Three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property

The following is cited from Spouses Bonifacio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424, May
2, 2006

Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover
possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and
(c)accion reivindicatoria.

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion)
and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of
real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful
detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in
that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the
issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date
of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of
unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It
is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently
of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had
become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,
but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover
ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction
should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not doubt
that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under
Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word tolerance confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer – not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court – provided
for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief
in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really
prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely
make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to
set in – and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially
if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary
nature of the action.

It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it
is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed
against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that
the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class
of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort
to parol testimony.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry
was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals,petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging
that they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which was occupied
by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the
issue on whether or not petitioners case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No.
C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of
their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written
demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x

It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the
land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind that
plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioner’s cause of action fails. The
appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged tolerance
by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated.

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not
merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the
subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and
before them, their mother. Clearly, defendants entry into the land was effected clandestinely,
without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth
which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court
of Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible
entry.

And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, petitioners complaint for
unlawful detainer merely contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent immediately
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and
(2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. The court, in finding
that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for unlawful detainer, held:

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at
the beginning of the possession.

In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that would
substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
Respondent Cruz. The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent immediately
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2)
her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.

These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory that its cause of action is for
unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondents occupation of the
property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in
unlawful detainer cases that petitioners supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present
right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.

Accion Reivindicatoria

(The following is cited from Serdoncillo vs. Benolirao, et. al., G.R. No. 118328 October 8,
1998)

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges

ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different
from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right
to possess without claim of title. In Banayos vs. Susana Realty, Inc., this Court held that:

We have consistently held that a complaint for forcible entry, as distinguished from that of
unlawful detainer, in order to vest jurisdiction upon the inferior court, must allege plaintiff’s
prior physical possession of the property, as well as the fact that he was deprived of such
possession by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely:
force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth, “for if the dispossession did not take place by
any of these means, the courts of first instance, not the municipal courts, have jurisdiction.

The aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the cases of dispossession of lands. Thus,
“whenever the owner is dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned he may maintain
his action in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until the
expiration of twelve months before commencing an action to be repossessed or declared to be
owner of the land.” Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over actions to recover possession
of real property illegally detained, together with rents due and damages, even though one (1)
year has not expired from the beginning of such illegal detention, provided the question of
ownership of such property is also involved. In other words, if the party illegally dispossessed
desires to raise the question of illegal dispossession as well as that of the ownership over the
property he may commence such action in the Court of First Instance immediately or at any time
after such illegal dispossession. If he decides to raise the question of illegal dispossession only,
and the action is filed more than one (1) year after such deprivation or withholding of possession,
then the Court of First Instance will have original jurisdiction over the case. The former is
an accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership as well as possession, while
the latter refers to an accion publiciana, which is the recovery of the right to possess and is a
plenary action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court of First Instance.

OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL
Art. 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights. (n)
Independent and general right of a person to control a thing particularly in his
possession, enjoyment, disposition and recovery, subject to no restrictions except
those imposed by the state or private persons, without prejudice to the provisions of
the law
KINDS OF OWNERSHIP
1. Full ownership—all rights of an owner
2. Naked ownership—ownership where the right to the use and the fruits have been
denied
3. Sole ownership—ownership is only vested in one person
4. Co-ownership
Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the
thing in order to recover it. (348a)
7 RIGHTS OF AN OWNER UNDER ROMAN LAW
1. Jus possidendi -The right to possess
2. Jus utendi -The right to use
3. Jus fruendi -The right to the fruits
4. Jus abutendi -The right to consume
5. Jus disponendi -The right to dispose
6. Jus vindicandi -The right to recover
7. Jus accessiones -The right to accessories
ACTIONS TO RECOVER
1. Replevin
2. Accion interdictal—forcible entry and unlawful detainer
3. Accion publiciana
4. Accion reinvidicatoria
5. Writ of possession | writ of demolition
6. Writ of preliminary injunction
REPLEVIN
An action or provisional remedy where the complainant prays for the recovery of the
possession of PERSONAL PROPERTY
FORCIBLE ENTRY
Summary action to recover material or physical possession of real property
when a person originally in possession was deprived thereof by force,
intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth
Action must be brought within 1 year from the dispossession
Issue involved is mere physical possession or possession de facto and not
juridical possession nor ownership
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Action that must be brought when the possession by a landlord, vendor,
vendee or other person of any land or building is being unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied
Action must be brought within one year from last demand letter
ACCION PUBLICIANA
Recovery of the better right to possess, and is a plenary action in an ordinary
civil proceeding before the RTC
Must be brought within a period of 10 years otherwise the real right to
possess is lost
Issue is possession de jure
ACCION REINVIDICATORIA
Action to recover ownership over real property
Must be brought in the RTC
It must be brought within 10 or 30 years as the case may be
Issue involved is ownership and for this purpose, evidence of title or mode may
be introduced
It is permissible to file both an action for ownership and for detainer
over the same land, and between the same parties, because the issues involved
are different
WRIT OF INJUNCTION
A person deprived of his possession of real or personal property is ordinarily
not allowed to avail himself of this remedy, the reason being that the defendant in
actual possession is presumed disputably to have the better right
WRIT OF POSSESSION
Used in connection with the Land Registration Law is an order directing
the sheriff to place a successful registrant under the Torrens system in possession
of the property covered by a decree of the Court
OWNERSHIP HAS LIMITATIONS
1. Those given by the State or the laws
2. Those given by the owner himself
3. Those given by the person who gave the right to its present owner
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use
such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (n)
DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP
The right to counter force with force
Comparable with self-defense under justifying circumstances in Criminal Law
Art. 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of
walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon. (388)
Art. 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such manner as to
injure the rights of a third person.
NO INJURY TO RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS
This is one of the fundamental bases of police power and constitutes a
just restriction on the right of ownership
Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference of
another with the same, if the interference is necessary to avert an imminent
danger and the threatened
damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from the interference, is
much greater. The owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for the
damage to him.
STATE OF NECESSITY
ANALOGOUS TO THE RULE UNDER CRIMINAL LAW
Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes
damage to another doesn't incur criminal liability provided that the following
requisites are present:
1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists
2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it
3. That there be no other practical or less harmful means of preventing it
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable
presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of the property.
RULE OF EVIDENCE
REQUIREMENTS TO HAVE DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION
1. Actual possession of the property
2. Claim of ownership
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's
claim.
REQUISITES IN AN ACTION TO RECOVER
1. Identity of the property
2. Strength of the plaintiff’s title
Art. 435. No person shall be deprived of his property except by competent
authority and for public use and always upon payment of just compensation.
Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts shall protect and, in a
proper case, restore the owner in his possession. (349a)
EMINENT DOMAIN V. EXPROPRIATION
- Eminent domain is the power of the state and expropriation is the proceeding
Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the
interest of health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to
compensation, unless he can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified.
Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything
under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and
excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject
to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation. (350a)
SURFACE RIGHT OF A LAND OWNER
Art. 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other
property on which it is found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the
State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed to
the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of the
treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science of the arts, the State may acquire them
at their just price, which shall be divided in conformity with the rule stated.
(351a)
Art. 439. By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any hidden and unknown
deposit of money, jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful ownership of which
does not appear. (352)
RULES REGARDING HIDDEN TREASURES
1. If the treasure is not hidden, there is no 50-50 sharing
2. If the precious metals are in their raw state, it will be owned by the State by virtue
of the Regalian doctrine
3. If the owner finds the treasure in his own land, he owns the treasure
4. If finder finds it not in his own land, there is 50-50 sharing with the owner of the
land
5. If the finder is hired, then compensation or salary or fixed fee will be given to him
6. If the finder is a trespasser, then he would not receive anything
2 SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT REGARDING “BY CHANCE”
1. If there is deliberate search, it is not to be construed as “by chance”
2. Even if there is a deliberate search, still “by chance” since there is uncertainty of
finding a treasure
Agricultural Lands

i. HOMESTEAD PATENT

- Chapter 4 of the Public Land Act governs the disposition of alienable public lands through
homestead

- Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of 18 years, or the head of a family, may enter a
homestead of not exceeding 12 hectares of agricultural land of the public domain

- The applicant must have cultivated and improved at least 1/5 of the land continuously since the
approval of the application and resided for at least 1 year in the municipality in which the land is
located, or in a municipality in which the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the
same, and then, upon payment of the required fee, he shall be entitled to a patent

EFFECT OF COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

- When a homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitle him to a
patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein, and is to be
regarded as the equitable owner thereof

- The execution and delivery of the patent, after the right to a particular piece of land has become
complete, are the mere ministerial acts of the officer charged with that duty

- Even without the patent, a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest sense,
unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is still in the government

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 456 - AN ACT TO AMEND SECTIONS NINETEEN, TWENTY, AND ONE
HUNDRED AND EIGHTEEN OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE,
COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE PUBLIC LAND ACT

Section 1. Sections nineteen, twenty, and one hundred and eighteen of Commonwealth Act Numbered
One hundred and forty-one are amended to read as follows:

"Section 19. Not more than one homestead entry shall be allowed to any one person, and no person to
whom a homestead patent has been issued by virtue of the provisions of this Act regardless of the area
of his original homestead, may again acquire a homestead; Provided, however, That any previous
homesteader who has been issued a patent for less than twenty-four hectares and otherwise qualified
to make a homestead entry, may be allowed another homestead which, together with his previous
homestead shall not exceed an area of twenty-four hectares.
"Sec. 20. If at any time after the approval of the application and before the patent is issued, the
applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has complied with all the
requirements of the law, but cannot continue with his homestead, through no fault of his own, and
there is a bona fide purchaser for the rights and improvements of the applicant on the land, and that the
conveyance is not made for purposes of speculations, then the applicant, with the previous approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may transfer his rights to the land and improvements to any
person legally qualified to apply for a homestead, and immediately after such transfer, the purchaser
shall file a homestead application to the land so acquired and shall succeed the original homesteader in
his rights and obligations beginning with the date of the approval of said application of the purchaser.
Any person who has so transferred his rights may not again apply for a new homestead. Every transfer
made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void
and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent."

