GREAT POWER POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:

THE COLD WAR AND THE POST-COLD WAR

SETTINGS
Noor Mohammad Sarker *

Abstract
Over the decades, Southeast Asian subsystem has gradually emerged
as a significant strategic place for the major players of the
contemporary international relations. In the aftermath of the Second
World War, the entire region had constantly been influenced by the
great power politics played mainly by the then three major world
powers: United States, former Soviet Union (now Russia) and China.
However, in the post-Cold War period, these powers, including Japan
and India, are applying different strategic and tactical policies to pursue
relative gain instead of zero-sum or absolute gain. On the other hand,
the Southeast Asian countries are following the great power strategies to
serve national and regional interests.
Introduction
The Southeast Asian subsystem is becoming an increasingly
important unit of the contemporary international system. Throughout
history, the region has got extensive importance for its significant
geopolitical location and the abundance of natural resources. That is
why a number of external powers, like the United States of America,
China, Japan, Russia and India, have engaged heavily to Southeast
Asian affairs. Centuries of Chinese and Indian influence, colonial rule,
and more recent imperial interventions have left ineffaceable ideational
legacies all over the region.1 Even in the modern era of independent
nation-states, outside powers remain vital to the developments of the
area. Therefore, the entire region has now become a theatre where great
power rivalries and competitions for influence are being played out.

* Noor Mohammad Sarker, Research Assistant for International Affairs,

Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs (BILIA). He graduated with
Honours and Masters from the Department of International Relations, University
of Dhaka. Email: nmsrdu@gmail.com
1
Fenna Egberink and Frans-Paul van der Putten, “ASEAN and Strategic Rivalry
among the Great Powers in Asia”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, vol.
29, no. 3, 2010, pp. 132-141.
124 Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 & 2, June & December 2012

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the entire region has
constantly been influenced by the great power politics played mainly by
five major world powers: United States, Russia, China, India and Japan.
Since the middle of the last century, they have consistently been
attempting to pursue their individual goals and interests about the
region.2 These world powers continue to poke and prod around the
region, seeking ways to increase their influence, but usually avoiding
moves that would raise military tensions among them. In the economic,
military and institutional dimensions, Southeast Asian states also appear
to have settled into a strategy of preserving middle ground among these
key international actors.3
The present study thus attempts to provide a comprehensive review
of the great power politics in Southeast Asian region, especially
focusing the role played by the United States of America, China, Russia,
India and Japan. While giving a spotlight on the individual interests and
goals of these world powers about the region, the paper attempts to
evaluate the Cold War-period great power politics within the area based
on some important historic events that had so much implications to the
world politics. The study then provides an insight on the post-Cold War
great power politics in Southeast Asia focusing on the individual roles of
the five world powers. Concluding remarks follow in the end.
Understanding Southeast Asia as a Region
Southeast Asia is a sub-region of the Asian continent. The term
‘Southeast Asia’ is of recent origin. German writers of the late 19th
century occasionally used the term. It became popular during the Second
World War, when the British created Southeast Asia Military Command
under the command of Lord Louis Mountbatten headquartered in
Ceylon, at present Sri Lanka.
At present, geographically the area is situated at the south of China,
east of India, west of New Guinea and north of Australia. Southeast Asia

2
Lt. Cdr. Dinesh Yadav, “Major Powers in Southeast Asia: In Strategic Crosshairs”,
2010, at <http://www.mafsc.edu.my/ administrator/ uploads/publications/ 131839
4894712133_LINK_MAJOR%20POWERS%20IN%20SOUTHEAST%20ASIA%20
%20IN%20STRATEGIC%20CROSSHAIRS.pdf> (accessed on March 19, 2013)
3
Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing
Regional Security Strategies”, International Security, vol. 32, no. 3, 2007, pp. 113–115.
 Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia 125

can be seen as two geographical sub-regions: mainland and maritime

Southeast Asia.4
• “Mainland Southeast Asia” also known as “Indochina”, comprises
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.
• “Maritime Southeast Asia” commonly known as “Malay Archipelago”,
encompasses Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and
the Philippines.
Map 1: Southeast Asia

Source: http://www.southchinasea.org/files/2011/08/Southeast-Asia-Political-Map-
CIA-2003.jpg
Southeast Asia is among the world’s most ethnically, politically and
economically diverse regions. However, as a region it has few
commonalities also, such as the climate of the region is mainly tropical–
4
D.R. Sardesai, Southeast Asia: Past and Present, London: Macmillan, 1989, pp. 9-11.
126 Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 & 2, June & December 2012

