Master Handbook

CF and SOF Integration and Interoperability Handbook
Foreword
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and
other commands, as appropriate.
Eric T. Olson Robert W. Wagner

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commander Deputy Commander
U.S. Special Operations Command U.S. Joint Forces Command
Robert B. Neller
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Director, Operations Division
U.S. Marine Corps
i
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Preface
1. Scope
This handbook takes lessons learned from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and addresses voids in actions and considerations when
planning operations requiring the integration and interoperability of Conventional Forces (CF)
and Special Operations Forces (SOF). The focus of the handbook is the CF and SOF
commander and staff at the operational and tactical levels, both officer and enlisted planners and
executers. This handbook addresses specific areas of concern and provides considerations to
overcome or mitigate the associated challenges. This handbook has not yet been validated by
field testing.
2. Purpose
This handbook provides a reference which details OEF and OIF operationally-proven ad hoc
tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance CF and SOF integration and interoperability
resulting in more timely actions, increased opportunities, and a reduced potential for fratricide.
3. Application
This handbook has applicability to the operating forces of the Services and United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM).
4. Developer Information
The Joint Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations (JIISO) joint test and evaluation
(JT&E) is chartered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, Deputy Director for Air Warfare. The JIISO JT&E team led the development of this
handbook through significant research and input from the operating forces of the Services and
USSOCOM. The JIISO JT&E will maintain ownership of this handbook through the end of the
JT&E charter (April 2007), at which time responsibility is planned for transition to Headquarters,
USSOCOM.
Recommendations for improving this handbook are encouraged. Forward your comments to the
address below or through email. Be sure to direct comments to specific chapters, pages, and
paragraphs, and provide a rationale for each recommendation. Use the following address to
obtain additional copies or compact discs (CDs).
Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command
(Attn: SOKF-J7-J, JIISO JT&E - R&P)
7701 Tampa Point Blvd.
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5323
NIPRNET: jiiso.jt&e@socom.mil
SIPRNET: jiiso.jt&e@socom.smil.mil
Phone: Commercial - (813) 828-6524
DSN - 299-6524
This publication is available on the JIISO website: http://www.JIISO.jte.osd.smil.mil
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword .......................................................................................................................................... i
Preface............................................................................................................................................. ii
CHAPTER 1 ............................................................................................................................... 1-1
Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability ..... 1-1
1.0. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1-1
1.1. Convergence Challenges .................................................................................................... 1-1
CHAPTER 2 ............................................................................................................................... 2-1
Command and Control.............................................................................................................. 2-1
2.0. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 2-1
2.1. Levels of Authority ............................................................................................................ 2-2
2.2. Traditional Command Relationships.................................................................................. 2-2
2.3. Support ............................................................................................................................... 2-3
2.3.1. Employment Considerations ......................................................................................... 2-4
2.4. Command and Control Systems ......................................................................................... 2-5
2.4.1. Situational Awareness Systems ..................................................................................... 2-5
2.4.2. Collaboration Systems................................................................................................... 2-9
CHAPTER 3 ............................................................................................................................... 3-1
Liaison and Control Elements .................................................................................................. 3-1
3.0. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3-1
3.1. The Liaison Officer ............................................................................................................ 3-2
3.1.1. General .......................................................................................................................... 3-2
3.1.2. Functions ....................................................................................................................... 3-3
3.1.3. Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities ................................................................................... 3-4
3.1.4. Liaison Procedures ........................................................................................................ 3-5
3.2. Special Operations Forces Command and Control, Coordination,
and Liaison Elements ......................................................................................................... 3-6
3.2.1. Special Operations Command and Control Element..................................................... 3-6
3.2.2. Special Operations Liaison Element ............................................................................. 3-7
3.2.3. Special Operations Coordination Element .................................................................... 3-8
3.2.4. Special Operations Forces Liaison Officers .................................................................. 3-9
CHAPTER 4 ............................................................................................................................... 4-1
Characteristics and Capabilities / Limitations........................................................................ 4-1
4.0. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 4-1
4.1. Conventional Forces........................................................................................................... 4-1
4.1.1. Characteristics ............................................................................................................... 4-1
4.1.2. Core Competencies........................................................................................................ 4-1
4.1.3. Capabilities .................................................................................................................... 4-7
4.1.4. Limitations..................................................................................................................... 4-8
4.2. Special Operations Forces .................................................................................................. 4-8
4.2.1. Characteristics ............................................................................................................... 4-8
4.2.2. Core Tasks ..................................................................................................................... 4-9
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4.2.3. Capabilities .................................................................................................................. 4-10

4.2.4. Limitations................................................................................................................... 4-11
CHAPTER 5 ............................................................................................................................... 5-1
Conventional Forces / Special Operations Force Integrated Operations Planning............. 5-1
5.0. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 5-2
5.1. Operational Framework...................................................................................................... 5-2
5.1.1. Operations Areas ........................................................................................................... 5-3
5.1.2. Battlespace..................................................................................................................... 5-4
5.1.3. Common Geographic Reference System....................................................................... 5-5
5.2. Planning Considerations for Integrated Operations ........................................................... 5-5
5.2.1. Conventional Forces Supported by Special Operations Forces .................................... 5-5
5.2.2. Special Operations Forces Supported by Conventional Forces .................................... 5-6
5.3. Operations Security Considerations ................................................................................... 5-7
5.4. Communications and Information Systems Support.......................................................... 5-7
CHAPTER 6 ............................................................................................................................... 6-1
Joint Fire Support...................................................................................................................... 6-1
6.0. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 6-1
6.1. Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces Capabilities ......................................... 6-2
6.1.1. How Special Operations Forces Capabilities Can Complement
Conventional Forces...................................................................................................... 6-2
6.1.2. How Conventional Forces Capabilities Can Complement
Special Operations Forces ............................................................................................. 6-2
6.1.3. Capitalizing on Capabilities .......................................................................................... 6-2
6.2. Planning Considerations..................................................................................................... 6-3
6.3. Fire Support Coordination.................................................................................................. 6-5
6.3.1. Fire Support Coordinating Measures............................................................................. 6-5
6.3.2. Clearance of Fires.......................................................................................................... 6-6
6.3.3. Time-Sensitive Targets.................................................................................................. 6-6
6.4. Joint Fire Support Assets.................................................................................................... 6-8
6.4.1. Naval Surface Fire Support ........................................................................................... 6-8
6.4.2. Artillery, Rockets, and Missile Support ...................................................................... 6-10
6.4.3. Close Air Support ........................................................................................................ 6-11
CHAPTER 7 ............................................................................................................................... 7-1
Intelligence.................................................................................................................................. 7-1
7.0. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 7-1
7.0.1. Intelligence Disciplines ................................................................................................. 7-1
7.1. Planning Considerations..................................................................................................... 7-2
7.2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace ........................................................................ 7-4
7.2.1. Define the Battlespace Environment ............................................................................. 7-4
7.2.2. Describe the Battlespace Effects ................................................................................... 7-4
7.2.3. Evaluate the Threat........................................................................................................ 7-5
7.2.4. Determine Threat Course of Action .............................................................................. 7-5
7.3. Special Operations Forces Intelligence Needs ................................................................... 7-6
7.3.1. Level of Detail............................................................................................................... 7-6
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7.3.2. Timeliness and Accuracy of Information ...................................................................... 7-6

7.3.3. Operational Element and Analyst Interface .................................................................. 7-6
7.4. Multinational Forces Planning Considerations .................................................................. 7-6
7.5. Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Joint Targeting Considerations....... 7-7
Appendix A - Acronyms ............................................................................................................ A-i
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1. Conventional Forces Enter a Joint Special Operations Area .................................. 1-2
Figure 1-2. Special Operations Forces Enter a Conventional Forces Operational Area ............ 1-3
Figure 1-3. Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces Deliberate Planning................... 1-4
Figure 1-4. Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces Crisis Action Planning .............. 1-5
Figure 2-1. Notional Joint Force Command Organizational Structure...................................... 2-2
Figure 5-1. Joint Operations Area............................................................................................... 5-3
Figure 6-1. Naval Gunfire Dispersion Pattern ............................................................................ 6-9
Figure 6-2. Artillery / Multiple Launch Rocket System Range Relationship........................... 6-11
Figure 6-3. AC-130 Gunship Target / Fire Line ....................................................................... 6-13
Figure 7-1. Request Flow for National Support - Crisis............................................................. 7-2
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1. Traditional Command and Control Relationship Considerations ............................. 2-3
Table 2-2. Support Relationship Considerations ........................................................................ 2-4
Table 3-1. Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces Liaison and Control Elements.... 3-2
Table 3-2. Notional Special Operations Liaison Element Functions.......................................... 3-8
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CHAPTER 1
CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY
1.0. Introduction
Integration. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates
by engaging as a whole. (Joint publication [JP] 1-02, Department of Defense [DOD] Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended)
Interoperability. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept
services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them
to operate effectively together. (JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12
April 2001, as amended)
Until recently, Conventional Forces (CF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) tended to operate
in separate operational areas in the battlespace, deconflicted in time and space. Generally, CF
and SOF operations were planned and executed independently within a synchronized framework
to support the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) overall plan. However, combat in Afghanistan
(Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) and Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) produced
situations where CF and SOF operated in the same operational area simultaneously (e.g.,
Operation ANACONDA) with little time to plan and develop procedures. Although joint
operations have progressed significantly over the past 20 years, circumstances still arise in which
actions against the enemy are delayed, opportunities are missed, and fratricide or near-fratricide
incidents occur. These challenges, primarily in command and control (C2), maneuver, and fire
support coordination, surface due to a variety of reasons. Lack of liaison placement and usage is
often the primary cause of the CF and SOF challenges. The lack of standardized procedures;
incompatible systems; and lack of knowledge of CF or SOF capabilities, limitations, and culture
create friction that impacts mission accomplishment.
While there are challenges when CF and SOF work together, there are also great opportunities
for the JFC to exploit. CF integrated with SOF by a JFC creates unique capabilities to achieve
objectives not otherwise attainable. Integration and interoperability enable the JFC to take
advantage of Service and SOF core competencies and systems and is most effective when these
forces are incorporated into the overall operational plan. CF operations are characterized by
lethal firepower, robust sustainment, extensive C2 capabilities, and relatively large numbers of
personnel. SOF operations are characterized by small units of specially-trained and select
personnel that conduct high-risk missions in hostile, denied, and politically-sensitive
environments. Effectively integrated CF and SOF actions can produce a greater effect at a
higher tempo with less potential for fratricide than if operating separately.
1.1. Convergence Challenges

Although numerous opportunities exist on the battlefield for CF and SOF to operate in proximity
and / or in each other’s operational area, four likely scenarios include:
1-1
• Scenario 1: CF enter an existing SOF operational area, such as a joint special operations
area (JSOA).
• Scenario 2: SOF enter an existing CF operational area.
• Scenario 3: CF and SOF conduct deliberate planning.
• Scenario 4: CF and SOF conduct crisis action planning.
These scenarios provide context to the lessons learned.
Scenario 1: Conventional Forces Enter a Joint Special Operations

Area
Background: SOF are conducting unconventional warfare in a designated JSOA or SOF-
dominated area. An increasing enemy threat in this less than mature battlespace requires CF to
deploy in support of SOF to conduct operations against larger enemy units. With CF and SOF
operating in proximity, the challenge is to maintain SOF freedom of action to conduct operations
while reducing the potential for fratricide. See Figure 1-1.
Joint Special
JSOA
••• Operations Area
SF
•••
SF
•••
SF
Special Forces Hostile

•• • Operational
Operational Mechanized Infantry
SF Airfield
Detachment
Detachment Alpha
Alpha Infantry Brigade Battalion
Figure 1-1. Conventional Forces Enter a

Joint Special Operations Area
Concerns: (a) C2, (b) operations security (OPSEC), (c) fire support coordinating measures
(FSCMs), and (d) intelligence fusion
Remedies: Refer to Chapters 2 through 7
1-2
Scenario 2: Special Operations Forces Enter a Conventional Forces

Operational Area
Background: CF are engaged in combat operations when intelligence is received that high-
ranking members of an insurgent cell are located within the operational area. A specially-
trained and equipped unit is required to neutralize enemy personnel. SOF are assigned tactical
control or in direct support to CF to conduct direct action missions against these high-value
targets. The challenge is to provide a framework in which SOF has responsive fire support, has
freedom of action with reduced risk of fratricide, and does not hinder the combat operations of
CF. See Figure 1-2.
SAFE
SAFE
•••
SF
Special Forces
•• • Operational Unit Hostile
SF SAFE
Detachment Alpha Safe House Boundary Infantry
Mechanized
Infantry Brigade Mechanized Hostile
Command Post Infantry Battalion Reconnaissance
Figure 1-2. Special Operations Forces Enter a Conventional Forces

Operational Area
Concerns: (a) C2, (b) OPSEC, (c) FSCMs, and (d) intelligence fusion
1-3
Scenario 3: Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces

Conduct Deliberate Planning Together
Background: During deliberate planning (operation plan / operation order development) SOF
are tasked to support CF by providing special reconnaissance for an amphibious operation. An
enemy brigade-sized armor unit, situated inland, can reinforce other enemy forces in the vicinity
of the landing area within 48 hours. If allowed to move unimpeded, the enemy armor force can
seriously impact the outcome of the landing, disrupting the commander’s campaign plan. The
challenge is to conduct as much CF / SOF coordination as possible, since the situation will
change with commencement of amphibious operations. See Figure 1-3.
Marine Observation Outpost Hostile

Expeditionary Occupied by Armor
Brigade Reconnaissance (SOF) Brigade
Figure 1-3. Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces

Deliberate Planning
Concerns: (a) planning, (b) maneuver control measures, (c) FSCMs, and (d) intelligence fusion
1-4
Scenario 4: Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces

Conduct Crisis Action Planning Together
Background: CF supports SOF for a hostage-rescue operation. CF will conduct a feint to
deceive the enemy as to the timing, purpose, and location of the rescue attempt. Due to the large
number of hostages involved, CF will also support SOF with transportation assets for evacuation.
The challenge is to coordinate CF support to SOF objectives given the short amount of time
available for planning and the inherent complexity of this type of operation. See Figure 1-4.
•••
SF
Special Forces
•• • Operational Hostile Hostile K
SF Reconnaissance Infantry Hostages
Detachment Alpha
Axis of
Infantry Wheeled Axis of Advance
Company Transportation Advance (Feint)
Figure 1-4. Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces

Crisis Action Planning
Concerns: (a) C2, (b) lack of understanding of the other’s tactics, techniques, and procedures,
(c) planning, (d) OPSEC, (e) fire support control measures, and (f) intelligence fusion
1-5
CHAPTER 2
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Lesson Learned
• In many circumstances, supporting / supported relationships better serve command
and control.
• Special Operations Forces, under the command and control of Conventional Forces, may
lose much of their capability to shape the battlespace when assigned limited geographic
boundaries.
• Support relationships, versus traditional command and control relationships, often better
serve the emerging battlespace of the contemporary operational environment.
• Fratricide due to lack of common situational awareness is a much greater threat to
personnel than is the potential compromise of Special Operations Forces’ locations.
• Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces commanders must jointly address the
need to display open feeds based on Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces
mission objectives, situational conditions, fratricide prevention, and enhanced situational
awareness.
2.0. Introduction
Command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command
and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing,
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also
called C2. (Joint publication [JP] 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended)
Effective command and control (C2) is a force multiplier that allows commanders to best employ
their forces toward a common effort. C2 should have a feedback process, or reciprocal
influence, that allows commanders to best adapt to rapidly changing circumstances.
Information, a key element of C2, is used to both create situational awareness, allowing better
informed decisions, and to direct and coordinate actions resulting from those decisions. The
amount of information is not as important as having the right information in a usable form to the
right person in time to influence critical decisions.
The C2 systems themselves, which aid in creating, disseminating, and using information, are
another key element of C2. The complexities of today’s C2 systems make them not only
vulnerable to enemy attack, but also susceptible to possible friction from information overload.
An over reliance on technology, misinformation, a lack of technical proficiency or training, and
systems failures are all obstacles to interoperability.
2-1
Command relationships with Conventional Forces (CF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF)
should be fashioned to provide the necessary guidance; given an uncertain, non-contiguous, and
asymmetric battlespace environment; without unnecessarily restricting the initiative and
flexibility of subordinate commanders. At the operational level, the support command
relationship, properly understood, has often proven to be the best method. At the tactical level,
the best command relationship is dependent on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time, troops
available and civilians. It is always important to understand the commander’s priorities,
acceptable risk levels, and mission approval levels.
2.1. Levels of Authority

The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned.
Levels of authority include four types of command relationships: (1) combatant command,
(2) operational control (OPCON), (3) tactical control (TACON), and (4) support. Figure 2-1
depicts a notional joint force command organizational structure.
Joint Task Force

Commander
Army Air Force Navy Marine Corps

Component Component Component Component
(ARFOR) (AFFOR) (NAVFOR) (MARFOR)
Joint Force Joint Force Joint Force Joint Force Special

Air Land Maritime Operations
Component Component Component Component
Joint Civil-Military Joint Psychological

Operations Task Operations Task
Force Force
Notes:
1. A joint force always contains Service components (because of administrative and logistic support
and training responsibilities).
2. A joint force composition can be a mixture of the above. (Navy and Marine Corps forces alone
will not constitute a joint force.)
3. There also may be a Coast Guard component in a joint force.
4. Source: Joint publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures, 13
January 1999.
Figure 2-1. Notional Joint Force Command

Organizational Structure
2.2. Traditional Command Relationships

Joint force commanders exercise OPCON and TACON over assigned or attached forces. Table
2-1 depicts traditional C2 relationship considerations.
2-2
Table 2-1. Traditional Command and Control

Relationship Considerations
Operational Control (OPCON)

• Authority to perform functions of command involving:
• Organization and employment of commands and forces
• Assignment of tasks and designation of objectives
• Authoritative direction for operations and training
• Normally exercised through commanders of subordinate joint
force and Service and/or functional component commanders
• Does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for:
• Logistics
• Administration, discipline, or internal organization
• Unit training
Tactical Control (TACON)

• Authority over assigned or attached forces or capability
• Usually limited to detailed local direction and control
• Typically exercised by functional component commanders
over military forces or capability made available for tasking
• Does not include authoritative direction for:
• Organizational authority*
• Administration and logistic support*
Note: *Parent unit authority
2.3. Support
A support arrangement is established when an organization should aid, protect, complement, or
sustain another force. Support relationships afford an effective means to weigh and ensure unity
of effort for various operations. Support is also a flexible command authority relationship. The
commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the
supporting effort, to include target / objective prioritization, timing and duration of the
supporting action, and coordination measures. The common superior commander is responsible
for clearly defining support command relationships. Support relationships work best when there
is a high degree of trust and confidence between the affected commanders. Table 2-2 depicts
support relationship considerations.
2-3
Table 2-2. Support Relationship Considerations
Supported Unit
• Ensure supporting commander understands the
assistance required
• Exercise general direction of the supporting effort
Supporting Unit
• Understand supported commander’s intent
• Ascertain the needs of the supported commander
• Provide needed assistance within capabilities
and priorities of other assigned tasks
Designating Authority
• Define type (direct, mutual, close, general), time,
place, level, and duration of the supporting effort
• Define the forces and resources allocated to
supporting effort
• Define the priority of the supporting mission relative
to the other missions of the supporting force
• Define the authority, if any, of the supporting force to
modify the supporting effort in the event of
exceptional opportunity or an emergency
• Define the degree of authority granted to the
supported unit
2.3.1. Employment Considerations

• In general, supporting / supported C2 relationships provide the best framework for integrated
CF / SOF operations. This relationship allows the supported commander to set requirements
and allows the supporting commander the flexibility to determine methods and tactics.
Degree, type, and priority of support need to be established.
• Support relationships require a clear definition of relationship parameters by the mutual
higher commander and a high degree of trust and confidence between commanders.
• Based on circumstances, SOF (or CF) at any level can be provided TACON to CF (or SOF)
for a short period of time to ensure unity of command for combat operations in proximity.
• Mission approval authority at the lowest possible level increases timeliness of support and
flexibility.
2-4
• Supporting units must be included early in the supported unit planning process to ensure
proper use and allow for full integration into the operation. Supported commander’s intent
must be understood.
• Develop an information management (IM) plan and establish an IM staff element to identify
necessary changes to IM policies, resolve IM issues, and discipline information flow both
within and external to the headquarters. Provide the IM element with the proper resources
and priority to make it effective.
• Clearly understand the operation’s published classification guidance to minimize the amount
of information handled within “focal point” channels. This prevents complicating or
undermining the C2 decision making process of CF and SOF commanders.
2.4. Command and Control Systems

Numerous command, control, communications, and computer capabilities are resident at each
Service or SOF organizational level. While the overall supporting network architectures are
varied, they generally include classified and unclassified, United States and coalition, voice and
data connectivity supporting a host of different tools and systems. These tools / systems include
situational awareness, collaboration, fire support, mission planning, intelligence management,
chat, file sharing, and data transfer. Careful interoperability consideration should be given to the
specific tool / system used at each organization, and level, as many are stove-piped within the
Service or SOF. Every effort should be made to establish and use joint standard tools / systems.
2.4.1. Situational Awareness Systems

Although occasionally the result of malfunctioning weapons, fratricide has often been the result
of confusion on the battlefield. Causes include misidentification of targets, inaccurate target
locations or descriptions, target locations incorrectly transmitted or received, and loss of
situational awareness…(JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air
Support [CAS], 3 September 2003)
The situational awareness tools employed by ground fires and maneuver elements only provide a
near real-time representation of track data. Blue force locations are only updated based on preset
reporting time frequency and / or distance threshold of the blue force tracking (BFT) device the
unit is carrying.
Commanders, when forming their situational awareness of the battlespace, should thus temper
their C2 decision-making process with consideration of the time latency between actual and
represented positions. Recognize that not all personnel / vehicles of a BFT unit carry the BFT
devices. Additionally, take into consideration the timeliness of the displayed positional / unit
data to determine its accuracy. This fact is especially important with highly-mobile SOF units
that, under certain mission conditions, are separated from the individual or platform carrying the
unit’s BFT device.
Moreover, while available systems offer the commander an enhanced ability to reduce fratricide
and an increased efficiency and opportunity to strike the enemy, consider the fact that the failure
and / or improper operation of these systems may compound the fog of war. The liaison officer
(LNO) is and will remain a critical element in the C2 architecture required for real-time
situational awareness.
2-5
2.4.1.1. Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below

Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) is an Army system (with limited
fielding within SOF) providing situational awareness and C2 to the lowest tactical echelons.
This system is normally mounted in tactical vehicles with graphical displays of the common
battlespace picture representing forces in near real time. The system also provides a basic
messaging capability facilitating text-based collaboration.
2.4.1.1.1. Employment Considerations

• During planning, consider what FBCB2 mode the units will be using. FBCB2 has two
modes of operation: a secure line of sight communications mode and a non-secure satellite
communications mode. The line of sight mode has limited range capabilities and is hindered
by natural and manmade obstructions.
• SOF commanders should designate which SOF units will be represented in FBCB2 and
how the tracks will be managed.
• CF and SOF commanders should consider the potential for the unplanned combat
identification of SOF elements during an operation and agree on policies / procedures for
the manual or automatic representation of such units in FBCB2.
• Give special consideration when attempting to share either track data or battlespace geometry
overlays (e.g., fire support coordinating measures [FSCMs]) with other joint tactical units
since this effort requires the manual entry of data into the FBCB2 system and may be prone
to human data entry errors. FBCB2 is not integrated or interoperable with other CF or SOF
tactical / operational level situational awareness systems, such as Command and Control
Personal Computer (C2PC).
• Consider the use of the FBCB2 basic text messaging capability for collaboration.
• Since FBCB2 fielding is not yet complete, during mission planning determine which CF and
SOF units have the system and how use of the system may be optimized to effectively
support the mission.
2.4.1.2. Maneuver Control System

Maneuver control system (MCS) is an Army system providing situational awareness and C2 at
the brigade and above levels. This system provides graphical displays of battlespace forces in
near real time in a common battlespace picture and creates and disseminates operation plans and
orders for combined arms maneuver commanders.

• Recognize the potential for conflicting track data as MCS receives track data and overlay
information from both FBCB2 and the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) –
Army, common operational picture (COP). Give special consideration to ensure that MCS
operators are diligent with the maintenance and deconfliction of track data.
• Use SOF liaison elements, who may be able to communicate directly with SOF elements, to
help ensure the integrity of this track and overlay situational awareness picture.
2-6
• Conduct pre-mission compatibility checks, during the planning process, to ensure that CF
and SOF elements involved in the operation are accurately displayed on the C2PC system.
2.4.1.3. Command and Control Personal Computer

C2PC is a Marine Corps system, also employed throughout SOF, that provides situational
awareness and C2 at all echelons. The system provides graphical displays of the common
battlespace picture representing battlespace forces and a basic text messaging functionality.
C2PC receives track data and overlay information from the GCCS – Maritime COP track
database. C2PC is incorporated in the SOF digital environment C2 suite known as the tactical
local area network (TACLAN). While the SOF TACLAN and Marine Corps versions of C2PC
offer essentially the same functionality, the versions of the fielded software may differ.

• During mission planning, identify and address differences in C2PC versions and
functionality.
• Conduct pre-mission compatibility checks during the planning process to ensure that CF and
SOF elements involved in the operation are accurately displayed on the C2PC system.
2.4.1.4. Common Operational Picture

COP is a joint mission application residing in the GCCS – Joint system providing situational
awareness at the joint task force and component commander echelons. This system provides
graphical displays of the common battlespace picture representing battlespace forces and a basic
text messaging capability. The joint task force headquarters, or a designated component
command, maintains the “top COP” track database for the entire joint operational area. The “top
COP” is a manned responsibility consisting of track database managers actively managing the
integrity of the area of operations battlespace situational awareness picture.

• The joint force track manager, referred to as the “top COP,” must diligently manage the
integrity of the situational awareness picture throughout all echelons (e.g., by setting
standards, establishing reporting frequency, managing track time latency, deconflicting dual
tracks).
• LNOs must recognize that the “top COP” is the primary point of contact for final
deconfliction of all tracks.
• Regarding track management:
• Assign responsibility for development and maintenance of the unit’s COP architecture
(i.e., trackers, feeds, displays, communications).
• Assign responsibility and determine how each unit’s tracks are inserted (i.e., manually,
electronically) and how often.
• Ensure liaison elements have access to the full situational awareness COP with a method
for track and battlespace geometry deconfliction.
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• Stipulate BFT reporting requirements for units that are using “reporting windows” to
conserve BFT unit battery life.
• Commanders may decide to implement discrete feeds, giving explicit guidance to the Army
Forces Strategic Command mission management center (MMC) as to when and which
specific internet protocol addresses may be provided to the feed. Commanders may also
deliberately maintain a discrete feed until just prior to H-hour and then switch to an open
feed for dissemination of SOF locations to all forces. This requires the SOF commander to
weigh the risks of compromise and fratricide prevention.
• During planning, give consideration to how and under what conditions a SOF discrete
feed should be switched to an open feed visible by CF.
• Commanders can opt to provide the “top COP” with either open or discrete feeds.
• Commanders may decide to also implement an open feed with a “generic” code limiting
the COP track database information only to SOF locations, but not unit identification.
• During planning, give special consideration to how CF and SOF units will manage the
dissemination and response to an emergent situation “911” distress call through BFT
devices. Understand that CF distress calls are disseminated within CF units throughout
the FBCB2, MCS, and COP situational awareness, and SOF distress calls are received by
the MMC and passed to the designated SOF unit.
• Consider and rehearse manual methods of position reporting, BFT, and situational
awareness for all phases of conflict as a method of guarding against failures in
technology and associated processes.
• During operational conditions requiring a real-time understanding of actual unit
positions, the CF and SOF commanders must rely upon the actual known ground truth of
unit locations, which can only be obtained by direct liaison with the tactical elements
themselves. Liaison elements play a critical part in this effort.
2.4.1.5. Theater Battle Management Core System

The theater battle management core system (TBMCS) provides air commanders a means to plan,
direct, and control air operations. The system consists of multiple mission applications
providing situational awareness, collaboration, messaging, and force employment capabilities.

• SOF commanders must consider that an increasing number of conventional unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) are occupying previously unhindered airspace. Many of these UAVs are
being operated in real or near real time at all echelons from the strategic level to the company
level soldier-deployable UAV. Since not all UAVs are listed on the air tasking order (ATO),
LNOs should be aware of the need to deconflict airspace with unmanned systems.
• UAVs used to perform “danger close” close air support or lethal strikes for CF or SOF units
must employ a method for UAV sensor operators to electronically, and / or visually, identify
friendly forces prior to engagement to prevent fratricide.
• Deconfliction of frequencies is often as critical as airspace for UAV operation. Ensure UAV
operational frequencies are listed on the joint restricted frequency list at the electronic
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warfare coordination cell. Additionally, deconflict UAV usage with collocated and adjacent
units. UAV frequency / communications deconfliction must occur at every level to avoid
catastrophic failure or interference with other communications systems operating in the same
frequency spectrum.
• During planning, commanders should consider the allocation of complementary UAV
resources in the ATO and other mission planning processes.
• LNOs are critical elements in deconflicting airspace for manned and unmanned SOF air
assets via TBMCS, as well as voice and online collaboration tools.
• Consider the establishment of altitude blocks for SOF and UAV aircraft in the event of lost
system communications. Ensure these block altitudes are incorporated into the airspace
control plan and airspace control order.
2.4.1.6. Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System

The joint automated deep operations coordination system (JADOCS) is a joint mission
management system providing battlespace visualization, battlespace management, air
interdiction planning and execution, time-sensitive targeting, and FSCM analysis.

