Political Law: by Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales

POLITICAL LAW
By Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales
The Philippine Constitution

1. What is a Constitution?
ANSWER: A Constitution is that written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the
fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are
distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.
(Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p.6)
2. Characterize the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
ANSWER: The 1987 Philippine Constitution is 1) written in form, being embodied in a single document
2) enacted in origin having been enacted by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and 3) a rigid one insofar as
the difficulty of amending it is concerned.
3. What are the essential parts of a written Constitution?
ANSWER: The essential parts of a written Constitution are: 1) constitution of government- which outlines the
organization of the government enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration.
Ex. Arts. VI, VII, VIII & IX. 2) constitution of liberty – sets forth the fundamental civil and political right of the
citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those
rights. Ex. Art III. 3) constitution of sovereignty – provides for the mode or procedure in accordance with
which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about. Ex. Art. XVII.
4. What are the two steps, and modes of amending the Constitution?
ANSWER: 1] Drafting of a Proposal either by i) Congress, by a vote of ¾ of all its Members ii) Constitutional
Convention, by a vote of 2/3 of all the Members of Congress, or if such vote is not obtained, by a majority vote
of all the Members of Congress with the question of whether or not to call a Convention to be resolved by the
people in a plebiscite, or iii) People’s initiative, and 2] Ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
held not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after the approval of the proposal by Congress or the
Constitutional Convention, or after the certification by the COMELEC 0f the sufficiency of the petition for
initiative.
05. In their desire to change the present system of government, SINGAW NG BAYAN and a
couple more of civil society groups sought to change the constitution by proposing a shift from
bicameral presidential system to unicameral parliamentary system of government through people’s
initiative by gathering more than 6 million signatures from among registered voters nationwide.
Under existing laws and jurisprudence, will their move prosper? What are the substantial and
procedural requisites in changing the Constitution through people’s initiative upon a petition?
ANSWERS: In Santiago vs. COMELEC, GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997, it was held that this mode of
amending the Constitution is not a self-executing provision of the Constitution. While there is an existing law on
initiative, RA 6735 – An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum, the same is in adequate and
incomplete to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. Such inadequacy cannot be cured by
empowering the COMELEC to promulgate implementing rules and regulations. However, in the resolution on
the motion for reconsideration, the Court noted that majority of the justices voted to declare RA 6735 sufficient
law for a people’s initiative on the Constitution, effectively abandoning Santiago vs. COMELEC.
A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to amendments of the Constitution and not
to revisions to Constitution. Only Congress or a Constitutional Convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. Where the intent of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose
revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments. Abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation
of powers and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
Likewise, the abolition of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks and balances within
the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift
from a bicameral presidential to unicameral parliamentary system, involving abolition of the Office of the
President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
(Lambino vs. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160)
People’s initiative as a mode of changing the Constitution requires a petition of at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein.
(1)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW / P02

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that
the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people – first, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal (No agent or representative can sign on their behalf) and second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal
in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon petition” only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The full text of the
amendments may either be written on the face of the petition, or attached to it, and if so attached the petition
must state the fact of such attachment. An initiative that gathers signature from the people without first showing
to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic
fraud on the people. (Lambino vs. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160)
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiative to amend
the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates:
(1) Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution allowing only mere amendment and not revision as a mode of
changing the Constitution.
(2) Section 5 (b) of RA 6735 which requires the that the petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution
must have at least 12% of the total number of registered voters as signatories and also requires the
people must sign the “petition xxx as signatories.”
(3) Section 10 (a) of RA 6735: “No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the
electorate xxx.” The proposed Section 4 (4) of the Transitory Provisions mandates the Interim
Parliament to propose further amendments or revision to the Constitution, a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government.
National Territory
06. a) What do you understand by the Archipelago Doctrine?
b) How does the Doctrine, as embodied in Article I of the Philippine Constitution, differ from
the version of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea?
ANSWERS:
a) The archipelagic doctrine emphasizes the unity of the land and waters by defining an archipelago
either as a group of islands and islets or body of waters studded with islands. For this purpose, it
requires that baselines be drawn by connecting the appropriate points of the outermost islands to
encircle the islands within the archipelago. The waters on the landward side of the baselines regardless
of breadth or dimension are considered merely internal waters.
b) Article I of the Philippine Constitution treats the vast areas of water between islands as internal waters
and therefore not subject to the right of innocent passage. The 1982 UNCLOS version calls such areas
“archipelagic waters” and are subject to the right of innocent passage through passages designated by
the archipelago concerned. But, where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with
Article 4 of the UNCLOS has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been
considered as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas (referred to as archipelagic waters), the right
of innocent passage shall exist in those waters, through passages designated by the archipelago
concerned.
07. What is the new archipelagic baseline law of the Philippines? What is its implications, if
any, upon the Philippine territorial claims over Sabah and the Kalayaan Islands Group?
ANSWER: The new archipelagic baseline law of the Philippines is embodied in RA 9522 which effectively
amended Section 1 of RA 3046, entitled “An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines,”
as amended by Section 1 of RA 5446. RA 9522 adopts the “regime of islands” formula in dealing with our claim
over Spratlys. The new law would operate as a repeal of the Sabah provision of the previous baseline law, RA
5446 (the only legislative re-affirmation of Philippine sovereignty over Sabah), resulting in the derogation of the
other territories clause of the Constitution. (Merlin M. Magallona, “A Framework for the Study of National
Territory: A Statement of the Problem” IBP Journal, September 2008.)
08. What is the Regime of Islands Doctrine enunciated in RA 9522, or the new archipelagic
baseline law of the Philippines? What are the arguments for and against the doctrine.
ANSWER: The Regime of Islands Doctrine as embodied in the new archipelagic baseline law of the Philippines
modifies the Archipelagic Principle by excluding two disputed territories, namely, the Kalayaan Islands Group
and the Scarborough Shoal from the country’s archipelagic baseline but they remain as parts of Philippine
territory and considered as regime of islands consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). It adopts a mix formula that combines archipelagic baselines for the main
archipelago, and “regime of islands” for the disputed islands with the option to fix normal baselines in the islands
we claim in the disputed Spratly islands group. Under the “regime of islands” principle, baselines will be drawn
on an island-to-island basis rather than a package deal-type “archipelago.”
09. The New Baseline Law, RA 9522 was enacted by Congress to comply with the terms of the
UNCLOS which the Philippines ratified in 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline
and optimized the location of some base points around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories such as Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal as
“regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zone. Is RA 9522
unconstitutional for converting internal waters into archipelagic waters and exposing the
Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard?
ANSWER: NO. The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines because
an archipelagic state has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baseline,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. The Philippines is subject to UNCLOS III which grants
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, thus, the right of innocent passage, being
a customary international law is automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. The compliance to
UNCLOS III through RA 9522 will not expose Philippine waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard. If the
Philippines did not comply with the baseline law, it will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines
from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured and which will produce two-
fronted disasters: (1) open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the
waters and submarine areas around the archipelago and (2) it shall weaken the country’s case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. (Magallona v. Ermita, GR No. 187167, July 16, 2011)
10. When is a suit against a public official deemed to be a suit against the State?
ANSWER: While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against public officials for acts allegedly done in the
performance of their official duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the State where the
satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the State to perform a positive act,
such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
The rule does not apply where the public official is clearly being sued for acts that are unlawful and
injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising
from the acts committed in bad faith…Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in
his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed
while he occupied a public position.
As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an
unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary
injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be
directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity does not apply
in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State. (Lansang vs.
CA, 326 SCRA 259 and DOH vs. Pharmawealth, Inc., GR No. 169304, March 13, 2007)
Citizenship
11. Who can elect Filipino citizenship under Article IV Section 1(3) of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution and Section 1 of CA No. 625?
ANSWER: The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate
children and not to one who was concededly an illegitimate child, as her Chinese father and Filipino mother
were never married. Being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent is a Filipino since birth, without
having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reaches the age of majority. (Republic vs. Lim, 420 SCRA 123, GR
No. 153883, January 13, 2004)
12. Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
majority?
ANSWER: NO under Art. IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be
made “upon reaching the age of majority.” The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma is resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election
should be made within “reasonable time” after attaining the age of majority. This phrase “reasonable time” has
been interpreted to mean the election should be made within three years from reaching the age of majority. (Re:
Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999)