"Section 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands
acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation
from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.

"No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years
after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds."

Section2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 763 August 6, 1975

AMENDING SECTION 121 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, TO ALLOW QUALIFIED JURIDICAL ENTITIES TO ACQUIRE LANDS ORIGINALLY
GRANTED UNDER THE FREE PATENT, HOMESTEAD OR INDIVIDUAL SALE PROVISIONS OF SAID ACT,
FOR COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PURPOSES

WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 121 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 615, limit the right of corporations, partnerships or associations to acquire or have any right to
lands originally granted under the free patent, homestead or individual sale provisions of the said Act,
only for educational, charitable, religious or right of way purposes;

WHEREAS, such restriction has been an obstacle to the efforts of the private sector to accelerate
economic development;

WHEREAS, it is necessary in the national interest to remove restriction imposed by Commonwealth Act
No. 615 on the right of judicial entities to acquire such lands for commercial or industrial purposes.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution of the Philippines, do hereby decree as follows:

Section 1. Section 121 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:

"Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Natural
Resources, and solely for commercial, industrial, educational, religious, or charitable purposes or for a
right of way, no corporation, association, or partnership may acquire or have any right, title, interest, or
property right whatsoever to any land granted under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale
provisions of this Act or to any permanent improvement on such land.

"The provisions of Section 124 of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding, any acquisition of such land,
rights thereto or improvements thereon by a corporation association, or partnership prior to the
promulgation of this Decree for the purposes herein stated is deemed valid and binding; Provided, That
no final decision or reversion of such land to the State has been rendered by a court; And Provided,
further, That such acquisition is approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources within six (6) months
from the effectivity of this Decree."

Sec. 2. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

ii. sale; lease

Lease of Rural and Urban Lands

SECTION 1. General Provisions

Article 1646. The persons disqualified to buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491, are also
disqualified to become lessees of the things mentioned therein.

Article 1647. If a lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property, the following persons
cannot constitute the same without proper authority: the husband with respect to the wife’s
paraphernal real estate, the father or guardian as to the property of the minor or ward, and the
manager without special power. (1548a)

Article 1648. Every lease of real estate may be recorded in the Registry of Property. Unless a
lease is recorded, it shall not be binding upon third persons. (1549a)

Article 1649. The lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is
a stipulation to the contrary.
Article 1650. When in the contract of lease of things there is no express prohibition, the lessee
may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to his responsibility for the
performance of the contract toward the lessor. (1550)

Article 1651. Without prejudice to his obligation toward the sublessor, the sublessee is bound to
the lessor for all acts which refer to the use and preservation of the thing leased in the manner
stipulated between the lessor and the lessee. (1551)

Article 1652. The sublessee is subsidiarily liable to the lessor for any rent due from the lessee.
However, the sublessee shall not be responsible beyond the amount of rent due from him, in
accordance with the terms of the sublease, at the time of the extra-judicial demand by the lessor.

Payments of rent in advance by the sublessee shall be deemed not to have been made, so far as
the lessor’s claim is concerned, unless said payments were effected in virtue of the custom of the
place. (1552a)

Article 1653. The provisions governing warranty, contained in the Title on Sales, shall be
applicable to the contract of lease.

In the cases where the return of the price is required, reduction shall be made in proportion to the
time during which the lessee enjoyed the thing. (1553)

SECTION 2
Rights and Obligations of the Lessor and the Lessee

Article 1654. The lessor is obliged:

(1) To deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to render it fit
for the use intended;

(2) To make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to keep it suitable for
the use to which it has been devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary;

(3) To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire
duration of the contract. (1554a)
Article 1655. If the thing leased is totally destroyed by a fortuitous event, the lease is
extinguished. If the destruction is partial, the lessee may choose between a proportional
reduction of the rent and a rescission of the lease.

Article 1656. The lessor of a business or industrial establishment may continue engaging in the
same business or industry to which the lessee devotes the thing leased, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary.

Article 1657. The lessee is obliged:

(1) To pay the price of the lease according to the terms stipulated;

(2) To use the thing leased as a diligent father of a family, devoting it to the use stipulated; and in
the absence of stipulation, to that which may be inferred from the nature of the thing leased,
according to the custom of the place;

(3) To pay expenses for the deed of lease. (1555)

Article 1658. The lessee may suspend the payment of the rent in case the lessor fails to make the
necessary repairs or to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property
leased.

Article 1659. If the lessor or the lessee should not comply with the obligations set forth in
articles 1654 and 1657, the aggrieved party may ask for the rescission of the contract and
indemnification for damages, or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force. (1556)

Article 1660. If a dwelling place or any other building intended for human habitation is in such a
condition that its use brings imminent and serious danger to life or health, the lessee may
terminate the lease at once by notifying the lessor, even if at the time the contract was perfected
the former knew of the dangerous condition or waived the right to rescind the lease on account of
this condition.

Article 1661. The lessor cannot alter the form of the thing leased in such a way as to impair the
use to which the thing is devoted under the terms of the lease. (1557a)

Article 1662. If during the lease it should become necessary to make some urgent repairs upon
the thing leased, which cannot be deferred until the termination of the lease, the lessee is obliged
to tolerate the work, although it may be very annoying to him, and although during the same, he
may be deprived of a part of the premises.

