1. Planas v.

COMELEC

FACTS:

While the 1971 Constitutional Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the
president issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. On November 29,
1972, the Convention approved its proposed constitution.

The next day the president issued PD No. 73 submitting to the people for ratification or rejection of
the proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a petition to enjoin respondents from implemented PD
No. 73 because the calling of the plebiscite among others is lodged exclusively in the Congress.

On December 17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of PD
1081 for the purpose of the free and open debate on the proposed constitution.

On December 23, the president announced the postponement of the plebiscite, as such, the Court
refrained from deciding the cases.

On January 12, the petitioners filed for an “urgent motion” praying that the case be decided “as soon
as possible”.

ISSUE: WON PD. 73 is VALID.

RULING:

The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long list of
cases decided by the Court but also of subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935
Constitution which expressly provides for the authority of the Court to review cases revolving such
issue.

The validity of the decree itself was declared moot and academic by the Court. The convention is
free to postulate any amendment as long as it is not inconsistent with what is known as Jus Cogens. Commented [1]: A latin phrase that literally means
“compelling law.” It designates norms from which no
derogation is permitted by way of particular
agreements. It stems from the idea already known in
Roman law that certain legal rules cannot be
contracted out, given the fundamental values they
uphold.
2. Javellana vs. Executive Secretary

Facts:

Prior thereto, or on January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against
the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain
said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the
propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" — referring to that of 1935.
After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged
that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his
Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the
President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election,
hence null and void."

The respondents filed their separate comment therein, alleging that "(t)he subject matter" of said
case "is a highly political question which, under the circumstances, this ...Court would not be in a
position to act upon judicially," and that, in view of the opinions expressed by three members of this
Court in its decision in the plebiscite cases, in effect upholding the validity of Proclamation No. 1102,
"further proceedings in this case may only be an academic exercise in futility."

Issue:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 involves a justiciable or political
question.
2. Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified to said Art. XV of the 1935
Constitution.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution aforementioned been approved by a majority of the
people in Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held throughout the Philippines.
4. Whether or not the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution.
5. Whether or not the parties are entitled to any relief.

Ruling:

The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the
crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition.
Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being
sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.

First Issue

On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the
validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices
Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion
of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed
there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not
there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off
out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and
legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices
Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and
"beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."

Second Issue

On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article
XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election
or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered
voters.

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been
validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding
the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, especially in the
manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof.
In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually
there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973
Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am
constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be
deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of
them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after
all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been
constitutionally ratified."

Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their
view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid
ratification.

Third Issue

On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed
Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.

Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the
people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free
expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law.

Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions
to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted
acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage
prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has
elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom
of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law."

Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that
"Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle
restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people
have accepted the Constitution."

Fourth Issue

On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal
and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the
final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which
considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant
and unavoidable."
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted
to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

Fifth Issue

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast
no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state
with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two
(2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes
to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices
Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered
in force and effect. It is so ordered.

3. Aquino v. Enrile

FACTS:

The cases are all petitions for Habeas Corpus, the petitioners, Aquino et al, having been
arrested and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081.
The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President “for being
participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power
in the country and to take over the Government by force…”

General Order No. 2 was issued by President Marcos in the exercise of the power he assumed by
virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial law.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can inquire the validity of Proclamation 1081.

RULING:

1. The detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law. As stated in the 1973
Constitution, under Section 3 (2) Article XVII, “all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and
acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the Law of the land,
and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or the
ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, resolved, or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless
expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular national assembly.”

In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore,
there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant
to the President’s Order.

2. The court can not inquire about the validity of the proclamation because it is a Political Question.
In the case of Tanada vs. Cuenco, "Those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislature or executive branch of the government."

The function of the Court is to check, not to supplant. The Court makes a determination that the
Constitution has vested the making of a final decision in a body other than the Court. They have
jurisdiction over the case but not over the specific issue.

NOTE: The proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the
persons referred to in this case. Of the 9 SC Justices, 5 declared the case as a Political Question,
not a Judicial Inquiry, since the case has become moot and academic.

Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with
respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation,
which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against
imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence.

4. PHILBar Association v. COMELEC

RELATED LAWS: BP 883 / Cabinet Bill No 7: calls for national elections on Feb 7, 1986 for the
offices of President & Vice-president of the Philippines.
Art 7 Sec 9: In case of permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation of the
President, the VP shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. The Batasang Pambansa
shall by law provide for the cases mentioned of the P and VP, declaring what officer shall then
become P & VP or the manner in which one shall be selected. In case vacancy in the office of the
president occurs before the election in 1987, the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa shall act as
president until a Pres and VP or either of them shall have been elected and shall have qualified.
Their term of office shall commence at noon of the 10th day following proclamation, and shall end at
noon on the 13th day of June of the 6th year thereafter.

FACTS:

Plaintiffs claim that BP833 is in conflict with the Constitution in that it allows the President to
continue holding office after the calling of the election.

ISSUE: Whether BP 833 is unconstitutional and the court must stop and prohibit the holding of
elections.

HOLDING: No. There are less than 10 required votes to declare BP 833 unconstitutional. Thus,
petitions are dismissed, writs are denied.

RATIO:

Teehankee, concur: The cancellation of the elections can only aggravate the prevailing crisis
and the President may find it difficult to govern effectively. Political system that calls an election and
calls it off when the momentum has already built up will not be taken by the people kindly. The
president is seeking the judgment of the people and the court cannot stand on its way. Such a
vacancy arising from an incumbent of the Presidential inspired by the desire to seek a fresh mandate
from the people is a novel situation that was not contemplated by the framers of 1981 amendments
to the 1973 constitution.