• Although JADOCS is found throughout almost all SOF echelons, there is limited deployment
to the lower CF echelons. Thus, the real-time identification of time-sensitive targets (TSTs),
and attack coordination below the component level, is conducted using voice C2 systems and
processes.
• LNOs are a critical element to facilitate and coordinate tactical CF / SOF prosecution of
TSTs. Ensure LNOs have access to the necessary tools (e.g., JADOCS, chat, voice
communications) to dynamically coordinate and deconflict CF and SOF resources.
• Ensure FSCM and airspace coordinating measures (ACM) match in both JADOCS and
TBMCS. The two systems are not 100% compatible and JADOCS may drop some of the
FSCM / ACM changes when TBMCS files are imported. This usually applies to FSCM /
ACM files that have been deleted or are no longer active. This has potential to cause delays
if JADOCS is the primary system to clear TST fires.
2.4.2. Collaboration Systems

2.4.2.1. Web Information Center
The web information center (WIC) is a web-based tool hosted by a joint special operations task
force or forward operations base allowing users to collaborate (e.g., posting and updating shared
files, operations center logs) and to link to other collaboration tools providing chat, video
teleconferencing, and text messaging functionality.
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• The WIC architecture allows varying degrees of permissions for visibility of information
posted. These permissions can be used to restrict external visibility of in-progress and
sensitive documents while allowing internal coordination. Consider allowing your LNO to
other organizations full access to improve situational awareness and allow them to identify
any potential conflicts during initial planning.
• During planning, identify CF and SOF individuals requiring WIC access to develop and
promulgate a WIC concept of operations.
• Allow LNOs full access to other organizations to improve situational awareness and to
identify any potential conflicts during initial planning.
• Provide individuals with appropriate (read and / or write) access to web pages.
• Ensure commanders understand the criticality of keeping website content up-to-date.
• Clearly understand the operation’s published classification guidance to minimize the amount
of information handled within “focal point” channels. This prevents complicating or
undermining the C2 decision making process of CF and SOF commanders.
2.4.2.2. Collaboration Applications

The defense collaboration tool suite is currently the standard collaboration system for CF and
SOF. Additional collaboration systems include internet relay chat client for Windows, Info
WorkSpace, and NetMeeting, which provide the functionality of chat rooms, text messaging, text
chat, video teleconferencing, file sharing, and whiteboard discussions and presentations.

• During planning, select one common tool for collaboration. If this is not possible, consider
the interoperability challenges associated with using different tools.
• When selecting a common tool for collaboration, consider operational need, bandwidth,
interoperability, and training requirements.
• Consider how the collaboration tools will be employed for various missions and during
different operational conditions.
• Continuous chat collaboration tools are recommended for monitoring operations. Record the
sessions and save the transcripts to the command journal.
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CHAPTER 3
LIAISON AND CONTROL ELEMENTS
Lesson Learned
• Exchange and use liaison and control elements.
• Exchange liaison officers as soon as possible, as physical presence optimizes
integration and effectiveness.
• Liaison officers should brief their unit capabilities and limitations to supporting
or supported commanders in order to manage expectations.
• Coordinate continuous collaboration between Conventional Forces and Special
Operations Forces commanders and staff.
• Maintain constant situational awareness (friendly / neutral / enemy).
• Disseminate information as expeditiously as possible.
• Ensure liaison and control elements have required communications and
information systems support.
• Establish standardized liaison officer workstations, processes, briefing formats,
and contact plans in the supported unit’s operations center.
• Maintain a message tracking system to monitor and document information.
• Establish a comprehensive unit training program to train liaison officers on their
duties and responsibilities based upon expectations and requirements.
3.0. Introduction
To fully integrate Conventional Forces (CF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF), effective
liaison must be maintained with all components of a joint force that may impact the conduct of
their activities. Unity of effort and reduction of friction between CF and SOF are accomplished
through a number of liaison and control elements, as depicted in Table 3-1.
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Table 3-1. Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces

Liaison and Control Elements
Element Sent From Sent To Remarks

Liaison Officer CF or SOF CF or SOF As required
BCD Army JFACC ARFOR representative to JFACC
MARLO Marine Corps JFACC MARFOR representative to JFACC
ANGLICO Team Marine Corps CF, SOF, or As required for fire support coordination
Multinational
NALE Navy CF NAVFOR representative to JFACC
TLE Navy CF Coordinate TLAM employment with JFACC
ALO / TACP Air Force CF or SOF AFFOR representative to ground units for fire
support coordination
JACE Air Force SOF AFFOR / CFACC representative to JFSOCC /
JSOTF
ACCE CF CF JFACC representative to other component
commanders. Primary conduit to resolve
coordination challenges of joint air-land operations
SOCCE SOF CF Established at a CF unit, by JFSOCC / JSOTF
commander to perform C2 or liaison functions to
synchronize SOF activities with CF operations
SOLE SOF CF JFSOCC representative to JFACC (if designated) or
appropriate Service component air C2 organization,
to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special
operations air, surface, and subsurface operations
with conventional air operations
SFLE SOF CF Liaison
ACCE - Air Component Coordination Element MARFOR - Marine Corps Forces

AFFOR - Air Force Forces MARLO - Marine Liaison Officer
ALO - Air Liaison Officer NALE - Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element
ANGLICO - Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company NAVFOR - Navy Forces
ARFOR - Army Forces SFLE - Special Forces Liaison Element
BCD - Battlefield Coordination Detachment SOCCE - Special Operations Command
C2 - Command and Control and Control Element
CF - Conventional Forces SOF - Special Operations Forces
CFACC - Combined Force Air Component Commander SOLE - Special Operations Liaison Element
JACE - Joint Air Control Element TACP - Tactical Air Control Party
JFACC - Joint Force Air Component Commander TLAM - Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
JFSOCC - Joint Force Special Operations Component TLE - Tomahawk Land Attack Missile Liaison
Commander Element
JSOTF - Joint Special Operations Task Force
3.1. The Liaison Officer
3.1.1. General
Liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or
other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (Joint
publication [JP] 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as
amended)
Exchanging liaison officers (LNOs) is the most commonly employed technique for establishing
and maintaining close, continuous, physical communications between CF and SOF commands.
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• LNOs may be exchanged between higher, lower, or adjacent units. The exchange of LNOs
between United States and multinational military units should be reciprocal. Additionally,
LNOs may be provided from and to government agencies, nongovernmental organizations,
or intergovernmental organizations.
• LNO requirements are driven by command relationships and anticipated mission support
requirements, which may be modified throughout the operation.
• LNOs serve as the principal representative of their commander and should be authorized
direct face-to-face liaison with the supported commander.
• LNOs are not staff augmentees, watch officers, or full-time planners. They must retain the
freedom of action required to perform the broader functions tasked by the supporting
organization’s commander.
• LNOs are NOT a substitute for transmitting critical information through normal command
and control (C2) channels or for proper staff-to-staff coordination.
Refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task
Force Operations, Appendix C, JSOTF Liaison Personnel Procedures, 19 December 2001.
3.1.2. Functions
LNOs perform four functions: (1) monitor, (2) coordinate, (3) advise, and (4) assist.
3.1.2.1. Monitor
• Examine current and planned operations, anticipate potential problems, and recognize
supporting unit issues.
• Consider how one unit’s operations impact the supporting unit, and vice versa.
• Consider operating styles to gain insight into that of the commander and staff to help ensure a
smooth relationship.
• Examine daily unit battle rhythm to determine where and when to engage to maintain
situational awareness to keep the supporting unit fully informed.
• Ensure required network connectivity and access (e.g., shared folders, intelligence /
operational spaces) to keep abreast of happenings.
3.1.2.2. Coordinate
• Know staff procedures and organization.
• Routinely meet with commanders, their staff, and other LNOs and know how to contact
them.
• Pass appropriate information to the supporting headquarters (e.g., unit standard operating
procedures, draft documents).
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3.1.2.3. Advise
• To effectively advise, and ensure optimum use of the unit represented, LNOs should possess
expert knowledge of supporting unit’s capabilities, limitations, and current status.
• Send LNOs who possess a rank and experience that will ensure credibility with the supported
unit, and an ability to influence the decision-making process.
• Be proactive in anticipating questions from the commander and the commander’s staff; know
where to go to quickly find the right answers.
• Anticipate problems / friction points and develop recommended solutions.
• Understand the level of authority the LNOs have to make decisions on behalf of their units.
• Do not obligate the supporting unit to tasks or schedules that they are not capable of
accomplishing. The supporting organization must be aware of any obligations. They must
be capable, but also willing and able (through appropriate prior planning) to support.
3.1.2.4. Assist
• Think and act as the link between the supporting and supported units by fully integrating into
the staff and attending meetings and planning sessions.
• Facilitate submission of required reports from supporting unit to higher headquarters.
3.1.3. Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities

3.1.3.1. Personal
• Demonstrate professional demeanor.
• Possess excellent communication skills (oral / written).
• Be experienced and comfortable briefing senior officers. An LNO must not be easily
intimidated by rank.
• Show tact in conveying concerns and the position of the supporting organization.
• Possess excellent interpersonal skills.
• Be detail-oriented and proactive in staff interaction.
• Be a team player.
• Be straightforward and honest when conveying information between the supporting and the
supported headquarters.
3.1.3.2. Professional
• Be thoroughly familiar with the supporting unit and have a familiarity with the supported
unit.
• Understand the supporting commander’s thought process and quickly gain an understanding
of the supported unit commander’s thought processes.
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• Facilitate appropriate coordination by networking to determine the formal / informal flows of

influence.
3.1.3.3. Administrative
• Possess the security clearance level required to effectively perform duties at the supported
organization.
• Consider the need for proficiency in the supported unit’s language.
• Consider any special training / qualification requirements.
3.1.4. Liaison Procedures

Before departure for the supported unit, be knowledgeable of:
• Operation order / operation plan.
• Current situation activities and intentions of supporting unit.
• Supporting commander’s intent, including details of the concept of operations.
• Current status and missions of the supported unit.
• Operations security applicable to the mission.
• Specific information and / or LNO requirements from each staff section.
• LNO mission, responsibilities, and commander’s intent.
• Communications and transportation needs.
• Supporting command points of contact, telephone numbers, and e-mail addresses.
• Supporting command watch lists.
• Supporting command communications-electronics operating instructions.
• Passport requirements.
• Specifics of when and how your security clearance was forwarded.
• Language and interpreter requirements.
• Potential issues, capabilities, employment doctrine, and operational procedures of the
supporting unit, and to the extent possible, the supported unit.
• “Hot buttons” of the supported commander.
• Command relationships among all major commands participating in the operation.
On arrival at the supported unit:

• Report to the commander or representative.
• Be prepared to brief supporting unit’s situation, activities, intentions, and capabilities.
• Visit and introduce yourself to each staff section.
• Notify supporting unit of safe arrival.
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During the LNO mission:

• When assigned to the supported unit the LNO must maintain situational awareness on how
the unit may be employed in a supporting role (e.g., mission, unit location, future locations,
future operations, commander’s intent). Make recommendations for employment as
necessary.
• Promptly notify the supporting unit if unable to accomplish the LNO mission.
• Report to supporting unit the LNO relationship and rapport with supported unit.
• Ensure the supported unit knows the LNO whereabouts at all times.
• Determine attendance requirements at briefings and meetings for accomplishment of the
LNO mission.
• Maintain a record of LNO actions and reports issued by supported unit.
• At the completion of the LNO mission, conduct an out-brief with the unit commander.
Upon return to the supporting unit:

• Brief supporting unit commander of completion of mission, including any requests from the
supported commander.
• Pass any appropriate information to pertinent staff sections.
3.2. Special Operations Forces Command and Control,

Coordination, and Liaison Elements
SOF commanders have available specific elements that facilitate C2, coordination, and liaison.
They include the special operations command and control element (SOCCE) to command and
control, and coordinate SOF activities with CF; the special operations liaison element (SOLE) to
provide liaison to the joint force air component commander (JFACC) or appropriate Service
component air C2 facility; and SOF LNOs placed in a variety of locations as necessary to
coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict special operations within the operational area. Although
not part of a SOF organization, there is also the special operations coordination element
(SOCOORD) that advises Army corps commanders on special operations. These elements
significantly improve the flow of information, facilitate concurrent planning, and enhance overall
joint force mission accomplishment.
3.2.1. Special Operations Command and Control Element

The SOCCE is the focal point for the synchronization of SOF activities with conventional force
operations. It performs C2 or liaison functions according to mission requirements and as
directed by the establishing SOF commander (joint force special operations component
commander [JFSOCC] or joint special operations task force [JSOTF] commander, as
appropriate). Its level of authority and responsibility may vary widely.
The SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conduct operations in support of CF. It collocates
with the command post of the supported force to coordinate and deconflict special operations
with the operations of the supported force and to ensure communications interoperability with
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that force. The SOCCE also can receive SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition
reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide them to the supported component
headquarters. The JFSOCC, JSOTF commander, and JSOTF component commanders may
attach liaison teams from other SOF elements to the SOCCE as required.
The SOCCE remains under the operational control of the establishing SOF commander and
performs the following functions:
• Exercises C2 of SOF tactical elements attached to, or placed in direct support of, the
supported conventional commander.
• Advises the conventional force commander on the current situation, missions, capabilities,
and limitations of supporting and supported SOF units.
• Advises the supporting SOF commander(s) of the supported force commander’s current
situation, missions, intentions, and requirements.
• Provides required secure communications links.
• Coordinates and deconflicts special operations activities with supported force operations.
• When linkup becomes imminent, assists the supported force commander and staff with
linkup planning and execution.
3.2.2. Special Operations Liaison Element

A SOLE is a team provided by the JFSOCC to the JFACC (if designated) or appropriate Service
component air C2 organization, to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air,
surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. The SOLE director works
directly for the JFSOCC. The SOLE director is not in the SOF chain of command, and thus
command authority for mission tasking, planning, and execution of special operations remains
with the JFSOCC.
The SOLE director places SOF ground, maritime, and air liaison personnel in divisions of the
joint air operations center (JAOC) to integrate with the JFACC staff. The SOLE accomplishes
the coordination, deconfliction, and integration of SOF air, surface, and subsurface operations by
providing a SOF presence in the JAOC that is aware of the activities of SOF units in the field
and by providing visibility of SOF operations in the air tasking order and the airspace control
order. The SOLE must also coordinate appropriate fire support coordinating measures to help
avoid fratricide. A notional SOLE consists of 43 personnel, but in practice is tailored as
appropriate (see Table 3-2).
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Table 3-2. Notional Special Operations Liaison Element Functions

Special Operations Liaison Element Director
(Liaison to Joint Force Air Component Commander)
STRATEGY DIVISION
• Coordinates and synchronizes SO strategy and targets with other components to meet combatant
commander objectives and guidance
• Nominates SOF targets for inclusion in the joint integrated prioritized target list
• Provides SOF input for joint force commander apportionment recommendation decisions
COMBAT PLANS DIVISION

• Coordinates SOF air requirements within the master air attack plan
• Coordinates with joint special operations task force / joint special operations air component on ATO
inputs and ensures distributed ATOs are merged with master ATO
• Provides SO input for inclusion in special instructions

• Coordinates airspace requirements and deconfliction for future operations
• Represents the SO component on the guidance, apportionment, and targeting team
COMBAT OPERATIONS DIVISION

