38 Phil.

378

G.R. No. 12579, July 27, 1918

GREGORIO JIMENEZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.

PEDRO RABOT, NICOLASA JIMENEZ AND HER HUSBAND,
EMILIO RODRIGUEZ, DEFENDANTS. PEDRO RABOT,
APPELLANT.

DECISION

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted by the plaintiff, Gregorio Jimenez, to recover

from the defendant, Pedro Rabot, a parcel of land situated in the
municipality of Alaminos, in the Province of Pangasinan, and described in
the complaint as follows:
"Approximate area of three hectares; bounded on the north and west with
land of Pedro Reynoso; on the south with land of Nicolasa Jimenez; and on
the east with land of Calixta Apostol before, at present with that of Juan
Montemayor and Simon del Barrio. It is situated in Dinmayat Tancaran,
barrio of Alos of this same municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan."

From a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Pedro Rabot has

appealed; but his codefendants, Nicolasa Jimenez and her husband, who
were cited by the defendant for the purpose of holding her liable upon her
warranty in case of his eviction, have not appealed.

It is admitted that the parcel of land in question, together with two other
parcels in the same locality originally belonged to the plaintiff, having been
assigned to him as one of the heirs in the division of the estate of his father.
It further appears that while Gregorio was staying at Vigan, in the Province
of Ilocos Sur, during the year 1911, his property in Alaminos was confided
by him to the care of his elder sister Nicolasa Jimenez. On February 7 of
that year he wrote this sister a letter from Vigan in which he informed her
that he was pressed for money and requested her to sell one of his parcels
of land and send him the money in order that he might pay his debts. This
letter contains no description of the land to be sold other than is indicated
in the words "one of my parcels of land" ("uno de mis terrenos").
Acting upon this letter Nicolasa approached the defendant Pedro Rabot,
and the latter agreed to buy the parcel in question for the sum of P500. Two
hundred and fifty pesos were paid at once, with the understanding that a
deed of conveyance would be executed when the balance should be paid
Nicolasa admits having received this payment of 9250 at the time stated; but
there is no evidence that she sent any of it to her brother.

About one year later Gregorio came down to Alaminos and demanded that
his sister should surrender this piece of land to him, it being then in her
possession. She refused upon some pretext or other to do so; and as a result
Gregorio, in conjunction with others of his brothers, and sisters, whose
properties were also in the hands of Nicolasa, instituted an action in the
Court of First Instance for the purpose of recovering their land from her
control. This action was decided favorably to the plaintiffs upon August 12,
1913; and no appeal was taken from the judgment.

Meanwhile, upon May 31,1912, Nicolasa Jimenez executed and delivered to

Pedro Rabot a deed purporting to convey to him the parcel of land which
is the subject of this controversy. The deed recites that the sale was made in
consideration of the sum of P500, the payment of which is acknowledged.
Pedro Rabot went into possession, and the property was found in his hands
at the time when final judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs in the
action above mentioned. It will thus be seen that Pedro Rabot acquired
possession under the deed from Nicolasa during the pendency of the
litigation in which she was defendant; but it does not positively appear that
he was at the time cognizant of that circumstance.

In considering the questions presented by this appeal one or two preliminary

observations may be made. The first is that, as a matter of formality, a power
of attorney to convey real property ought to appear in a public document,
just as any other instrument intended to transmit or convey an interest in
such property ought to appear in a public document. (Art. 1280, Civil Code.)
But inasmuch as it is an established doctrine that a private document is
competent to create, transmit, modify, or extinguish a right in real property
(Thunga Chui vs. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. Rep., 561; Couto Soriano vs. Cortes, 8
Phil. Rep., 459), it follows that a power of attorney to convey such property,
even though in the form of a private document, will operate with effect.
Again, supposing that the letter contained adequate authority for Nicolasa
to sell the property in question, her action in conveying the property in her
own name, without showing the capacity in which she acted, was doubtless
irregular. Nevertheless, such deed would in any event operate to bind her
brother, the plaintiff, in its character as a contract (Lyon vs. Pollock, 99 U.
S., 668; 25 L. ed., 265), and supposing that the authority was sufficient, he
could be compelled by a proper judicial proceeding to execute a document
to carry such contract into effect. (Art. 1279, Civil Code.)

