduct in turning the government over to
technocrats?
The Prosecution also falls into a trap because of its lack of
knowledge, its ignorance of the language.
So when the SDS, on the eve of the war, on the eve of the
most serious crisis, obtained in accordance with the Conference
the right [for Serbs] to have their own constituent unit, their own
police force, their own National Guard, and their own govern-
ment, in the words of the Accused:
This is what we agreed to. Go into the field.
Take the administrative duties into your own
hands. Act responsibly, etc.
The OTP translates this as take over. One of the principal
charges in this Indictment is the claim that the Serbs took over
power in municipalities. But, Excellencies, please look at this
map. There was no need for Serbs to take over power but simply
to assume in a responsible manner the administrative duties that
they had won in the elections. Why would they take over? From
whom? From whom would they take over power when they were
already in office in these areas? You can see it on this map
where all the Serbs were in office.
From whom would we take over power in Bijeljina? But Bi-
jeljina will be depicted here as a county that was taken over by
156
drasti~na je razlika. A re~ je svega — “pre” — jedno
“pre” se razlikuje. I ona je dovela do ove optu`nice.
Dakle, ne samo da nismo uzeli Ministarstvo
unutra{wih poslova, nego ni na ni`a mesta u
ministartsvu unutra{wih poslova na regionalnom
nivou zamenika ministra, itd. Nismo doveli ni jednu
jedinu li~nost koja ve} nije bila u policiji. Nismo
doveli nijednog kriminalca.
Ja sad preporu~ujem Va{oj pa`wi — intercept,
snimqen razgovor ovoga optu`enoga sa zamenikom
ministra, koji }e ovde biti svedok, gde se dobija
potvrda, gde kona~no i taj zamenik ministra nije bio
~lan SDS-a.
[PO~ETAK audio sminka]
KARAXI]: Vito, mi nismo doveli
nijednog kriminalca. Nismo—
@EPINI]: Ja govorim za wih.
KARAXI]: Gledajte, molim vas. Mi smo
~istog obraza. Mi nismo doveli nijednog
~oveka koji ve} nije bio u MUP-u. Wihov
interes je, Vito, da dovode odane qude.
Slu{ajte mene dobro. Odane qude oni su
doveli. I jesu nas oni pre{li, i oni su
nas pre{li dok smo mi doveli stru~ne
qude i po{tene qude koji nemaju nikakve
veze sa strankom.
@EPINI]: Ja }u to pitati i uputiti
otvoreno pismo onaj sekretaru SDA i
predsedniku stranke: Da li je u interesu
muslimanskog naroda da dovode
kriminalce?
157
force, but we have always been there, just as, after all, we were
everywhere else. But this is a result of not knowing the language.
When a person takes over [preuzima] a tool, that tool belongs
to another person, so I’m taking over possession of it. But when
someone takes [uzima] a tool, he is taking something that be-
longs to him. Therefore, there is a drastic difference. And it all
hinges on the word [i.e., prefix] pre [pre] — one single prefix
differentiates them. And it led to this Indictment.
The SDA Brings Criminals into the MUP81
Therefore, not only did we not take the Ministry of the Inte-
rior, we didn’t even have any ministers or deputies at the region-
al level there, etc. We did not bring one single person into the
police force who had not already been a member. We did not
bring one single criminal [into the police force].
I would now like to call your attention to the intercept of a
recorded conversation between the Accused and a Deputy Minis-
ter, who will testify here, and it will be confirmed by this Deputy
Minister that he was not a member of the SDS.
[START — telephone intercept]
KARADŽIû: Vito, we haven’t appointed one
single criminal. We haven’t —
ŽEPINIû: I’m talking about them.
KARADŽIû: Look, please. We have nothing to
be ashamed of. We haven’t brought in one single
man who wasn’t already in the MUP. It is in
their interest, Vito, to appoint people dedicated
to their cause. Pay attention to what I’m saying.
They appointed people dedicated to their cause.
They deceived us, and they deceived us while
we were bringing in experts and honest people
who had no party connections.
158 159

KARAXI]: Postavqali smo qude, ŽEPINIû: I’m going to send an open letter to
birali smo najpo{tenije i najsposobnije that secretary of the SDA and to the President of
i mi smo ih postavqali. I molim lijepo, the party and ask them: Is it in the best interest
sad smo do{li u }orsokak. Oni su of the Muslim people to appoint criminals?
postavili najodanije qude; mi smo
KARADŽIû: We nominated people, we chose
poslali najsposobnije qude.
the most honest and the most capable people and
[KRAJ audio sminka] we appointed them. Now, mind you, we wound
up in a dead end. They were appointing the most
Ovo je bila osnova razlika u pristupu Srpske
devoted party loyalists; we were appointing
demokratske stranke i srpske zajednice, i ovog
those who were most capable.
fundamentalisti~kog jezgra SDA, razlika u moralnom
pristupu dru{tvu i dru{tvenom `ivotu, dovela je do [END — telephone intercept]
toga da je policija u BiH krenula u masivne
This was the basic difference in approach between the SDS and
zloupotrebe dr`avne funkcije protiv srpskog naroda, a
the Serbian community and this fundamentalist core of the SDA
na ratnom programu Stranke demokratske akcije. Ovaj
— the difference being in the moral approach to society and
gospodin koji sa mnom razgovara je postavqen na srpsko
common public life, and it resulted in the police force in B-H mas-
mesto zamenka ministra. Nije bio ~lan SDS-a.
sively abusing their state functions and turning them against the
Jednostavno mi to nismo radili. A oni su promenili
Serbian people, which was in accordance with the SDA’s program
krvnu sliku policije. Sve kriminalce su doveli, i oni
for war. This gentleman with whom I was speaking had been ap-
su po~eli sa naoru`avawem naroda i sa naoru`avawem
pointed as Deputy Minister in a slot reserved for a Serb. He was
Stranke demokratske akcije, vide}ete, sa naoru`-
not a member of the SDS. We simply did not do such things. And
avawem Patriotske Lige, koja je tako rano formirana,
they altered the fundamental composition of the police force. They
31-og marta, dva meseca posle uspostavqawa zajedni~ke
appointed nothing but criminals, and they started off by arming
vlade.
the people, the Party of Democratic Action and, as you will see,
To je, zna~i, nekoliko dokaza imamo iz ovoga
the Patriotic League, which was formed early, on March 31, only
intercepta gde drugi ~ovek MUP-a potvr|uje i da oni
two months after a coalition government had been established.
dovode kriminalce i da mi ne dovodimo kriminalce.
This means we have a lot of evidence in this intercept in
Dr`imo se i daqe da stru~ni qudi moraju da budu i
which the number-two man in the MUP confirms that they were
po{teni, a ne strana~ki qudi u vlast.
appointing criminals and that we were not. We still maintain that
E sada, bilo bi jako korisno kada bismo videli {ta
professionals must be honest people, and not party loyalists ap-
g. Izetbegovi} ka`e u ovim okolnostima. 27-oga
pointed to public office.
februara do 15-og januara, je bio za Jugoslaviju. 27-og
And now, it would be most beneficial if we were to see what
februara iste godine, mesec dana nakon sklapawa
Mr. Izetbegoviü had to say in these circumstances.82 From Janu-
160
koalicione vlade, g. Izetbegovi} ka`e da }e:
“@rtvovati mir za nezavisnost Bosne,” za suverenost
Bosne, a ne}e “`rtvovati suverenu Bosnu za mir.”
Dakle, potpuna odlu~nost da ide do kraja bez obzira na
to da li imao pravo ili nemao, i da li ovaj svet koji
`ivi na dve tre}ine BiH — jeste jedna tre}ina, ali
jedna tre}ina stanovni{tva su Srbi radi toga {to je
genocidom taj broj redukovan i smawen.
Dakle, Tu`ila{tvo sugeri{e da bi Srbi trebalo da
prihvate da Muslimani i Hrvati eksploati{u
rezultate genocida protiv Srba, da izvuku iz toga
korist. Jer sada se wima stavqa, predo~i: “[ta vi
ho}ete? Nema vas vi{e od jedne tre}ine.” Ali se vidi
gde su bili ve}ina kad su bili ve}ina. Na dve tre}ine
teritorije BiH su bili, jesu uvek bili do genocida
Drugog svetskog rata ve}insko stanovni{tvo.
Ko su ti qudi s kojima mi smo napravili koaliciju
i koji su uslovili na{e pona{awe u potpunosti? Sad
}emo da vidimo {ta je ideologija te grupe qudi, po{to
Tu`ila{tvo traga za mens rea svih nas. Da vidimo s kim
smo mi imali posla. Da li to bila umiqata jagwad ili
smo se suo~ili sa ne~im na {ta smo morali da
reagujemo? I sa ~im smo morali da se —
G. Izetbegovi} je 1970-e godine objavio — zapravo
napisao i distribuirao tajno ɂɫɥɚɦɫɤɭ ɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢʁɭ.
G. Izetbegovi} je 1941-e, 42-e, 43-e, itd., bio ~lan
organizacije Mladi Muslimani, i tada se on opredelio
za uvo|ewe fundamentalisti~kog Islamskog re`ima
svuda gde `ive Muslimani. Svuda gde `ive Muslimani!
Osnova za taj program je ɂɫɥɚɦɫɤɚ ɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢʁɚ koju je on
napisao 1970-e godine. On je i posle Drugog svetskog
rata nastavio da deluje tajno i konspirativno i
subverzivno i osu|en je na tri godine posle Drugog
161
ary 15 to February 27, he was for Yugoslavia. However, on
February 27 of that same year, just one month after the coalition
government had been formed, Mr. Izetbegoviü said that he
would: “sacrifice peace for an independent Bosnia,” for a sover-
eign Bosnia; but that he: “would not sacrifice a sovereign Bosnia
for peace.” So, he was completely determined to go to the bitter
end regardless of whether he had the right to do so or not, and
whether the people living on two-thirds of the territory of B-H
— it is one-third — one-third of the population is Serbian be-
cause genocide had reduced and diminished its numbers.
Therefore, the Prosecution suggests that Serbs accept the fact
that the Muslims and Croats are exploiting the results of the gen-
ocide against Serbs in order to benefit from it. Because now they
[the Serbs] are being confronted by the question: “What do you
want? You don’t make up more than a third of the population.”
But we can see where the Serbs were a majority when they were
a majority. They were on two-thirds of the territory of Bosnia,
and they always were the majority population until the genocide
during World War II.
Alija Izetbegoviü and the Islamic Declaration
Who are these people with whom we entered into a coalition
government and who are completely responsible for causing us to
behave as we did? Now we’re going to see what the ideology of
this group of people was, since the Prosecution is seeking mens
rea for all of us. Let’s see who we were dealing with.83 Were they
adorable lambs or were we up against something to which we had
to react the way we did? And with whom we had to —
Mr. Izetbegoviü published in 1970 — actually, wrote and
clandestinely distributed — the Islamic Declaration.
Mr. Izetbegoviü was in 1941, 1942, and 1943, etc., a member of
the Young Muslims, and at that time, he became determined to
introduce a fundamentalist Islamic regime wherever Muslims
lived. Wherever Muslims lived! The basis of that program was
162
svetskog rata. Po{to je iza{ao iz zatvora — to je jedna
od li~nosti kojoj treba skinuti kapu zbog upornosti i
nepopustqivosti u pogledu programa za koje se
opredelio. I nema nikakvih promena u tom pogledu.
A toku Drugog svetskog rata, on i wegovi saradnici,
bra}a Behmen, primali su ovog ~oveka koji je na slici
sa Hitlerom. To je Veliki Muftija Jerusalemski el-
Huseini, koji je bio u Sarajevu nekoliko puta —
najmawe dva puta — a kod Hitler je bio nebrojano puta.
Svaki put kad je do{ao u Bosnu, to je rezultiralo
formirawe EsEs-Vafen divizije, koja se nazvala
Hanxar Divizija, i koja je bila najsurovija. Da ni
Nemci nisu mogli da zamisle takve surovosti. To je
bila najsurovija jedinica. E, to je Hitlerov prijateq i
gost kod Behmena i kod Izetbegovi}a.
Dakle, posle tog rata, g. Izetbegovi} je u zatvoru
bio, i 1970-e je napisao ɂɫɥɚɦɫɤɭ ɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢʁɭ, koja je u
stvari programski akt Stranke demokratske akcije.
Naravno, mi smo se nadali da to nije, ali se pokazalo da
jeste. Jesam ja u jesen 1991-e, tra`e}i na~ina da spasimo
Bosnu, tra`io da Izetbegovi} ka`e da se odrekne
ɂɫɥɚɦɫɤɟ ɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢʁɟ da nas uveri da ona nije politi~ki
program Stranke demokratske akcije. To nismo dobili,
jer je on zaista u tom pogledu bio ~vrst.
Tu`ila{tvo ne samo da nije tragalo ko su na{i
partneri koji su uslovqavali na{e pona{awe, nego
pogre{no tuma~i na{e re~i. Pa ka`e, kada ja govorim
na nekom sastanku — mislim da je skup{tina bila ili
strana~ka — ka`e da:
Mi Muslimane kontrolisati ne mo`emo
u toj unitarnoj dr`avi. Mi dobro znamo
gde do|e fundamentalizam da se tu vi{e
`iveti ne mo`e — nema tolerancije.
163
the Islamic Declaration which he wrote in 1970. After World
War II, he continued his clandestine, conspiratorial, and subver-
sive activities, and he was sentenced to three years in prison after
World War II. After he was released from prison — he was one
of those individuals who merits a tip of the hat because of his
pertinacity and unrelenting efforts with respect to the program on
which he had set his mind. And he never changed his views.84
During World War II, he and his collaborators, the brothers
Behmen, received this man who is pictured here with Hitler.
[EXHIBIT XV] This is the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, [Amin] al-
Husseini, who also visited Sarajevo several times — at least
twice — but who had visited Hitler on countless occasions. Each
time he came to Bosnia, it resulted in the formation of the most
brutal of Waffen SS Divisions, the Handžar Division.85 Not
even the Germans could imagine such cruelty. It was the most
vicious unit. So, that was Hitler’s friend, and he was a guest of
Behmen and Izetbegoviü.
So, after that war, Mr. Izetbegoviü received a prison sen-
tence, and in 1970 he wrote the Islamic Declaration, which is, in
fact, the Party of Democratic Action’s tactical and strategic pro-
gram. Of course, we hoped that this was not the case, but that’s
what it turned out to be. In 1990, when I was trying to save Bos-
nia, I wanted Izetbegoviü to renounce the Islamic Declaration to
assure us that it wasn’t the political program of the SDA. We did
not get those assurances because he did, indeed, stick firmly to
his position.
Not only has the Prosecution not attempted to find out who
our partners were, those who established the conditions for our
conduct, but it has also erroneously interpreted our words. So, it
says, when I’m speaking at a meeting — I think it was a session
of the Assembly or a party meeting — that I said:
We cannot control the Muslims in such a unitary
state. We know very well that wherever funda-
164 165

O ~emu se radi? [ta je Tu`ila{tvo ovde uradilo? mentalism turns up, life there is impossible —
Ono je otkinulo deo govora. Ono je donelo zavisnu there is no tolerance.
re~enicu, a nije donelo glavnu re~enicu. Teza je, koja }e
What is this about? What has the Prosecution done here? It
se ~esto provla~iti, i pokazati kao ta~na da Zapad nije
edited out part of my speech. It quoted the subordinate clause but
dao formirawe Republike Srpske ili eventualno
omitted the governing clause. The thesis, which will be repeated
ostajawe Srba u Jugoslaviji, radi toga {to nije hteo da
often, and will prove to be correct, is that the West neither permit-
omogu}i Muslimanima da budu tako izrazita ve}ina i
ted the creation of the Republika Srpska nor allowed the Serbs to
da formiraju islamsku dr`avu u Evropi. Teza je da
remain eventually in Yugoslavia, because the West did not want to
Srbi i Hrvati treba da ostanu u Bosni da bi
enable the Muslims to be a clear majority and to create an Islamic
kontrolisali islamski faktor za ra~un Evrope.
state in Europe. The thesis is that Serbs and Croats must remain in
Radovan Karaxi} smatra da to nije dobro. Prvo: Srbi
Bosnia to control the Islamic factor for Europe’s benefit. Radovan
ne pristaju da wihovi `ivoti budu potro{eni na
Karadžiü does not consider this to be good. First: the Serbs do not
kontrolu islamskog faktora; drugo, u celoj toj
agree that their lives must be spent controlling the Islamic factor;
unitarnoj Bosni, nemogu}e je da mi wih kontroli{emo;
second, it is impossible to control them throughout the territory of
i tre}e, mnogo je miroqubivije da Srbi izdvoje svoju
a unitary Bosnia; and third, it would be much more peaceful for
sudbinu ispod tog fundamentalisti~kog projekta nego
the Serbs to withdraw from this fundamentalist project rather than
da se suprotstavqaju tom projektu. Neka sa tom projektu
to oppose it. Let Europe oppose this project. Why should the Serbs
suprostavqa Evropa. Za{to bi Srbi ponovo bili
once again be the guardians of the gate, which is the title of a well-
~uvari kapije, kao {to postoji jedna poznata kwiga o
known book, which depicts the Serbs as the guardians of the gates
Srbima kao ~uvarima evropske kapije.
of Europe?86
E, zna~i ovde se Tu`ila{tvo poku{ava da ka`e kako
Well, this means the Prosecution is here trying to say that
mi `elimo da kontroli{emo Muslimane, a mi upravo
we, in fact, want to control the Muslims, whereas we were stat-
ka`emo obrnuto, da mi ne `elimo. To nam nije ciq.
ing quite the opposite, that we didn’t want to do that. That was
Ne}emo da potro{imo svoje `ivote na to. Isto tako,
not our goal. We don’t want to spend our lives doing that. Like-
re~i jednog drugog poslanika koji ka`e mi smo
wise, the words of another representative in the [B-H] Assembly
odre|eni da budemo xelati Muslimana u Bosni. I mi to
who said that we were appointed to become the executioners of
ne}emo, itd. Tu`ila{tvo prevodi i uzima, kao da smo
the Muslims in Bosnia. We do not want that, either, etc. The
mi rekli: mi smo se opredelili da budemo wihovi
Prosecution translates and selects [text] as if we had said just
xelati. A u pitawu je pasiv, i rekao taj ~ovek: “jedna
such things: that we were determined to be their executioners.
institucija stara sedam sto godina,” verovatno misle}i
But, the passive voice is in question and this person said: “seven-
na Vatikan, “odredila je nas da mi budemo xelati,” a mi
hundred-year-old institution” — probably with the Vatican in
to odbijamo. A to se upotrebqava protiv nas. Po mom
mind — “has cast us in the role of executioners,” but we reject
mi{qewu to je nedopustqivo, jer da nije bilo tih
that. And this is being used against us. To my mind, this is im-
166
falsifikata, ne bi bila nikakve optu`nice. To su
prosta ~itawa. Jednostavno treba videti {ta je taj
~ovek rekao. Nas su opredelili, a ne mi smo se
opredelili. I mi odbijamo taj zadatak koji nam
stavqaju.
Daqe, Tu`ila{tvo u svom paragrafu 23 pred-
procesnog podneska ka`e da ja sam bez osnova rekao
na{em narodu da stojimo pred istim planovima, istim
zlo~incima, i da su ispred istih planova i zlo~inaca
iste `rtve kao u Drugom svetskom ratu, i da sam
insistirao na tome da Muslimani `ele islamsku
dr`avu, da pripremaju zakone kojima nas Srbe da
pot~ine i da ih dovedu ponovo u ropstvo. A {ta ako je
ovo ta~no? A to je Tu`ila{tvu bila du`nost da utvrdi
da li je ta~no. Tu`ila{tvo nastupa kao da ovo nije
ta~no. A lako }emo dokazati da jeste ta~no.
A za{to gubimo vreme i novac i {ta sve radimo sa
ovim procesima? Da je istra`ni sudija ovo radio
umesto Tu`ila{tva, zakqu~io bi, Karaxi} je u pravo.
Ima mno{tvo dokaza. Previ{e dokaza da je to ta~no. Da
vidimo, dakle, da li je to ta~no, i kako je to ta~no.
G. Izetbegovi} je tvorac jedne organizacije koja
traje preko pedeset godina. Zna~i od 1939-e godine pa na
daqe, koja ima ovakvu zakletvu.
Neka je slava i hvala Alahu gospodaru
svih svetova, kao pripadnik organiz-
acije—
Ovo prvi deo je normalno.
— kao pripadnik organizacije zakliwem
se svemogu}im Alahom da }u se, izme|u
ostalog, bezkompromisno boriti protiv
svega neislamskog; da }u `rtvovati na
167
permissible, because if it weren’t for these falsifications, there
would not have been any indictment at all. These are simple
readings. One simply has to see what the man actually said. They
assigned us this role, but we did not choose it. And we reject the
assignment they have given us.
Furthermore, the Prosecution states in Paragraph 2387 of its
Pre-Trial Brief that I told our people, without any reason for do-
ing so, that we faced the same master plan, the same criminals,
and that, facing such plans and criminals, our people would be
victims just as they had been during World War II, and that I had
insisted that the Muslims wanted an Islamic state and that they
were preparing laws that would subjugate Serbs and once again
reduce them to a state of slavery. But what if this is true? It is the
Prosecution’s duty to confirm whether or not this is true. The
Prosecution acts as if this were not true. But we will easily prove
that it is true.
Why are we wasting time and money and what are we doing
by holding such trials? Had an investigating magistrate been in
charge instead of the Prosecution, he would have concluded that
Karadžiü was in the right. The evidence is abundant. In fact,
there is too much evidence that it is true. So, let’s see whether it
is true, and how true it is.
Mr. Izetbegoviü is the founder of an organization which has
existed for more than fifty years. That means from 1939 on, it
has had this as its oath:88
Praise and thanks to Allah, Master of all worlds,
as a member of the organization —
This first part is normal.
— as a member of the organization, I swear to
Almighty Allah that I, among other things, will
fight uncompromisingly against everything non-
Islamic; that I will sacrifice everything on God’s
168
Bo`ijem putem sve od sebe, pa i svoj
`ivot, ako to budu zahtevali interesi
Islama. Ustrajno }u se boriti za
veli~inu, mo} i sjaj Islama. Molim
svemogu}eg da mi da voqe, snage, hrab-
rosti, istrajnosti na ovome putu xihada.
PREVODILAC: Prevodioci vas qubazno mole da malo
usporite.
KARAXI]: [Dakle, moram to] usporiti.
Dakle, ovo je zakletva te muslimanske omladine.
E, sada da vidimo {ta ka`e g. Izetbegovi} u svojoj
ɂɫɥɚɦɫɤɨʁ ɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢʁɢ. [ta su zadaci Islama, odnosno
Muslimana? Dakle:
Muslimani moraju biti pokret, a taj
pokret treba i mo`e pri}i preuzimawu
vlasti ~im je moralno i brojno toliko
sna`an da mo`e ne samo sru{iti
postoje}u neislamsku nego i izgraditi
novu islamsku vlast.
Dakle, ne mora ~ekati ni pedeset posto, jer ~ekawe
pedeset posto zna~i opredeqewe za neku demokratiju
kakvu-takvu, ali za neko glasawe; nego, ~im se osete
sna`ni, da su du`ni da treba i mogu da pristupe ru{ewu
svega ne-islamskog.
Nakon prvog izlaska iz zatvora, g. Izetbegovi} je
napisao tu deklaraciju, a i u~lanio se u sve mogu}e
va`ne institucije. To Tu`ila{tvo ne zna, a to zna
Republikanski Politi~ki Komitet u Senatu
Sjediwenih Ameri~kih Dr`ava. To zna ceo svet, a
Tu`ila{tvo mene ovde predstavqa kao barbarina koji
nasr}e na dobrog mirnog kom{iju. Evo {ta Senat
Republikan[ski] [Politi~ki Komitet] ka`e o tome
169
path, even my own life, if the interests of Islam
demand it. I will also fight persistently for the
grandeur and splendor of Islam. I pray that the
Almighty grant me the will, the power, the cour-
age, and the persistence to take the path of jihad.
INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly request that you slow
down a little.
KARADZIû: So, I have to slow down.
As I was saying, this is the oath taken by the Young Muslims.
Now let’s see what Mr. Izetbegoviü says in his Islamic Dec-
laration. What tasks does Islam assign to individual Muslims?
Therefore:
Muslims must form a movement, and that
movement can and must start to take over gov-
erning authority as soon as it is morally and nu-
merically strong enough to be able to overthrow
not only the existing non-Islamic government
but also to build up a new Islamic government.89
So, they don’t have to wait until they are 50% [of the popula-
tion], because waiting for 50% means waiting for some kind of
democracy, and some kind of voting; instead, as soon as they
feel strong enough, it is their duty to join in the destruction of all
things non-Islamic.
After he was released from prison the first time,
Mr. Izetbegoviü wrote this Islamic Declaration, but he also be-
came a member of all possible significant institutions. The Pros-
ecution does not know about this but the U.S. Senate Republican
Party Policy Committee does.90 The whole world knows about it,
yet the Prosecutor presents me here as a barbarian who attacked
a good and peaceful neighbor. This is what the U.S. Senate Re-
publican Policy Committee said about it in 1998, that Mr. Izet-
begoviü in 1983 had strengthened his efforts since 1978 to intro-
170
1998-e godine, da je 1983-e g. Izetbegovi} od 1979-e
poja~ao napore za uvo|ewe islamske vlasti u BiH.
Tokom su|ewa 1983-e godine, zna~i to je drugo su|ewe,
kojim su saslu{ani 65 svedoka pred veliki ve}em — pet
sudija — svi pet Muslimani — 62 svedoka su bili
Muslimani.
E sada, presuda Aliji Izetbegovi}u, Omeru
Behmenu, Hasanu ^engi}u — oni su sva trojica bili
`ivi i aktivni 1990-e — ka`e da su oni opsednuti
idejom islamskog preporoda i islamizacije Muslimana
i da je to po~elo 1974-e godine, one godine kad je novi
Ustav Jugoslavije koji je bio osnova za razbijawe
Jugoslavije, usvojen; da su prihvatili revoluciju
iransku kao svoju, itd., ali osnovno je Islam mora biti
dr`avno ure|ewe u svim zemqama gde `ivi islamsko
stanovni{tvo. Ne ka`e ve}insko islamsko, nego
islamsko stanovni{tvo. I da treba raditi na stvarawu
uslova da BiH u budu}nosti bude islamska republika sa
islamskim zakonima. Mislite da se to ne bi odnosilo
na Srbe? Naravno bi se odnosilo na svakog `ivog
stvora u Bosni. Kao i da imami u BiH treba da budu
naoru`ani po uzora na [iitske imame u Iranu.
Izetbegovi} te godine — 1982-e godine kao
neprijateqe identifikuje Srbe. Nema ni Karaxi}a ni
Milo{evi}a. Na sceni nema ni Memoranduma Srpske
Akademije Nauke i Umetnosti. Sve te aparature koju
Tu`ila{tvo ovde usmerava protiv Srba, odnosno, uzima
kao dokaze srpske krivice.
Srbija je tada najslabija, jer je kontroli{u wene
dve pokrajine, Kosovo i Vojvodina, jedina republika u
Jugoslaviji koja ne mo`e da re{ava svoje probleme, a
zahvaquju}i savesti Lazara Koli{evskog, jednog
Makedonca, otkrili smo {ta je. Komunisti~ki slogan,
171
duce Islamic rule in Bosnia. During his trial in 1983, i.e., his
second trial, during which there were 65 witnesses who were
deposed before a chamber of five judges — all five were Mus-
lims — and 62 of the witnesses were Muslims.
Now, the verdict against Alija Izetbegoviü, Omer Behmen,
Hasan ýengiü — all three were alive and active in 1990 — the
verdict states that they were obsessed by the idea of an Islamic
rebirth, the [proper] Islamization of Muslims, and that this had
begun in 1974, the year the new Yugoslav Constitution, which
laid the foundations for the break-up of Yugoslavia, was adopt-
ed;91 and that they had accepted the Iranian Revolution as their
own, etc., but fundamentally that Islam must form the state struc-
ture in all countries with Muslim populations. It does not state
that there must be a Muslim majority, but simply a Muslim
population. And that one must work toward creating the condi-
tions so that B-H in the future becomes an Islamic republic with
Islamic laws. Do you think this would not apply to the Serbs? It
would, of course, apply to every living creature in Bosnia. Just as
Bosnian imams must be armed, following the example of the
Shiite imams in Iran.
That year, in 1982, Izetbegoviü identified the Serbs as the
enemy. There was no Karadžiü, and there was no Miloševiü.
There was no Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and
Sciences on the scene. All these apparatus that the Prosecution is
here directing against the Serbs, in other words, it takes as proof
of Serbian guilt.
Serbia was at its weakest at that time because two provinces,
Kosovo and Vojvodina, controlled it. Serbia was the only repub-
lic in Yugoslavia that was unable to solve its own problems, and
thanks to Lazar Koliševski, a Macedonian, we discovered what it
was about. The Communist slogan, ideology, was: Weak Serbia,
strong Yugoslavia. Well, that weak Serbia in 1982, according to
Mr. Izetbegoviü, was the enemy. His associate Omer Behmen,
172
ideologija je bila “Slaba Srbija, jaka Jugoslavija.” E,
ta slaba Srbija, 1982-e godine, za g. Izetbegovi}a je
neprijateq. Wegov saradnik, Omer Behmen, s kojim je
sara|ivao i za vreme Drugog Svetskog Rata, i u ~ijoj je
ku}i odsedao Muftija Jerusalimski el-Huseini, ka`e
da se od Srba ne mo`e `iveti, da se `ene muslmankama,
da je to pritisak na Muslimane. Da drugi ili tre}i,
^engi}, ka`e da muslimanka ne sme dojiti ne-
muslimansko dete i obrnuto, muslimansko dete ne sme
biti podojeno od nemuslimanke itd., a g. ^engi} tada,
gde nema ni Karaxi}a ni Srpske demokratske stranke,
od 1974–1983-e, ka`e: “[ta je ciq wihove revolucije
koju oni pripremaju?”
Ako imate u glavi kako izgleda mapa Jugoslavije,
zna~i, Bosna, Sanxak, Kosovo. Mi to tamo tako zovemo
“Zelena Transverzala.” Tu`ila{tvo se ne sla`e.
Smatra da mi ne smemo ~ak da razmi{qamo o tome. A
sada je Ministar Turksi Davotoglu do{ao tom
Transverzalom i kazao da }e ponovo uspostaviti tu
Transverzalu. A 1990-e godine, wegov predsednik
Turgut Ozal je rekao da }e Turska biti od Jadrana do
Kinezkog zida. Mo`e, ali bez Srba. Mi u toj imperiji
ne}emo da u~estvujemo.
Evo Zelene Transverzale koja je zacrtana od mo}nog
~oveka, koji ina~e sve{tenik — onaj ameri~ki
sve{tenik koji je javno za`alio {to Ugo ^avez nije
ubijen na vreme — pravo jagwe prema ovom sve{teniku.
On ka`e: “Za to ne treba ~ekati izazov i povod.” Na
drugo mesto ka`e treba napraviti izazov i povod.
Videli smo kako izgledaju Markale i drugi izazovi i
povodi koje oni naprave. I onda na osnovu wih,
postupaju prema Srbima kao da su to Srbi napravili.
Kao da su to Srbi napravili! As if.
173
with whom he had collaborated during World War II, and in
whose house the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Husseini, had
stayed as a guest when he visited, said that it was impossible to
live with Serbs: they took Muslim women as wives; this put
pressure on Muslims. The second or third man [i.e., in the pho-
tograph on screen], ýengiü, said that a Muslim woman must not
breastfeed a non-Muslim child and vice-versa; a Muslim child
must not be breastfed by a non-Muslim woman, etc., while
Mr. ýengiü at the time, when neither Karadžiü nor the Serbian
Democratic Party were on the scene between 1974–1983, was
asking: What is the goal of the revolution they are preparing?92
If you have any notion of what a map of Yugoslavia looks
like ʊ that means Bosnia, Sandžak, and Kosovo. We call that
down there “the Green Highway.”93 The Prosecution does not
agree. It is of the opinion that we should not even entertain such
thoughts. But now, Turkish Minister Davutoglu visited the Green
Highway and said that he was going to re-establish the Green
Highway. And in 1990, his President Turgut Özal said that Tur-
key would extend from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China.
Maybe, but without the Serbs. We are not going to participate in
that empire.
Here we have the Green Highway as described by an influ-
ential man who is a clergyman as well — the American clergy-
man94 who publicly stated that he was sorry that Hugo Chavez
had not been assassinated in time — Chavez is a lamb compared
to this clergyman. He says: “You do not need a provocation and
a motive.” Then he says elsewhere that you do need a provoca-
tion and a motive. We have seen what Markale and other provo-
cations and motives that they fabricated look like. And based on
that, they treat the Serbs as if they were to blame. As if the Serbs
were to blame! As if.
It comes as no surprise to me that they are doing this, but
why is the Prosecution following suit? And why is the Prosecu-
174
A nije mi ~udo {to oni to rade, ali za{to to radi
Tu`ila{tvo? I za{to to tra`i Tu`ila{tvo od ovog
suda da isto to radi? Da prihvati ratna lukavstva
primitivna? Nikakva. Druge Markale 1995-e su
tehni~ki boqe izvedene, ali potpuno ista tehnologija i
isti razlozi.
To je na su|ewu 1983-e godine. Prvo Izetbegovi},
drugo je Behmen. Za ostale se ne se}am koji su, ali znao
bih od prilike.
Evo sada, mo`emo ponovo da vidimo — ne moramo da
vidimo — isti planovi, isti zlo~inci, iste `rtve kao
u Drugom svetskom ratu. Tu`ila{tvo smatra da — a evo
{ta ka`e presuda 1983-e godine. Pet, ve}e petorice, svi
Muslimani, 62 muslimanska svedoka.
U na{im prilikama, zagovarawe ovakve
ideologije zna~i vra}awe na pozicije
bratoubila~kog rata. Nesumqivo je da se
ovakva ideologija ne bi mogla oteloviti
u sredini koja je nacionalno i vjerski
toliko izmije{ana —
ɉɊȿȼɈȾɂɅȺɐ: Prevodioci vas qubazno mole mɚɥɨ
ɫɩɨɪɢʁɟ ~itajte.
ɄȺɊȺȹɂȶ: Ima na ekranu pa se zato po`urim.
— koja je nacionalno i vjerski toliko
izmije{ana da prevaga ili potpuna
dominacija, bilo koje od postoje}ih
nacionalnih entiteta, naprosto nije
zamisliva ukoliko ne}e biti zasnovana
na teroru ili eventualno stranoj
intervenciji.
175
tion asking the Trial Chamber to do the same? To accept primi-
tive deceptions of warfare? Not under any circumstances at all.
There was a second incident at Markale in 1995 that was techni-
cally better executed, but it was the same technology and [it was
used for] the same reasons.
This is a photograph from the trial in 1983. Izetbegoviü is
the first man, and Behmen is the second. [EXHIBIT XVI] As for
the others, I don’t recall their names, but I’d know them if I saw
them.
Here, we can once again see — we don’t have to see the map
— the same master plan, the same criminals, the same victims as
in WWII. The Prosecution considers — and here is what the ver-
dict states in 1983. A Trial Chamber of five judges, all Muslims,
and sixty-two Muslim witnesses:
In our circumstances, recommendations for such
an ideology mean a return to the positions of the
fratricidal war. It is indisputable that such an
ideology cannot be implemented in a community
which is so profoundly religiously and political-
ly mixed —
INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly request that you read
[the text] more slowly.
KARADŽIû: It’s on the screen, that’s why I’m rushing through it.
— which is so profoundly religiously and politi-
cally mixed that the dominance or complete su-
premacy of any of the existing national entities
is simply inconceivable, unless based upon ter-
ror or foreign intervention.95
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadžiü, please slow down for the inter-
preters.
176
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Ƚɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄ, molim vas, uɫɩɨɪɢtɟ
za prevodioce.
KARAXI]: Pogledajmo, Ekselencije, a voleo bih da
pogleda i Tu`ila{tvo. Sedam godina nakon ove
presude, mi dobijamo realizaciju te ideologije, ali ne s
terorom ili stranom intervencijom nego i terorom i
stranom intervencijom. Ovaj sudija je bio, i ovo Ve}e je
bilo dalekovido. I teror i strani zahtevi stranom
intervencijom. Markale su zahtev za stranom
intervencijom. Sve insenacije u na{em ratu, lukavstva,
kasapqewe sopstvenoga naroda, vide}ete u programu da
ima kasapqewe sopstvenoga naroda. Zacrtano
kasapqewe sopstvenog naroda. To }ete videti u
programu.
I sada Tu`ila{tvo, pored svega ovoga {to mu je na
dohvat ruke, ka`e da je Karaxi} insistirao na {to
ve}oj separaciji koja je mogu}a. Pa ako na{e kom{ije
sebi pripremaju ovakav program i ovakav `ivot,
naravno da }emo da se separi{emo. Mi ne verujemo da to
muslimanske mase ho}e. Nije pobedio Izetbegovi} na
izborima nego Abdi}. Muslimani su klicali Srbima i
Muslimanima kada je sporazum — dva meseca smo se
bavili istorijskim sporazumom 1991-e godine — dok ga
Izetbegovi} nije povukao. Klicali su i sre}ni bili
{to se Srbi i Muslimani sporazumevaju, ali ta
zaverni~ka grupa mo`e da izmanipuli{e i SDA i celu
muslimansku zajednicu.
A sada da vidimo kako bi to bilo kada bi smo pravu
optu`nicu napisali, pa samo promenili imena.
Izetbegovi} je insistirao na secesiji
cele BiH uprkos etni~koj izme{anosti.
To je zna~ilo Srbe u BiH izvesti iz
177
KARADŽIû: Let’s take a look at this, Your Excellencies. I’d
like the Prosecution to take a look at this, too. Seven years after
this verdict, we were on the receiving end of the realization of
that very ideology, but not with terror or foreign intervention, but
with both terror and foreign intervention. This judge and this
Trial Chamber were farsighted. It was terror and foreign de-
mands for foreign intervention. Markale was a demand for for-
eign intervention. All the scripted scenarios in our war, the con
artistry, the butchering of their own people, and you will see that
the program [of the SDA] called for butchering their own people.
Killing one’s own people was prescribed. You’ll see that in their
program.
And now the OTP, despite having all this at its fingertips,
says that Karadžiü insisted on as much separation as was possi-
ble. Well, if our neighbors are preparing this kind of program
and this kind of life, of course, we’re going to separate ourselves.
We do not believe that is what the Muslim masses want. Izetbe-
goviü didn’t win the election; [Fikret] Abdiü96 did. The Muslims
cheered for the Muslims and the Serbs when they reached an
agreement — we spent two months hammering out that historic
agreement in 1991 — until Izetbegoviü withdrew [his support
for] it. They were cheering and were delighted because the Serbs
and Muslims had reached an agreement, but that conspiratorial
group was capable of out-manipulating the SDA as well as the
entire Muslim community.
Now let’s take a look at what things would be like if we
were to write a genuine indictment by simply changing the
names.97
Izetbegoviü insisted on secession of all of Bos-
nia despite Bosnia’s ethnically-intermingled
character. This meant [leading the Serbs out of
178
zemqe za koju su se opredelili i
pretvorili ih u nacionalnu mawinu u
wegovoj Islamskoj Republici.
Zna~i, kad su Muslimani izme{ani sa Srbima u
Republici Srpskoj, onda Republika Srpska ne mo`e da
se formira, a kad su Srbi izme{ani sa Muslimanima u
celoj Bosni, onda mo`e. Izgleda da su Muslimani vi{e
izme{ani nego Srbi, na istom mestu. Samo {to je
wihova izme{anost nekako ve}a.
Vide}ete kako se relativizuju brojke i broj~ani
odnosi, {to ka`e uva`eni g. Tiger, koji voli povr{ne
poglede. ‘Ajde da bacimo povr{ni pogled jo{ jedanput
na ovu mapu etni~kog rasporeda. Da li su Srbi u Bosni
sa ovakvim rasporedom koji meni ovo Tu`ila{tvo
zamera kad ka`em da su Srbi vlasnici. Srbi su
vlasnici zemqe po pitawu privatnog vlasni{tva, ali
Srbi su ve}insko stanovni{tvo na ovom prostoru. I
imaju pravo da ka`u, kad su ve} stekli pravo na dr`avu
i `iveli su u Jugoslaviji, imaju pravo da ka`u da li oni
prihvataju ovakve avanturisti~ke revolucije strane
jedne potpune ideologije, idelogije koja je nanela
veliko zlo i Muslimanima i Srbima.
Da li Tu`ila{tvo tra`i i odobrava da se broj —
recimo Tu`ila{tvo ka`e 30% itd. Da li odobrava —
evo, vidite kako bi to izgledalo. Zna~i, mi smo
insistirali da se mi odvojimo od wih. ‘Ajdemo da
vidimo kako bi to izgledalo. “Izetbegovi} je
insistirao na secesiji cele Bosne uprkos Bosansko
etni~kom me{ovitom karakteru.” To zna~i on mo`e da
izvede milion i po Srba, a Tu`ila{tvo ka`e da smo mi
tra`ili teritorije Republike Srpske na kojoj je bilo
stotinu hiqada Muslimana i Hrvata. Stotinu hiqada
Muslimana i Hrvata za Tu`ila{tvo izgledaju vi{e
179
the land they had decided on and] making Serbs
a national minority in his Islamic Republic.
That is to say, since Muslims and Serbs are intermingled in
the Republika Srpska, then the Republika Srpska cannot be es-
tablished, but when the Serbs are intermingled with the Muslims
in all of Bosnia, then in that case it is possible. It seems that
Muslims are more intermingled than Serbs are, and they are all
in the same place. Their intermingled character is only somehow
greater.
You will see how numbers and statistical relations are rela-
tivized, as the esteemed Mr. Tieger says, who likes cursory
glances [at things], so let’s cast a cursory glance once again at
this map of ethnic distribution. [EXHIBIT XIV] The Serbs in
Bosnia, with such a pattern of distribution, for which the OTP
reproaches me when I say that the Serbs are [the majority] land-
owners. Serbs own the land as far as private ownership is con-
cerned, and Serbs are the majority population in this area. And
they have the right to say, once they had attained the right to
statehood and wanted to live in Yugoslavia, whether they were
willing to accept such adventurist revolutions on the part of one
complete ideology, an ideology that inflicted great misfortune on
both Muslims and Serbs.
Does the Prosecution seek and approve this figure — let’s
say the Prosecution says 30%, etc. Now, does it approve — here
[pointing to the map], you see what it would look like. In other
words, we insisted on separating ourselves from them. Let’s see
what that would look like. “Izetbegoviü insisted on secession of
all of Bosnia despite Bosnia’s ethnically intermingled charac-
ter.” In other words, he can take a million and a half Serbs out of
Yugoslavia, but the Prosecution charges that we sought territo-
ries for the Republika Srpska where there were one hundred
thousand Muslims and Croats. One hundred thousand Muslims
and Croats means more to the OTP than a million and a half
180
nego milion i po Srba. To je ra~unica koju mi ne
razumemo. S tim {to ti Muslimani i Hrvati koji bi
ostali u Repubici Srpskoj ne bi napustili svoju
dr`avu: nego bi samo u istoj dr`avi bili u drugom
entitetu.
“Mi Muslimane kontrolisati ne mo`emo.” To je
zloupotrebqeno. To se apstolutno kasapi i sakati ta
re~enica tako da kada se sudijama poka`e, oni }e rado
da potvrde tu optu`nicu, jer nije wihovo da vr{e
istrage. Ali to je sve la`no, i zloupotrebqeno je. Nije
da nisu razumeli to. Kada se govori o natalitetu,
postoje tri velika izvora ve{ta~kog prira{taja. Mi
ka`emo prira{taj. To zna~i pove}awe populacije, nije
to samo ra|awe.
Prvi je forsirano doseqavawe Muslimana iz
Sanxaka. Drugi je planovi za naseqavawe, navodnih
potomaka muslimanskih iseqenika u Tursku. I tre}i je
fatva, preporuka, nalog verskog vo|e da Muslimanka
mora da ra|a petoro da bi jednu `rtvovala za Bosnu.
Za{to Muslimanka mora da ra|a petoro? Da bi ih bilo
vi{e od Srba? E, protiv takvog nataliteta mi jesmo. I
kada Tu`ila{tvo ka`e da sam ja rekao da ne}emo dati
da prave naseqa u Srpskoj, ja to pri~am {ta sam rekao
Izetbegovi}u. Rekao sam mu: “G. Izetbegovi}u, mi znamo
da vi planirate — videli smo taj program — da
planirate da doseqavate Muslimane iz Sanxaka i
Turke iz Turske — ali nemojte se zavaravati da }emo mi
pustiti da vi u srpske prostore praviti ta naseqa. To
ne bi dopustili ni Protestanti ni Katolici u
Severnoj Irskoj da im se namerno i svesno politi~kim
akcijama remeti etni~ka struktura i etni~ka
ravnote`a. To je zlo~in. To je krivi~no delo. I mi
imamo pravo to.” I to je ono {to ja sam rekao na{oj
181
Serbs does. This is a calculation we don’t understand. Except
that these Muslims and Croats who would stay in the Republika
Srpska would not have to leave their own state; they would in-
stead just be living in the same state but in a different entity.
“We cannot control the Muslims.” This is abusive. That sen-
tence has been completely butchered and mutilated, so that when
it is presented to the judges, they will gladly ratify the Indictment
because it is not their responsibility to conduct an investigation.
But all this is fake and abusive. It is not that they don’t under-
stand it. When discussing the birth rate, there are three major
sources for the artificial rise in the rate of population growth. We
say population growth. That means an increase in the population
and it is not just the birth rate.
The first is the forced migration of Muslims from Sandžak.
The second is the plan to settle the alleged descendants of [Bosni-
an] Muslims who had emigrated to Turkey. And the third is a fat-
wa, a recommendation, a command from a religious leader that a
Muslim woman must bear five children so that one may be sacri-
ficed for Bosnia. Why should a Muslim woman bear five chil-
dren? So that they would outnumber the Serbs? We are against
such a [rise in] birth rate. And when the Prosecution states that I
said that we would not give them the right to settle in the Repub-
lika Srpska, I am saying what I told Izetbegoviü. I said to him:
“Mr. Izetbegoviü, we know that you are planning — we saw that
program — that you are planning to settle Muslims from Sandžak
and Turks from Turkey — but don’t kid yourself that we are going
to allow you to create such settlements in Serbian areas. Neither
Protestants nor Catholics in Northern Ireland would allow such a
deliberate and conscious effort to disrupt the ethnic structure and
balance by means of political action. It is a crime. It is a criminal
act. And we have the right [to oppose it].” And that is what I said
to our Assembly or whomever at some meeting, and what I had
182
Skup{tini, ili ne znam kome sam rekao na nekom
sastanku, interpretiralo se {ta sam ja rekao
Izetbegovi}u. Ja sam to wemu rekao. I on je samo
treptao i rekao je, “Shvatio sam.”
Dakle, da vidimo {ta je ta ɂɫɥɚɦɫɤɚ ɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢʁɚ. To
je programski tekst od koga se ne odustaje bio
Komunista ili ne bio na vlasti. Ni{ta se u tom nije
promenilo. I zna~i, ka`e se:
Mi, s ovim uverewem, objavqujemo prija-
teqima i neprijateqima da su Muslimani
odlu~ili sudbinu islamskog svijeta uzeti
u svoje ruke i taj svijet urediti po svojoj
zamisli. Borba za nove ciqeve ne po~iwe
danas. Na protiv, povjest ove borbe ve}
pozna svoje {ehide —
(To su svete `rtve (borci koji poginu).)
— i ispisane stranice o stradawima i
`rtvama martidima ({ehid je martir).
Musliman mo`e poginuti samo sa imenom
Alaha i u slavu Islama ili bje`ati sa
bojnog poqa.
Ovde }u na~as prekinuti da Vam ka`em da }emo
pokazati — dokaz }emo doneti kako g. Izetbegovi}
ka`e svojim saradnicima.
Mi govorimo iz prakti~nih razloga da
na{i vojnici ginu za jedinstvenu Bosnu,
za multietni~ku Bosnu, a nemojte da se
la`emo. Na{i vojnici ne ginu za multi-
etni~ku Bosnu.
I to je trenutak iskrenosti u nekom u`em krugu, ali
mi taj dokaz imamo.
183
said to Izetbegoviü was just interpreted [to my disadvantage]. I
told him that. He just blinked and said, “I get it.”
So, let’s see what this Islamic Declaration is. This is an ac-
tion plan that they are going to stick to, regardless of whether the
Communists are in power or not. Nothing in it has changed at all.
It says as follows:
We announce to our friends and foes alike that
Muslims are determined to take the fate of the
Islamic world into their own hands, and we are
determined to reorder the world in accordance
with our own plans. The struggle for new goals
did not begin today. On the contrary, the history
of this struggle already knows its shehids —
These are holy martyrs, the soldiers who died in battle.
— and pages have been filled with accounts of
their deaths and the martyrdom of shehids (a
shehid is a martyr). A Muslim can die only with
the name of Allah on his lips and for the greater
glory of Islam or flee from the battle-field.98
I will pause here for a moment to advise you that we are go-
ing to show — introduce evidence of what Mr. Izetbegoviü said
to his associates.
For practical reasons, we are saying that our sol-
diers are laying down their lives for a united
Bosnia, for a multi-ethnic Bosnia, but let’s not
kid ourselves. Our soldiers are not dying for a
multi-ethnic Bosnia.
And this is a moment of sincerity in the narrow sense of the
word, but we have the evidence to prove it.
184
Prvi, najva`niji zakqu~ak je svakako
nespojivosti Islama i neislamskih sistema.
Nema mira ni koegzistencije izme|u
islamske vjere i neislamskih dru{tven-
ih i politi~kih situacija. Pola`u}i
pravo da sam ure|uje svoj svijet, Islam
jasno iskqu~uje pravo i mogu}nost
djelovawa bilo koje strane ideologije na
svom podru~ju.
Nema, dakle, lai~kog principa. A dr`ava treba da
bude izraz i da podr`ava moralne koncepte religije.
Islam je prva, a pan-Islamizam druga to~ka.
Gledajte ovo:
Najavquju}i preporod, mi ne najavqujemo
razdobqe sigurnosti i spokoja, nego
razdobqe nemira i isku{ewa. Suvi{e je
mnogo stvari koje mole za svojim
ru{iocima. Narod koji spava mo`e se
probuditi samo udarcima. Tko `eli
dobro na{oj zajednici, ne treba da je
po{te|uje naprezawa opasnosti i neda}a.
Islamski preporod ne mo`e zapo~eti bez
vjerske, ali se ne mo`e uspe{no
nastaviti i dovr{iti bez politi~ke
revolucije. Pokret treba i mo`e pri}i
preuzimawu vlasti, ~im je moralno i
brojno dovoqno sna`an da mo`e ne samo
sru{iti postoje}u neislamsku, nego
izgraditi novu islamsku vlast.
Nedvosmisleno. Nema dileme. Nespokoj, nemir,
isku{ewa — samo li~i na krv, znoj, i suze ^er~ilove,
jer krv, znoj, i suze kod ^er~il izaziva neprijateq, kod
185
o The first and most important conclusion is, of course, the
impossibility of co-existence between the Islamic and non-
Islamic systems.
There can be neither peace nor co-existence be-
tween the Islamic faith and non-Islamic social
and political situations. Islam, reserving the right
to create its own world, clearly excludes the
right as well as the possibility of actions taken
on behalf of any ideology foreign to it in regions
it controls.
The secular principle, therefore, does not exist. The state
must be an expression, as well as a support of, the moral precepts
of that religion. Islam is the first point, and pan-Islamism is the
second point.
Take a look at this.
While we are proclaiming a rebirth, we are not
announcing a period of peace and safety but a
period of unrest and trials. There are far too
many things that are praying for [the arrival of]
their annihilators. People who are asleep can on-
ly be awakened by blows. Whosoever wishes
our community well will not try to spare it the
intensification of danger and misfortune. The Is-
lamic rebirth cannot begin without a religious,
yet it cannot be successfully pursued and com-
pleted without a political, revolution. The [Is-
lamic] movement can and must act to take over
rule as soon as it is morally and numerically
strong enough to be able to not only overturn the
existing non-Islamic government but also to
build up a new Islamic governing authority.
186
^er~ilevog naroda. Ovde }e izazvati sopstvena vlast
krv, znoj, i suze sopstvenog naroda.
A tko `eli dobro na{oj zajednici ne
treba da je po{te|uje, treba da je udari,
da je probudi.
Samo udarcem! Udarac je Markale. Da bi se narod
dr`ao protiv Srba, treba dokazati da su Srbi
napravili ono na Markalama, a videli ste kako je to
neuverqivo. I nemogu}e jednom jedinom minom
pogoditi ciq, a pogotovu ubiti tolike qude kojih tamo
nije ni bilo — e, to je to. To je to {to se pojavilo 90-e
godine i trenutak kada se najavquje preporod i dolazi
razdobqe nespokoja, nemira i isku{ewa. Zbog toga {to
mnoge stvari vape za svojim ru{iocima, ali mi nismo
tra`ili te ru{ioce. Te stvari koje su vapile za
ru{iocima, odnosno, koji }e biti sru{ene su Ustav
Jugoslavije, Ustav BiH, kao sekularnih dr`ava sa
kojima ne}e biti kompromisa, kako ovde pi{e, je li?
JNA, srpski narod u BiH, zajedni~ki `ivot u B-H,
zajedni~ki etni~ki i kulturni koreni. Muslimani
govore srpskim jezikom. To {to su ovde prihvatili da
postoji bosanski jezik, to je zloupotreba. Srpski jezik
je intelektualna i kulturna svojina srpskog naroda. Ne
govore Australijanci australijanski nego Engleski.
Sru{eni su zajedni~ka pro{losti, i zajedni~ka
budu}nost, i zajedni~ka sada{wost. To je sru{eno, a mi
nismo tra`ili da se to sru{i. To su oni tra`ili ili su
smatrali da imaju pravo da ru{e i ako nisu pozvani.
Kako sada izgleda optu`ba protiv Srba? Da su
hteli ovo ili ono — pa do toga Tu`ila{tvo dolazi
saka}ewem re~enica, a ovde ima gotove dokumente.
Apsolutno gotovo dokumente, vi{e puta objavqene, zbog
187
It is unequivocal. There is no dilemma. Unrest,
troubles, trials — it all resembles Churchill’s
blood, sweat and tears, because Churchill’s
blood, sweat, and tears challenged the enemy on
behalf of Churchill’s people. But here their own
government is provoking the blood, sweat and
tears of its own people.
Whosoever wishes our community well should
not spare it, but strike it, instead, in order to
awaken it.
Only with violence! And that violent blow was Markale. To
turn the people against the Serbs, it has to be proven that Serbs did
that in Markale, but you have already seen how unconvincing it is.
And it is impossible to hit that target with one single shell, espe-
cially to kill so many people who were not there in the first place
— well, that’s that. That’s what happened in the 1990s when the
rebirth was announced along with a period of unrest and trials.
Because there are many things are yearning for [the arrival of]
their annihilators, but we did not ask for any such annihilators.
Those things that were yearning for their annihilators, in other
words, those who were going to be destroyed, were the Yugoslav
Constitution, the B-H Constitution, as well as the secular govern-
ment, with which there would be no compromise, as it states here.
Isn’t that so? The JNA, the Serbian people in B-H, common life in
B-H, and common ethnic and cultural roots. The Muslims speak
the Serbian language. The fact that the existence of a Bosnian lan-
guage is accepted here is nothing short of abuse. The Serbian lan-
guage is the intellectual and cultural property of the Serbian peo-
ple. Australians do not speak Australian; they speak English.
A common historical past was destroyed, as well as a com-
mon present, and a common future. That has been destroyed, but
we did not ask for it to be destroyed. This is what they wanted or
188
wih se odgovaralo na sudu, a nisu se odrekli tih
dokumenata. Radije su i{li u zatvor. Srpska
demokratska stranka je jo{ pre izbora 1990-e godine
tra`ila da se uvede Ve}e naroda u Skup{tinu BiH.
Ve}e naroda bi o va`nim stvari odlu~ivalo
konzensusom.
Kako taj predlog stoji sa udru`enim zlo~inala~kim
poduhvatom? Da je usvojeno Ve}e naroda, {ta bi Srbi
mogli da urade protiv voqe Muslimana i Hrvata?
Ni{ta. Jer imaju pravo veta. Nas su tada komunisti~ke
vlasti zadovoqile osnivawem saveta za pitawa
ostvarivawa ravnopravnosti naroda i narodnosti —
ovo je rogobatni jezik komunisti~ki. Treba re}i Savet
naroda — podjednak broj, zna~i paritet i konsenzus u
odlu~ivawu.
Zna~i, to su kao Ve}e naroda, ali se sastaje ad hoc,
nije redovno telo, nego ako ne{to zapne, onda se sastaje.
Da je primeweno — i to je bila neka garancija da
ne}emo biti dovedeni — ali ni Muslimani ni Hrvati
da ne}e biti dovedeni do te`ak polo`aj i da prihvate
ne{to {to nije prihvatqivo.
U svakoj prilici Srbi su i Srpska demokratska
strana i ovaj optu`eni predlagali re{ewa koja su
direktno suprotna onome {to im se pripisuje. Ovaj
savet je u{ao u Ustav. Dva puta smo Deklaraciju o
suverenosti zaustavili pomo}u ovoga saveta, a ovo nije
nikad formiran, jer je SDA sabotirala wegovo
formirawe tako da je kao da ga nije ni bilo. I na kraju,
kad sam onaj govor ovde koji imate, kad sam dr`ao taj
govor — 15-og oktobra — su prenebregli i rekli “ne
zanima nas. Ne mora to Savet.” Jer je ~ak i u martu,
g. Izetbegovi} rekao u Splitu kad je bila konferencija
ovih predsednika Jugoslovenskih Republika, “Mi }emo
189
they thought that they had the right to destroy it even though
they had not been asked to do so.
How does the indictment against the Serbs look now? That
they wanted one thing or another — well, the OTP reaches those
conclusions by mangling sentences, whereas here we have factu-
al documents [that prove otherwise]. Documents testifying abso-
lutely to facts that have been published many times; people were
held accountable for them before a court of law, but they did not
repudiate these documents. They preferred to go to prison. The
Serbian Democratic Party sought to have a Chamber of National-
ities introduced in the B-H Assembly even before the 1990 elec-
tions. The Chamber of Nationalities would have decided im-
portant matters by consensus.
The Aborted Council of Nationalities
How does such a proposal correspond to a joint criminal en-
terprise? If the Chamber of Nationalities had been adopted, what
could the Serbs have done against the will of the Muslims and
Croats? Nothing. Because they hold the right of veto. At that
time, the Communist authorities allowed us to establish a Coun-
cil for the Equal Rights of Peoples and Nationalities — this is
unwieldy Communist jargon. A Council of Nationalities was
needed — an equal number, meaning parity and consensus in
decision making.
This means it would have resembled a Council of Nationali-
ties but it would have convened on an ad hoc basis, not being a
regular body, but if a problem were to arise, then it would con-
vene.99 If it had been applied — it would have been some kind of
guarantee that we would not have been put into such a position
— but neither the Muslims nor the Croats would have been put
into a difficult position and then have to accept something that
was unacceptable.
In each case, the Serbs, the Serbian Democratic Party and
the Accused proposed solutions that were diametrically opposite
190
to usvojiti sa ili bez Srba.” Zna~i, i sa Srbima ili
protiv Srba.
Molim vas, Tu`ila{tvo uskra}uju}i nam pravo na
politi~ki `ivot i na recipro~ne mere, pa i tvrde}i da
smo mi morali da klepimo u{ima i da prihvatimo
nelegalno raspisan referendum i nelegalno postignutu
suverenost i nezavisnost koje su predvi|ene takav
stepen ru{ewa na{ih prava, stepen pravnog sistema,
konstrukcije, ki~me jednog dru{tva, koje proisti~e iz
ɂɫɥɚɦɫɤɟ ɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢʁɟ kao ru{ila~kog akta, Tu`ila{tvo
tvrdi da mi nismo trebali tu ni{ta da radimo. Nego da,
sve {to smo uradili, to je na{e krivi~no delo. A to je
bilo zapisano. Imali smo pravo da to osporimo.
G. Izetbegovi} ka`e: “Mi smo potpuno svjesni da
smo progla{ewem neutralnosti u odnosu na rat u
Hrvatskoj, mo`da ~ak i povrijedili neke zakone
posebno. Ali postoje u ovom trenutku — sve je fluidno
pomalo — postoje zakoni i zakoni.” Ho}e da ka`e:
“Postoje zakoni koje }emo po{tovati, ako nam
odgovaraju; a postoje zakoni koje ne}emo po{tovati ako
nekom drugom donose neku korist.” E, to je to fluidno
stawe o kome }e Karaxi} govoriti da se Srbi ne
snalaze u nepravnim situacijama. To }e tako|e
Tu`ila{tvo uzeti za zlo, ali to je osnova za haos u
BiH, to postojawe i zakona i zakona. Mo`e i ovako,
mo`e i onako.
U pitawima od interesa za ostvarewe
ravnopravosti naroda u BiH, Skup{tina odlu~uje da
vidimo kako je BiH mogla da postigne — nije mogla da
postigne nikako nezavisnost bez nas, bez Srpske
saglasnosti. Morala je da odlu~uje sa dvotre}inskom
ve}inom, niti je bilo dvotre}inske ve}ine na
referendumu, niti bi imali dvotre}insku ve}inu u
191
to what they have been charged with. This Council entered the
Constitution. We stopped the Declaration on sovereignty twice
through this Council, but it was never formally established be-
cause the SDA sabotaged it, so it was as if the Council had never
really existed. And finally, when I gave that speech (which you
have in evidence) on October 15, they [i.e., the Council] neglect-
ed their duties and said, “We’re not interested. The Council
doesn’t have to take it up.” Because even in March
Mr. Izetbegoviü said in Split during a conference of the Presi-
dents of the Yugoslav republics: “We are going to adopt this
with or without the Serbs.” In other words, either with the Serbs
or against the Serbs.
Please, the OTP denies us the right to political life and recip-
rocal measures, and it even claims that we simply ought to have
clapped our hands over our ears, pretended not to notice, and
accepted this illegally announced referendum, and accepted ille-
gally obtained sovereignty and independence that envisioned
destroying our rights to such a degree, destroying the legal sys-
tem to such a degree, destroying the construction, the backbone
of a society, all of which flows from the Islamic Declaration as a
destructive act; yet the Prosecution claims that we should not
have done anything about it. Instead, everything that we did was
a criminal act. However, this is what was written [in their pro-
gram]. We had the right to oppose this.
“There are laws ʊ and then there are laws.”
Mr. Izetbegoviü says: “We are fully aware that by declaring
the neutrality of B-H with respect to the war in Croatia, we may
have violated certain laws, but at the moment everything is fluid.
There are laws — and then there are laws.”100 He means that:
“There are laws that we are going to obey, if they suit us; and
there are laws that we are not going to obey if they benefit others.”
Well, this is the fluid situation — that Serbs do not [want to] end
up in an unjust situation — this is what Karadžiü is going to dis-
192
Parlamentu, jer je bilo 86 Srba na 240 poslanika, 83
Srbina su bili protiv i ta 83 Srbina su se izdvojila i
formirala Skup{tinu srpskoga naroda iz vi{e
stranaka. SDS je imao samo 72. Ovi ostali su iz svih
drugi stranaka. Dakle, nije bilo na~ina da se BiH
usvoji rezolucija, odnosno, deklaracija o suveronesti
osim ako ne ka`e ima zakona i zakona. Ako se ne
pogodimo da postupamo nezakonito.
Kada bi nam neko mogao re}i, da li je nama, kao
Srbima oduzeto pravo na odbranu, da l nam je oduzeto
pravo na reciprocitet na odgovor na nezakonite
postupke, na kr{ewe na{ih prava, ustava, itd.; ako i
nije, onda je ova optu`nica nemogu}a i trebalo je odmah
odbaciti, kao {to je treba odmah odbaciti ako
doka`emo da nismo nikad imali nameru da izbacimo
Muslimane i Hrvate iz svoje ku}e, jer mi Bosnu nismo
smatrali ni Republiku Srpsku svojom ku}om, nego
Jugoslaviju. A dokaza}emo to vrlo brzo.
Vrednosti bosanskog dru{tva koje su vapile za
svojim ru{iteqima, dobile su svoje ru{iteqe. Ali mi
nismo hteli da budemo deo toga. Srpski narod je imao u
BiH u tom trenutku izri~ito pravo po Ustavu ali i
istorijski posmatrano pravo dr`avotvornog naroda
koji tvori tu Bosnu sa svojim prostorima, sa svojim
pravima, i on je suvlasnik te Bosne. Suvlasnik, kao {to
su i Srbi u Krajini bili vlasnici Krajine i
suvlasnici Hrvatske, jer su u{li u “joint venture.”
Promena ustavno-pravnog statusa BiH je morala da
ide po zakonu. Srba je bilo vi{e od jedne tre}ine ako se
uzmu Jugosloveni, kojih je dve tre}ine ili tri
~etrvtine bilo Srba, sklonih stvarawu jugoslavenske
nacije, zna~i bilo daleko vi{e od jedne tre}ine, koja je
dovoqna da zaustavi, i na demokratskom — ne samo na
193
cuss. The Prosecution is likewise going to hold this against us, but
this was the source of chaos in B-H, the existence of laws, on the
one hand, and laws, on the other hand. Something could be done
one way or it could be done in another.
In questions regarding the interests involved in establishing
equality before the law in B-H, the Assembly decided to see how
B-H could attain it — it could not have attained any kind of in-
dependence without us, without Serbian agreement. It had to de-
cide by a two-thirds majority, but there was neither two-thirds
majority in the Referendum, nor was there going to be a two-
thirds majority in the [B-H] Parliament, because there were 86
Serbs out of 240 representatives, and eighty-three Serbs were
against it, and those 83 Serbs separated from the B-H Parliament
and they established the Assembly of the Serbian People by
drawing on multiple parties.101 The SDS had only 72 representa-
tives. The rest came from other parties. Therefore, there was no
way for B-H to adopt this resolution, namely, the Declaration of
Sovereignty, unless it had said there were laws, on the one hand,
and there were laws, on the other hand. Unless we strike a deal
to act unlawfully.
If someone could have asked us whether we, as Serbs, had
been denied the right to defend ourselves; whether the right of
reciprocity to respond to unlawful actions, violations of our
rights, breaches of the constitution, etc. had been denied to us;
then, if this were not so, this Indictment is impossible and the
charges must be dropped immediately, just as they must be
dropped immediately if we prove that we never intended to expel
Muslims and Croats from their homes, because we did not con-
sider either Bosnia or the Republika Srpska to be our home; in-
stead, Yugoslavia was our home. And we are going to prove that
very quickly.
The values of Bosnian society that were yearning for their
destroyers received their destroyers. But we didn’t want to have
194
pitawu konzensusa nego i na pitawu demokratskom — da
zaustavi ovo osamostaqewe. Pravo na samoopredeqewe
je pripadalo narodima, a ne administrativnim
teritorijama.
Znate li kako su Srbi dospeli u Jugoslaviju? 1918-e
godine je formirana dr`ava Slovenaca, Hrvata, i Srba
od novooslobo|enih teritorija koje su bile pod
Austro-Ugarskom. Nisu stvorene republike; stvorena
jedna jedinstvena dr`ava. Dakle, Srbi su bili
podjednako konstitutivni u Qubqani kao {to su bili i
Slovenci u Sarajevu. Ta dr`ava je zatra`ila dozvolu od
me|unarodne zajednice — predsednika, ministara, i
ostalih — da se ujedini sa Srbijom. Ujedinila se kao
jedinstvena. Ujedinila se sa Srbijom. Srbi su u{li u tu
dr`avu kao suvlasnik te dr`ave. Tada je re~eno da
narodi imaju pravo na samoopredeqewe. Tada je re~eno
da Amerika — predsednik Vilson je rekao — da Srbija
treba da dobije izlaz na more. To naslednici
predsednika Vilsona duguju Srbiji. Jo{ taj posao nije
zavr{en. To im je ostavio Predsednik Vilson u amanet.
Sad su to more oduzeli Srbiji.
Nisu se republike udru`ile u Jugoslaviju da bi
mogle da se razdru`uju. Narodi su se udru`ili. A onda
su — {to ka`e Lord Oven — napravili republi~ke
granice, pa wih proglasili za va`nije od vawskih
granica Jugoslavije. Odjednom su te unutra{we granice
napravqene arbitrarno. Ne mo`ete uop{te da utvrdite
ko je napravio te granice. Jer nije bilo bitno. Tito je
govorio: “Nije to bitno!” To su administrativne. I
bile su tada administrativne granice. Odjednom su one
postale va`nije od vawskih granica Jugoslavije, i oko
wih je po~ela krv da se proliva kao, uostalom, {to se
proliva uvek oko komunisti~kih granica i
195
any part in that. The Serbian people in B-H at that moment had
the explicit right, according to the Constitution, a historically
observed right, as a constituent people that was forming this joint
state with their territories with their rights, and they became co-
proprietors of that Bosnia. Co-proprietors, just as the Serbs of
Krajina were proprietors of Krajina and the co-proprietors of
Croatia because they had entered into a “joint venture.”
The change in the constitutional-legal status of B-H had to
evolve in accordance with the law. Serbs accounted for more than
one-third if Yugoslavs had been taken into consideration, two-
thirds or three-fourths of whom were Serbs who were in favor of
the creation of a Yugoslav nation, which means their number
would have been far more than one-third of the population, which
was sufficient, in a democratic fashion — not only in the question
of consensus but also in question of the democratic [process] —
to stop this quest for independence. The right to self-determination
belongs to its peoples, and not to administrative territories.
The Serbian Role in the Formation of Yugoslavia
Do you know how the Serbs got into Yugoslavia? In 1918, a
state composed of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs was established
from the newly liberated territories formerly ruled by Austro-
Hungary. Different republics were not established; one united state
was created. Therefore, the Serbs were equally a constituent people
in Ljubljana just as Slovenes were a constituent people in Sarajevo.
That state asked the International Community — presidents, minis-
ters, and all the rest — for permission to unite with Serbia. The
union formed a united state. It united with Serbia. Serbs joined that
state as co-proprietors. It was said that peoples had the right to self-
determination. At that time, it was said that America — President
Wilson said that Serbia had to be given access to the sea. President
Wilson’s successors owe this to Serbia. And the job still hasn’t
been done. President Wilson left it to them in his will. Now they
have deprived Serbia of access to the sea.
196
imperijalnih granicama. Pogledajte granicu Hrvatske.
Ona nasle|uje granicu Austro-Ugarske. I Srbi iz
Trebiwa mogu da vide more, ali nemaju pristup moru.
A to nijedna me|unarodna norma ne bi dopustila.
Ali, kad su Srbi u pitawu, sve mo`e.
Evo {ta ka`e Hasan ^engi}, sve{tenik, o
Patriotskoj Ligi koja je formirana 31-og marta 1991-e
godine. Neka Tu`ila{tvo poka`e jednu jedinu
formaciju iza koje je stajala Srpska demokratska
stranka ili srpski narod, a ovde imamo, ~ak i pre 31-og
marta, u Fo~i je formirana jedna jedinica od strane
oca ovoga Hasana ^engi}a. A Stranka demokratske
akcije je organizovala i vodila formirawe svoje vojne
falange od 31-og marta pa sve do po~etka rata. Na nivou
BiH, ovo je {ema Patriotske Lige. Vrhovni komandant,
Alija Izetbegovi}; Glavni politi~ki [tab, Ejup
Gani} i Omar Behmen; Glavni vojni {tab, Sefer
Halilovi} (koji je ovde oslobo|en, ili ne znam {ta je
ve} pro{ao) i Meho Kali{ik; regionalni politi~ki
{tabovi, op{tinski {tabovi; a ovamo su bili
regionalni vojni {tabovi i op{tinski vojni {tabovi.
Ta organizacija je bila prili~no brzo upotpuwena,
tako da su oni, januara 1992 godine do~ekali sa oko sto
hiqada vojnika. Oko sto hiqada vojnika. Ovo je uloga te
Patriotske lige, Zelenih beretki i drugih, ogromnog
broja tih jedinica koje su postojale.
Sada, ovde Tu`ila{tvo u optu`nicama protiv Srba
uglavnom barata kriznim {tabovima. Srbi su imali
krizne {tabove. Kad nema gasa, nedavno, kad je Ukrajina
ukinula gas, formiraju se krizni {tabovi. To zna~i da
onaj ne mo`e da ide ku}i, slu`benik, nego — mo`e da
ide ku}i ali mora da do|e ako ga zovnu — zna~i hitna je
situacija, neredovna situacija, mora da postoji krizni
197
The republics did not join to form Yugoslavia so they could
later go their separate ways. The people had united. And as Lord
Owen said, they then drew administrative borders that they sud-
denly proclaimed to be more important than the internationally
recognized borders of Yugoslavia. All at once, the internal bor-
ders became arbitrary. It is impossible to confirm who drew
these administrative borders. Because it wasn’t important. Tito
had spoken: “It doesn’t matter!” These are administrative bor-
ders. And they were administrative borders then. Now suddenly
they have become more important than Yugoslavia’s interna-
tionally recognized borders, and blood has been shed over them,
which is, after all, always the case when Communist or imperial
borders are at stake. Take a look at Croatia’s borders. It has in-
herited Austro-Hungary’s borders. And the Serbs of Trebinje can
look out on the sea but they do not have access to it.
Not one international standard would have permitted this.
But, when Serbs are in question, anything is possible.
The Patriotic League
Here is what Hasan ýengiü, a [Muslim] cleric, says about the
Patriotic League, which was formed on March 31, 1991. Let the
Prosecution show me one single [military] formation behind
which stood the Serbian Democratic Party or the Serbian people,
but here we have, even before March 31, a unit formed in Foþa
by the father of this Hasan ýengiü. Meanwhile, the SDS orga-
nized and led the formation of military phalanxes from March 31
all the way up to the start of the war.102 This is the Patriotic
League’s organizational chart for B-H. [EXHIBIT XVII] The
Commander-in-Chief is Alija Izetbegoviü; Political Chiefs of
Staff, Ejup Ganiü and Omer Behmen; the Military Chiefs of
Staff, Sefer Haliloviü (who, I think, was acquitted here but that is
water under the bridge) and Meho Kališik; then regional and
municipal political chiefs of staff; and here we have regional and
municipal military chiefs of staff. This organization was very
198 199