• Monitors and coordinates current day flying operations with other components
• Deconflicts ongoing SO surface operations in real time with other components
• Maintains updated list of team locations for deconfliction
• Coordinates support for and prosecution of SOF-monitored targets to include time-sensitive targets
• Coordinates airspace management with joint air operations center airspace manager
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE DIVISION

• Coordinates intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements for SOF in the field
• Provides intelligence support to Combat Plans and Operations Divisions
OTHER COORDINATION
• Coordinates requirements for airfield surveys supporting force basing (Air Mobility Division)
• Coordinates joint technical augmentation cell support for SOF when required
• Coordinates logistic requirements including supply, transportation, and contracting (Air Mobility
Division)
• Coordinates communications requirements, as necessary, for SOF in the field (communications

representative)
• Coordinates with joint search and rescue center
Source: Joint publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003
ATO - Air Tasking Order SO - Special Operations SOF - Special Operations Forces
3.2.3. Special Operations Coordination Element

The SOCOORD serves as the primary advisor to an Army corps commander with regard to SOF
integration, capabilities, and limitations. The SOCOORD is the functional organic staff element
of the corps operations division (G-3). With augmentation, it can function as the operations
directorate’s special operations division if the corps is established as a joint task force.
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A SOCOORD, while not organic to a Marine expeditionary force (MEF), may be established to
augment the MEF staff.
3.2.4. Special Operations Forces Liaison Officers

SOF LNOs ensure the timely exchange of necessary operational and support information to aid
mission execution and preclude fratricide, duplication of effort, disruption of ongoing operations,
or loss of intelligence sources. SOF LNOs may assist in the coordination of fire support,
overflight, aerial refueling, targeting, deception, psychological operations, civil affairs
operations, and other operational issues based on ongoing and projected special operations
missions. These efforts are crucial to maintaining the joint force commander’s unity of effort,
tempo, and coordination of limited resources and assets.
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CHAPTER 4
CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES / LIMITATIONS
Lesson Learned
• A thorough understanding of a unit’s capabilities and limitations enhances
integration and interoperability planning.
4.0. Introduction
History and the modern battlespace have shown that the force which best combines the
capabilities of its assets in military operations – wins! Conventional Forces (CF) and Special
Operations Forces (SOF) each possess unique capabilities which, when integrated, can produce
even greater warfighting potential for joint force commanders (JFCs). Planning must consider
the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of integrating forces.
4.1. Conventional Forces
4.1.1. Characteristics
• Decisive operations.
• Sustained combat operations.
• Significant firepower.
• Large footprint.
• Expansive logistic and medical support.
4.1.2. Core Competencies

4.1.2.1. Army
• Shape the security environment - The Army shapes the security environment by providing
presence – “boots on the ground.” While many countries do not have substantial air or naval
forces, virtually all countries have armies. The Army is uniquely suited to engage these
armies to reassure allies, build trust and confidence, promote regional stability, encourage
democratic institutions, deter conflict, and respond to crises.
• Prompt response - The Army’s strategic responsiveness provides the President, Secretary of
Defense, and JFCs with a broad range of land power options to shape the security
environment and respond to natural or manmade crises worldwide. Army forces normally
add the vital land capability to joint, multinational, and interagency operations. Strategically
responsive Army forces are mission-tailored, projected from home or abroad, and capable of
decisive operations immediately on arrival. Prompt land force response enhances our
Nation's ability to deter conflict and provides a capability to prevent an adversary from
achieving his political and military objectives if deterrence fails.
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• Mobilize the Army - The ability to expand the Army provides the President and Secretary of
Defense the means to confront unforeseen challenges and ensure America's security. The
Army can mobilize the forces necessary to meet any crisis, including protracted, major
theater war.
• Forcible entry operations - Multidimensional Army forces provide a forcible entry
capability to access contested areas worldwide. They can be ready to fight immediately and
prepare for the arrival of follow-on forces. This capability is essential to reduce
predictability, dominate a situation, deny an adversary his objectives, contain a conflict,
conduct decisive operations, deter protracted conflict, and terminate conflict on our terms.
• Sustained land dominance - The Army's unique contribution to America's national defense
is providing the capabilities for sustained land dominance across the full range of military
operations and the spectrum of conflict. Several specific supporting competencies allow the
Army to fulfill this vital role:
• Close with and destroy enemy forces - Army forces are uniquely capable of decisive
land warfare. The ability to close with and destroy enemy forces, occupy territory, and
control populations achieves moral dominance over enemy will and destroys means to
resist. Army forces close with and destroy the enemy to terminate conflict on our terms.
This capability, coupled with strategic responsiveness, provides the foundation of
conventional deterrence.
• Precision fires and maneuver - The Army is capable of attacking an enemy, directly or
indirectly, with lethal and nonlethal means, through the synergistic application of
precision fires and maneuver. The Army is organized and equipped to conduct combined
arms operations, which include integrating joint capabilities and operations. Precision
maneuver coupled with precision Army and joint fires, gives the JFC operationally
decisive land power capabilities.
• Information superiority - Information superiority is essential to decisive Army
operations. Technological advances will continue to enhance the common operational
picture and situational understanding, the precision of fires and maneuver, and virtually
every other aspect of Army operations. Through interoperable ground-, air-, and space-
based capabilities, Army forces conduct information operations that affect an adversary's
will to resist and enable decision superiority for joint and multinational forces.
• Command and control of joint and multinational forces - The Army provides
experienced leaders and adaptable organizations to command and control joint and
multinational forces and promote interagency unity of effort. Although not the only
Service capable of performing this function, the Army's combined arms culture and long-
standing experience with joint and multinational operations foster this competency.
• Control and defend land, people, and natural resources - Conflict normally requires
control of people and land to establish the conditions for self-sustaining peace. The
Army has a unique capability to dominate a situation and set those conditions, especially
when this control requires a sustained commitment. The Army also plays an essential
role in defending both our Nation and our allies. Through its full range of capabilities,
including national and theater missile defense, the Army's presence, at home and abroad,
is a certain signal of America's commitment.
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• Conduct sustainment operations - Army forces sustain themselves and provide support
to joint forces. Essential Army support includes the multifunctional theater support
command to include transportation (ground and aviation lift), supply, engineer, finance,
medical, and personnel.
• Support civil authorities - As part of an interagency and joint team, the Army provides
unique capabilities to support civil authorities in domestic and international contingencies.
This competency includes homeland security and defense. Prompt Army assistance to civil
authorities and agencies is often a decisive element in disaster relief or crisis resolution. The
Army will assure all available support is provided until civil authority is reestablished or
civilian relief agencies can assume the mission.
4.1.2.2. Marine Corps

• Ready to fight and win - Every Marine and Marine unit is ready to rapidly task organize,
deploy, and employ from the continental United States or while forward deployed to respond
and contain crises or immediately engage in sustained combat operations.
• Expeditionary culture - Marines are prepared to deploy into diverse, austere, and chaotic
environments on short notice and accomplish assigned missions using unique command,
control, and logistic capabilities to operate independently of existing infrastructure. These
unique capabilities allow Marine units to enable joint, allied, and coalition operations, and
interagency coordination.
• Combined-arms operations - Marines fight as air-ground task forces - integrated
organizations of air, ground, and logistic forces under a single commander. The Marine air-
ground task force (MAGTF) commander fights a single battle that unites and enhances the
capabilities of his force, whose whole is exponentially greater than the sum of its parts.
• Task organized - MAGTFs provide combatant commanders with forces that are tailored to
meet specific mission requirements from forward presence and peacetime engagement to
sustained operations ashore in a major theater war. Every MAGTF is a scalable force,
possessing the ability for today’s fight and to rapidly reconfigure based on a changing
situation to provide the right force for the next fight.
• Reserve integration expertise - Ready, rapidly responsive Marine Reserve forces are a vital
part of the Marine Corps and provide depth, flexibility, and sustainment. They are fully
integrated into the active forces for mission accomplishment across the complex spectrum of
crises and conflicts.
• Forcible entry from the sea - Together, the Navy and Marine Corps provide the Nation with
its primary capability to project and sustain power ashore in the face of armed opposition.
Amphibious forces reinforced, if required, by maritime prepositioning forces allow the
United States global access to protect our interests and reassure allies that we have the ability
to come to their aid.
• Marines are naval in character - In customs, traditions, and language, the Marine Corps’
heritage and future are tied closely to the Navy. Marines are equally at home ashore or
afloat, in combat, or in other expeditionary operations.
• Joint competency - Whether first-on-the scene, part of, or leading a joint or multinational
force, Marines instinctively understand the logic and synergy behind joint and multinational
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operations. Based on experience operating as combined-arms, multidimensional MAGTFs,

Marines seamlessly integrate into and operate as part of a joint or multinational force.
4.1.2.3. Navy
• Flexibility and adaptability - Naval expeditionary forces can be “tailored” and reconfigured
to meet the special needs of virtually any situation, from supporting the Coast Guard in
maritime security missions in important United States ports and waterways to carrying out
joint strike and special mission operations anywhere in the world.
• Access - Operating in international waters and unimpeded by the need for land bases, naval
forces can arrive on-station, ready for action, and, through projecting offensive and defensive
power throughout a theater, can help ensure needed access for other forces.
• Immediate precision strike - United States naval expeditionary forces are self-contained,
completely capable of conducting all offensive and defensive tasks needed to achieve
mission success. Forward-deployed battle groups, armed with precision-guided munitions
and other strike weapons, can engage targets even in land-locked countries and in areas in
which non-combatant casualties are a great concern.
• Sustained presence, flexible positioning, and surge response - America's naval forces are
self-sufficient, supplied, and sustained in forward areas by a “steel bridge” of United States
logistic ships. Six-month deployments to world regions of importance to the United States
are the norm, and should be anticipated as the war against terrorism moves into future
phases. Once in-region, moreover, the strategic and tactical mobility of naval forces allows
them to be repositioned quickly to other areas, where their presence can be sustained for as
long as necessary. Moreover, should additional forces be required, they can be surged
forward from United States bases to support a massive buildup of military capability.
• Survivability - The Navy is mindful of the possibility for asymmetric threats to strike
without warning, in a port or crowded sea-lane. Lessons learned from the terrorist attack
against the United States Ship Cole have been applied throughout the fleet, a good indicator
of the Navy's readiness to deal with these more likely, if more ambiguous threats.
Meanwhile, United States ship design and construction emphasize passive protection against
both asymmetric attacks as well as traditional threats from anti-ship cruise and ballistic
missiles, manned aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. The Navy is developing and
deploying active “soft-kill” countermeasures and “hard-kill” defensive weapons, as these
more traditional threats will almost certainly be encountered in the future in both the littoral
and the “blue-water” operating environments.
4.1.2.4. Air Force

The mission of the Air Force is to defend the United States and protect its interests through air
and space power. To achieve that mission, the Air Force has a vision of Global Vigilance,
Reach, and Power. That vision revolves around three core competencies:
• Developing Airmen.
• Technology-to-Warfighting.
• Integrating Operations.
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4.1.2.4.1. Foundational Doctrine

• The United States Air Force provides the Nation a unique capability to project national
influence anywhere in the world on very short notice. Air and space forces, through their
inherent speed, range, and flexibility, can respond to national requirements by delivering
precise military power to create effects where and when needed.
• Unity of command is vital to employment of air and space forces.
• Air and space forces can pursue tactical, operational, or strategic objectives, in any
combination, or all three simultaneously.
• Centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space power are critical to
effective employment of air and space power.
• Air and space power is inherently a strategic force and an offensive weapon.
• Unlike other forms of military power, air and space power may simultaneously hold all of an
enemy’s instruments of power at risk — military, economic, and political.
• The Air Force plans and trains to employ through a Commander, Air Force Forces
(COMAFFOR), who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and space component commander.
(Notes: 1) the inclusion of the phrase “and space” emphasizes the Air Force position that air
power and space power together create effects that cannot be achieved through air or space
power alone and, 2) while both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will
normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and joint force air component commander, the two
responsibilities are different, and are typically executed through different staffs.)
• The air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) is the organizational structure for
deployed Air Force forces. The AETF presents a JFC with a task-organized, integrated
package and the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, and force protection.
• The AETF commander - the COMAFFOR - is the Air Force warfighter, and exercises the
appropriate degree of control over the forces assigned, attached, or in support of the AETF.
• The axiom that “airmen work for airmen, and the senior airman works for the JFC,” not only
preserves the principle of unity of command, but also embodies the principle of simplicity.
4.1.2.4.2. Key Operational Functions

The Air Force’s key operational functions are the broad, fundamental, and continuing activities
of air and space power:
• Strategic Attack • Air Refueling
• Counterair • Spacelift
• Counterspace • Special Operations
• Counterland • Intelligence
• Countersea • Surveillance and Reconnaissance
• Information Operations • Combat Search and Rescue
• Combat Support • Navigation and Positioning
• Command and Control • Weather Services
• Airlift
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4.1.2.4.3. Tenets
Air Force tenets state air and space power:
• Should be centrally controlled and decentrally executed
• Because of air and space power’s unique potential to directly affect the strategic and
operational levels of war, it must be controlled by a single airman who maintains the
broad, strategic perspective necessary to balance and prioritize the use of a powerful,
highly-desired, yet limited force. A single air commander, focused on the broader
aspects of an operation, can best mediate the competing demands for tactical support
against the strategic and operational requirements of the conflict.
• Centralized control and decentralized execution provides theater-wide focus while
allowing operational flexibility to meet theater objectives and exploit opportunities in
rapidly changing, fluid situations. It assures concentration of effort while maintaining
economy of force and exploits air and space power’s versatility and flexibility to ensure
that air and space forces remain responsive, survivable, and sustainable.
• The benefits inherent in decentralized execution, however, are maximized only when a
commander clearly communicates his intent.
• Is flexible and versatile
• Flexibility allows air and space forces to exploit mass and maneuver simultaneously, to
“go downtown” on one sortie, then hit fielded enemy forces the next; to reassign assets
quickly from a preplanned mission to support an unanticipated need for close air support
of friendly troops in contact.
• Versatility is the ability to employ air and space power effectively at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of warfare. This synergy is achieved through asymmetric
and parallel operations. Parallel operations occur simultaneously and continuously
against a broad spectrum of targets. Parallel operations can generate sufficient force to
overwhelm the enemy, attaining effects which present the enemy with multiple crises
occurring so quickly that there is no way to respond to all or, in some cases, any of them.
The result can be paralysis that provides the leverage to dominate operations in all
mediums.
• Produces synergistic effects - The key objective of war is the precise, coordinated
application of the various elements of air, space, and surface power to bring disproportionate
pressure on enemy leaders to comply with our national will. Air and space power’s
overwhelming ability to observe adversaries allows us to counter their movements with
unprecedented speed and agility. Air and space power is unique in its ability to dictate the
tempo and direction of an entire warfighting effort.
• Offers a unique form of persistence - Air and space power’s exceptional speed and range
allow its forces to visit and revisit wide ranges of targets nearly at will. Space forces in
particular hold the ultimate high ground, and as space systems advance and proliferate, they
offer the potential for “permanent presence” over any part of the globe; unmanned aerial
vehicles are offering similar possibilities from the atmosphere. Examples of persistent
operations might be constantly monitoring adversaries to ensure they cannot conduct actions
counter to those agreed upon, assuring targets are kept continually out of commission, or
ensuring resources and facilities are denied an enemy or provided to an ally during a
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specified time. The end result is to deny the opponent an opportunity to seize the initiative
and directly accomplish his tasks.
• Must achieve concentration of purpose - With forces as flexible and versatile as air and
space forces, the demand for them will often exceed the available forces and may result in
the fragmentation of the integrated air and space effort in attempts to fulfill the many
demands of the operation. Depending on the operational situation, such a course of action
may court the triple risk of failing to achieve operational-level objectives, delaying or
diminishing the attainment of decisive effects, and increasing the attrition rate of air forces -
and consequently risking defeat.
• Must be prioritized - Demands for air and space forces (because of their flexibility and
versatility) will likely overwhelm air commanders unless appropriate priorities are
established. Only theater-level commanders of land and naval components can effectively
prioritize their individual air and space support requirements to the JFC, and only then can
effective priorities for the use of air and space forces flow from an informed dialogue
between the JFC and the air component commander. Air and space forces must be applied
where they can make the greatest contribution to the most critical current JFC requirements.
• Must be balanced - The air commander:
• Should balance combat opportunity, necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and the impact
on accomplishing assigned objectives against the associated risk to friendly air and space
forces.
• Is uniquely suited to determine the proper theater-wide balance between offensive and
defensive operations, and among strategic, operational, and tactical applications.
• Is responsible for communicating the intended effects of air and space power to the JFC
and other component commanders.
4.1.3. Capabilities
4.1.3.1. Army
• Decisive land warfare force.
• Offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations.
• Air assault and airborne operations.
4.1.3.2. Marine Corps