hot and humid all year round with plentiful rainfall, countries of
Southeast Asia share almost a common colonial experience under
Europeans, and so on. Ten of these states belong to the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional organization.
Geo-strategic Importance of Southeast Asia
The significance of Southeast Asia in world politics is particularly
due to its strategic location at the southeastern boundary of the great
Asian land mass. As a tropical extension of the continent, the region
consists of a two-pronged peninsula on the mainland and a vast string of
islands stretching along both sides of the equator for a greater distance
than that between New York and San Francisco.5 Throughout its modern
history, Southeast Asia has been an area of both cooperation and
competition of the major powers because of its geography and natural
resources. The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia during the Second
World War, the unification of Vietnam, and the growing Chinese
influence have transformed the entire region into one of the most
strategic and sensitive areas of the world.6
In addition, the region remains as a passage between the Indian and
the Pacific Oceans. The Indian Ocean is the world’s energy sea route
through which passes crude oil and natural gas from the Arabian
Peninsula and Iranian Plateau to the East Asia. About 90 percent of all
commercial goods travel from one continent to another by container
ships crossing the South China Sea which connects the Indian Ocean
with the Western Pacific and approximately 25 percent of the world’s
shipping moves through the Sea. The South China Sea is also an area
that engages most of the regional actors bordered by China and Taiwan
on the north, Vietnam in the West, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei in
the South and the Philippines in the East. There have been irregular

5
Patit Paban Mishra, “India-Southeast Asia Relations: An Overview”, Southeast
Asia: An Internet Journal of Pedagogy, vol. I, no. 1, Winter 2001, at
<http://www.sdstate.edu/projectsouthasia/Resources/upload/India-Southeast-
Asian-Relations-Mishra.pdf> (accessed on April 25, 2013)
6
Marvin C. Ott, “China’s Strategic Reach into Southeast Asia, Presentation Paper
to the U.S.-China Commission, July 22, 2005, at <www.uscc.gov/hearings/
2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22>, (accessed on March 23, 2013).
 Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia 127

conflicts between the Philippines, China and Vietnam over the control of
the islands.7

Map 2: Maritime Routes and Choke Points in Southeast Asia

Source: http://ada.asn.au/assets/images/maps/Sea-lanesMaritimeSEAsia.jpg

Perhaps the most important aspect of the strategic importance of

Southeast Asia is the chain of straits within the region, such as the straits
of Malacca, the Sunda Straits, the straits of Lombok and Makassar
Strait.8 The Straits of Malacca alone remains one of the busiest sea lanes
for global trade. It is estimated that some 50,000 ships carrying half of
the world’s seaborne oil, pass through the Straits of Malacca annually in
Southeast Asian waters.9 Moreover, two thirds of China’s petroleum
7
Elizabeth Economy, “China’s Rise in Southeast Asia: implications for the United
States”, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 14, no. 44, 2005, at
<http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/E.Economy,%20China's%20Rise%2
0in%20Southeast%20Asia.pdf> (accessed on April 25, 2013)
8
Supra note 2.
9
Bruce Vaughn and Wayne Morrison, China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends,
Issues and implications for the United States, Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, April 4, 2006, pp. 19-20.
128 Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 & 2, June & December 2012

imports flow from the Middle East through Southeast Asian waters.
About half of the world’s oil and gas trade already flows through the
Strait of Malacca, the world’s most important maritime chokepoint.10
Moreover, the energy rich South China Sea is the economic centre of
world commerce where international sea routes unite. Thus, the Southeast
Asia has not been a peripheral area during most of the recorded history,
and various factors underlined its strategic importance and made it a
potential place of a global conflict since the past three decades.11
Goals and Interests of the Great Powers in Southeast Asia
Great powers in international relations refer to the states with
existing potential economic, military, political, diplomatic and cultural
resources which enable those states to exercise their influence in a
regional and global scale.12 In regions of political, military and
economic interests, great powers involve themselves in varying degrees
resulting in conflicts and competition among them. Based on the
historical and the contemporary perspectives, I have chosen five world
powers to individually understand their mutual political game over the
Southeast Asian region. These five powers encompass the United States
of America (USA), China, Japan, Russia (former Soviet Union) and India.
Firstly, the USA has both strategic and economic interests in
Southeast Asia. From strategic viewpoint, as the entire region is situated
on both sides of the major waterway linking the Western Pacific, Indian
Ocean and Persian Gulf, strategic importance of Southeast Asia clearly
stands out for the US. Since shipping must cross through one of the major
straits in the region, such as the straits of Malacca, the Sunda Straits, or
the straits of Lombok and Makassar, the entire area lies central to the
operational and logistical capability of the US Central Command
(USCENTCOM) and US Pacific Command (USPACOM) forces.13
Secondly, China has a number of interests in the region, such as
preserving a stable political and security environment with the region to
ensure the stability of Chinese economic growth, maintaining and
expanding trade routs transiting Southeast Asia, gaining access to the

