G.R. No.

105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION et.al.petitioners,

vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications,
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL
CORP., respondents.

Ponente: CRUZ, J.:

Topic:
Legislature: Organization and Conducts of Sessions
e. Journal and Record
1. The Enrolled Bill Theory

DOCTRINE: Courts always presume that every statute has undergone the prescribed procedures of enactment before it
was signed into law; it is also assumed that a statute is carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it
was enacted.

CASE SUMMARY: Petitioners, who are members of the lower court, assail the constitutionality of R.A. 7354 insofar as it
withdraws the franking privilege of the Judiciary. According to the petitioners, R.A. 7354 is unconstitutional because of
three reasons: (i) its title embraces more than one subject; (ii) it did not follow the prescribe rules of enactment; and (iii)
it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary. The Court held R.A. 7354 as unconstitutional
insofar as the third argument of the petitioners, however, the Court sustained the said statute against the attack that its
subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

FACTS:

1) Petitioners, represented by Bernardo Abesamis of the Philippine Judges Association, and other judges of the
Regional Trial and Shari’a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, filed a
petition assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 7354 entitled “An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation,
Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
Purposes Connected Therewith” which was enacted to provide a nationwide postal system.
 The main target of the petition is Section 35 of the aforementioned law which was implemented by the
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28.
o According to the petitioners, these measures withdraw the franking privilege1 from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the RTCs, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts,
and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.

2) Petitioner’s legal standing: they are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced by R.A. 7354 and its accompanying implementing circular.

3) PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS:

a. The title of R.A. 7354 embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes
 This is based on Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution which states that “every bill passed
by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”
 According to the petitioners, Section 35 of R.A. 7354 which provides for the repeal of all franking
privileges previously authorized by law, thereby consequently withdrawing the franking privilege
of the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
b. R.A. 7354 did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill
in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage
 The petitioners assert that paragraph 2 of Section 35 of R.A. 7354 was not included in the original version of
House Bill 4200 and Senate Bill 720 and only appeared on the Conference Committee Report – the Conference
Committee is only a mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House and since no
disagreements were found between the S.B. and the H.B., the addition of the paragraph which repeals the
franking privilege from the Judiciary is violative of Article VI, Section 2 of the Constitution and of Section 74 of
the Rules of House of Representatives.
o Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution:

1
Privilege of sending mail without payment of postage
  No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered into the
journal.
o Section 74, Rules of the HOR:
 Requires that an amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have the differences
thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.

c. R.A. 7354 is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary

 According to the petitioners, the statute is discriminatory because while it withdrew the franking privilege from
the judiciary, it retains the same for some offices of the Government (e.g. President of the PH, VP of the PH,
Senators and Members of the HOR, COMELEC, former Presidents of the PH, widows of former Presidents of the
PH, NSO and the general public filing complaints against public offices or officers.
 Respondents’ argument: There is no discrimination since the law is based on a classification in accordance with
the equal protection clause.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. 7354 unconstitutional based on the following grounds:
a) Its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purpose
b) It did not follow the required procedures of enactment (i.e. readings in both Houses of Congress and
distribution of printed copies of its final form among the members before its passage)
c) Is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary

RULING:

1) On the statute’s title:

 The subject of Section 35 of R.A. 7354 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
The Constitution only requires that the title adequately covers the subject of the law and Section 35,
being the repealing provision contained in R.A. 7354, expresses an effect and not a subject of the law;
and it is the subject, not the effect of the law, which is required to be briefly expressed in the title. The
Constitution never claimed that every other act which the new statute repeals or alters by implication
must be mentioned in the title of the new act.
 Furthermore, the repealing provision is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of
R.A. 7354 and it has been established that a matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title may
properly be included in the act without it being expressly provided in the title of the statute.

2) On the required procedures of enactment

 The Court held that the conference committee’s jurisdiction is not limited to the compromise of
differences between the Senate and the House and so, assuming that the paragraph repealing the
franking privilege of the Judiciary only appeared on the Conference Committee Report, the Court could
not inquire into the petitioners’ assertion that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill
and that printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed to the members three days
before its passage because doing so would invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government and interfere with the legitimate powers of and functions of the Legislature.
 It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report was returned to and duly approved by
both Houses of Congress and was thereafter enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali
Gonzales and House Speaker Ramon Mitra as having been duly passed by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. It was then presented to and approved by the then President Corazon
Aquino.
 An enrolled bill is conclusive and the journals where the yeas and nays are entered on the final reading
of the bill are binding on the Supreme Court. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may
not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress.
 Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted in
accordance with Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
o Courts always presume that every statute has undergone the prescribed procedures of
enactment before it was signed into law; it is also assumed that a statute is carefully studied
and determined to be constitutional before it was enacted.

3) On the statute being discriminatory:

 The Court held that the repealing clause in R.A. 7354 is a discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. It
further asserted that the distinction made by the law is superficial since it is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
DISPOSITION: The petition is partially granted and Section 35 of R.A. 7354 is declared unconstitutional on the grounds of
it being violative of the equal protection of the laws enshrined in Article 3, Section 1 of the Constitution.