{tab. Ali va{oj pa`wi preporu~ujem prvo podatak da quickly manned and staffed so that it already had about 100,000
su krizni {tabovi Stranke demokratske akcije i troops by January 1992. About one hundred thousand troops.
Hrvatske demokratske zajednice, u Hrvatskoj bili This is the role that the Patriotic League, the Green Berets, and
prisutni svuda, i na svakom najmawem mestu, daleko pre the others, the enormous number of those military units that ex-
rata i daleko pre Srpske demokratske stranke. isted at the time, played.
Evo nekih razlika u kriznim {tabovima Stranke
The Crisis Centers
demokratske akcije i Srpske demokratske stranke.
Now the Prosecution here deals mainly with crisis centers in
Krizni {tabovi Stranke demokratske akcije
these indictments against Serbs. The Serbs had crisis centers.
formirani su daleko pre rata u vreme kada je izgledalo
When there was a shortage of gas, as was the case recently when
da u BiH ne}e biti rata, jer jo{ nije bio po~eo rat u
the Ukraine cut off gas supplies, crisis centers were established.
Hrvatskoj. Krizni {tabovi Srpske demokratske
That means the official managing the crisis center could not go
stranke su bili javni i formirani su tek pred izbijawe
home — rather, he could go home but he had to return if he were
rata, u trenutku kad je SDA uspela da dovede do kolapsa
called — it means that it’s an emergency, an irregular situation,
sistem dr`avne vlasti, a rat u Hrvatskoj je doneo
so an existing crisis center is imperative. But I would like to call
velika stradawa Srba, izbeglice. Postojawe
your attention first to the fact that crisis centers established by
Patriotske Lige je ve} bilo evidentno: naoru`ane
the SDA and the HDZ were present throughout Croatia, even in
formacije, tajni transport oru`ja, javni transport
the smallest villages, long before the war and long before the
oru`ja, i postojawe kriznih {tabova SDA. Tek tada
SDS established its own crisis centers.
Srbi formiraju krizne {tabove. Krizni {tabovi SDA
Here are some of the differences between the crisis centers of
su tajni, konspirativni, i sa ovla{}ewima i zadacima
the SDA [Muslim] and of the SDS [Serbian]. The SDA’s crisis
koji ima tajna izvr{na vlast, te sa zadacima koji se
centers had been formed well before the war when there was no
poveravaju ministarstvima odbrane i general{tab-
indication of a war breaking out in B-H because the war in Croatia
ovima armije. Krizni {tabovi SDS-a su imali jedino i
had not yet begun. SDS crisis centers were public and were
iskqu~ivo funkciju brzog javqawa lokalnim vlastima
formed only on the eve of the war, at the moment when the SDA
i centrali u Sarajevu o svim opasnim i prikrivenim
had managed to bring about the collapse of the system of state
zbivawima.
structure and when the war in Croatia led to the deaths of many
Wima Karaxi} na sastanku plenuma partijskom od
Serbs and numerous refugees. The existence of the Patriotic
14-og februara 1992-e godine ka`e izri~ito:
League was already evident: armed formations, covert weapons
Vi niste vlast. Vlast treba da vr{i shipments, overt weapons shipments, and the existence of SDA
vlast, a vi treba da poma`ete, da pratite crisis centers. It was only then that the Serbs established their own
transport oru`ja, da pratite {ta se crisis centers. The SDA crisis centers were secret and conspirato-
de{ava, i da o vanrednim situacija rial in nature, and they had secret executive powers with authori-
javqate. zations [to act] and [they were given] assignments that were moni-
200
Tu sam imao na umu britanski primer gde svaki
Britanac ~uva svoju zemqu.
Krizni {tabovi SDA su preuzeli funkciju
dr`avnih organa u op{tinama. A wima je rukovodio
krizni {tab BiH, republi~ki krizni {tab, formiran
u predsedni{tvu, kojim je rukovodio Ejup Gani}, i
istovremeno, i {ef glavnog politi~kog {taba
Patriotske Lige. Taj krizni {tab u predsedni{tvu
omogu}io je Aliji Izetbegovi}u da zaobi|e Biqanu
Plav{i} i Nikolu Koqevi}a kao predstavnike
srpskoga naroda. I da mimo wih radi. Vi{e nije morao
ni{ta na sastanku da usvaja. Krizni {tab odlu~i
ne{to, to bi se ne moralo da ide na glasawe i na
raspravu, i tako je ih on zaobi{ao.
Krizni {tabovi SDS-a su postojali kratko vreme
pred rat. A po izbijawu rata, prestali su sa
postojawem, a nastupili su op{tinski krizni {tabovi
kao dr`avni organi. Op{tinski krizni {tab nije {tab
SDS-a i nije {tab Srba, nego je {tab vlasti, i u wemu
ima i Muslimana i Hrvata u onim op{tinama u kojima
ima i Muslimana i Hrvata.
Ovde, recimo, Tu`ila{tvo ka`e jedan izve{taj iz
Bijeqine: “Krizni {tab Srpske demokratske stranke
izve{tava glavni odbor Srpske demokratske stranke
{ta je odlu~io krizni {tab op{tine.” A Tu`ila{tvo
ka`e da je to odlu~io krizni {tab Srpske demokratske
stranke, a lepo pi{e krizni {tab stranke obave{tava
{ta su vlasti, {ta je krizni {tab op{tine, kao
dr`avni organ odlu~io. A krizni {tab op{tine ~ine
qudi koji su ina~e u vlasti, samo {to je sada proces
odlu~ivawa br`i. Zna~i, ne mora se sastajati
Skup{tina, nego oni to odlu~uje. Na Skup{tini
naknadno da to usvoje.
201
tored by the Ministry of Defense and by the General Staff of the
[Muslim] Army.103 The crisis centers of the SDS performed the
exclusive function of quickly notifying local authorities as well as
the central crisis center in Sarajevo of all dangerous and covert
actions.
On February 14, 1992, at a plenary party meeting, Karadžiü
told them explicitly:
You are not an authority in charge. The govern-
ment exercises authority, but you are there to
help, to monitor the transport of weapons, to
monitor what’s going on, and to let us know of
any extraordinary situations.
There I had in mind the British example where every British
subject is guarding and protecting his country.
The crisis centers established by the SDA took over the func-
tions of government organs in the counties. And they, in turn,
were managed by the Crisis Center of B-H, the republic’s crisis
center established by the Presidency, which was directed by Ejup
Ganiü, [EXHIBIT XVIII] who was simultaneously the Director of
the Supreme Political Headquarters of the Patriotic League. That
crisis center [established] in the Presidency had been enabled by
Alija Izetbegoviü to circumvent Biljana Plavšiü and Nikola
Koljeviü as representatives of the Serbian people. And to work
around them. I don’t think he had to adopt anything at any meet-
ing. Once the Crisis Center decided on something, it would not
have to go before a vote and a debate, and that was how he got
around them.
The SDS crisis centers existed for a short period of time be-
fore the war. And once the war broke out, they ceased to exist,
and county crisis centers began to act as state organs. The county
crisis centers were neither SDS nor Serbian centers but, rather
centers operated by the authorities, and one could find Muslims
202
Krizni {tabovi SDA su radili konspirativno.
Krizni {tabovi u op{tinama u Republici Srpskoj
radili su javno, uredno bele`ili svaki sastanak, svaku
odluku, i bili podlo`ni proveri i kritici
op{tinskih parlamenata ~im se oni budi mogli
sastaviti. Ovde }emo videti. Tu`ila{tvo je izbacilo
iz moje optu`nice Kotor-Varo{, koji je svaki dan imao
sastanaka. Prvog kriznog {taba posle-ratnog
presedni{tva. Vide}ete kako jedna odgovorna vlast
radi u Kotor-Varo{i. A po{to ga je Tu`ila{tvo
izbacilo, ja }u da ga vratim u ovaj proces da se samo
vidi kako radi jedna odgovorna vlast.
Evo {ta ka`u o svojim postignu}ima, {efovi SDA,
odnosno, {efovi Patriotske Lige. “Svaka mesna
zajednica u 103 op{tine,” zna~i op{tina ima od desetak
to pedeset mesnih zajednica — svaka op{tina ima
mesnih zajednica vi{e. “U sve 103 op{tine,
rukovodstvo Patriotske Lige je imalo jedinice od
odeqewa do ~ete.” Jedan od kqu~nih zadataka tih
kriznih {tabova je bila nabavka oru`ja.
Ako se prisetite one mape, zna~i da su u svim ovim
op{tinama gde Srbi `ive bilo je 109 op{tina ukupno.
Samo nisu hrvatskim. (Ono bi trebalo da naprave, dole
ovo gde je braon.) U svim ovim op{tinama gde Srbi
`ive, oni su imali ~ete. I Srbi su kom{ije to videli.
I nama Tu`ila{tvo zabrawuje da pazimo {ta se de{ava
oko nas. A oni u srpskim op{tinama imaju svoje
jedinice. Meni ka`u, prigovaraju da sam Srbe pla{io
bez ikakvog osnova.
Ukupnim odbrambenim pripremama rukovodila je
Patriotska Liga i sa svojim glavnim {tabom i
{tabovima na celoj teritoriji BiH. Suverenoj BiH
nedostaje epitet islamskoj BiH, na celoj teritoriji,
203
and Croats working in the counties where Muslims and Croats
lived.
Here, for example, the Prosecution quotes one report from
Bijeljina: “The crisis center of the SDS in Bijeljina informs the
board of the SDS of what the county crisis center has decided.”
However, the Prosecution says that this was decided by the SDS
crisis center, although it quite clearly states the party’s crisis cen-
ter is reporting what the authorities, what the county crisis center
as a state organ, actually decided. The county crisis centers were
staffed by people who were state employees anyway, only now
the decision-making process was faster. This meant there was no
need for the Assembly to convene; instead, they made the deci-
sions. These were later adopted by the Assembly.
The SDA crisis centers acted conspiratorially. The crisis cen-
ters in the counties of the Republika Srpska operated openly and
publicly, and they meticulously recorded [the minutes of] every
meeting and each decision that they made, and they submitted
these for validation and feedback to their respective county as-
semblies as soon as they were able to convene. We shall see it
here. The Prosecution withdrew the charge of Kotor Varoš,
which had daily [crisis center] meetings. It was the presidency’s
first crisis center after the war broke out. You will see how re-
sponsible authority operated in Kotor Varoš. But since the OTP
has thrown out that charge, I will re-introduce it into the trial just
to show you how responsible authority operates.
Here is what the leaders of the SDA, in other words, the
leaders of the Patriotic League, have to say about their achieve-
ments. “Every local community in 103 counties,”104 which
means that a county has ten to fifty local communities — each
county has numerous communities. “In all 103 counties, the
leadership of the Patriotic League had units ranging from a squad
to a company.” One of the key tasks assigned to those crisis cen-
ters was the procurement of weapons.105
204
zna~i, bez obzira na to gde Srbi `ive i gde ko `ivi i
ho}e li, prihvata li to {to Patriotska Liga i SDA
ho}e. G. Izetbegovi} se susretao sa wima i odabravao
sve. On je bio vrhovni komandant. I gledajte, molim
vas, “Mi osnivamo vlast —”
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: G. Karaxi}, moramo da zavr{imo sa
radom uskoro.
ɄȺɊȺɀɂȶ: Ɇɨɝɭ ɥɢ imati ɬɪɢ ɦɢɧɭɬɚ?
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɇɟ, ʁɟɞɚɧ ɦɢɧɭɬ.
ɄȺɊȺȹɂȶ: ȳɟɞɚɧ ɦɢɧɭɬ. ɍ ɪɟɞɭ.
G. Izetbegovi} je po polo`aju predsednik saveta za
narodnu odbranu Republike BiH. On u februaru
formira tajni savet za odbranu Muslimana. I sada
jedan Izetbegovi} bi trebalo da hapsi drugog
Izetbegovi}a. Ovaj zajedni~ki Izetbegovi} predsednik
predsedni{tva BiH, trebalo bi da uhapsi Izetbegovi}a
predsednika muslimanske vrhovne komande, jer mu
podriva republiku. E, to je situacija nepravna u kojoj se
Srbi ne snalaze i ne}e ni da se snalaze. To mi vi{e ne
mo`emo izdr`ati. Hvala.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɏɜɚɥɚ, ɬɨ ʁɟ ɫɜɟ ɡɚ ɞɚɧɚɫ. Ƚɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ɍɢɝɟɪ,
ɠɟɥɢɦ ɞɚ ɩɨɬɜɪɞɢɦ ɞɚ ʄɟɦɨ ɜɚɫ ɞɚ ɱɭʁɟɦɨ ɤɚɨ ɩɪɜɨɝ ɫɭɬɪɚ
ɭʁɭɬɪɨ.
G. ɌɍɀɂɅȺɐ ɌɂȽȿɊ: ɑɚɫɧɢ ɋɭɞɟ, ɦɢ ɨɱɟɤɭʁɟɦɨ ɞɚ
ɩɨɞɧɟɫɟɦɨ ɧɟɲɬɨ ɞɚɧɚɫ ɢ ʁɚ ɦɨɝɭ ɬɨ ɞɚ ɧɚɝɨɜɟɫɬɢɦ ɋɭɞɭ. ȳɚ
ɜɟɪɭʁɟɦ ɞɚ ʄɟɦɨ ɛɢɬɢ — ɧɟʄɟɦɨ ɫɟ ɩɪɨɬɢɜɢɬɢ ɫɟɪɬɢɮɢɤɚɬɭ.
ɉɪɨɬɢɜɢʄɟɦɨ ɫɟ ɫɭɫɩɟɧɞɨɜɚʃɭ.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɏɜɚɥɚ. Ɍɨ ʄɟ ɛɢɬɢ ɨɞ ɩɨɦɨʄɢ. ɍ 9.00 ɫɭɬɪɚ
ɭʁɭɬɪɨ.
205
If you recall those maps, there was a total of 109 of all these
counties where Serbs were living. [EXHIBIT XIV] But they didn’t
do this in the Croatian counties. [Referring to the map on
screen.] (Down here, these brown areas should be highlighted.)
They had [paramilitary] units in all these counties where Serbs
lived. And their Serbian neighbors saw it happening. And the
Prosecution is forbidding us to monitor what was taking place
around us. But they had their own [paramilitary] units in Serbian
counties. They tell me ʊ they reproach me for having sown fear
among Serbs for no reason at all.
The Patriotic League, its General Headquarters, and its cen-
ters scattered throughout the territory of Bosnia coordinated
comprehensive defense preparations. Sovereign Bosnia was
missing a Muslim entity that encompassed the entire territory,
regardless of where Serbs were living, regardless of whether an-
yone else was living there, regardless of whether they were will-
ing to accept what the Patriotic League and the SDA wanted.106
Mr. Izetbegoviü used to meet with them regularly and he ap-
proved of everything. He was Commander-in-Chief. Take a look
at this, please: “We are establishing rule —”
JUDGE KWON: We need to adjourn very soon.
KARADŽIû: Could I have three more minutes, please?
JUDGE KWON: No, one minute.
KARADŽIû: One minute. Fine.
Mr. Izetbegoviü, by virtue of his position, was the Chairman
of the National Defense Council of B-H. In February, he estab-
lished a secret council for the defense of Muslims. And now one
Izetbegoviü has to arrest the other Izetbegoviü. The federal Izet-
begoviü, who was the President of the collective presidency, was
obliged to arrest Izetbegoviü, the President of the Muslim Su-
preme Command because it was undermining the republic. Well,
this was an unjust situation in which the Serbs were not going to
206
— ɋɟɞɧɢɰɚ ʁɟ ɡɚɜɪɲɟɧɚ ɭ 1.45 ɱɚɫɨɜɚ. ɇɚɫɬɚɜʂɚ ɫɟ ɭ
ɭɬɨɪɚɤ, 2. ɦɚɪɬɚ, 2010, ɭ 9.00 ɩɪɟ ɩɨɞɧɟ.
207
be finding themselves, and they will never be in that situation.
We cannot tolerate it any longer. Thank you.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you, that’s it for today. Mr. Tieger, I’d
like to make sure that we can hear you first thing tomorrow
morning.
MR. TIEGER: Your Honor, we expect to be filing something
today, and I can foreshadow that for the Court. I believe we’ll be
— we won’t be opposing certification. We will be opposing a
stay.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That would be helpful. Nine tomor-
row morning.
— Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1:45 p.m., to be recon-
vened on Tuesday, the 2nd day of March, 2010, at 9:00 a.m.
208 209

2. mart, 2010. Tuesday ʊ March 2, 2010

[Ɂɚɫɟɞɚʃɟ ʁɟ ɨɬɜɨɪɟɧɨ] [Open session]
[Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄ ɭɥɚɡɢ ɭ ɫɭɞɧɢɰɭ.] [Karadžiü enters the court room.]
[ɉɨɱɟɬɚɤ ɭ 9.00 ɱɚɫɨɜɚ] Upon commencing at 9:00 a.m.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Ⱦɨɛɪɨ ʁɭɬɪɨ. Ƚɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄɭ, ɦɨɥɢɦ JUDGE KWON: Good morning. Mr. Karadžiü, please continue.
ɜɚɫ ɧɚɫɬɚɜɢɬɟ. Ɇɨɥɢɦɨ ɜɚɫ ɞɚ ɩɥɚɧɢɪɚɬɟ ɫɜɨʁɭ ɢɡʁɚɜɭ ɬɚɤɨ ɞɚ Please plan your statement so as to leave about ten minutes at the
ɨɫɬɚɜɢɬɟ ɞɟɫɟɬɚɤ ɦɢɧɭɬɚ ɧɚ ɤɪɚʁɭ ɞɚɧɚɲʃɟɝ ɡɚɫɟɞɚʃɚ ɡɚ end of today’s hearing for a Chamber’s oral ruling.
ɭɫɦɟɧɭ ɨɞɥɭɤɭ vɟʄɚ.
KARADŽIû: Thank you, Your Excellencies.
KARAXI]: Hvala, ekselencije.
The Serbs Reluctantly Establish the SDS
Kao {to smo ju~e videli, u jednom ritmu
As we saw yesterday, the incredible pace [of events] in
neverovatnom, kakav je bio u Hrvatskoj: svaki mesec
Croatia: every month brought a shocking new measure taken
jedna {okantna mera za Srbe. Tako je bilo i kod nas.
against Serbs. That’s the way it was with us. Before I come to
Pre nego {to do|em do oktobra, do deklaracije koju su
October and the Declaration that was adopted by representatives
usvojili poslanici SDA i HDZ protivno i na~inu
of the SDA and HDZ against the rules governing the manner in
zakazivawe skup{tine, i protivno pravilima, odnosno,
which Assembly sessions are convened, namely, contrary to the
odredbama Ustava Jugoslavije i Ustava BiH, kratko }u
provisions of the Constitutions of Yugoslavia and B-H, I would
da pro|em da uhvatimo vezu sa ju~era{wim danom, dakle
just like to review briefly, so that we may understand the connec-
Srpsku demokratsku stranku smo osnovali kao posledwu
tion to [what I discussed] yesterday, that we thus established the
od svih etni~kih stranaka. Nerado smo je osnovali,
SDS as the last of all the ethnic parties. We formed the party re-
smatrali smo da ne treba uvoditi etni~ku demokratiju,
luctantly because we did not consider the introduction of ethnic
ali takvi su doga|aji bili da je to moralo tako.
democracy as the proper thing to do, but the circumstances were
Izbori su bili 18-og novembra. Svaka nacionalna
such that we were compelled to do so.
stranka je pobedila, zna~i prosto, narodi su bili
The elections took place on November 18. Each nationalist
krenuli na jednu stazu diferencijacije po etni~kom
party won, which simply means that the different peoples entered
principu. Ne{to iz strahova, ne{to iz nada i ambicija
a stage of differentiation according to ethnic principles. Partly
da }e ostvariti ne{to {to do tada nisu imali u
based on fears and partly based on hopes and ambitions that they
Jugoslaviji. Vlada formirana u januaru 1991-e; prva
would establish something that they had not had until then in
kampawa za nezavisnost BiH krajem januara. Jo{ uvek
Yugoslavia. The government was formed in January 1991; the
polovinom januara, g. Izetbegovi} se zakliwe u
first campaign for an independent B-H started at the end of Janu-
Jugoslaviju. Krajem januara, abruptno najavquje
ary. Mr. Izetbegoviü was still vowing to remain in Yugoslavia in
kampawu za nezavisnosti. U februaru, g. Izetbegovi}
mid-January. At the end of January, he abruptly announced the
210
formira tajni savet za odbranu Muslimana i ako je on
predsednik javnog dr`avnog Saveta za odbranu BiH.
I ja }u sada samo ovako kratko da ka`em, kod prve
kampawe za nezavisnost, Srbi protestuju bez
kontramera. Izetbegovi} formira taj savet, to je
vrhovna komanda tajne armije Patriotske Lige, tajne
armije SDA. Srpska reakcije je ~u|ewe, zabrinutost,
bez protesta i bez kontramera, jer je to ura|eno tajno.
Mi smo saznali, ali nismo pravili veliki protest zbog
toga.
U februaru, poku{aj usvajawa Dekleracije o
suverenosti i nezavisnosti. Srpska reakcija: protest,
veto, upu}ivawe na Savet za nacionalnu ravnopravnost,
i to veto tada uspeva, tada nam je usvojeno, i
najavqujemo zajednice op{tina na koje bi smo ina~e
radili, ako op{tine odlu~e, mogu da druga~ije se
udru`e, ako imaju ekonomske i neke druge interese.
31-a marta osnovana je Patriotska Liga. Zna~i, sada
onaj Vrhovni {tab, odnosno vrhovna komanda, dobija i
svoju vojsku. Srpska reakcija: duboka zabrinutnost,
zahtev od Srba u MUP-u, policiji — koje je Srpska
demokratska stranka dovela na vlast, ali nisu ~lanovi
Srpske demokratske stranke, smatramo da policija ne
treba da bude u partijama — zahteva se od wih da
reaguju, da spre~avaju zloupotrebu zajedni~ke policije,
da informi{u javnost i nas {ta se de{ava. Tu se ve}
prvi put na neki na~in, imamo nesporazume sa na{im
zamenikom ministra kojeg smo mi kandidovali tamo.
Zna~i, mart 1991-e dolazi i do drugog poku{aja
usvajawa Dekleracije o nezavisnosti. Srpska reakcija
je rasprava sa partnerima, veto, i ubrzan rad za
formirawu zajednica op{tina. U maju, Izetbegovi}
ka`e poznatu re~enicu koju sam ju~e saop{tio:
211
campaign for independence. In February, Mr. Izetbegoviü creat-
ed a secret council for the defense of Muslims, even though he
was the Chairman of the Public Defense Council of B-H.
I will only state briefly that, during the first campaign for in-
dependence, the Serbs protested without resorting to counter-
measures. Izetbegoviü formed this Council, which was the Su-
preme Command of the Patriotic League, the SDA’s secret army.
The Serbian reaction was astonishment, concern, without either
protests or countermeasures, because it had been done secretly.
We found out about it, but we did not lead large protests because
of it.
In February, there was an attempt to adopt a Declaration of
Sovereignty and independence. The Serbian reaction: protests,
lodging a veto, referring the matter to the Council of National
Equality, and this veto succeeded at that time, and then it was
adopted, and we announced to the county communities on which
we were anyway working — that if the county communities de-
cided to do so, they could associate themselves on a different basis
if they had economic and other mutual interests.
The Patriotic League was established on March 31. That
meant this Supreme Headquarters, in other words, the Supreme
Command, now got its own army. The Serbian reaction: profound
concern, the demand that Serbs in the MUP, the police — whom
the SDS brought into the administration but who were not mem-
bers of the SDS because we thought that the police should have no
political affiliations — we demanded that they react to prevent any
abuse of the joint [B-H] police force, and to inform the public as
well as us about what was going on. This was the first time that
we had, in some fashion, misunderstandings with our Deputy Min-
ister whom we had nominated.
So in March 1991, there was a second attempt to adopt a
Declaration on Independence. The Serbian reaction was consul-
tations with our partners, lodging a veto, and the acceleration of
212
“Dekleracija }e biti usvojena sa Srbima ili bez wih.”
Zna~i, potpuno je opredeqenost. Za tri meseca smo
potro{ili na{e bratstvo i jedinstvo, na{u
koalicionu idilu i najavquje se kr{ewe svih na{ih
prava. A ubrzava se zloupotreba policije. Zloupotreba
policije — u wihovoj policiji je puno kriminalaca.
Videli ste ju~e iz mog razgovora sa zamenikom
ministra, gde se i on sla`e da mi nismo doveli nijednu
novu li~nost u policiju, a da oni jesu. I da mi nismo
pogotovo doveli nijednog kriminalca, a da oni jesu.
I SDA kadrovi u policiji kriju od na{ih — od
Srba — sve. Stavqaju ih na neka neva`na mesta,
uklawaju ih od onih nelegalni radwi koje oni rade, i to
je prva podela MUP-a. Dakle, u maju mesecu 1991-e
godine, ona je de facto — nije de jure — de facto je podela.
Srpski kadrovi u policiji su skloweni na sporedni
kolosek da ne mogu da uti~u — ne mogu da vide, a kamoli
da uti~u — na doga|aje. Srpska reakcija na ovo je
formirawe srpskih autonomnih oblasti.
Srpske autonomne oblasti se progla{avaju, ali
nemaju sadr`aj. Ne deluju; ni{ta se ne de{ava. One su
samo tu za slu~aj da se ne{to desi i da narod ne ostane
— kad se iseku komunikacije — narod mo`e da ostane
bez rukovodsvta, pa onda neka na nivou regija — imaju
neko rukovodstvo koje }e da ih vodi.
U junu 1991-e godine su donesene odluke o
nezavisnosti Slovenije i Hrvatske, i sklopqen je tajni
zavereni~ki sporazum — Ku~an, Tu|man, Izetbegovi}
— za napad na Jugoslaviju i na JNA. Mi }emo o tom
tajnom paktu — zaveri — ovde pru`iti dokaze.
Qubazno{}u Tu`ila{tva do{li smo, a imamo i mi
svojih izvora oko toga.
213
work on the formation of communities in counties. In May, Izet-
begoviü uttered the famous sentence which I called to your atten-
tion yesterday: “The Declaration [i.e., of the sovereignty of B-H]
will be passed with the Serbs or without them.” In other words, it
was completely predetermined. In three months’ time, we used
up all of our brotherhood and unity, our idyllic coalition, and it
portended the violation of all our rights. Abuse of the police
force accelerated. Abuse of the police force — their police force
was full of criminals. Yesterday, you heard portions of my con-
versation with the Deputy Minister, in which even he agreed that
we did not bring any new personnel to the police force, but they
had. And we did not bring in a single criminal, yet they did.
The SDA personnel in the police force kept everything secret
from us — the Serbs. They placed Serbs in low-ranking posi-
tions, and kept them away from all the illegal activities in which
they were involved, and that was the first split that took place in
the MUP. Therefore, in May 1991, the split was de facto — not
de jure — the split or division was de facto. Serbian personnel in
the police were sidetracked so that they could not influence — so
that they could not see [what was going on], much less have any
influence on events. The Serbs reacted by forming autonomous
Serbian regions.
The Serbian autonomous areas were proclaimed, but this had
no substance. They were not functioning as such; nothing was
happening. They were only there just in case something hap-
pened so that the people would not be left — when communica-
tions are cut — the people could be left leaderless, so they would
then have to rely on some kind of regional leadership to guide
them.
In June 1991, decisions were made about the independence
of Slovenia and Croatia, and Kuþan, Tuÿman, and Izetbegoviü
concluded a conspiratorial agreement to attack Yugoslavia and
the JNA [i.e., Yugoslav National Army]. We will present proof
214
Srpska reakcija je ubrzan rad formirawu stavova i
sada ve} pomiwemo i regionalizaciju, a predvi|amo da
stavovi po~iwu da funkcioni{u jer je |avo odneo {alu.
Ako SDA ne, svi na{i potezi su, Ekselencije, uslovni.
To nisu na{i ciqevi. To su na{a nu`da [sic]. Ako
nastavite sa ovim i ne poni{tite nezakonite odluke,
mi }emo ovo pustiti u funkciju.
28. juna, 1991, Frankfurter-Algemeine Zeitung i Die Weldt
pi{u komentare. Jugoslaviju nazivaju istorijskom
nakazom, stvorenom kroz ugovore sa pariske
periferije. I izruguju}i se Versajskom, Sen
@ermenskom, i Trianskom i Nejskom ugovoru, kojima je
okon~an Prvi svetski rat i pravno sankcionisan poraz
Nema~ke i drugih Centralnih sila.
Podseti}u vas da 1977. i 1978. — Tito je jo{ bio `iv
— Jozef Straus, u blizini Minhena, okupqao evropsku
elitu i ube|ivao da Jugoslaviju treba proglasiti
mrtvom. Qubazno{}u Generala Galoa, mi smo do{li do
tog podatka. General Galoa je jedna izuzetna li~nost
francuske koji se nije s tim slagao ni tada ni sada.
U julu mesecu, Srbi izlaze sa dokumentum ɒɬɚ
ɩɪɟɞɥɚɠɭ ɋɪɛɢ? na srpskom i na engleskom jeziku. Meni
se sada postavqa pitawe: za{to Tu`ila{tvo nigde ne
pomiwe taj sporazum? Za{to se iz [toga] programa ne
informi{e? [ta su bile srpske pozicije u odnosu na
Jugoslaviju i odnosu na B-H? ɒɬɚ ɩɪɟɞɥɚɠɭ ɋɪɛɢ?
Va`an trenutak. Ubrzava se kriza i Srbi bosanski
izlaze sa svojim pogledima na re{ewe jugoslovenske
krize, na re{ewe bosanske krize. Taj predlog apsolutno
iskqu~uje svaki uslov za udru`ene zlo~ina~ke
poduhvate, a kamoli zlo~ina~ki poduhvat. Apsolutno
ukida mogu}nost da ishod bude takav kako stoji u
optu`nici.
215
of this secret pact — this conspiracy. Thanks to the kindness of
the Prosecution, we have come here, but we also have our own
sources of information about this.
The Serbian reaction was to accelerate the formulation of
positions and there was already talk about regionalization, but
we foresaw that the positions we took were working out because
the situation was not funny anymore. All our moves were condi-
tional, Your Excellencies, even though the SDA’s were not.
Those were not our goals. Those were necessities. If you contin-
ue this way and do not nullify these unlawful decisions, we are
going to activate our plans.
The German newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
and Die Welt published commentaries on June 28, 1991. They
dubbed Yugoslavia ‘a freak of history’ that was created by
agreements made in the suburbs of Paris. And they were ridicul-
ing the Versailles, Saint-Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly Treaties
that ended World War I and legally sanctioned the defeat of
Germany and the other Central Powers.
Let me remind you that in 1977 and 1978 — Tito was still
alive — Josef Strauss107 assembled [a meeting of] the European
elite near Munich, where he persuaded them that Yugoslavia had
to be pronounced dead. We acquired this information courtesy of
General [P.M.] Gallois.108 General Gallois is an outstanding
Frenchman who did not agree with that either then or now.
In July, the Serbs published a document entitled What Do the
Serbs Propose? in Serbian and in English. Now, I wonder why the
Prosecution has not mentioned this position paper at all. Why has
it not acquainted itself with this program? What were the Serbian
positions vis-à-vis Yugoslavia and B-H? What Do the Serbs Pro-
pose? It was an important moment. The crisis was accelerating
and the Bosnian Serbs came forth with their views on solutions for
the Yugoslav and Bosnian crises. This proposal absolutely dispels
any and all grounds for a joint criminal enterprise, not to mention
216
Po~etkom jula, Muslimanska-Bo{wa~ka Organiza-
cija predvo|ena Adilom Zuflikarpa{i}em i Muhamed-
om Filipovi}em, koji su napustili Stranku demo-
kratske akcije kada su identifikovali to zavereni~ko
jezgro koje je radilo iza le|a i glavnog odbora i cele
stranke i celog muslimanskog naroda, koji nije uvek
mogao da vidi gde vode ti potezi toga zavereni~kog
jezgra. Kada Filipovi} i Zulfikarpa{i}, iskusni
politi~ari, dugogodi{wi disidenti, nisu mogli —
trebalo im je vremena da vide kuda to ide i da vide kuda
vode ti potezi, {to je navelo g. ^au{evi}a da kada je
napustio SDA, pisao Izetbegovi}u, rekao mu: “Zar ti
misli{ da su Srbi budale i ne vide {ta ti radi{?”
Srpska reakcija na ponudu istorijskog Srpsko-
muslimanskog sporazuma, promptno prihvatawe, rad-
osno prihvatawe, uz odustajawe od svih dotada{wih
kontramera. Po~etak jula, dokaz da se kontramere koje
smo donosili na mere, kr{ewa na{ih ustavnih i
zakonskih prava — odustajemo kada muslimanska strana
ponudi da }e ona odustati od toga puta na koji se
zaputila.
Bio sam li~no sa Zuflikarpa{i}em kod g. Izet-
begovi}a, koji nas je podr`ao. Rekao je samo nastavite, a
Zulfikarpa{i}u je rekao: “Molim te, nastavi. Srbi mi
vi{e ne veruju. Mo`da }e{ ti uspeti da ne{to s wima
postigne{.”
Period jul i avgust 1991., radimo na tom istorijkom
Srpskom-muslimanskom sporazumu. Imamo zajedni~ke
mitinge gde smo imali ogromne tenzije, ali sada
Muslimani i Srbi, vo|stvo SDS-a i MBO-a ide u
osetqiva srpsko-muslimanska podru~ja na javne
mitinge. Imamo u Trebiwu ogroman miting. Tamo je
sedamnaest do dvadeset posto Muslimana — ali svi su
217
a criminal venture. It absolutely precludes the possibility of an
outcome such as the one that stands in the Indictment.
In the beginning of July, the Muslim-Bosniak Organization
[MBO] led by Adil Zulfikarpašiü and Muhamed Filipoviü, who
had both left the SDA once they had identified the conspiratorial
nucleus that was working behind the backs of the governing
board, the entire party, and all the Muslim people who were not
always able to see where the moves made by this conspiratorial
nucleus were leading. When Filipoviü and Zulfikarpašiü, experi-
enced politicians and dissidents of long standing — they needed
some time to see where all this was leading — could not see
where these moves were leading — which led Mr. ýauseviü,
who, after having left the SDA, to write to Mr. Izetbegoviü, and
ask him: “Do you think that the Serbs are fools and don’t see
what you’re up to?”
The Serbian reaction to the proposed historic Serbian-
Muslim Agreement was prompt acceptance — it was happily
accepted, along with the withdrawal of all theretofore existing
countermeasures. At the beginning of June, proof that counter-
measures we introduced against the steps taken to violate our
constitutional and legal rights — we withdrew [the countermeas-
ures] once the Muslim side offered to abandon the path it had
begun to take.
I was personally with Mr. Zulfikarpašiü when I met with
Mr. Izetbegoviü, who lent us his support. He merely said, con-
tinue doing what you’re doing, and to Zulfikarpašiü he said,
“Please continue your work. The Serbs don’t trust me any long-
er. Maybe you will be able to get somewhere with them.”
We were working on this historic Serbian-Muslim Agree-
ment during the period of July and August 1991. We held joint
meetings that were infused with enormous amounts of tension,
but now the Muslims and the Serbs, the leaderships of the SDS
and the MBO paid visits to sensitive Serbian-Muslim areas and
218
sre}ni, i Srbi i Muslimani. Idemo u Zvornik. Zvornik
je veoma osetqiv. Vide}ete kako posle je eksplodirao.
Osim ne{to malo nekih ekstremista, narod sre}an.
Prepuna sportska hala, narod sre}an {to je do{lo do
obrta u srpsko-muslimanskim odnosima. Srbi pri-
hvataju da se vrati status quo ante, ni{ta, nikakve
protivmere koje smo preduzeli za tih pola godine ne}e
biti na snazi i imamo sporazum sa Muslimanima.
Kajema avgusta, g. Izetbegovi} iznenada povla~i
podr{ku sporazumu, i to na jedan drasti~an na~in, dok
autori sporazuma, profesor Koqevi} i profesor
Filipovi}, oba sa Filozofskog Fakulteta, koje smo
li~no Izetbegovi} i ja ovlastili da nastave da rade —
i Zulfikarpa{i}. Oni prezentuju javnosti taj
sporazum, koji treba da relaksira celu situaciji u
Bosni, da Bosni ka`e, bosanskom trono{}u, jer Bosna
ima trono`ac (Srbi, Hrvate, i Muslimane), da ka`e
nema problema. Ovde ne}e biti rata. Tamo ve} u
Hrvatskoj, jer zna~i u avgustu ve} imamo sukobe. A, oni
izlaze i ka`u: “Mi radimo na sporazumu koji }e ovo
spre~iti da se prelije u Bosnu.”
Sti`e telefaks u sred emisije i SDA otkazuje, a
progla{ava MBO, Zulfikarpa{i}a i Filipovi}a
izdajnicima muslimanskog naroda. Dakle ta igra,
zamajavawa Srba i Muslimana dva meseca sa ciqem da
MBO bude pora`en politi~ki. I da jednu malu korist
SDA dobije u glasa~kom telu — e, pa to je stvarno
Pirova pobeda. To je stvarno bila skupa pobeda, i
odmah su ve} sutradan bila napetost u BiH poja~ana, a
srpska strana, i to autonomna regija Krajina, bez
ikakvog pitawa nas, progla{ava regiju Krajina, a ja im
u jednom razgovoru dajem za pravo — imamo taj intercep
— mo`emo ga uvek prikazati ako bude Ve}u zanimqivo.
219
held rallies there. We had a huge rally in Trebinje. There it is
17%–20% Muslim — but everyone was happy, both the Serbs
and Muslims. We went to Zvornik. Zvornik is an extremely sen-
sitive area. You will see how it later exploded. Apart from a
small number of extremists, people were delighted. The sports
arena was filled beyond capacity, and people were happy to see a
turning point in Serbian-Muslim relations. The Serbs accepted
the return of the status quo ante, and nothing — none of the
countermeasures that we had undertaken for six months were in
force any longer and we reached an agreement with the Muslims.
At the end of August, Mr. Izetbegoviü all of a sudden with-
drew his support for the Agreement, and did so in a drastic fash-
ion, while the authors of the agreement, Professors Koljeviü and
Filipoviü, both from the [Sarajevo] University’s School of Phi-
losophy, whom Izetbegoviü and I had personally authorized to
continue their work — as well as Zulfikarpašiü. They presented
this agreement to the public, which was supposed to ease the
tense situation in B-H, to declare that Bosnia is a tripartite state
(Serbs, Croats and Muslims), and to state that there were no
problems. There was not going to be a war here. Although we
did have conflicts going in Croatia in August. But they [Koljeviü
and Filipoviü] were coming out and saying: “We are working on
an agreement that will prevent this from spilling over into Bos-
nia.”
A fax arrived during the middle of a broadcast that the SDA
was withdrawing [its support for the agreement], and it declared
the MBO and Mr. Filipoviü traitors to the Muslim nation. So,
this game preoccupied the Muslims and the Serbs with a red her-
ring for two months, and its goal was to inflict a political defeat
on the MBO. And all this so that the SDA could gain a very
small advantage with the electoral body — well, that was a genu-
ine Pyrrhic victory. It was, indeed, a costly victory, and on the
very next day tensions immediately rose in B-H, while the
220
Dakle, na taj potez srpske strane, Izetbegovi} se
povla~i i usporava, i idemo u Skup{tinu. U
Skup{tini, usvajamo Dekleraciju ~iji su osnovni
elementi: da prvo sve opcije su ravnopravne; i drugo, da
ne}e biti nametawa re{ewa. Zna~i, mora se na}i
re{ewe koje }e biti prihvatqivo za sve, nikome se
ni{ta ne}e nametnuti, i svaka opcija je legitimna.
Mo`e da se ide sa svakom opcijom. Dakle, ponovo do|e
do jedno malog relaksirawa, me|utim, to sve traje mawe
od mesec dana.
Zna~i u Skup{tini u oktobru — polovina oktobra
— imamo onu poznatu skup{tinu gde se vr{i ustavni
pu~, nelegalno zakazuju nastavak sednice i donose
Deklaraciju o suverenosti te dve stranke. Srpski
poslanici iz svih stranaka — wih 83 od 86 — zna~i 72
iz Srpske demokratske stranke i ostali Srbi iz
ostalih stranaka, multietni~kih, napu{taju
Skup{tinu i srpska strana najavquje da }e, ako ne
povuku za deset dana — za nedequ dana — te odluke, da
}e srpska strana formirati svoju Skup{tinu na novou
personalne autonomije.
To je i za optu`nicu i za Tu`ila{tvo jedan veoma
va`an trenutak, gde u paragrafu 34, predpretresnog
podneska, Tu`ila{tvo ka`e:
Rukovodstvo bosanskih Srba osnovala je
24. oktobra, 1991. zasebnu srpsku
Skup{tinu. Kao {to je Karaxi} objasnio
poslanicima: “Ovo je istorijski korak.
Ovo je korak koji srpski narod razbija i
posledwe zablude, prepoznaje prijateqe i
neprijateqe, i zaokru`uje svoje bi}e na
na~in na koji (jedna re~ nije moglo da se
221
Serbian side, particularly the autonomous region of Krajina,
without consulting us at all, proclaimed the Autonomous Region
of the Krajina, while I in one conversation agreed with it — we
have the intercept — and we can always present it to the Trial
Chamber as proof should it merit interest to the Trial Chamber.
So, after the Serbian side made that move, Izetbegoviü with-
drew and resorted to dilatory tactics, and we went to the Assem-
bly. In the Assembly, we adopted a Declaration whose basic el-
ements were: first, that all options be treated as equal; and sec-
ond, that there be no imposed solutions. That meant a solution
had to be found that would be acceptable for everyone involved,
nothing was going to be imposed on anyone, and all options
were legitimate. So this once again eased tensions somewhat,
however, all that lasted less than a month.
So, in the Assembly in October — by mid-October — we
held that well-known Assembly session during which a constitu-
tional putsch took place by illegally continuing a session, and
those two sides passed a Declaration of Sovereignty. Serbian
representatives, 83 of 86 from all parties — seventy-two from
the SDS and the Serbs from other multi-ethnic parties, walked
out of the Assembly, and the Serbian side announced that unless
those decisions were revoked within seven to ten days, the Ser-
bian side was then going to establish its own Assembly on the
level of autonomous personnel [i.e., representatives].
This was a pivotal moment for the Prosecution as well as the
Indictment, where in Paragraph 34 of the Pre-Trial Brief, the
Prosecution states that:
The BSL [Bosnian Serb Leadership] established
a separate Serbian Assembly on 24 October
1991. As Karadžiü explained to the delegates,
“This is a historic step, a step the Serbian people
takes [sic] to shatter the last illusions, to discern
between its friends and enemies, and to round
222
pro~ita) nikad ne}e biti ugro`en
iznutra.”
Dakle, Karaxi} ka`e, ovaj trenutak, kada smo
re{ili se na{ih zabluda, videli smo {ta je na{a
sudbina i {ta nam je ~initi, videli smo ko su
prijateqi i ko su neprijateqi, videli smo {ta nas
ugro`ava. Dakle, “U novembru 1991,” nastavqa taj
paragraf 34:
neposredno prije plebiscita SDS-a na
kojem je srpski narod potvrdio da `eli
ostati u Jugoslaviji, Karaxi} je pozvao
~lanstvo SDS-a u op{tinama da se
pripreme za uspostavu vlasti na svojim
podru~jima. ‘Molim vas da budete tako|e
energi~ni i o{tri da se pripremite i
uspostavite vlast na svojim teritorijama
u op{tinama u regijama mjesnim za-
jednicama da pripremite prestrukturaciju
i reorganizaciju op{tina.’
Tu`ila{tvo citira moj re~. Da ovo nema to zna~ewe
koje je Tu`ila{tvo o tome pridalo, ho}u da vas
podsetim da je izme|u 24. oktobra, kada su Srbi
shvatili gde vodi Stranka demokratske akcije, Srbi su
do po~etka rata prihvatili nekoliko varijanti,
nekoliko {ansi za mir, uz spremnost da odustanu i od
ove skup{tine i podseti}emo se na te {anse. Dakle,
Srbi su formirali Skup{tinu kao posledwu odbranu.
Ako sve propadne, ta Skup{tina }e do}i u svoju
funkciju.
Kao {to ka`e Ve}e u slu~aju Kraji{nika, 195. ili
196. paragraf, ako se stari sistem raspao, centralna
vlast mora da uradi ne{to da se ne raspadne i teren.
223
our entity in such a way that [one word redacted]
it would never again find itself endangered from
within.109
Therefore, when we were disabused our illusions, Karadžiü
said at this moment that we saw what our destiny was and what
we had to do: we saw exactly who friends and enemies were; and
we saw what was threatening us. So, “In November 1991,” it
states again in Paragraph 34, that:
just before the SDS plebiscite of the Serbian
people confirming their willingness to stay in
Yugoslavia, Karadžiü exhorted the municipal
SDS membership to get ready to establish au-
thority in their territories:
‘I am asking you to be energetic and strict; to get
ready and establish authority in your territories;
in municipalities, regions, local communities,
and to prepare yourselves for restructuring and
regionalizing the municipalities (…).’110
The Prosecution is quoting my words. That this does not
have the meaning attributed to it by the OTP, I’d like to call to
your attention that between October 24, when the Serbs realized
where the SDA was going, the Serbs had accepted before the
beginning of the war several alternatives, several chances for
peace, and they were even prepared to abandon their own As-
sembly, and we are going to revisit those [lost] opportunities
now. So, the Serbs established the Assembly as their last stand.
If all else failed, that Assembly was going to become operative.
As the Trial Chamber says in the Krajišnik case, Paragraph
195 or 196, if the old system fell apart, the central government
had to do something in order to prevent the [situation on the]
ground from falling apart. What Karadžiü is saying is: “prepare
and establish authority in your own territories in the counties.” If
224
Ovo {to Karaxi} ka`e: “Na svojim teritorijama u
op{tinama, pripremite i uspostavite vlast na svojim
teritorijama.” Ako }e centralna vlast propasti, i ako
op{tine ne}e imati na koga da se oslone, ili }e kad
pozovu centralnu vladu, centralna vlada izdati im
naloge koji su suprotni opstanku naroda, onda treba
uspostaviti vlast. Mi tamo ve} imamo vlast, samo ona
treba da se spremi da funkcioni{e u vanrednim
okolnostima.
I moje je stanovi{te — i mislim za to daje zapravo
i svi me|unarodni dokumenti, boqe ikakva vlast nego
nikakva. Boqe vlast nego haos.
Srpski narod — ponovo, srpska strana sada, ali nije
vi{e SDS (tu su sada svi Srbi, sve stranke) — zakazuje
plebiscit srpskoga naroda za 10.–11. novembar, da
vidimo da li narod ho}e ovo {to Izetbegovi} forsira,
ili }e ne{to drugo.
Referendumsko pitawe je u vezi sa Jugoslavijom, sa
udru`ivawem svih koji ho}e da ostanu u Jugoslaviji, i
taj referendum je odr`an. Bilo je mogu}nosti da glasaju
druge, po{to je to etni~ki referendum. Drugi su imali
tako|e mogu}nost da glasaju, i glasalo je negde izme|u
40,000 i 60,000 Muslimana i Hrvata koji su glasali za
o~uvawe Jugoslavije, a Tu`ila{tvo, bojim se,
maliciozno ka`e da je to bio `uti listi}. Ja ne znam
koje boje listi} bio, ali Tu`ila{tvo propu{ta da se
informi{e da je to bio i listi} latinicom pisan.
Srbi prete`no pi{u }irilicom, al’ taj je bio
latinicom da bi im bilo prijatnije.
E, sada, 20. decembra, vlada BiH, suprotno stavu i
mi{qewe svih srpski ministara, i zamenika ministara
svih ~lanova vlade, donosi odluku da zatra`i od
Evropske zajednice priznawe nezavisnosti BiH.
225
the central government falls apart and if the counties have no one
to rely on; or, when they call upon the central [B-H] government,
the central government is going to issue directives that are going
to be work against the survival of the people, so we must then
establish governing authority. We already exercised governing
authority in these areas; it only had to be prepared to function in
extraordinary circumstances.
And my standpoint is — and I think that all international
documents corroborate it — that it is better to have some kind of
rule of law as opposed to none at all. Rule of law is better than
chaos.
The Serbian people — again, the Serbian side is now no
longer represented [solely] by the SDS (it is now all Serbs from
all political parties) — scheduled a plebiscite of the Serbian peo-
ple for November 10–11, 1991 to see whether the people wanted
what Izetbegoviü was forcing on them or whether they wanted
something else.
The question posed by the Referendum related to [the
preservation of] Yugoslavia, and all those who wished to remain
in Yugoslavia participated, and that Referendum was, indeed,
held. Others were able to vote as well, since this was an ethnic
referendum. Others were likewise able to vote, and somewhere
between 40,000 to 60,000 Muslims and Croats did vote in favor
of preserving Yugoslavia, but the Prosecution, I fear, maliciously
states that this was a yellow ballot. I don’t know what color this
ballot was, but the OTP omits to inform you that this ballot was
written in the Roman alphabet. Serbs predominantly use the Cy-
rillic alphabet, but this one was printed in the Roman alphabet so
that the others would find it easier [to read].
The Illegal Referendum and Proclamation of Independence
And now, on December 20, the government of B-H, after
having taken a position contrary to the thinking of all Serbian
ministers and deputy ministers, passed a resolution to seek
226
Uslova za to nema, ni ta odluka nije donesena na
ispravan na~in. Nije mogla da bude donesena ni na
referendumu jer je glasalo mawe od dve tre}ine za to od
svih glasa~a, i nebi moglo ni u Skup{tini jer smo mi
imali vi{e od jedne tre}ine i pogotovu vlada ne smije
da tra`i nezavisnost. To mora da tra`i Skup{tina na
osnovu dve tre}ine glasova svih poslanika.
Srpska reakcija na Skup{tini 21-og — 11-og ʊ
bi}ete upoznati sa svakim detaqem te skup{tine. (Oni
se ~esto eksploati{u u optu`nici). Tra`i poni{tewe
tog zahteva za nezavisnost, ili }e kao kontrameru
proglasiti Srpsku Republiku BiH.
Evo ponovo mape na koje mo`emo da bacimo pogled.
Plavo su Srbi. Sada, nakon, to je bila, ja mislim, 91-e.
To se nije mewalo. U glavnom je to tako. Nakon
genicidom u Drugom svetskom ratu i daqe, Srbi `ive na
dve tre}ine, ve}ina su na dve tre~ine teritorije BiH, a
na `alost, imaju jednu tre}inu. Ina}e, su do tih
zbivawa, do Drugog svetskog rata, bili oni ve}insku
stanovni{tva.
SDA odbija da povu}e zahtev. I ide daqe.
Zna}i, od 20. decembra do 9. januara, dato im je
dvadeset dana. Srpska reakcija je 9. Januara.
Progla{ava se Srpska Republika BiH, ali kao i sve
srpske kontramere, ona se samo progla{ava kao
mogu}nost a ne funcioni{e. Da Tu`ila{tvo nije u
pravu kada smatra da smo mi formirali Skup{tinu
srpskog naroda da bismo postigli ciqeve.
Mi smo u pravu da smo formirali srpsku
Skup{tinu da bismo spre~ili da SDA postigne svoje
ciqeve protiv na{e bezbednosti, na{e voqe. Mo`emo
videti i svih me|ukoraka, a jedan od tih me|ukoraka je
zasedawe zajedni~ke Skup{tine 24. i 25. januara gde se
227
recognition for an independent B-H from the European Commu-
nity. The conditions for such a resolution had not been met, so
the resolution was not passed in the correct manner. It could not
have been done with the Referendum [for an independent Bos-
nia] either, because less than two-thirds of all voters had voted in
favor of it, and it could not have passed in the [B-H] Assembly
because we had more than a third [of the seats], and so the gov-
ernment had absolutely no grounds to seek independence. Its
passage had to be sought by the Assembly on the basis of a two-
thirds vote of all representatives.
You will be informed of each and every detail of the Serbian
reaction in the Assembly of the 21st — 11th. (These details are
often exploited in the Indictment.) The Assembly was going to
move to annul this resolution for independence or it was going to
proclaim the Serbian Republic of B-H as a countermeasure.
Here, once again, is the map where we can take a look. [EX-
HIBIT XIV] The Serbian areas are blue. Now, I think, this was
1991. It did not change. This is basically the way it was. After
the genocide during the World War II, the Serbs continued
thereafter to live on two-thirds — the majority live on two-thirds
of the territory of B-H, but regrettably they make up only one-
third [of the population]. In any case, they were the majority
population until the events that transpired during the Second
World War.
The SDA refused to withdraw this resolution. And it went
further.
They were given twenty days, from December 20 until Janu-
ary 9 [to decide]. The Serbs reacted on January 9. The Serbian
Republic of B-H was proclaimed, but as all other Serbian
measures, it had been proclaimed merely as a possibility, since it
really wasn’t a functioning entity. So the Prosecution is incorrect
when it treats our creation of the Assembly of the Serbian People
as a means of achieving certain objectives.
228
Karaxi} i ^engi}, ali ovo je Muhamed ^engi} iz SDA.
To nije vi{e MBO. MBO je celo vreme bio za
sporazumevawe sa Srbima. Sada i potpredsednik SDA,
^engi} (ju}e smo to pomiwali) posti`e sa mnom
saglasnost za govornicom. To je poznati snimak.
Obojica smo bili istovremeno za govornicom,
posti`emo saglasnost da vlada napravi
regionalizaciju za petnaest dana i da Srbi iza|u na
referendum. Kako god glasaju, dali su mu legitimitet.
Taj sporazum, koji je bio inicaran od strane
Izetbegovi}a ʊ jer je ^engi} javno rekao da ga
Izetbegovi} ovlastio ʊ trajao je svega dva sata. Sa
MBO je sporazum trajao dva meseca; ovaj je trajao dva
sata.
E, onda dolazi februar i po~iwe konferencija
mada smo primili posmatra~e Evropske unije mnogo
ranije. Primali smo ambasadora Vajnadca, Lorda
Karingtona, Ambasadora Kutilera, i ranije, ali
zvani~no po~iwe u februar konferencija, i 22. ili 23.
februaru, definitvno se posti`e sporazum da }e biti
tri Bosne. Srbi su prelomili i rekli: “U redu.
Iza}i}emo iz Jugoslavije. Napusti}emo Jugoslaviju.
Osta}emu u okvirima ovih granica BiH kada budu
priznate, pod uslovom da mi dobijemo tu jednu jedinicu
unutra i da Bosna bude slo`ena, decentralizovana
dr`ava u kojoj }e Srbi, Hrvati, i Muslimani imati onu
garanciju, onu bezbednost kako su imali republike u
Jugoslaviji samo na mnogo mawem nivou.”
22. ili 23. februara, donosi se odluka da }e budu}e
konstituivne jedinice imati ingerencije svoje i izme|u
ostalog, ima}e pravo na svoju autonomnu, suverinu
policiju koja je odgovorna samo toj vladi i toj
Skup{tini.
229
We had the right to establish the Serbian Assembly in order
to prevent the SDA from achieving its objectives against our will
and at the expense of our security. We can see all the interim
steps that had been taken, and one of those interim steps was to
convene the joint [B-H] Assembly on January 24 and 25, where
Karadžiü and ýengiü — this is Muhamed ýengiü from the SDA.
It was no longer the MBO. The MBO was always in favor of
reaching an agreement with the Serbs. Now, even the Vice-
President of the SDA, ýengiü (we mentioned this yesterday),
reached an agreement with me on the very rostrum. This [video]
footage is very well-known. We were both at the rostrum at the
same time, and we reached an agreement that the government
carry out a regionalization within fifteen days, and that the Serbs
would vote in a referendum. Whatever way they may have de-
cided to vote, they would have conferred legitimacy upon the
referendum.
This agreement, initiated by Izetbegoviü’s side ʊ because
ýengiü publicly stated that it was Izetbegoviü who had author-
ized him ʊ lasted all of two hours. The agreement with the
MBO lasted for two months; this one lasted for only two hours.
The Lisbon Agreement
Well, then came February and the conference began even
though we had accepted monitors from the EU much earlier. We
received Ambassador Wijnaendts, Lord Carrington, and Ambas-
sador Cutileiro even earlier but the conference officially began on
February 22 or 23, and a definitive agreement was finally reached
that there would be three Bosnias. The Serbs were convinced and
said: “Okay, we will leave Yugoslavia. We will give up Yugosla-
via. We will remain within the framework of these borders of B-H
once they are recognized, on the condition that we receive this one
single entity within it, and that Bosnia be a compound, decentral-
ized state in which Serbs, Croats, and Muslims will have such
230
Po{to smo imali iskustvo da g. Izetbegovi}, ono
{to smo postigli ju}e, recimo, saglasnost o deset
pitawa, sutradan on ponovo da se vra}a na nulu. Mi smo
se dogovorili da to vi{e ne mo`e. Ako smo danas
postigli saglasnost o deset pitawa, sutra diskutujemo
jedanaesto. Deset zavr{enih pitawa ne mogu vi{e biti
problematizana. Tek 1993-e godine, mi usvajamo
princip da ni{ta ne mo`e biti usvojeno dok sve nije
usvojeno. Dotada, ono {to je usvojeno mo`e da se
provodi.
I zato srpska Skup{tina i Ministarski savez
donosi odluku 28. februara da se priprema za
formirawe srpskog MUP-a. A za{to odma posle
sporazuma? Zato {to su masivne, masivne u`asno
velike zloupotrebe muslimanskog dela zajedni~ke
policije, koja radi ~uda. To mo`emo videti iz
stanovi{te i potvrde svedoka Tu`ila{tva da je do{lo
do stapawa policije u srpskom delu policije. SDA,
Patriotske Lige, jednostavno, vi{e se ne mo`e
razaznati. Nijedna institucija sama za sebe. Ali,
vrati}emo se i da identifikujemo te zloupotrebe.
Zna}i, tada kada se ide 28. februara i 1. marta na
referendum, na koji Srbi ne izlaze, ali ga i ne
spre~avaju. Jesmo mi imali svoje plebicit u novembru i
smatramo da dobro da dobijemo i to kad su ve} zakazali,
ali to smatramo plebicit dvoetni~kim a ne
referendum gra|ana BiH, jer to nije. Jer do toga nije
do{lo na zakonit na~in.
1. marta kriminalci poznati koji su sada aktivisti
Patriotske Lige, Zeleni Beretki, ubijaju svata, ubijaju
oca mlado`ewinog pred onom starom crkvom na kojoj su
pisali one grafite protiv Srba, sutradan nakon {to je
najavqeno formirawe SDA.
231
guarantees and security as the Yugoslav republics had, albeit on a
much lower level.”
On February 22 or 23, a decision was made that the future
constituent units would have their own jurisdictions, and, among
other things, that they would have the right to autonomy and to a
sovereign police force that would be accountable solely to its
own government and assembly.
Since we already had experience with Mr. Izetbegoviü and
[understood] that despite whatever we may have achieved yes-
terday, such as reaching an agreement on ten points, the next day
he will want to go back to square one. If today we agree on ten
points, then tomorrow we are going to discuss number eleven.
The ten points of agreement that have been closed may not be re-
opened. It was only in 1993 that we adopted the principle that
nothing has been agreed upon until everything had been agreed
upon. Until then, whatever had been adopted may have been put
into force.
That is why the Serbian Assembly and the Council of Minis-
ters decided on February 28 to lay the groundwork for the crea-
tion for a Serbian MUP. But why immediately after the agree-
ment? Because there were massive, massive and terribly outra-
geous and enormous abuses of the joint [B-H] police force that
were being perpetrated by the Muslim side, and it was wreaking
havoc. We can see this from the standpoint of and confirmations
by Prosecution witnesses that this resulted in a take-over of the
Serbian part of the police force. The SDA and the Patriotic
League simply couldn’t be told apart. One institution was no
longer independent [of the other]. But we will revisit this matter
and identify the abuses that were then taking place.
In other words, at the time when the Referendum was being
held on the February 28 and March 1, the Serbs boycotted it, but
they did not prevent it from taking place. We had conducted our
own plebiscite in November and we thought it was a good idea to
232 233