Plana, concur: Art 7 Sec 9 does not yield to the conclusion that BP 883 is unconstitutional. Batasang
Pambansa is not obliged by the constitution to sit and wait until actual vacancy arises before it can
enact necessary legislation.

5. Lawyer’s League v. Aquino

Topic: Difference between De Facto and De Jure Government.

FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to
the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether or not Corazon C. Aquino’s government was legitimate.

RULING:

Corazon C. Aquino’s government was legitimate. The community of nations has recognized
the legitimacy of the Proclamation No. 1 since it was the people that made the judgement and
accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.

In the case at bar, the legitimacy of the Aquino government is a political question where people are
the judge. The people have made their judgment as they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Initially, it was considered as a De Facto
government for it has no constitutional basis of its creation. However, it developed into a De Jure
government after the people of the Philippines accepted and supported the decision.

Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1 is valid and Corazon C. Aquino government is legitimate.

6. IN RE: Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno

Facts:

Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated
Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the
CA. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on
June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982.

The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes." He was then appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a
deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice.

In Edsa Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the
judiciary.

A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as
an exercise of her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11
from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no.
11, he now ranked as no. 26.

He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order
of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc granted Justice Puno's request. A motion for consideration was
later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that
the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed
ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Issue:

Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would
negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33.

Held:

The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created
in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon
Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the
established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as as
sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually affected with
violence. A government as a result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it is already
accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others.
In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino
power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his
seniority ranking.

7. Republic v. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") and created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to
recover all ill-gotten wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates.

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth
of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board
issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendations on the reported unexplained wealth of
Ramas.
 Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure “on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.” Petitioner argues
that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were “taking power in the name and
by the will of the Filipino people.” Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively
withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’
exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all
rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same
in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutional right.

Issue: W/N there is violation to the constitutional rights of the respondents.

Held: The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President
Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution.“ The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the
revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international
law.
. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the
State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

8. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles

Facts:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. is a recruitment and placement

agency.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a monthly salary
of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.
She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In
Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior
notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get her
salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she
was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to
her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and
Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees

Basis for the decision: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022

Issue:

Whether or not the section reinstated wherein the decision for the NLRC awarding Cabiles
the three months’ worth of salary is based is constitutional?

Rule:

No. In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court
ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less”
is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. Thus, the
Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should be increased
to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all.”

The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of
Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of
any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws
must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the
nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision.
A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022,
violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant
us to revisit the precedent.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and therefore null and void.
9. Bayan v. Zamora

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement
called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for
the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine
governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.

RULING:

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave
abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under
a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as
a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the
United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached
to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To
be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the
said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard,
has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the
VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and
binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance
with the mandate of the Constitution.
10. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts,
the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in
a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement
of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s).

ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

Constitution Provides, Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or
such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress
shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital
is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction
and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies a sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation.
11. Francisco v. House of Representatives

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted

and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the
previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed
the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by
House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5
August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003
for being insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
 proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute
valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article
XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial
power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules
on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly,
its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
 1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings

which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office
of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
12. Chavez v. JBC

Facts:

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and
the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued
that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that
the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the
Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its
mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks
of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses
which comprise the entire Congress.

Issue:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in
this case?

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging
the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate
only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act
by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because
he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on
the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post
of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional.
The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized
in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the
land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s
ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the
Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens
who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the

Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of

Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative

of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a

representative of the private sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision
is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same
under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are
enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court
and a representative from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present
controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves
no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC.
Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the
JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules of statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense
that they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principles to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used
in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to,
but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that
is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court
to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned
practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in
the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the
precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to expect
that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that
an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said provision
was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the
Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through
oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the
role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An
inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule,
however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration
of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of
fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid.

13. CLU v. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
 ● The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No.
284 issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino.
● The petitioners alleged that Section 1, 2 and 3 of EO 284 contravenes the provision of
Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
● The assailed provisions of EO 284 are as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of

the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions
in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish
the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any
official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

● 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, meanwhile, states that:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President
shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or
offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

● PETITIONERS CONTENTION: EO 284 adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII

other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those
provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President (may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII: “The Vice-President may
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no
confirmation.”) and the secretary of justice (as an ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII: “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as
ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress
 as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”)

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes. EO 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The court said, by allowing Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to hold at
least two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment which is a direct contravention of the express mandate of Article
VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

The explained that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself which are
Section 3 of Article VII (for VP) and Section 8 of Article VIII (for Secretary of Justice).

Thus, the PETITION is GRANTED.

14. Magallona v. Ermita

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines
as an Archipelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties
over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A.
3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our
sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints
along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international
community of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of
such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them
in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international
law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it
should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
15.) Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP (Government of the Republic of the Philippines)

Facts: This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth
of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws
such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right
entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and principles,
territory, resources, and governance.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the
inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be
subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be subject to
plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that
the BJE shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE
territory; they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters
up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland
Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint
jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of
minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal waters.

Issue: WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws.

Held: Yes, MOA-AD violates the Philippine Constitution.

The constitution provides, that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

In the case at bar, the territory included in the BJE(Bangsamoro Juridical Entity) includes those
areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the
respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to
the express provision of the Constitution. Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of
the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are
areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

Thus, it violates the Constitution.