If the repairs last more than forty days the rent shall be reduced in proportion to the time –
including the first forty days – and the part of the property of which the lessee has been deprived.

When the work is of such a nature that the portion which the lessee and his family need for their
dwelling becomes uninhabitable, he may rescind the contract if the main purpose of the lease is
to provide a dwelling place for the lessee. (1558a)

Article 1663. The lessee is obliged to bring to the knowledge of the proprietor, within the
shortest possible time, every usurpation or untoward act which any third person may have
committed or may be openly preparing to carry out upon the thing leased.

He is also obliged to advise the owner, with the same urgency, of the need of all repairs included
in No. 2 of article 1654.

In both cases the lessee shall be liable for the damages which, through his negligence, may be
suffered by the proprietor.

If the lessor fails to make urgent repairs, the lessee, in order to avoid an imminent danger, may
order the repairs at the lessor’s cost. (1559a)

Article 1664. The lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person
may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct action against the
intruder.

There is a mere act of trespass when the third person claims no right whatever. (1560a)

Article 1665. The lessee shall return the thing leased, upon the termination of the lease, as he
received it, save what has been lost or impaired by the lapse of time, or by ordinary wear and
tear, or from an inevitable cause. (1561a)

Article 1666. In the absence of a statement concerning the condition of the thing at the time the
lease was constituted, the law presumes that the lessee received it in good condition, unless there
is proof to the contrary. (1562)
Article 1667. The lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless he
proves that it took place without his fault. This burden of proof on the lessee does not apply
when the destruction is due to earthquake, flood, storm or other natural calamity. (1563a)

Article 1668. The lessee is liable for any deterioration caused by members of his household and
by guests and visitors. (1564a)

Article 1669. If the lease was made for a determinate time, it ceases upon the day fixed, without
the need of a demand. (1565)

Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for
fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either
party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the
period of the original contract, but for the time established in articles 1682 and 1687. The other
terms of the original contract shall be revived. (1566a)

Article 1671. If the lessee continues enjoying the thing after the expiration of the contract, over
the lessor’s objection, the former shall be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad
faith. (n)

Article 1672. In case of an implied new lease, the obligations contracted by a third person for the
security of the principal contract shall cease with respect to the new lease. (1567)

Article 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes:

(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under articles
1682 and 1687, has expired;

(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;

(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract;

(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or service not stipulated which causes the
deterioration thereof; or if he does not observe the requirement in No. 2 of article 1657, as
regards the use thereof.

The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is governed by special laws. (1569a)

Article 1674. In ejectment cases where an appeal is taken the remedy granted in article 539,
second paragraph, shall also apply, if the higher court is satisfied that the lessee’s appeal is
frivolous or dilatory, or that the lessor’s appeal is prima facie meritorious. The period of ten days
referred to in said article shall be counted from the time the appeal is perfected.

Article 1675. Except in cases stated in article 1673, the lessee shall have a right to make use of
the periods established in articles 1682 and 1687. (1570)

Article 1676. The purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not recorded in the
Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipulation to the contrary in
the contract of sale, or when the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease.

If the buyer makes use of this right, the lessee may demand that he be allowed to gather the fruits
of the harvest which corresponds to the current agricultural year and that the vendor indemnify
him for damages suffered.

If the sale is fictitious, for the purpose of extinguishing the lease, the supposed vendee cannot
make use of the right granted in the first paragraph of this article. The sale is presumed to be
fictitious if at the time the supposed vendee demands the termination of the lease, the sale is not
recorded in the Registry of Property. (1571a)

Article 1677. The purchaser in a sale with the right of redemption cannot make use of the power
to eject the lessee until the end of the period for the redemption. (1572)

Article 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the
use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased,
the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the
improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall
not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he
may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the
lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
(n)
Article 1679. If nothing has been stipulated concerning the place and the time for the payment of
the lease, the provisions or article 1251 shall be observed as regards the place; and with respect
to the time, the custom of the place shall be followed. (1574)

SECTION 3
Special Provisions for Leases of Rural Lands

Article 1680. The lessee shall have no right to a reduction of the rent on account of the sterility
of the land leased, or by reason of the loss of fruits due to ordinary fortuitous events; but he shall
have such right in case of the loss of more than one-half of the fruits through extraordinary and
unforeseen fortuitous events, save always when there is a specific stipulation to the contrary.

Extraordinary fortuitous events are understood to be: fire, war, pestilence, unusual flood, locusts,
earthquake, or others which are uncommon, and which the contracting parties could not have
reasonably foreseen. (1575)

Article 1681. Neither does the lessee have any right to a reduction of the rent if the fruits are lost
after they have been separated from their stalk, root or trunk. (1576)

Article 1682. The lease of a piece of rural land, when its duration has not been fixed, is
understood to have been for all the time necessary for the gathering of the fruits which the whole
estate leased may yield in one year, or which it may yield once, although two or more years have
to elapse for the purpose. (1577a)

Article 1683. The outgoing lessee shall allow the incoming lessee or the lessor the use of the
premises and other means necessary for the preparatory labor for the following year; and,
reciprocally, the incoming lessee or the lessor is under obligation to permit the outgoing lessee to
do whatever may be necessary for the gathering or harvesting and utilization of the fruits, all in
accordance with the custom of the place. (1578a)

Article 1684. Land tenancy on shares shall be governed by special laws, the stipulations of the
parties, the provisions on partnership and by the customs of the place. (1579a)

Article 1685. The tenant on shares cannot be ejected except in cases specified by law.