Ta stara crkva je napravqena za vreme Turske have conducted this plebiscite since they had already scheduled
okupacije. Postaje anegdote ono da je sultan rekao: “U their own, but we regarded their Referendum as a bi-ethnic plebi-
redu, mo`ete da napravite bogomoqu koliko mo`e scite and not as a referendum of the citizens of B-H, because it
volovska ko`a da obuhvati. Onda su navodno Srbi was not. Because it had not been prepared in a lawful manner.
iskrojili tu ko`u u oputu, u nit, i napravili su jedan
The Murder of Wedding Guests
prostor gde naprave crkvu. I po{to je sultan tako|e
On March 1, known criminals who were now activists in the
rekao da ona ne sme da nadvisuje ni najni`e minare od
Patriotic League, the Green Berets, were killing wedding guests:
xamije, oni su tu crkvu ukopali u zemqu. Taj dobar deo
they killed the father of the groom in front of the Old [Serbian
kad se ui|e u crkvu, morate da silazite. Ja se nadam da
Orthodox] Church, where they had written anti-Serbian graffiti on
}ete jednoga dana biti u Sarajevu. Preporu}ujem Vama
the very next day after the establishment of the SDA had been an-
da pazite na svoje korake, jer se mora ui}i u dubinu. To
nounced.
je jedna veoma draga Srbima crkva.
This Old Church was built during the Turkish occupation. An
Nikad nije prestavila sa radom; nije ta~no {to se
anecdote survives of the Sultan, who said: “All right, you can
tvrdi. Ne znam da li je Tu`ila{tvo, ali znam da mi je
build a house of worship that will be as large as the area an ox
muslimanska strana poku{ala da prevari, kako to nije
hide can encompass. And then, the Serbs are said to have cut this
bila aktivna. To je uvek bila aktivna crkva i za vreme
ox hide into a cord, into a thread, and created the area where they
Turaka. Nikad je Turci nisu dirali.
would build their church. And since the Sultan had decreed that it
Tu, dakle, jedan mladi ~ovek puca u svatove, slu~ajno
must not be taller than even the lowest minaret of any mosque,
pogodi Nikolu Gardovi}a, oca mladog sve{tenika koji
they built the church partly underground. You must walk down-
se toga dana `enio. I ve} je slede}ih dana on na
stairs a good way when you enter the church. I hope you go to
televiziju, kao junak, i on ka`e: “Pucao sam. [ta on
Sarajevo one day. I advise you to watch your step going down the
ima da nosi srpsku zastavu.” A srpska zastava su nosili
stairs, because it’s a long way down. The Serbs cherish this
za vreme Turaka na svadbama. To je jednostavna crkvena;
church.
to nije bilo nacionalno, nego crkvena zastava sa
This church never ceased conducting services; their [i.e., the
krstom na sebi, itd.
Muslims’] assertions are incorrect. I don’t know whether the
Onda 2. marta nastaju barikade u Sarajevu. U to
Prosecution has done so, but I know that the Muslim side has
vreme, smo profesor Koqevi}, g. Kraji{nik, i ja u
tried to engage in deceit by claiming that this was not a function-
Beogradu na pregovorima, i nismo tamo. Nastaju
ing church. It has always been a functioning church, even during
barikade. Te barikade trajaju dva dana. Srpska
the Turkish era. The Turks never touched it.
demokratska stranka izvr{i odbor, po{to nije bilo
So it was there that a young man fires into a wedding party
nikoga iz glavnog odbora, prikqu~ila se da pregovara u
and happens to shoot Nikola Gardoviü, the father of the young
ime ovih na barikadama sa predsedni{tvom Bosne i
priest who was getting married that day. And over the next few
Hercegovine, i kriznim {tabom na~ijem ~elu je ovaj
days he appeared on television as a hero, and he said: “I shot
234
gospodin {to su ga sad uhapsili u Londonu, Ejup Gani},
~lan predsedni{tva, Jugosloven koji se okrenuo protiv
Jugoslavije.
I u takoj situaciji na pune napetosti, tenzija,
neizvesnosti, 18. marta se posti`e sporazum,
Lisabonski sporazum. Usvaja se Kutilerov plan
mirovni, da }e ova teritorija Bosne i Hercegovine
biti reorganizovana u tri unutra{we jedinice: srpsku,
hrvatsku, i muslimansku, i mi svi slavimo.
Podse}avam Vas da je g. Ajanovi} najvi{e slavio,
rekav{i da }e 80% do 85% Muslimana biti u wihovoj
konstituivnoj jedinici, a svega dvadesetak posto kod
Srba i kod Hrvata u wihovim jedinicama, dok su Srbi
najlo{ije, wih se svega pedeset i ne{to posto biti u
srpskoj jedinici, a ostali }e biti rastuci po Bosni.
Niko nikad, ni tada ni tosle toga, ne pomiwe ni
razmenu stanovni{tva niti isterivawa.
24. marta, SDA povla}i saglasnost. Podse}am da je
18. marta Ajanovi} rekao: “Ako Srbi odbiju ovaj
sprazum, to }e biti jo{ jedna wihova glupost, i bi}e
dokaz da se oni opredelili za rata.” Me|utim, za
nedequ dana, oni otkazuju Lisabonski sporazum.
G. Ajanovi} ka`e: “Ma, mi smo to napravili onako
trik da bismo mogli da kupimo neko vreme da sa}ekamo
me|unarodno priznawe.”
Evo, vidite. Mo`emo da vidimo ako mo`e. Ovaj,
“Ako mo`e srpska Skup{tina.” Mo`e ovaj prethodni.
“Ako srpska Skup{tina odbije Kutilerov plan,
bi}e jasno ko je protiv mira u Bosni i bi}e jasno ko
`eli da prevari Evropsku zajednicu i predsednika
konferencije.” Lorda Karingtona.
Ovo je priznawe, Ekselencije. Ovaj ~ovek priznaje
ko to uradi bi}e kriv. A on to radi za nedequ dana.
235
him. So what? Why was he carrying a Serb flag?” Serbian flags
were carried even in Turkish times at weddings. It was merely a
religious flag: it was not a national flag, but simply a church flag
with a cross on it, etc.
Then on March 2, the barricades go up in Sarajevo. At the
time, Prof. Koljeviü, Mr. Krajišnik, and I were in Belgrade for
negotiations. We were not there. The barricades went up, and
they stayed up for two days. The SDS’s [governing] committee
met since there was no one present from the governing board,
and it entered into negotiations with the Presidency of B-H on
behalf of those who were manning the barricades, as well as with
the Crisis Staff that was headed by this gentleman who was just
now arrested in London, Mr. Ejup Ganiü,111 a member of the
Presidency, a Yugoslav who turned against Yugoslavia.
Alija Izetbegoviü Reneges on the Lisbon Agreement
So it was in such a situation, rife with tension and uncertain-
ty, that on March 18 an agreement was reached, the Lisbon
Agreement. The Cutileiro Peace Plan was adopted, which stated
that the territory of B-H would be reorganized as three internal
units: Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim, and we all found it to be a
cause for celebration.
May I remind you that Mr. Ajanoviü,112 who found more
cause for celebration than the rest, said that 80%–85% of the
Muslims would remain in their own constituent unit, and that
only about 20% would be with the Serbs and Croats in their enti-
ties, while the Serbs fared the worst with only fifty-something
percent being in the Serbian entity while the rest would be scat-
tered throughout Bosnia. No one ever, either then or afterwards,
referred to any population exchanges or any expulsions.
On March 24, the SDA withdrew from the agreement. May I
remind you that on March 18, Ajanoviü said: “If the Serbs reject
this agreement, it’s going to be yet another one of their stupid
moves, and it will be proof that they have chosen war.” But a
236
SDA je prihvatila, ali:
SDA je prvobitno prihvatila Kutilerov
sporazum, jer je to bila politi~ka igra da
se osigura me|unarodnom priznawe su-
verene i nezavisne BiH, i zato {to bi
bila odgovorna za neuspeh pregovora.
SDS, HDZ, i Evropska zajednica bili su u
prilog ostanka BiH u sada{wim gran-
icama, ali da se teritorije transform-
i{u.
E, ovo wemu nije bilo prihvatqivo. I 18.–19. rekao:
“Ako Srbi to prevare, jasno je da oni ho}e da prevare
Evropsku zajednicu,” itd. I: “Da }e biti krivi za rat.”
Gospodin sada priznaje da su oni to uradili da }e biti.
Ovde se jasno vidi da srpski narod i srpske politi~ke
partije prihvataju minimum. Izlazimo iz Jugoslavije.
To je najbolnija mogu}a koncesija. Ostaju granice Bosne
i Hercegovine takve kakve jesu, ako mi unazad dobijemo
svoju konstituitivnu jedinicu. Evo {ta ambasador
Kutilero pi{e ’95-e godine kad je rat ve} zavr{en.
Pi{e o tome {ta se pri}a o Lisabonsom sporazumu i o
krivici za rat. ambasador Kutilero na{ao se
podstaknutim da objavi svetu. U Economist-u je ovo
objavqeno, da nije ba{ tako. I ba{ on ka`e: Not quite. A
evo wegovog pisma:
[Na engleskom]
Nakon nekoliko rundi pregovora, na{i
principi za ustavno ure|ewe BiH su
dogovoreni od sve tri strane (Muslimana,
Srba, i Hrvata) u Sarajevo 18. marta,
1992. To se nastavilo sve dok se
Muslimani nisu povukli sporazuma. Da to
237
week later, they were the ones who rejected the Lisbon Agree-
ment.
Mr. Ajanoviü said: “Well, we pulled off this ruse in order to
buy some time to await international recognition.”
Here, you see. We can take a look at this slide, if it’s possi-
ble. This one, If the Serbian Assembly…. Can we actually get the
previous slide?
“If the Serbian Assembly rejects the Cutileiro Plan, it will be
clear who is against peace in Bosnia, and it will be clear who
wants to trick the European Community and the Conference
Chairman.” Lord Carrington [speaking].
Your Excellencies, this is an admission. This man admits
that whosoever does this is guilty. And that is just what he did a
week later.
The SDA accepted [the Plan] but:
[In English]
The SDA originally accepted the Cutileiro
Agreement because it was a political game to
secure the international recognition of a sover-
eign and independent B-H, and because it would
[otherwise] be responsible for the failure of the
negotiations. The SDS, HDZ, and the European
Community were in favor of B-H remaining in
its present borders but for its territories to be
transformed.
Now, he [Ajanoviü] found this unacceptable. And on the
18th, 19th, he said: “If this is deceit on the part of the Serbs, it is
clear that they want to deceive the European Community,” etc.
And: “They will be guilty of [starting] the war.” And now this
gentleman admits that is just what they did to make it [i.e., the
war] happen. It is clear that the Serbian people and Serbian polit-
ical parties had accepted the minimum. We’re leaving Yugosla-
238
nisu u~inili, bosansko pitawe bi se
mo`da re{ilo ranije sa mawe gubitaka, u
glavno, muslimanskih `ivota i zemqe. Da
budemo po{teni, predsednik Izetbegovi}
i wegovi pomo~nici su ohrabrirani da se
povuku iz sporazuma i da se bore za
unitarnu bosansku dr`avu od strane
dobronamernih vawski faktora koje su
mislili da znaju {ta je boqe.
I ovo je trenutak da se zapitamo {ta je tu mogao da
uradi Karaxi} ili SDS ili svih milion i po Srba u
Bosni i Hercegovini? Sve prihvataju. Sve prihvataju
{to je konzistento sa wihovim opstankom. Prihvataju
da wihova jedinica bude najlo{ija, da najmawe
zadovoqi interese i ciqeve srpskog naroda. Sve
prihvataju i nemaju {ansu da sa~uvaju mir. Jedino {to
se od wih o~ekuje o~igledno je ono {to je qubazni
predsednik Tu|man saop{tio ameri~koj delegaciji:
“Srbi treba da idu iz Bosne,” a ne Muslimane da idu iz
Republike Srpske, nego Srbi iz cele Bosne.
Moram da samo se vratim kratko na ubistvo svata i
barikade. Tuma~e se u glavnom u pristrasnim medijama
zapadnim; tuma~e se kao barikade su nastale zato {to su
Muslimani izglasali nezavisnost. To nije ta~no. Mi
nigde nismo omeli.
Pogledajte ovu mapu ponovo ako mo`emo dobiti
etni~ku mapu Bosne i Hercegovine. Ovde, svuda gde je
plavo, tu smo mi na vlasti, jer je to srpska visina.
Nigde na ovom prostoru nisu mogli provesti
referendum da smo mi odlu~ili da oni ne provedu
referendum. I nismo to spre~avali. Zna}i, nije ta~no
da su barikade zbog referenduma, nego su barikade zbog
ubistva, zbog toga {to je neki momak poznat, ina}e
239
via. That was the most painful of all possible concessions we
could have made. The borders of B-H would then remain just as
they were if we got our own constituent unit in return. Here is
what Ambassador Cutileiro wrote in 1995 when the war was al-
ready over. He is writing about what was being said of the Lis-
bon Agreement and of culpability for the war. Ambassador
Cutileiro found himself compelled to make this public for all the
world to know. This was published in the Economist, that [what
people were saying about the Lisbon Agreement] was not quite
right. Not quite, as he had put it. Here is his letter:
[In English]
After several rounds of talks, our principles for
constitutional arrangements for B-H were agreed
by all three parties (Muslim, Serbs and Croats)
in Sarajevo on 18th of March, 1992. This con-
tinued until the Muslims reneged on the agree-
ment. Had they not done so, the Bosnian ques-
tion might have been settled earlier with less
loss of mainly Muslim life and land. To be fair,
President Izetbegoviü and his aides were en-
couraged to scupper the deal and to fight for a
unitary Bosnian state by well-meaning outsiders
who thought they knew better.
And this is the moment to ask ourselves: What could
Karadžiü or the SDS or all of a million and a half Serbs in B-H
have done? They accepted everything. They accepted everything
that was consonant with their survival. They accepted the fact
that their entity would be the worst, that it would least satisfy the
interests and goals of the Serbian people. They accepted it all
and they still didn’t have a chance of preserving the peace. The
only thing that was expected of them, quite obviously, was what
President Tuÿman told an American delegation: “The Serbs have
240
kriminalac, shvatio da se to sme. Da se sme pucati u
srpske svatove, ubiti, i da se treba posle pohvaliti na
televiziji kao junak. Da, biti junak svoje nacionalne
zajednice, i nije uhap{en dugo do negde ʊ mislim da su
ga likvidirali posle rata, negde pre tri-~etiri godine
su ga likvidirali u nekoj kafani. Ali, niko mu nije
ni{ta radio u tom trenutku. To 24.–25. su objavili da se
povukla SDA iz sporazuma.
25. marta. Pogledajte taj ritam. Sada vi{e to nisu
mesec dana ili nedeqa kao u Hrvatskoj. Ovo je sada iz
dana u dan {ok za {okom. 25. marta, oru`ane snage
Hrvatske, Zbor narodne garde, ne znate li MUP, ne
znate li ni {ta je ve} to, prelaze iz Hrvatske u Bosnu i
Hercegovinu u Bosanskom Brodu. Tamo se sastaju sa
ilegalnim paravojnim jedinicama Armina Pohare.
Ina}e, bio predsednik neke stranke ali imao i vojne
formacije. Pevaju, pucaju kao svatovi i ubijaju oca i
sina ʊ mislim da se zovu Petrovi} ʊ na benzinskoj
pumpi. Ni{ta. Nikakvih razloga nema. Nit’ su
naoru`ani na benzinskoj pumpi, nisu smeli ni pucati,
ali oni su, kad treba pucati u Srbe, usudili su se i
ubili su tu dvojicu qudi. Niko im se ne suprostavqa,
ni policija B-H, ni Jugoslovenska narodna armija, koja
nemo`e, koja ve} ima svoje bitke tamo u Hrvatskoj, i
oni nastavqaju sutradan, 26. marta, u susedno selo.
Isto tako kao svatovi. Niko da im stane na put i da
ka`e: “^ekajte, {ta vi radite?” U 26. marta je pokoq
Srba u Sijekovcu. Taj siroti Sijekovac je, i tokom
Drugog svetskog rata ʊ bile su tri tre}ine: te}ina je
pobegla; tre}inu su pobili; a tre}ina se pokrstila.
Ve}ina se posle vratila. A neki su i nisu vratili.
Ostali su Katolici.
241
to leave Bosnia,” but not that the Muslims had to leave the Re-
publika Srpska, but Serbs out of all of Bosnia.
I have to return briefly to the murder of the wedding guests
and the barricades. They have been generally interpreted in a
prejudicial manner by the Western media; the barricades are in-
terpreted as having gone up because the Muslims had voted for
independence. That is incorrect. We did not interfere anywhere.
Take another look at this ethnic map of B-H, if we can get it
up on screen. [EXHIBIT XIV] Here, all the blue areas are where we
held governing authority, because these are the heights [i.e., in the
mountains surrounding Sarajevo] where the Serbs live. They could
not have held a Referendum in this area had we decided against it.
And we did not prevent it. It’s incorrect that the barricades were
erected because of the Referendum; they were, instead, erected
because of the murder, because of the young man, a known crimi-
nal, who knew he could get away with it. He could get away with
opening fire on a group of Serbian wedding guests, kill someone,
and be fêted on television as a hero. Yes, to be a hero in his ethnic
community, and he wasn’t arrested for a long time until ʊ I think
he was liquidated after the war, about three or four years ago in
some café. But no one harassed him at that time. That was March
24 and 25, when the news came out that the SDA had withdrawn
from the agreement.
The Joint Croatian-Bosnian Muslim
Attacks on Bosanski Brod, Sijekovac, and Kupres
March 25. Take a look at the [rising] tempo. We’re no longer
talking about a month or weeks as we were in Croatia. This was
one shock after another, day after day. March 25, the armed
forces of Croatia, the National Guard, not to mention the MUP
ʊ you have no idea who was involved ʊ crossed the border
from Croatia into B-H [and went] to Bosanski Brod. There they
joined forces with illegal paramilitary units headed by Armin
Pohara.113 He was, in any case, the president of some party, but
242
Srpska strana, i ovaj optu`eni, poziva na{e qude u
policiji. “[ta vi radite? Za{to se ovo de{ava? Ko }e
da spasi narod?” Nemamo qudi. Nemamo policije.
“Za{to ne dignete rezervni sastav? Ne mo`e bez
ministra. Jedino je ministar ovla{~en da mobile{e
rezervni sastav policije.”
“Za{to vi?” Mi wih pitamo. Imamo zamenika
ministra, imamo vrlo visokih funkcija u ministarstvu.
Imamo Stani{i}a na nivou grada. Imamo Mandi}a na
nivou republike. Za{to, pitamo Mandi}a i Zepini}a:
“Za{to vi ne mobile{ite rezervni sastav policije?”
Oni ka`u, ne mo`emo. Nama mora neko da naredi. Nema
ko da ih naredi.
Nema brane izme|u ubica i srpskog naroda, srpskih
civila, srpskih neja~ih. Nema brane. Tu branu srpska
Skup{tina uspostavqa 27. marta. Dan nakon toga
pokoqa i trinaest meseci nakon {to je daleko mo~niji
je telo formirala SDA u februaru ’91. To je Savez za
nacionalno bezbednost kao savetodavno telo
Skup{tine srpskog naroda u BiH. I Tu`ila{tvo to
tretira u paragrafu 66 svog pretresnog podnesa. I on
glasi ovako, taj paragraf:
Savet nacionalne bezbednosti
osnovala Skup{tina 27. marta, 1992.
sa Karaci}em kao Predsednikom.
Iako je prvobitno namerovan da bude
savetodavno telo, SNB u stvari se
odmah pretvorilo u izvr{ni organ,
koji je podse}ao na krizni {tab
bosanski Srba u centralnoj Bosni,
izvr{avao sli~na ovla{~ewa kao
predsedni{tvo. Tako, kao predsednik
SNB-a, Karaxi} ostvarivao vlast nad
243
he also had military formations [under his command]. They’re
singing, they’re shooting like wedding guests, and they kill a
father and a son — I think they [the victims] were named Pe-
troviü ʊ at a gas pump. Nothing. There was no reason for it.
They [the father and son] weren’t armed when they were at a gas
pump, nor was anyone allowed to shoot there, but these other
fellows, when it came to shooting Serbs, made up their minds
and shot the two men dead. Nobody stood up to them, neither the
B-H police nor the JNA, which couldn’t have done anything
about it because it was busy fighting its own battles in Croatia,
and they [Pohara’s unit] continued [their rampage] the next day,
March 26, in a neighboring village.
The same thing happened with the wedding party. No one
stood up to them and said: Hey, wait a minute! What are you
doing? On March 26 Serbs were massacred in Sijekovac. That
unfortunate village, Sijekovac, during World War II was [divid-
ed] into thirds: one third of the population fled; one third was
killed; and one third was converted [to Roman Catholicism].
Most returned to Serbian Orthodoxy. But others did not. They
remained Roman Catholic.
The Serbian side, as well as the Accused here, called on our
people to join the police force. What’s happening? Why is this
stuff going on? Who’s going to save people? We don’t have
enough able bodies. We don’t have a police force. Why don’t you
mobilize reserve forces? We can’t do it without the Minister [of
the MUP]. Only the Minister is authorized to mobilize reserve
police forces.
Why you? we asked them. We have the Deputy Minister, we
have high-ranking officials in the Ministry, we have Stanišiü at
the municipal level. We had Mandiü at the republican level. So
we ask Mandiü and Žepiniü: Why don’t you mobilize the reserve
police unit? And their answer is: We can’t. We have to receive
an order to do that. There is no one to issue the order.
244
organima dr`ave bosanskih Srba, to
jest, snagama bosanskih Srba i
republi~kim, regionalnim, i defenseless. There was no line of defense. The Serbian Assem-
op{tinskim vlastima. SNB se
sastao na zajedni~kim sednicama sa
vladom bosanskih Srba, donosio
odluke o strate{kim i vojnim
pitawima, kao {to su naredbe o
aktivirawe krizni {tabova u
odre|enim uslovima, imenovawa
vr{ilaca du`nosti Komandanata
teritorialne odbrane, odbrana
srpskih polo`aja koji su ostvareni, i
nare|ivawe op{te mobilizacije.
[ta vi{e, SNB je poduzao va`ne po-
liti~ke odluke kao {to su ime-
novawa ministara i usvajawa zakona.
Ovo, naravno, {to Tu`ila{tvo sa`ima, to se desilo
tek kad je rat izbio. Tek kad je rat izbio. Dok rat nije
izbio, ovo telo, Savet za nacionalnu bezbednost, je
savetodavno. Savetodavno telo kako mu i sam naziv
ka`e. I u nedostatku bilo kakvog drugog tela, bilo
neke komande, bilo nekih formacija, srpska Skup{tina
se opredequje na to da Srbima u policiji nalo`i neko
telo — na savet nekog tela Skup{tina nalo`i da ~uvaju
narod, da spasavaju narod. A ve} je donesena odluka 28.
februara da se formira srpski MUP u skladu sa
konferencijom, i to niko ne prigovara, ali jo{ nije
srpski MUP formiran, jer treba da se formira
dogovor sa druge dve strane.
Naravno, Tu`ila{tvo u jednom paragrafu ka`e
kako su Stani{i} i Mandi} to kao na svoju ruku — to
nema veze sa wihovom rukom i wihovom voqom. To je
245
There was no line of defense between the killers and the
Serbian people, Serbian civilians, the Serbs who were weak and
bly created that line of defense on March 27. The day after the
massacre and thirteen months after a far mightier body had been
formed by the SDA in February 1991. It was a National Security
Council [acting] as an advisory body for the Assembly of the
Serbian People in B-H. And the Prosecutor deals with this in
Paragraph 66 of its Pre-Trial Brief. And this is how the para-
graph reads.
The SNB [the Savet nacionalna bezbednosti,
i.e., the National Security Council] was estab-
lished by the Assembly on 27 March 1992 with
KARADŽIû as its President. Although initially
intended as an advisory body, the SNB, in effect,
immediately turned into an executive organ, re-
sembling a central Bosnian Serb crisis staff and
executing powers similar to those of the Presi-
dency. Thus, as President of the SNB,
KARADŽIû exercised authority over the Bosni-
an Serb state organs, that is, the Bosnian Serb
forces and republican, regional and municipal
authorities. The SNB, meeting in joint sessions
with the Bosnian Serb Government, passed deci-
sions on strategic and military issues such as or-
dering the activation of crisis staffs in certain
conditions; appointing the Acting Commander
of the TO [i.e., Teritorijalna odbrana or Territo-
rial Defense Force]; defending Serb positions
reached; and ordering a full mobilization. More-
over, the SNB took important political decisions
such as the appointment of ministers and the
adoption of legislation.
246
odluka srpske Skup{tine na osnovu tekovina,
rezultata konferencije o BiH u Lisabonu pod
predsedni{tvom, presedavawem ambasadora Kutiqera.
Prvi april, u policiji se vode dogovori o podeli
zajedni~kih sredstava. To je takozvani deobeni bilans.
Tu`ila{tvo to tretira kao kriminalni akt a to je, u
stvari, svugda gde se jedan entitet razdvaja na dva, jedna
organizacija na dve, deobeni bilans je da vidimo {ta
pripada vama, {ta pripada nama, da bi obe policije
mogle da funkcioni{u i da ~uvaju red i mir. I na tome
se radi, i dogovara se i posti`u se sporazumi,
saglasnosti. Prvog aprila, muslimanski ekstremisti
napadaju Bijeqinu. A ne srpski ekstremisti —
muslimanski ekstremisti. To je ovde utvr|eno. Ovde
ima u svim svedo~ewima. Jasno je da su to muslimanski
— da je kowanik jedan u sred grada Bijeqine krenuo da
baci bombu na srpski kafi}. Nema opravdawa. Oni
ka`u ranije nekoliko desetak dana — kolko li ranije
— ili mo`da i vi{e — Srbin napravio neki incident
u muslimanskom kafi}u, ali policija je tog Srbina
uhapsila i sprovela ga u Tuzlu u muslimanskoj
teritoriji. Sprovela ga i predala ga organima. Zna~i,
nema razloga. To nije bilo opravdawe.
To je bio nalog iz Sarajeva da se problematizuje
Bijeqina i da oni preuzmu vlast. Tu`ila{tvo ka`e u
optu`nici i u pred-pretresnom podnesku: “nasilno
preuzimawe Bijeqine od strane Srba,” itd. Potpuno je
apsurdno tako re}i, s obzirom na to da je op{tina
Bijeqina predominantno srpska i da je vlast u
Bijeqini vlast Srpske demokratske stranke i da sve
dobro funkcioni{e.
Hteo bih samo da se malo vratim na ovaj paragraf
66, gde Tu`ila{tvo ka`e da je ovaj Savet preuzeo vlast
247
Of course, these events that the Prosecution is summarizing
took place right when the war broke out. The moment the war
broke out. Until the war broke out, this body, the Council for Na-
tional Security, was advisory in nature. An advisory body, as its
name indicates. And for lack of any other body, command authori-
ty or formation, the Serbian Assembly decided to prescribe a[n
advisory] body for the Serbs in the police — so that the Assembly
could, through the agency of such an advisory body, issue orders
[to the police] to protect and to save the people. And the decision
was already made on February 28 to establish the Serbian MUP in
accordance with the Conference, and no one found fault with this,
but the Serbian MUP had not been established yet because an
agreement had to be reached with the other two parties.
Of course, the Prosecution says in one paragraph that
Stanišiü and Mandiü did that on their own — this has nothing to
do with either their taking matters into their own hands or with
their strength of will. It was a decision made by the Serbian As-
sembly based on hard work and the results of the Conference on
B-H that had been held in Lisbon under the chairmanship of
Ambassador Cutileiro, who was the Chairman.
The Crisis in Bijeljina
On April 1, negotiations were being conducted in the police
department about the division of joint resources. This was the
division of assets according to an audit, so to speak. The Prose-
cution treats this as a criminal act, but it is, in fact, quite normal
whenever an entity or organization is split in two for there to be
an audit to see what belongs to you and what belongs to us, so
that both police departments could function successfully and
maintain law and order. And that is what we were working on,
and there were negotiations and agreements being reached, an
accord. On April 1, Muslim extremists attacked Bijeljina. Not
Serbian extremists — it was Muslim extremists. It has been es-
tablished here. It’s here in all the testimonies. It is clear that they
248
nad srpskim snagama. Koje srpske snage i koji
republi~ki organi postoje u tom trenutku? Nijedan!
Postoji Skup{tina, koja tako|e radi u zajedni~koj
Skup{tini. Nema izvr{nih organa. Nikakvih. Nigde.
Ni u stavovima. Jednostavno, to ne funkcioni{e. To je
pripremqeno za slu~aj haosa. A pogotovo srpske snage
— osim Teritorijalne odbrane koja je u svakoj op{tini
— srpskih snaga do 20. maja nema.
Tu`ila{tvo ka`e da se posle krize — zna~i kriza u
Bijeqini traje dva dana — neko sa lokalnog nivoa
poziva Arkana iz Beograda da do|e i Tu`ila{tvo
propu{ta da ka`e da je prvo ceo dan — no} jedna — bila
kriza i borbe po Bijeqini, pa je tek onda do{ao Arkan.
A za{to neko zvao Arkana? Zato {to — i ja to ne
opravdavam i ne osu|ujem — ja sada samo ho}u da
rasvetlimo istinu. Sijekovac je stotinak kilometra
daleko od Bijeqine. Svima je jasno — objavqeno je —
{ta se desilo u Sijekovcu. I {ta }e drugo gra|ani
Bijeqine da pomisle nego da to ~eka i wih?
Podseti}u vas da ona mapa — imamo jednu mapu o
tome, ako stignemo, govoriti daqe. Do prvog aprila,
ginu {irom Bosne samo iskqu~ivo Srbi. A
Tu`ila{tvo meni za taj period stavqa na teret
politiku, ratno hu{ka{ku, itd. Evo ovde na ovoj mapi
mo`emo da pogledamo mesta pograni~na, a i mesta po
dubini koja gore gde su iskqu~ivo protiv Srba
barikade, kontrolni punktovi, ubistva, premla}ivawa,
zastra{ivawa do izbijawa rata, odnosno, prvog aprila.
Ka`e Tu`ila{tvo visoki funkcioner Srpske
demokratske stranke, Biqana Plav{i}, oti{la je u
Bijeqinu. Pa to stvarno nema smisla da se ja branim od
takvih stravi. To je nekorektno. Biqana Plav{i} je
bila u Bijeqini kao ~lan predsedni{tva dr`avnog. To
249
were Muslims — that someone was riding on horseback in the
middle of Bijeljina and then turned to throw a bomb into a Serbi-
an café. There’s no justification for such an act. They say that
some ten days earlier — more or less — a Serb caused an inci-
dent in a Muslim café, but the police, however, arrested this Serb
and sent him to Tuzla in Muslim territory. They escorted him
there and handed him over to the authorities. This [bombing]
was senseless. There was no justification for it.
That was an order from Sarajevo to turn Bijeljina into a
problem, so that they could usurp governing authority. The Pros-
ecution speaks in the Indictment and in the Pre-Trial Brief of
“the [first] forcible municipality take-over in Bijeljina,”114 etc.,
by the Serbs. It is completely absurd to say such a thing, after
having taken into consideration the fact that: Bijeljina county is
predominantly Serbian; the Serbian Democratic Party was in
office at the time; and everything was functioning properly.
I would like to revisit Paragraph 66 for a moment, where the
Prosecution states that this Council took control of Serbian forc-
es. Which Serbian forces and which state organs existed at that
moment? Not one! The Assembly existed, which was likewise
participating in the joint [B-H] Assembly. There was no execu-
tive branch. None at all. Anywhere. Not even in the Articles [of
the Constitution]. Simply put, it wasn’t functioning. It [i.e., the
Council for National Security] was prepared in the event of cha-
os. And especially Serbian forces — except Territorial Defense
Forces which already existed in all the counties — but there
were no Serbian forces until May 20.
The Prosecutor states that after the crisis — i.e., the crisis in
Bijeljina lasted two days — someone on the local level called in
Arkan from Belgrade and the Prosecution first fails to say that
the fighting in Bijeljina lasted for a whole day — one night —
the city was in the throes of a crisis and fighting was taking place
throughout the city, and only then did Arkan arrive. Now, why
250
je bila dr`avna delegacija, a ne strana~ka. I u toj
delegaciji su bili: Fikret Abdi}, koji tako|e nije
~lan SDS-a; bio je Jerko Doko, ministar Odbrane,
Hrvat, koji tako|e nije ~lan SDS-a. Za{to
Tu`ila{tvo zapazilo samo Biqanu Plav{i}, a nije
zapazilo drugog ~lana predsedni{tva, Abdi}a i
ministar Odbrane! Pa to je onda, zna~i, apsolutno,
neko ko poma`e tamo Tu`ila{tvu dovodi ih u te{ku
situaciju da ih moramo posmatrati kao pristrasne i
nekorektne. Biqana Plav{i} tamo bila kao dr`avni
~ovek. I dr`avna delegacija je to bila.
Tre}eg aprila je napad na Kupres. Mo`emo li onu
mapu ponovo da vidimo? Napad hrvatskih snaga —
lokalni hrvatskih snaga i regularnih snaga iz
Hrvatske. Napad na Kupres. Kupres je veoma osetqiv.
Tu je 52% Srba, 40% Hrvata i 7-8% Muslimana. To je
ovaj najve}i plamen ovde. E, tu, gde je kursor. To je za
Hrvate iz centralne Bosne zna~ajno, jer je to jedan
prevoj planinski koji povezuje centralnu Bosnu sa
Dalmacijom i morem. I tu traju borbe nekoliko dana sa
kasapqenem Srba u Malovanu, u Vukovskom, u tim
selima oko Kupresa. To je strahovit napad i strahovito
stradawe Srba na Kupresu. Jo{ nije rat. Srbi nemaju
ni{ta osim policije koja treba da ih {titi, a ne {titi
ih nego radi protiv wih i Jugoslovenske Narodne
Armije koja ne mo`e da stigne. Tu se prvi put pojavquje
Kninski Korpus, jer je najbli`i koji poku{ava da
za{titi taj narod tamo.
^etvrtog aprila: {okovi nisu svakog dana, nego
maltene svakog sata. ^etvrtog aprila g. Izetbegovi}
progla{ava op{tu mobilizaciju. Dobro poznato i jasno
je da se Srbi ne}e odazvati. U tim prilikama, znaju}i
{ta radi policija, znaju}i {ta radi Patriotska Liga,
251
did someone call in Arkan? Because — I don’t want to justify
this but I don’t want to condemn it, either — all I want to do now
is shed light on the truth. Sijekovac is about 100 kilometers from
Bijeljina. It was clear to one and all — the news had come out —
what happened in Sijekovac. And why should the citizens of Bi-
jeljina suppose that they would not suffer the same fate?
And let me remind you of the map — we have a map of this
and I will discuss it further if time permits. [EXHIBIT I] Until April
1, Serbs were the only ones who were being killed throughout
Bosnia. The Prosecution, however, is charging me with pursuing a
policy of warmongering, etc. during that period, etc. Here, we can
see on this map the border areas as well as locations deep in Bos-
nian territory that were aflame, where barricades, check-points,
killings, beatings, and terror were being deployed exclusively
against Serbs until the war broke out on April 1.
The Prosecution goes on to say that a high-ranking official
of the SDS, Biljana Plavšiü, went to Bijeljina. It makes no sense
for me to defend myself against such things. It is improper.
Biljana Plavšiü was in Bijeljina as a member of the state Presi-
dency. It was a state delegation, not a party delegation. And it
included Fikret Abdiü, who was also not a member of the SDS; it
included Jerko Doko, the Minister of Defense, a Croat, who was
likewise not a member of the SDS. So why has the Prosecution
taken note only of Biljana Plavšiü but has not taken note of the
other member of the Presidency, Abdiü, and the Defense Minis-
ter? Well, it absolutely means that someone is aiding the Prose-
cution in order to put these people in a difficult situation, so we
must consider them to be biased and improper. Biljana Plavšiü
was there as a state official. And it was a state delegation.
April 3 is the date of the attack on Kupres. May we please
see that map again? It was an attack launched by Croatian forces
— local Croatian forces and regular forces from Croatia. Kupres
was an extremely sensitive area. It is 52% Serbs, 40% Croats and
252
znaju}i {ta rade Zelene Beretke, Srbi ne}e do}i u te
jedinice jer imaju pretpostavku i strah i procenu da }e
biti pobijeni.
Karaxi} zove Izetbegovi}a i tra`i od wega da
otka`e. To je poznato. Karaxi} mu ka`e: “Za{to ste to
uradili?” Prvo Biqana Plav{i} i Nikola Koqevi} su
bili izri~ito protiv. A on nije to smeo to uraditi. On
nije predsednik Bosne i Hercegovine. On je
presedavaju}i predsedni{tva kolektivnog predsednika.
I ja mu ka`em, javno sam rekao i to imamo snimaka i
kod Tu`ila{tva, da je to ludilo. Narod je naoru`an. Ne
mo`e vi{e niko da kontroli{e kako se i ko naoru`ava.
Sada, napraviti op{tu mobilizaciju, dakle
legalizovati tu pu{ku koju neko krije. To je uvod u rat.
Imamo tako|e taj snimak — ne}emo da tro{imo vreme.
Tokom procesa }emo ga pokazati.
Petog aprila, govorim da je gre{ka {ta se radi.
Trebalo je odlo`iti priznawe, ubrzati konferenciju,
i onda bi smo imali mir. Umesto toga, ubrzano je
priznawe, a odlo`ena konferencija. To je scenarijo za
rat; to je recept za rat. Petog aprila ujutru moj stan,
stan moje porodice, je izre{etan mitraqezom, a imamo
svedoke da su dole ~ekani da nas pobiju. No, mi smo ve}
bili u Holidej Inu u centru, u sedi{tu Srpske
demokratske stranke, i nisu nas pobili.
Petog aprila, odlazimo Izetbegovi}, Kquji} i ja —
ili Brki} ne se}am se ko je bio — idemo na televiziju
sa generalom Kukawcem da pozovemo na mir. U
istovremeno je, dan pre toga, zasedao je policija —
srpski MUP je dobio saglasnost da sedi{te srpskog
MUP-a bude u [koli unutra{wih poslova, na Vracama,
u srpskom jednom kvartu, iznad Grbavice. Tog petog
aprila, dok mi govorimo na televiziji, srpski MUP
253
7-8% Muslim. This was the center of the conflagration. There,
right by the cursor. This area is significant for Croats in central
Bosnia because it forms a saddle linking Central Bosnia with
Dalmatia and the sea coast. And that is where fighting went on
for several days that resulted in the slaughter of Serbs in Malo-
van, Vukovsko, and the villages surrounding Kupres. It was a
horrifying attack and it inflicted terrible suffering and fatalities
on the Serbs in Kupres. The war had still not begun. The Serbs
had nothing but the police force, which was obliged to protect
them; however, the police force was not actually protecting them
but working against them, and the Yugoslav People’s Army
could not reach them in time. The Knin Corps appeared there for
the first time because they were the closest who could try to help
protect those people there.
Izetbegoviü Orders a General Mobilization
April 4: the shocks are not occurring daily but almost hourly.
On April 4, Mr. Izetbegoviü issued an order for general mobili-
zation. It was clear, in fact, common knowledge that Serbs
weren’t going to respond. In these circumstances, knowing full
well what the police was doing, knowing what the Patriotic
League was doing, knowing what the Green Berets were doing,
the Serbs would not join these units because they feared and
[rightly] assumed that they would be killed.
Karadžiü calls up Izetbegoviü and asks him to rescind [the
mobilization]. This is common knowledge. Karadžiü says to him:
“Why did you do this?” Biljana Plavšiü and Nikola Koljeviü
were expressly against it. And he [Izetbegoviü] was not permit-
ted to do that [i.e., call for a general mobilization]. He was not
the President of B-H. He was the Presiding Chairman of the col-
lective Presidency. And I told him publicly ʊ and we have [vid-
eo] footage of this on file with the Tribunal — that this was
madness. The people were armed. No one could any longer con-
trol who was procuring weapons or how. Calling for a general
254
koji dolazi da se useli u prostorije biva do~ekan u
zasedi i ubijena dva divna momka, specijalca srpska,
ubijena. Tih ostalih tridesetak koji su do{li da
pomognu oko useqavawa, zarobili su 170-180 kursista
muslimanskog MUP-a i 400 |aka i nikom nije dlaka
falila sa glave, a dva divna momka srpska su poginula.
12. aprila, zna~i ve} jo{ 5. i 6. aprila, petog uve~e,
je nastupio teror u Sarajevu. To je najstra{nija no} u
Sarajevu. Svi neboderi su bili zaposednuti
snajperistima, Zeleni beretkih. Ubijen je policajac u
zajedni~koj policijskoj stanici u Novom Sarajevu —
Petrovi} — i bilo je stra{no biti Srbin te no}i u
Sarajevu.
Srbi su se izvukli u svoja predgra|a, u svoje
kvartove i poku{avaju da za{tite te kvartove i svoje
porodice u wima. Tako se uspostavqa linija podele
grada, kao {to }emo kasnije videti — ne opsadna
linija, nego linija podele grada.
Ovde je u predmetu protiv predsednika Milo{-
evi}a, svedok Iv-En Prentis iz Britanije, potvrdila
da to nije bio grad pod opsedom — to je bio podeqeni
grad. A \or| Keni iz Stejt Departmenta, koji je dobro
upoznat na{om situacijom, samoinicijativno, bez da ga
je pitalo Tu`ila{tvo ili odbrana, napisao da je
pogre{no pisati za Sarajevo da je to opsa|eni grad kao
Lewingrad. Sarajevo je pre Bejrut, podeqeni grad.
Jedni su u jednom delu, drugi su u drugom delu. U Bejrutu
se to ina~e znalo. Kad se zavr{i radno vreme u tri sata,
po~iwe pucawe, granate — a do tri sata su na poslu.
12. aprila dolazi ambasador Kutiqero, i u to vreme
je i [Sajrus] Vens u Sarajevu. Mi sa ambasadorom
Kutilerom potpisujemo sporazum o primirju. I u
okviru tih razgovora sa Kutilerom i sa Sajrusom
255
mobilization now was tantamount to legalizing the rifle that
someone was hiding. It was a prelude to war. And we likewise
have footage of that — we’re not going to waste any time. We
will screen it in due course during the trial.
April 5: I state that what is being done is a mistake. Recogni-
tion had to be delayed, a [peace] conference had to be convened
quickly, and then we could have had peace. Instead, recognition
was quickly granted, while the [peace] conference was post-
poned. It was a scenario for war. It was a recipe for war. On the
morning of April 5, my home, my family’s home was raked by
machine-gun fire, and we have witnesses who will testify to the
fact that they were waiting to kill us downstairs. Instead, we
were already in the Holiday Inn in the city center and the head-
quarters of the SDS, and they failed to kill us.
April 5: Izetbegoviü, Kljujiü115 — or was it Brkiü,116 I don’t
remember — and I went to the television station with General
Kukanjac117 to issue an appeal for peace. At the same time, a day
before, the police department held a meeting, and the Serbian
MUP obtained an agreement to establish its headquarters in a
School of the Ministry of the Interior in Vraca, in a Serbian
neighborhood overlooking Grbavica. On that April 5, while we
were speaking on television, the Serbian MUP official who came
to move into the office was ambushed, and two fine young men,
Serbs, members of elite units, were killed. The other thirty men
who came to help them move in took as prisoners 170–180 Mus-
lims who were MUP members enrolled in training courses, as
well as 400 students, and not one of them lost a hair on his head;
whereas two fine young Serbian men were killed.
The Reign of Terror in Sarajevo
April 12, i.e., as early as April 5 and 6, on the evening of
April 5, a reign of terror seized Sarajevo. It was the most horrible
night Sarajevo ever experienced. Snipers had taken up positions
in all the high-rise buildings — they were Green Berets. A po-
256
Vensom, utvr|ujemo da moramo ubrzati rad na
definisawu teritorija tri konstitutivne jedinice, jer
to mo`e da dovede do zaustavqawe rata. Ako neko zna da
}e wegovo selo biti u wegovoj jedinici, za{to bi on
imao sada da se bori? Me|utim, istog dana, po podne,
Hasan Efendi}, tada{wi komandant wihove
teritorijalne odbrane — ili nekog tela wihovog —
izdaje poznatu direktivu, “borbena gotovost odmah,”
zna~i napad na sve mogu}e ciqeve srpske i
Jugoslovenske narodne armije i ciqeve bosanskih Srba.
22. aprila, ovaj optu`eni objavquje i nudi svoju
platformu za obustavu neprijateqstva i nastavak
politi~kog re{ewa. To je vrlo va`an dokument;
ima}emo prilike da ga vidimo tokom ovog pretresa
procesa. To su stavovi srpske strane. Stavovi srpske
strane su dokumenti. Stavovi srpske strane su u
Skup{tini, Ekselencije. U Skup{tini imamo odredbu
da poslanik ne mo`e da odgovara za ono {to govori.
Ali Skup{tina se ne sastaje da bi qudi govorili, nego
se sastaje da produkuje akte, ustav, zakone, rezolucije,
deklaracije, odluke, zakqu~ke, i preporuke.
Najmawe sedam mi sada pada na pamet, najmawe sedam
dokumenata koje proizvodi Skup{tina. A sve to da se ti
dokumenti proizvode je slobodna demokratska
diskusija.
Tu`ila{tvo ka`e: “Neki je qutiti, rezignirani,
ili besni poslanik kojega je ne{to pogodilo u toku
rata rekao ne{to o{tro.” Tu`ila{tvo ka`e: “Pa,
Karaxi} nije ga opomenuo.” Predsednik uop{te ne mora
da sedi u Skup{tini. Ja sam sedeo ~esto, al’ ne uvek.
Ali Predsednik ne mora da sedi. I pogotovo
Predsednik nije u~iteq da opomiwe poslanike.
Poslanik je tako|e direktno biran, kao i Predsednik.
257
liceman was killed in the joint police station in Novo Sarajevo
— his name was Petroviü — it was terrifying to be a Serb that
night in Sarajevo.
The Serbs withdrew to their suburban areas, to their own
neighborhoods, and tried to defend those areas and their families
who were living there. That was how the lines of demarcation
dividing the city were established, as we will see later — these
were not siege lines, but lines of demarcation dividing the city.
Here, in the case against President Miloševiü, the witness
Eve-Anne Prentice118 (from Great Britain) confirmed that the
city was not under siege — it was a divided city. And George
Kenney from the [U.S.] State Department, who was well ac-
quainted with our situation, on his own initiative, without having
been asked by either the Prosecution or the Defense, wrote that it
was a mistake to describe Sarajevo as a city under siege like
Leningrad. Sarajevo was a divided city like Beirut. One group
was living in one area, and another group was living in another.
In the case of Beirut, it was common knowledge. When the
working day ended at 3:00 p.m., gunfire erupted, shelling — but
everyone was at work until 3:00 p.m.
April 12: Ambassador Cutileiro arrives, and at that time Cy-
rus Vance was also in Sarajevo. We signed an agreement for a
ceasefire with Mr. Cutileiro. Within the framework of these talks
with Messrs. Cutileiro and Vance, we established that we had to
accelerate the process of defining the territories of these three
constituent units [in Bosnia] because that could bring about an
end to the war. If anyone knew that his village was going to be in
a certain constituent unit, why would he then go off to fight?
However, on the afternoon of the same day, Hasan Efendiü,
Commander at the time of their Territorial Defense Forces — or
some other administrative body of theirs — issued the well-
known directive for “immediate combat readiness,” which meant
258
I nemam ja pravo da to radim, a drugo, ako vidim da
mo`e uticati na proizvod osnovni Skup{tine, zakon,
ustav, i neke druge odluke, onda se ukqu~ujem i uti~em
da bi moglo da se uti~e na kona~ni ishod.
A pored hiqada dokumenata koje je skupt{tina
zvani~no proizvela i objavila u slu`benu listu, ovo
Tu`ila{tvo ne mo`e da na|e ni jedan za koji bi me
optu`ilo ili ga stavila meni na teret, mada je to
zakonodavno telo. Ja ne odgovaram za to telo.
Odgovaram samo u toliko {to dokumente koje ja
potpisujem mogu da vratim jedanput. Pa ako ga usvoje,
onda ga moram potpisati. Zna~i Predsednik ima vezane
ruke — nema neograni~enu vlast. Makar to bio i
Karaxi}.
Od svih tih zakona, odredabi, dokumenata,
Tu`ila{tvo se ne oslawa ni na jedan, ni na jedan koji
bi mogao da stavi na teret ovom optu`enom da je to
kr{ewe bilo koga doma}eg ili me|unarodnog akta,
me|unarodnog prava.
E, to je, zna}i, taj ritam koji je doveo od izbora do
12. aprila, od izbora do rata.
Da pogledamo kratko paragraf 78 predpretesnog
podneska gde ka`e da je:
^ak i pre osniva~ke sednice, Karaxi} i
rukovodstvo je planiralo da }e
Skup{tina igrati ulogu u sticawu,
prisvajawu teritorije na koje Srbi
pola`u pravo.
Zna}i, 24. ɨɤɬɨɛɪɚ, ɤaɞa smo ɧɚɩɭɫɬɢɥɢ sɤɭɩɲɬɢɧɭ
ɨɞɥɭɱujemo ɞɚ ɮɨɪɦɢɪɚɦɨ ɫɨɩɫɬɜɟɧɭ sɤɭɩɲɬɢɧɭ da ɛɢɫɦɨ
izvr{ili pritisak na SDA da odustane od svojih
ratnih planova. Ovo Tu`ila{tvo ka`e: “Ne, oni su to
259
an attack on all possible Serbian and Yugoslav People’s Army
targets, as well as Bosnian Serb targets.
April 22: the Accused announced and offered his own plat-
form for the cessation of hostilities and the continued search for
a political solution. This is a very important document; we will
have the opportunity to see it over the course of the trial proceed-
ings. It contains the positions taken by the Serbian side. The Ser-
bian side’s positions are documented. They can be found in the
Serbian Assembly, Your Excellencies. There is a provision in the
Assembly that a representative cannot be held personally ac-
countable for things he says. However, an Assembly does not
convene for people to give speeches; instead, it convenes to pro-
duce acts, a constitution, laws, resolutions, declarations, deci-
sions, conclusions, and recommendations.
The Assembly produced at least seven — come to think of it
— different varieties of documents. Open democratic discussion
creates all the necessary circumstances to produce such docu-
ments.
The OTP says: “Some hotheaded or enraged representative,
who didn’t care anymore and was upset by something during the
war, had made some harsh statements.” The OTP says: “Well,
Karadžiü did not caution him.” The President is not obligated to be
present in the Assembly. I was often there, but not always. The
President is not required to be present. And even more to the
point, the President is not a schoolteacher who issues warnings to
representatives. A representative is a directly elected official, just
as the President is. I do not have the right to do that, and secondly,
if the possibility exists to influence some basic work product of
the Assembly, a law, the constitution or some other decisions, then
I get involved in order to influence the final outcome.
The OTP’s Charges against Karadžiü Are False
Alongside the thousands of documents officially produced
by the Assembly, and published in the official register, the OTP
260
formirali radi toga {to ho}e da — to je oktobar 1991-
e — oni su to formirali zato {to }e pomo}u te
Skup{tine da uzmu, zauzmu teritorije.”
A sad vas molim da bacimo jo{ jedan pogled na onu
mapu. Na mapu etni~ku. Koje teritorije Srbi treba da
zauzmu? Pa to su wihove teritorije. A kada Vam
poka`emo kuda idu linije fronta, vide}ete da se linije
fronta — kad to mo`emo? Can we have a map?
I od ovih teritorija, koje su srpske, vekovima, od
uvek, Srbi su spremni za rad mira, da vrate i da se
odreknu nekih teritorija. Evo, videli ste kako to
izgleda bez linija fronta. Sada }ete videti kako
izgleda sa linijama fronta.
A Tu`ila{tvo ka`e mi formiramo 24. oktobra
Skup{tinu da bi smo pomo}u we preuzeli. Da li mo`e?
Ama ~emo to imamo? Izvinite.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Ɇɨɪɚɬɟ ɞɚ ɭɤʂɭɱɢɬɟ monitor za
grafoskop.
KARAXI] : Evo, vidimo kako to izgleda. Ona ista
mapa, srpske snage, srpski narod, srpska teritorijalna
odbrana — svaka op{tina, po na{em zakonu, ima
teritorijalnu odbranu. Komandant te teritorijalne
odbrane je predsednik op{tine. Titova doktrina
naoru`anog naroda ovde mora biti rasvetqena. Ona
obja{wava mnoge stvari koje ne bi bile obja{wene ako
bi se smatralo da su Bosna i Jugoslavija, kao i ostale
zemqe, imaju svoje oru`ane snage, drilovane,
komandovane, kontrolisane. Ovo je narod koji je iza{ao
na rubove svojih teritorija, svojih prostora, da se
za{titi da ne do|u da ga pokoqu.
Ovo je mawe-vi{e tokom celog rata bila linija
fronta. Ekselencije, pogledajte ovaj sredi{ni deo. Da
261
cannot find a single document for which I could be indicted or
charged, even though it is a legislative body. I am not responsi-
ble for that body. I am only responsible to the extent that the
documents that are submitted to me for my signature I may send
back to the Assembly once. So, if they adopt it, then I must sign
it. That means the President’s hands are tied — he does not have
unlimited power. Even though Karadžiü himself was President.
Of all these laws, decrees, and other documents [that were
adopted], the OTP cannot rely on one single document with
which it could charge the Defendant for the violation of any do-
mestic or international act or right.
So this was the rhythm [of emerging events] that ensued
from the time the elections were held on April 12, from the elec-
tions to the outbreak of war.
Let us take a brief look at Paragraph 78 of the Pre-Trial Brief
where it says:119
Even before its inaugural session, Karadžiü and
the leadership planned that the Assembly would
have a role in the acquisition of Serbian-claimed
territories.
On October 24, when we walked out of the [B-H] Assembly, we
decided to form our own Assembly in order to exert pressure on
the SDA to abandon its plans for war. The OTP says: “No, they
established this because they wanted to” — this is October 1991 —
“they formed it to seize territories with the aid of the Assembly.”
May we please now have another look at that map? The eth-
nic map. [EXHIBIT XIV] What territories did the Serbs have to
capture? Well, those territories were already theirs. When we
show you where the front lines were, you will see that the front
lines — when we can we—? Can we have the map?
The Serbs were prepared to relinquish and return some of
these territories, which have been Serbian for centuries, for the
262
smo mi daqe napredovali, mi bi smo izvukli iz toga
koristi, jer smo skra}ivali linije fronta, i
poja~avali gustinu svojih snaga i imali rezervnih
snaga. Na protiv, kada bi muslimansko-hrvatske snage
napredovale, one bi {irile svoj front i bile bi
slabije. Zna~i, i sa strate{kog i sa takti~kog
stanovi{ta, da smo napredovali, imali bi vi{e snaga i
bili bismo jo{ ja~i. Zna~i, mogli smo da uzmemo —
takore}i — da uzmemo Bosnu. A za Sarajevo, vi }ete to
posebno videti.
E, to Tu`ila{tvo ka`e da je ona Skup{tina koju
smo osnovali da bismo se odbranili od nasiqa ustavnog,
da je ona u stvari osnovana da bismo mi preoteli ove
teritorije koje su ina~e na{e. I da nismo op{te
izlazili iz svojih etni~kih prostora da uzimamo ne{to
drugo, a tu gde ima Muslimana oko Prijedora, recimo, i
u isto~noj Bosni, tu je bilo bez rata predvi|eno — gde
god ima 20,000-30,000 Srba, Hrvata ili Muslimana, kao
u [vajcarskoj, da imaju svoj kanton. Da nije bilo rata,
oni bi mogli imati svoj kanton. Ne mora da se ima
teritorijalna veza izme|u kantona ako ona nema rata,
ako je mir.
Dakle, moram da se branim i od toga da nismo imali
snaga ni 24. oktobra, ni 27. Marta; nikakvih srpskih
snaga, ni 6. aprila, ni 10. maja, da smo svoje snage dobili
tek 20 maja, ne ra~unaju}i teritorijalnu odbranu, koju je
svaka op{tina imala pravo, svaka firma imala svoju
teritorijalnu odbranu, svaka firma je imala oru`je: to
je doktrina naoru`anog naroda. Na{a situacija je
druga~ija od situacija u va{im zemqama i u svetu, tako
da bi se razumelo to, moramo znati da je svaka firma
imala svoju jedinicu teritorijalne odbrane, i svoje
depo oru`ja. A op{tine pogotovo.
263
sake of peace. Here, you saw what it looked like without the
front line. Now you will see what it looks like with the front
lines. [EXHIBIT XIX]
But the OTP claims that on October 24 we established our
Assembly in order to take over [territories]. Can we see the map?
Excuse me, what is this on the screen? Excuse me.
JUDGE KWON: You have to turn on the ELMO or video.
The Front Lines Match the Borders of Serbian Areas
KARADŽIû: Here, let’s see what it looks like. The same map, the
same Serbian forces, the same Serbian people, the same Territorial
Defense Forces — according to our laws, every county has its
own Territorial Defense Force. The county president is command-
er of the Territorial Defense Forces. Tito’s doctrine of an armed
people must be clarified here. It explains many things that would
otherwise remain unexplained, if we were to consider that Bosnia
and Yugoslavia, as other countries, had their own armed forces,
which included training, command structure, and inspections.
These people went to the margins of their own territories, their
own areas, in order to protect themselves from those who would
have come to slaughter them.
This was more or less the front line throughout the entire
war. Excellencies, please take a look at the central part [of this
map]. If we had advanced further, we would have benefited be-
cause we would have been shortening the front lines and we
would have been concentrating our forces, and we [also] had our
reserve forces. Conversely, if the Croat-Muslim forces advanced,
they would have stretched out their front line and weakened it.
That means, from the strategic and tactical standpoint, if we had
advanced, we would have had greater forces at our disposal and
we would have been stronger. That means we could have taken
— so to speak — all of Bosnia. But as far as Sarajevo is con-
cerned, you will see that separately.
264
Ekselencije, ne znam da li sam uspeo da Vam
predo~im taj stra{ni ritam doga|aja usmereni protiv
srpskoga naroda koji ~ini jednu tre}inu, koji je
neorganizovan u vojnom pogledu, koji jedino od
organizanovasti ima Skup{tinu, svoje poslanike koji
su delimi~no o Skup{tini zajedni~koj, a delimi~no
svoje napustili i poku{avaju da za{tite srpski narod
protiv sopstvene dr`ave, protiv policije, protiv
dr`avnog terora sopstvene dr`ave.
E, sada }emo da se malo osvrnemo na to {ta je ta
policija radila? Za{to je Srpska demokratska stranka
tra`ila od ambasadora Kutilara da jedinice
konstituivne imaju pravo na policiju? Naravno, svuda u
svetu policija je decentralizovana i jo{ ni`e. U
Sjediwenim Ameri~kim Dr`avama postoji gradska
policija, odnosno okru`na, i postoji dr`avna policija,
i postoji federalna policija. Zna}i, mi smo to
tra`ili.
A da bacimo sad pogled {ta je sve radila ta
policija. Zajedni~ka policija u kojoj smo mi imali
svoje predstavnike, mesta dobijena demokratskim na
izborima.
Zajedni~ka policija je odmah na samom po~etku
krenula u ostvarivawe premo}i muslimanskog faktora,
muslimanske frakcije i u policiji, i do{lo je do
potpune identifikacije SDA, dr`avnih organa,
policije, Patriotske Lige, i Zelenih Beretki sve u
jednom i sve pod komandom SDA. Glavna li~nost u
policiji Bosne i Hercegovine zajedni~koj je ~ovek koji
nije u policiji. Sve{tenik. Hasan ^engi}.
Recimo, 11. Jula ’91 godine, dok mi pregovaramo sa
Zulfikarpa{i}em i Filipovi}em o istorijskom
265
Well, the OTP claims that our Assembly, which we estab-
lished in order to defend ourselves from constitutional violence,
was, in fact, established in order to get the upper hand in territo-
ries that are, in any case, already ours. And if we had never left
our own ethnic territories to take something else, and the fact
that there were Muslims around Prijedor and, for instance, in
Eastern Bosnia, there it was foreseen, without war — wherever
there were 20,000 or 30,000 Serbs, Croats or Muslims, as in
Switzerland — each could have their own canton. If there hadn’t
been a war, they could have had their own canton. There doesn’t
have to be any territorial link between cantons if there is no war,
if there is peace.
So, I even have to defend myself from charges that we did
not have sufficient forces on October 24 or March 27 or April 6
or on May 10, but we did obtain our own forces only on May 20,
not counting the Territorial Defense, which every county had the
right to create, and just about every [state-owned] company also
had its own Territorial Defense units; every firm had its own
weapons: that was the doctrine of an armed people. Our situation
was different from the one in your countries and the rest of the
world, and in order to understand that, we must be aware of the
fact that every company had its own Territorial Defense unit,
weapons, and arms depot. And all the counties.
The Bosnian Muslims Usurp Control of the MUP
Your Excellencies, I don’t know if I succeeded in portraying
this horrible [accelerating] tempo of events directed against the
Serbian people who constitute one-third [of the population], who
were not organized from a military standpoint, whose only or-
ganizational entity was its Assembly and its deputies who were
partly performing [their duties] in the joint [B-H] Assembly and
partly abandoning [their duties there], and they were trying to
protect the Serbian people from their own state, from the police,
from state-sponsored terror enacted by their own state.
266
Srpsko-muslimanskom sporazumu koji ima podr{ku
Alije Izetbegovi}a.
[Na engleskom]
11. jula 1991., SDA je izdala instrukcije
za slawe kandidata u obrazovni centar
MUP-a u Hrvatskoj.
Broj ove instrukcije 1258-3/91.
O ~emu se radi? Tajno, iza le|a srpskog zamenika —
ministar je Musliman, zamenik je Srbin — iza le|a
Stani{i}a koji je {ef policije za grad Sarajevo, u
wegovoj ustanovi, sa iza wegovih le}a, spremaju grupe i
grupe policajaca koji se {aqu u Hrvatsku koja u tom
trenutku ide u rat protiv Jugoslavije. [aqu se na
edukaciju, na trening, na pripremu da ponove istu stvar
koju je Hrvatska uradila.
Daqe, vide}ete ovde, imamo mnogo tragova tih
wihovih postupaka. Ovo je g. Hasan ^engi}, ~iji otac
Halid ^engi} je formirao prete~u Patriotske Lige —
prvu jedinicu naoru`anu u Fo~i 1990-e godine u
avgustu, pre izbora. Hasan ^engi}, sin svoga oca,
preuzima kontrolu nad policijom zajedni~kom:
U skladu sa sporazumom izme|u
zvani~nika bosanskog i hrvatskog MUP-
a, a u skladu sa uputstvima koji se ti~u
zapo{qavawa kadrova u policiji u
hrvatskom obrazovanom centru MUP-a,
SDA iz Sarajeva preporu~uje gore-
navedenu osobu kao kandidata za kurs u
va{em centru.
Bez znawa ikoga, to propratno pismo ne potpisuje
niko iz policije. To potpisuje ~ovek iz SDA i to
267
Now let us turn our attention to what the police were doing.
Why did the SDS ask Ambassador Cutileiro that constituent
units be granted their own police forces? Of course, throughout
the world police forces are decentralized all the way down to the
municipal level. In the United States, there are police forces on
the municipal, city, and district levels; there are state and federal
police forces. This is what we were asking for.
Let’s take a look at what this police force was doing. The
joint [B-H] police force in which we had our representatives
were positions obtained in democratic elections.
The joint [B-H] police force immediately set out to establish
the superiority of Muslim elements and Muslim factions within
the police force, and it resulted in the complete integration of the
SDA, government organs, the police, the Patriotic League, and
the Green Berets all in one unit and all being commanded by the
SDA. The leading figure in the joint B-H police force was a man
who was not a member of the police force. He was a cleric: Ha-
san ýengiü.
For instance, on July 11, 1991, while we were still in negoti-
ations with Zulfikarpašiü and Filipoviü over the historic Serbian-
Muslim agreement, which had Izetbegoviü’s support:120
[In English]
On 11 July 1991, the SDA issued instructions
for sending candidates to the MUP Educational
Center in Croatia.
And this instruction is number 1258-3 in 1991.
What is this about? Secretly, behind the back of the Serbian
representative — the minister was a Muslim, the representative a
Serb — behind the back of Mr. Stanišiü, who was the Chief of
Police for the city of Sarajevo, preparations were made behind
his back in his own institution to send group after group of po-
licemen to Croatia, which at that moment was going to war
268
dokazuje da je potpuno stapawe SDA i muslimanskog
delu policije. To je zajedni~ki MUP. I to je razlog da
odmah iz tog trena da na{i iza|u iz policije i da
formiraju svoju policiju. A to nisu uradili tada, to je
juli 1991.
Daqe, policija prislu{kuje stranku na vlasti,
gra|ane, politi~are — SDA deo policije — i ovde
}emo imati mnogo tih intercepata. Ja nemam nikakve
brige oko tih intercepata. Oni }e nam mnogo pomo}i,
da vidimo {ta se to sve radilo. Ovih dana sam ja tra`io
da mi se dostave intercepti snimqeni, presretnuti
razgovori Izetbegovi}a, Silajxi}a, Gani}a, i drugih.
Naivno pretpostavqu}i da, ako su prislu{kivali,
prislu{kivali su sve. Me|utim, o~igledno, nisu
prislu{kivali sve, nego su prislu{kivali samo Srbe.
[ta je SDA do ovoga trenutka uradila? SDA, zna~i:
[na engleskom]
[J]e formirala svoje vojno krilo —
takozvanu Patriotsku Ligu; SDA je
naoru`ala Patriotsku Ligu; SDA je
obstruirala postavqewe kadrova Srba u
bosanskom MUP; SDA je smenila veliki
broj srpskih zaposlenih u bosanskom
MUP-u; SDA je poslala muslimanske
policajce u hrvatski MUP na vojnu obuku
(u trenutku kada Hrvatska ratuje protiv Jugoslavije;
SDA je izvr{ila nezakonitu
mobilizaciju rezervnih snaga bosanskog
MUP-a; SDA je nezakonito presretala
telefonske razgovore srpskog
rukovodstva.
269
against Yugoslavia. They were being sent there for specialized
education, training, and preparations in order to duplicate what
Croatia was already doing.
Furthermore, as you will see here, they left behind many
clues to their actions. This was Mr. Hasan ýengiü, whose father,
Halid ýengiü, established the forerunner of the Patriotic League
— the first armed unit in Foþa in August 1990 ʊ before the
elections. Hasan ýengiü — the apple doesn’t fall far from the
tree — took control of the joint [B-H] police force:
In accordance with the agreement between offi-
cials of the Bosnian and Croatian MUP, and pur-
suant to the instructions regarding the employ-
ment of police candidates at the Croatian MUP
Educational Center, the SDA Sarajevo recom-
mends the aforementioned candidate for a
course at your center.
Without anyone’s knowledge. This letter of introduction was
not signed by anyone from the police force. It was signed, in-
stead, by a person from the SDA, and this proves that there was a
complete merger between the SDA and the Muslim part of the
police force. It was a joint MUP. And that was reason enough at
that moment for our people to leave the police force immediately
and form their own police force. But they did not do it then, but
in July 1991.
Furthermore, the police were wire-tapping the conversations
of the governing party, wiretapping the private conversations of
ordinary citizens and politicians — by the SDA’s part of the po-
lice force — and we’re going to present here many of these inter-
cepts. I’m not concerned about these intercepts at all. They are
going to be quite helpful in our case to see all that was happening
at the time. I recently asked to be provided with intercepts of rec-
orded wiretapped conversations between Izetbegoviü, Silajdžiü,
270
Mno{tvo ɞɪɭɝi ɫɬɜɚɪɢ ali ovo je najupe~ativqije
{ta su nam radili na{i partneri u vlasti. U tom
trenutku, SDS nije opoziciona, a ni partija na vlasti.
A da je i opoziciona, bez odluke suda nisu smeli nikoga
da prislu{kuju. Ne treba ni da Vam ka`em da je i SDS i
ceo srpski narod znao za sve to, ali bez dima iz
pi{toqa, bez o~iglednog dokaza, nije bilo na~ina da se
to obelodani, a i kad su obelodanili, de{avalo da se o
tome govori u medijima, to je odmah odbijano, i srpska
strana je optu`ivana za kvarewe me|uetni~kih odnosa i
podizawe tenzija.
Evo jednog razgovora izme}u ovog optu`enog i
zamenika ministra — {to je Srbin, srpski kadar, koji
nije ~lan SDS-a, ali su ga Srbi kandidovali, da
naravno, izme|u ostalog, {titi srpske interese,
odnosno, da kontroli{e. Svima demokratija je pitawe
kontrole. Moramo jedne druge kontrolisati.
Predla`em da ~ujemo ovo.
[PO~ETAK — telefonski intercept]
KARAXI]: Alija, Alija donosi —
Alija mo`e da donese odluku. On samo
mo`e da poziva Muslimane u neku svoju,
ovaj, Teritorijalnu odbranu i neki qudi
oko wega su spremni da zapo~nu rat. Mi
to prili~no dobro znamo.
Oni pripremaju rat, oni su pripremili
{tab, vi to ne znate gde je taj {tab. Mi to
sve znamo. Postoji ogroman broj
naoru`anih qudih, postoji i priprema za
rat! Priprema za rat! Postoje vje`be
blokirawem kasarni, postoje
271
Ganiü, and others. I naively supposed that if they were wiretap-
ping, they would be recording everyone’s conversations. Obvious-
ly, however, they were not wiretapping everyone’s phone conver-
sations — instead, they were wiretapping only Serbs.
So what had the SDA done up to this moment? The SDA had:
[in English]
established its military wing — the so-called Pat-
riotic League; the SDA armed the Patriotic
League; the SDA obstructed the appointments of
Serbian personnel in the Bosnian MUP; the SDA
replaced a large number of Serbian employees in
the Bosnian MUP; the SDA sent Muslim police
personnel to the Croatian MUP for military train-
ing
(at the same time when Croatia was fighting a war against Yugo-
slavia);
the SDA carried out an illegal mobilization of the
reserve forces for Bosnian MUP; and the SDA il-
legally intercepted telephone conversations of the
Serbian leadership.
And they did a lot of other things but these are the most strik-
ing examples of what our partners in government were doing. At
that moment, the SDS was not an opposition party, but a govern-
ing party. And even if it were an opposition party, it [the SDA] did
not have the right to wiretap phone conversations without a court
order. I don’t have to tell you that the SDS and the entire Serbian
nation knew about all this, but we did not have a smoking gun or
any solid proof, and there was no way to get this out in the open,
and even when it was made public and discussed in the media, it
was immediately denied and the Serbian side was charged with
damaging inter-ethnic relations and raising tensions.
272
protivje`be armije, i ovde oni idu na
rat!
Ja dva dana s wima gubim — 18 sati sam
bio izgubio. Oni ho}e na bezpravan na~in
da i ako nisu dokazali ni pravno, ni
politi~ki. Nikako ne mogu to da ostvare.
Upu}ujemo ih na ustavnu proceduru na
promenu ustava — oni to ne}e, znaju da
nemaju nikakvih {ansi. Nemaju {ansi ni
u me|unarodnoj javnosti, nemaju ni {ansi
ni u pravnom sistemu. Oni imaju samo
{ansi da poku{aju da nas prevare, ali to
Srbi ne}e.
@EPINI]: Izetbegovi}u se pru`ila
{ansa {to nikome u istoriji nije po{lo
za rukom. Da stvori islamsku dr`avu u
Evropi.
KARAXI]: Ma nemamo tu {ansi. Ma
Evropa, pa oni znaju {ta je. Wima ne
trebamo mi. Oni bi pravili dr`avu, ali
Evropa ne}e da prizna islamsku, odnosno
muslimansku, dr`avu uop{te. I to je
wima veliki problem. Oni poku{avaju da
mi budemo wihovi taoci te wihove
dr`ave.
[KRAJ — telefonski intercept]
Evo, to je 17. juni, 1991., moj razgovor sa na{im
najvi{im predstavnikom u policiji koji }e do}i ovde
da ovo i potrvdi, mada nema potrebe da se ovo potvr|uje.
Verujem da vi{e ne treba o MUP-u — sad je vreme pauze,
273
Here is one conversation between the Accused and a Deputy
Minister — a Serb but not a member of the SDS, but the Serbs
nominated him, of course, among other things, to protect Serbian
interests, namely, to check up on what was going on. Democracy
is a question of examination and verification. Both sides must be
free to examine and verify the other. I suggest we listen to this.
[START — telephone intercept]
KARADŽIû: Alija, Alija makes — Alija can
make the decision. He’s the only one who can
call up Muslims to join their own, let’s see, Ter-
ritorial Defense Forces, and some people around
him are ready to start a war. We’re fairly certain
of that.
They are preparing for war; they organized a
headquarters. You don’t know where it is. We
know all about it. There is a huge number of
armed men, and there are preparations for war!
Preparations for war! There are exercises in
blockading barracks, countermaneuvers against
an army, and they are going to war right here!
I’ve lost two days with them over this — I lost
eighteen hours. They want to pull it off unlaw-
fully, even though they haven’t proved that they
have the right to do so legally or politically.
They will never be able to achieve it. We’ve ad-
vised them to use constitutional procedures to
change the Constitution — but they don’t want
to do that because they know they don’t stand a
chance. They don’t stand a chance with interna-
tional public opinion, and they don’t stand a
chance within the legal system. The only chance
274 275

