C.

Persons
BOOK I

PERSONS

Concept of Person. – The term person is

derived from the Latin persona; which
means a mask – the mask which Roman
actors regularly wore on the stage to
represent the role they were playing.
Later, it came to mean either the person
whose character was portrayed in a play,
or the actor who portrayed it, as shown
by the familiar phrase “dramatis
personae” which means the persons of
the play.

In a juridical sense, the term “person” is

now understood as any being, physical or
moral, real or juridical and legal,
susceptible of rights and obligations or of
being the subject of legal relations (1
Tolentino 153, citing 2 Sanchez Roman
110; 1 Planiol & Ripert 3). Falcon maintains
that there is no difference between
“person” and “man” and defines “person”
as “man and all associations formed by
man. This view, however, is not correct,
because the term “person” is more
extensive than “man” or “human being.” It
includes entities which have no physical
existence, such as corporations and
partnerships, which have been endowed
with an independent legal existence by
the law.

On the other hand, since the abolition of

slavery, all human beings are persons,
whatever may be the condition of their
intelligence and will. Infants and the
insane are persons, for every individual is
in himself a person. Thus, it has been said
that even those who are physically
connected, such as twins, are two distinct
persons, if each has an independent life
of his own (1 Tolentino 153, citing 1 Planiol
& Ripert 4).

Classes of Persons. – The definition of

person shows that there are two classes:
(1) human beings or men, called natural
persons; and (2) entities formed by the
association of men, known as juridical
persons, or as artificial, fictitious,
abstract, or moral persons.

The natural persons are individual or

physical beings who exist in nature and
are perceptible to the sense; while the
juridical or artificial persons have no
physical existence, but exist only in
contemplation of law. The former are
products of procreation, while the latter
are products of legal fiction.

Status of Persons. – The status of a

person is the legal condition or class to
which one belongs in society; it is the
legal or juridical position of the individual
in society, or with regard to the rest of the
community. It is determined by a series of
personal qualities, which respectively
carry with them certain rights and
obligations. A personʼs status serves to
determine the nature and number of his
rights and obligations (1 Tolentino 154,
citing 1 Viso 32; 2 Sanchez Roman 110; 3
Bouvierʼs Law Dictionary3129; 1 Salvat
341).

Kinds of Status. – The status of a person

may be political or civil, depending on
whether he is considered in the light of
public law or of private law. The rights and
obligations in connection with suffrage
refer to political status, while those
arising from family relations refer to civil
status.

Civil status, in turn, may be grouped into

three classes:

(1) Status as member of the society in

which a person lives, such as resident or
non-resident, citizen or alien;

(2) Status as member of a family, such

as (a) single, married, widowed, or
divorced, and (b) the position in the
family, as parent, child, brother or sister,
which in turn may be further classified
into legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted.

(3) Status with respect to the person

himself, such as (a) age, whether minor or
of majority age, (b) mental condition,
whether sane or insane, and (c) sex,
whether male or female.

Some authors consider possession as a

fourth kind of status. The qualities which
create a status however are only those
inherent in the person himself. Hence,
profession cannot be a status, because
the rights and obligations derived from it
are not inherent in the person, but
depend upon an accidental element
which is the occupation (1 Salvat 341:
343-344)

Characteristics of Status. – The status

of a person is outside of the commerce of
man; hence, (1) it is inalienable; (2) it is
imprescriptible, (3) it cannot be the
object of compromise, (4) the action to
claim it cannot be renounced, and (5) the
rights arising from it cannot be exercised
by creditors (1 Salvat 347-348).

Title I

CIVIL PERSONALITY

Concept of Personality. – Personality is

the quality derived from being a person.
While a person is any being susceptible of
rights and obligations, personality is the
aptitude of that being of becoming the
subject, active or passive, of juridical
relations. Personality is thus an attribute
of persons. It is a consequence of human
existence; it is born with man and stays
with him until his death. Although
inherent in every natural person, it is
extended by law to entities which have no
natural existence, or to juridical or
artificial persons (1 Tolentino 155, citing 1
Castan 135-136; 1 Oyuelos 79; 1 Camus
56).

Same; Its Characteristics. – The

characteristics of personality are: (1) It is
not a being, but a quality of certain
beings. (2) It is not a physical element,
but a juridical concept. (3) It is not an
object of contract, or of possession, and
cannot be impaired by agreement. (4) It is
a matter of public interest (1 Tolentino
155, citing 1 Bonet 41-42).

Same; Relation to Capacity. – Sanchez

Roman makes a distinction between
personality and capacity. According to
him, the two are intimately related, but
are not identical. He view personality as
the conduct of capacity in law, a
necessary derivation from its existence,
and the external manifestation of
capacity. He considers personality in
general and in a specific sense. In a
general sense, it cannot be limited,
because it is the consequence of juridical
capacity, which in turn is merely a
consequence of human nature. But in a
specific sense, it may suffer limitations
because it is merely the result of capacity
to act (1 Tolentino 155, citing 2 Sanchez
Roman 114-117).