10
Supra note 6.
11
Supra note 4, p. 15.
12
Supra note 2.
13
Ibid.
 Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia 129

regional energy resources and raw materials, achieving influence in the

region to overwhelm the attempts of strategic containment by the USA,
and separating Taiwan from the region and promoting ‘One China’
policy throughout Southeast Asia.14
Thirdly, Japan’s relationship with Southeast Asian nations has
primarily been driven by economic considerations. Given its trade and
economic investments in Southeast Asia, Japan undoubtedly takes
interest in the developments in the region. Japan also relies on energy
routes that pass through the region, with approximately 80 percent of
Japanese oil supplies and 70 percent of its shipping traverse through the
area.15 It is notable that, at any time, there is a Japanese oil tanker almost
every 100 nautical miles in the Indian Ocean. These tankers pass
through Southeast Asian waterways.16 Any disruption in its energy and
trade lanes could bring disaster for Japan’s economy and, therefore,
Japan would always be intense to preserve its economic and security
interests in the region.
Fourthly, although Russia is not as the same great power in
Southeast Asia that its predecessor the Soviet Union was, but under the
leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia still makes its strong presence
known in Southeast Asia region. Russia is not willing to simply leave
great power visibility in the region to China, Japan, India and the United
States.17 Therefore, the primary concern of Russia regarding Southeast
Asia is concentrated to the arms trade issue. However, to ensure the
status quo of power-projection against the US and its allies in the Indian
and the Pacific Oceans, Russia also seeks bilateral initiatives with China
that also encircles the Southeast Asian region.18
Finally, India is pursuing closer economic relations with Southeast
Asian nations. Indian engagement also has a number of strategic
implications. The perceived encirclement by China, through its ‘string of

14
Supra note 9, p. 7.
15
See, Strait of Malacca - World Oil Transit Chokepoints, Energy Information
Administration, US Department of Energy, 2012.
16
Supra note 4, p. 5.
17
Ron Huisken, “Southeast Asia: Major Power Playground or Finishing School?”,
Strategic and Defence Studies Center Working Paper, no. 408, April 3, 2008, pp. 1-2.
18
Karl Hack and Geoff Wade, “The origins of the Southeast Asian Cold War”,
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 40, no. 3, October 2009, at
<http://oro.open.ac.uk/18829/1/> (accessed on April 24, 2013)
130 Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 & 2, June & December 2012

pearls’ strategy, has caused unease in New Delhi and has prompted its
leaders to respond with a ‘counter-encirclement’ strategy. With the entry
of Myanmar into ASEAN fold in 1998, India now shares 1,500
kilometres contiguous border with ASEAN.19 Moreover, Indian efforts
to enhance strategic ties with Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and
Vietnam highlight the fact that geographical proximity has a large
influence in India’s ‘Look East’ policy. This becomes more apparent
when Indian effort to improve relations with the military regime in
Myanmar is observed.20
Great Power Politics during the Cold War Period
Most of the eleven countries of Southeast Asia have got
independence at the end of the Second World War and, consequently, at
the beginning of the Cold War.21 During the first decades of their
independence, the primary definition of Southeast Asian states’ place in
the international system was by their ties to the great powers in the Cold
War. The states adapted to the internal and external challenges in
different ways: alliance, nonalignment, and confrontation.22 The
backdrop of the great power politics in Southeast Asia during the Cold
War era can be understood through analyzing a number of crucial
events. These events include the containment policy by America;
initiation of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); three
Indochina Wars; and the politics of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN).
Containment Policy and the First Indochina War (1945-1954)
The political and strategic foundation of Cold War-period
international relations in Southeast Asia was ‘containment’ of
communism by the USA, a strategy most famously spelled out in George
Kennan’s 1947 ‘Mr. X’ article in the Journal of Foreign Affairs.23 The

19
Anindya Batabyal, “Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India’s
Look East Strategy”, China Report, 2006, p. 2.
20
Supra note 2.
21
For example, Indonesia in 1945, Vietnam in 1945, Philippines in 1946, Myanmar
in 1948, Laos in 1949 and Cambodia in 1953.
22
Marc Trachtenberg, “The Structure of Great Power Politics, 1963-1975”, May 18,
2010, at <www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/chcw(long).doc> (accessed
on March 18, 2013)
23
Ibid.
 Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia 131

focus of containment in Southeast Asia particularly was on Vietnam. The

French were fighting the First Indochina War against the Viet Minh
nationalist as well as communist independence movement led by Ho Chi
Minh.24 An April 1952 U.S. National Security Council memorandum
outlined the American view of the strategic problem followed by the
communist expansion in Vietnam. The document stated that:
[I]n the absence of effective and timely counteraction the loss of any single
(Southeast Asian) country would probably lead to a relatively swift
submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries
of this group.25
This was the core of what a few years later called the ‘Domino
Theory’26 of the strategic inter-relatedness of Southeast Asian states that
guided American geopolitical thinking about the region for a quarter of
the twentieth century.27 To the USA, the first domino was Vietnam. For
Washington, all communist lines of command, including the command
of Ho Chi Minh, ultimately ran back to Moscow. The establishment of
the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) provided the Vietnamese both
material and technical assistance.28 China’s 1950 intervention in the
Korean War underlined for the United States the urgency of containment
of communism in Asia. Washington viewed the Korean War and the
French struggle in Indochina through the same lens of communist threat.
By 1954, the French were exhausted, especially after the huge defeat
in the Battle of Dien Bien phu on May 7, 1954. The United States,
unwilling to intervene directly in support of the French, had provided
over a billion dollars of assistance. The United States participated in the
1954 Geneva Foreign Ministers’ Conference, which devised a
compromised political settlement to terminate the French military role in