je’l tako? O~igledno, da MUP je bio najsna`niji they’ve got is to try and trick us, but the Serbs
oslovac ratne politike SDA. won’t allow that to happen.
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Ⱦɚ. ŽEPINIû: Izetbegoviü is getting the chance to
something no one has ever achieved. To estab-
ɄȺɊȺȹɂȶ: ȿɤɫɟɥɟɧɰɢʁɨ, ɞɚ ɥɢ je vreme pauze? ȳɚ ɦɨɝɭ ɞɚ
lish an Islamic state in Europe.
radim jo{ onako.
KARADŽIû: We don’t stand a chance. Europe
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: ɇɟ, napravi}emo sada ɩɚɭɡɭ. Vra}amo se
knows what it’s all about. They don’t need us.
za 20 ɦɢɧɭɬɚ.
They could try to create a state without us, but
— ɉɚɭɡɚ ɩɨɱɟɥɚ ɭ 10.13. Europe would not recognize an Islamic — I
mean a Muslim state — at all. That’s a big prob-
lem for them, too. They are trying to turn us into
hostages for their state.
[END — telephone intercept]
Look, that was June 17, 1991, my conversation with our high-
est-ranking representative in the police force who will come here
to confirm this, although there’s really no need to confirm it. I be-
lieve that there is no need for me to go on about the MUP — it’s
time for the break, anyway, isn’t it? It’s obvious that the MUP was
at that time the strongest supporter of the SDA policy of war.
JUDGE KWON: Yes.
KARADŽIû: Excellency, is it time to take the break now? I can
keep going.
JUDGE KWON: No, we’ll take a break for 20 minutes.
— Recess taken at 10:13 a.m.
276
— ɇɚɫɬɚɜɚɤ ɭ 10:46
ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Ⱦɚ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄɭ
KARAXI] : Evo kako se daqe odvijaju kontakti ovog
optu`enog sa prvim ~ovekom Srbinom najvi{e
pozicioniranim u policiji koji, naravno, nije ~lan
SDS-a, nego stru~wak, ekspert. Pa vidimo na ovom da
ovaj optu`eni ka`e:
[PO~ETAK audio snimka]
Mi smo u MUP-u zakinuti naro~ito u
dr`avnoj bezbednosti. Ne smije se
pojedina~no ni{ta tu raditi. To nije
privatna stvar. Mora sjesti ~itav kolegij
i kazati: u koliko se mjesto to i to. I mi
predla`emo, ukazalo se [u] mjesto i mi
predla`emo da to mjesto toga i toga
~oveka. Ja vas molim da vi{e niko
privatno ne radi te stvari.
[KRAJ audio snimka]
Hteo bih da privu~em Va{u pa`wu, {ta ovde
predsednik vladaju}e stranke ka`e — ne da on stavqa
to, ne da se wega slu{a, nego Srbi u MUP-u. Da oni
ka`u: “Mi ne}emo toga koga nam vi stavqate — Srbina
— nego ho}emo da mi ka`emo koji je Srbin zaslu`io da
bude na to mesto.” To ne radi Radovan Karaxi}. To
Radovan Karaxi} tra`i od srpskih predstavnika u
policiji da {tite svoj narod. Na taj na~in {to }e
stavqati stru~ne qude, i to oni, a ne stranka.
Daqe nastavqamo, 22. jula — ovo je bilo 8. jula —
22. jula.
[PO~ETAK audio snimka]
277
— On resuming at 10:46 a.m.
JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadžiü.
Bosnian Muslim Manipulations of the MUP
KARADŽIû: Here is how further contacts between the Accused
and the highest-ranking Serb in the police force, who, of course,
was not a member of the SDS — but rather an expert. We see
here that the Accused says:
[START — telephone intercept]
And we’ve been tricked in the MUP, especially
in State Security. Nothing may be done single-
handedly there. This is not a private matter. All
the directors should meet if a position is vacant.
And we are suggesting these men for the vacant
position. I beg you to stop doing this on a pri-
vate basis.121
[END — telephone intercept]
I’d like to call your attention to what the President of the
governing party [i.e., Karadžiü] is saying here — he’s not saying
that he’s imposing this, and he’s not saying they should obey
him, but it’s the Serbs in the MUP. To have [the Muslims] say:
“We don’t want the man you’re imposing on us — a Serb — we
want to be the ones who are going to say which Serb deserves to
have that position.” It’s not Radovan Karadžiü who’s doing that.
It’s Radovan Karadžiü who’s asking representatives of the police
force to protect their own people. This is how they can place ex-
perts in the right positions, and they have to be the ones doing it,
not a political party.
Let us continue. July 22 — what I read just now was on July 8.
278 279

Recite im da se ne igraju. Recite im: [START — telephone intercept]

imate li uvida? Evo, oni su u Prijedoru
Tell them to stop playing games. Tell them: Can’t
po podne, ovaj, u petak po podne postavili
you see what’s coming round the bend? Let’s see,
~ovjeka. Sada je tamo komandir Musliman,
they [the SDA] appointed a man in Prijedor on
nad~elnik Musliman, {ef odbrane
Friday afternoon. Now there’s a Muslim Com-
Musliman, i teritorijalne odbrane
mander there, a Muslim Mayor, the Chief of Ter-
Musliman, a komandir je morao biti na{.
ritorial Defense is a Muslim, but the Commander
[KRAJ audio snimka] position should have been ours.122
To je jedna od naj~e{}ih bila rutinskih [END — telephone intercept]
manipulacija. Srbin dobije neko mesto, oni to ne daju.
That was one of the most frequent of routine manipulations.
Ili ne postave nikoga, pa zamenik Musliman. Ali
A Serb gets a certain position, but they oppose it. Either they
vidite, postavqa se scenarij za krvoproli}e u
leave the position unfilled or they appoint a Muslim replacement.
Prijedoru, koje }e se desiti. Vide}emo kako.
But you see, a scenario for bloodshed was being set up in Pri-
Daqe, 17 septembar, 1991. Karaxi}-Plav{i}.
jedor, which was eventually going to happen. And we will see
[PO~ETAK audio snimka] how.
Let’s go further. September 17, 1991, Karadžiü–Plavšiü:
Danas }emo vjerovatno imati razgovor sa
wima — sa Muslimanima — i ja }u re}i: [START — telephone intercept]
“Od razgovora nema ni{ta dok se u SUP-u
Today we’ll probably hold discussions with
ne postavi — ovaj — ta~no dok ne
them — the Muslims — and I’m going to say:
prestanu da oni odre|uju gde }e koji
“No talks until they stop deciding in the MUP
Srbin da radi! Dok ne prestanu da oni
where each Serb is going to work! Until they
odre|uju. Izdvoji}emo dio na{eg MUP-a.
stop making decisions for us. We’ll separate our
Izvr{i}emo i kantonozaciju MUP-a.”
part of the MUP. We’ll divide the MUP into
Sve }emo to da uradimo. I tu nam dokazuju
cantons.” We’re going to do that. They are prov-
kako }emo mi da `ivimo tu u toj wihovoj
ing to us how we are going to live in their
dr`avi.
state.123
[KRAJ audio snimka]
[END — telephone intercept]
Evo, ekselencije, to su {okovi koji su — nisu vi{e
Here, Your Excellencies, these were the shocks — they were
kao u Hrvatskoj nedeqni, mese~ni — nego dnevni, i iz
no longer occurring on a weekly or monthly basis as in Croatia
sata-u-sat.
— but they were occurring daily, hourly.
280 281

A evo razgovora izme|u ovoga optu`enog i {efa And here’s a conversation between the Accused and
stranke u Bosanskoj Krajini, dr Vuki}a. Dr. Vukiü, the leader of the political party in Bosanska Krajina.
[START — telephone intercept]
[PO~ETAK — telefonski intercept]
There are forces in B-H who know that they
Ima snaga u BiH koje znaju da ne mogu da
cannot divide B-H without a war. And they need
odvoje Bosnu i Hercegovini bez rata. A za
a pretext for that war so they can blame someone
rat im treba povod da okrive nekoga
else. We’re not going to give them a pretext to
drugoga. Mi ne}emo dati povod za rat. I
start a war. And that’s the most essential thing.
to je najosnovnija stvar. Ina~e,
In any case, international law and our constitu-
me|unarodno pravo i na{e ustanvo pravo
tional rights are on our side.
je na na{oj strani.
[END — telephone intercept]
[KRAJ — telefonski intercept]
Now for the sake of the record, since the on-screen material
Radi zapisnika, po{to ekran ne ide uz zapisnik, ja
does not enter the record, I think it’s clear now. Izetbegoviü
mislim da je sada jasno. Izetbegovi} ho}e da ratuje.
wanted to go to war. And Izetbegoviü the warmonger found
Babi} mu ide na ruku, ovom ratobornom Izetbegovi}u.
Babiü suitable because they’re two of a kind. It is said of the late
Govori se o pokojnom Milanu Babi}u, koji je u Krajini
Milan Babiü,124 who was often in Krajina because he was nearby,
~esto bio — jer mu je to blizu i wegove posete tamo, kao
and his visits there, as will be seen over the course of the trial,
{to }e se viditi tokom procesa, su bile veoma te{ke za
were very difficult for us. We had to put out fires whenever he
nas. Morali smo da gasimo vatru kad god on pro|e tamo.
went there. This warmonger Izetbegoviü found Babiü suitable:
Babi} ide na ruku ovom ratobornom Izetbegovi}u:
[START — telephone intercept]
[PO~ETAK — telefonski intercept]
You tell all the people from Krajina that I talked
Recite vi slobodno Kraji{nicima na
with — that I told Alija Izetbegoviü he is prepar-
{irini da sam ja razgovarao — da sam
ing for war and that he is seeking assistance for
rekao Aliji Izetbegovi}u da priprema
a war. Please give him our reply. Tell him there
rat i da tra`i pomo} za rat. Molim vas,
are forces in Bosnia that know they cannot come
recite ovaj na{ odgovor. Recite ima
out on top without a war.
snage u Bosni koje znaju da ne mogu odozgo
do}i bez rata. [END — telephone intercept]
[KRAJ — telefonski intercept] And they did need a pretext for that war so they could blame it
on someone else. We must not be the ones who give them the
A za rat im treba povod da okrive nekoga drugoga.
pretext for starting a war. And that was the most essential thing.
Mi ne smijemo dati povod za rat. To je najosnovnija
282
stvar. Ina~e me|unarodno pravo i na{e ustavno pravo
je na na{oj strani. Dakle, osnovna briga je da mi ne
u~inimo ni{ta {to bi dalo povod za rat.
[PO~ETAK telefonskog intercepta]
KOQEVI\: Muslimani se `estoko
okre}u protiv nekih ratnih namjera, ali
oni ne}e da ratuju. Imaju republiku.
Imaju Jugoslaviju. I niko normalan ne}e
da ratuje. Alija bi `eleo da ratuje da
promjeni to. I sad Alija ne mo`e da
objasni muslimanskom narodu za{to bi
ratovao. Ako oni naprave glupost, on }e
da ka`e, “Evo, za{to mi ratujemo.” E, to
mu jedino. Sad mu jedino treba alibi za
rat. Ne treba da mi da mu poma`emo u
tome.
[KRAJ telefonskog inter-cepta]
Ovo je razgovor prof. Koqevi}a, ~lana
predsedni{tva, i Karaxi}a gde se mi zala`emo da na{i
neodgovorni qudi izjave — ne}e drugo ni{ta
napraviti, ali izjave — budale — da ne{to ne naprave
da ne dadnu povod za rat, odnosno alibi za rat. Dakle,
~inimo i na tom planu da ne do|e do rata.
A evo kako paragraf 109 i 110 predpretresnog
podneska tretira ovoga optu`enoga, u odnosnu na MUP.
[Na engleskom]
109. Od samog po~etka sukoba, MUP je
igrao zna~ajnu ulogu u uspostavqawu i
odr`avawu vlasti bosanskih Srba nad
teritorijom i u sprovo|ewu zajedni~kog
zlo~ina~kog ciqa. Nakon preuzimawa
283
In any case, international law and our constitutional rights are on
our side. So, the basic concern was that we must not do anything
that would provide them with a pretext for war.
[START — telephone intercept]
KOLJEVIû: Muslims are vehemently turning
against some warlike intentions, but they don’t
want to fight. They have a republic. They have
Yugoslavia. No sane person wants to go to war.
Alija would like to go to war to change that. And
now Alija cannot explain to the Muslim people
why he would go to war. If they do something
stupid, he’ll say, “Look, that’s why we’re going
to war.” That’s all he’s got. All he needs now is
an alibi to start a war. We must not help him
achieve that.
[END — telephone intercept]
This is a conversation between Professor Koljeviü, member of
the Presidency, and Karadžiü, where we are coming out against
some of our irresponsible people who were announcing — they
wouldn’t do anything else besides make announcements — fools —
so they do something stupid to give them a pretext for war, in other
words, an alibi for starting a war. So, we were working even on that
level to avoid a war.
And here’s how Paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Prosecution
Pre-Trial Brief treat the Accused in relation to the MUP.
[In English]
109. From the outset of the conflict, the MUP
played a significant role in establishing and
maintaining Bosnian Serb authority over the ter-
ritory and in implementing the common criminal
purpose. Following the take-overs, the MUP
284
vlasti, MUP je igrao vode}u ulogu u
razoru`avawu, hap{ewu, privo|ewu,
zatvarawu, premla}ivawu, ubijawu, i
proterivawu Muslimana i Hrvata.
110. Mjesecima prije wegove podjele,
Karaxi} je smi{qao ‘podjelu MUP-a’ kao
su{tinsku komponentu podjele BiH, i
ostvarewe kona~nog ciqa, ‘prekida sa
Muslimanima i Hrvatima zauvijek.’
Eto, tako Tu`ila{tvo govori o Karaxi}evim
`eqama i namerama genuinim da stvori MUP na ~istu
miru, bez ikakve potrebe, i da time pokvari idilu izme|u
Srba i Muslimana. I Tu`ila{tvo jednostavno ide na to
da izvu}e, rekonstrui{e srpske namere iz srpskog
pona{awa koje je odgovor, koje je reakcija. Dakle,
apsolutno je nedopustivo i nemogu}e da se na osnovu
na{ih reakcija izvu~e na{a prethodna namera. Na{e
reakcije su uslovqene pona{awem drugih. SDA odlu~uje
{ta }e Srbi uraditi, ne odlu~uju Srbi. I to je celo
vreme od februara 1991-e, posle izbora — celo vreme su
Srbi, {ahovski re~eno, u iznudici. Mi, dakle, moramo da
odigramo ono {to nam oni uslove ili }emo propasti.
A, da vidimo kako je to. Ovo, dakle, na{e zalagawe
da imamo svoju policiju nije dovelo do stvarawa
policije. To je dovelo do na{eg zahteva prema
Evropskoj zajednici da konstitutivne jedinice imaju
svoju policiju. Evo izvoda iz Lisabonskog sporazuma,
odnosno, Kutiqerovog plana.
[Na engleskom]
Izjava o principima za novo ustavno
ure|ewe BiH;
285
took a lead role in disarming, arresting, rounding
up, detaining, beating, killings, and expelling
Muslims and Croats.
110. For months prior [to] its division, Karadžiü
contemplated the ‘division of the MUP’ as an
essential component of the division of B-H and
the realization of the final goal ‘to break off with
Muslims and Croats forever.’
There, that’s how the Prosecution speaks of Karadžiü’s
wishes, and his genuine intentions to create an MUP out of the
clear blue without any need to do so and, thus, spoil idyllic rela-
tions between Serbs and Muslims. And the Prosecution is simply
doing this to extrapolate, to reconstruct Serbian intentions on the
basis of Serbian behavior, which was a response, a reaction.
Therefore, it is absolutely impermissible and impossible to ex-
trapolate our initial intentions on the basis of our conduct. Our
conduct was conditional with respect to the conduct of others.
The SDA decided what the Serbs were going to do — the Serbs
were not going to decide. And that was going on the whole time
between February 1991, after the elections — the entire time the
Serbs, to borrow from chess terminology, were forced to make a
move of last resort. We, therefore, had to make our play under
their conditions or we were going to be ruined.
Now let’s take look at this. So, our coming out in favor of
having our own police force did not lead to its [i.e., the Serbian
MUP’s] creation. It led to our request that the European Com-
munity provide the constituent units with their own respective
police forces. Here is an excerpt from the Lisbon Agreement,
namely, the Cutileiro Plan.
[In English]
The statement of principles for new constitu-
tional arrangements for B-H.
286
D. Ustavne jedinice
3. Dr`avna slu`ba, policija,
lokalna pravosu|e i bilo kakva
nacionalna garda koju bi stvorile
ustavne jedinice bi odra`avala
proporcionalno nacionalni
sastav te ustavne jedinice.
Mi smo dobili od Ambasadora Kutilera i Evropske
zajednice pravo na svoju policiju. Tek tada smo mi,
28. februara, Skup{tina odlu~ila da }emo imati svoju
policiju, ali je nismo oformili do 1. aprila. I za tu
iznudicu i za to {ta mi moramo da uradimo,
Tu`ila{tvo mene tereti da sam to radio sa
predumi{qajem, da sam to radio sa ciqem da
postignemo ne{to nekad, a umesto da se jasno vidi da je
to izazvano i uslovqeno pona{awem SDA.
I za sve to vreme do tada, mi znamo za tajni
sporazum Ku~an-Tu}man-Izetbegovi} da se u|e u rat i
znamo i hvatamo informacije da Izetbegovi}a pitaju u
drugoj polovini 1991. god. za{to ne ulazi u rat protiv
Jugoslavije. On ka`e: “Ho}u, ho}u, ali ~ekam trenutak.”
I to je trenutak kada se on ohrabruje i od polovine
oktobra, prekida svaku mogu}nost mirnog re{ewa.
Tu`ila{tvo ima nekoliko ugaonih kamena na kojima
poku{ava da izgradi, da konstrui{e srpsku krivicu i
srpsku odgovornost. Jedna od stvari koju Tu`ila{tvo
stavqa meni na teret je takozvani papir, Varijanta A i
Varijanta B. Varijanta A i Varijanta B, na`alost nije
nastala u SDS-u i nismo je ni diskutovali i nije
usvojena i nema tragova, a bilo bi da je to ura|eno, svi
na{i zapisnici su zapleweni. Ali naro~ito stari,
penzionisani oficiri, kada su videli {ta je
287
(D) The constituent units.
3. The civil service, the police, and the
local judiciary and any national guard
established by a constituent unit would
reflect proportionally the national com-
position of the constituent unit.125
We obtained the right to have our own police force from Am-
bassador Cutileiro and the European Community. It was only on
February 28 that we — the Assembly decided that we would have
our own police force, but we did not form it until April 1. And by
making this move of last resort, after having been compelled to do
so, the Prosecution, nevertheless, charges that I did this in a pre-
meditated fashion, that I did this with the intention of achieving
something at some later time, instead of clearly seeing that this
was our response to a challenge and that it was conditioned by the
SDA’s conduct.
Throughout that time, we were aware of the secret Kuþan-
Tuÿman-Izetbegoviü agreement to go to war and we received
information that Izetbegoviü had been asked in the second half of
1991 why he had not yet gone to war against Yugoslavia. And he
replied: “I will, I will, but I’m waiting for the right moment.”
That was at the time when he was still summoning the courage to
rise to the occasion, and starting in mid-October, he thwarted
each and every possible solution for a peaceful settlement.
The OTP’s Cornerstones of Serbian Guilt
The OTP has laid several cornerstones upon which it is at-
tempting to construct Serbian guilt and Serbian responsibility. One
of the things that the OTP charges me with is the so-called docu-
ment, Variants A and B. Unfortunately, Variants A and B did not
originate with the SDS and we did not even discuss it and we did
not adopt it and there is no trace of it [there], and if it had been
implemented, there would have been evidence of it because of all
288
preporu~io Hrvatima Martin [pegeq: “Otvori{ mu
stan, dum-dum u stomak, i ide{ u drugi stan, i dum-dum u
stomak.” Kad su oficiri videli da se u Sarajevu wihovi
stanovi obele`avaju — to je objavqeno — da su wihovi
stanovi obele`eni, da neki ubica mo`e da pozvoni, i
dum-dum u stomak, onda su napravili Varijantu A i
Varijantu B, za slu~aj da izbije rat, {ta treba da se radi
na terenu da bi se rat izbegao.
Nema te partije i toga Karaxi}a koji ima pravo da
spre~i da se to vidi, da qudi na terenu imaju taj papir,
da vide da za slu~aj — da li }e zaista — ako do|e do
haosa i prekinu se veze sa centralom, {ta }e oni da
urade. Evo da vidimo {ta ka`e ovaj papir.
Ka`e Tu`ila{tvo, paragraf 36:
[Na engleskom]
20-og decembra 1991-e, ili od prilike u to
vreme, na sastanku u hotelu “Holidej In”
u Sarajevo Karaxi} je podelio vo|ama iz
op{tine uputstva za formirawe tajnih
tela srpskih kriznih {tabova, Varijante
A i B. Ova poverqiva uputstva su bila o
formirawu tela, koji bi trebala da budu
me|u glavnim mehanizmima putem kojih
Karaxi} i drugi ~lanovi rukovodstva
bosanski Srba preuzimalo kontrolu nad
teritorijama i uklawalo ne-Srbe.
A vidite {ta pi{e u tom sporazumu, u tom papiru,
koji je seviran dobrom voqom penzionisanih oficira.
U preuzimaju svih ovih mera, voditi
ra~una da se obezbedi po{tovawe
nacionalnih i drugih prava pripadnika
svih naroda i wihovo kasnije
289
our records were seized. But retired [JNA] officers, when they saw
what Martin Špegelj was recommending to Croats: “You go into
one apartment, bang-bang in the stomach, and then you go to an-
other apartment, bang-bang in the stomach.” When the officers
saw that their apartments in Sarajevo were being marked — this
was reported — that their apartments had been marked so that
some assassin could ring their doorbell and bang-bang shoot them
in the stomach, then they then came up with Variants A and B in
case war broke out, to plan for what had to be done on the ground
if a war started.
That political party [the SDS] and that Karadžiü did not then
exist. Karadžiü had the right to prevent this document from being
seen, had the right [to make sure] that people on the ground had
this document to see, in case — if it really came down to it — if
it really came to chaos and all contact with headquarters were cut
off — what they were supposed to do. Here, let’s see what this
document says.
The OTP cites Paragraph 36:
[In English]
On or about 20 December 1992, at a meeting in
the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo, Karadžiü distribut-
ed to the municipality leaders instructions for
the establishment of clandestine bodies, the
Serbian Crisis Staffs (A/B). The confidential
instructions established the bodies that would
be among the primary instruments through
which Karadžiü and other members of BSL as-
serted control over territories and removed non-
Serbs.
But you see what this agreement, this document, [copies of]
which had been saved by the good will of retired officers, says:
290
anga`ovawe u organima vlasti koje }e
osnovati Skup{tina srpskog naroda u
op{tini.
Sve opet moramo posmatrati u kontekstu Lisabon-
ske konferencije i Kutilijerovog plana, i za koji mi
znamo da }e ga SDA poku{ati derogirati ratom. A ovo
je predvi|eno da se rat izbegne, da se haos izbegne, i da
se sa~uva tekovine konferencije i da se sa~uva narod od
stradawa.
Dakle, ne treba ni nagla{avati koliko je ovo da se
~uvaju interesi drugih i to su oficiri koji su ina~e
bili za “bratstvo i jedinstvo” stavili na va`no mesto.
Da vidimo kako drugi ugaoni kamen ovoga
Tu`ila{tva su strate{ki ciqevi. Strate{ki ciqevi u
osnovi nisu usvajani: oni su saop{teni Skup{tini, da
}e biti platforma — strate{ki ciqevi su bili
saop{teni Skup{tini 12-og maja, kada je ve} jasno bilo
da je rat, i da }emo birati predsedni{tvo, i birano je
predsedni{tvo: dvoje ~lanova predsedni{tva BiH,
gospo|a Biqana Plav{i} i gospodin Nikola Koqevi}
i tre}i sam biran ja od strane Skup{tine u
Predsedni{tvo.
I tada smo mi saop{tili {ta }e biti na{ stav
prema Evropskoj zajednici u nastavku re{avawa krize
politi~kim sredstvima. Po{to je rat, sada vi{e ne
dolazi u obzir da imamo enklave diskontinuitetne radi
toga {to qudi ne bi smeli da `ive tamo. Ne{to se
mewaju ciqevi, odnosno, na{a pozicija prema
pregovorima sa Evropskom zajednicom.
Mesec dana kasnije, u junu ili julu, Predsedni{tvo
odlu~uje (po{to jo{ nisu poslati ni objavqeni ti
strate{ki ciqevi) da se opobjave a da se zajedno sa
mapom po{aqu Evropskoj zajednici, odnosno
291
In the implementation of all these measures, en-
sure the respect for the national and other rights
of members of all peoples and subsequently en-
sure their involvement in the administrative or-
gans to be set up by the Assembly of the Serb
People in the municipality.
Once again, we have to reconsider all of this in the context
of the Lisbon Conference and the Cutileiro Plan, which we knew
the SDA would try to annul by a war. And this was anticipated in
order to avoid war, to avoid chaos, and to preserve what had
been achieved at the [peace] conference and to save people from
death and destruction.
So, there is no need to emphasize to what extent the interests
of others were being protected, and these were officers who
were, in any case, devoted to brotherhood and unity, and they
gave such considerations a prominent place.
Let’s see how the OTP’s other cornerstone is composed of
strategic objectives. The strategic objectives were basically not
adopted; as a matter of fact, they were just reported to the As-
sembly as a platform [for the conference] — the strategic goals
were reported to the Assembly on May 12, when it was already
clear that the war had already started and that we were going to
elect a [collective] Presidency, which was, indeed, elected: two
members of the Presidency of B-H, Mrs. Biljana Plavšiü and Mr.
Nikola Koljeviü, and I was the third member elected to the Pres-
idency by the Assembly.
At that time, we announced what our position would be vis-
à-vis the European Community in our continuing efforts to re-
solve the crisis by political means. Since there was a war going
on, having discontinuous enclaves now no longer came into con-
sideration because people would not dare live there. Our objec-
tives were changing, in other words, our position vis-à-vis the
negotiations with the European Community.
292 293

