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Poltical Science PDF
POLITICAL SCIENCE – II
SUBMITTED TO - SUBMITTED BY =
Dr. RAKA ARYA SANCHIT KAUSHIK
2018BALLB71
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 3
2. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 4
4. LEGITIMATION CRISIS 7
9. CONCLUSION 22
10. BIBLIOGRAPHY 23
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Introduction
and social perspectives revealing arguments and disagreements about the content of
“morality” and the validity of public actions. He argues in favour of adopting a theory of
communicative action and discourse ethics within a proceduralist view of legitimate state
action.
The Inclusion of the Other, begins as a search for legitimacy and quickly turns to
a conversation about speech acts and truth conditional utterances. Habermas begins his
theory of justice with an exploration of the philosophy of morality, and ends with the co-
originality of the rule of law and popular sovereignty. He argues for a theory of justice
measure the democratic nature of the modern legal system. Overall, he argues for an
administrative system justified to the extent that rules of procedure are in congruence
3
Political Principles
Habermas proposes that constitutional states derive authority and legitimacy from
the application of two political principles, namely popular sovereignty and the rule of
participation rights, while the rule of law is expressed in rights of private and public
autonomy. 1
to justify political authority and the application of the rule of law. The administrative
programs are necessary to create conditions for civil and voluntary associations, and civil
and voluntary associations are necessary to create conditions for legitimate public
administration. In this way, the rule of law and popular sovereignty are seen as co-
The need for a theory of justice arises when people find themselves confronted
with administrative structures that would govern their public or private behaviour. In the
modern era, whether in the form of commonplace regulation like a traffic ticket, or the
cries of large numbers of people unable to free themselves from poverty, democratic
1
Habermas, J. The Inclusion of the Other. Frankfurt (1996). pp.258-259.
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Habermas, the use of administrative coercion and/or intervention, or lack thereof, make a
principles find expression in the form of positive law. In democratic forums, political
interests communicate and transmit their values through the exercise of positive law. In
other words, legal positivism is subjected to justification under the guise of statutory
authority.
The use of positive law puts the medium of language at the centre of any
discourse about regulation or legitimation. In other words, the use of positive law links
cannot itself “rule” but can only channel the use of administrative power in a specific
direction2. Legality and thereby legitimacy is bestowed performatively on acts that can
demonstrate they were the result of formal procedures relating to justice within specific
by constitutional law, Habermas reminds us that our political system remains at the
2
Ibid p.250.
3
Habermas J. Legitimation Crisis. Frankfurt (1973). P.99.
5
mercy of other functional mechanisms such as the revenue-production of the economic
system to survive.4
legal system is a means by which a people can reflect a unique cultural identity while also
regulating shared social interaction. The creation of the artificial status of “legal person”
with enforceable rights and freedoms, and corresponding obligations set the limits for
parties, a functioning Parliament, and formal elections. In this paper, I intend to use the
term “public administration” to refer to the legislative, the executive, and the judicial
branches of the state, which may increase the scope and application of the term in the
present usage.
4
Habermas, J. The Inclusion of the Other. Frankfurt (1996). pp.252.
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Legitimation Crisis
Debate over principles of justice can begin with descriptions of existing de facto
conditions. The constitutional law system in Canada was received mainly from the
British legal tradition. Principles of fundamental justice are applied in particular ways to
between ancient and modern assumptions about legitimacy concerning state action.
Legitimacy was undermined in the modern era when the rejection of religious dogma
have tried to provide substitutes for the missing traditional justifications of norms and
Public debate appears to have, or at least holds the potential to have some impact
on our world. In the past, theories of justice have been tied to claims of autonomy,
Behind each new claim is the power to enforce or promote a theory of justice along with
7
Prior to the legitimation crisis, moral norms and principles were viewed as
way of life leading to salvation. Eventually, the “objective” reason embodied in religion
was displaced by the “subjective” reason of the human mind. Modern theories of justice
were satisfied with the attempt to justify or persuade people to invest in particular ideas
of public administration and conceptions of community and the identities that inform
them.
people continue to appeal to moral convictions and norms that each think everyone else
should accept. Habermas points out that people continue to debate moral questions with
reasons they take to be compelling, regardless of whether a mere modus vivendi would be
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The Rise of Science
the people of Europe came out of the dark ages, ancient religion had long held sway over
their actions. The application of empirical science to all areas of human activity was
thought to be a general method of discovering the enlightened truth. It was thought that
governing even our social organization. Rational thought soon became synonymous with
toward the application of technique in our physical world in endless repetition and
sequence.
interest and coupled with power they motivate actions which are directed toward change
in the world. The fundamental choice facing people today is whether countries will
struggle against each other for wealth and power, or work together for security and
mutual advantage.5
Reasons
5
United States Proposals, Dept. of State Pub. No. 2411, at 1-2 (1946) as quoted p.38, Jackson, J. H., Legal
Problems of International Economic Relations, cases, materials and text. 3rd ed. West Publishing Co. MN
1995.