24
Sheldon W. Simon, “The Great Powers and Southeast Asia: Cautious Minuet or
Dangerous Tango?”, Asian Survey, vol. XXV, no. 9, September 1985, pp. 928-930.
25
Simon and Schuster, Henry Kissinger Diplomacy, New York, 1994, p. 152.
26
The ‘Domino Theory’ was used by successive United States administrations
during the Cold War to clarify the need for American intervention around the
world and to contain the Communist influence. According to the theory, if one
state in a region came under the influence of communism, then the surrounding
countries would follow in a domino effect.
27
Supra note 18.
28
Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and The Soviet Union in
World Politics, 1941-1991, New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 235-251.
132 Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 & 2, June & December 2012

Indochina. Already in 1954, the United States was characterizing the

Viet Minh’s struggle for an independent unified Vietnam as
aggression.29 The Geneva settlement partitioned Vietnam at the
seventeenth parallel for the purposes of an armistice and regrouping of
military forces. From its Hanoi capital, Ho Chi Minh’s Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, with its ties to China and the Soviet Union, faced
the southern government of Vietnam ensconced in Saigon and backed by
the United States.30 Indeed, this was the prelude to the Vietnam War
(1963-1975) and the Second Indo-China War.
Initiation of SEATO
After the defeat of France, the United States mobilized its allies to meet
the threat that now seemed posed by the opening of a communist strategic
window to Southeast Asia. In 1954, eight nations signed the Southeast Asia
Collective Defence Treaty and created the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO). In the beginning, only two SEATO members, the
Philippines and Thailand, were, in fact, Southeast Asian. The other
signatories were the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand,
France, and Pakistan.31 The operative heart of the Manila Pact stated that,
the parties to the treaty would recognise that aggression by armed attack in
the treaty area on a party to the treaty or any state or territory unanimously
designated by the parties would endanger its own peace and safety. In that
event, they would consult to meet the common danger.32
However, in order to ensure the US foothold in South Vietnam, a
separate protocol brought Laos, Cambodia, and the ‘free territory’ of
Vietnam under the SEATO cover. In an understanding to the agreement,
the United States stated that the treaty obligations applied only to
communist aggression.33
Vietnam War or the Second Indochina War (1961-1975)
After the 1954 Geneva Conference, the United States became the
principal supporter of the anticommunist government of Vietnam.

29
Evelyn Goh and Sheldon W. Simon (eds), China, the United States, and Southeast
Asia, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 12-16.
30
Supra note 24.
31
Supra note 25.
32
Supra note 28, p. 241.
33
Supra note 22.
 Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia 133

American advisors and material assistance worked to build a South

Vietnamese political and military capability to withstand an emerging
internal war led by Viet Minh cadres left behind at partition. The
revolutionary political structure was the National Front for the
Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). The armed insurgents were
called the Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communists). Both the front and the
Viet Cong were directed by the chief of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV).34 DRV leader Ho Chi Minh got a huge logistical
support from USSR and China, including heavy armaments, food as well
as the training of the Communist cadres. But, at that time, there was
Sino-Soviet rift over the leadership of Communism. They were divided
also over the strategies of the war. Beijing favoured the Maoist strategy
of protracted guerrilla war, while the Soviet Union counselled the
employment of conventional force strategy. Ho Chi Minh pursued
neutral policies and military strategies between them which were
designed to promote North Vietnamese interests without alienating
either of the communist powers.35
By 1961, it seemed clear that the government of Vietnam would not
be able to defeat the insurgency from its own resources. The then US
President John F. Kennedy decided to introduce fifteen thousand US
military advisors in Vietnam. In the words of a veteran participant or
observer, this was the most fateful decision ever made by the US in
Vietnam, because it foreclosed the possibility of withdrawal and set the
course for a decade of warfare.36 The United States justified its position
by reference to its SEATO obligations. Hanoi denounced the American
role as imperialism. However, the actual goals37 of the USA regarding
the war were set as follows:
1. Containing Communism in Southeast Asia
2. Ensuring a self-sustaining South Vietnam
3. Maintaining the credibility of USA in the eyes of allies and enemies.
The United States assumed major responsibility for the war after the
Congress gave President Lyndon Johnson a blank check in the 1965
‘Tonkin Gulf’ resolution to use whatever force necessary to defeat