The principal question for consideration therefore in the end resolves itself
into this, whether the authority conferred on Nicolasa by the letter of
February 7, 1911, was sufficient to' enable her to bind her brother. The only
provisions of law bearing on this point are contained in article 1713 of the
Civil Code and in section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 1713
of the Civil Code requires that the authority to alienate land shall be
contained in an express mandate; while subsection 5 of section 335 of the
Code of Civil Procedure says that the authority of the agent must be in
writing and subscribed by the party to be charged. We are of the opinion
that the authority expressed in the letter is a sufficient compliance with both
requirements.

It has been urged here that in order for the authority to be sufficient under
section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure the authorization must contain
a particular description of the property which the agent is to be permitted
to sell. There is no such requirement in subsection 5 of section 335; and we
do not believe that it would be legitimate to read such a requirement into it.
The purpose in giving a power of attorney is to substitute the mind and hand
of the agent for the mind and hand of the principal; and if the character and
extent of the power is so far defined as to leave no doubt as to the limits
within which the agent is authorized to act, and he acts within those limits,
the principal cannot question the validity of his act. It is not necessary that
the particular act to be accomplished should be predestinated by the
language of the power. The ques^ tion to be answered always, after the
power has been exercised, is rather this: Was the act which the agent
performed within the scope of his authority? In the case before us, if the
question is asked whether the act performed by Nicolasa Jimenez was within
the scope of the authority which had been conferred upon her, the answer
must be obviously in the affirmative.

It should not escape observation that the problem with which we are here
concerned relates to the sufficiency of the power of attorney under
subsection 5 of section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not to the
sufficiency of the note or memorandum of the contract, or agreement of
sale, required by the same subsection, in connection with the first paragraph
of the same section. It is well settled in the jurisprudence of England and
the United States that when the owner, or his agent, comes to make a
contract to sell, or a conveyance to effect a transfer, there must be a
description of the property which is the subject of the sale or conveyance.
This is necessary of course to define the object of the contract. (Brockway
vs. Frost, 40 Minn., 155; Carr vs. Passaic Land etc. Co., 19 N. J. Eq., 424;
Lippincott vs. Bridgewater, 55 N. J. Eq., 208; Craig vs. Zelian, 137 Cal., 105;
20 Cyc, 271.)

The general rule here applicable is that the description must be sufficiently
definite to identify the land either from the recitals of the contract or deed
or from external facts referred to in the document, thereby enabling one to
determine the identity of the lana and if the description is uncertain on its
face or is shown to be applicable with equal plausibility to more than one
tract, it is insufficient. The principle embodied in these decisions is not, in
our opinion, applicable to the present case, which relates to the sufficiency
of the authorization, not to the sufficiency of the contract or conveyance. It
is unquestionable that the deed which Nicolasa executed contains a proper
description of the property which she purported to convey.

There is ample authority to the effect that a person may by a general power
of attorney authorize an agent to sell "all" the land possessed by the
principal, or all that he possesses in a particular city, county, or state. (Roper
vs. McFadden, 48 Cal., 346; Rownd vs. Davidson, 113 La., 1047; Carson vs.
Ray, 52 N. C, 609; 78 Am. Dec, 267; 31 Cyc, 1229.) It is also held that where
a person authorizes an agent to sell a farm ("my farm") in a certain county,
this is sufficient, if it be shown that such party has only one farm in that
county. (Marriner vs. Dennison, 78 Cal., 202.) In Linton vs. Moorhead (209
Pa. St., 646), the power authorized the agent to sell or convey "any or all
tracts, lots, or parcels" of land belonging to the plaintiff. It was held that this
was adequate. In Lyon vs. Pollock (99 U. S., 668), the owner in effect
authorized an agent to sell everything he had in San Antonio, Texas. The
authority was held sufficient. In Liñan vs. Puno (31 Phil. Rep., 259), the
authority granted was to the effect that the agent might administer "the
interests" possessed by the principal in the municipality of Tarlac and to that
end he was authorized to purchase, sell, collect, and pay, etc. It was held that
this was a sufficient power.
In the present case the agent was given the power to sell either of the parcels
of land belonging to the plaintiff. We can see no reason why the
performance of an act within the scope of this authority should not bind the
plaintiff to the same extent as if he had given the agent authority to sell "any
or all" and she had conveyed only one.

From what has been said it is evident that the lower court should have
absolved the defendant Pedro Rabot from the complaint. Judgment will
accordingly be reversed, without any express adjudication of costs of this
instance. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ., concur.