• Forcible entry from the sea.
• Task organized for employment as a Marine air-ground task force.
• Forward presence.
• Expeditionary.
• Combined arms force.
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4.1.3.3. Navy
• Maritime superiority.
• Surface, sub-surface, and air forces.
• Precision firepower.
• Forcible entry.
• Air and missile defense, strategic attack, airspace control, air interdiction, and close air
support (CAS).
• Sea-based support.
• Forward presence.
4.1.3.4. Air Force

• Air and space superiority.
• Global attack.
• Rapid global mobility.
• Precision engagement.
• Information superiority.
• Agile combat support.
4.1.4. Limitations
• Require detailed intelligence to pinpoint enemy assets and precise locations.
• Limited long-range ground force communications and equipment compatibility.
• High consumption rate of supply items, especially Classes III (petroleum, oils, lubricants),
V (ammunition), and IX (repair parts).
• Vulnerable to targeting by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
4.2. Special Operations Forces
4.2.1. Characteristics
• Specialized skills, equipment, and tactics.
• Often use non-standard (by CF standards) methods and procedures (e.g., means of mobility,
uniforms, weapons, grooming standards).
• In general, regionally focused.
• Language skills.
• Political and cultural sensitivity.
• Small, flexible joint force.
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4.2.2. Core Tasks

SOF perform two types of activities: (1) tasks that no other forces in the Department of Defense
(DOD) conduct, and (2) tasks that other forces in the DOD conduct, but do so under a unique set
of conditions and standards.
• Direct action (DA) – Short duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions
conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically-sensitive environments and
which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or
damage designated targets. DA differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of
physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise
use of force to achieve specific objectives.
• Special reconnaissance (SR) – Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a
special operation in hostile, denied, or politically-sensitive environments to collect or verify
information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not
normally found in CF. SR actions provide an additive capability for commanders and
supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions.
• Foreign internal defense (FID) – Operations that involve participation by civilian and
military agencies of a government, in any of the action programs taken by another
government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion,
lawlessness, and insurgency; both CF and SOF units have a role and capability to conduct
FID missions.
• Unconventional warfare (UW) – Operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with,
or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and
directed in varying degrees by an external source.
• Counterterrorism (CT) – Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent,
deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. SOF conduct CT missions as special operations by
covert, clandestine, or low visibility means.
• Counterproliferation (CP) of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – Actions taken to
locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover WMD.
• Civil affairs operations (CAO) – Actions taken to support campaign planning and campaign
execution in regards to enemy prisoners of war, refugees, public safety and welfare,
clearance of routes and other associated campaign protection requirements; post-major
combat, actions taken to establish and conduct a military government of civil administration
within operational areas until civilian authority or government can be restored or transitioned
to other appropriate authorities and other tasks.
• Psychological operations (PSYOP) – Planned operations that convey selected information
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning,
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals;
operations that induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the JFC’s
objectives.
• Information operations (IO) – Actions taken to affect adversary information and
information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.
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4.2.3. Capabilities
• Task organize quickly / deploy rapidly for tailored response.
• Gain access to hostile, denied areas, and remote areas of operations.
• Function with limited medical support for themselves and those they support.
• Communicate worldwide with organic equipment.
• Conduct operations in austere, harsh environments without extensive support.
• Rapidly survey / assess / report local situations.
• Cooperate closely with regional military / civil authorities.
• Organize people into working teams to help solve local problems.
• Maintain lower profile and less intrusive presence than CF.
• Address ambiguous situations with unconventional options.
• Act as a force multiplier.
4.2.3.1. Army Special Operations Forces Operational Elements

• Special Forces – conduct FID, UW, SR, DA, and CT through peacetime, conflict, and war.
• Rangers – conduct infiltration and exfiltration by land, sea, and air; DA; and conventional or
special light infantry operations.
• Aviation – provide precision rotary-wing operations in complex urban areas; long-range
infiltrations / exfiltrations under high threat, adverse weather and all terrain / environmental
conditions; long-range precision attack and CAS to ground SOF in contact; rotary-wing FID;
and personnel recovery.
• Psychological operations – persuade target audiences to take actions favorable to mission
objectives.
• Civil affairs – assist and support the civil administration in the operational area.
• Logistic and communications support – provide robust, tailorable, deployable, modular,
logistic, and signal support packages.
4.2.3.2. Navy Special Operations Forces Operational Elements

• Sea-Air-Land Team (SEAL) – conduct UW, DA, CT, SR, FID, IO, security assistance,
counter-drug operations, personnel recovery, and hydrographic reconnaissance.
• SEAL delivery vehicle teams – conduct clandestine reconnaissance, DA, and passenger
delivery in maritime environments.
• Special boat teams – conduct coastal patrol and interdiction, infiltration and exfiltration of
SOF, and rapid mobility in shallow water areas where larger ships cannot operate.
4.2.3.3. Air Force Special Operations Forces Operational Elements

• Fixed-wing – provide precision application firepower; infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, and
refueling of SOF operational elements; and airborne radio and television broadcasts.
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• Rotary-wing – offer precision application of firepower, infiltration, exfiltration, resupply,

and refueling of SOF operational elements.
• Special tactics – provide combat control, weather, and pararescue personnel to ensure air
power is integrated and operable with special operations and CF. Provides personnel
recovery to include planning expertise and program management.
• FID – consists of combat aviation advisers and trainers to assist foreign nation air forces with
their host nation’s internal defense and development strategy.
• Combat weather – provides weather predictions to support planning and operations.
4.2.4. Limitations
• Improper employment results in depletion of forces.
• Not a substitute for CF.
• Austere logistic support.
• Incapable of controlling large amounts of terrain without support of local authority,
conventional, coalition or indigenous / host nation forces.
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CHAPTER 5
CONVENTIONAL FORCES / SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

INTEGRATED OPERATIONS PLANNING
Lesson Learned
• During mission analysis, consider options to best integrate Conventional Forces
and Special Operations Forces maneuver elements for mission accomplishment.
Detailed planning and execution coordination is required.
• Use mission-type orders and commander’s intent to permit subordinates’ flexibility,
initiative, and responsiveness.
• Develop a clear and flexible battlespace organization.
• Increase awareness of delineated areas and detailed planning during integrated
operations.
• Activate and deactivate small gridded areas of operation during rapid decisive
operations. Use kill boxes overlaid on or outside of these defined areas to facilitate
more responsive fire support.
• Begin the mission execution approval process early to allow sufficient time for
proper coordination and prevent delays in execution.
• Use collaborative planning techniques early and throughout and determine the
collaborative planning tools / procedures to be used.
• Plan for and include liaison and control elements early in the planning process.
• Parallel planning and coordination may require trusted agents for
compartmentalized plans.
• Plan to rapidly disseminate information to ensure appropriate actions in time to
preclude missed opportunities.
• Conduct frequent coordination with other interagency players.
• Acknowledge differences in Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces
rules of engagement.
• Identify acceptable risk (to mission success and to force [personnel / critical
equipment]) and define clear lanes that empower subordinate commanders with
mission approval authority.
• Understand that acceptable levels of risk may differ for Conventional Forces and
Special Operations Forces. Recognize how this may affect mission
accomplishment when forces are synchronized.
• Coordinate communications and information systems requirements and
interoperability, and rehearse communications procedures to ensure all forces have
a common and secure means to communicate, as well as a backup method or plan.
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5.0. Introduction
When properly integrated during planning, Conventional Forces (CF) and Special Operations
Forces (SOF) can capitalize on their inherent strengths to achieve the joint force commander’s
(JFC’s) intent. Ignoring CF and SOF integration issues in planning may introduce operational
complexities that either increase risk or mitigate potential complementary effects.
Successful CF and SOF integration begins during peacetime. Practicing CF and SOF integration
procedures and addressing interoperability challenges during training and exercises provides the
best means of reducing the number of missed opportunities, unnecessary delays, and the
potential for fratricide during conflict. Additionally, trustworthy personal relationships, forged
during peacetime or conflict, prove vital to the success of integrated CF and SOF operations.
Poor relationships tend to drive poor integration.
Effective crisis response depends on gaining early warning of potential situations that may
require a military response. CF and SOF missions worldwide or regionally with foreign military
forces can provide knowledge of conditions in an area. SOF are especially adept in providing
cultural awareness and can help facilitate the introduction of CF into an area or region.
Likewise, CF can enable the introduction of SOF into denied areas, providing them logistical
bases of operations, fire support, and reinforcements.
During conflict, opportunities for integrated CF and SOF operations will most certainly present
themselves. Effective integration of both forces’ functions and capabilities focused on a
common purpose will produce a synergy greater than the sum of their individual forces.
Commanders and their staffs must recognize and capitalize on the many tools that can achieve
this integrated capability, including clearly defined command relationships, clearly delineated
battlespace, well thought through maneuver control and fire support coordinating measures
(FSCMs), and a reliable common operational picture to assist situational awareness. Early
exchange of experienced liaison and control elements is critical to the success of both forces.
Combined, these tools afford both forces their needed tactical flexibility and reduce the potential
for fratricide.
5.1. Operational Framework

Commanders with a poor understanding of the essence of maneuver; i.e., the union of
efforts, prefer, most of all, to divide the area of their maneuver uniformly among their
subordinates and demand the same results from all. It is a misfortune to be subordinated to
such a ‘corridor’ commander. A completely opposite picture obtains with a good, efficient
leadership... (Mikhail Tukhachevsky)
Figure 5-1 depicts a notional operational framework in which CF and SOF operate.
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JSOA JSOA
Battlespace ••• Battlespace

SF
CGRS
AO
Battlespace
Battlespace
AO
AO: JFMCC Land

Sea
• Strategic attack and interdiction within JOA, but outside of AOs: JFACC is the
supported commander.
• Operations within AOs: AO commander is the supported commander.
••• Special Forces
SF
Mechanized Infantry Company Operational Detachment Alpha
AO - Area of Operations JFMCC - Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
CGRS - Common Geographic Reference System JOA - Joint Operations Area
JFACC - Joint Force Air Component Commander JSOA - Joint Special Operations Area
Figure 5-1. Joint Operations Area
5.1.1. Operations Areas

Operational areas. Joint force commanders (JFC[s]) define operational areas to assist in
coordination and deconfliction. The size of these areas depends on the scope and nature of the
crisis and anticipated duration of operations. JFC designated areas can include: joint
operations area (JOA), area of operations (AO), and joint special operations area (JSOA). (JP
[Joint publication] 1-02, Department of Defense [DOD] Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended)
Joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant
commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a
joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint
operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic
area, or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called
JOA. (JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended)
Area of operations. An operational area defined by the JFC for land and naval forces. Areas of
operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large
enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions, protect their forces. Also
called AO. (JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as
amended)
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Operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic
areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited
to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint
operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of
operations. (JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as
amended)
Joint special operations area. A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint
force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special
operations activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission
or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare
operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
12 April 2001, as amended)
5.1.1.1. Area of Operations Commander Authorities / Responsibilities

Ownership of an operational area carries many authorities and responsibilities. AO commander
authorities / responsibilities include:
• Priorities and desired effect of all fires (lethal and nonlethal) within the AO.
• Targeting.
• Deconfliction and clearance of fires.
• Designation of FSCMs.
• Land management (including designation of internal boundaries).
• Enemy force tracking.
• Friendly force tracking.
• Airspace deconfliction if included in AO (an AO does not normally include airspace, but a
JSOA does).
• Civil-military operations.
5.1.1.2. Operating in an Area of Operations Assigned to another Commander

When operating within another commander’s AO, a commander must comply with the AO
“owner’s authorities.” Targeting fires, force tracking, and land management must be in
accordance with the direction provided by the AO commander. SOF units operating within an
AO must keep the AO commander apprised of locations and recognize that the AO commander
retains authority for establishing FSCMs and clearing fires.
5.1.2. Battlespace
Battlespace. Environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply
combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space,
and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic
spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest.
(JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended)
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Battlespace is a conceptual construct that allows commanders to visualize the many factors
impacting their operational area. Commanders determine their own battlespace within their AO
using their experience, professional knowledge, and understanding of the situation to visualize
how to best accomplish their mission. Commanders pass on their visualization to their staffs and
subordinate units to focus their planning efforts and ensure unity of purpose during execution.
5.1.3. Common Geographic Reference System

Commanders visualize the battlespace and decide how to arrange forces and develop a concept
of operations. Current doctrine refers to deep, close, and rear areas embracing contiguous and
noncontiguous battlespace. Arranging their forces, commanders will consider all these factors to
provide a common focus and integration of all actions, affording subordinate commanders
maximum flexibility and initiative while maintaining common situational awareness.
The common geographic reference system (CGRS) is a two-dimensional reference system
(administrative measure) used to rapidly and clearly define geographical locations for battlespace
coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization. The CGRS consists of: 1) origin point (latitude
/ longitude) and end point, 2) cell (box) dimensions, and 3) labeling system. The CGRS is
especially useful in noncontiguous battlespace and in featureless terrain (e.g., desert, littoral).
And, while the CGRS is not an FSCM or airspace coordinating measure (ACM), FSCMs and
ACMs may be defined using the CGRS.
The CGRS supports responsive fire support through the closing and opening of keypads / cells as
CF move through the battlespace and also by adjusting JSOA boundaries (e.g., a keypad / cell
within a JSOA is closed when SOF are operating in the cell and open when SOF are not in the
cell).
• Understand that the CGRS is not intended to define exact locations of friendly forces, but
rather only to increase the accuracy of the box dimensions.
• Geographic references remain an important method of rapidly communicating location
information.
• The blending of CGRS with ground features make it easier to use (e.g., engage targets north
of river in cell 8D).
5.2. Planning Considerations for Integrated Operations
5.2.1. Conventional Forces Supported by Special Operations Forces