Most civil law writers, however, consider

personality as identical to juridical
capacity (1 Tolentino 155, citing 1 Camus
135-136; 1-I Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff
325; 1 Valverde 241; 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1
Camus 56).

Chapter 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Art. 37. (first sentence, Juridical capacity,

definition, nature, how lost) Juridical
capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, is inherent in
every natural person and is lost only
through death.

(second sentence, Capacity to Act,

definition, loss and acquisition) Capacity
to act, which is the power to do acts
with legal effect, is acquired and may
be lost.

Source of Article. – Taken from Sanchez

Roman (vol. 2, pp. 112-113) and from
article 11 of the Swiss civil code. The
latter provides: Every man is capable of
rights. Subject to limitations imposed by
law, all men have the same capacity for
rights and obligations.”

Kinds of Capacity. – Capacity may be (1)

juridical capacity, and (2) capacity to act.
The union of these two forms the full civil
capacity (1 Tolentino 156, citing 1 Bonet
49).

Juridical capacity is synonymous to legal

capacity and to personality. These terms
are, therefore, used interchangeably in
the law. They all refer to the aptitude for
the holding and enjoyment of rights. On
the other hand, capacity to act refers to
the aptitude for the exercise of rights, and
is often referred to merely as “capacity.”
In this sense, it is broadly defined as “the
ability, power, qualification, or
competency of persons, natural or
artificial, for the performance of civil acts
depending on their state or condition
(status) as defined or fixed by law” (1
Tolentino 156, citing 1 Bouvierʼs Law
Dictionary 416). In the words of the Code,
while juridical capacity is the fitness of
man to be the subject of legal relations,
capacity to act is the power to do acts
with legal effect.

Same; Comparison. – Juridical capacity

is just one, indivisible, irreducible, and
essentially the same for all men; it is an
inherent and ineffaceable attribute of
man, and attaches to him by the mere
fact of his being a man. But capacity to
act is conditional and variable. It is
acquired and may be lost. The mere
existence of a man is not sufficient to
confer capacity to act, because this
capacity requires both intelligence and
will; and since these are not always
present in all men, nor are they always of
the same degree, the law in some cases
denies this capacity and in others limits it.
Thus, juridical capacity can exist without
the capacity to act, but the existence of
the latter implies that of the former. They
do not always coincide (1 Tolentino 157,
citing 2 Sanchez Roman 112-113; 1
Valverde 212; 1 Castan 135-136; 140-142;
1-I Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 325-326).

Capacity of Public Interest. – The

capacity or incapacity of persons
depends upon the law. It is determined by
law and cannot be modified, extended, or
restricted by agreement. It is a matter of
public interest (1 Tolentino 157, citing 1
Salvat 350).

(scope of restrictions on capacity)

Art. 38. Minority,

insanity or imbecility,

the state of being a deaf-mute,

prodigality and

civil interdiction

(legal force, mere restrictions)

are mere restrictions on capacity to

act,

(legal effect, when not exempted from

obligations)

and do not exempt the incapacitated

person from certain obligations, as
when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as
easements. (32a).

Source of Article. – Taken from article

32, old Civil Code.

Causes of Incapacity. – The causes of

incapacity enumerated in this article are
minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of
being a deaf-mute, prodigality, and civil
interdiction. However, these are not the
only causes of incapacity. Some of them
are mentioned in the next article, such as
family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency, and trusteeship. Others are to
be found in the Rules of Court and other
legal provisions.

Same; Minority. – The age of majority

commences upon the attainment of the
age of 18 years (R.A. 6809); a person
bellow such age is a minor, and has a
limited capacity to act. The
unemancipated minor cannot enter into
contracts (article 1327, par. 1); but he may
be estopped from disavowing his contract
if he has misled the other party as to his
age.

The mere fact that one month after the

execution of the contract, the minor
informed the other contracting party of
his minority, does not affect the case;
such subsequent information is of no
moment, because his previous
misrepresentation has already estopped
him from disavowing the contract (Young
vs. Tecson, 39 Off. Gaz. 953).

Same; Insanity or Imbecility. – Insanity

includes the various forms of mental
disease, either inherited or acquired, in
which there is a perversion of the
mentality, as when the person is suffering
from illusions, hallucinations, or
delusions, unnatural exaltation or
depression, or insane ideas of
persecution or power. Various phases of
insanity are known as dementia praecox,
paranoia, schizophrenia, mania,
melancholia, etc. It is a manifestation, in
language or conduct, of disease or defect
of the brain, or a more or less
permanently diseased or disordered
condition of the mentality, functional or
organic, characterized by perversion,
inhibition, or disordered function of the
sensory or of the intellective faculties, or
by impaired or disordered volition (Sec.
1089, Revised Administrative Code).