pregovara~ima. Dakle, to nije nikakav tajni papir. A A month later, in June or July, the Presidency (since the stra-
evo {ta, ina~e vrlo nepravedno lo{a presuda protiv tegic objectives had neither yet been sent nor made public) de-
Kraji{nika, o ovoj stvari ka`e: cided to make them public and send them along with a map to
the European Community, that is, to the negotiators. Therefore,
995. Staviti ove srpske ciqeve na
this was no secret document. And look, here is a terribly unfair
pijedestal, kao {to je u~inilo
judgment against Krajišnik and it states in connection with this
Tu`ila{tvo, ne bi bilo ispravno, jer oni,
matter:
na kraju krajeva, predstavqaju
995. It would be incorrect to place these goals
razvodwavawe izjave koje su slu`ile kao
on a pedestal, as the Prosecution does, for in the
zvani~na dr`avna politika i koje su se
final analysis they are anodyne statements serv-
~ak mogle objaviti i u Slu`benom
ing as official state policy and even qualifying
glasniku Republike bosanskih Srba. Ako
for a publication in the Bosnian Serb Republic’s
bi neko i bio sklon tome da u wima
Official Gazette. If one is inclined to find in
pronalazi podmukla skrivena zna~ewa,
them insidious hidden meanings, it is because of
onda je to zbog konteksta i doga|aja koji su
the context and the events that followed. An
uslijedili nakon wihovog progla{ewa.
anachronistic reading of the May goals is not on-
Anahrono tuma~ewe ciqeva iz mjeseca
ly inadvisable, it misses the point. Just as an
maja ne samo da nije preporu~qivo, nego se
anachronistic reading of the December Instruc-
wime ne mo`e shvatiti wihova poenta,
tions (that’s Variants A and B), misses the point.
ba{ kao {to se anahronim tuma~ewem
The instructions and the goals lacked substance
uputstva iz decembra (to je Varijanta A i
and utility, but they did symbolize a new central
B) ne mo`e shvatiti wihova poenta.
authority at a time when the old order had disin-
Uputstvu i ciqevima nedostajali su
tegrated.126
sadr`aj i upotrebqivost, ali oni su
predstavqali simbole nove centralne This Chamber shows that we were right to reorganize at the
vlasti u vrijeme kada se stari poredak moment the old system was collapsing. And shards from this
raspao. disintegrated system are still flying at us to this very day to cause
us damage, to destroy us.
Nama ovo Ve}e daje za pravo da se reorganizujemo u
So, this paragraph deals with two cornerstones in the Indict-
trenutku kada se stari sistem raspao. A komadi toga
ment against me and, as far as both are concerned, it says the
raspadnutog sistema lete prema nama danas da nas
Prosecution is wrong on both counts. But, even though this
o{tete, da nas uni{te.
judgment was handed down earlier and this was not appealed,
Dakle, ovaj paragraf tretira dva ugaona kamena ove
the Prosecution still maintains that it can use this against me.
optu`nice protiv mene i za oba ka`e da Tu`ila{tvo
294
nije u pravu. Ali, iako je ova presuda doneta ranije i u
kona~noj presudi ovo nije osporeno, Tu`ila{tvo i
daqe dr`i da bi moglo da to upotrebi protiv mene.
Evo da vidimo, za kraj ovoga dela, kako Lord Oven,
koji je do{ao u bosanske pregovore krajwe anti-srpski
— neopredeqen, ali uslovqen — jednostavno je imao
pogre{ne informacije — i vrlo brzo se veoma
iznenadio kao, u ostalom, vide}ete svi oficiri
Ujediwenih nacija do{li su educirani da su Srbi
zveri, a za mesec-dva dana su videli su{tinu. Evo {ta
ka`e Lord Oven u jednoj emisiji, odnosno u svojoj
kwizi, “Balkanska Odiseja.”
Slika od bosanskim Muslimanima
li{enim oru`ja nije naru{ena, ni ~ak
kad je Alija Izetbegovi} sa televizije
otvoreno priznao da je bosanska vlada
tajnim kanalima pro{vercovala oru`je:
30.000 pu{aka i mitraqeza; 20 miliona
metaka; 37.000 mina; 4.600 protiv-
tenkovskih raketa; 20.000 ru~nih bombih;
90.000 uniformi; i 12.000 ~izama.
A ja dodajem iz muslimanskih izvora u Sarajevu
proizvela 80,000 mina. To je wihov dokument. Wihova
potvrda. U tom Sarajevu, koje je navodno bilo opsa|eno
i maltretirano od srpske vojske, imali su fabriku i
proizveli su 80.000 minobaca~kih mina. I dakle,
Tu`ila{tvo i daqe, na osnovu na{ih reakcija, odbrane
pani~ne, posledwe nu`ne odbrane, poku{ava da
rekonstrui{e i da predstavi kao da smo mi to davno
hteli i planirali, a mi smo u stvari odgovarali na
izazove koje nam je Hasan ^engi} i drugi, prema wihovoj
ɂɫɥɚɦɫɤɨʁ ɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢʁɢ, pravili kao izazove i povode za
295
Now let’s see, in order to conclude this part [of my opening
defense statement], how Lord Owen [saw the situation], who
entered the Bosnian negotiations with extreme anti-Serbian
views — vague but adopted — had simply been given the wrong
information — and he was quickly surprised as, you will see, all
the other officers of the United Nations were who had come and
who had been taught that the Serbs were wild animals, but after a
month or two they saw what was really going on. Here is what
Lord Owen said in a broadcast [which is recorded] in his book
Balkan Odyssey:
The image of Bosnian Muslims with no arms
was not diminished even when President Izetbe-
goviü openly acknowledged on Sarajevo televi-
sion that the Bosnian government had smuggled
arms in through secret channels: “We managed
to get hold of 30,000 rifles and machine-guns,
20 million bullets, 37,000 mines, 4,600 anti-
armor rockets, 20,000 hand grenades, 90,000
uniforms, and 120,000 pairs of boots.127
And I should like to add that Muslim sources in Sarajevo
state that 80,000 shells were manufactured. This is their docu-
ment. In this same Sarajevo, which was allegedly under siege
and abused by the Serbian Army, they had an arms factory and
they manufactured 80,000 mortar shells. And the Prosecution,
therefore, on the basis of our reactions, our panic-stricken de-
fense, our defense of last resort, persists in trying to recast this
and present it as being something that we had wanted and had
planned long ago; whereas we, in fact, were responding to the
challenges that Hasan ýengiü and others, according to their Is-
lamic Declaration, used as provocations and as pretexts for cha-
os, because, as they said: “There is no need to wait for natural
provocations and pretexts; it is necessary to manufacture our
own provocations and pretexts.”
296
haos, jer oni su rekli: “Ne treba ~ekati prirodne
izazove i povode, treba praviti izazove i povode.”
Ovde se postavqa meni jedno pitawe: Kako bi SDS i
Srbi u redovnim prilikama? A redovne prilike su se
mogle obezbediti u slu~aju prihvatawa novih sporazuma
koje su Srbi nudili ili prihvatali tu|e sporazume.
Kako bi u tim redovnim prilikama mogli da pomisle, a
kamoli da planiraju, [da] izvedu izdvajawe podru~ja koja
su smatrali srpski u BiH? Tu`ila{tvo preska~e to
pitawe. Postavqa pitawe: Kako se SDS usudio da se
bavi opisanim radwama kad, zbog etni~ke izme{anosti,
to bilo nemogu}e mirnim putem?
Pa ta etni~ka izme{anost va`i i za SDA. Ni oni
nisu smeli, ni trebali, da idu na nasilnu secesiju od
Jugoslavije radi toga {to smo etni~ki izme{ani. I mi
smo bili za to da ne izlazimo iz Jugoslavije, ali ako su
oni iza{li, i nas izveli, onda smo i mi hteli da se
obezbedimo u toj Bosni i podjednako smo izme{ani i mi
i oni.
Evo, sada imamo jedan sa poznate sednice 24. januara.
Ovaj optu`eni dok govori, dok se zala`e, da se prihvati
ovo {to je sa ^engi}em on dogovorio da se izvr{i
regionalizacija i da se Srbi prikqu~e — za petnaest
dana se to moglo izvr{iti za kraj januara, a krajem
februara je Referendum. Evo {ta ja u tom trenutku
ka`em:
[PO~ETAK video snimka]
Ja mogu sada, i svi mi mo`emo sada da
zamislimo {ta bi se desilo, gospodo, kada
bi ne daj Bo`e, zapo~eo nemir me|u-
etni~ki, me|u-vjerski rat u BiH. Mo`emo
to da nacrtamo na tabli. Srbi bi bje`ali
297
Here, one single question is being posed to me: How would
the SDS and the Serbs have acted in ordinary circumstances?
Ordinary circumstances could have been secured in the case of
the acceptance of new agreements which the Serbs had offered
or had [otherwise] accepted agreements made by others. Under
ordinary circumstances, how could they have imagined, much
less planned, to effect a separation of areas of B-H which they
considered to be Serbian in the first place? The Prosecution skips
that question. It poses the question: How did the SDS decide to
engage in undertakings as described here when, on account of
ethnic intermingling, it was impossible by peaceful means?
So this ethnic intermingling even meant something to the
SDA. They did not dare ʊ nor did they need ʊ to secede forci-
bly from Yugoslavia because we are ethnically intermingled.
And we were not in favor of leaving Yugoslavia, but if they were
to leave Yugoslavia and took us out with them, then we wanted
to secure our positions in that new Bosnia where we and they
were equally intermingled.
Here, now we have one [video] from a well-known session
held on January 24. The Accused is speaking in favor of, advocat-
ing the acceptance of the agreement that he made with ýengiü
about enacting regionalization — it could have been done in two-
weeks’ time by the end of January, and at the end of February
there was the Referendum. And here’s what I said at the moment:
[START video clip]
I can now say, and we can all now imagine what
would happen, gentlemen, if, God forbid, inter-
ethnic and inter-religious unrest were to break
out in B-H. And we can draw it on a blackboard.
The Serbs would flee from Muslim areas, while
the Muslims would flee from Serbian ones. The
Croats would go to their own areas, and there
298
iz mislimanskih krajeva, a muslimani iz
srpskih. Hrvati u svoje krajeve, usput bi
bilo pucwave, bilo bi ru{ewa gradova,
bilo bi krvi do koqena, i gdje bismo se
zatekli? Isto gdje smo i sada. Srbi u
srpskim krajevima, Muslimani u regions, and the Croats in Croatian regions —
muslimanskim, Hrvati u hrvatskim, samo
potpuno homogeno.
I {ta bismo morali? Morali bismo opet
da sjednemo da se dogovaramo da stavimo
tri potpisa. Bez tri potpisa, nema
re{ewa BiH.
[KRAJ video snimka]
Evo dokaza 24. januara. Ovaj optu`eni ka`e svima je
jasno i wemu je jasno da nema fait accompli — to je januar
1992. To je mesec dana pred Referendum.
Gde je i bilo koja zlo~ina~ka namera koju
Tu`ila{tvo pripisuje ovom optu`enom i wegovim
saradnicima, i zajednici wegovoj nacionalnoj? Gde je?
Kada se ka`e: “Ima}emo to i to. Ako sada ne
postignemo sporazuma, ima}emo to i to. Ne}emo.” E,
ima jo{ jedan deo gde ovaj optu`eni ka`e: “Nemojte da
nam se desi da nam situacija izmakne iz ruku. Red je u
na{im rukama. Haos nije ni u ~ijim rukama. Mi smo u
rukama haosa.”
E, to su, dakle, stvari koje su apsolutno vodile nas
da tra`imo od Kutiliera da nam se omogu}i da imamo
svoju policiju i to je bilo i prihva}eno.
Va{oj pa`wi sada preporu~ujem da bacimo jedan
pogled na Sarajevo. Ovo je {iri prostor Sarajeva.
Dakle, plava linija je srpska i vidite na ovom delu
tamo gde pi{e “HVO,” da su sa jedne strane prema nama
299
would be plenty of shooting to go along with it,
cities would be destroyed, we would be knee-
deep in bloodshed, and where would that get us?
The same place where we are right now. The
Serbs in Serbian regions, the Muslims in Muslim
except it would be completely homogenous.
And what would we have to do then? We would
once again have to sit down at the negotiating
table and to put three signatures to an agreement.
Without three signatures, there’s no solution for
B-H.
[END video clip]
And here’s the proof on January 24. The Accused says it’s
clear to one and all, and it’s clear to him, too, that there was no
fait accompli — that’s January 1992. That’s one month before
the Referendum [on Independence].
Where is the criminal intent the OTP ascribes to the Ac-
cused, along with his associates and his national community?
Where is it? When we say: “We’re going to have this and this. If
we do not reach an agreement now, then we are going to have
that and that. We don’t want that.” And there’s another part
where the Accused says: “Let’s not lose control of the situation.
Order lies in our hands. No hand can hold chaos. We are in the
hands of chaos.”
So, these are matters which absolutely led us to ask Cutileiro
to enable us to have our own police force, and it was accepted.
Sarajevo Was a Divided City
Now I’d like to call your attention to Sarajevo. Let’s take a
quick look. [EXHIBIT XX] This is greater metropolitan Sarajevo.
The blue line is the Serbs, and you see here where it says “HVO”
ʊ we have the HVO on one side, and on the other we have the
300
HVO, s druge strane su Muslimani, a onda smo mi.
Zna~i, mi smo u wihovom okru`ewu.
Vidite, ako mogu i da ustanem. Ovo je, dakle, deo.
Ovo je zona Sarajeva. Ovo je “city proper.” To }emo
kasnije objasniti. Ovo su srpske teritorije i pod
srpskom su kontrolom. Ne sve, ali su neke pod srpskom
kontrolom.
A te srpske teritorije su u okru`ewu Hrvatsko-
Musimanskih snaga. Zna~i, mi smo tako|e u opsadi.
Ovde je “city proper.” Imamo podeqeni grad. A vide}ete
za{to su Srbi oko Sarajeva.
Sad bih molio da pogledamo etni~ku mapu grada
Sarajeva. Mo`emo da vidimo to.
Ovo je od istog onog instituta koji je pravio onu
mapu cele Bosne, a ovo je grad Sarajevo koje vidite. To
su granice grada Sarajeva. Bela linija suptilna, to je
“city proper.” Plavom bojom su ozna~ena naseqa i atari
gde su Srbi zna~ajna ve}ina, a ovi bledi u centru grada,
gde su relativna ve}ina.
Ovo je Sarajevo bilo celokupno Srpsko. To je bila
posedi imovina, vlastelinske porodice Pavlovi}. Kad
su Turci do{li, ta porodica je propala ali Srbi su
ostali da `ive oko Sarajeva i u Sarajevu. I dugo su
bili ve}insko stanovni{tvo u Sarajevo.
Kada je izbio rat, onda su Srbi uspeli da za{tite
ovaj deo u centru grada.
Ako mo`emo sada da stavimo liniju fronta?
Sada vidimo da su Srbi uspeli da za{tite i jedan
deo grada — to je poznata Grbavica, srpsko naseqe
Grbavica na levoj obali Miqacke. Na desnoj obali
Miqacke, Pofali}i, srpsko naseqe, nisu uspeli da ga
za{tite, i ve} 15. maja nije bilo ni jedne ku}e ili
jednog `ivog stanovnika tamo. Preko 250 qudi je usred
301
Muslims, and then we are there. That means we have been encir-
cled by them.
If I may rise, I’ll show you [on the map]. So, this is the area.
This is the Sarajevo zone. This is the “city proper.” We’ll explain
this later. These are Serbian territories and they’re under Serbian
control. Not all of them, but some are under Serbian control.
And these Serbian territories are surrounded by Croat-
Muslim forces. That means we are likewise under siege. Here is
the “city proper.” We have a divided city. And you will see why
the Serbs are located around Sarajevo.
Now, can we please take a look at the ethnic map of the city
of Sarajevo? Can we get that up on screen? [EXHIBIT XXI]
This map was produced by the same institute that produced
the map of Bosnia we saw earlier, but this is the city of Sarajevo
that you now see. Here are Sarajevo’s borders. The thin white
line is the “city proper.” The blue areas indicate the settlements
and districts where Serbs form a significant majority, and the
pale blue areas in the city center where they form a relative ma-
jority.
This Sarajevo was entirely Serbian. It was the property of the
Pavloviü family, who were landed gentry. When the Turks ar-
rived, the family was ruined, but the Serbs continued living in
and around Sarajevo. And for a long time they formed the major-
ity population in Sarajevo.
When the war broke out, the Serbs managed to protect this
part of the city center.
May we now overlay the front lines? [EXHIBIT XXII]
Now we can see that the Serbs succeeded in protecting one
part of the city — the well-known Serbian settlement of Grbavi-
ca on the left bank of the Miljacka River. On the right bank,
Pofaliüi, a Serbian settlement that they did not succeed in de-
fending, and by May 15 there was not a single household, not a
single resident left alive there. More than 250 people were killed
302
grada na domak vlasti g. Izetbegovi}a, pobijeno, a tu je
bila i Mladi}eva ku}a. Na svu sre}u porodica je
pobegla, ali sve je to uni{teno.
Ekselencije, pogledajte da ovde — Srbi kontroli{u
samo svoje delove grada. Samo svoje delove. Kako “city
proper,” tako i okoline. I te srpske teritorije se
nalaze u okru`ewu muslimansko-hrvatske vojske.
Preporu~ujem va{oj pa`wi dowi-levi ugao gde je
op{tina Haxi}i. Ako mo`ete kurserom da poka`ete.
To je druga slika zna~i, da, op{tina Haxi}i, zna}i,
levi dowi ugao. Ovde Tu`ila{tvo ka`e Srbi su
preuzeli kontrolu nad Haxi}ima gde su oni mawina.
Ta~no je da smo mi mawina. Ali sve ovo zeleno krajwe
levo dole, to je op{tina Ha|i}i, tako|e, koju Srbi ne
kontroli{u. Srbi kontroli{u samo srpski deo Haxi}a.
I to se {irom BiH gde god Vam ka`u ili pi{u da su
Srbi preuzeli kontrolu nad op{tinom u kojoj su
mawina. To nije ta~no. Srbi kontroli{u samo srpski
deo te op{tine.
Onda ovo gde pi{e “Hrasnica.” Hrasnica, broj 5.
Hrasnica je polovina op{tine Ilixa. Srbi
kontroli{u samo srpsku polovinu te op{tine Ilixa.
Nikada nisu ni poku{ali da preuzmu kontrolu nad
Hrasnicom. Mislim da vidimo Hrasnica ispod broja 5
na ovoj mapi. Ovde je, preko puta Hrasnice sa desne
strane, tu je Lukavica, Dobriwe, itd.
Mi, takore}i, ne kontroli{emo nijedno
muslimansko naseqe, niti to poku{avamo. A
Muslimani kontroli{u znatne srpske prostore na
kojima niko `iv nije ostao. Ve} do polovine maja su
qudi morali da pobegnu.
Mermerne istine u vezi sa Sarajevom su da Sarajevo
nije bilo u srpskoj opsadi, nego da je bio podeqeni grad.
303
in the middle of the city, well within the range of
Mr. Izetbegoviü’s authorities, and Mladiü’s house was there, too.
Luckily, his family had managed to escape but the entire area
was destroyed.
Your Excellencies, take a look here — the Serbs are only
controlling their own parts of the city. That’s all. In the “city
proper” as well as in the surrounding areas. And those Serbian
territories found themselves surrounded by the Muslim-Croat
Army.
I’d like to call your attention to the Hadžiüi municipality in
the lower left-hand corner. If you could point to it with the cur-
sor. This is another map of the village of Hadžiüi, the lower left-
hand corner. Here, the Prosecution claims that the Serbs took
control of Hadžiüi where they were a minority. It was true that
we were the minority. But this entire green area down on the ex-
treme left, is the part of Hadžiüi county which the Serbs did not
control. The Serbs controlled only the Serbian part of Hadžiüi.
And likewise throughout B-H, wherever they claim or write that
the Serbs had taken control of a certain county in which they
were a minority. It just isn’t true. The Serbs controlled only the
Serbian part of such county.
Then here, where it says “Hrasnica.” Hrasnica, number 5.
Hrasnica comprises half of the Ilidža municipality. The Serbs
controlled only the Serbian half of the Ilidža municipality. They
never attempted to take control of Hrasnica. I think we can see
Hrasnica below number 5 on this map. Here it is, opposite Hras-
nica on the right is Lukavica, Dobrinja, etc.
We, so to speak, controlled not one Muslim settlement nor
did we attempt to do so. Whereas the Muslims did control known
Serbian areas where no one at all remained alive. By mid-May,
people had to flee those areas.
The truth is carved in stone: Sarajevo was not a city besieged
by the Serbs; it was, instead, a divided city. This was the case in
304
Kako {ire podru~je grada, tako “city proper.” Evo, na
ovom ekranom vidimo kako izgleda “city proper.” A
vidimo linije fronta, koje se negde dr`e na sto-dve sto
metara jedna od druge, a negde na petnaest metara. Negde
u jednom stanom su Srbi, u drugom Muslimani. Preko
zgrade ide linija fronta.
Ja bih se rado tamo ponovo pojavio da malo objasnim.
Ovo je moj grad. Ovde sam proveo pedeset godina
`ivota. Ovo je Grbavica, ovo je reka Miqacka po
sredini. Srbi su za{titili Grbavicu, jer to [je]
ve}insko stanovni{tvo ovde. Ovo su Vele{i}i, u
kojima ima vojnih objekata, vojnih ciqeva. A ovo su
Pofali}i, koje nismo —
SUDIJA KVAN: Molim vas, iz po~etka sa upaqenim
mikrofonom.
KARAXI]: Dakle, vidimo sada liniju fronta. Linija
fronta prati — jedna drugu prati — mo`emo videti na
ovom {to je na ekranu. Ova debela crvena linija, to ona
sadr`i i srpsku i muslimansku liniju fronta. Tu smo
jedni do drugih. I kada neko ka`e da je srpska granata
— vide}ete od svedoka Tu`ila{tva — da oni mogu da
ka`u samo iz kog pravca je do{la — granata. A ko }e da
ka`e? Sada }emo da vidimo koji su na ovom delu,
recimo, koji su legitimni ciqevi u ovom starom delu
grada. Koji su legitimni ciqevi na koje je srpske
strana imala pravo da odgovori? Va{oj pa`wi
preporu~ujem — ovo jo{ nije potpuna mapa — kad
proces bude, bi}e potpuna mapa — ali preporu~ujem
Vam da vidite koliko su {kole i obdani{ta pretvareni
u vojne objekte.
Zna~i, to je obdani{te “P~elica”. Lokacija je
Svetozara Markovi}a, to je komandno mesto 105-e
305
the “city proper,” as well as in the surrounding areas. Here, on
this screen we can see what the “city proper” looks like. And we
see the front lines where, in some places, only 100 to 200 meters
separate the opposing sides, and in some places there was as lit-
tle as 15 meters separating them. In some places there were
Serbs in one apartment and Muslims in another, and the front
line ran right through the building.
I would like to approach the screen again so that I may ex-
plain this.
This is my city. I have spent fifty years of my life here. This
is Grbavica, this is the Miljacka River cutting through the mid-
dle. The Serbs protected Grbavica because they were the majori-
ty population there. This is Velešiüi where there are military
buildings, military targets. And this is Pofaliüi, where we haven’t
—
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadžiü, could you start again with your
microphone on?
KARADŽIû: So, now we see the front lines. [EXHIBIT XXIII]
The front lines — one runs alongside the other — we can see this
on the screen. This thick red line is comprised of the Serbian and
Muslim front lines. There, we are right next to one another. And
when somebody says it was a Serbian shell [that struck] — as you
will hear from Prosecution witnesses — all they can say is what
direction the shell came from. Now, who’s going to say? Now we
are going to see what legitimate targets there were, for instance, in
this old part of the city. What were the legitimate targets to which
the Serbian side had the right to respond? I’d like to call your at-
tention to this area — this is still not a complete map — when the
trial starts, we will have a complete map — but I’d like to call
your attention to all the schools and nursery schools that were
transformed into military facilities.
306
Brigade, bataqon vojne policije. U obdani{tu. To je taj
grad koji je opsa|eni, koji je nevin, i koji je
bezpomo}an, u kome se nalazi uvek tri puta vi{e vojske
nego u srpskom sarajevskom Romanijskom korpusu. Uvek
imaju tri puta brojniju vojsku. Evo komandno mesto 105-
e Brdske brigade, osnovna {kola Razija Omanovi}. Ovo
je staro jezgro grada, takozvana Ba{~ar{ija. Staro, iz
Turskog vremena, jezgro grada odakle se puca na nas. I
nanose nam se gubici. A vide}ete da imamo i
minobaca~e na ovoj obali ovamo iznad pivare. Tu su
negde minobaca~i, sa kojih se verovatno pucalo po
Markalama, jer je to taj pravac iz koga dolaze granate
prema delu grada.
Imate u spisku, tu na Bistriku. Da, tu negde.
Eto, vatreni polo`aj, rejon Bistrik, ulica
Bistrik, minobaca~i. Baterija minobaca~a. To je
padina koja gleda prema gradu i prema wihovim
polo`ajima. Mi smo iza wih ovamo na jugu. A oni su —
odatle se mo`e po celom gradu pucati kad god Vam
padne na pamet.
Pogledajte jo{ u tom naju`em delu grada, koliko
ima legitimnih ciqeva. Ovo je deli}. Ovo je deset
posto legitimnih ciqeva od onih koji }emo prikazati
tokom procesa, ali ovde su najupe~atqivija — upravo te
zloupotrebe, bolnica, {kola, obdani{ta, koja su
pretvorena u vojne objekte. Ovde imamo komandu 152-e
Brdske brigade. To je {kola stranih jezika u ulice Vase
Miskina — sada je to Ferhadija. To je ista ona ulica u
kojoj je bila eksplozija u redu za hleb, 27-og maja 1992.
Evo komandno mesto vojne policije. Dakle, to je
Ba{~ar{ija. Dole, jo{ ni`e, jo{ je nizvodno dole.
Levo. Jo{ prema Skenderije. Tu, preko puta Skenderije,
tu negde. Dositejeva. Jo{ je levo, ja mislim. Malo
307
This is the nursery school called Pþelica. [EXHIBIT XXIV] It
is located in the Svetozar Markoviü area; it was the command post
for the 105th Brigade, a Military Police battalion. In a nursery
school, mind you. So this is the besieged city, innocent, helpless,
in which there were always three times as many soldiers as there
were in the Serbian Romanija Corps in Sarajevo. They always had
three times as many soldiers as we had. Here is the command post
of the 105th Mountain Brigade, the Razija Omanoviü Elementary
School. This is in the very heart of the Old City, the so-called
Bašþaršija. It’s old, and it dates back to Turkish times, the very
heart of the old city from which they were firing at us. And we
were suffering losses. And you will see that there were some mor-
tars on this bank here behind the brewery. The mortars were over
here somewhere — probably the ones that fired on Markale be-
cause that was the direction from which the shells were coming
toward that part of the city.
You have that in the list. It’s somewhere around there. Yes,
in the Bistrik area. [EXHIBIT XXV]
There it is: firing positions, the Bistrik area, Bistrik Street,
mortars. A battery of mortars. It’s a slope overlooking the town
and their positions. We were behind them this way to the south.
And they were in a position — from here you could fire on any
part of the city whenever you get the notion to do so.
Now take a look at this narrowest part of the city, and see
how many legitimate targets there were. This is just a small part.
This is only 10% of the legitimate targets which we are going to
present over the course of the trial, but these are the most strik-
ing examples — I’m talking about the misuse of hospitals,
schools, and nursery schools that were turned into military facili-
ties. Here we have the command post of the 152nd Mountain
Brigade. It is a foreign language school on Vasa Miskin Street —
now it has been renamed Ferhadija Street. That is the same street
where there was an explosion in a bread line on May 27, 1992.
308
uzvodnije od — evo komandno mesto 105-e. To je zgrada
[ipada, civilni privredni objekat, ali on je
pretvoren u vojni objekat. I ako bi sa krova, ravnog,
recimo te zgrade, ili bilo odakle, pucali po nama, pa
mi uzvratili vatru, oni bi to prikazali kao
neselektivo granatirawe grada od strane srpske vojske.
Ovo je logisti~ka baza helikopterska Dositejeva,
sada Branislava \ur|eva 2. To je Prvi korpus —
helikopterske eskadrile u centru Sarajeva.
Helikopterska eskadrila. Legitimni vojni ciq prvoga
reda. Evo Marijin Dvora, koji je staro jezgro. Odmah do
Marijin Dvora je Holidej In, gde `ive strani
novinari. I oko Holidej In-a je pozornica,
inscenacija i bombi i granata koje — evo kako je,
recimo, u senci Katoli~ke katedrale, pozadinsko
komandno mesto 152-e Brdske brigade, u centru grada.
Uz crkvu. Evo, to je ulica koja izlazi na most Vrbawa
— vatreni polo`aj, ugao ulice — minobaca~i. Vidite
gde su minobaca~i. U centru grada.
Evo tako|e Pam 12,7 — to je oprema opasno oru`je
— mitraqesko gwezdo u centru grada. Evo snajperski
polo`aj, ugao ulice Gunduli}a i Branimira ]osi}a.
Sad }e te videti koliko {kola je zloupotrebqeno, i
obdani{ta, fakultete. Tu je fakulteta odmah do
Vrbawe, gde ste bili malopre.
Evo muzej. Zgrada muzeja. Vatreni polo`aj. Zgrada
Zemaqskog Muzeja. Odatle se puca na nas. Ako na{i
uzvrate, onda smo mi ga|ali Muzej, a nismo ga|ali wih.
Evo, zgrada Skup{tine BiH. Pam 12,7. Odatle seju smrt
po na{im redovima, a ako mi odgovimo, onda napadamo
neselektivno.
Dajte Vele{i}e, gore gde pi{e “@elezni~ka
stanica Sarajevo.”
309
Here is the command post of the military police. So, this is
Bašþaršija. Down, lower, further downstream. To the left. Move
toward Skenderija. There, opposite Skenderija. There some-
where. Dositejeva Street. Further left, I think. Pan a little more
upstream — here we have the command post of the 105th. [EX-
HIBIT XXVI] It’s the Šipad Building, a civilian economic facility
but it was turned into a military facility. And if, from a flat roof,
for instance, from that building or any other building there, they
fired at us, and then if we returned fire, they would portray it as
indiscriminate shelling of the city by the Serbian Army.
This is a helicopter logistics base on Dositejeva Street, now
called Branislava Ĉurÿeva Number 2. This is the First Corps’
helicopter fleet in the center of Sarajevo. A fleet of helicopters.
This is a legitimate, first-rate military target. [EXHIBIT XXVII]
Here we see Marijin Dvor,128 which is in the Old Town. Immedi-
ately next to Marijin Dvor is the Holiday Inn where foreign jour-
nalists were staying. And around the Holiday Inn was the staging
area for all these scripted bombs and shells which — this is how
things stood. For instance, here in the shadow of the Roman
Catholic Cathedral was a rear guard command post held by the
105th Mountain Brigade in the city center. Right next to the
church. Here, this is the street that leads to the Vrbanja Bridge —
there’s a firing position on the street corner — mortars. You see
where the mortars are. Right in the city center.
Here we have, as well, a PAM 12.7mm129 — that’s a dan-
gerous piece of equipment — a machine-gun nest in the center of
town. Here we have a sniper position at the corner of Gunduliüa
and Branimira ûosiüa Streets.
Now you will see how many schools were misused, and kin-
dergartens as well as colleges. Here is the college right by
Vrbanja Street, which you saw a moment ago.
Here is the Museum. The Museum building. A firing posi-
tion. The National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina Build-
310
Ovde, ima jedan snimak gde General Mladi} ka`e:
“Okreni po Vele{i}ima, tamo nema Srba.” Ali ovaj koji
puca zna po ~emu Vele{i}ima da udari. Da udari po
legitimnom ciqu. Ne mora Mladi} wemu da ka`e, “Udari
po legitimnom ciqu u Vele{i}ima.” Po{to se zna da
postoje legitimni ciqevi u Vele{i}ima. Evo ga,
Vele{i}i, vatreni polo`aj, 101-a Centrotrans — Bu}a
potok. Ali ima u Vele{i}ima onaj servis gde servisiraju
borna kola i zgrada Saobra}ajnog Instituta, tako|e,
vatreni polo`aj, odnosno legitimni ciq.
Kod `elezni~ke stanice, tu je — evo ga! To je u
Vele{i}ima, istureno komandno mesto u autoservisu. I
kada Mladi} ka`e, “Udari po Vele{i}ima,” ne ka`e
“udari po civilnim objektima.” Nego, kad on ka`e,
“Udari po Vele{i}ima,” misli na legitimni ciq
Vele{i}a. Al’ Tu`ila{tvo smatra da mi koji
podrazumevamo i znamo o ~emu se radi, treba punom
re~enicom da ka`emo, “Udari po Vele{i}ima u
servisu, po komandnom mestu.” To se tako ne radi.
Ko{evska bolnica. Evo bolnica Ko{evo.
Tu`ila{tvo }e potvrditi da su bu{ili oni svojim
oru`jima i onda pokazivali novinarima. A evo i
legitimnog ciqa u bolnici Ko{evo. U dvori{tu
bolnice Ko{evo 105-e Brigade.
To je fakultet za Fizi~ku kulturu. Zna~i {kolska
ustanova, visoka-{kolska ustanova zloupotrebqena.
Evo drugi fakultet gra|evinski. Ja mislim — jeste, to
je Gra|evinski fakultet: 105-a Brigada.
Zgrada osnovne {kole Vuk Karaxi}. Verujem da se
vi{e ne zove tako. To je moj predak. Iz mog sela ro|en u
Srbiji, koji je reformisao srpsku kulturu i srpsko
pismo.
311
ing. They were firing at us from there. If we returned fire, then
we would stand accused of firing on the Museum, but not at
them. Here we have the National Assembly of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina Building, a PAM 12.7mm. From there, they were sow-
ing death among our ranks, and if we returned fire, then we stood
accused of firing indiscriminately.
Let’s have Velešiüi, up there where it says “Sarejevo Train
Station.” [EXHIBIT XXVIII]
There is the video footage here where Mladiü says: “Target
Velešiüi. There aren’t any Serbs there.” But this man who is fir-
ing knows what targets to strike in Velešiüi. To strike legitimate
targets. Mladiü doesn’t have to say, “Strike legitimate targets in
Velešiüi.” Because it’s obvious there are legitimate targets in
Velešiüi. Here it is: Velešiüi, a firing position, the 101st Centro-
trans — Buüa Potok. And in Velešiüi there is a maintenance and
repair shop for armored vehicles, and the Transport Institute
Building, a firing position, namely, a legitimate target.
By the train station — there it is! This is in Velešiüi, a for-
ward command post in an auto repair shop. And when Mladiü
says, “Fire on Velešiüi,” he is not saying: “Fire on civilian facili-
ties.” Instead, when he says: “Fire on Velešiüi,” he is thinking of
legitimate targets. But the OTP thinks that we who understood
[the situation] and knew what it was about had to use a complete
sentence, such as: “Fire on the auto repair shop in Velešiüi, at the
command post.” That’s not the way it’s done.
The Koševo Hospital. [EXHIBIT XXIX] Here’s Koševo Hos-
pital. The OTP will confirm that they [the Muslims] riddled the
building with [gunfire from] their own weapons and then showed
it off to journalists. And this is a legitimate target in the Koševo
Hospital. The 105th Brigade was using the Koševo Hospital
courtyard.
This is the College of Physical Education. It is an education-
al institution; an institution of higher learning that was also mis-
312
Sada bi hteo da Vam nabrojim dosta taksativno u
vezi sa Sarajevom. [ta se mo`e re}i u vezi sa
Sarajevom. Dakle, Sarajevo je u celini izgra|eno na
srpskoj zemqi. Dugo je bio ve}inski srpski grad. Sva
naseqa oko Sarajeva i neka u Sarejevu su oduvek
ve}inski srpska. Neki kvartovi u u`em jezgru grada su
do rata bili ve}inski. A do Drugog svetskog rata, celo
Sarajevo je bilo — naro~ito neki kvartovi bili
maltene sto posto srpski.
Pre izbijawa ovoga rata (u okviru konvencije o
BiH, grad Sarajevo i wegove op{tine), srpska strana
nije predlagala podelu grada nego transformaciju
grada po tipu Brisela. I mi smo govorili za BiH
[vajcarizacija. Zna~i, kantonizacija po [vajcarskom
tipu. Za Sarajevo, ne podela, nego transformacija po
tipu Brisela. U Briselu, kao {to verovatno znate boqe
od mene, ima sedamnaest op{tina, ni jedna nije
me{ovita. Ili je flamanska ili je valonska. Tako se
izbegavaju sukobi, osim kad su u pitawu balkanski
narodi od kojih se tra`i da se meltuju u nekom “melting
potu” i da `ive uz nepotrebne anksiosnosti i napetosti
i sukobe. Zna~i, Sarajevo je trebalo da se
transformi{e da svaka zajednica ima svoju op{tinu i
da se ukloni jedan od razloga za napetosti. To iskqu~uje
bilo kakvu nameru terorisawa grada.
Ekselencije, na ovoj mapi na kojoj ste videli, vojska
nije profesionalna. To su qudi koji `ive na 50 metara
od linije. Oni nemaju kud da pobegnu. Oni moraju da se
bore na 50 metara od svoje ku}e. Idu ku}i da spavaju. Ne
`ive u kasarni. Nisu to drilovani vojnici. To je
narodna vojska. Nikada nisu znali da }e da se ratuje u
Sarajevu — da se bori u Sarajevu. Da je rat izbegnut,
313
used. And here’s another college building. I think — yes, it’s the
Civil Engineering Building; the 105th Brigade [took up position
there].
The Vuk Karadžiü Elementary School. I don’t believe it’s
called that any longer. Karadžiü was an ancestor of mine. He was
born in my village in Serbia, and he reformed Serbian culture as
well as the Serbian alphabet.
Now, I would like to enumerate a few things with respect to
Sarajevo. What can be said about Sarajevo? Sarajevo was com-
pletely built on Serbian-owned land. For a long time, it was a
city with a majority Serbian population. All of the settlements
around Sarajevo and some neighborhoods in Sarajevo have al-
ways had a Serbian majority. Some neighborhoods in the city
center had Serbian majorities until the star of the war. And up
to Second World War — all of Sarajevo was — some neighbor-
hoods were almost one hundred per cent Serbian.
Before the outbreak of this war (within the framework of the
Conference on B-H, the city of Sarajevo and its boroughs), the
Serbian side did not propose a division but instead a transfor-
mation of the city according to the Brussels model. We were in
favor of reorganizing B-H along the lines of the Swiss model. This
meant cantonization in accordance to the “Swiss” model. For Sa-
rajevo, not division but transformation according to the Brussels
model. Brussels, as you probably know better than I do, has seven-
teen boroughs and not one of them is integrated. A borough is ei-
ther Flemish or Walloon. That is how conflicts are avoided, except
when Balkan peoples are in question, who are being asked to
“melt’ into a “melting pot” where they live alongside needless
anxiety and tensions and conflicts. This meant Sarajevo had to be
transformed so that each community had its own borough in order
to eliminate one reason for tensions. This dismisses any possible
intent of terrorizing the city.
314
Sarajevo bi bilo transformisano u vi{e op{tina i
svaka op{tina bi vodila svoje poslove.
Ho}u Vam da ka`em da je u Sarajevo posebno, mada u
~itavoj Bosni, izvr{eno takozvano “|erimanderisawe.”
\eri Mander je bio majstor manipulacije izborne.
Tako je umeo da napravi izborne jedinice da slabija
partija pobedi na izborima. Me|utim, i za vreme
komunista, u Bosni je bio veoma prisutan taj fenomen
|erimaderisawa tako da je, recimo, Hrasnica pripojena
Ilixi da Srbi ne bi imali svoju op{tinu. Rajlovac, iz
koga je g. Kraji{nik (bio je nekad op{tina, pa smo ga u
ovom ratu ponovo proglasili op{tinom), ali nekada je
bila op{tina i razvijao se. Pripojen je Novom Gradu
gde su Srbi postali mawina, i razvoj Rajlovca je stao.
[irom Bosne }emo Vam tokom procesa prikazati
kako je |erimanderizam opusto{io srpske krajeve, jer je
stao razvoj, jer su pripojeni u nekim drugim sredinama.
Zna~i, Sarajevo je bilo predvi|eno da se reorganizuje
adminastrativno. Ho}u da Vam ka`em da je, ina~e,
potrebno bilo praviti mawe op{tine. To su ogromne
op{tine u kojima niko ni{ta ne mo`e da zavr{i bez
mita i korupcije — i tako da je to bio razlog i
ekonomski. I da nije bilo rata i da nije bilo krize,
trebalo je to uraditi.
Srbi su na teritoriji grada Sarajeva, koju ~ini
deset predratnih op{tina, kontrolisali samo srpske
op{tine, i u tim op{tinama samo srpska naseqa, a u
muslimanskim ve}inskim op{tinama, samo srpska
naseqa.
Evo, levo ako mo`emo da vratimo — ovaj sa front
linijom. Sasvim krajwe levo. Ovo je op{tina Pale. A
ovaj }o{ak ovamo to je Renovica i muslimanska
315
Excellencies, the army that you have just seen on this map
was not a professional one. They were people who were living
fifty meters from the front line. They had nowhere to flee. They
had to fight fifty meters from their own homes. They had to sleep
in their own homes. They weren’t living in barracks. They were
not trained soldiers. This was a people’s army. They never had
any idea that a war was going to break out in Sarajevo — that they
would have to fight for Sarajevo. Had war been avoided, Sarajevo
would have been transformed into [several] boroughs, and each
borough would have had control of its own affairs.
I want to tell you that gerrymandering, so to speak, was car-
ried out throughout the entire territory of B-H, especially in Sa-
rajevo. Gerry Mander130 [sic] was a master of electoral manipula-
tion. In this fashion, he was able to create electoral units that en-
abled weaker parties to win elections. During the Communist
era, however, the phenomenon of gerrymandering was very
much alive and well in B-H, so that, for example, Hrasnica was
attached to Ilidža so that the Serbs would not have their own
borough. Rajlovac, from which Mr. Krajišnik hails, used to be a
borough (and over the course of this war we once again pro-
claimed it one), but it once was a borough and it was developing.
It was attached to Novi Grad where Serbs had become a minori-
ty, and the development of Rajlovac halted.
Over the course of this trial, we are going to demonstrate
how gerrymandering, applied throughout Bosnia, devastated
Serbian areas, because their development was halted by attach-
ing them to some other milieu. This means that Sarajevo’s ad-
ministrative reorganization had been anticipated. I want to ex-
plain that, in any case, it was necessary to create smaller bor-
oughs. These were enormous boroughs in which no one could do
anything without resorting to bribery and corruption — so this
also became an economic reason [for their continued existence].
316
op{tina Pale, koju mi nismo nikad ni poku{ali da
uzmemo i da stavimo pod svojom kontrolu. Krajwe desno.
Deo grada koji je kontrolisala vojska i policija
Stranke demokratske akcije bio je zaposednut Prvim
korpusom Armije BiH, kasnije 12-om Divizijom. Oni su
imali od 35 do 80 hiqada vojnika. Oni su imali
legitimne ciqeve: Obdani{te «emerlija, to je ona
P~elica, Kapruzova, osnovna {kola Razija Omanovi},
Beta Isakovi}, Pirina kafana, Pastrma, Ferhadija, to
je Vaso Miskina [kola stranih jezika, vojna policija u
Ulici Mar{ala Tita, [ipad, isto tako civilna zgrada.
Stanovi, Karingtonka (poznata elitna stambena zgrada)
je bila legitimni ciq, puna je bile vojske, minobaca~a, i
drugih razornih borbenih sredstava. Na Vrbawa mostu
bio Pam, bili su minobaca~i, itd. Zna~i, to }emo kada
bude proces, da precizno utvrdimo i da precizno
prika`emo apsolutnu istinu gde su se sve nalazili
ciqevi.
Ekselencije, UN }e Vam re}i da nikada Srbi u
Sarajevu nisu zapo~iwali borbe. I stalno smo im
govorili: “Sa~ekajmo politi~ko re{ewe. Na{ je ciq je
samo da sa~uvamo stanovni{tvo.”
Sami Muslimani se hvale — ova unutra{wa linija,
na unutra{wem prstenu prema “city proper” je bila na
po~etku rata duga 42 kilometra. Do kraja rata, oni su se
hvalili da su to pove}ali na 64 kilometra. E, pa ako
uzmete u obzir da su to gradske borbe, uli~ne borbe, 22
kilometra napredovati u uli~nim borbama, to jasno
govori ko je u gradu Sarajevu napadao, a ko se u gradu
Sarajevu branio.
Kao i u celoj Bosni, ni u Sarajevu Srbi nisu
nastojali da zauzmu vi{e, jer su i onako bili spremni
za radi mira [da] vrate zna~ajne teritorije. Za{to
317
This [administrative reorganization] had to be carried out even if
there had been no war and no crisis.
The Serbs controlled only Serbian boroughs on the territory
of Sarajevo, which was composed of ten boroughs before the
war, and in those boroughs they controlled only Serbian settle-
ments, and they controlled only Serbian settlements in Muslim
majority boroughs.
If we can return to that map with the front line on the ex-
treme left. [EXHIBIT XXIX] This is the borough of Pale. And this
corner is Renovica and the Muslim borough of Pale, which we
never tried to take and place under our control. To the extreme
right.
The part of the city controlled by the SDA’s Army and po-
lice force was occupied by the 1st Corps of the Army of B-H,
and later by the 12th Division. They had between 35,000 and
80,000 troops. They were sitting on legitimate targets: the
ýeremlija Nursery School, i.e., the aforementioned Pþelica;
Kapruzova; the Beta Isakoviü and Razija Omanoviü Elementary
Schools; Pira’s Café; Pastrma; Ferhadija, i.e., Vasa Miskin
School of Foreign Languages; the Military Police [Headquar-
ters] on Maršal Tito Street; Šipad, as well as civilian buildings.
Apartments in the Carrington Building (a well-known, exclusive
apartment building) were a legitimate target because they were
was full of troops, mortars, and other destructive combat wea-
ponry. There was a PAM on Vrbanja Most; there were mortars,
etc. During the upcoming trial, we are going to show you in de-
tail and establish the absolute truth about where all these targets
were located.
Excellencies, the United Nations will tell you that the Serbs
never started battles in Sarajevo. And we kept saying: “Let’s
wait for a political solution. Our sole purpose is to protect the
population.”
318
bismo u gradu mi u op{te bilo {ta ~inili {to je
suprotno na{im interesima? A na{ interes je bio da
do`ivimo politi~ko re{ewe i po tri potpisa za kojoj
smo znali da bez wih nema politi~kog re{ewa. Nije
bilo namerno granatirawe — nikad! Nikad! Sva
masivna stradawa — mi }emo to ovde dokazati — su
rezultat “lukave strategije,” kako je Sefer Halilovi}
Izetbegovi}evu politiku naziva, odnosno, rezultat
ratnih lukavstava sa ciqem dovo|ewa strane
intervencije. A se}ate se kako je sudija 1983 rekao:
“Ovo {to ho}e Mladi Muslimani, to se mo`e posti}i
samo terorom, ili stranom intervencijom.”
Izetbegovi}eva SDA, to nije postigla terorom, pa je
htela da zadr`i teror, a da dobije stranu intervenciju.
I svi }e Vam strani posmatra~i i posrednici kazati da
sve {to se de{avalo u BiH sa muslimanske strane bilo
je sra~unato na uvla~ewe NATO-a i zapadnih zemaqa u
rat u wihovu korist.
Ja sam uveren da se bez obzira na reformisawe i na
inovacije u me|unarodnoj sudskoj praksi, princip in
dubio pro reo i daqe po{tuje. A dovoqno nam je da znamo
i da mo`emo da doka`emo da su ~inili neka
granatirawa svoga naroda i neka ubistva snajperima
svoga naroda, pa zahtevamo Tu`ila{tva da nam doka`e
da su neko od tih Srba uradili, a ne mi da dokazujemo da
su to Muslimani radili. Onog trena kad postoje takvi
dokazi da su oni to radili ili da su i oni to radili,
onda moramo identifikovati koje oni nisu uradili, i
dokazati da jesu Srbi.
Na{i odgovori, “retaliation,” odmazde, ja sam u jednom
pismu — vidim da se to navodi i Generalu
Milovanovi}u — rekao, “Saop{tavaju mi strani
posmatra~i, koji nam ne zameraju {to vr{imo odmazdu
319
The Muslims themselves boasted that this internal [front]
line ringing the city proper was 42 kilometers long at the begin-
ning of war. By the end of war, they boasted of having length-
ened it to 64 kilometers. Now, if you take into consideration that
this involved urban warfare, street fighting, and to advance 22
kilometers in street-by-street fighting gives a clear indication of
who was launching the attacks and who was on the defensive in
Sarajevo.
In Sarajevo, just as throughout all of Bosnia, the Serbs never
strove to capture more territories because they were prepared to re-
turn significant amounts of territory for the sake of peace. Why
would we have done anything at all in Sarajevo that was contrary to
our interests? And our interest was to live to see a political resolu-
tion with three signatures, without which we knew there would be
no political solution. There was never any deliberate shelling —
never! Never! All the mass killings — and we’re going to prove it
here — were the result of “wartime cunning,” as Sefer Haliloviü
called Izetbegoviü’s policy, namely, wartime deceptions whose goal
was to bring about foreign intervention. And you remember what
the judge said in 1983: “What the Young Muslims want can only be
achieved by means of terror or foreign intervention.” Izetbegoviü’s
SDA failed to achieve this through a reign of terror, so it tried to
sustain the reign of terror in order to win foreign intervention. And
all the foreign observers and mediators will tell you that everything
that happened in B-H on the Muslim side was calculated to draw
NATO and Western countries into the war for their benefit.
I am convinced, despite all the reforms and innovations in in-
ternational jurisprudence, that the principle in dubio pro reo131 is
still valid. It is sufficient for us to know we can prove that the
Muslims shelled their own people and that they had snipers kill, in
some cases, their own people, so we demand that the OTP prove
that some Serbs committed these crimes, while we are not going to
prove that Muslims were the perpetrators. The moment such evi-
320
al’ nam zameraju na broju granata od kojima
odgovaramo.” I ja sam mislio da je to zbog toga {to wih
ima tri puta vi{e vojske, a na{i imaju ne{to boqu
tehniku. Ja to nisam proveravao i pisao sam Generalu
Milovanovi}u kao da je to ta~no. I naoru`io sam na{u
stranu za{to se to radi. Me|utim, pokazalo se da ba{
ni to nije ta~no, ili nije toliko ta~no, ali je ~iwenica
da je mogao neko koji ima malo vojnika, upla{en
velikom navalom, da vrati ne{to vi{e granata.
I vide}ete u sednici Presedni{tva (negde oko 10.
jula) kada mi ka`emo: “Mora se smawiti granatirawe,
ali za to treba dovesti brigadu iz Krajine.” Jer mora se
strate{ka ravnote`a o~uvati, ina~e }e ovaj narod biti
uni{ten, poklan. Zna~i na Predsedni{tvu se — taj
zapisnik, koji god postoji — ka`e: “U redu smawite
granatirawe, ali dovedite jednu brigadu iz Krajina, i
ovaj narod ovde ne mo`e da se odbrani.” I to nije rat
vojski; to je rat naroda, i tamo gde do|e vojska SDA, ni
ma~ke `ive nisu ostale.
Sve je spr`eno. A rat je u Sarajevo trajao negde
1.200 i ne{to dana, Biblijska je brojka je 1.260 iz
Apokalipse.
Ekselencije, grad nikada nije bio blokiran za ono
{to nije bilo vojna, a ni za vojnu nije bilo blokirano.
Vide}ete ovde u slu~aju Hrvata iz Bosne, kako oni
potvr|uju da su jedinice mogle ulaziti, izlaziti u
Sarajevo kad su htele. A vide}ete iz naredbi
muslimanske vojske, gde ka`u da sa Igmana vratiti
jednu brigadu u grad, i tako daqe.
[to se ti~e transporta, saobra}aja, prvo na po~etku
rata sam ja predlo`io da Sarajevo bude otvoreni grad, i
da se stavi pod Ujediwene Nacije. Izetbegovi} to nije
prihvatio. Wemu Sarajevo bilo potrebno radi
321
dence appears that they [the Muslims] did this or that, then we
must identify which killings were not committed by them and
prove that those killings were committed by Serbs.
I wrote in one letter that our replies, “retaliation,” reprisal —
I think General [Manojlo] Milovanoviü132 also quoted it — I said
that: “I have been advised by foreign observers that they are not
faulting us for retaliating; they are, instead, objecting to the
[sheer] number of mortar shells with which we are replying.”
And I thought it was because they had three times as many
troops, but our troops had somewhat better weaponry. I did not
verify it but I wrote to Gen. Milovanoviü as if it were true. And I
armed our side because that was going on. However, it turned
out that it was not even true, or was not so exact, but the fact re-
mains that it is possible for someone who has fewer soldiers,
frightened by an onslaught, to reply with a larger number of
shells.
And you will see a session of the Presidency (around July 10)
during which we said: “We must reduce the shelling, but in order
to do that we have to bring in a brigade from Krajina.” We had to
maintain a strategic balance, otherwise the people would have
been annihilated, slaughtered. That was in the Presidency — it’s in
the minutes — whichever ones exist — it states: “The next order
of business is the reduction of the shelling, but you have to bring
in a brigade from Krajina, and these people here cannot defend
themselves.” This was not a war between armies; this was the war
between peoples, and wherever the SDA Army arrived, not even a
stray cat survived.
Everything was burned to the ground. The war in Sarajevo
lasted for about 1,200 and some days; the Biblical number is
1,260 for Armageddon.
Excellencies, the city was never under blockade when it con-
cerned non-military matters, nor was it under blockade for mili-
tary matters. You will see here, in the case of the Croats from
322
ucewivawe me|unarodne zajednice, emocionalno
ucewivawe, izazivawe emocija, i zahteva za
intervencijom. Rekli smo civilni saobra}aj i
komercialni saobra}aj nema restrikcija. Restrikcije
se odnose samo na vojne robe, vojne transporte.
Sarajevski kriminalci nikad nisu dopustili
komercijalni saobra}aj, radi toga {to bi cene pale na
crnoj berzi, a tamo oni su od toga `iveli, i od toga su
zaradili veliki novac.
Ekselencije, pogledajte. Ovaj “city proper” koji je pod
kontrolom Armije SDA, nije dobio ni jednu kap vode,
ni jedan kubik gasa, ni jedan kilovat struje, a da to nije
pre{lo preko srpske teritorije. Uvek, i sve {to su
dobili, dobili su preko srpske teritorije, i nikada to
namerno nismo uskratili. Kako je to terorisawe grada
kada smo mi imali malo vode, mi smo je delili s wima?
Sva okolna izvori{ta su na srpskoj zemqi, i mi smo tu
vodu delili s wima, kad smo i mi imali mawe.
Ima jedno pismo koja je ovde tako|e uvr{teno. Ja
pi{em na{im generalima; oni se qute {to mi pu{tamo
humanitarnu pomo} koja se daje samo Muslimanima. A
nikad Srbima. Kasnije smo dobili jednu ~etvrtinu ili
tre}inu. Gde ovaj optu`eni ka`e: “Civili nisu na{i
ratni protivnici. Nisu neprijateqi. Ne}emo ratovati
hranom, vodom, i drugim stvarima.”
Ekselencije, ovde kod Hrasnice, izme|u Hrasnice i
gde je ovaj prolaz uski na liniji fronta, je aerodrom
koji smo mi predali Ujediwenim Nacijama u julu 1992-e.
Na taj aerodrom je sletelo preko deset hiqada
humanitarnih letova. Ni jedan incident sa srpske
strane nije bilo. Ponekad su oni pucali po avionima da
bi nas optu`ili.
323
Bosnia, who will confirm that these units were able to enter and
leave Sarajevo as they pleased. And you will see orders from the
Muslim Army, because they ordered a certain brigade to return
from Igman to the city, etc.
As far as transportation and traffic are concerned, it was I
who first proposed at the beginning of war that Sarajevo be an
open city and that it be placed under UN control. Izetbegoviü did
not accept that. He needed Sarajevo in order to blackmail the
International Community with emotional provocations and de-
mands for intervention. We said that there were no traffic re-
strictions for civilian and commercial traffic. The restrictions
pertained only to military materiel, military transport. Sarajevan
criminals never allowed commercial traffic because then prices
on the black market would have fallen, but they lived off those
proceeds over there, and they made a lot of money doing that.
Excellencies, please take a look. The “city proper,” which
was under control of the SDA Army, did not receive a single drop
of water, a single cubic meter of gas, a single kilowatt of electrici-
ty unless it had crossed Serbian territory first. Everything they re-
ceived always came across Serbian territories, and we never inten-
tionally deprived them of it. We had little water, yet we shared it
with them. How is this terrorizing a city? All the surrounding
sources of water are in the Serbian territory, and we shared these
water resources with them, even though we had less.
There is a letter which is included here. I’m writing to our
generals. They were angry about the fact that we were allowing
humanitarian aid to pass through that had been earmarked solely
for Muslims. But never for Serbs. Later on, we received one-
third or one-fourth [of what the Muslims were receiving]. Where
the Accused says: “Civilians were not our opponents in this war.
They are not our enemies. We are not going to wage war by us-
ing food, water, and other things [as weapons].”
324
Deset hiqada letova humanitarnih. Zar je to
terorisawe grada? To je srpska strana obezbedila. Mi
smo dr`ali aerodrome. I prepustili smo ga
Ujediwenim Nacijama. U{li su hiqade kamiona,
hiqade konvoja humanitarne pomo}i je u{lo u Sarajevo
preko srpske teritorije. I dokumentacija Generala
Valgrena, g. Aka{ija i drugih, pokaza}e Vam da je
incident sa konvojima bio iskqu~ivo ako konvoj
napravi neku neregularnost. I to u mom pismu Valgrenu
obja{wavam, a to potvr|uju i predstavnici Ujediwenih
Nacijama. Ka`e Srbi ne prave problem sa konvojima,
ali ako se pojavi kamion vi{ka i ako ima neka roba
koja nije prijavqena u deklaraciji, onda prave problem.
Pa tu se radi o jednostavnoj vojni~koj pameti. On
ima na spisku {ta je odobreno, ako to odudara od tog
spiska, on ka`e ne mo`e. Drugi na~in da se napravi
incident sa humanitarnim konvojem za CNN i za druge
— uvek je tu i neka ekipa. Konvoj se pojavi na prelazu
koji nije obave{ten o tome. I taj vojnik nema ta
ovla{}ewa da bude kreativan i fleksibilan. Na jednom
mostu je prijavqen konvoj, a on se pojavi na drugom
mostu. Ta posada ne zna ni{ta o tome.
Eto, ovo je grad Sarajevo. To je na{ grad. Dvesta
hiqada Srba — 157,000 deklarisani, i skoro 30,000
Jugoslovena, od ~ega skoro svi su bili Srbi. To je
Srpski grad, tako|e. Ja sam `iveo u tom gradu po svojoj
slobodnoj voqi. Ja sam voleo taj grad, i volim ga i sada,
i ne}emo nikad od wega odustati. Imamo deo grada tu.
Da je bilo prihva}eno na{ predlog da se proglasi
otvorenim gradom, nikakvog stradawa ne bi bilo; da je
bilo prihva}eno da se transformi{e u op{tine srpske
i muslimanske i hrvatske — gde je braon boja — to je
bila hrvatska op{tina, Stup i Doglodi do Ilixe. Bio
325
Excellencies, here in Hrasnica, between Hrasnica and this
narrow passage on the front line, is the airport that we handed
over to the United Nations in July 1992. Over 10,000 humanitar-
ian flights landed at this airport. There was not a single incident
from the Serbian side. They [the Muslims] occasionally shot at
the planes in order to blame us.
Ten thousand humanitarian flights. Is that terrorizing a city?
The Serbian side secured [deliveries of humanitarian aid]. We
held the airport. And we handed it over to the United Nations.
Thousands of trucks, thousands of convoys of humanitarian aid
entered Sarajevo through Serbian territory. And the documenta-
tion of General Wahlgren,133 Mr. Akashi134 and others will show
you that incidents with convoys were due solely to irregularities
caused by the convoys themselves. And I explained that in my
letter to Wahlgren, and even representatives of the UN confirm
it. They said Serbs were not causing any problems with convoys,
but if there were an extra truck or goods that had not been de-
clared in the manifest, then this posed a problem.
Straightforward military thinking is involved here. The sol-
dier has an authorized list, and if the shipment is different from
the list, he says that it can’t go through. Another way is to create
an incident with a humanitarian convoy for CNN and others —
there were always some news crew involved. A convoy shows
up unannounced at a crossing. And the soldier is not authorized
to be creative and flexible. A convoy would be scheduled to
cross at one bridge, but then it would show up at another. The
soldiers on duty didn’t know a thing about it.
This is the city of Sarajevo. This is our town. Two hundred
thousand Serbs — 157,000 have declared themselves to be
Serbs, and almost 30,000 have declared themselves as Yugo-
slavs, of which almost all were Serbs. It is, likewise, a Serbian
city. I lived in that city of my own free will. I loved that city, and
I love it to this very day, and we’re never going to give up on it.
326
bi mir i prosperitet. Ali politika koja ho}e sto posto
Bosne, sto posto vlasti u sto posto Bosne, protiv
Hri{}anske ve}ine, je dovela do ovoga do ~ega je
dovela, a Tu`ila{tvo smatra da nismo imali nikakva
prava da sebe za{titimo.
I ja bi Va{oj pa`wi preporu~io — ja }u pro~itati
jedan izve{taj iz kwige Generala Rouza. Ka`e:
Mnogo su ozbiqniji bili izve{taji
Francuza, da su muslimanske trupe u
gradu otvarale vatru na sopstvene
gra|ane. Ovo je bilo pre pravilo nego
izuzetak.
Bosanskom brigadiru Hajrulahovi}u,
zvanom Talijan, i Generalu Jovanu
Divjaku, rekao sam da je prvo ispitivawe
karaktera bombe koja je eksplodirala na
Markalama, pokazalo da je ona ispaqena
sa bosanske strane. U sobi je zavladao
muk, a Hajrulahovi} me gleda
neprijateqski. Dodao sam da ugao putawe
mine o~igledno dokazuje da je ona
ispaqena sa veoma male daqine ili da je
~ak podmetnuta na licu mesta i
aktivirana. Zatim sam ga pitao zbog ~ega
su sklonili neke delove rasprsnute
mine...
SUDIA KVAN: Gospodine Karaxi}u, pɨɲɬɨ ɩɪɟɜɨɞɢɨɰɢ
ɧɟɦɚʁɭ ɬɚʁ ɦɚɬɟɪɢʁɚɥ ɦɨɥɢɨ ɛɢɯ ɜɚɫ ɞɚ ɝɨɜɨɪɢɬɟ ɫɩɨɪɢʁɟ.
KARAXI]: ɂɡɜɢɧʁɚɜɚɦ ɫɟ.
Zatim sam ga pitao zbog ~ega su sklonili
neke delove rasprsnute mine pre nego
327
We have our own part of town. [EXHIBIT XXI] Had our proposal
been accepted to declare Sarajevo an open city, there never
would have been any casualties; had it been accepted to trans-
form the city into Serbian and Muslim and Croat boroughs —
the brown areas here — that was a Croatian borough — Stup and
Dogloda to Ilidža — there would have been peace and prosperi-
ty. However, a policy that wants 100% of Bosnia, 100% of gov-
erning authority in 100% of Bosnia against the Christian majori-
ty, led to what it has led to, but the Prosecution believes that we
did not have any right whatsoever to protect ourselves.
I would now like to call your attention to — I’m going to
read an excerpt from General Rose’s book. He says:
The French reports were much more serious, al-
leging that Muslim troops were opening fire on
their own citizens. This was the rule rather than
the exception.135
We were met by Deputy Commander, Gen.
Divjak…. Brig. Hajrulahoviü … [who] was known
in Sarajevo as the “Italian” … I told [them] that
the first UN examination of the bomb crater in the
Markale market place indicated that the bomb had
been fired from the Bosnian side of the battle lines.
The room went deadly silent and Hajrulahoviü
looked anxious. He coldly asked me to explain. I
told him that the angle of the trajectory of the mor-
tar bomb suggested that it had been fired at ex-
tremely short range from their side of the lines or
perhaps detonated in situ.
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadžiü, since the interpreters do not have
this material, I would ask you to slow down.
KARADZIû: Please excuse me.
328 329