SECTION 4
Special Provisions for the Lease of Urban Lands
Article 1686. In default of a special stipulation, the custom of the place shall be observed with
regard to the kind of repairs on urban property for which the lessor shall be liable. In case of
doubt it is understood that the repairs are chargeable against him. (1580a)

Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to
year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to
week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even
though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a
longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent
is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in
possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after
the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. (1581a)

Article 1688. When the lessor of a house, or part thereof, used as a dwelling for a family, or
when the lessor of a store, or industrial establishment, also leases the furniture, the lease of the
latter shall be deemed to be for the duration of the lease of the premises. (1582)

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO 1073

EXTENDING THE PERIOD OF FILING APPLICATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

LEGALIZATION (FREE PATENT) AND JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT AND INCOMPLETE TITLES TO ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
LANDS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER CHAPTER VII AND CHAPTER VIII OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141, AS AMENDED, FOR ELEVEN (11) YEARS
COMMENCING JANUARY 1, 1977

WHEREAS, under the provisions of Sec. 45, Chapter VII and Sec. 47, Chapter VII,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, the period
fixed in the entire Archipelago for filing applications for free patent and judicial confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete title to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain will expire
on December 31, 1976;

WHEREAS, there is still a substantial number of Filipino citizens and member of the National
Cultural Communities who are entitled to the benefits of the aforementioned law but have not
been able to take advantage of the period for filing their application because the lands occupied
and settled by them have not been surveyed or they are located in municipalities that have not
been reached by the cadastral survey program of the government; and

WHEREAS, it has always been the policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and
quieting of titles to unregistered lands including alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain in favor of qualified Filipino citizens who have acquired inchoate, imperfect and
incomplete titles thereto by reason of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation
and cultivation thereof under bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership for a number of years
prescribed by law:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of

the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree as part of the law of the land, the
following:

Section 1. Sec. 45, Chapter VII, of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 45. The President of the Philippines (Prime Minister), upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Natural Resources, shall from time to time fix by proclamation the period which
applications for free patents may be filed in the district, chartered city, province, municipality or
region specified in such proclamation, and upon the expiration of the period so designated,
unless the same be extended by the President (Prime Minister) all the land compromised within
such district, chartered city, province, municipality or region subject thereto under the provisions
of this chapter may disposed of as agricultural public land without prejudice to the prior right of
the occupant and cultivator to acquire such land under this Act by means other than free patent.
The time to be fixed in the entire Archipelago for the filing of applications under this Chapter
shall not extend beyond December 31, 1987, except in the provinces of Agusan del Norte,
Agusan, del Sur, Cotabato, South Cotabato, Bukidnon, Lanao, del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao,
del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Sulu, Mt. Province, Benguet, Kalinga-Apayao, and
Ifugao where the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural
Resources, shall determine or fix the time beyond which the filing of applications under this
Chapter shall not extend. The period fixed for any district, chartered city, province, or
municipality shall begin to run thirty days after the publication of the proclamation in the
Official Gazette and if available in on newspaper or general circulation in the city, province or
municipality concerned. A certified copy of said proclamation shall be furnished by the Secretary
of Natural Resources within 30 days counted from the date of the presidential proclamation to
the Director of Lands and to the provincial board, the municipal board or city council and
barangay council affected, and copies thereof shall be posted on the bulletin board of the bureau
of Lands at Manila and at conspicuous places in the provincial building and at the municipal
building and barangay hall or meeting place. It shall moreover, be announced by government
radio whenever available, in each of the barrios of the municipality."

Sec. 2. Sec. 47, Chapter VIII, of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to
extend beyond December 31, 1987 within which to take advantage of the benefit of this chapter:
Provided, That this extension shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed 144
hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in
accordance with section forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this chapter, but this section shall not be construed as prohibiting any time prior to
the period fixed by the President."
Sec. 3. The judicial confirmation of incomplete titles to public land based on unperfected
Spanish grants such as application for the purchase, composition or other forms of grant of lands
of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees in force prior to the transfer or sovereignty
from Spain to the United States shall no longer be allowed. However, this Section shall not be
construed as prohibiting any person claiming the same land from acting under Sec. 48(b) and
Sec. 48(c) if he meets the conditions prescribed for judicial confirmation of his incomplete title
thereunder.

Sec. 4. The provisions of Sec. 48(b) and Sec. 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a
bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Sec. 5. Any law or executive order or part thereof contrary to or inconsistent with this Decree is
hereby amended or repealed accordingly.

Sec. 6. This Decree shall take effect upon its promulgation.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-seven

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 197297, August 02, 2017

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES DANILO GO AND

AMORLINA GO, RESPONDENTS.