An insane person cannot make a valid will

or testament (article 798); and he cannot
validly give consent to contracts (article
1327, par. 2).

A person may not be insane, but only

mentally deficient, in which case there is
a defect in quantity of mental
development, called amentia, which is
divided into idiocy, imbecility, and feeble-
mindedness. These mental defects exist
from birth, or arise during childhood
because mental development is arrested.
The idiot belongs to the lowest class of
mentally defective; the feeble-minded or
moron, to the highest group; and the
imbecile, to the medium. The idiot never
reaches the stage of speech, although
some are able to make themselves
understood by signs; scientific tests show
that idiots never develop over the
intelligence scale of two years. The
imbecile stands on a higher plane of
mental capacity; in this group the mental
ages up to the completed eighth year are
included. The feeble-minded or morons
comprise the mental ages of nine to
twelve years (1 Tolentino 159, citing
Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence, 406-
408).

Same; Deaf-Mutism. – The old rule that

a deaf-mute was presumed to be an idiot
no longer prevails; such persons are now
considered as capable of entering into
contracts if shown to have sufficient
mental capacity (Director of Lands vs.
Abelardo, 54 Phil. 687). A deaf-mute can
make a valid will, so long as its contents
have been communicated or made known
to him in some practicable manner
(article 807). But when the deaf-mute
does not know how to read and write, he
cannot give consent to contracts (article
1327, par. 2), and he cannot personally
accept or repudiate an inheritance (article
1048).

Same; Civil Interdiction. – Civil

interdiction is an accessory penalty
imposed upon persons who are
sentenced to a principal penalty not lower
than reclusion temporal (article 41,
Revised Penal Code), which is a penalty
ranging from twelve years and one day to
twenty years.

Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code

provides: “Civil interdiction shall deprive
the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental
authority, or guardianship, either as to the
person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his
property, and of the right to dispose of
such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.”

Same; Prodigality. – A spendthrift or

prodigal is a “person who, by excessive
drinking, gambling, idleness or
debauchery of any kind shall so spend,
waste or lessen his estate as to expose
himself or his family to want or suffering”
(see Sec. 559, Act No. 190). The acts of
prodigality must show a morbid state of
mind and disposition to spend, waste and
lessen the estate to such an extent as is
likely to expose the family to want of
support, or to deprive the compulsory
heirs of their legitime (Martinez vs.
Martinez, 1 Phil. 182).

Prodigality in itself does not limit the

capacity of a person to act. He may enter
into contracts and make wills disposing of
his property. There is no specific
provision which incapacitates him for any
particular act. But he may be placed
under guardianship as an incompetent
under the provisions of Rule 93, section
2, of the Rules of Court. The moment he
is under guardianship, his capacity to act
is restricted, because he can only bind
himself by contract through his guardian.
It seems erroneous, therefore, to include
prodigality in the present article as a
circumstance which limits capacity,
because there is no specific provision of
law which implements this general
provision. It is not the circumstance of
prodigality, but the fact of being under
guardianship, that restricts the capacity
to act of the spendthrift. Unlike the other
circumstances mentioned in this article,
prodigality, independently of
guardianship, does not limit the capacity
of a person for any juridical act.

Rights of Incapacitated Persons. – The

old Civil Code, in article 32, expressly
stated that incapacitated persons “are
susceptible of rights”; this provision has
been omitted in the present article of the
Code. This omission is unfortunate and
conducive to confusion. It may give rise
to the inference that the Code intended to
suppress the rights of incapacitated
persons, because it retained the
reference to their obligations but
suppressed the reference to their rights.
Undoubtedly, however, other provisions
of the Code will show that they have
rights in the same manner that other
provisions indicate that they have certain
obligations despite their incapacity. They
have the right to support, the right to
inherit, the right to damages for injuries
caused to the, etc.

Obligations of Incapacitated Persons. –

Under the Code, obligations arise from
law, contracts, quasi-contracts, crimes
and quasi-delicts. The present article
does not specify what obligations the
incapacitated person may have; it merely
says “certain obligations,” such as those
which “arise from his acts or from
property relations, such as easements.”
The Code could have been more definite.
The fact of the matter is that
incapacitated persons may have
obligations arising from all sources,
except contracts.

They have obligations arising from law,

such as those imposed by the law on
family relations. The obligations referred
to by the Code as arising from “property
relations, such as easements,” are in
reality obligations arising from law; the
easements referred to are legal
easements, or those imposed by law,
because the incapacitated person cannot
by contract create a voluntary easement
on his property. The obligation to pay
taxes is also one arising from law.

Incapacitated persons are also civilly

liable for crimes committed by them, even
if they are exempted from criminal liability
(Article 101, Revised Penal Code). They
are liable for quasi-delicts, under the