{to su snage Ujedinenih Nacija stigle na

It was difficult, I said, to be precise when only one
mesto doga|aja.
bomb had been fired and also because the Bosnian
Vide}ete, Ekselencije, da ovo Tu`ila{tvo, kao svoje Army had removed some of the important forensic
svedoke i ekspertne svedoke, a svoje svedoke iz evidence before the UN arrived.136
Ujedinenih Nacija, ovde ne poziva one koji su prvi
You will see, Excellencies, that this OTP is not subpoenaing
stigli na mesto. I nemamo wihove nalaze. Ovde nam
those who were the first to arrive on the scene as their witnesses;
poziva ~oveka koji je do{ao u jednom slu~aju 40 minuta
instead, it is expert witnesses, witnesses from the UN. And we
nakon incidenta u avgustu 1995., i sedam dana nakon
don’t have their findings. The OTP is subpoenaing a man to testify
incidenta 1994-te. I kada pitamo te qude: “Koje je
who arrived 40 minutes after the incident that took place in Au-
najboqe vreme za istragu incidenta?” Oni ka`u:
gust 1995, and seven days after the 1994 incident. When we asked
“Slede}e minute nakon incidenta.” Zna~i, ko prvi do|e
these people “What is the best time for investigating such an inci-
na mesto incidenta ima najve}u {ansu da dadne akuratan
dent?” they replied: “The first minutes right after the incident oc-
nalaz.
curs.” This means whoever first arrives on the scene where the
A Tu`ila{tvo negde je sklonilo ili zanemarilo
incident took place has the best chance of providing accurate find-
prve koji su do{li na mesto icidenta, jer im se,
ings.
o~igledno, wihovi nalazi ne dopadaju.
But the OTP has removed or ignored those who were the
Lord Dejvid Oven u svojoj kwizi Ȼɚɥɤɚɧɫɤɚ ɨɞɢɫɟʁɚ,
first to arrive on the scene after the incident occurred because
navodi — da je citiram:
their findings obviously did not appeal to it.
Bosanska vlada spre~avala odlazak svoga Lord David Owen says in his book The Balkan Odyssey, and
naroda unutra{wim blokadama i I quote:
birokratskim za~koqicama. U radio
… the Bosnian government army, with internal
emisijama, vojska je — a ne vlada —
blockades and red tape bureaucracy which kept
govorila da je zabrawen odlazak telesno
their own people from leaving. In a radio
sposobnim mu{karcima od 18 do 65 godina
broadcast the army — not the government —
i `enama od 18 do 60 godina. Jesu
said that able bodied men aged 18–65 years and
neophodni u odbrani grada. Ali wihov
women aged 18–60 years were forbidden to
glavni razlog je bio druga~iji. Srpska
leave because they were needed for the city’s
opsada je u propagandnom ratu budila
defense; but their main reason was different. In
saose}awa sveta. Stoga im je bilo
the propaganda war the Serbian siege aroused
potrebno da starci i deca ostanu. Bilo je
the sympathy of the world, and for this they
to wihovo najemotivnije propagandno
needed the elderly and the children to stay. It
was their most emotive propaganda weapon for
330
oru`je da uvedu Amerikance u rat, te
nipo{to nisu `eleli da ono oslabi.
Daqe, to je dakle bio ciq i sredstvo da se NATO i
Amerikanci uvedu u rat. Ovo je sve u vezi sa
granatirawem Sarajeva. I na jednom mestu, General
Rouz ka`e bilo bi mnogo lak{e kada oni ne bi pucali
po svom stanovni{tvu. Rat bi se pre zavr{io.
Kod tako masivnih — ne indikacija in dubio pro reo
— nego dokaza da su oni to radili, mene ~udi i kod onog
snimka kojeg ste ju~e videli na praznoj pijaci — videli
ste snimak priprema incidenta — ja se ~udim, ne samo
za{to je General Gali} dobio do`ivotni zatvor, nego
za{to Tu`ila{tvo i daqe dr`i te incidente u
optu`nicama protiv Generala Milo{evi}a i protiv
mene, itd. Zna~i, mi zaista moramo biti svesni da bi
bilo jako dobro kada bi Ve}e nalo`ilo da Tu`ila{tvo
jo{ jedanput pogleda tu optu`nicu i da dobro razmisli
kakav je to postupak i koja je to {teta da se ovakvi
procesi protiv samo jedne strane, i to je strana koja je
bila slabija, malobrojnija, i koja je bila u defanzivi
celo vreme, i koja je ~ekala politi~ko re{ewe, da se
ona proglasi za ratobornu, agresivnu i da se proglasi
da je terorisala sopstveni grad iz koga je isterano 80%
srpskog stanovni{tva u ova prigradska naseqa.
I ja verujem ako bi oni dobro pregledali sa ~ime
raspola`u, da bi ne samo povukli optu`nicu protiv
mene, nego da bi tra`ili (u smislu za{tite
zakonitosti) reviziju presuda protiv mojih Generala
Gali}a i Milo{evi}a, i da se spasi ideja me|unarodne
pravde, da se spasi ideja ovakvih sudova, jer je ovo
velika opasnost da ideja, uop{te me}unarodne pravde,
bude kompromitovana, jer ja }u ovde dokazati. Ako se
ovaj proces nastavi — i pogotovo sa svim ovim — ja }u
331
bringing the Americans in to fight the war, and
never wanted it to be weakened.137
Furthermore, it was the objective as well as the means to
draw NATO and the Americans into the war. All this is connect-
ed to the shelling of Sarajevo. At one point, General Rose said it
would be a lot easier if they [i.e., the Muslims] did not fire on
their own population. The war would have ended earlier.
With such massive — not indications of dubio pro reo, in-
stead — proof that they were doing these things. I am even
astonished by the footage you saw yesterday of the empty mar-
ketplace — you saw footage of the preparations for that incident
— I am astonished not only by the life sentence General Galiü
received but also by the fact that the OTP continues to use this in
the indictments against General Miloševiü138 and against me, etc.
This means we must be aware of the fact that it would be very
good if the Trial Chamber would order the OTP to take a good
look at the Indictment once more and to carefully consider what
kind of [legal] action this is, as well as how damaging it is to
have these proceedings [conducted] against only one side, the
one that was the weaker side, the one that had fewer soldiers, the
one that was on the defensive during the entire time, and [the
side] that was awaiting a political solution, to have it declared
the belligerent, aggressive side, and to have it declared to be the
one terrorizing its own city from which 80% of the Serbian pop-
ulation had been expelled into suburban areas.
And I believe that if they were at all to carefully examine the
material they have at their disposal, they would not only withdraw
the Indictment against me but they would even ask (with the idea
of safeguarding the Law) for a review of the judgments against my
Generals Galiü and Miloševiü in order to rescue the idea of inter-
national justice, to rescue the very idea of such courts as these,
because it is a great danger to have an ideal, international law as a
whole, compromised, because I am going to prove that here. If, if
332
ovde dokazati {ta se de{avalo u BiH, i vide}e se da je
tu odgovorna, pre svega, deo me|unarodne zajednice —
pre svega SDA, ali ona nije ni{ta mogla uraditi da
nije imala podr{ku i ohrabrivawe da ide na sve ili
ni{ta — ni{ta za Srbe i Hrvate — kasnije i Hrvate —
a sve za islamske fundamentaliste, navodno za
muslimanski narod, ali muslimanski narod od toga ne
bi imao ni{ta, jer je struktura vlasti u zamislima
fundamentalista jo{ uvek otomanska, a ne demokratska.
Tu bi bile age i begovi, Silajxi} i drugi koji bi imali
kompletnu korist od takvog re`ima koji bi oni
uspostavili.
Imamo li jo{ pre pauze ili — ?
SUDIJA KVAN: Mo`ete nastaviti jo{ pet minuta.
Ali ako `elite, mo`emo da napravimo pauzu sada.
KARAXI]: Ja sam mislio da sam mo`da dovoqno rekao
uop{tenih stvari o Sarajevu. Ja sam u toku procesu —
Sarajevo pretresati zaista u pojedinosti. Ova odbrana
se ne sla`e sa pristupom Tu`ila{tva — neki Srbi
ubili neke Muslimane. Ho}emo ta~no da znamo. Ja jo{
nemam normalan forezi~ki materijal za Markale I,
Markale II, za red za hleb u Vase Miskina, za druge
incidente masovnog stradawa, a ja sam uveren da na
Markalama I i Markalama II, mo`da ~ak nije bilo
civilnih `rtava. Mo`da su sve posejani le{evi, tela, a
ovde }e prestavnici Ujedniwenih nacija potvrditi da
su i wihovi prethodnici upozoravali ih da budu
oprezni u pogledu sejawa, podmetawa planting of bodies,
podmetawa tela {irom Sarajeva da bi se srpska strana
optu`ila. Kako }emo mi da iza|emo sa tim na kraj?
Mi — po{to ne mo`emo da ra~unamo na objektivnu
istragu istra`nog sudije — ne mo`emo da ra~unamo na
333
this trial continues — and especially with all this — I will here
prove that what happened in B-H, and you will first of all see
that the International Community is responsible — the SDA is
first and foremost responsible, but it could not have done any-
thing had it not had the support and encouragement to go for all
or nothing — nothing for the Serbs and Croats — and later on
nothing for the Croats — and everything for the Islamic funda-
mentalists, allegedly for the Muslim people, but the Muslim
people weren’t going to get anything out of it, because the struc-
ture of the state authority as fundamentalists imagine it is still
Ottoman, not democratic. There were agas and beys,139 Silajdžiü
and others who were going to enjoy the principal benefits of
such a regime as they would establish.
Do we have more time before the break or — ?
JUDGE KWON: We can go on for five minutes. But if you wish,
we can take a break now.
KARADŽIû: I thought that perhaps I have said enough about
general matters pertaining to Sarajevo. I am in the middle of a
trial — I am, indeed, discussing Sarajevo in detail. This Defense
does not agree with the approach taken by the OTP — that some
Serbs killed some Muslims. We want to know exactly what hap-
pened. I still don’t have regular forensic material for Markale I,
for Markale II, for the bread line in Vasa Miskin Street, for other
incidents of mass killing, and I am convinced that perhaps, there
weren’t any civilian casualties at all in Markale I and Markale II.
Perhaps they were all corpses, bodies that had been planted, and
the representatives of the UN are going to confirm here that their
predecessors had warned them to be very careful about “planting
bodies” throughout Sarajevo in order to have the Serbian side
charged with it [i.e., their deaths]. How are we going to get to the
bottom of all this?
334
skromnost Tu`ila{tva, da pazi {ta radi. Moramo da
ra~unamo iskqu~ivo na Vas, na Ve}e, da }e Ve}e
spre~iti ovakva podmetawa i kodifikovawa la`i i
trikova koji treba u istoriji na{ih naroda da ostanu
kao neka su{ta istina.
U ono {to smo videli ju~e na Markalama, u ono
mo`e da veruje samo neko ko `eli u to da veruje. Pa ~ak
i to te{ko. Ako imamo razuma, mora da vidi da to Srbi
nisu uradili. I da to op{te nije bio incident
su{tinski, nego da je to inscenacija. Ali treba znati:
{ta to ~ini tim narodima tamo? [ta to ~ini Srbima i
Muslimanima? A govori}emo danas i o Srebrenici.
[ta ti la`ni mitovi, i la`ne `rtve ~ine u du{ama
obi~nog sveta koji ne mo`e da pronikne u te su{tine. I
{ta }e to za budu}nost zna~iti? I koje scene budu}ih
pokoqa i budu}ih smrti je posejan ovim la`ima?
Posejano za na{u decu i za na{u unu~ad. Ko proveruje i
ko kodifikuje ove stvari da se jesu desile? I da su
Srbi to radili {to nisu radili. Taj je obezbedio
nastavak daqih sukoba i daqih pokoqa. Kad god neka
srpska kriza bude, kao {to je i do sada u svim ratovima
bila, ponovo bude gra|anska i bratoubila~ka
komponenta.
Eto, za sada bih zavr{io za Sarajevo.
SUDIJA KVAN: Napravi}emo pauzu od pola sata.
— ɉɚɭɡɚ ɩɨɱɟɥɚ ɭ 11:59.
335
Since we cannot rely on an objective investigation conducted
by an investigating judge, then we cannot rely on a measured
response from the OTP to pay attention to what it is doing. We
must rely on you alone, that the Trial Chamber is going to pre-
vent this kind of a set-up, the codification of lies and trickery
that are supposed to remain permanently in the history of our
people as an irrefutable truth.
In the footage we saw yesterday of Markale, only someone
who wants to believe it could believe it. And even then with
great difficulty. If we have any common sense, it is obvious that
the Serbs did not do this. And it was absolutely not an incident; it
was, instead, fundamentally a staged incident. But you must
know: What effect does that have on the people over there?
What does it do to the Serbs and the Muslims? And we’re going
to talk today about Srebrenica. What these false myths and these
false victims do to the souls of ordinary people who cannot pene-
trate the heart of the matter. What is this going to mean for the
future? And what scenes of future slaughter and future deaths
have been sown by these lies? Sown for our children and grand-
children. Who confirms and codifies that such things actually
took place? And that the Serbs did something they had not done?
Whosoever says this has ensured the continuation of further con-
flicts and further slaughters. Whenever there is a Serbian crisis,
as the case has so far been in these wars, a civil and fratricidal
war has once again become its component.
For now, I have finished with Sarajevo.
JUDGE KWON: We’ll break for half an hour.
— Recess taken at 11:59 a.m.
336 337

— ɇɚɫɬɚɜɚɤ ɭ 12:32. — On resuming at 12:32 p.m.

ɋɍȾɂȳȺ ɄȼȺɇ: Ⱦɚ, ɝɨɫɩɨɞɢɧɟ Ʉɚɪɚʇɢʄɭ. JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadžiü.
KARAXI]: Hvala Vam, Ekselencijo. KARADŽIû: Thank you, Excellency.
Sada bih se, po tipu rekapitulacije, odnosno, po
A Reply to the Charges of a Joint Criminal Enterprise
tipu jednog nabrajawa fakata u odnosu na prvi
I’d like now, as a recapitulation, to summarize the facts with
udru`eni zlo~ina~ki poduhvat, uputio Va{u pa`wu na
respect to the first charge of a joint criminal enterprise, to call
neke fakte koje tokom ovog procesa — lako dokazati —
your attention to some facts that during the course of this trial —
sve {to — ~ime sam se bavio u ovoj uvodnoj re~i. Bavio
they are easy to prove — everything I have dealt with in this
sam se na osnovu onoga {to }u mo}i lako i bez ikakvih
opening statement. I dealt with matters that I could easily prove
problema dokazati tokom postupka.
without any problems over the course of this trial.
Dakle, prisilno uklawawe bosanskih Muslimana i
Therefore, the forcible removal of Bosnian Muslims and
bosanskih Hrvata nikad nije bio na{ plan. Nikada ni u
Croats was never our plan. It was never even imagined, not to
zamisli nam nije bilo, a kamoli u planovima i kamoli
mention [that it was ever] in the plans, not to mention that it
na na~in da bi se to moglo ostvarivati. Naveo sam
could have been achieved in any way. I have cited over the past
tokom ovih dva dana koji su sve predlozi srpske strane
two days what all the proposals the of Serbian side were — be
bili — bilo inicirani od Srba, bilo prihva}eni od
they initiated by the Serbs, be they agreed to by the Serbs —
Srba — koji su apsolutno iskqu~ivali bilo koji
which absolutely render null and void any [charge of a] joint
udru`eni zlo~ina~ki poduhvat, a pogotovo
criminal enterprise, especially the transfer, in other words, the
preme{tawe, odnosno, isterivawe Muslimana i Hrvata
expulsion of Muslims and Croats from the Republika Srpska.
iz Republike Srpske.
We said that we always wanted to live together with the
Rekli smo da smo uvek hteli da `ivimo sa
Muslims, that we begged them to remain in Yugoslavia, but that
Muslimanima, da smo ih molili da ostanu u Jugoslaviji,
we could not accept leaving [Yugoslavia] to fall under the sway
ali da nismo mogli prihvatiti da iza|emo u Bosnu, i
of a Muslim fundamentalist regime in Bosnia, of which there
zapadnemo pod islamski fundamentalist~ki re`im, o
was no doubt because the Constitution of that regime had to be,
kome nema nikakve sumwe, jer je Ustav toga re`ima
of necessity, Mr. Izetbegoviü’s Islamic Declaration.
trebalo da bude ɂɫɥɚɦɫɤɚ ɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢʁa g. Izetbegovi}a.
All the agreements — let me remind you that of the five
Svi sporazumi — podse}am da je od pet mirovnih
peace plans put forward — five peace proposals — the Accused
planova, pet mirovnih predloga, ovaj optu`eni
agreed to four of them; and we maximally reduced our wishes
prihvatio ~etiri; da smo maksimalno reducirali svoje
and our goals in order to avoid war. I also want to call to your
`eqe i svoje ciqeve, da bismo izbegli rat. Ho}u da vas
attention one fact that is likewise written in stone. There was
podsetim na jednu, tako|e, mermernu ~iwenicu. Nikada
never a time when the [legally binding decisions of a peace]
nije bilo, a da neka konferencija o BiH nije bila na
Conference in B-H was not in force. At least from February
338
snazi. U najmawu ruku, od februara 1992. E, sada da
vidimo {ta radi srpska strana, a {ta radi muslimanska
strana.
Srpska strana pregovara bona fide, a preduzima
kontramere za{titnog karaktera za slu~aj da pregovori
propadnu. Za slu~aj da budemo prevareni. Tu`ila{tvo
smatra da nismo imali pravo da budemo oprezni u
pogledu prevara. Pa ka`e: “Karaxi} je pregovarao, ali
je imao i rezervnu varijantu.” Pa kakav bi ja bio
politi~ar, i kakav bi ja bio slu`benik svoga naroda
kada ne bih imao rezervnu varijantu? A znam s kim
imam posla. Ali meni rezervna varijanta nije bila
prioritet. Meni su bili prioritet pregovori. I
varijante koje su nu|ene kroz pregovore.
SDA je obrnuto pregovarala la`no. I sami ka`u —
ostavili su tragove da su pregovarali la`no, a bona fide
su pripremali rat. To je sasvim obrnuta pozicija. I
sami nas je Bog spasao da ne nastradamo u toj situaciji,
u kojoj mi pregovaramo bona fide, a pripremamo — imamo
protivmere za slu~aj da ne{to po|e naopako.
Kratko }u Vam predo~iti jedan obrazac: {ta se
de{avalo u op{tinima. U svim op{tinama u toku su
bili dogovori o transformaciji tih op{tina u dve ili
tri op{tine, zavisno da li ima i Hrvata tamo ili,
recimo, ima dve muslimanske i jedna srpska, itd.
Kada Tu`ila{tvo ka`e, ~im su preuzeli op{tinu —
naravno od sebe — od koga }emo preuzeti srpske
op{tine, nego od sebe? Mi smo tamo na vlasti. Mi smo
mogli preuzeti op{tinu. Mogli smo samo uvesti malo
precizniju, malo odgovorniju vlast. To je paragraf,
mislim 105 “Pre-Trial Brief”— zapamtio sam ga. Ka`e:
otpu{tali i radili su ovo i ono. Otpu{tali su
Muslimane iz policije, itd.
339
1992. Well, now let’s see what the Serbian side was doing and
what the Muslim side was doing.
The Serbian side was negotiating bona fide, while taking
countermeasures of a protective character in case the negotia-
tions should fall through. In case we were tricked. The Prosecu-
tion supposes that we did not have the right to be cautious about
such trickery. It alleges: “Karadžiü did negotiate, but he had a
back-up plan.” Well, what kind of politician would I be, what
kind of a servant of the people would I have been, if I did not
have a back-up plan? And I know who I’m dealing with. But my
back-up plan was not my priority. My priority was the negotia-
tions. And the unexpected variations that are offered up during
the negotiating process.
The SDA, on the contrary, negotiated in bad faith. And they
said so themselves — they left clues that they were negotiating
in bad faith, and were preparing a bona fide war. That is the di-
ametrically opposite position. And it was God alone who saved
us from perishing in that situation, where we were negotiating in
good faith and were preparing — we had countermeasures in
place in the event something went wrong.
Now I am briefly going to point out one pattern: what was
unfolding in the counties. In all the counties, negotiations were
underway on the reorganization of those counties into two or
three [smaller] counties, depending on whether there was a Croat
population or, for instance, two Muslim counties and one Serbi-
an one, etc.
When the Prosecution says: As soon as they took over a
county — of course, we were taking it over from ourselves —
from whom would we be taking Serbian counties if not from
ourselves? We were the governing authority there. We were able
to take over a county. We only introduced a more detailed, more
responsible civil authority. That’s in Paragraph 105, I think, of
the Pre-Trial Brief — I remembered it correctly. It states: they
340
A evo {ta je bilo u pitawu. Postoje srpske
op{tine: srpska op{tina Sanski Most, srpska op{tina
Kqu~, srpska op{tina Prijedor, srpska op{tina itd. A
za Bijeqinu ne pi{e “srpska op{tina.” Za Bawu Luku,
ne pi{e srpska op{tina, za Pale ne pi{e srpska
op{tina. Za{to? Zato {to nema uslova da postoji
muslimanska op{tina. Dakle, tamo gde pi{e srpska
op{tina, dogovori su da }e biti i muslimanska
op{tina. Ako srpska op{tina ima srpsku policiju,
onda su dogovori u toku da Muslimani policajci idu u
muslimansku stanicu. I to je izvor toga {to se ovde
navodi da su Srbi otpu{tali. Srbi nikoga nisu
otpu{tali.
[to nisu otpu{teni Muslimani iz policije u
Bijeqini? [to nisu otpu{teni u Gradi{ki? [to nisu
otpu{teni u Bawa Luci? [to nisu otpu{teni bilo gde,
gde nije bilo srpska op{tina? Ne samo policajci, nego
svaka institucija koja je trebalo da se — koju je
trebalo da ima i — to koja nije na nivou grada nego na
nivou op{tina — svaka institucija koju je trebalo
muslimanska op{tina da ima — bilo je u pregovorima i
u dogovorima i dogovoreno da ima. I vide}ete ako negde
pi{e “srpska op{tina,” onda zna~i da se tu razdvajaju
slu`be u dve op{tina. A ako ne pi{e “srpska op{tina,”
neka mi poka`u gde smo mi to otpustili nekoga iz Bawe
Luke ili iz Bijeqine. Ovde }e do}i svedok iz
Bijeqine, Musliman koji je bio u policiji, radio dok je
hteo. Svi su znali da je on Musliman. Niko ga nije ubio.
Poginulo je i Muslimana i Srba u Bijeqini, ali
razlika izme|u Muslimana koji je poginuo i Muslimana
koji nije poginuo bila je izkqu~ivo {to je onaj imao
pu{ku. Te pregovore, videli ste iz pisma Rabija [ubi}
Izetbegovi}u, gde ga poziva da u celoj Bosni provede
341
dismissed people and they did this and that. Dismissed Muslims
from the police force, etc.
Now, here’s what was at stake. Serbian counties exist: Sanski
Most is a Serbian county; Kljuþ is a Serbian county; Prijedor is a
Serbian county, etc. But as far as Bijeljina is concerned, it doesn’t
say “Serbian county.” It doesn’t say “Serbian county” for Banja
Luka; and it doesn’t say “Serbian county” for Pale. Why? Because
there were no conditions for it to become a Muslim county. So,
wherever it says “Serbian county,” the agreement was that there
would also be a Muslim county. If a Serbian county had a Serbian
police force, then negotiations were underway for the Muslims to
go to the Muslim police station. And that was the source of what is
cited here, that the Serbs were dismissing people. The Serbs did
not dismiss anyone.
Why weren’t Muslims dismissed from the police force in Bi-
jeljina? Why weren’t they dismissed from Gradiška? Why weren’t
they dismissed from Banja Luka? Why weren’t they dismissed
anywhere else where there was no Serbian county? Not only po-
licemen but every institution which needed — which had to have
— not at the municipal level but at the county level — it had every
institution a Muslim county was supposed to have — it was in the
negotiations and in agreements, and it was settled that they were
supposed to have these institutions. And you will see, if it says
“Serbian county,” then that means the services there were being
divided into two counties. If it doesn’t say “Serbian county,” let
them show me where we dismissed someone from Banja Luka or
Bijeljina. A witness is coming [to testify], a Muslim who worked
for the police force for as long as he wanted. Everybody knew he
was a Muslim. No one killed him.
Muslims and Serbs were killed in Bijeljina, but the differ-
ence between the Muslim who got killed and the Muslim who
didn’t was exclusively because one was carrying a rifle. These
negotiations, you saw them in [the excerpts from] Rabija Šubiü’s
342
sporazume kakve su postigli Srbi i Muslimani u
Vlasenici i u Bratuncu. Da }e imati po dve op{tine i
da }e `iveti mirno, ne smetaju}i jedni drugima.
Taj proces pregovora koji su tako|e spasavali mir i
iskqu~ivali bilo kakvo preme{tawe stanovni{tva,
grubo je prekinula Stranka demokratske akcije svim
sredstvima, a posebno naredbom, odnosno, direktivom
borbena gotovost odmah od 12. aprila. Onda, po nalogu
Stranke demokratske akcije od 12 aprila, svo borbeno
sposobno stanovni{tvo kre}e, jer je op{ta
mobilizacija — {to zna~i od 16 godina do 65 — op{ta
mobilizacija progla{ena je 4 aprila. Svi su vojnici po
wihovim trvdwama i wihovim dokumentima, preko 75%
nema uniformu. Cele prve godine rata, nema uniformu.
I ako pogine u civilnom odelu, ne zna~i da je bio
civil.
I Srbi nisu svi imali uniformu, ali Muslimani
pogotovu nisu imali uniformu. Nisu i{li u vojsku,
sabotirali su JNA celu godinu dana pre toga, i zato su
ratovali u civilnom. I ako pobede negde, onda to slave
i oni i wihovi strani saveznici. Ako izgube negde,
onda nadaju vi~u kako je agresija, agresija, agresija.
Kako }e biti agresija? I ~ija agresija u Kotor Varo{u,
recimo, ili u Sanskom Mostu ili u Kqu~u gde `ive
Srbi i Muslimani, doma}i Srbi, doma}i Muslimani.
Ovde }e svedok iz Prijedora potvrditi kad ga
advokat, u jednom drugom slu~aju pita — slu~aju
Kova~evi} — “Kako ste se usudili?” On ka`e: “Pa
izgubili smo. Oni su bili boqe organizovani. Boqa
vojska.” A advokat ga pita: “Kako ste se usudili da
povedete svoj narod protiv takve vojske?” “[ta sam
mogao,” ka`e, “to je bilo nare|ewe iz Sarajeva.”
343
letter to Izetbegoviü, where she called on him to implement
throughout Bosnia such agreements as those that had been
reached by the Serbs and Muslims in Vlasenica and Bratunac.
That they would each have two counties side by side and that
they would live in peace without interfering in one another’s af-
fairs.
This negotiation process, which served to preserve peace and
to exclude any kind of population resettlement, was brutally in-
terrupted by the SDA which used all the resources at its disposal,
but especially the order, in other words, the directive for Imme-
diate Combat Readiness issued on April 12. Then, pursuant to
the orders of the SDA issued on April 12, all members of the
population who were fit for combat duty were on the move be-
cause it was a general mobilization — which meant men be-
tween the ages of 16 and 65 were called up — a general mobili-
zation was proclaimed on April 4. All of them were, according to
their assertions and documents, soldiers [even though] over 75%
did not have uniforms. For the entire first year of the war, there
were no uniforms. And if a person wearing civilian clothing
were killed, it did not necessarily mean that he was a civilian.
And not all Serbs had uniforms, but the Muslims had practi-
cally none. They [i.e., the Muslims] dodged the draft, they sabo-
taged the JNA for the entire previous year, and that’s the reason
they went to war wearing civilian clothing. And if they scored a
victory somewhere, then they and their foreign allies would cel-
ebrate. If they were defeated elsewhere, then they would raise a
cry that it was aggression, aggression, aggression. How could
that be aggression? Who was the aggressor in Kotor Varoš, for
instance, or Sanski Most or Kljuþ, which was inhabited by both
the Serbs and Muslims, local Serbian and Muslim householders?
A witness from Prijedor will testify here, and when he was
questioned by an attorney in another case — the Kovaþeviü140
case — “How dare you —?” He replied: “Well, we lost. They
344
Vide}ete nekoliko obrazaca. Jedan obrazac je
Vi{egrad i Zvornik. U Vi{egradu, koji je izba~en iz
moje obtu`nice, na`alost, celu godinu dana vlada
teror Muslimana nad Srbima i silovawa devoj~ica i
devojaka na etni~koj osnovi, i ubistvo spomenika Ivi
Andri}u, nobelovcu srpskom iz Bosne, katolik po veri
— to su nam zabranile neke zapadne zemqe da Srbi
katolici ostaju i daqe Srbi, ali Andri} je ostao.
Spomenik je 1991-e sru{en.
I ubistva na slavi — Srbi imaju slavu. To je svetac
za{titnik wegove porodice. I do|u dva Muslimana. On
ih pozove, oni ru~aju, i na kraju, na izlazu, pucaju mu u
~elo radi toga {to on slavi u wihovoj Bosni
hri{~anski praznik. I ~upali su popove za bradu,
vra}ali hodo~asnike koji su krenuli u manastir u
Hercegovinu, da moraju da pro|u kroz Vi{egrad.
Vra}ali su ih. Zaustavqali su JNA cele 1991-e godine.
Kad god su hteli zaustavqali su JNA. Onda su Srbi
pobegli iz Vi{egrada u okolinu, i onda su se vratili, i
vojska je uspostavila red. Srbi su se vratili, i onda su
Muslimani rekli da su oni iz ~ista mira napadnuti,
izvr{ena agresija.
U Zvorniku je straho-vlada muslimanska bila
tako|e. Srbi su izbegli u Karakaj, u srpske op{tine.
Ina~e taj Zvornik ka`u da smo mi kontrolisali. Mi
smo kontrolisali u Zvorniku prete`no srpske delove,
a kada se odbiju Sapna, Kova~evi}, i druge muslimanske
koncentracije, vide}ete da ono {to je ostalo nije
muslimanska ve}ina. Onda su se Srbi vratili, i
oporavili se i pobedili — e, onda je to agresija. Na
stranu, koliko je na{e u~e{}e, to je bilo na samom
po~etku, tako da nismo imali mogu}nosti.
345
were better organized. It was the better army.” And the attorney
questioned him: “Why did you dare lead your people against an
army like that?” He said, “What could I do? That was the order
from Sarajevo.”
You will see several models. One model is Višegrad and
Zvornik. In Višegrad, which was unfortunately dropped from my
Indictment, the Muslims instigated a year-long reign of terror
against the Serbs and they raped young girls and young ladies on
an ethnic basis, and they destroyed the memorial statue of Ivo An-
driü, the Serbian Nobel Prize winner from Bosnia, Roman Catho-
lic by faith — some Western countries have forbidden Serbian
Catholics to remain Serbs, but Andriü always remained a Serb.
Andriü’s memorial statue was destroyed in 1991.
And the murders that took place on the slava — Serbs cele-
brate the slava, [the feast day of] the guardian saint of a family.
And two Muslims came. The host invited them, they sat down to
eat, and at the end [of the meal] as they were leaving, they shot
the host in the forehead for celebrating the feast of his patron
saint, a Christian holiday, in their [Muslim] Bosnia. And they
tore out the beards of priests, they turned away people who were
going on a pilgrimage to a monastery in Herzegovina, so they
had to go through Višegrad. They turned them away. They were
stopping the JNA throughout all of 1991. Whenever they felt like
it. Then the Serbs fled from Višegrad to the surrounding areas,
and then they returned, and the Army established law and order.
The Serbs returned, and then the Muslims claimed that the Serbs
had attacked them for no reason at all, an act of aggression.
The Muslims likewise established an administration of fear
in Zvornik. The Serbs fled to Karakaj, to Serbian counties. In
any case, they say that we controlled Zvornik. In Zvornik, we
controlled predominantly Serbian areas, and when you deduct
Sapna, Kovaþeviüi and other areas where Muslims were concen-
trated, you will see that what remained was not a Muslim majori-
346
U Prijedoru je bilo ne{to sli~no. Dogovor je bio
da se — prvo, 12-og su izgubili, i spre~eni su. A onda su
dobili novi nalog. Cela dolina Sane, to je, zna~i,
Kqu~, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, da ~im
Jugoslovenska narodna armija, posle 20-og maja, ode, oni
napadnu. Imali su u dolini reke Sane elitnu brigadu
Patriotske lige. I dolina Sane se zapalila po nalogu
iz Sarajeva.
Imamo taj — to je Sanski Most, iz koga }emo dobiti
— ja jo{ nisam spreman da ispitam svedoke Sanskog
Mosta, ali toliko znam. Ima sela, i sela, {to bi rekao
Izetbegovi}, ima zakona i zakona. Ima sela, i sela.
Ima sela kojima ni{ta nije falilo, ima sela koja su
imala sukobe. Al’ ta sela koja su imala sukobe,
Hrustovo i ostale, imale su 900 boraca. I lepo
Muslimani pi{u u svojim kwigama: “Dok smo ~uvali
stra`e, nismo imali problema. A kad smo krenuli u
ofanzivu, dobili smo po prstima.” Mi smo znali da oni
~uvaju stra`e i nije nam to smetalo. To je defanzivna
mera. Ako se ose}aju nesigurno, neka ~uvaju stra`e. Ali
kad krenu da ubijaju po srpskim selima, onda je sukob
neizbe`an.
Zna~i, dva tipa je, mawe vi{e dva tipa: teror. Srbi
be`e, vra}aju se, i za{tite svoje ku}e, i eventualno
pobede u jednom delu grada ili u jednom delu op{tine.
Drugi je tip — dogovori da se podele op{tine. Zna se
da }e Sanski Most biti srpski sa Rurci Palankom i
delom grada da }e ostavni deo biti muslimanski — sve
dogovoreno. A onda se to izneveri, napadnu nas, i onda
kad izgube, onda imamo tu buku. Dvanaest hiqada
Muslimana je `ivelo tokom rata u Sanskom Mostu pod
srpskom kontrolom. Sanski Most je poznat iz Drugog
svetskog rata. [u{war, brdo na kome je ubijeno u
347
ty. Then the Serbs returned, they recovered their strength, and
were victorious — well, then that’s aggression. Besides, as far as
our participation was concerned, that was at the beginning of the
war, so we did not have any opportunities there.
Something similar took place in Prijedor. There was an
agreement to — first of all, they were defeated on April 12, and
they were thwarted. And then they got a new order. The whole
Sana valley, that means Kljuþ, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Bosanski
Novi, that as soon as the JNA left, after May 20, they were going
to attack. They had an elite Patriotic League brigade in the Sana
River Valley. And the Sana River Valley was put to the torch
pursuant to orders from Sarajevo.
We have the case of Sanski Most, from which we’re going to
get — I’m still not ready to examine witnesses from Sanski
Most, but I do know this much. That there are villages, and then
there are villages, as Izetbegoviü would say — there are laws,
and then there are laws. There are villages, and then there are
villages. There are villages where nothing happened, and then
there are villages where conflicts took place. But those villages
that had conflicts, Hrustovo and the others, had 900 fighters.
And the Muslims write lovely passages in their books, such as:
“While we were standing guard we didn’t have any problems.
But when we launched an offensive, we got rapped across the
knuckles.” We knew that they were standing guard and that
didn’t bother us. That was a defensive measure. If they felt un-
safe, let them stand guard. But when they started killing people
in Serbian villages, then conflict was unavoidable.
There were more or less were two types of terror. The Serbs
flee, they return, they protect their homes, and eventually they
come out victorious in part of a town or part of a county. The sec-
ond type [of terror] — negotiations on the division of counties. It
was common knowledge that Sanski Most was going to be Serbi-
an, with Rurca Palanka, and the remaining part of the town was
348
jednom danu 5.300 Srba. E, ti Srbi — niko nema pravo
da od wih od~ekuje da budu neoprezni, i da puste da
ponovo bude pet hiqada Srba u jednom danu pobijeno. To
je poznati [u{war. Dvanaest hiqada Muslimana `ivi
i radi u Sanskom Mostu bez ikakvih problema, a
nekolike stotine — ne znam koliko — je na Mawa~i, a
razlika je samo u tome {to su se ovi borili, a ovi se
nisu borili.
U Prijedoru, Ekselencije, vlast je dala oglas na
televiziji kad su odlu~ili da napadnu 23. maja. Pucali
su na kola u kojima su bila ~etiri Srbina i dva Hrvata.
Dvojicu ubili, dvojicu lako ranili, i dvojicu te{ko
ranili. Vide}ete kako to sme{no izgleda kad oni
obja{wavaju da su ova {estorica napali wih na punktu
odnosno. Prosto je sme{no.
Vlast je, kada su Muslimani krenuli na Prijedor,
dala oglas na radiju da civili ne izlaze dok se s
teroristima ne obra~una. Ali mnogi nisu poslu{ali, i
to }e ovde potvrditi, ti svedoci, da nisu poslu{ali, i
ve} imamo wihove — u javnosti — izjave.
Omarska i Keraterm nisu logeri. Omarska i
Keraterm su istra`ni centri redovnih dr`avnih
organa. Tu`ila{tvo ima, a nije mi dostavilo, preko tri
hiqade dokumenata istra`nih radwi, koje su
zabele`ili istra`ni organi u Keratermu i u Omarskoj.
Hiqadu i pet sto i ne{to je bilo zarobqenih, u dva
dana. To }e potvrditi hrvatski intercepti, i drugi
izvori. Masivno zarobqavawe boraca, i civila koji su
iza{li i ume{ali se, a nisu ratovali. Trija`a u
centrima Omarska i Keraterm daje slede}i rezultat:
41% utvr|uje se da nisu u~estvovali u borbama. I
pu{teni su. I oni se dokopaju Trnopoqa i tamo naprave
sebi sigurnost, jer nema{ toliko policajaca da ~uva{
349
going to be Muslim — everything had been agreed upon. And
then that agreement was betrayed, they attacked us, and once they
lost, we had this brouhaha. During the war, twelve thousand Mus-
lims lived in Sanski Most under Serb control. Sanski Most is well
known from World War II. That’s where Šušnjar is, a hill where
5,300 Serbs were killed in a single day. Well, those Serbs — no
one has the right to expect those Serbs to be careless and to allow
five thousand more Serbs to be killed once again in a single day.
That’s the well-known Šušnjar. Twelve thousand Muslims live
and work in Sanski Most without any problems, while several
hundred — I don’t know the exact number — are in Manjaþa, and
the only difference is that the latter took up arms, while the former
did not.
In Prijedor, Your Excellencies, the [Muslim] authorities an-
nounced on television that they had decided to attack on May 23.
They fired on an automobile in which there were with four Serbs
and two Croats. Two were killed, two suffered minor injuries,
and two were seriously wounded. You will see how ludicrous it
was when they explained that those six men attacked them at a
check-point. It’s simply ludicrous.
When the Muslims started moving toward Prijedor, the [Ser-
bian] authorities made a radio announcement that civilians
should not leave their homes until accounts with the terrorists
had been settled. But many did not pay attention to this, and wit-
nesses will testify to that here, that these people did not obey [the
authorities] and we already have their affidavits, which have
been made public.
Omarska and Keraterm were not concentration camps.
Omarska and Keraterm were investigative centers that were a part
of regular state institutions. The Prosecution has in its possession,
but has not disclosed, over 3,000 investigative documents which
the investigative authorities recorded in Keraterm and Omarska.
Over the course of two days, about 1,500 people were captured.
350
svaku ku}u, a kad su oni u Trnopoqu, onda pet
policajaca mo`e da ih ~uva da im tamo niko ne
na{kodi. I oni }e to sami potvrditi, i vidi se na onom
filmu i ~uje se kad oni ka`u. ^etrdeset jedan posto
privedenih u Keraterm i Omarsku su pu{teni nakon
trija`e na osnovu istrage. Oni su podjednako
Muslimani kao i ovi. Pedeset devet posto je na|eno da
su bili borci i oni su poslati na Mawa~u u ratni
zarobqeni~ki logor, a 41% je pu{teno.
E, neka Tu`ila{tvo prvo mi dade tih tri hiqade
dokumenata istra`nih, a drugo, neka pogleda malo kako
su te istrage vo|ene. To su dr`avni organi. To su
normalne institucije. To nije strana~ka policija. Pa
da onda utvrdimo — boqe bi bilo da je bilo utvr|eno
pre procesa — i na procesu da utvrdimo kako se desilo
da za kratko vreme kad su zarobqeni, da je od hiqadu pet
sto, da je 41% pu{ten.
To govori protiv onoga {to Tu`ila{tvo ka`e, da je
to bilo hap{ewe qudi koji nemaju nikakvih
odgovornisti.
[to se ti~e drugih preme{tawa itd., odnosno,
deportacija. Ovde }emo dokazati pomo}u dokumenata
koje smo dobili qubazno{}u Tu`ila{tva da su civili
iz jedne i druge sredine tra`ili da idu. Srbi su morali
da pla}aju grdne pare, i u Sarajevu, da bi bili pu{teni
da iza|u, i u centralnoj Bosni, a u centralnoj Bosni
ponegde su nam pomogli Hrvati da ih propuste. Jer su
be`ali bezglave, a i mi smo Hrvate i Muslimane
pu{tali gde god je trebalo da civile spasimo i
pustimo.
351
Croatian [telephone] intercepts will bear this out, as will other
sources. There was a capture en masse of combatants as well as
civilians who had gone out and gotten mixed up with them, but
had not fought. The triage conducted in the Omarska and Ker-
aterm Centers yields the following results: 41% confirmed that
they had not taken any part in combat. And they were released.
And then they managed to reach Trnopolje and they felt safe there
even though there weren’t enough policemen to guard every single
house, and while they were in Trnopolje, five policemen were
enough to protect them so no one came to any harm. And they
themselves will confirm this, and it can be seen in the film footage
what they have to say. Forty-one percent of the detainees in Ker-
aterm and Omarska were released after this triage had been con-
ducted on the basis of an investigation. They were Muslims just as
the others were. Fifty-nine percent were found to be combatants,
and they were sent to Manjaþa to the military prisoner of war
camp, while 41% were released.
Well, first I’d like the Prosecution to provide me with those
3,000 investigative documents; and second, they should take a
look and see how these investigations were conducted. Those
were state organs. They are normal institutions. They were not a
police force with party affiliations. So let’s establish — it would
have been better to have established this before the trial — here
during the trial [to establish] how it happened that within a short
period of time after their capture, 41% of the 1,500 detainees
were released.
This contradicts the Prosecution’s claim that this was the ar-
rest of people who were completely innocent.
As far as other relocations, in other words, deportations,
etc., are concerned, we will prove, with the aid of documents
provided to us, courtesy of the Prosecution, that civilians from
both communities sought to leave. Serbs had to pay exorbitant
amounts of money, even in Sarajevo, to be allowed to leave, as
352
U zoni Srebrenice i Zvornika, General Morijon je
bio pod stalnim pritiskom srpske i muslimanske
strane. Muslimanska strana je tra`ila od wega da vodi
civile u Tuzlu. A srpska strana je rekla u redu.
Dopusti}emo to, ali izvedite nam Srbe iz Tuzle, jer
tamo pate. Tamo su u opasnosti. Nesumwivo je da je
Morijon bio pod takvim pritiscima, da je to
posvedo~io, i da je omogu}avao da muslimanski civili
odu u Tuzlu, a na`alost, Muslimani iz Tuzle nisu dali
da Srbi iz Tuzle iza|u, i to je bio na~in kako je SDA
kompromitovala SDS kod srpskog naroda. Rekla, evo,
va{e SDS ne mo`e vas da izvede iz Tuzle.
U dnevniku Nikole Koqevi}a, imamo dokaz da su
Muslimani iz Trebiwa preko Biqane Plav{i} vr{ili
pritisak da im dopustimo da idu iz Trebiwa. I ja sam
pobesneo. Po tom dnevniku, bio sam besan i rekao sam
da ne dolazi u obzir. Ako im ne{to smeta, ima policija
da ih za{titi. Oni su ipak oti{li po nalogu SDA, i
imamo taj dokument koji }emo ovde prikazati. Za tri
meseca, SDA je tra`ila Trebiwe po osnovu etni~kog
~i{}ewa. Ma to su primitivni trikovi! Imamo ih.
Znamo da su oni naredili trebiwski Muslimani da idu
u Crnu Goru, koji niko nije ubijen. Ni{ta im nije bilo.
U istom tom dnevniku, profesor Koqevi}, svedok i
u~esnik, podpresednik Republike, divan ~ovek,
odgovoran, vrlo dobrim odnosima sa Muslimanima,
Bawa Lu~anin ro|eni, `iveo u Sarajevu, svedo~i kako
je jedna od dve me|unarodne organizacije — Crveni
Krst i UNHC su bile najpovla{}enije i
najpo{tovanije s na{e strane — zahtevala od mene da
dopustim da veliki broj Muslimana i Hrvata iz
Bosanske Krajine, iz okoline Bawa Luke, odvedu u
tre}e zemqe. I ja sam naravno bio besan. I nisam dao. I
353
well as in Central Bosnia, but in Central Bosnia the Croats
helped us in some places to grant them safe passage. Because
they were fleeing head over heels, but we granted Croats and
Muslims safe passage wherever it was necessary in order to save
civilian lives and allow them to leave.
In the Srebrenica and Zvornik zones, General Morillon was
under constant pressure from both the Serbian and Muslim sides.
The Muslim side wanted him to take the civilians to Tuzla. And
the Serbian side said it was alright. We shall allow that, but let
the Serbs from Tuzla leave because they are suffering there.
They are in danger there. There is no doubt that Morillon was
under such pressures, and he testified to that, and he enabled
Muslim civilians to leave for Tuzla, but, unfortunately, the Mus-
lims from Tuzla did not allow Serbs from Tuzla to leave, and
that was how the SDA compromised the SDS in the eyes of the
Serbian people. They said: Look, your SDS is incapable helping
you leave Tuzla.
In Nikola Koljeviü’s diary,141 we have evidence that the
Muslims from Trebinje exerted pressure on Biljana Plavšiü in
order to be allowed to leave Trebinje. I was infuriated. Accord-
ing to the diary, I was enraged and I said that it was out of the
question. If they had any problem, the police were there to pro-
tect them. They, nevertheless, left according to the SDA’s order,
and we have that document which we will produce here in court.
Three months later, the SDA sought to gain possession of
Trebinje on the basis of ethnic cleansing. O, this is low-class
con-artistry! We’ve got them. We know that they ordered the
Trebinje Muslims, not one of whom was killed, to go to Monte-
negro. Nothing happened to them.
In that same diary, Prof. Koljeviü, who was a witness to as
well as a participant in these events, a Vice-President of the Re-
public, a wonderful, responsible man, who had excellent rela-
tions with the Muslims, who was born in Banja Luka and lived
354
nakon dugih pritisaka, ja sam dao saglasnost po pet
kamiona dnevno, a ne po osamdeset kako su oni hteli.
Zna~i, ako je neko ugro`en i ba{ `eli da ide, `eli da
se spoji — to su oni pod spajawem porodice, itd.
Ali da ne verujemo pokojnom Profesoru Koqevi}u.
Svedok ovog Tu`ila{tva istim re~ima, u svojoj izjavi
— nije dosad svedo~io — svedo~i}e u mom slu~aju.
Istim re~ima, to isto ka`e. I Tu`ila{tvo }e da ka`e
da smo mi o~istili te qude iz Bosanske Krajine, a oni
su tra`ili. I iz Bosanskog Novog su upotrebili
UNPROFOR da ih prevede u Hrvatsku. Zahtevi su
wihovi bili. Ju~e sam pomenuo da su mnoge op{tine
pravile smetwe, tra`ile su potvrdu da su platili
porez, da su ovo, da su ono. Pravili su smetwe. To se ne
radi ako se neko tera iz ku}e, a ostavqa topao ru~ak,
kao {to su Srbi be`ali iz muslimanskih krajeva.
Srbi su iz muslimanskih krajeva be`ali navrat na
nos. Muslimani su iz srpskih krajeva odlazili
organizovano, na wihov zahtev, uz pratwu policije koju
su oni tako|e zahtevali. To }emo sve dokazati. Zna~i,
Bosanksa Krajina nije o~i{}ena. Ministar, Hrvat, koji
sada `ivi u Ladije, Republike Srpske, ovih dana je dao
intervju i rekao: “Ja nisam nigde odlazio iz Republike
Srpske. A oni koji su oti{li, qutili su se na mene {to
ja ostajem.” Dakle, wegovi Hrvati koji su oti{li iz
Doboja, oti{li su demonstrativno, oti{li su da mogu
da to eksploati{u. Qutili su se na wega za{to je ostao
i tako negira wihovu tvrdwu da se ne mo`e `iveti sa
Srbima. Eto, to imamo `ivog tog ministra. Imamo
wegov taj intervju.
355
in Sarajevo, witnessed how one of the two international organi-
zations — the ICRC and the UNHCR were the most favored and
the most respected by our side — demanded that I allow a large
number of Muslims and Croats from Bosanska Krajina, the area
surrounding of Banja Luka, to be escorted to a third country. Of
course, I was enraged. And I didn’t allow it. And as a result of
long-standing pressure, I approved five trucks a day to be al-
lowed leave instead of the eighty they had demanded. If some-
one had been subjected to threats and wanted to go, and wanted
to be reunited — I’m referring to people who wanted to be reu-
nited with their families, etc.
But let us not lend credence to the late Prof. Koljeviü. A
Prosecution witness who used these same words in his statement
— he has not yet given testimony — will testify in my case. He
will say the same things with the same words. And the Prosecu-
tion is going to claim that we cleansed these people from Bosan-
ska Krajina, but they, in fact, wanted to leave. And the people
from Bosanski Novi actually used UNPROFOR to escort them to
Croatia. Those were their demands. Yesterday, I mentioned that
many counties created obstacles, seeking proof of payment of
taxes, and then one thing after another. They created obstacles.
That’s not done if you’re driving people out of their homes, peo-
ple who are leaving a hot lunch behind, as when Serbs were flee-
ing Muslim areas.
The Serbs fled head over heels from Muslim areas. Muslims
left Serbian areas in an organized fashion, at their own request,
escorted by the police, which they as well had demanded. We are
going to prove all this. Bosanska Krajina was not ethnically
cleansed. A minister, a Croat who now lives in Ladija, Republika
Srpska, recently gave an interview and said: “I never left the Re-
publika Srpska. But those who did leave were angry with me for
staying behind.” So, his fellow Croats who left Doboj did so
demonstratively in order to exploit their departure. They were
356
Dakle, to je stvar koju }emo osporiti i verujem i
nadam se da }emo dokazati da ona nije takva. Dokaza}emo
da nijedno selo koje je predalo oru`je ili ga nije ni
imalo, nije imalo nikakvih problema. I da nijedan
Musliman koji se nije se borio, nije imao nikakvih
problema. I vide}ete koji su to koji nisu imali
problema, i koji su imali problema i bili u zatvorima
— oni su bili ekstremisti, jer redovno su bili
ekstremisti.
Sada bih pre{ao na temu Srebrenice. “Eliminacija
Muslimana iz Srebrenice sa organizovawem ubijawem
mu{karaca, i deportacija `ena i dece, i genocid
Srebreni~kih Muslimana.”
Ovde u naslovu nema mu{karaca i de~aka koje
Tu`ila{tvo prilepi uz mu{karce, ne specifikuju}i
{ta je to “de~ak.” Ali to je emocionalno — ovako
dobro zvu~i u svetu — zna~i Srbi su ubijali de~ake. A
po “de~acima” podrazumeva momka od sedamnaest godina,
{estnaest i vi{e koji su bili mobilisani, bili su u
jedinicama.
Moram samo kratko — da ne bude tu quoque, nije tu
quoque — da ka`em da su u`asne bitke i teror koji su
Muslimani iz celog tog podru~ja ispoqavali prema
Srbima. Pucali u le|a vojske — nijedna vojska na svetu
to ne mora da trpi — cela sela ubijali na praznike
hri{}anske: Bo`i}, slave. I to je jasno, to postoji —
lako dokazati. Ovaj optu`eni je za sve muslimanske
praznike i katoli~ke praznike izdavao naredbu da se
maksimalno udr`ava. A oni su nas i u Drugom svetskom
ratu, i u ovom ratu, na najve}e srpske praznike ubijali.
Vide}ete ovde {ta su uradili u Kravici 1993-e godine
na Bo`i} — to je Bo`i}, zna~i, osam, devet meseci
posle od izbijawa rata, kako su pokasapili nespreman
357
angry with him for staying behind and thereby nullifying their
claim it was impossible live together with Serbs. Look, we have
a flesh and blood minister. We have his interview.
So, we are going to contest this and I believe and I hope to
prove that this was not so. We will prove that not one single vil-
lage that had surrendered its weapons, or didn’t have them at all
in the first place, had any problems at all. And that not one Mus-
lim who was not a combatant had any problems at all. And you
will see who those were who didn’t have any problems, as well
as those who did have problems and were imprisoned — they
were extremists, each and every one of them.
I would now like to move to the subject of Srebrenica. “The
Elimination of Muslims from Srebrenica by Means of the Orga-
nized Killing of Men and by the Deportation of Women and
Children, and the Genocide of Srebrenica’s Muslims.”
In the title there is no reference to the “men and boys” whom
the Prosecution bundles with the men without specifying what
“boy” means. But this has emotional impact — it sounds good
[broadcast] throughout the world — it means that the Serbs were
killing boys. But the word “boy” means a seventeen-year-old
male, sixteen or older who had been mobilized, who was a
member of a unit.
I must briefly state — so that it does not appear as tu quoque
— it’s not tu quoque — that there were horrible battles and terror
which the Muslims from that entire area inflicted on Serbs. They
shot [members of] the Army in the back — and no army in the
world has to put up with that — they slaughtered entire villages
on Christian holidays: Christmas and slavas. And it’s clear it
happened — and it’s easy to prove. The Accused issued orders to
exercise maximum restraint during all Roman Catholic and Mus-
lim holidays. They were killing Serbs on their great Christian
holidays during the Second World War, as well as during this
one. You will see here in court what they did in Kravica on
358
narod koji se spremao da slavi. To je bilo napad na
civile bez ikakvih razloga.
Ovde }u tra`iti od Tu`ila{tva da nam donese
pouzdane podatke, koliko je `ena muslimanskih
poginulo, a kolko srpkiwa; koliko dece muslimanske, a
koliko srpske. A pokaza}emo, Ekselencijo, gde su
ginuli Srbi a gde Muslimani. I Srbi i Muslimani su
prete`no ginuli u srpskim selima. Dakle, do|e
muslimanska vojska, napadne srpsko selo, i ginu i Srbi
i Muslimani. Mesto smrti }e jasno pokazati ko je {ta
radio u ovome ratu.
Pre Srebrenice, bih samo hteo jednu stvar da ka`em
u vezi sa direktivama. Ovde se pomiwu Direktiva 4 i
Direktiva 7. Direktiva 4, direktiva 7. Ja sad ne ulazim
u to, da li sam ja i gde sam i koju sam potpisao, nego {ta
je su{tina re~enice Generala Mladi}a kada on ka`e da
ima da sa stanovni{tvom napuste zonu. A evo kako stvar
stoji.
Stanovni{tvo ultimativno tra`i da bude pu{teno.
Recimo, 2-og i 3-eg novembra u Kotor Varo{u, digli su
ustanak Muslimani i tra`e da se wihovo stanovni{tvo
pusti. I ja to odobravam. Mladi}, ne znaju}i za moju —
on ka`e ne. Mogu samo da idu i oni. Ne mogu oni da
puste civile, a da oni ostaju da se bore u dubini na
na{oj teritoriji.
Dve nedeqe posle toga, Mladi} izdaje Direktivu
broj 4, koja se odnosi na isto~nu Bosnu, i ka`e isto ovo.
Da sa civilima napuste ili da se razoru`aju i ostanu da
`ive kao civili — to Tu`ila{tvo prevodi da se
“predaju”, razoru`ati se i “predati se.”
Imamo problem sa transkriptom, je’l?
359
Christmas in 1993 — I mean Christmas day, eight/nine months
after the war broke out, how they slaughtered people who were
not prepared [to defend themselves], people who were preparing
their slava. It was a senseless attack on civilians.
I’m going to request that the Prosecution provide reliable in-
formation on the number of Muslim women who were killed; the
number of Serbian women who were killed; the number of Mus-
lim children who were killed; and the number of Serbian chil-
dren who were killed. And we are going to demonstrate, Excel-
lencies, where Serbs were being killed and where Muslims were
being killed. Both Serbs and Muslims were killed chiefly in Ser-
bian villages. So, the Muslim Army arrives, attacks a Serbian
village, and both Serbs and Muslims die. The place of death will
clearly demonstrate who was doing what in this war.
Directives No. 4 & 7
Before I move on to Srebrenica, I would like to say some-
thing in connection to those directives. Directives No. 4 and 7
are mentioned here. Directive No. 4 and Directive No. 7. And
I’m not going to go into whether I signed or where I signed or
which one I signed; instead I will focus on the essence of Gen-
eral Mladiü’s statement when he said that they [the combatants]
had to leave the zone together with the population. Here’s how
the matter stands.
The population issued an ultimatum that it wanted to be al-
lowed to leave. For instance, on November 2 or 3 in Kotor Va-
roš, the Muslims staged a rebellion, and they wanted their popu-
lation to be allowed to leave. I approved it. Mladiü, unaware of
my decision, said no, only the rebels could leave. They could not
allow the civilians to go and leave them [the combatants] there to
fight against us deep in our own territory.
Two weeks later, Mladiü issued Directive No. 4, which re-
lated to Eastern Bosnia, and he said the same thing: That they
[the combatants] had to either leave with the civilians or disarm
360
Vidite, da malo razjasnim. U Direktivi br. 4, jedna
re~enica ima koja se perpetuira u daqim direktivima.
U Direktivi br. 7, i ona glasi — ta re~enica koju
Tu`ila{tvo stavqa meni i Mladi}u na teret — da smo
naredili da se vojska i civili izgube iz odre|ene zone.
Ali to nije tako. Mladi} je rekao da borci idu sa
civilima, a ne civili sa borcima. Ovde }emo dokazati
da su civili tra`ili i da im je bilo odobrovano da idu,
a Mladi} ka`e: “Ima da idete i vi sa civilima.” I u toj
direktivi ne ka`e Mladi} ima vojska da napusti da
povede civile, nego obrnuto, po{to civili idu, neka
ide s wima i vojska. I to je nedvosmisleno.
Dve nedeqe pre Direktive br. 4, imamo taj slu~aj u
Kotor Varo{u, i taj slu~aj sada postaje model srpskog
pona{awa: ako ho}e civili da idu, mogu da idu, ali
nemojte vi da ostajete da se borite, da nam pucate u
le}a. Idite i vi, pusti}emo vas. Su{tina Direktive 4 i
Direktive 7 je da civili sa sobom povedu vojsku, po{to
civili ina~e ho}e da idu. Zahtevi su sa muslimanske
strane i u isto~noj Bosni, prema Morijonu, i u Kotor
Varo{u prema kriznom {tabu op{tine, odnosno,
ratnom presedni{tvu op{tine, u ultimativan zahtev da
se wihovi civili puste. I ima dokaz da ja sam rekao, “u
redu, pustite ih, omogu}ite im da bezbedno pro|u.” Ali
vojnici imaju svoju logiku, oni ka`u: “Izvinite, za{to
biste vi sada da civile idu preko cele na{e teritorije
da bi vi posle da nas ubijate? Idite i vi s wima.” E, to
je osnova Direktive 4 i Direktive 7, kojima ovde ma{e
Tu`ila{tvo i osudili su neke qude, a to u op{te nije
ta~no. Re~enica ne glasi da civili odu s vojskom, nego
obrnuto, da vojska ode s civilima. A vidimo dve nedeqe
ranije utvr|eno je da }e iz Kotor Varo{a civili oti}i,
361
and remain there living as civilians — the Prosecution translates
this as they “must surrender,” disarm and “surrender.”
We have a problem with the transcript, don’t we?
You see, I want to clarify things a little. In Directive No. 4,
there is a sentence which was repeated in subsequent directives.
In Directive No. 7, and this sentence — with which the Prosecu-
tion charges both Mladiü and me — declares that we had ordered
the Army and the civilians to disappear from a certain zones. But
that is not so. Mladiü said that the combatants should leave to-
gether with the civilians, not the civilians with the combatants.
We are going to prove here that it was the civilians who asked
and who received permission to leave, but Mladiü told them:
“You too have to go with the civilians.” Mladiü didn’t say in this
directive that the Army had to leave and take civilians along with
them, but quite the opposite, that, since the civilians were leav-
ing, then the Army had to go with them. And this is unambigu-
ous.
Two weeks before Directive No. 4 was issued, we had that
case in Kotor Varoš and this case now serves as a model for Ser-
bian conduct: if civilians want to leave, they may leave, but
don’t stay behind to fight and shoot us in the back. You go too,
and we’ll allow it. The essence of Directive Nos. 4 and 7 was
that the civilians must take the Army with them because the ci-
vilians, in any case, want to leave. These requests were made by
the Muslim side in Eastern Bosnia to Morillon, and in Kotor Va-
roš to the county crisis centers, in other words, to the wartime
presidency of the county, as an ultimatum that their civilians be
allowed to leave. There is proof that I said: “All right, let them
go. Grant them safe passage.” But soldiers have their own logic
and they say: “Pardon me, why would you allow civilians to go
across all of our territory so that you can then kill us? You ought
to go with them, too.” Well, that is the basis for Directives No. 4
and 7, which the OTP is waving around and with which they
362 363