Public land remains inalienable unless it is shown to have been reclassified and alienated to a
private person.

This resolves a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dated January 21,
2011 and Resolution dated June 6, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 93000, which affirmed the Decision
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities dated December 12, 2008 issuing the Decree of
Registration for Lot No. 4699-B of Subdivision Plan Csd-04-022290-D in favor of the Spouses
Danilo and Amorlina Go.

On August 26, 2006, respondents Spouses Danilo and Amorlina Go (the Spouses Go) applied for
the registration and confirmation of title over Cadastral Lot No. 4699-B (Lot No. 4699-B), a
parcel of land in Barangay Balagtas, Batangas City covering an area of 1,000 square meters.

The Spouses Go registered Lot No. 4699-B in their names for taxation purposes. They had paid
the real property taxes, including the arrears, from 1997 to 2006, as shown in Tax Declaration
No. 026-04167. They had also established a funeral parlor, San Sebastian Funeral Homes, on the
lot. According to them, there were no other claimants over the property.
The Spouses Go claimed to be in an open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and actual
possession of the property for seven (7) years since they bought it. They also tacked their
possession through that of their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:

Sometime in 1945, Anselmo de Torres (Anselmo) came to know that his parents, Sergia Almero
and Andres de Torres (the Spouses de Torres), owned Lot No. 4699, a bigger property where Lot
No. 4699-B came from. According to Anselmo, the Spouses de Torres paid the real property
taxes during their lifetime and planted bananas, mangoes, calamansi, and rice on this lot. His
mother, Sergia Almero (Sergia), allegedly inherited Lot No. 4699 from her parents, Celodonio
and Eufemia Almero (the Spouses Almero).

In the 1960s, Anselmo and his siblings inherited Lot No. 4699 from their parents upon their
deaths.

One of Anselmo's sisters, Cristina Almero de Torres Corlit (Cristina), then built a residential
house on Lot No. 4699-B, declaring this parcel of land under her name for tax purposes, as
evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 026-03492. Meanwhile, Anselmo and his other siblings built
their homes on another portion of Lot No. 4699. Anselmo, who was then 28 years old, started
living in the eastern portion from 1966.

On January 26, 2000, the Spouses Go bought Lot No. 4699-B from the previous owners, siblings
Anselmo, Bernardo Almero de Torres, Leonila Almero de Torres Morada, and Cristina, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.

On August 26, 2006, the Spouses Go (respondents) applied for the registration and confirmation
of title of Lot No. 4699-B. They attached the Report dated January 31, 2007 of Special Land
Investigator I Ben Hur Hernandez (Hernandez) and the Certification dated January 29, 2008 of
Forester I Loida Maglinao (Maglinao) of the Batangas City Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Calamba, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon
(CALABARZON) Region of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Hernandez's January 31, 2007 Report and Maglinao's January 29, 2008 Certification stated that
the property was located in an alienable and disposable zone since March 26, 1928, under Project
No. 13, Land Classification Map No. 718. No patent or decree was previously issued over the
property.

On November 3, 2006, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) opposed respondents'

application for registration for the following reasons: 1) Lot No. 4699-B was part of the public
domain; 2) neither the Spouses Go nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12,
1945 or even before then; 3) the tax declaration and payment were not competent or sufficient
proof of ownership, especially considering that these were relatively recent.

Anselmo and his siblings had no proof of their inheritance. He claimed that the office having
custody of the documentary proof of their inheritance was burned and they no longer had the
original copy of the documents.
In the Decision dated December 12, 2008, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities confirmed the title
of the lot in the name of the Spouses Go. The dispositive portion read:
Considering that the applicants have duly established essential facts in support of the application,
the Court hereby confirms title to Lot 4699-B, Cad 264 Batangas Cadastre covered in approved
plan Csd-04-22290-D, containing an area of ONE THOUSAND (1,000) SQUARE METERS
situated at Barangay Balagtas, Batangas City in the name of Spouses Danilo Go and Amorlina A.
Go, of legal age, Filipino and residents of San Jose Subdivision, Barangay San Sebastian, Lipa
City.

Once the Decision becomes final, let the corresponding Decree of Registration be issued.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed directly to the Court of Appeals. In the Decision dated January 21, 2011, the
Court of Appeals denied the appeal:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision, dated
December 12, 2008, of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Pallocan West,
Batangas City in Land Registration Case No. 2006-162, is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on June 6, 2011.

Petitioner elevated the case before this Court, arguing that Maglinao testified having investigated
only 200 square meters of the 1,000-square-meter land for registration. She also admitted that her
certification was based on the approved plan and not on the Land Classification Map. She
certified the lot only to determine "the point or monument of the entire or whole area" and not to
identify its alienable character. Thus, petitioner argues that Maglinao's certification should not
have been used to determine that the land was alienable and disposable.

Petitioner assails respondents' failure to submit a copy of the original classification map that
bears the DENR Secretary's approval and its legal custodian's certification as a true copy.
Petitioner argues that a CENRO Certification is insufficient to establish that a land applied for
registration is alienable.

