Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC Under a republican or representative state, all
Residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
When the Constitution speaks of “residence ” in
election law, it actually means only “domicile.”
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification
requirement.
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different
places.
The HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives.
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
The Constitution makes the number of district
representatives the determinant in arriving at the
number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers,
a formulation which means that any increase in the
number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list
seats.
(No. of district representatives/0.8)*0.2 = No. of
party-list representatives
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not
mandatory—it merely provides a ceiling for party-
list seats in Congress.
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides: “(b) The
parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.”
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government authority emanates from the people,
but is exercised by representatives chosen by them,
but to have meaningful representation, the elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient
number of people.
Formula for determining additional seats for First
Party:
No. of votes of First Party/Total votes for party-list
system = Proportion of votes of first party relative
to total votes for party-list system
Formula for determining additional seats of Other
Qualified Parties:
Additional seats for Concerned Party = No. of
votes of Concerned Party/No. of votes of First
Party*No. of additional seats allocated to the First
Party
BANAT v. COMELEC
In computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold
for the distribution of the additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional.
Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for
party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7941:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall
be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
The remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC
The party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that
cannot win in legislative district elections a chance
to win seats in the House of Representatives.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the
party-list system to include not only sectoral
parties but also non-sectoral parties.
The party-list system is composed of three
different groups:
(1) national parties or organizations;
(2) regional parties or organizations; and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.
A “political party” refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of
government.
A “sectoral party” refers to an organized group of
citizens whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.”
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and
regional parties or organizations to represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member
of the party or organization which he or she seeks
to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a
bona fide party-list nominee one must either
belong to the sector represented, or have a track
record of advocacy for such sector.
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the
principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
Republic Act (RA) No. 8043 entitled “An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country
Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes” (otherwise known as the “Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995”), RA No. 8552, entitled
“An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the
Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes” (otherwise known as the Domestic
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Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No.
02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption,” all
expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be
adopted.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under
international law.
The common thread of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR), United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)
and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) is to obligate the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no
child is stateless.
It is a generally accepted principle of international
law to presume foundlings as having been born of
nationals of the country in which the foundling is
found.
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations
There is a recognized presumptive presidential
communications privilege.
The presidential communications privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution.
When an executive official, who is one of those
mentioned in the Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims
to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no
presumption of authorization to invoke executive
privilege given by the President to said executive
official, such that the presumption in this situation
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure.
The doctrine of “operational proximity” was laid
down precisely to limit the scope of the
presidential communications privilege.
In determining which test to use—whether the
Operational Proximity Test or the Organizational
Test—the main consideration is to limit the
availability of executive privilege only to officials
who stand proximate to the President, not only by
reason of their function, but also by reason of their
positions in the Executive’s organizational
structure.
Congress must not require the Executive to state
the reasons for the claim with such particularity as
to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect.
Considering that the information sought through
the three (3) questions subject of this Petition
involves the President’s dealings with a foreign
nation, with more reason, the Court is wary of
approving the view that Congress may
peremptorily inquire into not only official,
documented acts of the President but even her
confidential and informal discussions with her
close advisors on the pretext that said questions
serve some vague legislative need.
The right to information is not an absolute right—
that there is a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of such information covered by
executive privilege is a recognized principle in
other democratic States.
The demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information
does not have the same obligatory force as a
subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress and
neither does the right to information grant a citizen
the power to exact testimony from government
officials.
The Court cannot uphold the view that when a
constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is
validly invoked by a witness in the course of a
legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of
the Committees’ questions can be sufficiently
supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes
and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a
whole may have relevance—the presumption of
privilege can only be overturned by a showing of
compelling need for disclosure of the information
covered by executive privilege.
The Legislature’s need for information in an
investigation of graft and corruption cannot be
deemed compelling enough to pierce the
confidentiality of information validly covered by
executive privilege.
Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
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When the Code of Professional Responsibility or
the Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or
“misconduct,” the reference is not confined to
one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of lawyer’s professional duties, but
also covers any misconduct, which—albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of their
profession—would show them to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which their
license and the law invest in them.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
A bill originating in the House of Representatives
may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate
that the result may be a rewriting of the whole; As
a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
produced and to insist that a revenue statute must
substantially be the same as the House bill would
be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur
with amendments” but also to “propose
amendments.”
The Constitution simply means that the initiative
for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private
bills and bills of local application must come from
the House of Representatives and that it does not
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill
in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House.
Presidential certification on urgency of a bill
dispenses with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
A third version of the bill may result from the
conference committee, which is considered an
“amendment in the nature of a substitute,” the only
requirement being that the third version be
germane to the subject of the House and Senate
bills.
The three-reading requirement refers only to bills
introduced for the first time in either house of
Congress, not to the conference committee report.
An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of
its provisions but also of its due enactment.
The constitutional requirement that every bill
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in its title is intended to
prevent surprise upon the members of Congress
and to inform the people of pending legislation so
that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it.

Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to

enforce since what Congress is required by the
Constitution to do is to “evolve a progressive
system of taxation.”

Legarda v. De Castro
The constitutional function as well as the power
and the duty to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualification of
the President and Vice-President is expressly
vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.

Marcos v. Manglapus
The right to return to one’s country is not among
the rights specifically guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights, though it may well be considered as a
generally accepted principle of international law
which is part of the law of the land.

The constitutional guarantees invoked by

petitioners are not absolute and inflexible, they
admit of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interests.

The President can exercise Commander-In-Chief

powers in order to keep the peace and maintain
public order and security even in the absence of an
emergency.

The President has the power under the Constitution

to bar the Marcoses from returning to our country.

The President did not act arbitrarily, capriciously

and whimsically in determining that the return of
the Marcoses poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare, and in prohibiting their return.

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