The CF commander must consider that since SOF normally operate in small elements; they do
not possess sufficient combat power to confront enemy forces for a sustained period. However,
properly used, SOF offer specialized, yet complementary capabilities to the CF commander.
• Ensure SOF input on how the CF commander’s intent and operational plan can be supported.
• Conduct a feasibility assessment to determine the viability of a proposed mission / target for
SOF employment.
• Determine if the tasking is an appropriate use of SOF.
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• Determine the feasibility of using SOF given time, distance, mobility, and availability
factors.
• Determine if required resources are available (e.g., air defense suppression assets).
• Ensure the desired outcome of using SOF justifies the risk.
• Bring SOF liaison support fully and early into the planning and coordination process.
• Recognize the characteristics and capabilities / limitations of each other’s forces.
• Make force protection arrangements for SOF.
• Provide SOF with any non-SOF resources required to successfully execute the mission.
• Rehearse with full CF and SOF participation.
• Plan and provide support for SOF mission termination and redeployment.
• Consider the different mobility, survivability, and firepower capabilities of CF and SOF.
• During planning, know the joint standard used for combat identification to enable the unit to
arrive with the proper identification measures installed on vehicles.
5.2.2. Special Operations Forces Supported by Conventional Forces

CF conduct operations to defeat enemy forces and to control land, air, sea, and space, including
populations and resources. CF possess a variety of capabilities, including a greater number of
personnel, that can be used to support SOF in the accomplishment of core tasks.
• Conduct a feasibility assessment to determine the viability of a proposed mission / target for
CF employment.
• Determine if the tasking is an appropriate use of CF.
• Determine the feasibility of using CF given time, distance, mobility, and availability
factors.
• Determine if required resources are available.
• Bring CF fully and early into the planning and coordination process.
• Recognize the characteristics and capabilities / limitations of each other’s forces.
• Coordinate to provide any non-CF resources required for CF to successfully execute the
mission (e.g., interpreters, indigenous guides).
• Rehearse with full CF and SOF participation.
• Plan for CF mission termination and redeployment.
• Consider the different mobility, survivability, and firepower capabilities of CF and SOF.
• During planning, know the joint standard that will be used for combat identification to enable
the unit to arrive with the proper identification measures installed on vehicles.
• Use a combat camera to support psychological operations print products and weapon systems
video to counter allegations of collateral damage.
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5.3. Operations Security Considerations

Operations security measures. Methods and means to gain and maintain essential secrecy about
critical information. The following categories apply: a) action control - the objective is to
eliminate indicators or the vulnerability of actions to exploitation by adversary intelligence
systems; b) countermeasures - the objective is to disrupt effective adversary information
gathering or prevent their recognition of indicators when collected materials are processed;
c) counteranalysis - the objective is to prevent accurate interpretations of indicators during
adversary analysis of collected materials. (JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, 12 April 2001, amended)
• In choosing to execute particular operations security (OPSEC) measures, commanders must
decide that the assumed gain in secrecy outweighs the cost in resources. The OPSEC process
requires decision-makers to directly address how much risk they are willing to assume.
• Balance security with integration. Insufficient security may compromise a mission.
Excessive security will usually cause the mission to fail due to inadequate coordination.
• Use trusted agents to support parallel planning and coordination involving compartmented
plans.
5.4. Communications and Information Systems Support

The mission, command relationships, assigned forces, and locations drive the communications
system. Recognizing the goal of communications system planning is to support mission
accomplishment, communications system planners identify the systems and connectivity that
provide the most effective, secure, and timely vertical and lateral information exchange.
• Understand the commander’s mission, intent, and concept of operations to properly assess
communications system needs.
• Know the command relationships and recognize that changes in levels of authority and type
of command relationship affect the overlaying communications system.
• Ensure that the deployment schedule of communications system assets is consistent with the
plan phase and that it provides the support when and where needed.
• Ensure the plan is supportable from a communications perspective by engaging in all
operational planning efforts during its development.
• Make arrangements during planning to exchange communications-electronics operating
instructions with adjacent and supporting / supported CF and SOF units and follow through.
• Coordinate code words to the lowest operating levels.
• Know the communications connectivity (voice and data paths and associated systems) the
intelligence staff uses. As required, any communications path can and should be used to
communicate required information / commands.
• Be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of potentially available strategic, operational,
tactical, and commercial communications systems and equipment, whether organic to a
Service, SOF, United States government agency, multinational force, or provided by a host
nation.
5-7
• Regarding spectrum usage:

• Use the joint restricted frequency list to identify and protect frequencies allocated to
critical functions.
• Understand that CF and SOF units have the single-channel ground and airborne radio
system and what organization develops the frequency hop set used by each unit.
• Regarding bandwidth requirements:
• Coordinate with units to determine number and types of systems to be employed.
• Coordinate with units to determine number and types of application requirements.
• Consider batch and off-peak utilization periods.
• Regarding communications security (COMSEC):
• Assess the need for joint intertheater COMSEC package (ICP).
• Know what forces and nets use what COMSEC software (Service and / or ICP) and what
is the associated cryptographic change over time / period.
• Recognize that CF and SOF, as well as multinational forces, will have different levels of
communications system proficiency.
• Regarding liaison officers (LNOs) between CF and SOF units:
• Recognize there may be a need to send a secure communications capability (voice and
data) with LNOs.
• Use the LNO to address communications system issues that require immediate
coordination or action with the supporting unit.
• Regarding multinational operations, plan for:
• Secure voice and data networks with multinational access.
• Provision of LNOs to multinational forces with the supporting information systems and
associated network COMSEC hardware and software.
• Installation and maintenance of virus detection software on terminals at their locations
connecting to any United States-run network, and adherence to current information
assurance vulnerability assessment procedures.
• Augmentation with United States equipment and personnel for interoperability.
5-8
CHAPTER 6
JOINT FIRE SUPPORT
Lesson Learned
• Use liaison officers to help coordinate joint fire support.
• Ensure fires liaison officers are knowledgeable of unit capabilities and limitations.
• Understand the joint force commander’s guidance, targeting priorities, and attack
guidance matrix.
• Understand the targeting cycle and the air tasking order timeline.
• Ensure the joint special operations air component, through the special operations
liaison element, conducts airspace deconfliction with the Tomahawk land attack
missile liaison officer located within the joint force air component headquarters.
6.0. Introduction
Fires. The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. (Joint publication [JP] 1-02, Department of
Defense [DOD] Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended)
Joint fires. Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in
coordinated action toward a common objective. (JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended)
Joint fire support. Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations
forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters.
(JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended)
Joint fire support is the synergistic product of three subsystems: 1) target acquisition,
2) command and control (C2), and 3) attack resources. These subsystems will inevitably cross
intratheater boundaries and must be properly planned and executed to prevent fratricide and
duplication while supporting operational momentum, maintaining the initiative, and conducting
maneuver.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) will often operate within the Conventional Forces (CF)
operational area and vice versa, and it is imperative that both CF and SOF have a thorough
understanding of joint doctrine, Service doctrine, and the battlespace in accordance with the
commander’s intent (e.g., operational versus tactical fires, deep versus close battlespace,
employment of kill boxes, supported command forward of a fire support coordination line).
6-1
6.1. Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces Capabilities
6.1.1. How Special Operations Forces Capabilities Can Complement

Conventional Forces
• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), including special reconnaissance
capabilities.
• Positive identification of specific targets.
• Target marking / terminal guidance.
• Battle damage assessment.
• Recommendations to no-strike / restricted target list.
• AC-130 gunship support.
• Deception and denial operations.
• Remote area operations.
• Indigenous force status.
• Combat weather support.
6.1.2. How Conventional Forces Capabilities Can Complement

Special Operations Forces
• Lethal and nonlethal fires.
• Robust fire support C2.
• Multiple attack resource options.
• ISR.
• Sea basing.
• Heavy combat ground formations.
• Joint terminal attack controllers (e.g., controllers in tactical air control party or Air Naval
Gunfire Liaison Company).
• Logistic support (e.g., fuel, maintenance, ammunition).
6.1.3. Capitalizing on Capabilities

Early, detailed, and integrated CF and SOF fire support planning is required to capitalize on
complementary fires capabilities. Not conducting this planning can cause the joint fire support
process to respond less effectively and efficiently by adding unnecessary layers of coordination
during execution and will cause missed opportunities, delays in action, and increased potential
for fratricide.
6-2
6.2. Planning Considerations

• Understand the higher headquarters’ mission and commander’s intent.
• Ensure common rules of engagement are established and disseminated for any use of lethal
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) when supporting CF or SOF.
• Understand the CF and SOF command and support relationships to ensure the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and / or joint automated deep operations
coordination system (JADOCS) database supports these relationships for expeditiously
clearing fires and maintaining situational awareness. (Note: JADOCS employs command
and support relationships resident in AFATDS.)
• Understand the higher commander’s guidance for fires.
• Understand battlespace geometry and implications for targeting / fires. To obtain fires /
targeting within another command’s area of operations, the request must go through that
command’s chain / approval process.
• Understand the targeting cycle, targeting priorities, and process for submission of target
nominations.
• Develop a plan to integrate appropriate SOF target nominations into the joint targeting
process and joint target list, balancing operation security and integration with CF.
• Ensure development and refinement of common fire support databases, which are then
accessible by other C2 systems.
• Understand communications interoperability requirements (e.g., communications-electronics
operating instructions, communications security issues).
• Know the fire support communications plan (frequencies, router and gateway internet
protocol addresses, tactical and administrative telephone numbers, and points of contact).
• Consider and plan alternate and non-direct communications paths (e.g., relay) to request and
coordinate needed fire support.
• Ensure development of unit battlespace geometry, overlays, and required tracks to support
unit scheme of maneuver.
• Consider fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs) and maneuver control measures that
will allow the safe and expedient attack of targets while eliminating fratricide.
• Consider the higher headquarters’ attack guidance matrix, high-payoff target list, high-value
target list, and target selection standards, before submitting targets or requesting fires on
targets.
• Identify available fire support assets; consider both lethal and nonlethal fires to achieve
desired effects.
• Participate in CF / SOF mission planning and consider the following:
• Common operational picture (COP) architecture and units’ responsibilities.
• Hardware and software requirements (version-specific).
6-3
• Support higher headquarters’ collaborative planning requirements (type / system

requirements).
• Concept of operations for sustainment of forces.
• Understand the air tasking order (ATO) / integrated tasking order cycle, requirements, and
processes for dynamic re-tasking of aircraft.
• Understand the air-to-ground target identification plans (e.g., no-communications close air
support [CAS] control procedures, combat identification / visible markings on friendly
vehicles).
• Consider the airspace implications of UAV operations:
• Use liaison elements to plan / coordinate / deconflict airspace with the joint air operations
center (JAOC) for UAV employment.
• Plan the use of UAVs to identify and dynamically target enemy maneuver units and
defenses.
• Coordinate small UAVs (e.g., Raven) flying below the coordinating altitude established
in the airspace control order with the joint special operations air component commander
and the special operations liaison element (SOLE).
• Understand munitions safety considerations.
• Be aware of the dud rate for improved conventional munitions.
• Identify gaps in the current fire support plan.
• Prepare needed fire plans (e.g., on-call targets, groups or series of targets, smoke screens).
• Update AFATDS with any changes in command and support relationships and distribute to
appropriate staff sections.
• Understand and rehearse the processes for coordination and deconfliction of fires and
airspace.
• Submit requests for additional fire support to higher headquarters as planning matures.
• Ensure needed connectivity with other tactical C2 systems (e.g., JADOCS, theater battle
management core system, Global Command and Control System).
• Understand the supported unit planning cycle and battle rhythms and prepare your own unit
battle rhythm accordingly when in the supporting role.
• Understand and rehearse the calls for fire procedures for the various attack resources, as
shown in JFIRE Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application
of Firepower, October 2004.
6-4
6.3. Fire Support Coordination

Fratricide. The unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly firepower.
(Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001)
Fratricide is also one of the most debilitating agents to morale and combat effectiveness.
Historically, fratricide incidents are most likely to occur in the early stages of combat, during
reduced visibility, or along shared unit boundaries. The key element in reducing the likelihood
of a fratricide incident is the sharing of accurate and updated unit locations between CF and
SOF. Everyone shares the responsibility for preventing fratricide.
6.3.1. Fire Support Coordinating Measures

Fire support coordinating measures. Measures employed by land or amphibious commanders to
facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly
forces. (JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as
amended)
FSCMs enhance the expeditious attack of targets; protect forces, noncombatants, critical
infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage for future
operations. Locations and implementing instructions (e.g., establishing headquarters and date /
time / group for which a FSCM is in effect) for FSCMs are disseminated electronically by
message, database update, and / or overlay (e.g., digital file or transparency) through both
command and fire support channels to higher, lower, and adjacent maneuver and supporting
units.
Knowledge of the various FSCMs employed by each Service and functional component (e.g.,
joint force land component), in addition to joint measures, is necessary for effective fire support
coordination. Examples of non-joint doctrinal FSCMs include battlespace coordination line
(Marine Corps), and deep battle synchronization line (Army). Additionally, theater-specific kill
box procedures using the common geographic reference system (CGRS) may be established.
Refer to Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment, June
2005.
6.3.1.1. Considerations
• Establish procedures for dissemination, receipt confirmation, tracking, and deletion of
FSCMs.
• Understand the impact of FSCMs on CF and SOF current and future operations.
• Liaison officers (LNOs) must maintain situational awareness of all FSCMs impacting their
supporting unit.
• Ensure operational graphics are included in the COP.
• Ensure LNOs and planners use the joint force commander (JFC)-approved CGRS.
• Ensure FSCMs are restrictive or permissive only to the degree necessary to facilitate the
rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces.
6-5
• Recognize the timeliness of reporting. FSCMs may not be depicted the same on all C2 and
fire support systems. If the FSCM is delayed, the LNOs may have to assist in clearing the
fires.
6.3.2. Clearance of Fires

• Understand maneuver commanders have the responsibility for clearance of fires, with
management delegated under the lead of the fire support element.
• Positively clear fires not pre-cleared or allowed by permissive FSCMs.
• Assign land ownership to facilitate the clearance process using control measures. As a
digital consideration, when boundaries / zones are not well-defined, all cross-boundary fires
short of the coordinated fire line require procedural clearance by the higher headquarters,
instead of the headquarters closest to the effects of fires.
• Use FSCMs to facilitate clearance of fires. Permissive measures, if positioned correctly and
disseminated to all, permit safe and responsive fires on targets of opportunity.
• Verify the size of restrictive measures and consider the additional buffer zone AFATDS may
include, avoiding unnecessary delays in what would otherwise be safe fires.
6.3.2.1. Examples of Pre-Clearance of Fires