i da treba da ide i vojska s wima, a ne da ostane da se u have convicted some people, but it is utterly incorrect. This sen-
na{oj dubini iza na{ih le|a bori protiv nas. tence does not state that the civilians must leave with the Army,
Za Srebrenicu }u kratko da pre|em taj period pre but the reverse, that the Army must leave with the civilians. And
1995. Srebrenica i @epa su u 1993-e progla{ene za we saw two weeks prior to this that it was confirmed that the
za{ti}ene zone nakon {to sam ja obustavio civilians would leave Kotor Varoš, and that the Army had to
napredovawe srpske vojske. Iz Kamenice, iz okolnih leave with them, and not to stay behind deep in our territory and
mesta izme|u Srebrenice i Zvornika. Stalno su nas fight us while we had our backs turned.
napadali. I ne samo vojsku, nego su zaustavqali zasedu,
Srebrenica
pa autobus civila pobiju na Crnom Vrhu. To se nije
As for Srebrenica, I will briefly cover the period before
vi{e moglo tolerisati. Nikakvi predgovori nisu dali
1995. In 1993, Srebrenica and Žepa were declared safe havens
rezultate. Oni su slu{ali naredbe iz Sarajeva da
after I halted the advance of Serbian Army. They were constant-
uznemiravaju Srbe i vojsku svuda i na svakom mestu.
ly attacking us from Kamenica, from the areas between Srebren-
Tako su se razvile borbe na podru~ju izme|u Zvornika,
ica and Zvornik. They were constantly attacking us. And not on-
Kamenica itd., prema Srebrenici. I tada su oni
ly were they attacking the Army, but they also set up an ambush,
izgubili i mnogi su oti{li u Srebrenicu. Bila je
and they killed a bus load of civilians on Crveni Vrh. It was im-
stra{na propaganda oko Cerske. Ista kao {to je bilo i
possible to tolerate this any longer. Negotiations did not yield
za Srebrenicu. Krv te~e potocima, Srbi su pokasapili,
any results whatsoever. They were following orders from Sara-
itd.
jevo to harass Serbs as well as the Serbian Army anywhere and
General Morijon je tra`io saglasnost od mene da
everywhere they could. That was how fighting broke out in the
u|e u Cersku da vidi. General Morijon je u{ao u Cersku
area between Zvornik, Kamenica, etc. towards Srebrenica. And
i izvestio: nema ni traga o borbama, a kamoli o
then they lost, and many of them went to Srebrenica. There was
masakrima. Zato smo mi kasno naredili istrage oko
an enormous propaganda campaign surrounding Cerska just as
Srebrenice, jer je ista propaganda, istim re~ima za
there was surrounding Srebrenica. Rivers of blood flowed. The
Cersku ponovqena dve godina kasnije za Srebrenicu.
Serbs were slaughtering people, etc.
Ja sam zaustavio napredovawe na{e vojske kod
General Morillon sought my agreement to enter Cerska to see
Srebrenice poznatom naredbom. Ona je ovde
for himself. General Morillon entered Cerska, and he reported:
prezentovana. I naredio sam ~ak da ne vr{e ni istrage
there was no trace of fighting at all, let alone a massacre. That’s
o ratnim zlo~inima, a bilo je jako mnogo ratnih
the reason why we were late in ordering an investigation to be
zlo~ina, da bismo izbegli eventualno neku
conducted on Srebrenica, because the same propaganda campaign,
nekontrolisanu osvetu.
the same words that were applied to Cerska were repeated two
years later in connection with Srebrenica.
I halted the advance of our Army towards Srebrenica with
the well-known order I gave. It has been presented here. And I
364
Progla{ena za{ti}ena zona, dogovorene granice
dve za{ti}ene zone, izme|u dve za{ti}ene zone koje
nisu spojene, ostavqen je na{ prolaz u na{oj
teritoriji izme|u Skelana i Mili}a, itd. Celo vreme,
kao {to svedo~i Generalni Sekretar Ujedinih Nacija,
da Srebrenica i @epa nisu za{ti~ene zone nego
“stronghold,” upori{ta vojna, oru`ana upori{ta iz koji
se permanentno svakodnevno bar jedan Srbin, vojnik
ili civil, gine oko tih “za{ti}enih zona.”
Svakodnevno, imamo izve{taje Generalnog Sekretara
Savetu Bezbednosti, {ta se de{ava tamo. Tu`ila{tvo
je, vaqda na osnovu toga, prihvatilo da je to legitimna
akcija bila, ali na{a akcija nije bila usmerena na
uzimawe Srebrenice.
U svim sporazumima, u svim planovi mirovnim, mi
smo prihvatali da }e Srebrenica i @epa biti ~ak
povezane sa Gora`dem i da }e u tom delu biti kanton
kao sada {to ima u Gora`du kanton, da }e biti @epa i
Srebrenica muslimanske. Zna~i, nije nam padalo na
pamet da to uzimamo. Kada su se na{i vojnici vratili u
granice za{ti}ene zone, odjednom se pokazalo da su oni
napustili Srebrenicu. I onda sam ja odobrio da u|u da
razoru`aju bande, da uspostave vlast, da uspostave red i
mir, da ~uvaju, itd. Ima i to pismo ovde. Posebno je
General Tolimir obave{tavan {ta sam ja odobrio.
Kad su na{i u{li u Srebrenicu, nema civila! Nema
ni vojske. Nema nikoga. Vojska je pobegla u {ume,
civilna vlast je izvr{ila predaju. Vojska nije
poslu{ala civilnu vlast, odmetnula se u {ume da se
bori, a civile — nije srpska vojska izvela iz ku}a, nego
su ih izvele Ujediwene Nacije.
365
even ordered them not to investigate any war crimes, although
there were plenty of them, just in order to avoid any eventual
uncontrollable revenge killings.
A safe haven was declared, borders were agreed to for the
two safe areas, and between two safe areas that were not con-
nected, a passage was left for us on our territory between Skelani
and Miliüi, etc. Throughout this entire time, as the UN Secretary-
General himself testified, Srebrenica and Žepa were not safe ha-
vens but were instead military “strongholds,” military bases,
armed bastions from which, as a permanent daily occurrence, at
least one Serb, be it a soldier or a civilian, was killed around
these “safe havens.” We have daily reports from the Secretary-
General of the Security Council about what was happening there.
The Prosecution, perhaps on this basis, accepted that it was a
legitimate operation, but our operation was not designed to cap-
ture Srebrenica.
In all the agreements, in all the peace plans, we had accepted
that Srebrenica and Žepa would even be connected to Goražde
and that the area would become a canton, just as there is a Go-
ražde canton, and Žepa and Srebrenica would be Muslim. It nev-
er occurred to us to take them. When our soldiers returned to the
safe haven, it was immediately apparent that they [i.e., the Mus-
lims] had abandoned Srebrenica. And then I ordered them to en-
ter the town to disarm roving gangs, to establish authority, to
establish order and maintain peace, to protect, etc. I have that
letter here. General Tolimir,142 in particular, was advised of what
I had approved.
Once our troops entered Srebrenica, there were no civilians!
There was no Army. There was no one at all. The [Muslim] Ar-
my had fled into the woods; the civilian authorities surrendered.
The [Muslim] Army did not obey the civilian authorities; it fled
into the woods to continue fighting, while the civilian population
366
Imamo ovde dokaze, i svedoka muslimanskih da su,
polaze}i od sela, a ne iz same Srebrenice, i{li sa
planom i sa namerom da mu{karci se pridru`e jedinici
za probaj prema Tuzli, a civili da idu u Poto~are da ih
Ujediwene Nacije prebace u Kladaw i u teritoriju pod
muslimanskom kontrolom. Potpuno iznena}ewe bilo
kad smo mi u{li, i potpuno iznena|ewe bilo da nema
civila kod svojih ku}a, i potpuno iznena|ewe je bilo da
svi civili ho}e da napuste.
Ovde, i daqe Tu`ila{tvo insistira da je to bilo
prisilna deportacija, a imamo sve mogu}e dokaze da nije
bila prisilna deportacija. I imamo dokaz da nije bila
planirana. Ni{ta nismo imali sredstava.
Morali smo, kad smo ~uli da ne}e da idu ku}ama, da
ho}e da budu preme{teni u Kladaw i Tuzlu pod
muslimansku kontrolu, navrat-nanos smo tra`ili
autobuse i kola i kamione, jer smo se pla{ili osvete. U
tolikoj masi, neki osvetnik baci bombu, to bi bila
kasapnica. Nikakvih ubijawa nema do 14-og. Ima 13-og
incident u Kravici — izazvao je zarobqenik —
Musliman — oteo je pu{ku i pucao je i tu se desio
incident.
Do 14-og nema nikakvih incidenata. Krunski svedok
Tu`ila{tva protiv mene u slu~aju Srebrenice, pokojni
Derowi}, na koga se oni najvi{e nadaju, od 92 quarter
pravilu, u stvari svedo~i u moj korist. On ka`e da je
dva puta 13-og uve~e i 14-og u jutru, navodno nekog
pukovnika koji je bio raspolo`en da likvidira neke
ratne zarobqenike, spre~io mojim imenom. Rekao mu je,
i 13-og u ve~e i 14-og u jutru: “Ako tako nastavi{, ja }u
zvati Predsednika.” I on se povukao.
367
— the Serbian Army did not escort them from their homes; in-
stead, the UN did.
We have proof, and Muslim witnesses will testify to the fact,
that starting out from the villages, and not from Srebrenica itself,
they [i.e., Muslim Army] went with the plan and intention to join
units to break through our lines in the direction of Tuzla, while
the civilians were supposed to go to Potoüari so that UN forces
could transfer them to Kladanj and territory under Muslim con-
trol. A complete surprise was waiting for us when we entered;
the absence of civilians in their homes was a complete surprise;
and it was a complete surprise that all the civilians wished to
leave.
Here, the Prosecution still insists that this was a forcible de-
portation, but we have all manner of proof that that was not a
forcible deportation. And we have proof that this had never been
planned. We had no means to carry this out.
When we heard that they did not want to return to their
homes, that they wanted to be transferred to Kladanj and Tuzla,
[towns] under Muslim control, we bent over backwards to look
for buses and automobiles and trucks [to provide transportation]
because we were afraid of acts of revenge. With such a great mass
of people, some avenger could throw a bomb, which would have
resulted in sheer butchery. There had been no killings until the
14th. There was some incident in Kravica on the 13th — caused
by a prisoner of war — a Muslim — he had seized a rifle and
started shooting, which resulted in an incident.
There were no incidents prior to July 14. The Prosecution’s
crown witness against me in the Srebrenica case, the late Deron-
jiü, on whom the OTP had laid its greatest hope according to the
92 quarter rule, was in fact actually testifying in my favor. He
said that on two occasions, the evening of the 13th and the morn-
ing of the 14th, there was allegedly a colonel who was inclined
to liquidate certain prisoners of war, and that he had prevented
368
Detainees. Ratni zarobqenici. Ja Vas molim, jezik je
problem. I vide}ete kasnije da kad ka`u “razmena
zarobqenika.” “Zarobqenik” kod nas nije “zatvorenik.”
Kad se ka`e “zarobqenik,” to zna~i “ratni
zarobqenik”. To je, takore}i, tautologija. Zarobqenik
je ratni. A zatvorenik je detainee. Zna~i ovo su bili
ratni zarobqenici. I kad ka`e “razmena ratnih
zarobqenika” — a ne ka`e “ratnih” — onda se to
stavqa na teret mojoj policiji da je razmewivala
zatvorenike. To je tako|e jedan od jezi~kih problema.
“Ratni zarobqenik,” dovoqno je re}i “zarobqenik.”
Zna se da je ratnik. “Zarobqen” zna~i uhva}en u borbi.
A “zatvoren” zna}i uhap{en po nekom drugom osnovu.
Hvala za kontrolu transkripta.
14-og ujutru, kako svedo~i Derowi} — ja ne znam da
li se to zbivalo tako sa tim pukovnikom — ali sam
Derowi} ka`e: “Na @utom mostu sam ga sreo — on mi
tra`i da upotrebi Ciglanu. Ja mu ka`em ja idem na
Pale kod Predsednika.” I stvarno je do{ao kod mene
14-og, i on se povukao.
Dva puta ~lana glavnog {taba, jedan mali
predsednik op{tinskog odbora SDS-a, dva puta stopira
imenom Radovana Karaxi}a. Kako }e, da je Karaxi}
naredio ne{to, neko nezakonito ubijawe? Ovaj bi
pukovnik rekao: “Ma sedi ti, mali. Be`i mali, {ta
ti—?” “Imam ja svojih instrukcija. Meni je Predsednik
reko.” I da mu je mladi} ~ak rekao: “[ta me briga za
tvog {efa. Imam ja moga {efa.”
369
him from doing so by invoking my name. He said to him on the
night of the 13th or the morning of the 14th: “If you keep acting
like that, I’m going to call the President.” And he [the colonel]
backed off.
Detainees. Prisoners of war. Please, the language is a prob-
lem. And you will see later that when they use the expression “ex-
change of prisoners.” A “prisoner” in our language is not a “de-
tainee.” When you say “prisoner,” that means “a prisoner of war.”
That is, so to speak, a tautology. The prisoner is a prisoner of war.
Anyone who is detained is called a detainee. That means these
people were prisoners of war. And when we speak about an “ex-
change of prisoners of war” — without saying “of war” — then
the Prosecution charges me with having exchanged detainees. This
is, likewise, a linguistic problem. For “a prisoner of war,” it is suf-
ficient to say “a prisoner.” It goes without saying that he is a
combatant. “Prisoner” means captured in battle. “Detained” means
arrested for a different reason altogether.
Thank you for this correction in the transcript.
On the morning of the 14th, as Deronjiü testified — I don’t
actually know whether this incident with the colonel actually
took place as he describes it or not, but Deronjiü himself says: “I
met him on the Yellow Bridge — he wanted me to give him
permission to use Ciglana, the brick factory. And I told him I’m
going to Pale to see the President.” And, indeed, he did come to
see me on the 14th, and this other fellow backed off.
The young president of an SDS county board twice stopped
a member of the general staff by invoking the name of Radovan
Karadžiü. If Radovan Karadžiü had issued an order, how could
someone carry out an extrajudicial killing? The colonel would
have said, “Easy does it, kid. Get lost. What are you —?” “I
have my instructions. The President gave them to me.” The kid
even could have even said: “What do I care about your boss?
I’ve got my own boss, see?”
370
Eto, najja~i svedok Tu`ila{tva, prema onome {to je
dosada rekao, apsolutno ne govori u korist one teze
koju Tu`ila{tvo zastupa.
Derowi} svedo~i isto tako da mi je navodno 14-og
rekao da neki oficiri ho}e da ubiju zarobqenike, a da
sam ja rekao: “Ma ti svi oficiri su ludi!” Voza~ koji ga
je dovezao svedo~i: “Kad se vratio Derowi} do mene i
seo u kola, rekao: ‘Ne mogu da verujem da Predsednik za
ovo ne zna ni{ta.’”
To je dato u ovom Tu`ila{tvu. Ja se ne se}am da mi
je on rekao. Ako mi je rekao, mogao je napraviti neku
aluziju koju ja nisam ozbiqno shvatio. A da sam rekao da
su oficiri ludi, pa mo`e biti i tu je bilo dosta
napetosti izme|u civilne vlasti i oficira. Jedni
drugima smo sva{ta zamerali ali nije doslovno. Kad
psihijatar ka`e da je neko lud, to zvu~i kao dijagnoza,
ali ovo nije bila dijagnoza, nego je bila jedno ovako
preneseno zna~ewe. Zna~i da oni ne mogu Derowi}a
upotrebiti protiv mene, a nemaju drugo ni{ta.
I izve{taj vlade Holandske ka`e da je nejasna uloga
Karaxi}a, a po pravila in dubio pro reo, ako je nejasna
uloga, onda uloge nema.
Nema istrage. Nema istrage za Srebrenicu i ne mogu
ni{ta da znam ni da ka`em za Srebrenicu, jer nema
istrage. Oni su tamo napravili jedno svetili{te. Opet
je to mit. Na kamenu pi{e osam hiqada i ne znam kolko
Muslimana, ali nisu mogli da sahrane vi{e od dve i po
hiqade i ne znam kolko ve} ima. A pogledajte, molim
Vas, odakle su ti Muslimani koji su sahraweni u tom
svetili{tu. Mi znamo da i sada — evo ga. Zna~i, iz
Bratunca, Bijeqine (koja je daleko sto pedeset
kilometara), Fo~e, Han Pijeska, Rogatice, Sarajeva,
Sokolca, Srebrenice — Srebrenika (koji je daleko jo{
371
There you have it. The strongest Prosecution witness, ac-
cording to what he has so far said, absolutely does not speak in
favor of the premise advocated by the Prosecution.
Deronjiü likewise testifies to the fact that on the 14th he al-
legedly told me that some officers wanted to kill prisoners of
war, and that I had replied: “All these officers are crazy!” The
chauffeur who drove him [i.e., Deronjiü] testified as follows:
“When Deronjiü returned and got into the car, he said, ‘I can’t
believe that the President doesn’t know anything about this.’”
This was provided to the OTP. I don’t remember him telling
me about it. If he had said this to me, he could have been allud-
ing to something that I didn’t take seriously. And that I said that
the officers were crazy — well, perhaps in that case there could
have been quite a bit of tension between the civilian authorities
and officers. We reproached one another for all sorts of things,
but it was not to be taken literally. When a psychiatrist says that
someone is crazy, then it sounds like a diagnosis, but this was
not a diagnosis; it was, instead, just an instance of speaking fig-
uratively. This means they cannot use Deronjiü against me —
and they really don’t have anything else.
And the Dutch Government Report says that Karadžiü’s role
is unclear, and according to the in dubio pro reo rule, if the role
is unclear, then the role doesn’t exist.
There was no investigation. There was no investigation of
Srebrenica and there is nothing I can learn or anything I can say
about Srebrenica because there has been no investigation. They
created a sanctuary [i.e., the Potoüari Memorial Cemetery] over
there. Once again, it’s a myth. And the stone monument that says
8,000 and I don’t know how many Muslims [lie buried there],
but they couldn’t bury more than 2,500 there — I don’t know
what the exact figure is now. And please take a look at where
these Muslims came from who are buried in this hallowed
ground. We know even now — here it is. That means: from
372
vi{e) — Ugqevika, Vi{egrada, Vlasenice i Zvornika.
A to va`i kao da su Srbi ubili mu{karaca i de~aka
8.320.
A sve sa prirodnim smrtima za ~etiri godine rata,
sa pogibijama u borbama za ~etiri godine rata, sa
pogibijama u borbama po {umama oko Srebrenice, pri
nasilnom probijawu kroz srpske teritorije, oni nisu
mogli da indentifikuju ni da sahrane vi{e od, ne znam,
dve i po ili tri hiqade qudi.
I onda taj istra`ni materijal. Ovde se sudi qudima
za Srebrenicu. Taj istra`ni materijal ide onako od
oka. Ne ubijeni su osam i po hiqada. Da vidimo taj
materijal. Da vidimo DNK.
Ja sam sada u fazi utvr|ivawa istine oko
Srebrenice. Da vidimo da li je bilo nezakonitog i
kako, i kako je do{lo do nezakonitog ubijawa i koji je
to obim to nezakonito ubijawe. Ali mi imamo izve{taj
same muslimanske op{tine, ka`e: “Imamo 37.000 qudi.
Prikazujemo 45 radi humanitarne pomo}i da hranimo
vojsku.” I kada saberemo prirodne smrti, smrti tokom
borbi, i ono {to je iza{lo u Kladaw i u Tuzli, i kada
vidimo {ta su indetifikovali, na koji na~in su
poginuli — ne mo`e od granate biti egzekucija. Moraju
biti istrage radi budu}nosti — ne radi Karaxi}a —
radi budu}nosti tih naroda tamo. Moraju biti istrage;
mora se utrvrditi ko je kad, kako poginuo. Kada, na koji
na~in. A ovo da se sudi, od oka nekoliko Srba ubilo
nekoliko Muslimana. Ja se nadam da to ovo Ve}e ne}e to
dopustiti, i da }e ovo Ve}e stati na stranu, da }e
podr`ati obranu da se jednom za sva vremena utvrdi {ta
se desilo u Srebrenici.
373
Bratunac, Bijeljina (which is about 50 kilometers away), Foþa,
Han Pijesak, Rogatica, Sarajevo, Sokolac, Srebrenica, Srebrenik
(which is even farther away), Ugljevik, Višegrad, Vlasenica, and
Zvornik. And now this validates [the assertion] that Serbs killed
8,320 Muslim “men and boys.”
And all this added to the natural deaths that occurred over
the course of four years of war, along with all the combat fatali-
ties in the forests surrounding Srebrenica during the violent at-
tempt to break through across Serbian territory, they could nei-
ther identify nor bury more than — I don’t know — 2,500 or
3,000 people there.
And then this investigative material. Here, people are being
tried for Srebrenica. This investigative material making the
rounds is guesswork. 8,500 people were not killed. Let’s have a
look at this material. Let’s see the DNA.
Now I am in the phase of establishing the truth about Sre-
brenica. Let us see whether it was unlawful or not, and how it
came to extrajudicial killings as well as the scope of the extraju-
dicial killings. However, we have the report issued by the Mus-
lim county itself that says: “We have 37,000 people. We are
showing 45,000 for the sake of humanitarian aid so that we can
feed our troops, too.” And when we add up the natural deaths,
combat fatalities, along with all those who managed to leave for
Kladanj and Tuzla, and when we see whom they have identified
as well as the cause of death — people are not executed by
shells. There must be an investigation for the sake of the future
— not for Karadžiü’s sake — for the sake of the future of the
people [who live] there. Investigations must be conducted; it
must be established who was killed, how, and when. The time of
death and the manner of death. And to try this in court, making
charges that are guesswork, that some Serbs killed some Mus-
lims. I hope this Trial Chamber will not allow this, and that this
Trial Chamber will come out in favor of and will support the
374
Moram da ka`em da ne mogu da optu`im Ve}a {to
nisu to utvrdili. U na{em sistemu, sudije to istra`e i
utvr}uju, ali ove odbrane nisu bile u stawu da Ve}ima
predo~e istinu, jer nisu izvr{ile istragu. Nema
istrage. Jednostavno ne postoji osnov da se ka`e ovo je
bilo ili ono je bilo, radi toga {to nema istrage.
Tako da }emo nakon istrage oko Srebrenice, a ja }u
zahtevati svaki izve{taj. Ja sam dobio saglasnost od
Ve}a da dobijem sav materijal — da dobijem podatke —
a onda da napravimo uzorak od pet posto za DNK i na
osnovu tog pet posto }emo videti da li ima zna~ajnih
odstupawa. Ako ima zna~ajnih odstupawa, onda ima sve
da se pregleda.
Ina}e, vidite, jer mi znamo i sada da se iskopavaju
grobovi po Bosni iz nekih mesta da bi u julu bilo neko
da se sahrani u Srebrenici. Pa, dajte da vidimo —
zlo~in je jedan ~ovek ako se ubije. «emu izmi{qati i
~emu preterivati.
Na kraju, bi hteo da ka`em — imam jo{ petnaest
minuta svojih — je’l tako?
Hteo bih da ka`em ne{to o ovome, ta~ki 11,
odnosno, udru`eni zlo~ina~ki poduhvat, koji se odnosi
na uzimawe talaca.
Moja su{tinska primedba odbrani }e biti da vojska
ne mo`e biti talac, da su taoci civili, koji ni na koji
na~in ne u~esvuvaju u borbama.
Ova gospoda koja su bila utao~ena — kad tako ka`em
— nisu bili civili i bili su ume{ani u borbe.
Odmah da ka`em, lako }e mi biti dokazati da ja s
tim nemam veze. Svedok Tu`ila{tva je rekao: “Karaxi}
je saznao iz medija.” I ceo svet je saznao iz medija — da
su qudi u panici pred nezakonitim bombardovawem od
strane NATO Saveza, nezakonitim bombardovawem, jer
375
Defense in establishing once and for all what happened in Sre-
brenica.
I must say that I cannot blame the Trial Chambers for not
having established this [i.e., what happened in Srebrenica]. In
our system, it is the investigating judges who investigate and
confirm the charges, however, the Defense team was not in a
position to present the truth to the Trial Chamber because no in-
vestigation had ever conducted. There was no investigation.
There is simply no basis for saying this or that happened because
there was no investigation.
That is what we’re going to do after the inquiry on Srebreni-
ca, and I am going to demand [copies of] each and every report. I
have been given the consent of the Trial Chamber to receive
[copies of] all the material involved — to get all the information
— and then let us take a sample of 5% of the DNA and, on the
basis of this 5% sample, we will see whether there are significant
deviations. If there are significant deviations, then all of it must
be reexamined.
In any case, you see, we know even now that graves are be-
ing exhumed in B-H in certain places in order to have [enough]
bodies to bury in Srebrenica in July. Well, let’s see — it is a
crime if one person is killed. Why bother concocting [charges]
and exaggerating?
Finally, I would like to say — I have another fifteen minutes
left — is that right?
Charges of Taking Hostages
I would like to say something about this Paragraph 11,
namely, the joint criminal enterprise which pertains to hostage-
taking.
My fundamental comment for the Defense will be that an
army cannot be held hostage; that civilians, who do not partici-
pate in the fighting at all, are hostages.
376
se nije radilo o bliskoj podr{ci, close air support, koja je
bila legitimna ako je jedinaca Ujediwenih Nacija
ugro`ena. Ovo je bilo operativno — da ne ka`em
strate{ko — bombardovawe srpskih polo`aja, da se
oslabi srpska sposobnost da se brani.
U panici su qudi, civili, uzeli te strance,
zadr`ali kod nekog mosta ili negde da im taj most ne
bude pogo|en, jer onda }e ih vojska Stranke demokratske
akcije poklati, a ne}e mo}i da se evakui{u.
Svedok tvrdi, a ja to dobro znam — a on je to u prvom
svom intervju rekao — General — Karaxi} je saznao iz
medija, nazvao i naredio da se odmah puste. Ali vi{e
nije bilo od pomo}i. Mediji su to objavili i svi koji su
se ose}ali ugro`eni po~eli su da uzimaju te qude.
Za{to oni nisu taoci? Za{to su oni borci? Ovde
}emo pokazati da svi generali Ujediwenih Nacija mole
svoje civilne {efove: “Molimo vas, ne me{ajte nas u
sukob. Izlo`i}ete nas na opasnosti, svrsta}ete nas na
jednu od strana.” Svesni su. Svi wihovi komandanti su
svesni: ako budu bombardovali Srbe uz poziv ovih
trupa, da }e te trupe biti ume{ane. A ne samo da su
ume{ane akcijom wihovih komandanata, nego su
ume{ani i pojedina~no.
Kod Generala Rouza imamo bukvalno prenos sa
radija transkript kako su wegovi vojnici ume{ani —
oni su ni{anxije onih aviona gore. I taj momak u radio
prenosi ka`e: “A, evo odabrao sam ciq, ~ujem Sea Harrier
dolazi, izlazi ispod oblaka, ja sam nani{anio. O, Bo`e
moj! Bo`e moj! Srbi su ga pogodili, on pada,” itd.
377
These gentlemen who were held hostage — if I may put it
that way — were not civilians and they were mixed up in the
fighting.
Let me say right now it will be easy for me to prove that I
had nothing to do with that. A Prosecution witness said:
“Karadžiü learned about it from media reports.” The whole
world learned about it from the media reports — that people
were panic-stricken as they faced illegal air-strikes by the NATO
alliance, illegal bombardment, because this was not about close-
air support, which would have been legitimate if UN units had
been endangered. This was operational — not to mention strate-
gic — bombardment of Serbian positions in order to weaken
their capability to defend themselves.
Panic-stricken people, civilians, took these foreigners and
kept them close to some bridge or somewhere so that that bridge
would not be hit, because then the SDA’s Army would have
slaughtered them, and they would not have been able to evacu-
ate.
A witness claims — as I know well — and he said this in his
first interview — the General — that Karadžiü found out about it
from media reports and that he ordered that they be immediately
released. But it was no longer of any use. The media had already
broadcast the news and anyone who felt threatened started taking
these men as hostages.
Why are they not hostages? Why are they combatants? Here,
we are going to show that all the UN generals were begging their
civilian chiefs: “Please do not involve us in the conflict. You are
going to expose to us to danger, and they will treat us as belonging
to one of the warring parties.” They were aware of it. All of the
commanders were aware of it: if they bombed the Serbs in re-
sponse to an appeal made by these troops, that these troops would
be involved. And not only were they involved through the actions
378
Da ostavimo ono {to su na{e sumwe, i dokazane
sumwe da su te jedinice Ujediwenih Nacija {vercovale
— UNPROFOR je u jedno vreme su ga zvali “taksi
muslimanske vojske,” jer su kroz na{e linije prolazili
nenajavqeno, itd. [vercovali su oru`je, municiju, ali
niko ih za to ne bi uzeo kao taoce, nego ih su uzeli kao
taoce kad je do{lo do toga da su bombardovani — ne
zbog close air support, nego takti~ki i operativno — a
Boga mi, za malo i strate{ki.
A svi ti vojni posmatra~i — ovde nam je svedok
kojeg smo intervjuisali — posvedo~io da su to vojnici
borci, da su oni ni{anxije, da su eksperti. Jedan takav
vredi vi{e od moje ~ete, jer je ekspert i ume{ani su do
gu{e. Naravno da je meni `ao. Prvo mi je `ao da oni su
nas bombardovali, {to su nam naneli {tetu. A mi je
`ao {to smo tako odgovorili, ali to nije zadr`avawe
talaca. Oni su bili ume{ani u taj rat protiv nas.
Pozvali su NATO avione da nas bombarduju. Pomagali
su im. Bili su ni{anxije wihove. E, pa to ne mo`e biti
talac.
Dakle, vide}ete tokom dokaznog postupka koliko je
muslimanska strana ubila stranih vojnika u Bosni.
Vide}ete da su oni oborili italijanski avion, jer
nikako ga nije mogla oboriti srpska vojska, nakon ~ega
smo dobili zabranu letewa. Vide}ete koliko su puta
Muslimani granatirali konvoj u pratwi UNPROFOR-
a sa Igmana — sve iz dokaznog materijala koje
Tu`ila{tvo ima protiv mene. Vide}ete {ta su oni
radili tim strancima, koji su ih {titili, ~uvali, i
{vercovali oru`ije za wih, davali im ogromnu
humanitarnu pomo}. Oni su wih granatirali i pucali
snajperima, itd., da bi izazvali odijum protiv Srba, a u
stvari je bilo jasno i nedvosmisleno, i utvr}eno da su
379
taken by their commanders, but they were even involved individu-
ally.
We have with General Rose a true and accurate transcript of
a radio transmission about how his soldiers were involved —
because they were spotters for aircraft flying overhead. And then
this young man says in the radio transmission: “Look, I approved
a target and I can hear the Sea Harrier coming, emerging from a
cloud, and I assigned the target. O, my God! O, my God! The
Serbs hit it. It’s falling,” etc.
Let us leave aside our suspicions for the moment, and the
proven suspicion that these UN units were involved in smug-
gling — at one time, they called UNPROFOR “the taxi service
of the Muslim Army” because they traveled across our lines un-
announced, etc. They smuggled weapons, ammunition, but no-
body would have taken them as hostages because of that; in-
stead, they took hostages when they started bombing — not for
the sake of close-air support but tactically, operationally — and,
I swear to God, almost even strategically.
All of these military observers — here we have a witness
whom we interviewed — testified that these men were combat-
ants, that they were spotters, experts. One of them is worth more
than an entire company of mine, because these experts were
deeply implicated [in these events]. I am, of course, very sorry. I
am sorry that they bombed us in the first place, that they caused
us damage. And I am sorry that we replied in this fashion, but
this was not hostage-taking. They were involved in this war
against us. They called on NATO aircraft to bomb us. They
helped them. They were their spotters [who were selecting tar-
gets]. Well, that can’t be considered a hostage.
You will see during the presentation of evidence how many
foreign soldiers the Muslim side in Bosnia killed. You will see
that they downed an Italian aircraft because the Serbian Army
absolutely could not have done it — after which a no-fly zone
380
to oni radili. A ne}ete na}i, osim u jednom slu}aju, da
su Srbi to uradili.
Jedan potpukovnik u nervnom rastrojstvu rasturio
je jedan konvoj — nije ubio nikoga, nego je prosto
pobacao stvari — i ja sam ga smenio.
Priznao sam Generalu Valgrenu i izvinio se, i
smenio sam ~oveka, koji je `iv~ano bio popustio zbog
toga {to se UNPROFOR tako pona{a — prolazi kroz
na{e linije, i radi sve {to ne treba da radi. Ali ono
{to je najva`nije, to je ono {to komandanti
UNPROFOR-a ka`u. “Nemojte nas me{ati u rat. Ako
budete bombardovali Srbe izvan close air support, mi
postajemo ratuju}a strana.” I to je ta~no. Onoga trena,
kad su po~eli da nas bombarduju izvan close air support,
oni su postali ratuju}a strana. E, daqe o tome ne moram
ni{ta re}i.
Dovoqno je to da ne mogu biti vojnici koji se
svrstaju na jednu stranu, bilo da im je oru`je pu{ka ili
laser koji ni{ane, oni ne mogu biti taoci. Oni su
borci. Oni su zadejstvovani borci, dejstvuju protiv
jedne od strana koja u najmawu ruku mo`e da ih zarobi.
Naravno, to nije bila odluka ni civilnih vlastih, niti
je bila odluka vojnih komandi, ali se desilo da je narod
to uradio i imamo dokaz u materijalu Tu`ila{tva da je
to bilo tako. Ja znam da je bilo, i se}am se da je bilo
tako. Se}am se da su slike oti{le u sve medije po svetu
i vi{e nije bilo na~ina da se oni puste u ti{ini,
po{to je bombardovawe jo{ trajalo, a narod je odjednom
video da bi to bio spas.
381
was imposed on us. You will see how many times the Muslims
shelled convoys that were being escorted by UNPROFOR from
Igman — all of this drawn from evidence that the OTP has in its
case against me. You will see what they did to those foreigners
who protected them, guarded them, who smuggled weapons for
them, and were giving them vast amounts of humanitarian aid.
They shelled them and subjected them to sniper fire, etc., in or-
der to evoke odium against the Serbs, but, in fact, it has been
clearly and unambiguously established that they were the ones
who were doing these things. You will not find a single case but
one in which the Serbs did such things.
A lieutenant-colonel who was suffering a nervous break-
down broke up a convoy — he did not kill anyone, but he simply
ransacked the convoy’s shipments — and I personally relieved
him of duty.
I acknowledged this to Gen. Wahlgren, and I apologized to
him, and I dismissed this man, whose nerves had been shot be-
cause UNPROFOR was behaving as it did — crossing our lines
and doing all sorts of things it was not supposed to be doing. But
of utmost importance is what the UNPROFOR commanders
said: “Don’t get us mixed up in this war. If you bomb the Serbs
outside of the framework of close-air support, we will become a
warring party.” And that was true. The moment they started
bombing us outside the framework of close air support, they did
become a warring party. Well, I don’t have to say anything else
on the subject.
Suffice it to say that soldiers who take a particular side, re-
gardless of whether their weapon is a rifle or a targeting laser,
cannot be considered hostages. They are combatants. They have
taken a side; they were fighting against one of the sides that could,
at least, take them prisoner. Of course, that was not a decision
made by the civilian authorities, nor was it a decision made by the
military command, but it turned out that [these] people did do that,
382 383

Ekselencije, ja se ne bojim ovog procesa. Sa velikim and we have evidence of it in the OTP material that it happened
entuzijazmom se pripremam. Na `alost, mogu da ugrozim that way. I know what happened, and I remember what happened.
svoje zdravqe, radim po celu no}, jer vremena nemam I remember that the pictures [of the hostages] were broadcast in all
dovoqno, a nemam ga, i izme|u ostalog, ne samo zato {to media all over the world, and there was no way to release them
nisu mi pla}eni tri i po meseca, ~etiri — koliko? — [i.e., the prisoners] quietly because the bombardment was still go-
~etiri i po meseca — nisu mi pla}eni — nisam imao ing on and the people all of a sudden realized that this would res-
pomo}, nisam imao svoje saradnike — nego i zato {to je cue them.
Tu`ila{tvo neselektivno nabacalo ogroman broj
Conclusion
materijala i ogroman broj navodnih dokaza, rukovo|eno
Excellencies, I’m not afraid of this trial. I am preparing for it
~iwenicom da nemaju dokaz. Pa onda, kao i Marksisti
with great enthusiasm. Regrettably, I may endanger my health
na{i, smatraju da }e jednog dana kvantitet pre}i u
because I am working all night long because I do not have suffi-
kvalitet ili da je boqe na pticu pucati sa~marom,
cient time [to prepare my defense], and I do not have sufficient
jedno }e ga zrno vaqda pogoditi.
time because, among other things, for three and a half or four
U koliko Savet Bezbednosti ne donese rezoluciju da
months — four — how many? — four and a half months — my
sankcioni{e sporazum sa Holbrukom o mom imunitetu
support staff has not been funded — I had no help, I didn’t have
— ja razmi{qam o tome — ja }u da ka`em {ta mislim, a
a staff — but also because the OTP has indiscriminately thrown
ne znam da li je to sve mogu}e. Ja razmi{qam o tome da
together an enormous amount of material and an enormous
bi dobro bilo kada bi Ve}e vratilo optu`nicu
amount of alleged evidence, altogether determined by the fact
Tu`ila{tvu da razmotri {ta je sve iznelo tu {to je
that they have no evidence. And then, like our Marxists back
lako pomesti metlom kao fal{ dokaz, kao la`ni dokaz,
home, suppose that one day quantity will become quality or that
pa ili da preuredi i smawi optu`nicu i da se usmeri na
it’s better to use a shotgun against a bird because at least one
izolovawe dela, a ne re~i tu|ih. Ne mogu da ka`u
buckshot will hit the target.
Karaxi}eva namera se vidi u re~ima Janka i Marka. Ne
If the Security Council does not pass a Resolution sanction-
mo`e. Ne mo`e se moja namera ni iz mojih re~i — ja sam
ing my agreement with Holbrooke concerning my immunity
politi~ar. Ja govorim. Ako ho}u neku meru koje se
from prosecution — I’m thinking it over — I’m going to tell you
narod boji da provedem, ja moram da ih umirim govore}i
what I think, but I don’t know whether all that will be possible.
drugu stranu te pri~e. Nego dela — deeds, not words.
I’m considering whether it would be good if the Trial Chamber
Ako ne ni to, ako ne}e da povu~e optu`nicu ili da
were to return the Indictment to the OTP to examine all the
je reducira i da se usmeri i da izoluje moja dela, da
things that they set forth therein that can easily be swept away as
vidimo ta dela, onda bi dobro bilo da dobijem vreme i
false, trumped up evidence, so they could either alter the Indict-
sredstva, kao {to je Predsednik Suda utvrdio da sam
ment or narrow the scope of the Indictment and direct it to iso-
neopravdano uskra}en bio za sredstva za pripremu
lated actions, and not base it on hearsay evidence. They cannot
tokom ovog perioda, i da se pripremim da napravimo
simply say that Karadžiü’s intentions may be divined by what
384
egzemplaran proces, koji }e slu`iti kao matrica i
slu`iti na ~ast i Ve}u i Tu`ila{tvu i odbrani,
egzemplaran proces koji }e biti matrica, koja }e
rehabilovati i me|unarodno pravo i ovaj poduhvat i
ovaj Tribunal, i biti primer kako treba suditi u
ovakvim stvarima.
U tom slu~aju, ja bih mogao da uzmem obavezu da do
kraja maja ili do polovina juna — obnova procesa do
polovina juna — do polovine maja dostavim hiqade
~iwenica, moju agreed fact list, ~iwenica od kojih
Tu`ila{tvo ne}e mo}i da ospori skoro ni{ta. Na
primer, proste ~iwenice, ka`e Srbi su preuzeli
op{tinu, tu i tu, a tu Srbi `ive. I Srbi, se ka`e,
kontrolisali, recimo, Haxi}e. Srbi su kontrolisali
mali deo Ha|i}a, u srpskim naseqima. Ta vrsta fakata,
oko kojih bismo se saglasili, ja bi mogao do kraja maja,
do polovine maja da dostavim, {to bi ovaj proces
o~istilo i oslobodilo ogromnog broja nepotrebnih
stvari oko kojih }emo se ovde dokazivati, i to bi
skratilo bi ovaj proces maksimalno, na godinu, godinu
i po dana, jer bi ostalo veoma malo fakata koji bi bili
sporni i oko kojih bismo se ovde bavili wima u ovoj
sudnici.
Ekselencije, toliko. Ja mislim da bi najboqe bilo
da se uva`i Holbrukov sporazum, jer je to bilo, ali
neko nije dovr{io svoj posao.
Ja sam se dr`ao sporazuma — ako to ne, onda
Tu`ila{tvo da izvr{i reviziju i da tra`i dozvolu od
Vas da povu~e optu`nicu. Ako idemo u proces, onda }e
Tu`ila{tvo — ja se nadam — mora}e da se dese revizije
drugih procesa u kojima su nevini qudi osu|eni. Jer }u
ja ovde uspeti da doka`em da su oni nevino osu|eni
brane}i sebe, brane}e fakte. A, ako se ide u proces,
385
any Tom, Dick, and Harry may have to say. It’s impossible. It’s
impossible [to infer] my intentions from my words — I’m a poli-
tician. I make speeches. If I intend to carry out some measure
which the people fear, I have to assuage them by telling them the
other side of the story. It is deeds — deeds, not words.
If this does not result in the withdrawal the Indictment or a
reduction of its scope, if it is not aimed at isolating my actions,
to see these actions, then it would be good for me to receive the
time and the resources [to answer them], as the Vice President of
the Tribunal also determined that I had been unjustly deprived of
resources in order to prepare myself during this period of time,
so I can prepare, so that we can have an exemplary trial that will
be a blueprint that will restore the honor of the Trial Chamber,
the Prosecution, as well as the Defense, an exemplary trial that
will be a blueprint which will rehabilitate international justice as
well as this undertaking and this Tribunal and stand as an exam-
ple of how such matters should be tried.
In that case, I would take it upon myself to — by the end of
May or mid-June — resuming the trial by mid-June — then by
mid-May I could deliver thousands of facts, my agreed facts list,
facts that the OTP will be practically unable to challenge. For ex-
ample, the simple fact that the OTP says that Serbs took over cer-
tain counties here and there, even though Serbs lived there in the
first place. And it says the Serbs, for instance, controlled Hadžiüi.
The Serbs controlled a small part of Hadžiüi — only the Serbian
neighborhoods. Such facts, on which we could agree, I could de-
liver by the end of May or by mid-May, in order to purge and lib-
erate these proceedings from the enormous number of unnecessary
matters that we can prove here, and it would shorten this trial to a
maximum of one or one and a half years, because there would be
very few facts that could be disputed that we would be dealing
with here in this courtroom.
386
onda }u ja i to uraditi. Ako ho}emo da proces bude brz,
egsemplaran, da bude na ~ast me|unarodnoj zajednici,
me|unarodnom pravosu|u, da ne propadne ideja o
su|ewima, za kr{ewe me|unarodnih normi, onda }u ja da
dadnem konstruktivan doprinos kao i celo vreme do
sada, a moj konstruktivan doprinos bi bio u tom {to
bih ja izdvojio fakte oko kojih }emo svi saglasiti i
o~istiti ovaj proces od nepotrebnog materijala oko
koga }emo se ovde iscrpqivati i zaista baviti se samo
jednim meritimom koji je su{tinski.
Hvala.
SUDIJA KVAN: ɏɜɚɥɚ ɜɚɦɚ.
387
So much for now, Excellencies. I think it would be best to
validate the agreement with Holbrooke because it actually did
take place, but someone did not do his job.
I held up my part of the agreement — if not, then the OTP
must execute a revision [of the Indictment] and seek your per-
mission to withdraw the Indictment [as it now stands]. If we are
to go to trial, then the OTP — I hope — will have to review oth-
er trials where innocent men were convicted. Because I will suc-
ceed in proving that they were convicted as innocent men by de-
fending myself, by defending the facts. If we go to trial, howev-
er, then I’m going to go through with it. If we want to have an
expeditious, exemplary trial that would will be an honor to the
International Community as well as to international jurispru-
dence, so that the very idea of trials for violations international
norms is not destroyed, then I shall have made a constructive
contribution, as I have been doing all along up to now, and my
constructive contribution is going to be singling out the facts on
which we can all agree and purge these proceedings of unneces-
sary material that would simply exhaust us, and we must, indeed,
deal solely with the fundamental merits of this case.
Thank you.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
 ENDNOTES

1. Mehmet-Paša Sokoloviü (Bajo Sokoloviü) (1505?–1579), Serbian

by birth, was one of the greatest viziers of the Ottoman Empire.
He was taken as a child by the Ottomans as a blood tribute under
the devúirme system, then Islamized and educated in Edirne, Tur-
key. He was named third vizier in 1555 for his distinguished mil-
itary service. Thanks to Mehmed-paša, the Ottoman Empire pur-
sued a political policy of laissez faire toward Serbia during this
time, which allowed for the building of monasteries, the introduc-
tion of printing, and the re-establishment of the Patriarchate of
Peü in 1557. He compelled Austria to sign a peace treaty in 1568,
and conquered Arabia in 1570. He had many enemies, and was
the victim of an assassination plotted by a dervish. The famous
bridge on the Drina in Višegrad, which was Ivo Andriü’s inspira-
tion for his novel, The Bridge on the Drina, was Mehmed-paša’s
endowment.
2. Osman Ðikiü (1879–1912) poet and dramatist from Mostar.
3. Hasan Rebþiü, unidentified.
4. Meša Selimoviü, (1910–1982) novelist, best known for Death and
the Dervish (1966).
5. Muslim Bosniak Organization (“MBO”), which called for a dem-
ocratic Yugoslavia and supported Yugoslavia at the expense of
the sovereignty of individual republics, was founded in 1990 by
Adil Zulfikarpašiü and Muhamed Filipoviü. The party disavowed
the use Islam for political ends, and it distanced itself from the
SDA, which was founded by Alija Izetbegoviü.
6. Zulfikarpašiü, Adil, (1921–2008) Bosnian Muslim politician who
joined the Communist Party in 1938. He became a party organizer
in 1942, and was subsequently captured and tortured by Ustaše,
but escaped with the help of Partisans. He became Minister of
Trade after the Communist victory, but fled to Switzerland after
he was disillusioned by Tito. He returned to Bosnia on the eve of
the Bosnian War and formed the MBO with Muhamed Filipoviü.
7. Filipoviü, Muhamed (b. 1929) Bosnian Muslim academic, histori-
an, and member of the Academy of Sciences of B-H.
8. Young Muslims (Mladi Muslimani), a Muslim youth organization
that was begun in the 1930s in Yugoslavia as a party of Islamic
renewal but ended up as a fascist organization that recruited sol-
diers for the Nazi Handžar Division during WWII.

9. Muslim Brotherhood, a Muslim Fundamentalist organization
formed by Hasan El Banna, an Egyptian, in 1928. It seeks to es-
tablish Muslim states based on Sharia Law and the caliphate sys-
tem of political rule. Sayed Qutb continued the movement, which
inspired the young Alija Izetbegoviü.
10. tu quoque (Latin, “you, too”), a retort that discredits an oppo-
nent’s position by turning his own accusations against him.
11. Carla Del Ponte (1947–) former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY
(1999–2008).
12. the agreement between Karadžiü and Holbrooke, U.S. Special
Envoy Richard Holbrooke signed an agreement guaranteeing
Dr. Karadžiü immunity from prosecution in exchange for his
withdrawal from politics. Gojko Kliþkoviü, who was also a de-
fendant at the ICTY, testified during his trial in 2009 that he wit-
nessed the signing of the agreement in July 1996. In 2007, Rich-
ard Holbrooke described the Karadžiü’s allegation as an “outra-
geous lie” and said he was “astonished that people would believe
a war criminal over the word of the United States or people who
brought peace to the Balkans.” A copy of the agreement appeared
in the Kurir (Serbian) in August 2008. In March 21, 2009, The
New York Times ran an article entitled “Study Backs Bosnian
Serb’s Claim of Immunity.” In October 2009, the ICTY finally re-
jected Dr. Karadžiü’s appeal and ruled that the agreement with
Holbrooke was not binding.
13. EC Peace Conference held in February 1992.
14. Momþilo Krajišnik (b. 1945), was a co-founder of the SDS, speaker
of the Serbian Assembly (1990–1992), and later a member of the
Presidency of the Republika Srpska. After the war, he served as the
Serbian member of the tripartite Presidency of B-H. In 2006, he
was convicted by the ICTY of crimes against humanity and sen-
tenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. He was granted an early re-
lease in 2013.
15. SLIDE: Krajišnik Trial Judgment, Paragraphs 907, 908.
16. SLIDE: Radovan Karadžiü’s speech at the 11th session of the
Serbian people in B-H, 18 March, 1992.
17. SLIDE: “A war in B-H will not solve anything. We must study
the situation regarding the saving of lives, property, and territory.
We have no other plans. We should strive to maintain peace.”

Radovan Karadžiü’s speech to the first session of the Serbian
People in B-H, March 27, 1992.
18. Hasan Efendiü was appointed Commander of the Bosnian Mus-
lim Army on April 4, 1992 by Alija Izetbegoviü.
19. SLIDE: “As far as other nations are concerned, we have to have a
proportion participating in the municipal authorities. We have to
be responsible, as we are creating a state. You are the organ creat-
ing it. The state must be created in the best way. We need to make
it with all the ingredients.” Radovan Karadžiü’s speech at the 1st
session of the Serbian people in B-H, 12 August, 1997.
20. SLIDE: “Commenting on the Fifth Round of the conference on
the future of B-H, the SDA spokesman Ifran Ajanoviü estimated
that the Muslim people will make up 82% of the population of
their own ethnic unit and that the Serbian people will make up
50% of the population of the Serbian unit.” Ifran Ajanoviü, Sara-
jevo, 18 March, 1992.
21. SLIDE: “We do not envisage or recommend population ex-
change. We propose reciprocal protection of minority rights.” Ra-
dovan Karadžiü at a press conference, May 3, 1992.
22. SLIDE: From Slobodan Miloševiü’s Indictment by The Hague
Tribunal, ¶¶ 19–20 (22 May 1999).
23. SLIDE: “There would not have been a war if Croatia had not
wanted it. Had we not wanted it and had we not armed ourselves,
we would not have reached our goal.” Franjo Tuÿman, at Ban
Jelaþiü Square, May 1992.
24 SLIDE: Alija Izetbegoviü’s interview on Sarajevo TV, 15 Febru-
ary, 1993.
25. SLIDE: MAP and “Statement of Principals for new constitutional
arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina”
D) Constituent Units
Within Bosnia and Herzegovina three constituent units would
be established. Members of the nations who would be a minority
in a particular constituent unit would receive protection similar to
that in Article 2(3) of the Draft Convention.”
23 February 1992.
26. SLIDE: Sovereign and Independent
Bosnia and Herzegovina
and within it
Serbian constituent unit

and within it
Muslims, Croats, and Serbs
living freely.
27. SLIDE: After several rounds of talks, our “principles for constitu-
tional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina” were agreed
[to] by all three parties (Muslim, Serb, and Croat) in Sarajevo on
18 March, 1992. These continued until the Muslims reneged on
the agreement. Had they not done this, the Bosnian question
might have been [settled] earlier with less loss of (mainly Mus-
lim) life and land. To be fair, President Izetbegoviü and his aides
were encouraged to support that deal and to fight for a unitary
Bosnian state by well-meaning outsiders who thought they knew
better.” Jose Cutileiro, Secretary-General Western European Un-
ion, BRUSSELS, Cutileiro’s Letter to The Economist, December,
1995.
28. SLIDE: Radovan Karadžiü’s speech at the 9th session of Bosnia
& Herzegovina’s Assembly 24-25 January 1992.
29. Uti possidetis juris (Latin, “what you possess you may hold and
use by law”), a concept originating in Roman law that governs the
lawful possession of property. It later evolved into a principle that
governs international relations that defines the borders of newly
sovereign states in a treaty, which leaves belligerents mutually in
possession of what they have acquired by force of arms during a
war.
30. James Bissett, Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Speaking
Notes, U.S. Congressional Hearing, July 14, 2000.
31. Colin Powell, The New York Times, September 19, 1995; The
New Yorker, September 17, 1995.
32. Roland Dumas, French Foreign Minister 1988–1993, Le Monde,
22 June, 1993.
33. Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary General, 10 December, 1991.
34. Ralph Hartmann, GDR Ambassador to Yugoslavia (1982–1988)
35. James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, 1989–1992. Yugoslavia, the
Avoidable War, at 13:42.
36. James Bisset, Western Interference, Part VI, Premature Recogni-
tion.
37. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey.

38. George Kenny, U.S. Department of State official until August
1992, Yugoslavia, the Avoidable War, at 54:45.
39. Cyrus Vance, UN Special Envoy to Yugoslavia 1991–1993,
The New York Times, April 14, 1993.
40. Ruud Lubbers, Dutch Prime Minister, 1982–1994, Die
Volkskrant, December 21, 1997.
41. SLIDE: “The United States fought and won the wars in Bosnia
and Kosovo. We will win in Afghanistan, too.” Richard
Holbrooke’s statement in Doha, February 2010.
42. SLIDE: “The Serbs had never attacked the Muslims, nor will they
ever attack the Muslims, nor is there such an intention. Irregular
and outvoting decisions will create chaos and chaos is in no one’s
hands. That is how we can announce that there will not be a war,
that I show we can guarantee that there will be no chaos, because
the order is in our hands and chaos is in no one’s hands.” Ra-
dovan Karadžiü’s speech at the Bosnia & Herzegovina Assembly,
15 October 1991.
43. Video of Markale. These are screen captures from the YouTube
version of Dr. Karadžiü’s Opening Defense Speech (Uvodna reþ).
This video clip is, apparently, evidence that was submitted to the
Trial Chamber by the Prosecution.
44. General Stanislav Galiü (b. 1943), Commander of the Sarajevo-
Romanija Corps of the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) dur-
ing the Bosnian War. The ICTY convicted him in 2003 on charg-
es of crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and cus-
toms of war. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison.
45. SLIDE: “Humanitarians” and “Journalists”
Spying for NATO, their countries or ABiH
Creating and spreading false reports
Abusing press documents
Smuggling enemy soldiers through combat lines
Reconnaissance and intelligence work for ABiH
Smuggling of arms and ammunition for ABiH
46. These are clips from Judgment: The Bosnian ‘Death Camp’ Ac-
cusation: An Exposé, produced by Jared Israel in conjunction with
www.emperors-clothes.com. Available on YouTube:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xox7TR11evI (last accessed
on 10/10/14).

47. SLIDE:
“Zulfikarpašiü emphasized the fact that it would be tragic for us if
two nations that inhabit 92% of Bosnia and are profoundly mixed
were to initiate a confrontation.
“Karadžiü and Koljeviü displayed open satisfaction that we had
agreed to talks. They accepted our proposition about defining the
so-called minimum about which there cannot and will not be any
negotiation.
“Alija Izetbegoviü knew about these talks. The SDA had set
things up to undermine us and the talks, which they succeeded in
the end.”
Muhamed Filipoviü about the Muslim-Serb Historic Agreement,
from I Was Alija’s Diplomat (2000).
48. Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief Para. 10. See:
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/custom3/en/090518.pdf (last
accessed 1/14/15).
49. Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief Para. 11.
50. Franjo Tuÿman, transcript of the conversation between Tuÿman,
Holbrooke, Peter Galbraith, and General Clark (1995).
51. Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, Para. 12.
52. SLIDE: According to international law, the six Yugoslav repub-
lics do not have the right to external self-determination. […] The
acquisition of independence of Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, and FRY
Macedonia, can accordingly be observed as [ILLEGIBLE]. Anto-
nio Cassese, comment on Article 1, Section 2 of the United Na-
tions Charter, Paris Economica, 1991, p. 49-50.
53. SLIDE: “Jasenovac was the largest concentration camp in Croa-
tia. Between 1941 and 1945, over 600,000 were murdered there,
the Serbs, the Jews (around 30,000), and the Gypsies.” The Simon
Wiesenthal Center.
SLIDE: “The Ustashe were a Croatian nationalistic and terrorist
organization. Their hatred toward the Jews could have been sur-
passed only by their hatred toward Serbs. After the creation of the
Croatian puppet state by Hitler in 1941, the Ustashe terrorists had
murdered 500,000 Serbs, expelled over 250,000, and forcibly
converted 250,000 to Catholicism.” The Simon Wiesenthal Cen-
ter.