13. What is naturalization? Name the three modes of acquiring Filipino citizenship through
naturalization.
ANSWER: Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under existing laws, there are three modes by which an alien
may become a Filipino citizen by naturalization: (1) administrative naturalization pursuant to RA 9139; (2)
judicial naturalization pursuant to CA 437; and (3) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by
Congress granting Philippine citizenship to an alien (So, vs. Republic, GR No.170603, January 29, 2007)
14. Who are eligible to apply for naturalization under RA No. 9139, the Administrative
Naturalization Law? State the rationale for the enactment of the law.
ANSWER: RA 9139 is an act providing for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship for 1) aliens born in the
Philippines and 2) residing therein since birth by administrative naturalization subject to certain requirements
dictated by national security and interest. RA 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the
process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It also addresses
the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their
profession, thus promoting "brain drain for the Philippines. (So vs. Republic, supra)
15. Are the qualifications prescribed under Act 473 applicable to RA 9139?
ANSWER: NO. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set
forth in Sections 2 and 4 of CA 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of RA 9139 provide for the
qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. First, CA 473 and RA
9139 are separate and distinct laws- the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers
native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along
thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to
customs and traditions. Second, if the qualifications prescribed in RA 9139 would be made applicable even to
judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who
are not native-born. Third, applying the provisions of RA 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention
of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. (Ibid.)
16. Are minor children of naturalized Filipino citizens under LOI 270 also granted Philippine
citizenship?
ANSWER: Yes, pursuant to the principle of derivative naturalization. Section 15 of CA 437, which extends the
grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder should be similarly applied to
the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270. The following are requisites to be entitled to
Philippine citizenship: (1) they are legitimate children of petitioner (2) they were born in the Philippines and (3)
they were still minors when petitioner was naturalized as Filipino citizen. (Tan Co vs. Civil Register of Manila,
423 SCRA 665)
17. Distinguish dual citizenship from dual allegiance.
ANSWER: Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is
born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive acts, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is voluntary, dual allegiance is the result
of an individual’s volition. (Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May 29, 1999)
18. Who may validly avail of repatriation under RA No. 8171? Does this mode require a judicial
proceeding?
ANSWER: RA No. 8171, which lapse into law on October 23, 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, including their minor
children. (Angat vs. Republic, GR No. 132244, September 14, 1999) Included in the second group are minor
children at the time of repatriation and does not include one who is no longer minor at the time of his repatriation
or one who lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law. The loss of Philippine citizenship must be on
account of political or economic necessity and not by operation of law such as derivative naturalization, or for
the purpose of avoiding deportation and prosecution in the US. (Tabasa vs. CA, 500 SCRA 9)
Repatriation as a mode of reacquiring Philippine citizenship does not require the filing of a petition in
court. All that an applicant had to do is to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
(Angat, supra.) In addition thereto, registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the Bureau of Immigration is a
prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. (Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655) But in Tabasa,
supra, the Supreme Court ruled that petition for repatriation shall be filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization (SCN) which was designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to AO 285 dated
August 22, 2006.
19. Under the Repatriation Law, what kind of citizenship is reacquired by the repatriate?
ANSWER: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino. (Bengson III vs. HRET, et. al. GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001)
20. What are the salient features of RA 9225, The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
of 2003, or the so-called Dual Citizenship Law?
ANSWER: It allows former natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country to reacquire Filipino citizenship. It also allows Filipino citizens
to retain their Filipino citizenship even if they acquire another citizenship in a foreign country. Retention or
reacquisition is accomplished by simply taking the oath of allegiance as prescribed by RA 9225. The required
oath of allegiance does not contain the usual renunciation of allegiance to any and all other states, thereby
impliedly allowing continued allegiance to the adopted state. The usual absolute renunciation is, however,
required from those seeking public elective office or appointed to public office in the Philippines. Likewise, under
the principle of derivative citizenship, the unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below 18
years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of RA 9225, shall be deemed
citizens of the Philippines.
21. Does RA 9225 violate Section 5 of Article IV of the Constitution prohibiting dual allegiance?
ANSWER: NO. Section 5 of Article IV of the Constitution is a mere declaration of policy and it is not a self-
executing provisions. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Section 2 and 3 of RA 9225,
the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship, per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a
mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters as to what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this
is done, it would be premature for the judicial department to rule on the issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
(Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR 160869, May 11, 2007)
Separation of Church and State
22. What do you understand by the Doctrine of BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY or
ACCOMMODATION?
ANSWER: The doctrine believes that the wall of separation that divides the church and the state is meant to
protect the church from the state. The principle recognizes that the state is not hostile to religion because it
plays an important role in public life. It believes that the wall of separation does not require the state to be
adversary, rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups or religious believers and non-believers.
Under the doctrine, accommodation of religion may be allowed not to promote the government’s favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Thus, the
Philippine Constitution provides for tax exemption of church properties, salary of religious officers in government
institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools. The adoption of the benevolent neutrality-
accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemption every time a free exercise
claim comes before it. (Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1)
23. Can the courts, in the performance of their judicial functions, exercise control over church
authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions?
ANSWER: NO. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution or organization is a matter