34
Ibid.
35
Supra note 28.
36
Supra note 25, p. 155.
37
Supra note 28, pp. 244.
134 Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 & 2, June & December 2012

communism in Indochina. By 1968, over 500,000 American ground

troops were at war in South Vietnam, along with forces from Thailand,
the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. Regular
North Vietnamese troops, known as the People’s Army of Vietnam
(PAVN), were operating in the south in what the United States claimed
was a war of northern aggression against South Vietnam.38 The United
States carried the war north in massive bombing campaigns. The conflict
spilled over into Laos and Cambodia as the United States tried to
interdict North Vietnamese supply lines to the south along the so called
Ho Chi Minh trail and to strike enemy sanctuaries. As the American war
in Vietnam escalated in cost and casualties, realist critics viewed it as a
strategic mistake as it degraded the US military capabilities to the
advantage of the USSR.39
American public support for the war collapsed, which in 1968
helped elect President Richard Nixon, who promised to end the war. It
took four years. President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
tried to force the DRV to the negotiating table on terms that would still
preserve American credibility.40 Pressure was kept on the north by
heavy bombing and the Sino-Soviet split was diplomatically exploited
by beginning a process of normalizing the United States-PRC relations.
China also wanted to use the war as an issue to achieve recognition from
the major world powers, especially the USA, and in the way get
admission to the United Nations. For instance, before Nixon came to
power, the USA and China reached the so called stand-off agreement in
1966, where China set three conditions to prevent the Vietnam War
escalating into a Sino-American war. These conditions were:
1. The USA would not attack China
2. The USA would not attack North Vietnam
3. The USA would also not bomb over the Red River dike system.
However, it was the first indication of the United States’
reconsideration of its policy of non-recognition of Communist China
during the Cold War period. China also eventually got access to the
United Nations Security Council with the support of the USA in 1970s.41
38
Supra note 25.
39
Supra note 32.
40
Supra note 25, pp. 162-166.
41
Ibid.
 Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia 135

Ultimately, the 1973 Paris Agreement between the conflicting parties

gave the United States what it described as ‘peace with honour’. The
termination of American support left the government of Vietnam to face
their enemy alone. Within two years, southern resistance crumbled.
Saigon fell on 29 April 1975. Nine months later, Vietnam was unified.
Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City. As the end game played out in
South Vietnam, so did the sideshows in Laos and Cambodia, with the
victories of the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Rouge.42
The American war in Vietnam was, until Iraq, the most controversial
period in modern American political and military history. It impacted
the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy for a
generation. Talk of the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ in the years following the
war reinforced the sense that in foreign relations, as in domestic affairs,
of the USA the war provoked a serious rupture. The battle cry “no more
Vietnams” represented a new, limitationist view of America’s role in the
world. Providing a basis for the beginning of American troop
withdrawals under the rubric “Vietnamisation,” the Nixon Doctrine
stated that in cases of aggression other than nuclear, the United States
would provide military and economic assistance in accord with treaty
commitments, but that the threatened nation had the primary
responsibility for its defence.43 From the perspective of great-power
politics, Richard Crackatt had correctly remarked:
[T]he United States for its part needed Chinese and Soviet help in
extricating itself from Vietnam, and American negotiators were careful to
assure the Soviets that the opening to China was not to be regarded as an
anti-Soviet move. Once the Vietnam issue was resolved, at least to the extent
of removing the United States from the equation, lines of conflict which had
always been present were free to flourish. If only for a brief period in the late
1960s and early 1970s, the Vietnam War was the pivot of the triangular
superpower balance. With the pivot removed the balance collapsed.44

Establishment and the Politics of ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was
established on August 8, 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of
the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) by Indonesia, Malaysia,

42
Supra note 24.
43
Ibid.
44
Supra note 25.
136 Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 & 2, June & December 2012

Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.45 ASEAN elites expressly and

repeatedly denied that ASEAN was a security organization or alliance.
In cases of defence cooperation between ASEAN members, great pains
were taken to point out that these were not part of ASEAN. Yet, from its
outset, ASEAN functioned in terms of collective political security.
A Malaysian foreign minister retrospectively underlined the fact
that, the creation of ASEAN was the political reaction of the non-
communist states of Southeast Asia to the perceived common threat of
communism posed by the Sino–Soviet struggle, expansive Vietnam, and
domestic communist insurgencies.46
The Third Indochina War (1978- 1991)
In December 1978, supported by a new military alliance with the
USSR, Vietnam invaded Cambodia (Democratic Kampuchea), expelling
Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge (KR) regime and adding to Thailand’s growing
Cambodian refugee burden. Pro-Vietnamese ex-KR members
accompanied the 180,000-man occupying army. With Vietnamese
advisors, they established the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).
Because of the ‘peace offensive’ and the existence of a climate of hope
for normal relations with Indochina, invasion and occupation of
Cambodia by Vietnam came as a disappointing shock to ASEAN.47
However, there was ideological rivalry also. The KR refused to
accept the political inequality inherent in its perception of Vietnamese
hegemonic posturing through its promotion of a Hanoi-centred ‘special
relationship’ among the three Indochinese states. There were territorial
issues with a border inflamed by KR cross-border attacks and
Vietnamese hot pursuit.48
In December 1977, Phnom Penh put an end to any special
relationship by breaking relations with Vietnam. Finally, there was an
analysis by Vietnam of the strategic threat to it posed by Sino-
Cambodian ties. Vietnam, an ally of the USSR, feared Chinese
encirclement. This brought the Sino-Soviet conflict to Southeast Asia in

45
See, ASEAN Secretariat official website, at: <http://www.aseansec.org/ about_
ASEAN.html> (accessed April 13, 2012)
46
Supra note 1, pp. 137-139.
47
Supra note 24; supra note 25.
48
Supra note 1, p. 140.
 Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia 137

fact. The Vietnamese invasion launched the Third Indochina War.