54. SLIDE: “The terrible deeds were committed by the Ustaše in
Croatia against the Serbs. The Ustaše groups had committed their
horrendous acts especially against the elderly, women, children,
in the most atrocious ways. The estimation of about 300,000 Or-
thodox Christian individuals, whom the Ustaše had butchered and
tortured with their sadistic methods must be taken into account.”
Letter of the Chief of German’s secret police Turner addressed to
Heinrich Himmler, February 17, 1942.
55. SLIDE: Genuine Indictment Paragraph 10.
56. SLIDE: Genuine Indictment Paragraph 12.
57. SLIDE: Croats (Muslims) earmarked territories considered Croat
(Muslim), created separate Croat (Muslim) institutions to resist
Yugoslav authority, declared independence and forcibly took con-
trol of large parts of Yugoslav territory, killing thousands of Serbs
and expelling hundreds of thousands from their homes.
58. SLIDE: “The Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was not just a
Quisling creation and a fascist crime, but the expression of the
historical aspirations of the Croatian people.” Franjo Tuÿman,
February 24–25, 1990.
59. NDH (Nezavisna Država Hrvatske or the Independent State of
Croatia) the Nazi government that came to power in Croatia dur-
ing World War II.
60. SLIDE: Lord Owen, Balkan Odyssey, p. 100.
61. Sometimes referred to as the Špegelj Tapes, these video tapes
contain a secretly recorded conversation which was leaked to the
Yugoslav press in January 1991. Špegelj and Boljkovac claimed
the tapes were fakes, but they were subsequently proved to be au-
thentic.
62. Dalibor Brozoviü, (1927–2009) was a Croatian linguist, Slavicist
and dialectologist who sought to eliminate the standard Serbo-
Croatian language in favor of a Croatian language as conceived
by nationalist politicians. He was a co-founder and Vice-President
of the Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ, i.e., Croatian
Democratic Union), which won the 1990 elections. He became
the Vice-President of the Presidency of the Republic of Croatia,
and served as a member of the Croatian Parliament (1992–1995).
63. SLIDE: Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief, Paras. 15, 16.
64. SLIDE: Genuine Indictment, paragraphs 15 and 16. “Karadžiü
and the BSL were aware of the nature and the purpose of Croat

arming campaign, creation of an illegal army, dismissals of Serbs
from work on ethnic grounds, killing of Serbs, legal degradation
of Serb constitutional status, glorification of Ustaša symbols,
promotion of Ustaša immigrants to official positions.
Karadžiü supported the efforts of Krajina Serbs to protect their
existence and cited them as an example to the Bosnian Serbs in
case Bosnia chooses the same path as Croatia.
65. SLIDE: “The Republic of Croatia establishes as the national state
of the Croatian people and the state of the Croatian people and the
state of the members of autochthonous national minorities: The
Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans,
Austrians, Ukrainians, Russians and others.” Croatian “Christ-
mas” Constitution, 22 December, 1990.
66. SLIDE: “Croatia attacked the Serbs and Yugoslavia, not the other
way around.” Josip Boljkovac, Croatian Minister of Internal Af-
fairs (May 1990–July 1991), Vesti, 13 February, 2009.
67. VIDEO: The murder of Sašo Geršovski in Split; JNA Barracks in
Bjelovar, showing the bodies of murdered JNA soldiers.
68. SLIDE: “The JNA was in its own country. Its troops were legiti-
mately spread around all Yugoslav republics. After the pro-
nounced independence of Slovenia and Croatia, the troops were
treated as the occupational, even when they were not leaving their
barracks. Slovenian tactics (and later Croatian too), who could not
be taking particular pride in heroism, was based on the avoidance
of open conflict and the attempts to get the soldiers, through
blockades of the barracks, to the brink of starvation and force
them to leave.” Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its De-
stroyers, Warren Zimmerman, Zagreb, Globus International,
Znanje, 1996.
69. SLIDE: “Germany is celebrating your military success and we
express our tribute. It has to be noted that even experts who un-
derstand the issue have not predicted such a quick and glorious
action.” Representative of the German Embassy in Croatia on Ra-
dio Zagreb.
70. SLIDE: See Pre-Trial Brief:
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/custom3/en/090518.pdf (last
accessed 1/14/15).
71. Dr. Karadžiü is, of course, speaking sardonically.

72. SLIDE: “The Serbian Assembly made a decision. There is no one
who could change that. Not Karadžiü, not Miloševiü, not God
himself! Everyone must respect that Assembly. There is no other
way! If the Assembly passes something, well who am I to change
that? I am a small player who serves that Assembly and the entire
party and the entire Serbian nation. I am not any kind of boss who
can change anything.” Telephone conversation between Radovan
Karadžiü and Momþilo Krajišnik, 9 November, 1991.
73. SLIDE: “No one will stand behind crime. There is justice, no
doubt about that. None of them can act any differently than any
honest citizen. There is no change in the political position regard-
ing the legality of the state. We’ll not rely on criminals anywhere
and they have to know that. The influence of politics on the law
and the courts must not be realized any longer.” Telephone con-
versation between Radovan Karadžiü and Momþilo Krajišnik, 20
December 1991.
74. SLIDE: “It cannot be done that way. That is the pushing of purely
political will against the legal norms. That cannot be. The Com-
munists did that in 1945. We as a democratic party cannot allow
for that. I would not socialize with half the people I work with
now. I would not want to see them. But I have to work with them,
because the Party is not my private property for me to introduce
an element of affinity or lack of affinity. We cannot do whatever
we want.” Telephone conversation between Radovan Karadžiü
and Momþilo Krajišnik, 12 January, 1992.
75. SLIDE: “Ethnic Cleansing” and other war crimes can only be
committed in war. If Radovan Karadžiü wanted to avoid a war at
all costs — there could not have existed any JCE plan.
76. SLIDE:
x Chronological analysis of events
x Causality
x Sequence of events
x Options at one’s disposal
x Genuine, NOT false consequences of events
x Personal contribution of Accused
x State of mind of the Accused
x Reasons AT THAT POINT IN TIME that influenced the Ac-
cused’s acts

77. Pravaška strana, established in 1861 by Ante Starþeviü, a half-
Serbian Croatian racist who insisted on the creation of a Croatian
state. The party was re-established in 1991, with Dobroslav Para-
ga as its first President.
78. Prosveta is a Serbian educational and cultural society that was
founded in 1902 in Sarajevo. Its stated purpose was the preserva-
tion of Serbian culture and identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
Communist authorities banned the institution in 1949 and confis-
cated its property. Prosveta was re-established on St. Vitus Day
(June 28) in 1990 and it continued its work in Sarajevo even dur-
ing the war.
79. mens rea (Latin for “guilty mind”), a legal concept in criminal
law that refers to the subjective mental element of the offense that
accompanies the commission of a crime.
80. B-H had a seven-member, multi-ethnic rotating Presidency
81. MUP (Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova) the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, which is in charge of law enforcement and security.
82. SLIDE: “A sovereign and integral Bosnia and Herzegovina on
one side and its peaceful achievement on the other are not of
equal value to me. I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia.
But I would not sacrifice a sovereign Bosnia for peace.” Izetbe-
goviü’s speech at the Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly, 27 Feb-
ruary, 1991.
83. SLIDE: “By announcing a rebirth, we are not announcing an age
of peace and security, but one of unrest and trial. There are too
many things crying out to be destroyed.” Islamic Declaration,
Alija Izetbegoviü, 1970 (reprinted in 1990).
84. SLIDE: “Husseini made his contribution to the Axis war effort by
recruiting and organizing Bosnian Muslim battalions in Croatia
comprising some twenty thousand men. These Muslim volunteer
units, called Hanjar (sword), were put in Waffen-SS units and
participated in the massacre of civilians in Bosnia [Serbs, Jews,
and Roma] and volunteered to join in the hunt for Jews in Croa-
tia.” Encyclopedia of the Holocaust (1990 Edition) Volume 2,
Pages 706-707. Entry listed under Husseini, Haj Amin Al.
85. Handžar means long dagger (Turkish).
86. The Serbs: The Guardians of the Gate, by R.G.D. Laffan. Origi-
nally published: Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918. Reprinted: New
York: Dorsett Press, 1989.

87. Paragraph 23 of the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief reads in part:
“KARADŽIû repeatedly underscored that Muslims and Croats
represented an existential threat to the Serbs, and that Serbs faced
the same genocidal threat they confronted in World War II. He
told the Assembly at its inaugural session that Serbs faced the
“same plans, the same villains and the same victims” as World
War II. He insisted that Muslims sought an Islamic state, were
preparing laws to subjugate Serbs and that Serbs were unwilling
to ‘go back to slavery’.”
88. SLIDE: “I will fight uncompromisingly against everything non-
Islamic; I will sacrifice everything on God’s path, including my
life, if the interests of Islam require that.” (The oath taken by
Muslim Youth.)
89. SLIDE: “We announce to our friends and enemies alike that Mus-
lims are determined to take the fate of the Islamic world into their
own hands. A Muslim can die only in the name of Allah and for
the glory of Islam. There can be neither peace nor coexistence be-
tween the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political in-
stitutions. Whoever wishes our community well will not try to
spare it struggle, danger, and misfortune. The Islamic movement
should and can start to take over power as soon as it is morally
and numerically strong enough to be able to overturn not only the
existing non-Islamic Government but also to build up a new Is-
lamic one.” Islamic Declaration, Alija Izetbegoviü, 1970 (reprint-
ed 1990).
90. SLIDE: “IZETBEGOVIû became a member of ‘Fedayeen of
Islam’ organization, of an Iran-based radical group […] which by
the late 1980s had recognized the leadership of the Ayatollah
Khomeini. Following Khomeini’s accession to power in 1979,
IZETBEGOVIû stepped-up his efforts to establish Islamic power
in Bosnia and was jailed by the communists in 1983.” U.S. Senate
Republican Party Committee, “Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms
Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base.”
91. SLIDE: “Izetbegoviü advocated that Islam must be a state struc-
ture in all states where Muslim population lives, and that one
must work on creating the conditions for Bosnia to become an Is-
lamic republic with Islamic laws […] The imams in Bosnia
should be armed as the Iranian Shiite imams.” Judgment of the
Sarajevo District Court 20, August 1983.

92. SLIDE: “The goal of the Islamic revolution in the country is the
creation of a unified state, which will be comprised of the territo-
ries of Bosnia, Sandžak and Kosovo. Jihad should be implement-
ed to the maximum and through it we must annihilate the enemies
and infidels … we should not wait for a challenge or a reason to
do that.” Judgment of the Sarajevo District Court 20, August
1983.
93. Green Highway (Zelena transversala) is the name given by Mus-
lims to a continuous land bridge leading from Istanbul to Europe
via the former Yugoslavia.
94. Dr. Karadžiü is referring to Pat Robertson’s call to assassinate
Hugo Chavez. See “Assassinate Chavez, Pat Robertson tells a
stunned America,” by Andrew Buncombe, 24 August, 2005 (The
Independent (UK)).
95. SLIDE: Judgment of the Sarajevo District Court 20, August 1983.
96. Fikret Abdiü (b. 1939) was the most popular Bosnian Muslim
leader. He was Izetbegoviü’s political opponent in the presidential
elections in Bosnia in 1990, in which he won the most votes. He
was allied with the Bosnian Serbs and he supported the preserva-
tion of Yugoslavia.
97. SLIDE: Genuine Indictment, para. 24.
98. SLIDE: “We announce to our friends and enemies alike that Mus-
lims are determined to take the fate of the Islamic world into their
own hands. A Muslim can only die in the name of Allah and for
the glory of Islam. There can be neither peace nor coexistence be-
tween the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political in-
stitutions. Whoever wishes our community well will not try to
spare it struggle, danger and misfortune. The Islamic movement
should and can start to take over power as soon as it is morally
and numerically strong enough to be able to overturn not only the
existing non-Islamic Government but also build up a new Islamic
one.” The Islamic Declaration, Alija Izetbegoviü, 1970 (reprinted
1990).
99. SLIDE:
• The Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina establishes the
Council for the protection of equality among the nations and
nationalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

• Equal number of representatives from each of the nations of
Bosnia and Herzegovina — the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats
are elected to the Council.
• If at least twenty members of the Assembly consider that the
equality of nations has been breached, the matter will be
brought before the Council.
• Decisions are made by consensus.
Amendment LXX to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
31 July, 1990.
100. SLIDE: Alija Izetbegoviü, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Presidency
Session, 15 October, 1991.
101. SLIDE:
• According to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution as
well as from the historical point of view, the Serbs enjoyed
the status of a constituent people.
• Any change of the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not
possible without the consent of the Serbian people
• The Serbian people enjoyed an explicit right to self-
determination
• Unilateral secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina was prohib-
ited by SFRY Constitution and existing international laws
• The right of self-determination belonged to peoples and not
to the administrative territories
102. SLIDE: The SDA (Party of Democratic Action) led an organized
preparation for the defense and command of all forces.
103. SLIDE: One of the priority tasks of the crisis staffs was the acqui-
sition of weapons. Analysis and Experience from Combat Opera-
tions, District Headquarters — Zenica Municipality.
104. SLIDE: By the beginning of the war, every local community in
103 municipalities had a Patriotic League leadership and units
ranging from a squad to a company. The Role of the Patriotic
League, Green Berets, and Other Organized Patriots.
105. SLIDE: Analysis and experience from combat operations — Zen-
ica Municipality.
106. SLIDE: The Patriotic League Main Staff decided: War will be all-
encompassing. It will be led throughout all of Bosnia with the
participation of all human and material resources. The Role of the
4
Patriotic League, Green Berets, and Other Organized Patriots. 5
January, 2000.
107. Franz Josef Strauss (1915–1988), German politician who served
as Chairman of the Christian Social Union and held several posi-
tions in the federal cabinet, most notably as Defense Minister and
Minister of Finance.
108. Pierre Marie Gallois, General (1911–2010), French brigadier
general and politician, known as the father of the French atomic
bomb. He campaigned against the treaty creating a European
Constitution, and was a staunch defender of Serbia.
109. Prosecution Submission pursuant to Rule 65 ter (E)(i)-(iii) para-
graph 43, May 18. 2004.
110. Ibid.
111. Ejup Ganiü (1946–) Serbia charged Ganiü, Bosnia's wartime
Vice-President, in late February 2010 with ordering Bosnian
Muslim forces to shoot and kill wounded Yugoslav National Ar-
my troops who were departing the Bosnian capital in a convoy in
May 1992. He was arrested at Heathrow Airport on March 1,
2010 on a Serbian arrest warrant. A UK judge later ruled that the
charges were political in nature and released Ganiü.
112. Ifran Ajanoviü was a pre-war member of the Yugoslav Federa-
tion, as well as an important ally of Alija Izetbegoviü, who later
turned on him. He allowed Ajanoviü to remain in prison in the
Republika Srpska and would not negotiate for his release.
113. Armin Pohara was a local commander of the Patriotic League.
“The League is the embryo of a Bosnian army.… We have two
platoons with a total of 60 men but they get bigger every day and
this is hard to control.” (The Independent (London), March 30,
1992.)
On the barricades in Bosanski Brod some soldiers wear the blue
and white coat of arms of Bosnia, others the red and white Croa-
tian flag, or the green flag of Islam.
114. Prosecution Submission pursuant to Rule 65 ter (E)(i)-(iii) para-
graph 43, May 18. 2004. Available on www.icty.org.
115. Kljujiü, Stjepan (b. 1939) was member of the collective presiden-
cy of B-H and was a founding member of the Croatian Democrat-
ic Union (HDZ) party in 1990. He was also President of the Bos-
nian chapter of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and he
4
urged Croats to support the elected government of Alija Izetbe-
goviü.
116. Brkiü, Miljenko (b. 1944) succeeded Stjepan Kljujiü as the Presi-
dent of the Bosnian chapter of the Croatian Democratic Union
(HDZ)
117. Kukanjac, General Milutin (1935–2002) Serbian JNA Colonel
General during the Bosnian War. Kukanjac was commander of
JNA troops in Sarajevo from March–July 1992. Kukanjac was al-
so in charge of JNA units on Dobrovoljaþka Street in Sarajevo
when the Army of B-H attacked the convoy of withdrawing sol-
diers, killing 46 and wounding many others in 1992.
118. Eve-Anne Prentice (1952–2007), reporter for the London Times
who covered the Bosnian War.
119. Prosecution’s submission pursuant to rule 65 ter (E)(i)-(iii), May
18, 2009.
120. SLIDE: No. 1258-3/91.
121. SLIDE: Telephone conversation between Karadžiü and Žepiniü, 8
July, 1991.
122. SLIDE: Telephone conversation between Karadžiü and Mandiü,
22 July, 1991.
123. SLIDE: Telephone conversation between Karadžiü and Plavšiü,
17 September, 1991.
124. Milan Babiü (1956–2006) was the first President of the Republika
Srpska Krajina.
125. February 27, 1992
126. ICTY Trial Judgment, Krajišnik, September 27, 2006.
127. Owen, Lord David, Balkan Odyssey. New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1995, p. 120.
128. Marijin Dvor, a large apartment/office complex built in 1895. It
also lends its name to the surrounding neighborhood.
129. PAM 12.7mm, a heavy-duty machine gun (designed as an anti-
aircraft weapon) that had a range of 1,500 meters.
130. Gerry Mander, Dr. Karadžiü incorrectly supposes that the name
of the practice of gerrymandering derives from such a putative in-
dividual; however, the name finds is origin in the name of Massa-
chusetts Governor Gerry, who tailored such electoral districts,
4 4

and salamander, which denoted the long and winding shape of 142. General Zdravko Tolimir (b. 1948), Assistant Commander of In-
such artificially drawn electoral districts. telligence and Security for the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) who
131. in dubio pro reo (Latin, when in doubt, favor the accused.) Over reported directly to General Ratko Mladiü. He was sentenced to
time, this tenet of Roman Law evolved into the concept of “inno- life imprisonment after the ICTY convicted him on six counts of
cent until proven guilty.” genocide.
132. General Manojlo Milovanoviü headed the General Staff of the
Army of the Republika Srpska during the Bosnian War.
133. Wahlgren, Lars-Erik General (Swedish), UNPROFOR Com-
mander in Bosnia (March–June 1993).
134. Akashi, Yasushi, Japanese-born UN career diplomat who was the
Secretary-General's Special Representative to the former Yugo-
slavia during the War.
135. The translator has been unable to locate this italicized passage in
General Rose’ book.
136. Fighting for Peace: Lessons from Bosnia, by General Sir Michael
Rose (Warner Books, a Division of Little, Brown and Company
(UK) (London: 1998), p. 70–71.
137. Owen, Lord David, Balkan Odyssey. New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1995, pp. 59–60.
138. General Dragomir Miloševiü (b. 1942), Commander of the Sara-
jevo-Romanija Corps of the Army of the Republika Srpska
(VRS). The ICTY convicted him of war crimes in 2006 and sen-
tenced him to twenty-nine years imprisonment.
139. agas and beys, Dr. Karadžiü is saying that the current Muslim
ruling class in Bosnia is composed of the descendants of the for-
mer Ottoman gentry who have usurped the reins of political pow-
er from ordinary citizens, those who had been empowered by the
socialist revolution.
140. Kovaþeviü, Milan (1941–1998) an anesthesiologist by profession,
he served as Vice President of the Municipality of Prijedor Crisis
Center in Prijedor in April 1992. He was indicted for genocide by
the ICTY and captured by SFOR in 1997. He died in The Hague
while in detention.
141. Koljeviü’s diary…. This diary was published under the title
Stvarawe Republike Srpske (Slu`beni Glasnik: Repub-
like Srpske, 2008). An abridged American edition is now
available: Creating the Republika Srpska, by Nikola Koljeviü,
Unwritten History, Inc.: New York, 2014.
 EXHIBITS
(Screen Captures from the YouTube Version of “Uvodna reü”)

EXHIBIT I
Oružani sukobi i incidenti u B-H prije 6/4/1992 godine
(Armed Conflicts and Incidents in B-H before April 4, 1992)

EXHIBIT II
 
EXHIBIT III EXHIBIT V

EXHIBIT VI

EXHIBIT IV
 
EXHIBIT VII

EXHIBIT VIII
(Recreation of graphic)
 
EXHIBIT XI EXHIBIT XIII

EXHIBIT XIV
EXHIBIT XII (This is a high-resolution copy of the map presented during the trial. See Liar’s Poker:
The Great Powers, Yugoslavia, and the Wars of the Future (see Bibliography). 
 
EXHIBIT XV EXHIBIT XVII
(For text of this Slide, see endnote 84.) (Recreation of graphic)

EXHIBIT XVI
EXHIBIT XVIII
Izetbegoviü et al. case before the Sarajevo District Court (1983)
(Recreation of graphic)
 
EXHIBIT XIX EXHIBIT XXI

EXHIBIT XX

EXHIBIT XXII
4 41
EXHIBIT XXIII EXHIBIT XXV

EXHIBIT XXIV EXHIBIT XXVI

4 4
EXHIBIT XXVII
EXHIBIT XXIX

EXHIBIT XXVIII
 ANNEX I ʊ SAMPLE OF THE HAGUE TRANSLATION

I will start by describing a situation in my country. At the

elections in 1990, and they were the first democratic elections at
which many dissidents appeared because before that it wasn’t a
multi-party system. In the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
we had seven members, two Serbs, two Croats, two Muslims,
and a representative for the minorities. My Serbian Democratic
Party was in this seventh place, and the nomination there was the
president of the Jewish community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who
was not a member of the SDS, but we did however consider that
he represents, in the best sense of the word, the rest, the others.
And apart from that, the community is very significant in Saraje-
vo because after the persecution in Spain, the Jews came to Sara-
jevo and have significant traces there and have contributed to
Sarajevo’s development.
The Party of Democratic Action has put lamb’s clothing on a
wolf, a wolf in lamb’s clothing on Mr. Ganic, called him a Yu-
goslav for this opportunity, and of course he was elected to this
post which belonged to the minorities or the others. And that is
the well-known gentleman who became famous when he slaugh-
tered innocent soldiers who were withdrawing from — in Sara-
jevo in Dobrovoljacka Street, and the well-known order he gave
over the radio, As soon as Alija gets out of his car, kill them all.
So that is how the SDA and the Muslim community in Bosnia —
in Bosnia-Herzegovina achieved supremacy in a body where
parity was supposed to prevail.
The Serbs had an even better candidate which they could
have once again put in lamb’s clothing, and somebody who de-
clared himself as a Yugoslav, but we consider that that wasn’t
done in proper society because it wasn’t democracy and it wasn’t
an honest and sound basis for life together and progress in gen-
eral. And it was almost an innocent child’s game in comparison
4
to what the state organs, the joint state organs, did for the war
policy of the Party of Democratic Action that was geared to-
wards gaining as much advantage to their own community and
inflicting detriment on the Christian majority, that is to say, the
Serbs and the Croats.
Now, why did the leaders of the Party of Democratic Action
do this in the first place? Not only because it was the basic mod-
el of the fundamentalist way of thinking and acting, that is to
say, domination, supremacy, privileges, 100 per cent power, just
as it was in the days of the Ottoman Empire, but first and fore-
most, again one more vote in the Presidency in order to achieve
the Islamist goal, that is to say, a state of the kind that they had
envisaged, that is to say, 50 years ago the people and the actors
of our drama, their image of that.
ANNEX II ʊ SAMPLE BLACKLINE
OF CHANGES TO THE HAGUE TRANSLATION
I will start by describing a review the situation in my coun-
try. At the , which will speak volumes to you. The elections in
1990, and they were the first democratic elections atin which
many dissidents appeared because before that it wasn’t a there
had been no multi-party system. In the prior to that. The Presi-
dency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, weB-H had seven members,: two
Serbs,, two Croats,, two Muslims, and , as well as a representa-
tive for the minorities. My party, the Serbian Democratic Party
was in this [i.e., the “SDS,” Srpska demokratska stranka], nom-
inated for the seventh place, andseat of the nomination there
wasPresidency the presidentPresident of the Jewish community
in Bosnia-Herzegovina,B-H, who was not a member of the SDS,
but we did ; however consider, we thought that he representsrep-
resented, in the best sense of the word, the rest, the others. And
remaining members of national minorities, and apart from that,
the community is very significant in Sarajevo because after the
persecution in Spain, the a great many Jews came to Sarajevo
and have after having been persecuted in Spain, and because
they have left a significant traces there and have contributed to
Sarajevo’sand lasting mark on the development of Sarajevo.
The Party of Democratic Action has [i.e., “SDA,” Strana
demokratske akcije, the Muslim party] put lamb’sforth Mr. Ejup
Ganiü, a wolf in sheep’s clothing on a wolf, a wolf in lamb’s
clothing on Mr. Ganic, called, and rebranded him as a Yugoslav
for this opportunity, andoccasion. And, of course, he was elected
to this postposition which properly belonged to the minorities or,
namely, the others. And thatThat is the well-known gentleman
who became famous when he slaughteredfound fame with the
slaughter of innocent soldiers who were withdrawing from — in
Sarajevo in Dobrovoljacka on Dobrovoljaþka Street, and, when
he gave the well-known order he gave over the radio, : “As soon
as Alija gets out of his car, kill them all. So that!” This is how
the SDA and the Muslim community in Bosnia — in Bosnia-
4
Herzegovina in B-H achieved supremacy in a government body
wherefor which parity was supposed to prevailhad been fore-
seen.
The Serbs had an even better candidate whichwhom they
could have once again put in lamb’s clothing, and somebody
who dressed for the part, someone who had already been consid-
ered as, and had declared himself asto be, a Yugoslav, but we
considerconsidered that that wasn’tsuch things were not done in
propera civil society because it wasn’t . That is not democracy
and it wasn’tis neither an honest andnor sound basis for commu-
nal life togetherwith other ethnic groups and progress infor our
general. And it advancement. But this was almost an inno-
centpractically child’s gameplay in comparisonrelation to what
the state organs, — the joint [B-H] state organs, — did for the
war benefit of the SDA [by instituting] a policy of the Party of
Democratic Action war that was geared towards gaining as much
advantage totoward obtaining benefits for their own community
andwhile inflicting detrimentdamage on the Christian majority,
that is to say, thecomposed of Serbs and the Croats..
Now, whyWhy did the leaders of the Party of Democratic
ActionSDA do this in the first place? ? Not onlysimply because
it was the basic model of the fundamentalist way of thinking and
acting, that is to say,theory and practice: domination, supremacy,
privileges, 100 per cent power (holding one hundred percent of
the governing authority, just as it was in the days of the Ottoman
Empire,), but first and foremost, againto gain one more vote in
the Presidency in order to achieve the Islamist goal, that is objec-
tive with respect to say, a state of the kind that they government,
just as those who played leading roles in our national drama had
envisaged, that is to say, 50envisioned it fifty years ago.
(See p.  for a clean version of this passage.)
CHRONOLOGY OF THE BOSNIAN WAR
Source: Wikipedia (Serbian)
June 25, 1991 ʊ Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally secede from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia; Germany immediately recognizes the new states, and
with the U.S., it encourages the political leadership of B-H to secede, which
leads to a brutal civil war.
March 19, 1992 ʊ The U.S. sabotages an agreement reached by the Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims (the Lisbon Accords) on a unified Bosnian state. The civil
war continues for three more years.
March 1, 1992 ʊ The day after the Referendum on the Independence of B-H,
Ramiz Delaliü, a member of the Green Berets, fires into a Serbian wedding
procession in the Bašþaršija district of Sarajevo, and kills Nikola Gardoviü, the
father of the groom. He is the first casualty in the war. This results in Serbs
erecting barricades in their neighborhoods.
March 1992 ʊ The Croatian Army invades and attacks Bosanski Brod,
Kupres, and the Neretva River Valley in B-H. Among the cities attacked by the
Croatian Army, which is operating in conjunction with Muslim paramilitary
units, is Sijekovac where 46 Serbs are massacred.
April 6, 1992 ʊ The European Community recognizes the independence of B-H
on the basis of the Badinter Commission Report on the Referendum of February
29, 1992.
April 7, 1992 ʊ The Assembly of the Serbian People of B-H is established at
the Holiday Inn Hotel in Sarajevo and it proclaims the independence of the
Republika Srpska of B-H, which “may unite with other entities in Yugoslavia.”
is proclaimed.
April 8, 1992 ʊ Ninety percent of the Serbian members of the MUP resign and
join the newly established Serbian MUP.
May 15, 1992 ʊ Muslim forces attack a JNA column in Tuzla and inflict a toll of
50 dead and 44 wounded.
May 27, 1992 ʊ An explosion on Vasa Miskin Street in Sarajevo leaves 17
dead. The Muslims claim the Serbs are responsible for the attack on civilians.
July 29, 1992 ʊ The International Community pressures the Serbs into surren-
dering the Sarajevo airport to the UN for deliveries of humanitarian aid.
August 26, 1992 ʊ The London Conference, established to end the war in B-H,
convenes.
January 7 and 16, 1993 ʊ Muslim forces commit massacres against the Serbi-
an residents of Kravica and Skelani.
4 4
February 22, 1993 ʊ At the insistence of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine August 29, 1995 ʊ The leadership of the Republika Srpska authorizes the Pres-
Albright, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ident of Serbia, Slobodan Miloševiü, to represent the Republika Srpska in peace
is established in The Hague to try Balkan leaders, especially Serbs. negotiations.
March 11, 1993 ʊ General Philippe Morillon, UNPROFOR Commander in B-H, August 30, 1995 ʊ The NATO Air Force begins intense bombardment of the
arrives in Srebrenica, which has been surrounded by Serbian forces. Republika Srpska and destroys chiefly military and communications targets.
March 18, 1993 ʊ The UN Security Council designates Srebrenica to be a “pro- September 8, 1995 ʊ The Republika Srpska is officially recognized as one of
tected area.” the two entities of B-H.
May 2, 1993 ʊ Radovan Karadžiü, President of the Republika Srpska, signs the September 14, 1995 ʊ After two weeks of NATO air strikes, the Serbs agree to
Vance-Owen Peace Plan in Athens. The Plan has to be ratified by the Assembly withdraw their heavy weaponry from the area surrounding Sarajevo.
of the Republika Srpska. October 5, 1995 ʊ One of the key negotiators who drew up the peace treaty,
May 5, 1993 ʊ The Assembly of the Republika Srpska rejects the Vance-Owen Richard Holbrooke, U.S. [Assistant Secretary of State], announces a two-month
Plan. cessation of hostilities in B-H. Muslim-Croat seized more than 50% of B-H
June 16, 1993 ʊ A new peace plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, is proposed in territory by this date.
Geneva. The Serbian and Croatian sides accept the proposed maps. November 16, 1995 ʊ The Hague Tribunal broadens the indictments against
August 24, 1993 ʊ Croatians in B-H proclaim the independence of The Republic Radovan Karadžiü and Ratko Mladiü by charging them with responsibility for
of Herceg-Bosna. the alleged massacre in Srebrenica.
September 21, 1993 ʊ The Muslim side rejects the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. November 21, 1995 ʊ President Miloševiü and the presidents of Bosnia and
Croatia initial the Dayton Peace Accords which officially ends the Bosnian
February 5, 1994 ʊ An explosion in the Sarajevo market square Markale is re-
War. U.S./NATO occupation begins.
ported to have killed 68 and wounded 200. The Serbs are held to be responsible
for the explosion. December 14, 1995 ʊ The Dayton Peace accords are ratified during an official
ceremony in Paris.
March 18, 1994 ʊ Franjo Tuÿman and Alija Izetbegoviü sign an agreement on
the formation of the Muslim-Croat Federation in B-H.
April 10, 1994 ʊ The Army of the Republika Srpska launches an offensive
against Goražde, a Muslim enclave with 60,000 inhabitants.
April 25, 1994 ʊ The United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
and Russia form the Contact Group.
July 18, 1994 ʊ The Muslims and the Croats accept the plan proposed by the
Contact Group, according to which B-H is divided with 51% going to the Mus-
lim-Croat Federation, and 49% to the Republika Srpska.
August 4, 1994 ʊ After the Republika Srpska rejects the Contact Group’s Plan,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia breaks off relations with the Republika
Srpska and closes the border on the Drina.
July 11, 1995 ʊ The Army of the Republika Srpska takes Srebrenica.
July 16, 1995 ʊ The Hague Tribunal issues indictments against Radovan
Karadžiü and General Ratko Mladiü for the siege and bombardment of Sarajevo.
August 4, 1995 ʊ The Croatian military, led by the future head of the Kosovo
Liberation Army, Agim Ceku, launches “Operation Storm” with U.S. military
backing, which drives 250,000 Serbs from their ancestral regions in Krajina.
August 28, 1995 ʊ One more explosion is detonated at the Markale Market in
Sarajevo in which 37 people were killed. The Serbs are held accountable for
this explosion, too.
 SUGGESTED READINGS

Books
Aarons, Mark, and Loftus, John. Unholy Trinity: The Vatican, The Nazis,
and The Swiss Banks. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1998.
Brock, Peter. Media Cleansing, Dirty Reporting: Journalism and Trag-
edy in Yugoslavia. Los Angeles : GM Books, 2005.
Collon, Michel. Liar's Poker: The Great Powers, Yugoslavia and the
Wars of the Future. New York: International Action Center, 2002.
Dedijer, Vladimir. The Yugoslav Auschwitz: The Croatian Massacre of
the Serbs during World War II. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1992.
Ivaniševiü, Milivoje. The Srebrenica ID Card. http://www.serb-
victims.org/en/content/blogcategory/20/33/ (last accessed 2/22/14).
Karadžiü, Radovan. Opening Defense Speech at The Hague Tribunal.
New York: Unwritten History, Inc. (title in preparation).
Karganoviü, Stephen. Rethinking Srebrenica. New York: Unwritten
History, Inc., 2013.
Kohlmann, Evan F. Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian
Network. New York: Berg, 2004.
Koljeviü, Nikola, Creating the Republika Srpska, New York: Unwritten
History, Inc., 2014.
Miloševiü, Slobodan. The Defense Speaks: For History and the Future.
New York: International Action Center, 2006.
Schindler, John R. Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa'ida, and the Rise of
Global Jihad. St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2007.
The Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Cana-
da. Martyrdom of the Serbs: Persecutions of the Serbian Orthodox
Church and Massacre of the Serbian People, Documents and reports of
the Trustworthy United Nations and of Eyewitnesses. Chicago: The
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada,
1943.
Yelesiyevich, Milo, et al. Ratko Mladiü: Tragic Hero. New York: Un-
written History, Inc., 2006.
4
Internet Resources
www.ebritic.com
grayfalcon.blogspot.com
www.juliagorin.com/wordpress
www.serb-victims.org
www.serbianna.com
www.slobodan-milosevic.org
www.srebrenica-project.com
www.srpska-mreza.com
theremustbejustice.wordpress.com
INDEX
101st ...........................................311
105th Brigade ........... 307, 311, 313
105th Mountain Brigade... 307, 309
12th Division .............................317
152nd Mountain Brigade...........307
1st Corps of the Army of B-H ...317
92 quarter rule ............................367
Abdiü, Fikret ............... 53, 177, 251
Adriatic ............................... 63, 173
agas ............................................333
Ajanoviü, Ifran ............ 33, 235, 237
Akashi, Yasushi .........................325
Albanians ...................................149
al-Husseini, Amin ......................163
Allies ............................................63
Americans ................... 65, 123, 331
Andriü, Ivo .................................345
Arab world .................................103
Arkan .........................................249
Assembly of B-H ...... 45, 51, 95, 97
165, 189, 193, 209, 221, 227,
229, 249, 261, 265
Assembly of the
Serbian People 29, 31, 67, 129,
151, 163, 181, 193, 203, 221,
223, 227, 229, 231, 237, 245,
247, 249, 259, 261, 263, 265,
287, 291
Australians .................................187
Austria........................................111
Austro-Hungarian Empire 111, 145
Austro-Hungary 111, 131, 195, 197
Autonomous Region
of the Krajina .......................221
Babiü, Milan ..............................281
Baker, James ................................57
Balkan Odyssey ................ 295, 329
Balkans ......................... 37, 61, 119
Ban Jelaþiü Square.......................41
Banja Luka................ 121, 341, 353
Bašþaršija .......................... 307, 309
Behmen, Omer.. 163, 171, 175, 197
Beirut .........................................257
Belgrade ...................... 51, 235, 249
Berlin Wall ..................................33
Beta Isakoviü
Elementary School ...............317
beys ............................................333
B-H .... 7, 9, 11, 13, 19, 21, 23, 25,
27, 31, 33, 35, 39, 41, 43, 45,
49, 57, 67, 81, 95, 97, 99, 101,
105, 107, 109, 111, 113, 115,
127, 135, 139, 149, 151, 159,
161, 171, 187, 189, 191, 193,
195, 197, 199, 201, 209, 213,
215, 219, 225, 227, 229, 235,
237, 239, 241, 245, 247, 253,
267, 281, 285, 297, 299, 303,
313, 315, 319, 333, 337, 375,
407, 408
Bijeljina.... 155, 203, 247, 249, 251,
341, 373
Bildt, Karl ....................................13
Bissett, James.................. 55, 59, 61
Bistrik area .................................307
Bjelobrk, Mr. ...............................97
Bjelovar......................................133
Black Legions ............................133
Boljkovac, Josip ....... 123, 125, 131
Bosanska Krajina .............. 121, 355
Bosanski Brod ...........................241
Bosanski Novi .................. 347, 355
Bosna River Valley ...................103
Bosnia .... 13, 19, 23, 25, 35, 37, 39,
41, 43, 45, 49, 53, 55, 59, 61,
91, 93, 97, 103, 107, 109, 117,
119, 123, 131, 135, 137, 145,
149, 151, 153, 161, 163, 165,
171, 173, 177, 179, 181, 183,
193, 195, 205, 219, 229, 235,
237, 241, 251, 253, 263, 265,
281, 295, 297, 301, 315, 323,
327, 337, 343, 345, 353, 359,
379
Bosnian MUP ............................271
4
Bosnian Muslims .......................337
Bosnian Parliament....................193
Bosnian Serb Government ........245
Bosnian Serbs ....... 49, 81, 127, 215
Bosnians.......................................13
Branislava Ĉurÿeva
Number 2 .............................309
Bratunac ................ 51, 53, 343, 373
brotherhood and unity ...... 213, 291
Brozoviü, Dalibor ............. 127, 145
Brussels model...........................313
Buüa Potok.................................311
Budak, Mile ...............................115
cantonization..................... 151, 313
Carrington Building ...................317
Carrington, Lord ..... 25, 65, 81, 229
Cassese................................ 39, 113
Catholics ................... 181, 243, 345
ýauseviü, Mr..............................217
ýengiü, Helid .............................269
ýengiü, Hasan ......... 171, 173, 267,
269, 295
ýengiü, Muhamed ............. 45, 197,
227, 297
Central Europe ...........................119
Central Powers...........................215
Centrotrans.................................311
ýeremlija Nursery School .........317
Cerska ........................................363
Chamber of Nationalities...........189
Chavez .......................................173
checker-board flag .....................127
Christmas ...................................357
Churchill, Winston ....................187
Ciglana .......................................369
close-air support ....... 377, 379, 381
CNN ...........................................325
collective Presidency .......... 31, 253
College of Physical Education ..311
Communist era...... 11, 51, 153, 315
Constitution [of B-H] ....... 51, 113,
129, 153, 187, 191, 195, 337
Constitution [Yugoslav] ............209
constitutive people .....................151
Contact Group ..............................47
Council for the Equal Rights of
Peoples and Nationalities.....189
Council of National Equality.....211
Council of Nationalities.............189
Council of Peoples.......................51
Council on National Equality ......51
Crisis Staff .................................289
Croatian Democratic Party ..........95
Croatian MUP................... 269, 271
Croat-Muslim forces......... 263, 301
Croats . 9, 11, 13, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29,
31, 33, 39, 43, 51, 63, 95, 97,
99, 113, 115, 117, 119, 133,
135, 151, 161, 165, 179, 189,
193, 195, 203, 219, 225, 229,
235, 239, 251, 265, 285, 289,
297, 321, 333, 337, 349, 353,
355, 407, 408
Crveni Vrh .................................363
Cutileiro ..... 25, 29, 31, 43, 59, 229,
235, 237, 239, 247, 257, 267,
285, 287, 291, 299
Cutileiro Plan ... 25, 31, 43, 59, 237,
285, 291
Cyrillic script .............................225
Czechs ........................................131
Dalmatia.....................................253
Davutoglu, Ahmet .....................119
de Cuellar, Perez ..........................57
Declaration of Sovereignty........193
Declaration on Independence ....211
Del Ponte, Carla...........................19
Demurenko, Corporal ..................71
Deronjiü, Nenad........ 367, 369, 371
Detainees....................................369
Die Welt .....................................215
Directive Nos. 4 and 7 ...............359
DNA.................................. 373, 375
Dobrinja .............................. 69, 303
Dobrovoljaþka Street .......... 11, 407
Ĉogan, Simo ..............................127
Dogloda .....................................327
Doko, Jerko................................251
Dositejeva Street ........................309
Drina River ....................... 127, 145
dubio pro reo .............................331
Dumas, Roland ............................57
Durakoviü, Nijaz..........................53
Dutch Government Report ........371
Eastern Bosnia ...........................361
Efendiü, Hasan .................... 29, 257
European Community ... 25, 65, 81,
227, 237, 285, 287, 291, 293
European Union .................... 47, 65
Europeans ....................................65
fatwa ..........................................181
Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia .............................39
Ferhadija ........................... 307, 317
Ferhadija Street ..........................307
Filipoviü, Muhamed ...... 15, 53, 91,
217, 219, 267, 423
Foþa........................... 197, 269, 373
Forum for the Protection of
Individual and Traditional
Rights of Muslims................143
Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung .................................215
Galiü, General ..................... 75, 331
Gallois, Gen. P-M ......................215
Ganiü, Ejup .................. 9, 197, 201,
235, 271, 407
Gardoviü, Nikola .......................233
Germany ... 41, 57, 61, 63, 135, 215
gerrymandering..........................315
Geršovski, Sašo ................ 131, 133
Goldštajn, Slavko ......................121
Goražde ......................................365
Gradiška .....................................341
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem 163, 173
Grbavica.................... 255, 301, 305
Great Wall of China...................173
Greeks ........................................149
Green Berets (Muslim) .... 199, 253,
255, 267
Green Highway..........................173
4
Habsburg Empire .......................119
Hadžiüi .......................................303
Hajrulahoviü, Brig. ....................327
Haliloviü, Sefer.................... 96, 319
Han Pijesak ................................373
Handžar .....................................163
Hartmann, Ralph..........................57
Harvey, Richard.............................5
HDZ ................... 93, 101, 113, 115,
133, 145, 199, 209, 237
Helveticizing..............................149
Hitler, Adolf...............................163
Holbrooke, Richard ............. 13, 19,
27, 47, 65, 383, 387
Holiday Inn ............... 255, 289, 309
Hrasnica .................... 303, 315, 325
Hrustovo ....................................347
humanitarianism ..........................85
HVO...........................................299
Igman .........................................381
Ilidža ......................... 303, 315, 327
in dubio pro reo ................ 319, 371
International Community .....47, 55,
85, 195, 323, 333, 387
Iran .............................................171
Iranian Revolution .....................171
Islamic Declaration.... 81, 161, 163,
169, 183, 191, 295, 337
Islamic fundamentalism ..............15
Islamic republic ................ 103, 171
Islamic state .............. 165, 167, 275
Islamization ...............................171
ITN ...............................................89
Izetbegoviü, Alija ................ 15, 25,
33, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 53, 55,
59, 61, 83, 101, 103, 109, 117,
147, 159, 161, 163, 167, 169,
171, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183,
191, 197, 201, 205, 209, 211,
213, 217, 219, 221, 225, 229,
231, 239, 253, 255, 267, 269,
275, 281, 287, 295, 303, 319,
323, 337, 343, 347
Jews............................... 9, 121, 407
jihad ...........................................169
4
JNA ............... 29, 37, 57, 123, 133,
143, 187, 213, 343, 345, 347
joint criminal enterprise. 27, 29, 31,
47, 53, 137, 189, 215, 337, 375
journalists.................... 85, 309, 311
Kališik ........................................197
Kamenica ...................................363
Kapruzova..................................317
Karadžiü, Radovan ...............3, 5, 7,
17, 19, 27, 29, 31, 35, 39, 43,
45, 53, 61, 103, 105, 109, 113,
129, 131, 139, 143, 149, 157,
159, 165, 167, 171, 173, 175,
177, 191, 201, 209, 221, 223,
229, 239, 253, 259, 261, 277,
279, 283, 285, 289, 305, 337,
339, 369, 371, 373, 377, 383
Karakaj.......................................345
Kenney, George .................. 59, 257
Keraterm ....................................349
Kladanj.............................. 367, 373
Kljuþ ......................... 341, 343, 347
Knin .................................. 127, 253
Koliševski, Lazar .......................171
Koljeviü, Nikola .. 51, 61, 201, 219,
235, 253, 283, 291, 353, 355
Koševo Hospital ................. 81, 311
Kosiü ............................................31
Kosovo .............................. 171, 173
Kotor Varoš ...... 203, 343, 359, 361
Kotor-Varoš ...............................203
Kovaþeviü, Milan ......................343
Kovaþeviüi .................................345
Krajina 37, 111, 113, 127, 129, 131,
195, 221, 281, 321, 355
Krajišnik, Momþilo ..... 25, 27, 137,
223, 235, 293, 315
Kravica.............................. 357, 367
Krleža, Miroslav ........................101
Kuþan, Milan ............ 149, 213, 287
Kupres ........................................251
KWON, Justice O-Gon .......3, 5, 7,
53, 73, 77, 79, 123, 125, 141,
143, 175, 205, 207, 209, 263,
275, 277, 305, 333, 335, 337,
387
Ladija .........................................355
League of Communists..............143
Leningrad ...................................257
Lisbon Agreement ... 25, 29, 43, 55,
59, 235, 237, 239, 285
London Conference .....................87
Lubbers, Ruud .............................61
Macedonia .................................133
Malovan .....................................253
Mandiü, Momþilo ............. 243, 247
Manjaþa ............................ 349, 351
Marijin Dvor ..............................309
Markale .. 69, 79, 87, 173, 175, 177,
187, 307, 327, 333, 335
Markale I............................. 69, 333
Markale II ........................... 69, 333
Maršal Tito Street ......................317
Marshall ................................ 89, 91
Marxists .....................................383
MBO ..... 15, 91, 217, 219, 229, 423
Memorandum of the Serbian
Academy of Arts and Sciences
..............................................171
mens rea .................... 147, 151, 161
Miliüi..........................................365
Military Frontier ........................111
Miljacka River .................. 301, 305
Miloševiü, General ....................331
Miloševiü, Slobodan ........ 103, 123,
171, 257, 331
Milovanoviü, General ................321
Ministry of Agriculture .............151
Ministry of Defense .......... 151, 201
Ministry of Information .............153
Ministry of Justice .....................155
Ministry of Science....................153
Ministry of the Interior .... 151, 157,
255
Mladiü ....... 303, 311, 359, 361, 369
Morillon, Gen. Philippe ..... 83, 353,
361, 363
Munich .......................................215
MUP. 157, 159, 211, 213, 231, 241,
247, 255, 267, 269, 271, 275,
277, 279, 283, 285
Muslim Brotherhood ...................17
Muslim community ..... 11, 33, 177,
408
Muslim-Bosniak Organization ..217
Muslims ..................... 9, 13, 15, 17,
21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 39,
43, 47, 49, 51, 75, 91, 93, 95,
97, 103, 107, 109, 113, 117,
119, 133, 135, 143, 151, 161,
163, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173,
175, 177, 179, 181, 183, 187,
189, 193, 201, 205, 211, 217,
219, 225, 229, 233, 235, 239,
241, 249, 255, 265, 273, 279,
283, 285, 297, 301, 303, 305,
319, 323, 325, 333, 335, 337,
341, 343, 345, 347, 349, 351,
353, 355, 357, 359, 371, 373,
381, 407, 423
National Assembly of Bosnia and
Herzegovina Building ..........311
National Defense Council of B-H
..............................................205
National Guard ..........................155
National Guards Corps ..............241
National Museum of Bosnia and
Herzegovina Building ..........311
National Security Council .........245
NATO ......... 17, 319, 331, 377, 379
NDH...........................................121
Neuilly .......................................215
Njegoš, Prince-Bishop .................65
non-Islamic ............... 167, 169, 185
Northern Ireland ................. 25, 181
Novi Grad ..................................315
Office of the Prosecutor
see OTP
Official Gazette ..........................293
Old Town ...................................309
Omarska .....................................349
OTP 19, 37, 39, 41, 43, 71, 75, 105,
107, 115, 127, 131, 133, 135,
137, 139, 143, 151, 155, 177,
4
179, 189, 191, 203, 223, 225,
259, 261, 263, 265, 287, 289,
291, 299, 311, 319, 329, 331,
333, 335, 361, 367, 371, 381,
383, 385, 387
Ottoman Empire ... 11, 49, 119, 408
Owen, Lord . 47, 59, 79, 81, 83, 83,
85, 121, 197, 295, 329
Özal, Turgut ...................... 119, 173
Pale............................ 317, 341, 369
PAM 12.7mm ........... 309, 311, 317
pan-Islamism .............................185
Partizan ......................................121
Party of Democratic Action
(see also SDA) ... 9, 11, 15, 145,
159, 163, 407, 408
Pastrma ......................................317
Patriotic League ......... 43, 159, 197,
199, 201, 203, 205, 211, 233,
253, 269, 271, 347
Paveliü, Ante ..............................121
Pþelica ............................... 307, 317
Pejanoviü......................................53
Peter Robinson...............................3
Petroviü ............................. 243, 257
Pira’s Café .................................317
Plavšiü, Biljana ................ 201, 251,
253, 279, 291, 353
plebiscite ..................... 97, 223, 225
Pofaliüi .......................................301
Pohara, Armin............................241
Popoviü ........................................31
Powell, Gen. Colin ......................55
Pravaška strana .........................145
Prentice, Eve-Anne ....................257
Presidency of B-H 9, 235, 291, 407
Pre-Trial Brief
Paragraph 105 ......................339
Paragraph 109 ......................283
Paragraph 11 ............... 105, 375
Paragraph 110 ......................283
Paragraph 195 ......................223
Paragraph 196 ......................223
Paragraph 34 ............... 221, 223
Paragraph 66 ............... 245, 249
4
Paragraph 7 ............................79
Paragraph 78 ........................261
Prijedor .... 265, 279, 341, 343, 347,
349
Prisoners of war .........................369
propaganda............ 83, 85, 329, 363
Prosecution 3, 7, 17, 21, 23, 27, 35,
37, 39, 41, 47, 49, 53, 61, 67,
73, 75, 81, 89, 91, 93, 105, 109,
111, 113, 121, 127, 137, 139,
147, 151, 153, 155, 161, 163,
165, 167, 169, 171, 173, 175,
177, 179, 181, 191, 193, 197,
199, 203, 205, 215, 221, 223,
225, 227, 231, 247, 249, 251,
257, 283, 285, 287, 293, 295,
297, 303, 305, 327, 339, 349,
351, 355, 357, 359, 361, 365,
367, 369, 371, 377
Prosveta .....................................145
Protestants ..................................181
Public Defense
Council of B-H.....................211
Pyrrhic victory ...........................219
Raþan, Ivica ...............................113
Rajlovac .....................................315
Razija Omanoviü Elementary
School...................................307
Razina Omanoviü Elementary
School...................................317
Reid, Iain........................................3
Renovica ....................................317
Repiü ..........................................243
Republika Srpska ........... 19, 23, 27,
29, 79, 109, 133, 137, 165, 179,
181, 193, 203, 241, 337, 355
Rogatica .....................................373
Roman script ..............................225
Romanija Corps .........................307
Rose, Gen. Michael .. 327, 331, 379
Rule 84 .....................................5, 79
Rule 84 bis .....................................5
Rurca Palanka ............................347
Saint-Germain............................215
Sana River Valley ......................347
Sandžak ....................... 13, 173, 181
Sanski Most .............. 341, 343, 347
Sapna..........................................345
Sarajevo ... 9, 11, 35, 69, 71, 73, 75,
79, 81, 83, 127, 145, 163, 195,
201, 233, 235, 239, 249, 255,
257, 263, 267, 269, 289, 295,
299, 301, 303, 307, 309, 313,
315, 317, 319, 321, 323, 325,
327, 331, 333, 335, 345, 347,
351, 355, 363, 373, 407
Sarejevo Train Station ...............311
Scandinavianization...................149
SDA ............... 9, 13, 15, 17, 29, 33,
35, 45, 53, 67, 91, 97, 101, 107,
109, 127, 133, 135, 145, 147,
155, 159, 177, 191, 199, 201,
203, 205, 209, 211, 213, 215,
217, 219, 223, 227, 229, 231,
233, 235, 237, 241, 245, 261,
267, 269, 271, 275, 279, 285,
287, 291, 297, 319, 321, 323,
333, 339, 343, 353, 377, 407
SDS .................. 9, 29, 37, 133, 151,
153, 155, 157, 159, 193, 197,
199, 201, 203, 209, 211, 217,
221, 223, 225, 235, 237, 239,
251, 255, 267, 271, 273, 277,
287, 297, 353, 369, 407
Sea Harrier .................................379
Security Council ............... 365, 383
Serbian culture ............ 15, 119, 313
Serbian Democratic Party 9, 37, 61,
95, 99, 113, 133, 137, 139, 145,
147, 151, 155, 173, 189, 197,
249, 407
Serbian Renewal Movement .......99
Serbian territories ...... 25, 107, 119,
301, 303, 323
Serbian-Muslim
Agreement ............. 91, 217, 267
Serbs .............. 9, 11, 13, 15, 21, 23,
25, 27, 29, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41,
43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 55, 63,
73, 75, 85, 91, 93, 95, 97, 99,
101, 105, 107, 109, 111, 113,
115, 117, 119, 121, 125, 127,
129, 131, 133, 135, 137, 139,
141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151,
155, 161, 165, 167, 171, 173,
177, 179, 181, 187, 189, 191,
193, 195, 197, 199, 205, 211,
213, 215, 217, 219, 221, 223,
225, 227, 229, 231, 235, 237,
239, 243, 247, 249, 251, 253,
255, 257, 261, 265, 271, 273,
275, 277, 279, 285, 289, 295,
297, 299, 301, 303, 305, 311,
315, 317, 319, 323, 325, 333,
335, 337, 341, 343, 345, 347,
349, 351, 353, 355, 357, 359,
363, 373, 377, 379, 381, 385,
407, 408
SFOR ...........................................19
shehits ........................................183
Shiite ..........................................171
Sijekovac........................... 243, 251
Silajdžiü, Haris.................. 269, 333
Šipad Building .................. 309, 317
Skelani .......................................365
Skenderija ..................................309
Sladojeviü, Marko..........................3
slava .................................. 345, 359
Slovenes ................ 39, 63, 113, 195
Slovenia ... 57, 61, 63, 99, 117, 123,
131, 213
Socialist Party ..............................49
Sokolac ......................................373
Špegelj, Martin ......... 123, 125, 289
Split ........................... 131, 133, 191
Srebrenica .. 53, 137, 335, 353, 357,
359, 363, 365, 367, 371, 373,
375
Srebrenik ....................................373
Stanišiü, Miüo ........... 243, 247, 267
status quo ante ...........................219
Stoltenberg, Thorvald ........... 47, 79
Strauss, Josef .............................215
Stup ............................................327
Subiü, Rabija................. 49, 53, 341
Šušnjar .......................................349
“Swiss” model ...........................313
Switzerland ............... 149, 265, 423
4
television ............... 81, 83, 255, 349
Territorial Defense Forces ........249,
257, 263, 265, 273, 279
The Elimination of Muslims from
Srebrenica by Means of the
Organized Killing of Men and
by the Deportation of Women
and Children, and the Genocide
of Srebrenica’s Muslims ......357
Third Reich ..................................63
Tieger, Alan ................. 3, 7, 67, 69,
79, 147, 179, 207
Tito, Marshall .............. 61, 65, 113,
149, 197, 215, 263, 423
Tolimir, General ........................365
Transport Institute Building ......311
Trebinje ..................... 197, 219, 353
Trial Chamber ...... 5, 7, 27, 75, 117,
175, 177, 221, 223, 331, 335,
373, 375, 383
Trianon.......................................215
Trnopolje............................. 87, 351
Tsar Dušan .................................147
tu quoque ............................ 17, 357
Tuÿman, Franjo ................. 41, 107,
109, 117, 121, 213, 239, 287
Turkey ....................... 119, 173, 181
Turkish invasion ........................111
Turkish occupation ........... 119, 233
Turks ........... 13, 119, 181, 233, 301
Tuzla ................. 249, 353, 367, 373
Uertz-Retzlaff, Hildegard ..............3
Ukraine ......................................199
UN.. 35, 61, 65, 71, 79, 81, 83, 323,
325, 327, 329, 333, 365, 367,
377, 379
United Kingdom ..........................25
United Nations .. 119, 295, 317, 325
United Nations Resolutions.......119
United States ......................... 13, 19
U.S. State Department .. 13, 59, 257
U.S. Senate Republican Party
Policy Committee ................169
UNPROFOR............. 355, 379, 381
Ustaša émigrés ...........................129
4
Ustaša symbols ..........................121
Ustaše ................ 115, 121, 145, 423
uti possedetis juris .......................47
Vance, Cyrus........... 47, 61, 83, 257
Variants A and B .............. 287, 293
Vasa Miskin Street ..... 69, 307, 333
Vasa Miskin School of Foreign
Languages ............................317
Vatican ................................ 57, 165
Velešiüi ......................................311
Versailles ...................................215
Višegrad ............................ 345, 373
Vlasenica............... 51, 53, 343, 373
Vojvodina ..................................171
Vrbanja Bridge ..........................309
Vrbanja Most .............................317
Vrbanja Street ............................309
Vukajloviü, Mirjana.......................5
Vuk Karadžiü
Elementary School ...............313
Vukovsko ...................................253
Waffen SS Divisions .................163
Wahlgren, Gen.................. 325, 381
Walloon .....................................313
weapons ..... 85, 133, 199, 201, 203,
253, 265, 311, 357, 379, 381
West Virginia........................ 23, 43
What Do the Serbs Propose? ....215
Wiesenthal Center .....................115
Wijnaendts, Ambassador...........229
Wilson, U.S. President
Woodrow..............................195
World War I ................ 63, 145, 215
World War II ............... 55, 63, 113,
115, 121, 127, 145, 161, 163,
167, 173, 227, 313, 243, 349,
357
Yellow Bridge ...........................369
Young Muslims ................ 109, 423
Yugoslav People’s Army
(see also JNA) ............. 37, 243,
253, 259
Yugoslavia ............... 13, 23, 25, 27,
33, 35, 39, 41, 43, 53, 55, 57,
59, 61, 63, 65, 79, 93, 95, 97,
103, 105, 111, 113, 117, 125,
129, 131, 133, 147, 149, 161,
165, 171, 173, 179, 193, 195,
197, 209, 213, 215, 223, 225,
229, 235, 239, 263, 269, 283,
287, 297, 337, 423
Zadar ..........................................133
Zbor............................................129
Žepa .......................... 137, 363, 365
Zimmerman, Warren .......... 59, 133
Zulfikarpašiü, Adil ............... 15, 53,
91, 217, 219, 267, 423
Zvornik ..... 219, 345, 353, 363, 373