Qui v.

People

 Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10(a), 3 Article VI of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 or
the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
 (RTC) Quezon City convicted petitioner as charged, and sentenced 4 her to two equal periods of imprisonment for
an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional in its
maximum period, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its
minimum period, as maximum.
 petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal. With the perfection of her appeal and the consequent elevation of the case
records to the CA, petitioner posthaste filed before the appellate court an Urgent Petition/Application for Bail
Pending Appeal which respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed. The OSG urged for the denial of the bail application on the ground of petitioner’s propensity to evade
the law and that she is a flight-risk, as she in fact failed to attend several hearings before the RTC resulting in the
issuance of three warrants for her arrest.
 the CA issued the first assailed Resolution denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal on the basis of
Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
 the core issue boils down to whether petitioner is entitled to bail pending appeal.
 Bail pending appeal is governed by Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
SUPREME COURT:
 Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as here.

The Court held:

 Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates
the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as
conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail
is prohibited.5
 The CA properly exercised its discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. The CA’s
determination as to petitioner being a high risk for flight is not without factual mooring. Indeed, the undisputed fact
that petitioner did not attend the hearings before the RTC, which compelled the trial court to issue warrants for her
arrest, is undeniably indicative of petitioner’s propensity to trifle with court processes. This fact alone should weigh
heavily against a grant of bail pending appeal.
 Petitioner’s argument that she has the constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of guilt against her is not
strong is spurious. Certainly, after one is convicted by the trial court, the presumption of innocence, and with it,
the constitutional right to bail, ends.7 As to the strength of evidence of guilt against her, suffice it to say that what
is before the Court is not the appeal of her conviction, let alone the matter of evaluating the weight of the evidence
adduced against her.
 Consequently, the Court agrees with the appellate court’s finding of the presence of the fourth circumstance
enumerated in the above-quoted Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and holds that the
appellate court neither erred nor gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending
appeal. The appellate court appeared to have been guided by the circumstances provided under the Rules. As
the Court categorically held in People v. Fitzgerald, "As for an accused already convicted and sentenced to an
imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the
existence of any of the. circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e) x x x."8 Evidently, the circumstances
succinctly provided in Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure have been placed as a guide for
the exercise of the appellate court's discretion in granting or denying the application for bail, pending the appeal of
an accused who has been convicted of a crime where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years.
Leviste v. CA
 Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. 1
 He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission
to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or
possibility of flight on his part.
 The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or
aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.
 Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none
of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not
more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
 in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal
mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
 SUPREME COURT:
 WE DISAGREE
 The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant
applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated
in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or
violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation,
parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of
committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The
second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
 Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following
rules:

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not
more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not
more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x

- Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion.
- if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of
discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.
- In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has
the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-
negating26 circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the
appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by
and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
- After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk
of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal
should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the
history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It
is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the accused should be in prison.
Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our
 criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate
sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused
faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other
release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-
wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.

Gacad v. Clapis
 Judge Clapis’ wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made overt by the circumstances on
record. First, the Notices of Hearings were mailed to Gacad only after the hearing. Second, Judge Clapis
started conducting the bail hearings without an application for bail and granted bail without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Third, Judge Clapis set a
preliminary conference seven months from the date it was set, patently contrary to his declaration of speedy
trial for the case. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by shifting the blame to his court personnel. He ought
to know that judges are ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates
are not the guardians of the judge’s responsibility.
 We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail hearings without a petition
for bail being filed by the accused and without affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt
of the accused is strong.
 Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that "at the hearing of an application for bail filed by the person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. x x x." This rule presupposes that: (1)
an application for bail was filed, and
 (2) the judge notified the prosecutor and conducted a bail hearing for the prosecution to adduce evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused.
 In the present case, the records show that Judge Clapis set the first bail hearing on 29 March 2010 yet the
Petition For Bail was filed only on 8 April 2010. Furthermore, the 12, 13 and 14 April 2010 bail hearings
reveal that the prosecution was not given the opportunity to be heard in court. During the 12 April 2010
hearing, Gacad appeared by herself because the private prosecutor, who was to appear in her behalf, filed a
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. Gacad requested for more time to secure a new private counsel. Gacad
also manifested that she already filed a motion for Arafol to inhibit from the case. Judge Clapis allowed her
to secure a new private counsel but the hearing proceeded with the accused alone being given the
opportunity to present his evidence. It was only during the 14 April 2010 hearing, the last day of hearing, that
Gacad was represented by another public prosecutor since she could not secure a new private counsel. But
immediately after the defense completed presenting its evidence in support of its bail application, the petition
for bail was submitted for resolution. The prosecution was not given an opportunity to present evidence to
prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Judge Clapis’ Order granting bail indicates that he merely used
as basis the affidavit of one prosecution witness that was submitted earlier. Clearly, Judge Clapis failed to
observe the proper procedure in granting bail.

Villanueva v. Buaya

 With the numerous cases already decided on the matter of bail, we feel justified to expect judges to diligently
discharge their duties on the grant or denial of applications for bail. Basco v. Rapatalo26 laid down the rules
outlining the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation x x x;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its discretion x x x;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution x x x; [and]
 (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the [bail bond]. x x x
Otherwise, petition should be denied.

 In the present case, Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion to grant bail on the same day that it was filed
by the accused. He did this without the required notice and hearing. He justified his action on the ex-parte
motion by arguing that the offense charged against the accused was a bailable offense; a hearing was no
longer required since bail was a matter of right. Under the present Rules of Court, however, notice and
hearing are required whether bail is a matter of right or discretion.27 Likewise, jurisprudence is replete with
decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of
bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
where bail is a matter of discretion

 The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail. Where bail is a
matter of discretion, the grant or the denial of bail hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the
guilt of the accused is strong and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the judge to properly exercise this discretion, he
must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.30 This discretion lies not in
the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the
weight of the prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the accused.
 In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a petition for bail is required in order
for the court to consider the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the
amount of bail.31 This Court has repeatedly held in past cases that even if the prosecution fails to adduce
evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require the prosecution to
answer questions in order to ascertain, not only the strength of the State's evidence, but also the adequacy
of the amount of bail.

Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second
delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought
from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled
his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him
from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other
does not."
 The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or
simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless
of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects
qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-
craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the
distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower
rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.