Pre-clearance of fires during planning facilitates rapid engagement of targets and enhances troop
safety. Rehearse procedures to achieve timely, accurate, and safe clearance of fire missions.
• Call for fire zones placed around areas considered possible enemy indirect firing positions
allow counter-battery radars to initiate a pre-coordinated fire mission request with a high
priority tag. This expedites the required coordination to attack enemy indirect fire assets.
• Preplanned targets and fire plans with definable triggers allow for expedient and accurate
fires in accordance with the scheme of fire support.
• Kill box attributes and associated FSCMs allow for rapid engagement of targets by air
and / or surface fires.
6.3.3. Time-Sensitive Targets

Time-sensitive targets. Those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will
soon pose) a danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.
Also called TST. (JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as
amended)
• Clear guidance from the JFC on what constitutes a time-sensitive target (TST) is essential for
timely action against a target.
• The JFC requires an integrated approach to TST C2. Because multiple organizations
(national, theater, and component-level) require TST-related planning and execution data, the
goal is to create a mutually agreed upon, comprehensive, and accurate COP. Options for
achieving this include:
6-6
• Collaboration.
• Liaison and control elements.
• Consolidation and collocation.
• Pre-established and well-rehearsed C2 procedures permit the engagement of TST within the
window of vulnerability.
• Establish and deconflict FSCMs against specific TST.
• Validate the target still meets the TST criteria.
• Identify the TST engagement authority and execute as permitted.
• Understand the level of risk acceptable to the JFC (e.g., risk to friendly forces and
noncombatants, possible collateral damage, and the disruption of diverting attack assets from
their deliberately planned missions versus the danger of not attacking the TST in time and
risking mission failure or harm to friendly forces).
• Although targeting is a continuous, cyclical process, the cycle for one routine preplanned
target may take hours or even days. Successful prosecution of a TST requires that this cycle
be completed in a matter of minutes. Means to achieve this time-compressed cycle include:
• Preplanned target reference methods such as kill boxes to expedite the clearance and
deconfliction process.
• Use of intelligence preparation of the battlespace to determine the most probable areas
where TSTs will emerge, permitting effective scheduling and positioning of acquisition
and strike assets to ensure rapid response to TSTs.
• Use of predictive software applications (e.g., Generic Area Limitation Environment) to
assist in predicting the most probable TST locations.
• Organizational enhancements by process streamlining and / or organizational change
(e.g., streamlining TST procedures within each organization, connecting specific TST
prosecution nodes within the command into a virtual cell, collocating specific
TST-related functional assets, or by a combination of these options).
• Communications enhancements such as direct, dedicated, and redundant real-time links
(collaborative planning suites, voice, and data) between TST cell nodes.
• Coordinate and deconflict SOF locations with TST attacks. The primary method to
accomplish deconfliction and clearance of fires is through the SOF chain of command, but it
may be facilitated via liaison and control elements:
• The SOLE is linked with the JAOC for air operations interface.
• The special operations C2 element (SOCCE) is linked with surface agencies (e.g., deep
operations coordination cell, fire support element, fire support coordination center
[FSCC], supporting arms coordination center [SACC]) for land operations.
• The SOLE and SOCCE have situational awareness on the locations and activities of SOF in
and outside of the operational area.
6-7
• Should CF operations put SOF at risk, the joint special operations task force, assisted by the
SOLE or SOCCE, is responsible for deconfliction and / or recommending courses of action
to avoid the potential for fratricide.
SOF’s primary contribution in actions against TSTs is clandestine reconnaissance, surveillance,
and terminal guidance and control of weapons systems. If required, SOF can be employed to
destroy or disable a TST, but if not planned well in advance of the operation, this may
compromise their primary mission and require extraction of the team.
6.4. Joint Fire Support Assets

CF and SOF must understand the advantages in leveraging joint fires capabilities. A wide range
of fire assets are available to CF and SOF; both must understand the need to coordinate and
rehearse for the employment of fire support assets early in the planning process.
6.4.1. Naval Surface Fire Support

Naval surface fire support. Fire provided by Navy surface gun and missile systems in support of
a unit or units. Also called NSFS. (JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
12 April 2001, as amended)
Naval surface fire support (NSFS) ships provide all-weather and round-the-clock naval gunfire
support in littoral areas and long-range Tomahawk missile strike capability.
6.4.1.1. Naval Gunfire

Naval gunfire is a near-immediate, all-weather, around-the-clock support option that is restricted
for use in the littoral area. Naval gunfire provides fire support for targets in coastal regions in
circumstances where traditional artillery support is not available or as augmentation to the
ground forces’ existing fires assets.

• Recognize that hydrography and the mine threat affects the location of pre-planned fire
support areas (FSAs) / fire support stations.
• Naval ships are multi-mission platforms that may simultaneously provide fire support to
ground forces, as well as anti-air and anti-submarine protection to other ships at sea. This
complicates their employment and will need to be considered in the planning process.
• Naval gunfire provides high rates of fire for limited periods of time.
• The naval gunfire high velocity and flat trajectory affords:
• Direct fire against fortifications.
• Limited use against targets in defilade.
• Calls for fire primarily rely on high frequency communications.
• Gun-target line:
• Changes when the ship is under way within the FSA.
6-8
• Consider the elliptical dispersion pattern, as shown in Figure 6-1, with the long axis of
the pattern along the direction of fire (e.g., plan the gun-target line parallel to the forward
line of own troops).
Gun Target Line
Land Sea
Target Round Impact Naval Gunfire Impact Area

– Forward Line of Own Troops
Figure 6-1. Naval Gunfire Dispersion Pattern
6.4.1.2. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

Three types of Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) variants are launched from surface ships
and submarines. Blocks III C (single target unitary warhead) and D (submunitions warhead)
TLAMs fly preplanned missions remotely prepared by the cruise missile support activities and
strike planning cells. The Block IV TLAM-E (single target unitary warhead) is capable of in-
flight two-way communications with the launch platform. With TLAM-E, technology has
evolved so that TLAMs are no longer purely a strategic stand-alone weapon, but also a tactical
weapon with the following benefits uniquely capable of supporting CF and SOF:
• Deep strike capability (1000+ nautical mile range).
• Denied airspace utility (unmanned system, difficult to counter with anti-air).
• High precision (time on target programmable, small circular error of probability, global
positioning system [GPS] programmable).
• All-weather, day, or night strike capability.
• High reliability (low dud rate).
• In-flight reprogrammable (capable of loitering and supported GPS reprogramming to support
call for fires and TSTs).
• High altitude target attack (15,000+ feet).
• Multi-purpose (1000 lb unitary warhead [TLAM-C] for hardened targets, submunitions
dispenser with combined effects bomblets [TLAM-D] for anti-personnel and lightly
protected targets).
• High element of surprise (multi-missile simultaneous time on target, small radar/visual
profile, programmable fly-in headings, programmable terminal phase attack).
6-9

• TLAMs require roughly an hour to activate for launch. Tactical Tomahawk (TLAM-E) can
be ready for launch within six to eight minutes.
• During mission planning, the joint fires element must coordinate the employment of TLAMs
with the SACC (afloat), the FSCC (ashore), or the Tomahawk Strike Coordinator cell to
assign the necessary launch platforms to the TLAM support mission. Once TLAM assets
have been apportioned, calls for fire can be initiated down to the special operations team
level directly with the launch platform via voice communications.
• Since TLAMs do not have a return-to-base capability, the in-flight mission must terminate
with a final attack yielding destruction of the missile. Commanders should ensure this final
aim point is positioned in a location that will provide the most benefit to their mission, yet
ensure that the terminal attack explosion does not compromise the overall effectiveness of
the mission.
• Give special attention to the fact that TLAM and SOF aircraft flight profiles often occupy the
same airspace and either TLAM or SOF overland flight profiles must be adjusted according
to mission priority. This is best accomplished by the SOLE, on behalf of the joint special
operations air component commander, conducting airspace deconfliction with the TLAM
LNO located within the joint force air component commander’s air operations center.
6.4.2. Artillery, Rockets, and Missile Support

Cannon artillery is usually the most abundant fire support system available to the conventional
ground force, providing near-immediate, all-weather, 24-hour response. Artillery offers high
volume and both precision and area fires (see Figure 6-2).
The multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) is an Army free-flight, area-fire, artillery rocket
system used primarily to attack counter fire, enemy air defenses, and personnel targets (Note:
MLRS will soon field a unitary warhead). The MLRS supplements cannon artillery fires with a
rapid response, longer range, and large volume of firepower.
The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is a longer-range GPS-guided missile system
with the responsiveness of the MLRS. The ATACMS offers an anti-personnel / anti-materiel,
anti-armor submunition warhead, and a dual purpose improved conventional munition with
unitary and / or anti-armor warheads.
6-10
Forward
Boundary
ATAC
MS FSCL
MLRS
Artille
y r
Infantry Division Mechanized Infantry Division Division Boundary

ATACMS - Army Tactical Missile System FSCL - Fire Support Coordination Line
- Forward Line of Own Troops MLRS - Multiple Launch Rocket System
Figure 6-2. Artillery / Multiple Launch Rocket System

Range Relationship
6.4.2.1. Employment Considerations

• Understand the MLRS:
• Has collateral damage concerns due to a munition producing dud bomblets (with a dud
rate of one to ten percent) that is hazardous to dismounts, light vehicles, and civilians.
• Has limited effectiveness against hardened targets.
• High altitude trajectory requires airspace deconfliction.
• Understand the ATACMS:
• High angle launch and impact, along with the very high altitude flight path, does not
require large amounts of airspace to be deconflicted before firing.
• Because the missile cannot be redirected after launch, it is difficult to employ against
moving targets.
6.4.3. Close Air Support

The speed, range, and maneuverability of aircraft allow them to attack targets that other fire
support means may not be able to effectively engage because of limiting factors such as target
type, range, terrain, or ground scheme of maneuver. Attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft
have capabilities that are complementary, especially when employed in combined attacks, and
can quickly mass fires throughout the battlespace.
6-11
Manned aircraft offer both day and night capability and a wide variety of munitions, but are
weather and refueling dependent. Manned aircraft can offer “eyes on target” during an attack,
particularly useful when exact target coordinates are not available or when mobile targets are
attacked. Although more vulnerable to enemy air defense assets due to low altitude and
relatively slow speed, attack helicopters can often operate in poorer weather conditions than
fixed-wing aircraft. Helicopters also offer an improved ability to locate and attack targets and an
increased loiter time on station.
6.4.3.1. Employment Considerations

• Identify the need for preplanned CAS and understand the immediate CAS request process.
• Plan for CAS at key points throughout the depth of the battlespace.
• Anticipate preplanned CAS requirements for inclusion in the joint ATO. The ATO planning
cycle is normally 72 hours and covers a 24 hour period. The ATO is generally published 12
to 24 hours before the ATO period.
• Understand the typical aircraft employment concept:
• CAS attack aircraft normally fly in groups of two to four aircraft. Bombers normally fly
as single ships or small groups. The Air Force calls these “flights,” while the Navy and
Marine Corps call them either “sections” (two aircraft), or “divisions” (three to four
aircraft). Special operations AC-130 gunships typically operate single-ship sorties during
hours of darkness and under low-threat conditions (when survivability of aircraft is
usually higher).
• Army aviation units are organic to corps, divisions, and regiments and perform missions
as part of a combined arms team. The Army does NOT consider its attack helicopters a
CAS system, but rather a close combat attack mission. Helicopter units normally receive
mission-type orders and execute as an integral unit / maneuver element. The preferred
employment method is under the control of a maneuver commander.
• Marine Corps attack helicopters normally operate in groups of two to four and are
integral to the Marine air-ground task force.
• A joint air attack team (JAAT) is a combination of attack and / or scout rotary-wing
aircraft and fixed-wing CAS aircraft operating together to locate and attack high-priority
targets and other targets of opportunity. A JAAT normally operates as a coordinated
effort against enemy forces supported by fire support, air defense artillery, NSFS, ISR
systems, electronic warfare systems, and ground maneuver forces.
• Consider the enemy air defenses and the joint force’s ability to counter them.
• Understand the requirement to integrate CAS with fire and maneuver.
• Understand that CAS requires an integrated, flexible, and responsive C2 structure, and
dependable, interoperable, and secure communications architecture.
• If a support relationship exists, the supporting element uses the CAS C2 system of the
supported element. If a command relationship does not exist, CAS requests are forwarded
using their respective CAS process to the JAOC for consideration / fill.
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6.4.3.2. AC-130 Gunship (H and U Models)

The primary missions of the AC-130 aircraft are CAS and air interdiction, normally
accomplished at night. They can perform force protection and interdiction missions where
limitation of collateral damage and / or fratricide is a primary concern. The AC-130H weapons
suite consists of a 105mm and 40mm cannon; the AC-130U also has a 25mm cannon.
• With its accurate, low-yield munitions, AC-130s can fire extremely close to friendly troops
while limiting collateral damage.
• AC-130s can effectively perform interdiction missions against “soft” targets (e.g., personnel,
trucks, trains, boats), with limited capability against “hard” targets (e.g., buildings, armor,
underground).
In contrast to other attack aircraft, the AC-130 engages the target while in a counterclockwise
orbit as opposed to a run-in style attack (see Figure 6-3). The AC-130 orbit profile, combined
with the sophisticated sensor suite and long loiter time, allows the crew to continuously (threat
permitting) monitor the battlefield, affording exceptional battlefield situational awareness.
Flight Path
Target / Fire Line
Target
Changing
Target / Fire
Line
Figure 6-3. AC-130 Gunship Target / Fire Line

• Direct interaction with an AC-130 weapons officer / tactician is essential when considering
employment tactics.
• Gunships normally operate in the hours of darkness and must operate in areas of friendly air
superiority and outside the range of radar-guided threat systems.
• AC-130U’s radar affords a limited all-weather strike capability.
• The most important step for the AC-130 in any CAS engagement, and especially on urban
terrain, is the positive identification of friendly forces; units must clearly mark their positions
per standing operating procedures to avoid fratricide.
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• Consider the unique procedures for requesting and controlling fires from the AC-130
gunship.
• Do not ask the gunship to identify colors, as the optical system is unable to display color.
• Because the gunship target / fire line is constantly changing:
• Reference north / south / east / west (cardinal directions) and distance; do not reference or
make corrections by clock positions or left / right or short / long.
• Identify friendly troop locations and no-fire areas (e.g., via beacon, infrared strobe, gated
laser intensifier tape, verbally).
• Identify target (e.g., via laser, talk-on).
• Do not pass run-in headings (no-fire headings).
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CHAPTER 7
INTELLIGENCE
Lesson Learned
• Fusion must occur at every level to develop targets and future operations.
• Information sharing is critical to overall mission success. What one force may
view as unimportant, another force may see as the “missing piece.”
• Understand the criticality of time-sensitive information and the procedures to
facilitate time-sensitive execution to obtain maximum effects on the battlespace.
• Understand the supported commander’s intelligence priorities.
7.0. Introduction
Tell me what you know…tell me what you don’t know…tell me what you think…always
distinguish which is which. General Colin Powell – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989-
1993
Commanders drive the intelligence effort by clearly designating priority intelligence
requirements (PIRs) and mission requirements. Then, staff intelligence officers synchronize the
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination with operations, ensuring commanders get
what they need in a form they can use in time to influence their decision-making process.
Intelligence synchronization is continuous and keeps intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance operations tied to a commander’s critical decisions and concept of operations.
Timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence on the adversary and environment reduces
the risks associated with decision making. Joint intelligence operations integrate Service,
Special Operations Forces (SOF), theater, and national intelligence capabilities into a unified
effort that surpasses any single organizational effort and provides the most accurate and timely
intelligence to a commander. Each intelligence discipline provides pieces of information
synthesized through an analytical process to approach total situational awareness.
7.0.1. Intelligence Disciplines