In the Resolution dated August 15, 2011, this Court required respondents to submit a certified
true copy of any Presidential or DENR Secretary's issuance stating Lot No. 4699-B as alienable
and disposable.

In their Compliance dated September 25, 2011, the Spouses Go attached a certified photocopy of
the CENRO Certification dated January 29, 2008, which this Court noted. In the Resolution
dated November 14, 2011, this Court informed the Spouses Go that the CENRO Certification
was not the submission required of them.

On June 20, 2012, the Spouses Go's counsel, Atty. Jose Amor M. Amorado, was ordered "to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt" for failure to
comply with this Court's August 15, 2011 Resolution. The Spouses Go manifested that they had
already complied with this Court's Resolution through their September 25, 2011 Compliance.
They re-attached the CENRO Certification dated January 29, 2008.

On September 24, 2012, this Court resolved to require respondents to file their Comment. The
Spouses Go failed to do so, which led this Court to again require their counsel to show cause for
their failure to comply with the September 24, 2012 Resolution.

In their Compliance dated August 15, 2013, the Spouses Go informed this Court that they would
dispense with the filing of their Comment.

For resolution before this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in issuing the Spouses Go
a Decree of Registration over Lot No. 4699-B.

Any application for confirmation of title under Commonwealth Act No. 141 already concedes
that the land is previously public.

For a person to perfect one's title to the land, he or she may apply with the proper court for the
confirmation of the claim of ownership and the issuance of a certificate of title over the property.
This process is also known as judicial confirmation of title.

Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
states who can apply for judicial confirmation of title:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [Regional Trial Court] of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the
government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a special law that applies to agricultural lands of the public
domain, not to forests, mineral lands, and national parks. The requisite period of possession and
occupation is different from that of land classification.

In an application for judicial confirmation of title, an applicant already holds an imperfect title to
an agricultural land of the public domain after having occupied it from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Thus, for purposes of obtaining an imperfect title, the date it was classified is immaterial.
Classifying a land of the public domain as agricultural is essential only to establish the
applicant's "eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it. Heirs of Malabanan
v. Republic of the Philippines explained:
[T]he applicant's imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the
application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its
eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
In Malabanan, the Court En Banc affirmed that June 12, 1945 is the "reckoning point of the
requisite possession and occupation" and not of the land classification as alienable and
disposable:
[T]he choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the
wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June
12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as
written by the legislators.

[A]n examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no
requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, the land may be declared alienable and disposable at any time, not necessarily before June
12, 1945. The moment that the land is declared alienable and disposable, an applicant may then
initiate the proceedings for the judicial confirmation of title.

On the other hand, for the requisite duration of possession, an applicant must have had
possession of the property under a bona fide claim of ownership or acquisition, from June 12,
1945 or earlier. Such possession must have also been open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious.

Under Section 11(4)(a) of Commonwealth Act No, 141, the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles, which the law describes as "judicial legalization," allows for agricultural public
lands to be disposed of by the State and acquired by Filipino citizens.

Meanwhile, Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides for the procedure to register
a title under the Torrens system:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not vest or create a title to a public land that
has already existed or has been vested under Commonwealth Act No. 141. The procedure of
titling under Presidential Decree No. 1529 "simply recognizes and documents ownership and
provides for the consequences of issuing paper titles.
Thus, under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, Filipino citizens applying for the judicial confirmation and
registration of an imperfect title must prove several requisites. First, they must prove that they,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the property. Second, it must be settled that the applicants'
occupation is under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
immediately before the application was filed. Third, it should be established that the land is an
agricultural land of public domain. Finally, it has to be shown that the land has been declared
alienable and disposable.

The Spouses Go's possession, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, does not
meet the statutory requirements.

The evidence the Spouses Go submitted to prove their required length of possession consist of
Anselmo's testimony, Cristina's sole Tax Declaration, and the Spouses Go's sole Tax
Declaration. Other than these pieces of evidence, the Spouses Go could not support their claim of
possession in the concept of an owner, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
from June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The records do not show that the Spouses Go's predecessors-in-interest fenced the original
3,994-square-meter Lot No. 4699, claiming it as exclusively theirs or that they introduced
improvements on it since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Cristina built a residential house on Lot No.
4699-B when her parents died in the 1960s, while Anselmo started living in the eastern portion
of Lot No. 4699 in 1966 when he was 28 years old. These events happened at least 15 years after
1945. Moreover, the siblings could not produce any documentary proof of their alleged
inheritance of this land from their parents.

Apart from Cristina's single tax declaration and the Spouses Go's single tax declaration covering
even Cristina's arrears from 1997 to 2000, nothing in the records shows that the Spouses Go's
predecessors-in-interest religiously paid real property taxes. Payment of real property taxes is a
"good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his [or her] right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his [or her] actual, or at the least constructive,
possession.

Anselmo only gave bare assertions that his parents paid the real property taxes during their
lifetime. Neither did the Spouses Go give any proof of the alleged tax payments of the Spouses
de Torres or of Anselmo's grandparents, the Spouses Almero.

Although not adequate to establish ownership, a tax declaration may be a basis to infer
possession. This Court has highlighted that where tax declaration was presented, it must be the
1945 tax declaration because June 12, 1945 is material to the case. The specific date must be
ascertained; otherwise, applicants fail to comply with the requirements of the law. In Republic v.
Manna Properties:
It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on, before or after 12 June
1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax declaration issued in 1945 may
have been issued in December 1945. Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated,
compliance with the reckoning date in [Commonwealth Act No.] 141 cannot be established.
II

Even assuming that there is sufficient evidence to establish their claim of possession in the
concept of an owner since June 12, 1945, the Spouses Go nevertheless failed to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the land.

The 1987 Constitution declares that the State owns all public lands. Public lands are classified
into agricultural, mineral, timber or forest, and national parks. Of these four (4) types of public
lands, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Article XII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution
provide:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated . . .

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by
law according to the uses [to] which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands . . .
Thus, an applicant has the burden of proving that the public land has been classified as alienable
and disposable. To do this, the applicant must show a positive act from the government
declassifying the land from the public domain and converting it into an alienable and disposable
land. "[T]he exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the
Executive Department. In Victoria v. Republic:
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the
government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must
show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable.
Section X(1) of the DENR Administrative Order No. 1998-24 and Section IX(1) of DENR
Administrative Order No. 2000-11 affirm that the DENR Secretary is the approving authority for
"[l]and classification and release of lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable."
Section 4.6 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2007-20 defines land classification as follows:
Land classification is the process of demarcating, segregating, delimiting and establishing the
best category, kind, and uses of public lands. Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution of
the Philippines provides that lands of the public domain are to be classified into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
These provisions, read with Victoria v. Republic establish the rule that before an inalienable land
of the public domain becomes private land, the DENR Secretary must first approve the land
classification into an agricultural land and release it as alienable and disposable. The DENR
Secretary's official acts "may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.
The CENRO or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer will then conduct a
survey to verify that the land for original registration falls within the DENR Secretary-approved
alienable and disposable zone.

The CENRO certification is issued only to verify the DENR Secretary issuance through a survey.
"Thus, the CENRO Certification should have been accompanied by an official publication of the
DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. A CENRO certification,
by itself, is insufficient to prove the alienability and disposability of land sought to be registered.
In Republic v. Lualhati:
[I]t has been repeatedly ruled that certifications issued by the CENRO, or specialists of the
DENR, as well as Survey Plans prepared by the DENR containing annotations that the subject
lots are alienable, do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that
the property sought to be registered belongs to the inalienable public domain. Rather, this Court
stressed the importance of proving alienability by presenting a copy of the original classification
of the land approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records.
Here, in its Decision dated December 12, 2008, the Court of Appeals concluded that the January
29, 2008 CENRO Certification, which stated that Lot No. 4699-B was within alienable and
disposable zone, was conclusive proof that this land applied for registration was alienable. This
Court disagrees.

To establish that a land is indeed alienable and disposable, applicants must submit the
application for original registration with the CENRO certification and a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records.

Judicially entrenched is the rule that it is the DENR Secretary who has the authority to approve
land classification and release a land of public domain as alienable and disposable. In Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties:
[I]t is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable.
Republic v. Hanover ruled that a CENRO certification does not constitute incontrovertible proof
that a piece of land is alienable and disposable. This is because "the CENRO is not the official
repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability
and disposability of public lands. Republic v. Vda. De Joson explained:
This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO
did not suffice to support the application for registration, because the applicant must also submit
a copy of the original classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
 III

The pieces of evidence the Spouses Go adduced fall short of the requirements of the law.

First, the Spouses Go failed to present a certified true copy of the original classification of the
DENR Secretary. This Court has given them enough chances to prove their claim. As a rule, this
Court can only consider the evidence submitted before the trial court. Nevertheless, this Court
gave respondents the opportunity to submit "a certified true copy of the Presidential or
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary's issuance declaring the property
alienable and disposable." They failed to comply despite being given a show-cause order.

This Court also required them to file their Comment on petitioner's opposition to their original
registration. Instead of complying, they asked that their Comment be dispensed with.

Second, although the Spouses Go submitted a CENRO certification stating that the land was
verified to be within alienable and disposable zone under Project No. 13, Land Classification
Map No. 718, Maglinao, the person who issued the CENRO Certification, testified otherwise.
She admitted in her testimony that, she certified the lot only to determine "the point or
monument of the entire or whole area" and not to identify its alienable character.

The Spouses Go have the burden to show that the land for registration is alienable or disposable,
which they miserably failed to do so. Without the original land classification approved by the
DENR Secretary, the Spouses Go's application for registration must be denied. The land remains
inalienable.

In sum, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the trial court's Decision that granted the
Spouses Go's application for registration of Lot No. 4699-B. The Spouses Go failed to
adequately prove their claim of possession in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945. They
likewise failed to establish that the land applied for registration is alienable and disposable. Thus,
their occupation of this land, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and cannot be
registered as a title.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated January 21,
2011 and Resolution dated June 6, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 93000, which affirmed the Decision
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities dated December 12, 2008, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The application for registration of the Spouses Danilo Go and Amorlina Go of Lot No.
4699-B of Subdivision Plan Csd-04-022290-D is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.