Eventually, with the collapse of Soviet Union in the late 1980s and
following the weakening Soviet baked power, the war among the parties
came to an end.49
Post-Cold War Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia
The study focuses the great power politics in Southeast Asia during
the post-Cold War era from the individual perspective of each of the five
great powers, i.e. the USA, China, Japan, Russia and India. However, the
interests and foreign policy strategies seem different between the Cold
War and the post-Cold War great power politics in the region. The
unipolarity of the USA and, later, the move of world politics to a possibly
multipolar order have made a number of tactical changes in foreign policy
making and implementation on the part of the great powers.
The United States of America
Based on geopolitical perspective, the role of the USA in Southeast
Asia has been variously described as contributing to a stable
international order, essential to the regional balance of power, a benign
hegemony or imperialism.50 With the demise of the Cold War, the global
threat posed by a bipolar confrontation with the Soviet Union no longer
remains the basis for USA-Southeast Asian relations. Replacing it in the
immediate post-Cold War period was a vague, loosely formulated
strategic concept initially articulated by President Bill Clinton in his
1993 vision of a Pacific Community resting on three pillars51:
1. Economic growth
2. Political democracy
3. Security.
The geo-economic dimension of American post-Cold War strategy
in Southeast Asia has been characterized by efforts to advance the US
economic agenda of international trade and investment liberalization.52

49
Supra note 25, p. 147.
50
Leszek Buszynski, “Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and
Security”, Asian Survey, vol. XXXII, no. 9, 1992, pp. 831-833.
51
Supra note 29.
52
David Capie and Amitav Acharya, “A Fine Balance: US Relations with Southeast
Asia since 9/11”, 2002, at <http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/ archive/ jan03/
artca.pdf> (accessed on March 11, 2013)
138 Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 & 2, June & December 2012

The Bush administration, prodded by the awareness of a rising China,

gave increased attention to ASEAN regionalism. It promoted an
enhanced US-ASEAN economic relationship, the first fruit of which was
the 2006 ASEAN–US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
(TIFA). In 2006, the United States was ASEAN’s largest export market
and was tied with Japan as ASEAN’s second largest import source.53
The United States was second only to Japan as a source of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in ASEAN. The United States resists what it sees as
closed and exclusionary regionalism in ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, and
South Korea) arrangements or the proposed East Asia Economic
Community (EAEC).
Although the Cold War has ended, the US security interests in the
region as the vibrant power, or as the balancer in a balance of power, are
still considered significant. The USA always keen to ensure its
continuous strategic access to the region. This is provided by the US
Seventh Fleet, based in Japan but with ‘places not bases’ in Southeast
Asia, and the alliances with the Philippines and Thailand and strategic
partnership with Singapore.54
It has been the American focus on the War on Terror, Iraq War and
Afghanistan War that has led critics in Southeast Asia to argue that, the
United States has neglected its broader, and in the longer-run perhaps
more important, interests, allowing China to fill a vacuum. American
disengagement from the real interests of Southeast Asian region, they
argue, has created opportunities for Chinese soft power, as Southeast
Asian statesmen try to hedge or balance against a future with a reduced
American presence.55
Moreover, the American desire to maintain the alliances with the
Philippines and Thailand despite the political and human rights records of
their militaries can be contrasted with the American campaign against the
Myanmar Junta. However, in December 2011 visit by the then US
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in Myanmar has clearly revealed to the
US interest to the regional matters even where Chinese influence is
53
Udai Bhanu Singh, “Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia”, 2007, at
<http://www.idsa-india.org/an-may-07.html> (accessed on March 6, 2013)
54
Supra note 52.
55
Bruce Vaughn, “U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-Pacific
Region”, Congressional Research Service Report, January 22, 2007, at
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33821.pdf> (accessed on February 27, 2013)
 Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia 139

visible.56 The establishment of democracy and capitalist ideas in Myanmar

has been the keen goal of the USA to pose a challenge to the long lasting
Chinese ideological influence over this Southeast Asian country.
China
Now a day, China is seen by the governments in Southeast Asia as a
responsible major actor to which the future of Southeast Asia is crucially
linked. Contemporary post-Marxist China has demonstrated to Southeast
Asia that in most respects China is a normal country behaving in
accordance with accepted international norms. While it does not yet rival
the United States in military power and political and economic reach,
there is a sense in Southeast Asia that, inevitably, China will be the power
to be considered with in the future.57 It is the need to adapt to the future
that informs the present day Southeast Asia-China relationship. China’s
growing economic strength immediately engages Southeast Asia.
Expanding China-ASEAN economic relations are paralleled in the
political sphere. China has imposed political discipline on Southeast
Asia with respect to Taiwan. Taiwan has an active economic presence in
the ASEAN region, but the ASEAN states unquestioningly accept that
Taiwan is part of China. In his state visit to Indonesia in July 2002,
Chinese Premier Hu Jintao announced a ‘new security concept’ for Asia.
He dismissed the Cold War mentality, hegemony, and power politics,
and referred in favour of an approach that would ensure genuine mutual
respect, joint cooperation, consensus through collaboration and peaceful
settlement of disputes rather than bullying, confrontation, and imposition
of one’s will upon others.58 Thus, it is clearer from Hu’s podium that the
obvious promoter of the discredited old security concept was the United
States. China picked up this theme when it associated itself with the
ASEAN states that opposed the American war in Iraq, denouncing
American unilateralism and its assumed role of global policeman.59