best left to the discretion of the officials, and laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for
the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official
functions. In disputes involving religious institution or organization, there is one area which the Court should
not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary matters. The amendments of the constitution, re-statement of articles of
religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by the appellant, having to do with faith, practice,
doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of
excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters
which are outside the province of civil courts. (Taruc vs. Cruz, 453 SCRA 123)
Non-delegation of Power
24. Congress enacted the EVAT Law, a provision of which allows the President to increase the
rate from 10% to 12%. The provision of the law is assailed for being violative of the doctrine
of non-delegation of powers. Decide.
ANSWER: The provision is not a delegation of legislative power – it is simply a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which the enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. No
discretion would be exercised by the President. The use of the word “shall” connotes a mandatory order.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done,
who must do it, and what is the scope of its authority – in our complex economy that is frequently the only way
in which the legal process can go forward. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from
Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. (ABAKADA vs. Ermita, 469
SCRA 1)
25. What are the requisites of valid delegation of power?
ANSWER: A delegation of power is valid only if the law (1) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate, and (2) fixes a standard – the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. (Abakada vs. Ermita,
supra.)
Legislative Department
26. A law was passed by Congress imposing “sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer
and cigarettes. During the interpellation of the bill, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was
going to raise a question on the quorom but was not able to do so until the end of his
interpellation. After such announcement, there was a move to approve and ratify the
conference committee report. The Deputy Speaker asked if there are any objection to the
motion. When asked what was the question by Arroyo, said deputy did not respond and
instead, continued to approve the report. Arroyo’s objection was not entertained. The bill
was signed into law. Arroyo questions the validity of the law because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House. Decide.
ANSWER: A law may not be nullified on the ground that internal rules of procedure of the House has been
violated. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of non-compliance with rules
of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberation. The constitutional provision that “each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings” must be invoked to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch
to conduct its business free from interference by courts, not for the purpose of invoking judicial review.
Moreover, no rights of private individuals were involved and as such, the Supreme Court has no power to look
into the internal proceedings of the House. (Arroyo vs. de Venecia, GR. No. 127-255, August 14, 1997).
Legislative Privilege
27. Accused – appellant Congressman RJ filed a motion before the Court asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge his duties, including attendance in legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted of a non-bailable offense He
contended that his re-election being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile
by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest- not even the police power of the State.
Decide.
ANSWER: NO. All top officials of the government – executive, legislative and judicial – are subject to the
majesty of law. What the appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing him to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all
the privileges appurtenant to his position. In the ultimate analysis, the issue boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The immunity from arrest or detention of a Senator or a
Member of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution, not inferred from the
duties of a position. The doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-
elected official may have committed during his previous term. (People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689)
Legislative Inquiry
28. Distinguish Question Hour of Sec. 22, from Legislative Investigation of Sec. 21, both of
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.
ANSWER:
As to purpose
QH: directed merely to congressional oversight over the implementation of laws,
in line with the principle of checks and balances
LIn: to illicit information that may be used in aid of legislation
As to persons who may appear
QH: only a department head/cabinet member’s appearance may be requested
LIn: any person, and the appearance is mandatory, unless a valid claim of
executive privilege is made by a department head
As to who conducts inquiry
QH: entire body, either Senate or House of Representatives
LIn: committees
As to subject matter
QH: matters related to the department only
LIn: any matter for the purpose of legislation
As to the requisite of President’s permission
QH: President’s permission for cabinet members to appear required
LIn: President’s permission for cabinet members to appear not required
As to the use of compulsory process
QH: Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials
LIn: Congress can compel executive officials to appear (except when a valid
claim of executive privilege is invoked)
29. The President issued EO 464, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of which prohibit Cabinet
Members and other officials from appearing before congressional investigations without securing her
prior consent to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the
rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of
legislation. The Senate assailed the validity and constitutionality of the EO on the following grounds:
(1) the EO contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress,
(2) the EO violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, and
(3) there was grave abuse of discretion in implementing the EO prior to its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Decide.
ANSWER: In Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 , the Supreme Court issued
the following ruling:
1) Section 3 and Section 2 (b) must be invalidated. The assailed EO severely frustrates the power of inquiry of
Congress. In the conduct of congressional inquiry in aid of legislation, any person, including Cabinet
Members and other public officials may be required by either House of Congress to appear before
congressional investigations under pain of contempt without prior permission of the President.
The requirement of securing prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress applies only to Cabinet Members and not to other public officials and only when either House
of Congress conducts a Question Hour and not in cases of inquiries in aid of legislation as the latter
should be untrammelled because it is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
2) Any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information, which are presumably a matter of public concern.
3) While EO 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is
exempt from the need for publication. Due process requires that the people should have been apprised
of this issuance before it was implemented.
However, in Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006, the Supreme Court en banc clarified
the above ruling and upheld the President’s constitutional authority over the military and to stop the two officers
from attending the Senate hearing by virtue of her power as Commander in Chief, and that as a consequence, a
military officer who defies such an injunction was liable under the military justice. In the same case, the
Supreme Court also ruled that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military
officer against the consent of the President, has adequate remedies under the law to compel such attendance.
Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If
the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of
the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the
duty to faithfully execute. But the Supreme Court said that the two officers could have been allowed to testify
before the Senate without having to defy their Commander in Chief and superior officers. And if emphasis be
needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulder of the President, as Commander in Chief, to
authorize the appearance of military officials before Congress.
30. Can the Senate require members or staff of the PCGG to testify or produce evidence
concerning matters within its official cognizance?
ANSWER: YES. Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution grants Congress and any of its committee the power of
legislative inquiry notwithstanding the exemption granted by Section 4 (b) of EO NO.1, which is
deemed repealed by the aforementioned constitutional provision. The power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch. The operation of the government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate. Furthermore, Section 4 (b) is inconsistent with the constitutional
provisions on accountability of public officers and the State’s policy of transparency and full public
disclosure of its transactions involving public interest. (Sabio vs. Gordon, GR 174340, October 17,
2006)
31. Is the Senate barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan?
ANSWER: NO. The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or
pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry
to carry out a legislative purpose. So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected
by the Senate Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts
needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to
subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with
respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. (Sabio vs. Gordon, supra.)
In Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies,
GR 167173, December 27, 2007, it was held that the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint
before court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation.
Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy
of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of
which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation.
32. What are the limitations on the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation?
ANSWER: The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the
proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory
process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in
accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. (Neri vs. Senate Committees, supra)
33. Explain briefly the following doctrines:
1) Doctrine of Automatic Re-appropriation
2) Doctrine of Inappropriate Provision
3) Doctrine of Augmentation
4) No-amendment Rule
ANSWERS:
(1) Under the Doctrine of Automatic Re-appropriation, if by the end of any fiscal year, Congress shall have
failed to pass the General Appropriation bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and in effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by Congress.
(2) A general appropriation bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to special sums of
money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit – any provision therein which is intended to
amend another law is considered “inappropriate provision.” (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA 736)
It is a provision which does not relate to any particular item or which extends its operations beyond an item in
an appropriations law which can be vetoed by the President separately from the item.
(3) Under the Doctrine of Augmentation, no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriation;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court and the Heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
(4) The “no-amendment rule” in law-making refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of
Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the
other house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any
further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the
other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said
bill. Thus, Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the
Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have
been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited. (ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita, GR No.
168056, September 1, 2005)
34. What government agency is vested with emergency powers?
ANSWER: Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23
(2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Section 17, Article XII must be understood
as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest
is just another facet of emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states
that "the State may during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to
Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. (David vs.
Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
35. During a period of national emergency, Congress may grant emergency powers to the
President. State the conditions under which such a vesture is allowed.
ANSWER: Under Section 23(2), Article VI of the Constitution, Congress may grant the President emergency
powers subject to the following conditions:
1. There is war or other national emergency;
2. The grant of emergency powers must be for a limited period;
3. The grant of emergency powers is subject to such restrictions as Congress may prescribe; and
4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a declared national policy.
36. Is the Pork Barrel System under the Priority Development Assistance Fund constitutional?
ANSWER: In Belgica v. Executive Secretary, GR Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19 ,
2013, the Supreme Court declared the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent
defects in the rules within which it operates. Insofar as it allowed legislators to wield, in varying
gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system
violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations
bill, it has flouted the prescibed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the
power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators
a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountablity; insifar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local
institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the
President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he
may deem fit as well as other funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development
projects,” it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability. The Court’s pronouncement anent
the unconstitutionality on congressional pork barrel, however, must only be treated as prospective in effect in
view of the .
Executive/Judicial Departments
37. What is the nature of the president's power to appoint? Can the President validly issue an
acting appointment for cabinet members?
ANSWER: The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary [1996]) Limitations on the
executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. (Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 459)
The scope of the legislature's interference in the executive's power to appoint is limited to the power to
prescribe the qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office. (Flores vs. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568) Even if the Commission on Appointments is
composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its power is executive and not legislative. It is independent
of Congress. Its powers do not come from Congress but emanate directly from the Constitution. The
Commission on Appointment does not legislate when it exercises the power to give or withhold consent to
presidential appointment.
YES. EO 292, The Administrative Code of 1987, allows the President to make acting appointment
by temporarily designating an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, including cabinet members.
38. What do you understand by an “ad interim” appointment? Is the President prohibited to issue
this kind of appointment to the three Constitutional Commissions? How can an “ad interim
appointment be terminated?
ANSWERS: An “ad interim” appointment as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked anytime. It is a permanent appointment because it
takes effect immediately and the individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his functions without loss of
time. The same can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The
fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an “ad interim” appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm “ad interim”
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make “ad interim”
appointment. (Matibag vs. COMELEC, 380 SCRA 49)
NO. The Constitution does not prohibit the President from making “ad interim” appointment to the three
independent constitutional commissions. An appointment or designation in temporary or acting capacity is the
kind of appointment that the constitution prohibits. While an “ad interim” appointment is permanent and
irrevocable, except as provided by law, an appointment or temporary appointment or designation in a temporary
or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting
appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. (Ibid)
An “ad interim” appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution –first, by
the disapproval of his “ad interim” appointment by the Commission on Appointments, and second, by the
adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointment acting on his appointment. These two
causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all “ad interim” appointments. (Ibid.)
39. Distinguish "ad interim appointment" from appointments in an acting capacity.
ANSWER: Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended anytime there is a vacancy. Moreover, ad
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.(Bernas, supra) In Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ermita, 472 SCRA 587, it was held that
there was no abuse in the President's appointment of cabinet members in acting capacity. The absence of
abuse is readily apparent from her issuance of ad interim appointment to respondents immediately upon the
recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
40. The President issued a permanent promotional appointments to A, B C and D as Rear
Admiral, Vice Admiral, Commodore and Naval Captain in the Philippine Coast Guard,
respectively. The promoted officers subsequently assumed office without confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments under the 1987 Constitution. S filed a petition for prohibition
questioning the constitutionality and legality of the appointment made by the President.
Decide.
ANSWER: The petition must be denied. Their assumption of office without the confirmation is valid and legal.
While the Philippine Coast Guard used to be a subordinate unit of the Philippine Navy, a major branch of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, EO 475 transferred the same to the Office of the President, then transferred
again to the Department of Transportation and Communications. Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no
longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of
the respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do
not require confirmation by the CA. (Soriano vs. Lista, GR No. 153881, March 4, 2003)
41. Can the President validly issue appointment for RTC judges within 90 days from submission
of list by the Judicial and Bar Council, during the period of the ban on appointments by
reason of presidential election?
ANSWER: NO. To allow the President to issue such appointment is violative of the prohibition against two types
of appointment, namely: 1) those made for buying votes and 2) those made for partisan consideration, except in
a temporary appointment to executive position where continued vacancy will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety. While the time frame for filling up vacancies generally prevails over the restriction on the
President’s power to appoint, there is no compelling reason to justify the making of appointment during the
period of the ban. Besides, the vacancies in lower courts can be filled up temporarily by designation. (In Re
Appointments of Hon. M. Valenzuela and Hon. P Vallarta, AM No. 98-5-01 SC, Nov, 9, 1998)
42. X and Y applied for pardon as well as for amnesty pending appeal. They were granted
conditional pardons but such were declared void by the Supreme Court for having been
extended during the pendency of their appeal. The application for amnesty was later
granted. They were subsequently released. Were X and Y validly released?
ANSWER: YES. The release of the accused can only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the pardon. While
the pardon was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final
judgment, and therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of
amnesty was valid because in amnesty, finality of judgment is not needed. (People vs. Casido, GR No 116512,
March 7, 1997).
43. President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 43 creating the Presidential Commission on
Constitutional Reforms and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants, the purpose of which is to study and recommend proposed amendments to the
1987 Constitution. Under Section 7 of the Executive Order, the amount of PhP 3 M is
earmarked for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the
President. RAG, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assailed the constitutionality of
the creation of the PCCR contending that it is a public office which only the legislature can
create by way of a law. He likewise sought to enjoin the COA from passing in audit
expenditure of the PCCR.
(1) Does RAG have the standing to raise the constitutional issue?
(2) Would your answer be the same if the petitioner in the case is Senator Pimentel Jr.?
(3) Can the President validly authorize the release of PhP 3 M taken from funds
intended for the office of the President for the operational expense of the PCCR?
ANSWERS:
(1). NO. Petitioner has sustained no direct or even any indirect injury. Neither does he claim that his rights
or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or
burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or
Constitution. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President by the President not by
Congress in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25 (5) of Art. VI of
the Constitution. In fact there was no appropriation at all. Thus, a taxpayer’s action is properly brought only
when there is an exercise of Congress of its taxing or spending power. (Gonzales vs. Narvasa, et. al., GR No.
140835, August 14, 2000)
(2) NO. Congress can claim injury in this case since the act of the President infringed on their prerogatives as
legislators by encroaching upon the legislators’ power to create a public office and to propose amendments to
the charter by forming the PCCR. (Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141)
(3) YES. Under the Doctrine of Augmentation, the President may transfer funds from one agency to
another within the same department from savings in other items of their respective appropriation pursuant to
Sec. 25 (5) of Art. VI of the Constitution.
44. The President issued Letter of Instruction ordering the deployment of members of the Philippine
Marines in the metropolis to conduct joint visibility patrols with members of the Philippine
National Police in various shopping malls. The IBP filed a petition before the SC questioning the
validity of the order.
(1) Does the IBP have the legal standing to file the petition?
(2) Does the President’s order constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause of the
Constitution?
(3) Can the same order be the subject of judicial review?
ANSWERS:
(1) NO. The IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi apart from its declaration of its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. It has failed to present a specific and substantial
interest in the resolution of the case. Moreover, the IBP has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered
or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.
(2) NO. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes a permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which provides
the metes and bounds of the Marine’s authority. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of
a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. It is the local police forces that are the ones in charge of
the visibility patrols at all times, with the Metro Manila Police Chief as the overall leader. Under the LOI, the
police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to
direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is their duty to provide logistical support to these soldiers.
(3) NO. It is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to
prevent or suppress lawlessness, violence, invasion or rebellion. The exercise of this discretionary power is
solely vested in him. The Court, thus cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its
own. Unless it can be shown that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President’s exercise
of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court. (IBP vs. Hon. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August
15, 2000)
45. What is the power of impoundment of the President? What are its principal sources?
ANSWERS:
Impoundment refers to the refusal of the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made
available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the
President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second,
is the executive power drawn from the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief. Third, is the Faithful Execution
Clause.
Proponents insist that faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from
implementing the law if by doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when through efficient
and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such case, it is sheer folly to expect the
President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, August
9, 1994)
46. Who has been vested with the power to ratify a treaty?
ANSWER: In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. (BAYAN vs. Zamora, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000)
Residual Powers
47. Can the President validly issue an executive order deactivating the function of a particular
office in the executive branch? Does he have the power to reorganize the executive
department?
ANSWER: YES. The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. Except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence. However, as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department is concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the function of a
particular office, or certain law may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The
Economic Investigation and Intelligence Bureau is a bureau attached to the DOF. It falls under the office of the
President. Hence, it is subject to the President’s continuing authority to organize. (Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs.
Zamora, 360 SCRA 718) The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his
residual powers. (MEWAP vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007)
48. What is the nature of the power of the Secretary of Justice to review the tax ordinances
enacted by LGU’s?
ANSWER: Where the Secretary of Justice reviews, pursuant to law, a tax measure enacted by the local
government unit to determine if the officials performed their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers under the Local Government
Code, the same is an act of mere supervision, not control. While the Secretary of Justice is authorized to review
the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance and if warranted, to revoke it on either or both grounds, he
cannot substitute his own judgment for that of the local government. (Drilon vs. Lim, 235 SCRA 135)
Calling-out Power
49. Can the President validly declare a state of rebellion? What about a state of national
emergency? Give the distinction between the two powers.
ANSWER: YES. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not prohibit the President from declaring a state
of rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and
foremost, with Executive powers. The President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18 of Article VII. For the
purpose of exercising the calling out power, the Constitution does not require the President to make a
declaration of state of rebellion, and the concurrence of the following conditions are NOT required: (1) an actual
invasion or rebellion and (b) public safety requires the exercise of such power. The concurrence of the
foregoing conditions are required only in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to declare martial law. The declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring
a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of
the Administrative Code of 1987. (Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656, GR No. 159085, February
3, 2004)
In David vs. GM-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006, upheld the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 which declared a state of national emergency and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress lawless violence. The Proclamation was based on the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief
to call out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, insurrection or rebellion. But the Court clarified that
the provision she relied upon did not give her “emergency powers” or any new or additional power. She had
merely described a situation to deal with which she could call on the Armed Forces to help the civilian national
police. However, in the same case, the Court struck down for being unconstitutional the warrantless arrest of
protesters, the break-up of rallies, the raid on a newspaper office carried out by security forces, and the
imposition of standards on mass media, or any form of prior restraint on the press. Likewise, the provision in the
proclamation empowering the President to exercise legislative powers through the issuance of the presidential
decree is declared unconstitutional as the same can be exercised only when martial law is proclaimed.
Under Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution, the President can validly declare the existence of a
state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency
powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest requires
a delegation from Congress.
50. Can the President, through Administrative Order No. 308, validly establish a national
computerized identification reference system? Would your answer be the same if the order
is issued through EO 420 directing entities under the executive department to adopt a
uniform ID data collection format?
ANSWER: NO. In Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional AO No. 308
as it did not merely implement the Administrative Code. It established a national computerized identification
reference system which requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies, the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy against dossier-gathering by the government, and choices of policies. It
deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
NO. In Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director General of NEDA, GR No. 167798, April 19, 2006, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of EO No. 420. It ruled that it is within the constitutional powers of
the President to direct entities under the executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection format.
Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the President shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. The President did not make, alter or repeal any law when it issued EO 420
and that she merely made use of existing law. EO 420 reduces costs as well as insures efficiency, reliability,
compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of the current ID system of the government entities
under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation. EO 420 is
limited only to the executive branch and does not apply to the judicial and other independent constitutional
commissions. EO 420 limited the information to be collected to 14 special items only.
Alter Ego Doctrine
51. What is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency? Is the doctrine applicable to the
relationship between the Office of the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor?
ANSWER: The acts of a subordinate bears the implied approval of his superior, unless actually disapproved by
the latter. Taken with the powers of control and supervision, the acts of Department Secretaries in the
performance of their duties are presumed to be the act of the President, unless and until the President alters,
modifies, or nullifies the same.
NO. The quantity of work in the hands of the Ombudsman does not measure up to the workload of
the Office of the President as to necessitate having the Special Prosecutor as an alter ego of the Ombudsman.
While the Office of the Ombudsman could very well make a general delegation of powers to the Special
Prosecutor, an examination of the office orders issued by the Ombudsman, however, reveal that there had been
no such intention to make a general delegation. (Perez vs. People, GR No. 166062, September 26, 2006)
52. Can the exercise of the President’s foreign borrowing power be exercised by the Secretary
of Finance?
ANSWER: YES. The Constitution allocates to the President the exercise of the foreign borrowing power “subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.” Said presidential prerogative may be exercised by the
President’s alter ego who in this case is the Secretary of Finance. Section 1 of RA 9245 empowers the
Secretary of Finance with the approval of the President and after consultation with the Monetary Board “ to
borrow from time to time on the credit of the Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as his judgment may
be necessary, and to issue therefore evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government. (Constantino v.
Cuisia, GR No. 106064, Oct. 13, 2005)
53. EO No. 125 was issued by the President Aquino in the exercise of legislative powers. It
mandates the now DOTC to make plans, policies, coordinate, implement and regulate the
promotion, development and regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of
transportation and communication system. Despite such delegation, may the President
directly perform such functions or mandates conferred upon the DOTC?
ANSWER: YES. Such authority springs from the President’s power of control over all executive departments as
well as the obligation for the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution. This
constitutional provision in echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code defines
the President's power of supervision and control over the executive departments which provides that
supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate. Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to subordinate,
the President may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty. (Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534
and MMDA vs. Viron Transit Co. Inc. GR No. 170656, August 15, 2007)
Executive Privilege
54. What is the so-called executive privilege? Who may invoke and how the privilege is
invoked?
ANSWER: Executive privilege is the right of the President and high level officials authorized by her to withhold
information from Congress, from the courts, and ultimately from the public. The privilege is a function of
separation of powers. Among the types of information which have been judicially recognized as privileged are
state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. Certain information in the
possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress, such as Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings . (Chavez vs. PEA, 384
SCRA 152)
Since the privilege belongs to the President, only the President can invoke it. The Supreme Court
ruling limited to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may also authorize the Executive Secretary
to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case, the Executive Secretary must state that the Act is “By order
of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with the President such matter of concern. The
privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy.
(Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, supra)
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be
covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive
Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the
Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive
privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes
the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and
may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance. (Senate of the Philippines vs.
Ermita, supra)
The claim of privilege must be specific, e.g., whether the information sought to be withheld involves
military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc. A claim of privilege, being a claim of
exemption from an obligation to disclose information must be clearly asserted. Congress has the right to know
why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so. If the President and Congress cannot
agree on whether the matter is privileged or not, then the Court must come in to determine the validity of the
claim of privilege. (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, supra)
55. What are the elements of presidential communications privilege?
In Neri vs. Senate Committees, GR No. 180643, March 25, 2008, the Court ruled that the claim of
executive privilege was properly invoked by Secretary Neri, specifically under what is called “presidential
communication privilege.” The elements of presidential communications privilege are: (1) The protected
communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” (2) The communication
must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or by the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President. (3) The presidential
communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Neri had been asked three explosive questions: (a)
Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project; (b) Whether the President directed him to prioritize the
ZTE: and (c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged
bribe. It was held that the claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communication elicited by the three
(3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials”
necessary in “her executive and policy decisions-making process” and, that “the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
56. Congress has been granted by the Constitution to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of the courts.
(1) Congress enacted RA 6770 providing that decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases be appealed to the Supreme Court, is the provision valid?
(2) If, however, a law was passed providing that cases affecting ambassadors and consuls fall
under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, is this enactment valid?
ANSWERS:
(1) NO. Section 30 of Art. VI provides that no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its consent. This is a clear limitation on the
power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Fabian
vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, September 16, 1998)
(2). NO. According to Section 2 of Article VIII, Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in Section 5, Art. VIII. The Supreme Court has been given the original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and consuls. Congress cannot deprive the highest
tribunal of such jurisdiction which has been lodged to the Supreme Court by the Constitution itself.
57. Does the period for decision-making under Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, apply
to the Sandiganbayan?
ANSWER: NO. The above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The provisions refers to regular
courts of lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals. Sitting in five
(5) divisions, the Sandiganbayan is a special court of justice, with functions of a trial court. The Sandiganbayan,
in original cases within its jurisdiction, conducts trials, allows the introduction of evidence, has the discretion to
weigh evidence of the parties, admit evidence it regards as credible and reject that which they consider
perjurious or fabricated. Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one. The three-month
period, not the twelve-month period, to decide cases applies to the Sandiganbayan. (Re: Problem of Delays in
cases Before the Sandiganbayan, AM No. 08-05-SC, November 28, 2001)
58. What is a Memorandum Decision? Does it violate the requirements as to contents of judicial
decisions set forth in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution?
ANSWER: Memorandum decisions adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in
the decisions of inferior tribunals. Incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome
reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decisions of the higher court.
(Francisco vs. Permskul, 173 SCRA 323). This is particularly true when the decision sought to be
incorporated is lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at. (Oil and Natural Gas
Commission vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26) It seeks to avoid having to repeat in the body of the appellate decision the
findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway. Most likely, the
purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of facts by the
lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court.
NO. For as long as the appellate court does not incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law of the lower court only by remote reference, ie, the decision should be easily and immediately available to
the person reading the memorandum decision, such as in an annex attached to and made an indispensable
part of the decision and; should be sparingly used and may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in
the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal
complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. Ex. Simple litigations such
as collection cases.
Judicial Review
59. What are the requisites for the exercise of judicial review?
ANSWER: A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act of statute must show “not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.” (Dimasangcop vs. Datumanong, 444
SCRA 203)
The requisites for the exercise of judicial review are:
1. There must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review;
2. The question before the court must be ripe for adjudication;
3. The person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge;
4. The question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and
5. The issue of constitutionality musts be the lis mota of the case. (Ibid.)
60. What is the Operarive Fact Doctrine.? Is the Doctrine applicable to executive acts?
ANSWERS: An unconstitutional law is void, but its effects, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fairplay. The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an apropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such is presumed
cponstitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.
(Belgica v. Executive Secretary, GR 208566, November 19, 2013)
The doctrine merely reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior
to such adjudication. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination of unconstitutionality, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. (CIR v. San Roque Power
Corporation, GR No. 187485, October 8, 2013)
The Operative Fact Doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or
unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. (HLI v. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council, GR No.171101, November 22, 2011)
61. What do you understand by the principle of moot and academic case? Name exceptions
hereto, if any.
ANSWER: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events (Prrovince of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRAS 736) so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value. (Banco Filipino vs. Tuazon, 425 SCRA 129. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case, (Royal Cargo Corporation vs CAB, 421 SCRA 21) or dismiss it on ground of mootness. (Lacson
vs. Perez, 357 SCRA 756)
However, courts will decide case, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, supra); second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved (Lacson vs. Perez, supra); third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. (Sanlakas vs. Execcutive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656)
62. What is the Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality?
ANSWER: A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances.
Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by
a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. (Central Bank
Employees Association vs. BSP, 446 SCRA 299)
63. What is the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts? State its rationale and the effect of non-
compliance thereto?
ANSWER: This doctrine applies to cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of trial courts and appellate
courts involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to refer to the trial courts at
the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of evidence of the
parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate
courts as they are not triers of facts. When cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but
legal questions, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary. (Agan, Jr. vs. PIATCO,
420 SCRA 575, GR No. 155001, January 21, 2004)
The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from the Supreme Court must be put to halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition
upon the precious time of the Supreme Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended
or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases. (LBPS Commercial vs. Amila, 544 SCRA 199) The disregard of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants the outright dismissal of the petition. (Flaminiano vs vs. Adriano, 543
SCRA 605)
64. What is the direct injury test in the determination of locus standi in public suits? Name
exceptions to the rules on standing to sue and hierarchy of courts?
ANSWERS: The direct injury test postulates that for a private individual to invoke judicial power to determine the
validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that
action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. The person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.
However, taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met: (1) the case involves constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers,
there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for
voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for
concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised constitute exceptional or compelling
circumstances or the issues are of paramount public interests or the issues are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early;. (La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. GR No. 127882, January 27, 2004) or
other legal issues with far reaching economic and social implications are embedded in the case (Agan, Jr. vs.
PIATCO, 420 SCRA 575, GR No. 155001, January 21, 2004); and legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. (Ople vs. Torres, supra)
65. What do you understand by the Writ of Amparo ? Writ of Habeas Data?
ANSWER: Writ of Amparo is a special constitutional writ or order issued by a court to protect or enforce a
constitutional right (other than physical liberty which is already covered by the writ of habeas
corpus) in consonance with the power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules to protect or enforce
constitutional rights. The Writ of Amparo was usually used in totalitarian countries to protect the
rights of victims of disappearances. In the Philippines, the remedy resorted to by relatives of
missing persons is the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. But by way of experience, petitions
for habeas corpus just ended up with state agents saying the missing person was not in their
custody. Under the Writ of Amparo, it is not enough for officials to say that. The writ compels
state agents to look for the missing person. And if the court finds that the officials did not exert
enough effort in finding the person, it can hold them liable.
Write of Habeas Data pertains to the right of a person (1) to access registries (data bank); (2) right to
complement information contained in the registries and (3) the right to rectification of said registries. It is a legal
process by which an individual may petition, through courts, that government present to the petitioner all
information gathered by government on his person, and demand that said data be corrected if erroneous, or
totally destroyed if ridiculous. The two new writs were authorized by the 1987 Constitution when it allowed the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules to protect constitutional rights.
National Economy and Patrimony
66. Give two cases in which aliens may be allowed to acquire entity in a business but cannot
participate in the management thereof.
ANSWER: Under the Constitution, aliens may acquire entity but cannot participate in the management of
business entities engaged in the following activities: (A) public utilities - Section 11, Art. XII (b) education –
Section 4(2), Art. XIV, and (c) advertising – Section 11(2), Art. XVI
67. A corporation, 60% of its capital stock is owned by Filipinos, proposes to publish a weekly
magazine for general circulation in Metro Manila which will feature the lifestyle of the rich
and famous. May this be done? Cite the constitutional provision in point.
ANSWER: No, the corporation cannot publish a weekly magazine since it is engaged in the operation of a mass
medium and is not wholly owned by Philippine citizens. Section 11(1) of Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution
provides: “The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations, cooperatives or association wholly owned and managed by such citizens.”
68. May a foreigner who owns substantial stock holdings in a corporation engaged in the
advertising industry sit as a treasurer of said corporation? Cite the constitutional provision in point.
ANSWER: NO. A foreigner who owns shares of stock in a corporation engaged in the advertising industry
cannot serve as treasurer in the corporation, for a treasurer is an executive or managing officer.
Section 11(2), Art. XVI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides: “The participation of foreign
investors in the governing body of entities of such industry shall be limited to their proportionate share in the
capital thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of such entities must be citizens of the Philippines.”
69. (1) Are ancestral domains and ancestral lands part of the land of the public domain?
ANSWER: NO. Ancestral domain and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not
constitute part of the land of the public domain. The Indigenous People Rights Acts grants to indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous people a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. (Cruz
vs. Sec. of ENR, GR No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2002)
(2) Distinguish ownership of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription
against the State.
ANSWER: Ownership be native title presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his
predecessor in interest in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the
State, that is, Spain or its successor-in- interest, the United States and Philippine Government. There has been
no transfer of title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as memory
goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a conversion of the
character of the property from alienable public land to private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from
the State to a private person. (Ibid.)
(3) Does the principle of jure regalia negate native title held in private ownership since time
immemorial?
ANSWER: NO. The Regalian Theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time
immemorial. In the landmark case of Carino vs. Insular Government (41 Phil 935) the US Supreme Court
recognized the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a
claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish crown, as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia. (Ibid.)
70. MAGANDA, natural-born Filipino citizen, went to the US in 1965 to work as a nurse. With
her savings she bought a parcel of land consisting of 1,000 square meters in a residential
subdivision in MetroManila. She had the said property titled in her name 1970. In July 1972,
MAGANDA acquired American citizenship by naturalization. Two months later, she married
her Canadian boyfriend.
(1) Can MAGANDA validly sell this parcel of land to the younger sister of her husband who is
also a Canadian citizen?
(2) Supposing MAGANDA’s husband dies and she decides to reside in the Philippines
permanently, can MAGANDA buy the parcel of land consisting of another 1,000 square
meters neighboring her own?
(3) Supposing the area where her lot is situated has been reclassified as commercial district by
virtue of a zoning ordinance, can MAGANDA use the lot for commercial purposes?
ANSWERS:
(1) No. Under Sec. 7, Art. XII of the Constitution, as a general rule, aliens cannot acquire private lands since
pursuant to Sec. 2 in relation to Sec 3 of said Article, they are not qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain. Under Sec. 7, an alien can acquire public lands only by hereditary succession.
Under Sec. 8, a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private land. The younger sister of her husband is not acquiring the private land by hereditary
succession but by sale. Neither is she a former natural-born Philippine citizen who lost her Philippine
citizenship. Consequently, neither of the exception found in the above-mentioned provisions is
applicable to her.
(2) Yes. Under RA 8179, which amended BP 185, a natural-born Philippine citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship may now acquire a maximum of 5,000 square meters of private urban land.
(3) Yes. Under the same amendatory law, such land may now be used for business and for other lawful
purposes.
71. The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization thereof. Name the four modes
though which the State may undertake these activities.
ANSWER: The State may undertake these activities through four modes:
(1) The State may directly undertake such activities;
(2) The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or entities at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens;
(3) Congress may, by law, allow small scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens (RA 7006 –
People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 and other pertinent laws); and
(4) For the large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils,
the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or
financial assistance, (RA 79 42 ) subject to the following limitations: a) As to Parties. Only the
President, in behalf of the State, may enter into these agreements, and only with corporations. b) As to
Size of the Activities. Only large scale exploration, development and utilization is allowed, i.e., very
capital - intensive activities. c) The natural resources subject of the activities is restricted to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils, the intent being to limit service contracts to those areas where
Filipino capital may not be sufficient. d) Consistency with the Provisions of Statute. The FTAA must be
in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by law. e) The FTAA must be based on real
contributions to economic growth and general welfare of the country. f) The FTAA must contain
rudimentary stipulations for the promotions of the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources. G) Notification Requirement. The President shall notify Congress of every FTAA entered
into within 30 days from its execution. H) Scope of the FTAA. Only for agreements involving either
financial or technical assistance and does not include “service contracts” and “management or other
forms of assistance.” (La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc., GR No. 127882, January 27, 2004)
72. The Public Estate Authority reclaimed the submerged areas of Manila Bay which are part of
the sea. Later, the PEA sought to transfer ownership of the 77 hectares comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificate of title in the name of the PEA as well as the
209 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, to the AMARI Coastal Development
Corporation, a private corporation.
(1) Discuss the validity of the transfer of a) the Freedom Islands and b) still submerged
areas of Manila Bay .
(2) Would your answer be the same if the reclamation was undertaken by the National
Housing Authority, a government entity not tasked to dispose of public land, under a
BOT contract governed by the BOT law?
ANSWERS:
(1) (a) The reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands are alienable lands of the
public domain and as such its transfer to the AMARI is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but not sell or transfer these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens subject to the ownership limitations in the Constitution and existing
laws.
(b) The transfer of the 209 hectares of the still submerged areas of Manila Bay is likewise void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which prohibits the alienation or natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. After the PEA has reclaimed these submerged
areas and until classified as alienable and disposable land open to disposition and declared no longer needed
for public service, only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the submerged areas are still inalienable
and outside the commerce of man.
(2) NO. The NHA, unlike the PEA is an "end user agency" authorized by law to administer and
dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are
transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of
the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos.
Likewise, the combined and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with Special Patents Nos. 3592
and 3598 is tantamount to and can be considered to be an official declaration that the reclaimed lots are
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. (Chavez vs. NHA, 530 SCRA 235)
73. Can a private corporation acquire any kind of alienable land of the public domain?
ANSWER: NO. The 1987 Constitution adopts the policy of banning private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable lands of the public domain. However, it allows private corporation to hold alienable lands of the
public domain only through lease. Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case because the “land…
was already private property at the time it was acquired… by Acme.” In this case, respondent acquired the land
on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of
that date, in open, continuous and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short,
when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was not yet a private property. (Republic vs. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc., GR 154953, June 26, 2008)
74. Are aliens allowed to acquire private lands?
ANSWER: NO. The primary purpose of the constitutional prohibition disqualifying aliens from acquiring lands of
the public domain and private lands is the conservation of the national economy and patrimony. A German
citizen married to a Filipino woman and eventually separated and filed a petition for separation of properties and
prayed for the reimbursement of the amount the foreign husband advanced for the purchase of the parcel of
land, is disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines. Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing
statute, no trust can result in favor of the guilty party. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit him to enjoy
the fruits of the property which he is not allowed to own. The sale of land as to him is null and void. In any event,
he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on
the theory that he is merely exercising the prerogative of the husband in respect to conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would permit indirect contravention of the constitutional prohibition. (Muller vs. Muller, GR
149615, August 29,2006)
In Ting Ho, Jr. vs. Teng Gui 558 SCRA 421, a Chinese citizen acquired a parcel of land, together with
the improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs claimed the properties as part of the estate of their
deceased father, and sought the partition of said properties among themselves. The Court, however, excluded
the land and improvements thereon from the estate precisely because he never became the owner thereof in
the light of the constitutional prohibition.
In Matthews vs. Taylor, GR No. 164584, June 22, 2009, the Court upheld the validity of an Agreement
of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. Being an
alien, the husband is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines even if he
claims that he provided funds for such acquisition. He had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising
the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive
vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
In Borromeo vs. Descalar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009, the Court reiterated the consistent
ruling that if land is validly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a
Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
75. What do you understand by the Regalian Doctrine?
ANSWER: The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus,
all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State
as part of the inalienable public domain. (Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap, GR 167707, October 8, 2008)
76. Can private claimants of Boracay island have the right to secure titles over their occupied
portion in the island? Who has the authority to classify land of the public domain?
ANSWER: NO. Except or lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1604. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD
705, hence, inalienable. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public lands into disposable land for
agricultural and other purposes. The fact that the island has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the
way for commercial developments does not negate its character as public forest. The mere continued
possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in
Boracay and, therefore, they are ineligible to apply for judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in
the island. Presidential Proclamation 1801 did not convert the whole Boracay into an agricultural land. It merely
classified Boracay as a tourist zone. It was Proclamation No. 1064 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened to private ownership. Section 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the President,
upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Is issuing Proclamation 1604, the
President merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably
subject to existing vested right. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive
department, through the Office of the President. (Sec. of DENR vs. Yap, GR No167707, Oct.8, 2008)
77. When may a public land become alienable and disposable?
ANSWER: To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a
legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. A certification of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the DENR stating that the land subject of an
application is found to be within the alienable and disposable site in a land classification project map is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the application. (Republic vs. Candymaker, Inc. GR
No. 163766, June 22, 2006)
78. What is the State's policy on monopolies? On free enterprise?