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practical reason. If we want to be considered as bearers of communicative rationality, we
must make our argumentation accessible to others and that process consists of giving
reasons. We ask ourselves what might be the best way to solve social conflicts and avoid
violence. This process of clarification evidently binds the will by building conviction
norms in the form of a model or standard of judging which consists in general agreement
(consent).6 He defines logic as rules relating to the agreement of cognition with the laws
of the understanding and of reason (empirical verification). Habermas claims that Hume
first clarified a distinction between “is” and “ought,” a distinction perhaps analogous to a
division between facts and norms. Husserl made a similar distinction claiming that
“essences and facts (are) incommensurable, one who begins his inquiry with facts will
never arrive at essences.”7 These distinctions are difference between various conceptions
Habermas claims that the distinction between “is” and “ought” signifies the
descriptive sentences or statements.”8 Such an insight points to a gap between speech acts
that are capable of empirical verification and consequently true, and those that are
6
Kant, I. Immanuel Kant’s Logic: A Manual for Lectures. Trans. Hartman and Schwarz. General
Publishing Company, Ltd. Toronto. 1974. p.17.
7
Satre quoting Husserl in Sartre, J.P. The Emotions, Outline of a Theory. Citadel Press : NY. 1948. p.9.
8
Habermas J. Legitimation Crisis. Frankfurt (1973). p.102 Habermas references K. Popper, The Open
Society and its Enemies, 2vols. (Princeton, 1950), vol. 1 chap. 5, “Nature and Conventions.”
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incapable of empirical congruence, and are therefore no more than assertions with
reasons attached.
how the current system operates consisting of only factual statements, i.e. statements
open to empirical verification, could easily be set apart from sentences of an assertoric
nature.
Political “science” and social domains rarely dwell on issues capable of congruent
immanent relation to truth, the grounds upon which it is explicitly based have only
psychological significance.9
I consider the difference between the two basic types of cognition process in the
deduction and the other relies on the performance of pragmatic inference skills.
Deductive processes limit themselves to conventions of logic, and reason, while inference
based pragmatic skills involve the whole person, emotions, imagination, and reason in the
building up of a “hunch.”
9
Habermas J. Legitimation Crisis. Frankfurt (1973). P.97 Habermas explicating Max Weber’s Concept of
Legitimation.
10
Mayer, Richard. Thinking, Problem Solving, Cognition 2nd Ed. Freeman and Company (New York
1992).
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Pragmatic insights claw back a tremendous amount of ground from prior matters
held to be scientific. The various conceptions of justice, the nature of ethics and morality
and the alternative approaches to describing metaphysical, rather than factual terms, is the
From this perspective, science, the proponent of the empirical method, is limited
in operation and function to description and as such cannot offer any value statements
capable of guidance in the public sphere. All value statements become assertoric in
nature.
concepts such as legitimate and valid are reducible to the concept of persuasion. Such a
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Legitimacy and Persuasion
who constructed the standard, for what reasons, and whose values are included and
excluded in it. Human beings will have different values reflected in different standards.
Acceptance of different values does not imply that all values are of equal worth.
Speech act theorist suggest that “truth” is reserved for language that expresses
propositions capable of empirical verification. This implies that the validity and
legitimacy of assertoric statements has no more meaning than the contents of persuasive.
From this perspective, claims to legitimacy for statements beyond correspondence with
In the context of deductive statements legitimate and valid are terms of reasonable
factual certainty, in the context of assertoric statements legitimacy and validity, without
A confusion between the deductive nature of validity and an attempt to apply the
same process to assertoric statements creates the illusion that in such context “validity”
persuaded that the position is legitimate, it is not legitimate in the same way a deductive
process can claim validity. To give reasons is an attempt at persuasion and nothing more.
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Habermas views as valid any law arrived at through appropriately regulated
in public debate. Consent is the final arbitrator of legitimacy in a theory of justice, and for
that reason a theory of justice should canvas all available conceptions of legitimacy in an
attempt to find the one that holds the greatest potential for actual universal consent.
I would argue that if any ethical good were a suitable candidate it would have to
be geared toward minimizing the opportunity for coercion and/or intervention particularly
in the form of paternalism. It would have to be detailed enough so as not to be vague, but
information for transmission to new generations. The following Christian maxims serve
“concrete” test by which to do it. If we required above all other testing a test to ensure
that our behaviour conformed with the golden rule under a theory of justice perhaps near
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universal consent could be gathered together. “Whatever you wish that men would do to
you, do so to them.” Matthew 7:12, and the golden rule “…thou shalt love thy neighbour
as thyself,” paraphrased from the third book of the old testament. These ethical maxims
can be applied in a manner that is universal in the sense of a constant imperative and
concrete.