56
BBC News, “Hillary Clinton Burma visit: Suu Kyi hopeful on reforms”, December
2, 2011, at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15997268>
57
David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order”,
International security, vol. 29, no. 3, Winter 2004/05, p. 65.
58
Bronson E. Percival, “China’s Influence in Southeast Asia: Implications for the
United States”, Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, July 22, 2005, pp. 3-7.
59
Supra note 1, pp. 137-138.
140 Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 & 2, June & December 2012

From the Southeast Asian vantage, the central question of the future
structure of great power involvement in the region will be the evolution
of the US-China relationship. It is understood in ASEAN capitals that,
as China’s economic and military power grows, the United States cannot
maintain the same level of preponderance it once enjoyed. However,
American interests and capabilities will still make it a major actor. In
fact, the issue for the ASEAN states is not the relativity of power, but
whether the United States will accommodate to a real balance of power
with China or seek to contain its rising power.60
Japan
Once upon a time Japan served as the economic engine for the
growth of Southeast Asian region. Japan’s vision of its role in Southeast
Asia was summarized in the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, enunciated in a
speech by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda during a visit to ASEAN states.
In it, Japan foreswore a military role; defined Japan-Southeast Asian
relations as an equal partnership based on mutual confidence and trust;
and promised assistance to build prosperity and strengthen ASEAN to
help establish a stable regional international order.61
In the Cold War era, under the American security umbrella, Japan
maximized its regional economic power without political and military
concerns. In the post–Cold War international relations, however, Japan
seemed more like a wounded goose rather than the leader of the flock,
caught in economic stagnation, a ballooning debt, and an aging
population in a demographic trajectory toward significant population
decline. While Japan is still an important player in the Southeast Asian
economies, its future leadership role can be questioned. It is because of
the rise of China’s power profile in Southeast Asia has led to a sense that
East Asian regional leadership has been psychologically transferred from
Tokyo to Beijing.62 With reference to Japan’s Prime Minister Yasuo
Fukuda, son of Takeo Fukuda, ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan
in March 2008 called for a ‘Fukuda II’ doctrine. Japan has sought to

60
Supra note 3.
61
Mark Beeson, “Japan and Southeast Asia: The Lineaments of Quasi-hegemony”,
2004, at <http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/ eserv.php?pid=UQ: 10797& dsID=mb
_quasi.pdf> (accessed on March 11, 2013)
62
Supra note 17.
 Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia 141

influence non-economic areas of international relations in Southeast Asia

through targeted investments in regional peace and stability.63
Japan’s security role in Southeast Asia is essentially limited to
hosting the US military forces that are the main component of American
forward deployment in Asia. Even though the residual emotions about
the role of Japan in the Second World War are not as close to the surface
in Southeast Asia as they are in China and Korea, Japan hesitates about
any projection of an assertive regional policy backed by hard power,
even if it should be freed from domestic constitutional and public
opinion constraints. Because of its energy dependencies, Japan has a
vital interest in freedom of navigation through the South China Sea
although it has no real capability to influence the resolution of the
jurisdictional disputes there.64
So far, the rise of China remains the greatest challenge to the relative
power position of Japan in Southeast Asia. Even, some argue that Sino-
Japanese rivalry in Southeast Asia may have more impact on ASEAN
than Sino-US competition. If the decade-long trend of Chinese growth
and Japanese relative decline continues, Japan could be relegated to a
secondary role in Southeast Asia. Since 2002, Japan has sought to
balance and preempt China’s efforts to build Southeast Asian platforms
for China-centric regional integration. In December 2007, Japanese
Prime Minister Fukuda made an historic visit to China during which
both sides welcomed the warming of relations. In a speech at Peking
University, Fukuda called for a “mutually beneficial relationship based
on common strategic interests” in which they in “creative partnership”
could forge a bright future for Asia.65
Russia
Russia is a dialogue partner of ASEAN. Moscow’s determination to
remain regionally relevant was given a boost in June 2003 by the signing
of a ‘Joint Declaration’ for an ASEAN–Russian Federation partnership
to enhance cooperative engagements between Russia and ASEAN over
the full spectrum of ASEAN interests. Russia held its first ASEAN + 1
Summit in 2005. The greatest bilateral visibility of Russia in Southeast

63
Supra note 61.
64
Supra note 4, p. 11.
65
Supra note 18.
142 Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 & 2, June & December 2012