ANSWER: The Constitution does not totally prohibit the operation of monopolies. It mandates the State to
regulate them when public interest so requires. (EASCO vs. LTFRB, 413 SCRA 75)
Despite the fact that our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, nonetheless, the
Government reserves the power to intervene to promote the general welfare. Free enterprise does not call for
removal of protective regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly
how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. (Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines vs. Duque, GR 173034, October 9, 2007)

79. Can a Japanese citizen be admitted into the practice of medicine in the country?
ANSWER: YES, provided he has taken and passed the medical board examination and upon submission of a
proof of reciprocity between Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine. It is
enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get license and practice therein. Philippine laws
do not require that the conditions for the practice of medicine in the other country are practical and attainable by
Filipinos. The license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. However, the
power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or
its agents in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner. (Board of Medicine vs. Ota, 558 SCRA 234)
Pardoning Power of the President

PARE, the City Mayor of Kati was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder. Incumbent
President ANGELA subsequently granted PARE an executive clemency. The text of the pardon
partly reads:
“[w]hereas, PARE has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,”
xxx
"(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights."
In the 2013 elections, PARE filed his certificate of candidacy for his reelection as City
Mayor. MARELIM , a member of the political opposition, sought to disqualify PARE contending that
the Presidential pardon granted him merely extended a conditional pardon. Decide.
ANSWER: When the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the
executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder
and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of
imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Hence, from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., “[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,” neither makes the pardon conditional, nor
militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective
office have been restored. A preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show
its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
Hence if the pardon was intended be conditional, it should have explicitly stated the same in the text of the
pardon itself. Since it did not make an integral part of the decree of pardon, the 3rd preambular clause cannot
be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended. (Risos-Vidal and Lim v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666,
January 21, 2015, J. Leonardo-De Castro)
---oOo---

Political Law: by Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales

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Political Law: by Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales

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POLITICAL LAW

By Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales

The Philippine Constitution

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW / P02

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW / P04

ANSWER: NO. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution or organization is a matter

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW / P16

78. What is the State's policy on monopolies? On free enterprise?

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW / P20

Pardoning Power of the President

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