The ethical imperative is not universal in the sense of (U) because no one is
strong formulation of the ethical imperative would likely intend that an individual limit
situations, it is intended to apply to your personal behaviour. It does not require that you
consider its application to every situation. It does not act in the equal interest of all. What
themselves.
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A Moral Conception of Justice
Morality has been described as the bad conscience that “plagues” us when we act
against our better judgment.11 Ethical intuitions have been directly incorporated into all
conceptualized and transmitted ethical insights derived from a shared sense of solidarity
arising from their confrontation between self and others in the form of responsibility.
morality originating in community rules. The presence of others is also the catalyst for
insights into the origin of communicative ethics which Habermas uses to oppose the
Habermas places a high value on morality claims that create values of justice
from a process of abstract generalization. His faith is derived by the mental skill to create
universal and impartial positions. It should be noted however that there may be some
evidence to suggest that the notion of impartiality is merely the exercise of one value
The “moral point of view” has been explained in terms of various principles or
procedures, be it the categorical imperative or G.H. Mead’s ideal role-taking. The moral
11
Habermas, J. The Inclusion of the Other. Frankfurt (1996). P. 35.
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point of view is aimed at an agreement or an understanding that satisfies our intuitions
Habermas defines the discourse principle (D), according to which only those
norms can claim validity that could meet with the agreement of all those concerned in
morality is that the reflexive application of the universalization test calls for a form of
deliberation in which each participant is compelled to adopt the perspective of all others
in order to examine whether a norm could be willed by all from the perspective of each
person. 13
Kant assumes that in making moral judgments each individual can project himself
sufficiently into the situation of everyone else through his own imagination. Habermas
suggests that the “moral point of view can only be realized under conditions of
communication that ensure that everyone tests the acceptability of a norm…from the
12
Hab p.34 IoO(1996) quoting FN #50 Habermas, “Discourse Ethics: Notesnon a Program of Philosophical
Justification,” in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p.66.
13
P.33. IoO (1996)
14
p.33
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Critique of Ethical Positions
conception of the good beyond a discourse of self-understanding, relying on its own logic
of argumentation, remains bound to its context of discovery in a specific way. The ethical
The main problem with a position based on an ethical self clarification is that it is
political justice can no longer be based on a settled traditional ethos for the whole of
society. For Habermas, this means that any construction of an ethical good is based on
historically situated reason subject to fallability and the claims of pluralism. To argue in
premised on the idea that different communities will want to define unique and to some
15
Habermas, J. The Inclusion of the Other. Frankfurt (1996). P. 27.
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mutual understanding based on the recognition of fallible claims to validity, but he does
assumptions and valuations which are controversial. Habermas holds the view that a
He claims that ethical conceptions distinct from “morality” in the Kantian sense
involve contradictions because any attempt to explain the concept inevitably entails
privileging certain basic contents. As well, any attempt to create a detailed ethical
abstracted from all local contexts would undermine the concept of the good.
The reasoning that follows from this assumption supports his emphasis of
consensus on political traditions of free and equal citizens. For Habermas, any description
paternalistically. If a person rejects the good in question, in this view, they will have it
applied to them anyway. By carefully limiting his validity claims to procedural domains
the good.
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The assumptions of pluralism tends to exclude examination of specific values that
might serve as a basis for a starting position in relation to a theory of justice, tied as it
would be to a particular socio-cultural horizon. However, ideologies have been and will
be constructed and implemented in the political sphere that might have the potential for
for reaching agreement based solely on the enlightened self-interest of the participants. A
veil of ignorance is used in an attempt to provide the conditions required for impartial
judgment of practical questions by mutually disinterested though free and equal parties.
In this view, the contracting parties need only consider whether it is advantageous
or rational for them in light of their desires and preferences to adopt a rule of action or a
system of such rules. Participants are assumed to be purposive-rational (ie. seek their
of humanity that unduly narrows the range of actual human decision making.
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The corresponding conception of validity is captured by a principle of
universalization which state that only those moral norms are valid that are such that all
those affected by their general observance could freely accept their anticipated
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Conclusion
In the competition for persuasion, Habermas sets out three main sources of
ideological consent for mass agreement about legal norms from an ever-widening
possible audience. The concepts of rationality associated with each ideology reflect
build from a set of shared cultural conventions, including equal participation and an
attempt at an impartial system within its own contextual horizon. The operational aspects
situation and become concepts of morality, and by definition qualify for a potentially
larger agreement. The third source of consent, is pragmatic. Habermas limits his
audience.
systems and abstract rules is intolerable. I can’t help but wonder throughout this exercise
if ethical conceptions of positional horizons are capable of finding an ethic that is capable
of near universal agreement in the form of love or compassion. What would our political
16
Habermas, J. Theory and Practice. Frankfurt (1973). P.262.
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systems look like it we subjected assertoric validity claims to an addition burden which in
this case would be the exercise of authority in congruence with an ethic of care.
Bibliography
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