Asia has been in weapons sales.66 The high point of Indonesian

President Megawati’s state visit to Russia in April 2003 was the signing
of a counter trade deal for four Russian Sukhoi combat aircraft. During
Putin’s official visit to Malaysia in August 2003, a deal for eighteen
Sukhoi jet fighters was completed. Both Indonesia and Malaysia see
Russia as an alternative, and cheaper, source for high-technology
weapons than the United States.67
In Bangkok for the 2003 APEC Summit, Russian President Putin
and Thai Prime Minister Thaksin signed two agreements. One involved
the repayment of a Russian debt. The other was a military logistics
agreement paving the way for Thai military acquisition of Russian
military equipment. The special attention of Russia to Indonesia was
underlined by President Yudhoyono’s 2006 visit to Moscow and Putin’s
return visit to Jakarta in 2007 for the signing of a more than $1 billion
arms deal.68
India
India has its own geo-strategic and economic interests in the region,
while keeping an eye to China’s sharp profile in Southeast Asia. New
Delhi has watched warily as China has increased regional and bilateral
partnerships with the ASEAN states.69 China’s rise has stimulated
India’s own ‘Look East’ policy towards Southeast Asia. India’s security
concerns have been demonstrated by its naval deployments to the South
China Sea and Strait of Malacca, and defence cooperation agreements
with Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia; all while denying that this was
part of a strategy to counter China.70
Indian arms transfers and military training for Myanmar’s military
have greatly concerned human rights advocates. India’s infrastructure
projects include linking India’s Mizoram state to Myanmar’s Arakan
state. India’s desire to win access to Myanmar’s energy resources has

66
Supra note 53.
67
Supra note 1, p. 139.
68
Supra note 17.
69
John Garver, “The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations”, India Review, vol.
1, 2002, p. 28.
70
Supra note 2; Sanjeev Nayyar, “India’s Relationship with South East Asia”, March
2002, at <http://www.esamskriti.com/essay-chapters/India%60s-relationship-with-
South-East-Asia-1.aspx> (accessed on March 18, 2013)
 Great Power Politics in Southeast Asia 143

brought it into direct competition with China. New Delhi’s diplomatic

wooing of the Myanmar junta and abandonment of support for
democracy in Myanmar have not had the hoped-for policy payoff. China
is the junta’s preferred partner. In the international politics of the India–
Myanmar–China triangle, the junta understands that China, with its
growing power, is a stronger patron.71 In addition to cultivating
enhanced bilateral ties with ASEAN states, India has become a part of
ASEAN regional network. Its eventual goal is to have the same standing
in ASEAN as China.
In the shadow of the last ASEAN Summit on April 3, 2012, the
strategic rivalry between India and China has come to the forefront over
the South China Sea. While ASEAN members permitted India to lunch
the energy exploration in the area, Chinese President Hu Jin Tao quickly
warned India not to be involved into such a disputed matter. From this
event, it has become clearer that, China does not want to loss its
influence and control over the sea passages of its adjacent areas,
especially waterways linked with the Southeast Asia.72
Conclusion
Over the years, Southeast Asia has become strategically significant
for the great powers to serve their national interests. Therefore, the
grand-chase of great power politics has shifted significantly in Southeast
Asia over the past decades. The great powers are applying different
strategic policies to pursue relative gain instead of absolute gain.
ASEAN nations are also not behind to promote their interest to the
economic development of the region.
The great power politics in Southeast Asia during the Cold War was
directly influenced by the then bipolar world order. Newly born
countries of the region often served as the playgrounds of the great
power rivalries, in which political and security issues mainly got
precedence. Indochina Wars, especially Vietnam War, had a great range
of implications not only in transforming the domestic political
arrangements of a number of Southeast Asian countries, but also in
determining the fate of great powers in the Cold War period.

71
Supra note 5.
72
The Daily Star, “South China Sea Disputes: Asean to ‘intensify efforts’”, April 5, 2012.
144 Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 & 2, June & December 2012

However, after a short epoch of relatively clear American primacy in

the post-Cold War period, the ascent of China and other powers like
Russia, Japan and India, has again made the Asia-Pacific order more
genuinely multipolar, in which economic interests seems to have more
priority relative to political and security ones. Most scholars agree that,
at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the balance of external
influence in Southeast Asia has shifted perceptibly toward China, even
through the American ‘hard power’ resources in the region are still
arguably as dominant as they have ever been.73
The Southeast Asian countries are following the great power
strategies to serve national and regional interests. At present, Malaysia,
Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia are becoming economically
developed by the dint of the strategic influence of the major powers in
the region. But they do not promote any hegemonic presence of a single
power to dominate over the regional resources. However they create
scopes and encourage for multilateral initiatives of the great powers.
Thus, interests and politics of the great powers in this region are not
always neglected, rather often welcomed by the South East Asian
countries for maintaining the mutual respect, non-interference, gradual
prospect, and economic development of the region.

73
Supra note 50, pp. 835-839.