• Counterintelligence (CI) - Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations.
• Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) - Intelligence derived from imagery, imagery
intelligence, and cartographic data and information.
• Human intelligence (HUMINT) - A category of intelligence derived from information
collected and provided by human sources.
• Imagery intelligence (IMINT) - Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by
visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors.
7-1
• Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) - Technically derived intelligence that

detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and describes the unique characteristics of fixed and
dynamic target sources.
• Open-source intelligence (OSINT) - Information of potential intelligence value that is
available to the general public.
• Signals intelligence (SIGINT) - A category of intelligence comprising either individually or
in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign
instrumentation signals intelligence.
• Technical intelligence (TECHINT) - Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign
material, produced for strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. Technical
intelligence begins when an individual Service member finds something new in the
battlespace and takes the proper steps to report it. The item is then exploited at succeedingly
higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the adversary’s technological
advantage.
7.1. Planning Considerations

• Understand how the total intelligence process works, including the request for information
process, and how to integrate intelligence assets and products.
• Understand the procedures for requesting national intelligence support during a crisis, as
depicted in Figure 7-1.
NMJIC RFIs/Collection Production

Requirements Agency or
Validates
Time- and Tasks/ Response Collector
Sensitive Forwards
RFIs and CIA
Collection RFI Response DIA
Reqmts. FBI
Time NGA
Sensitive NSA
Response Combatant State
Joint Intelligence Command
Center Treasury
Collection
Determines Requirements
Time- Theater
Sensitive Response Collector
RFI
RFI Response
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

Requester DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
NGA - National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Component
NIST - National Intelligence Support Team
NMJIC - National Military Joint Intelligence Center
NIST NSA - National Security Agency
RFI - Request for Information
Source: Joint publication 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military
Operations, 7 October 2004
Figure 7-1. Request Flow for National Support - Crisis
7-2
• Know PIRs and identify gaps that exist in the intelligence database and products.
• Know what collection assets are available from supporting and supported forces.
• Understand the timeline for preplanned and dynamic collection requests for particular assets.
• Understand the intelligence requirements of higher and subordinate commands.
• Identify collection assets and / or dissemination systems that may help answer the supported
commander’s PIRs.
• Ensure liaison and coordination elements are aware of PIRs and timeline for satisfaction.
Ensure PIRs are tied to specific operational decisions.
• During planning, identify collection requirements and any trained analyst augmentation
required to support post-strike battle damage assessment.
• Plan for cross queuing to exploit collection assets.
• Ensure liaison elements have the required network and system accesses, to include access to
needed spaces (e.g., non-secure internet protocol router network, SECRET Internet Protocol
Router Network, Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, joint deployable
intelligence support system, Global Command and Control System, operations and
intelligence workspaces).
• Identify potential augmentation sources for translators or interrogator support (e.g., consider
language skills of SOF operators or Conventional Forces [CF] translators).
• Plan the use of tactical HUMINT teams, composed of HUMINT and CI assets, to directly
support maneuver commanders. Provide the teams with adequate secure communications to
enable timely reporting.
• Consider that the reporting frequency of CF and SOF HUMINT, as well as reconnaissance
and surveillance assets, are likely to be different.
• Ensure there are established procedures for the collection, dissemination, and sharing of
information across CF and SOF.
• Ensure access to robust communications dissemination architecture.
• Identify a single geospatial information and services (GI&S) point of contact for maps,
charts, and digital data. (Note: the term “GI&S” has replaced “mapping, charting, and
geodesy.”)
• Identify any special communications needs for GI&S (e.g., digital databases, dedicated
servers, bandwidth).
• Consider whether SOF (e.g., psychological operations, civil affairs units) can answer or
influence any CF PIRs. Recognize that SOF operators have foreign language skills, cross-
cultural training, a regional orientation, and understand the political context of their
operational environments. Consider whether CF (e.g., through familiarity with the
operational area) can answer or influence any SOF PIRs.
• Consider locations and meeting cycles of key nongovernmental organizations,
intergovernmental organizations, other government agencies, governing bodies, and
religious groups.
7-3
• Consider event cycles and seasons.

• Consider key personnel and linkage to the population (i.e., leaders, figureheads, clerics).
• Coordinate with and provide input to other staff sections for production of annexes to
operations plans or orders such as:
• Information operations.
• Personnel recovery.
• Reconnaissance.
• Logistics.
• Intelligence systems / communications requirements.
• GI&S.
• Medical intelligence.
7.2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

The intelligence preparation of the battlespace process, which is continuous and cyclical, consists
of four steps: 1) define the battlespace environment, 2) describe the battlespace effects,
3) evaluate the threat, and 4) determine the threat course of action (COA).
7.2.1. Define the Battlespace Environment

• Evaluate existing databases and identify intelligence gaps in current holdings.
• Identify for further analysis specific features of the environment or activities within it that
may influence COA or the commander’s decision:
• The joint force commander (JFC) defines the area of operations (AO). The AO does not
encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for
component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.
• Understand that the area of interest (AI) extends from home base, through operational
bases, into the operational area, to targeted AIs. AIs can also include infiltration,
exfiltration, and evasion and escape routes / corridors as well as areas or countries
that provide aid to target forces or that are a threat to the mission.
7.2.2. Describe the Battlespace Effects

• Limitations and opportunities the environment imposes on potential operations of friendly
and threat forces.
• Products developed may include, but are not limited to:
7-4
• Terrain analysis:
• Observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover
and concealment.
• Include all potential zones of entry and infiltration corridors, to include waterborne
access routes, transportation systems, sewer systems, rooftops, culverts, and tunnels.
• Weather analysis:
• Five military aspects are: visibility, winds, precipitation, cloud cover, and
temperature / humidity.
• Describe the effect on infiltration and exfiltration operations, airborne operations,
ultra-low-level flight, tides, sea conditions on waterborne operations, and visibility on
/ near target.
• Population analysis:
• Density and distribution of population groups, composite groups based on political
behavior and strength of each, and issues motivating behavior of groups.
7.2.3. Evaluate the Threat

• Determine how the threat normally organizes for combat and conduct operations under
similar circumstances.
• When operating against a new or less well-known threat, historical databases may be of little
use; develop intelligence databases and the threat model concurrently.
• Identify high-value targets.
• Identify threat capabilities.
• Identify the threat’s desired end state.
• Identify external groups supporting the threat.
• Identify any discord within the threat.
• Evaluate organizational structures within the threat.
7.2.4. Determine Threat Course of Action

• Integrate results of previous steps into a meaningful conclusion.
• Identify initial intelligence collection requirements to focus the collection effort on the COA
the threat will execute.
• Products include situational templates, enemy COAs (most likely and most dangerous),
collection plans, and decision support templates.
7-5
7.3. Special Operations Forces Intelligence Needs

While most intelligence requirements and procedures for CF and SOF are the same, given the
uniqueness of special operations missions and roles, the following distinctions exist:
7.3.1. Level of Detail

• Intricate planning and decentralized execution of SOF missions require intelligence support
that is usually more detailed or specific than that needed in conventional operations (e.g.,
thickness / construction and hinging of a door rather than just knowing a door exists).
• SOF often require intelligence to avoid enemy forces, regardless of size or composition, as
opposed to information that would allow CF to directly engage the enemy.
• Combat search and rescue forces require the same degree of intelligence preparation as SOF
aviation.
• A small SOF team may require more dedicated intelligence resources than those required by
a larger CF.
7.3.2. Timeliness and Accuracy of Information

• Given the high risk factor or criticality of the mission, uncertainty about the threat or
environment reduces the chance for SOF success more than it does large scale conventional
operations.
• SOF missions are often high-risk operations with limited windows of execution that require
first-time success, thus the need for greater analytical fidelity in intelligence products.
7.3.3. Operational Element and Analyst Interface

• Given the sensitive and critical need for very detailed information, intelligence personnel
often work directly with the SOF element that will execute a mission. Frequently both
analysts and collectors work hand-in-hand with operational planners, and even those
executing the mission, during the planning, rehearsal, execution, and post-operational phases
of a mission.
• A significant intelligence effort may be required to bring what is an acceptable “degree of
risk” for CF to one that is acceptable to SOF.
7.4. Multinational Forces Planning Considerations

• Establish liaison with multinational intelligence organizations. Provide a liaison element
with secure portable communications and information systems support.
• Identify the multinational intelligence operational architecture that unites the intelligence
cells in a common effort.
• Determine the requirement for different levels of intelligence (e.g., United States Only,
Releasable to North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Releasable to non-NATO).
7-6
• Establish and review procedures to expedite sanitization and sharing of United States-
generated intelligence products with multinational partners. Likewise, address the
procedures for sharing of non-United States-originated intelligence with United States forces.
• Identify the policy on disclosure and / or release of geospatial information to multinational
forces.
• Request emergency dissemination authority (to specific allies) for imagery intelligence.
• Understand that non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations, by the
nature of what they do, become familiar with the culture, language, and sensitivities of a
populace; this information can be very valuable to commanders.
7.5. Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Joint

Targeting Considerations
• The battlespace commander’s PIRs and mission priorities provide the overarching guidance
for mission planning and asset allocation for intelligence collection or target engagement
• Establish, early on, a joint targeting board that meets daily, or as needed, to coordinate,
deconflict, and engage designated targets through kinetic and non-kinetic means.
• Synchronize and leverage all tactical, theater, and national intelligence assets to gain best
possible “ground truth.”
• Reinforce the supporting / supported relationships during the targeting process (e.g., CF
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] assets are the supported and SOF
aviation the supporting during mission planning / intelligence collection; and during mission
execution SOF direct action elements are the supported and CF infantry and logistical
elements are the supporting.)
• Open sharing of mission essential intelligence between CF assets (e.g., ISR elements, CI,
radio battalion, HUMINT exploitation teams, civil affairs), SOF, and other government
agencies (e.g., national security agency, central intelligence agency, federal bureau of
investigation, defense intelligence agency) is critical to successful operational integration of
CF and SOF.
7-7
Appendix A
Acronyms
A-i
Appendix A
Acronyms
A
ACM airspace coordinating measure
AETF air and space expeditionary task force
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AI area of interest
AO area of operations
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ATO air tasking order
B
BFT blue force tracking
C
C2 command and control
C2PC command and control personal computer
CAO civil affairs operations
CAS close air support
CF Conventional Forces
CGRS common geographic reference system
CI counterintelligence
COA course of action
COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces
COMSEC communications security
COP common operational picture
CP counterproliferation
CT counterterrorism
D
DA direct action
DOD Department of Defense
F
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
FID foreign internal defense
FSA fire support area
FSCC fire support coordination center
FSCM fire support coordinating measure
A-ii
G
GCCS Global Command and Control System
GEOINT geospatial intelligence
GI&S geospatial information and services
GPS global positioning system
H
HUMINT human intelligence
I
ICP intertheater communications security (COMSEC) package
IM information management
IMINT imagery intelligence
IO information operations
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J
JAAT joint air attack team
JADOCS joint automated deep operations coordination system
JAOC joint air operations center
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander
JIISO Joint Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations
JOA joint operations area
JP joint publication
JSOA joint special operations area
JSOTF joint special operations task force
JT&E joint test and evaluation
L
LNO liaison officer
M
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
MCS maneuver control system
MEF Marine expeditionary force
MLRS multiple launch rocket system
MMC mission management center
N
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIPRNET non-secure internet protocol router network
NSFS naval surface fire support
A-iii
O
OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
OPCON operational control
OPSEC operations security
OSINT open-source intelligence
P
PIR priority intelligence requirement
PSYOP psychological operations
S
SACC supporting arms coordination center
SEAL sea-air-land team
SIGINT signals intelligence
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SOCCE special operations command and control element
SOCOORD special operations coordination element
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOLE special operations liaison element
SR special reconnaissance
T
TACON tactical control
TACLAN tactical local area network
TBMCS theater battle management core system
TECHINT technical intelligence
TLAM Tomahawk land attack missile
TST time-sensitive target
U
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
UW unconventional warfare
W
WIC web information center
WMD weapons of mass destruction
A-iv
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CF and SOF Integration and Interoperability Handbook

Eric T. Olson Robert W. Wagner

This publication is available on the JIISO website: http://www.JIISO.jte.osd.smil.mil

4.2.3. Capabilities .................................................................................................................. 4-10

7.3.2. Timeliness and Accuracy of Information ...................................................................... 7-6

CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

1.1. Convergence Challenges

Scenario 1: Conventional Forces Enter a Joint Special Operations

Special Forces Hostile

Figure 1-1. Conventional Forces Enter a

Scenario 2: Special Operations Forces Enter a Conventional Forces

Figure 1-2. Special Operations Forces Enter a Conventional Forces

Scenario 3: Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces

Marine Observation Outpost Hostile

Figure 1-3. Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces

Scenario 4: Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces

Figure 1-4. Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2.1. Levels of Authority

Joint Task Force

Army Air Force Navy Marine Corps

Joint Force Joint Force Joint Force Joint Force Special

Joint Civil-Military Joint Psychological

Figure 2-1. Notional Joint Force Command

2.2. Traditional Command Relationships

Table 2-1. Traditional Command and Control

Operational Control (OPCON)

Tactical Control (TACON)

Note: *Parent unit authority

Table 2-2. Support Relationship Considerations

2.3.1. Employment Considerations

2.4. Command and Control Systems

2.4.1. Situational Awareness Systems

2.4.1.1. Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below

2.4.1.1.1. Employment Considerations

2.4.1.2. Maneuver Control System

2.4.1.2.1. Employment Considerations

2.4.1.3. Command and Control Personal Computer

2.4.1.3.1. Employment Considerations

2.4.1.4. Common Operational Picture

2.4.1.4.1. Employment Considerations

2.4.1.5. Theater Battle Management Core System

2.4.1.5.1. Employment Considerations

2.4.1.6. Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System

2.4.1.6.1. Employment Considerations

2.4.2. Collaboration Systems

2.4.2.1.1. Employment Considerations

2.4.2.2. Collaboration Applications

2.4.2.2.1. Employment Considerations

LIAISON AND CONTROL ELEMENTS

Table 3-1. Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces

Element Sent From Sent To Remarks

ACCE - Air Component Coordination Element MARFOR - Marine Corps Forces

3.1. The Liaison Officer

3.1.3. Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities

• Facilitate appropriate coordination by networking to determine the formal / informal flows of

3.1.4. Liaison Procedures

On arrival at the supported unit: