FREQUENTLY ASKED OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS

(From 1985 to 2003)

(1) Distinguish mala in se from mala prohibita. (1988; 1997; 1998; 2001; 2003)

ANS: Mala in se is a wrong from its very nature, as most of those punished in the RPC. Hence, in
its commission, intent is an element and good faith is a defense. The test to determine whether an
offense is mala in se is not the law punishing it but the very nature of the act itself.

On the other hand, an act mala prohibita is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the
law punishing the act, it cannot be considered a wrong. Hence, the mere commission of that act is
what constitutes the offense punished and criminal intent will be immaterial for reason of public policy.

(2) What do you understand by aberratio ictus, error in personae and praeter intentionem? Do
they alter the criminal liability of the accused? (1989; 1993; 1994; 1999)

ANS: Aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow occurs when the offender delivered the blow at his
intended victim but missed, and instead such blow landed on an unintended victim. The situation
generally brings about complex crimes where from a single act, two or more grave or less grave
felonies resulted, namely the attempt against the intended victim and the consequences on the
unintended victim. As complex crimes, the penalty for the more serious crime shall be the one
imposed and in the maximum period. It is only when the resulting felonies are only light that complex
crimes do not result and the penalties are to be imposed distinctly for each resulting crime.

Error in personae or mistake in identity occurs when the offender actually hit the person to whom
the blow was directed but turned out to be different from and not the victim intended. The criminal
liability of the offender is not affected, unless the mistake in identity resulted to a crime different from
what the offender intended to commit, in which case the lesser penalty between the crime intended
and the crime committed shall be imposed but in the maximum period (Art. 49, RPC).

Praeter intentionem or where the consequence went beyond that intended or expected. This is a
mitigating circumstance (Art. 13, par. 3, RPC) when there is a notorious disparity between the act or
means employed by the offender and the resulting felony, i.e., the resulting felony could not be
reasonably anticipated or foreseen by the offender from the act or means employed by him.

(3) Are reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment the same? Can they be imposed
interchangeably? (1991; 1994; 2001)

ANS: NO. Reclusion perpetua is a penalty prescribed by the RPC, with a fixed duration of
imprisonment from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, and carries with it accessory penalties.

Life imprisonment, on the other hand, is a penalty prescribed by special laws, with no fixed
duration of imprisonment and without any accessory penalty.

(4) Distinguish instigation from entrapment. (1990; 1995; 2003)

ANS: Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a crime. Without
the inducement, the crime would not be committed. Hence, it is exempting by reason of public policy.
Otherwise, the peace officer would be a co-principal.

On the other hand, entrapment signifies the ways and means devised by a peace officer to entrap
or apprehend a person who has committed a crime. With or without the entrapment, the crime has
been committed already. Hence, entrapment is not mitigating.

(5) Distinguish motive from intent. (1996; 1999)

ANS: Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a definite result, while intent is
the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. Intent is an element of the crime (except
in unintentional felonies), whereas motive is not.

(6) When is the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law not applicable? (1999; 2003)

ANS: The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to:

 (1) Persons convicted of offenses punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment;
(2) Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
(3) Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage;
(4) Those convicted of piracy;
(5) Those who are habitual delinquents;
(6) Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
(7) Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon granted to them by the Chief
Executive;
(8) Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year;
(9) Those who, upon the approval of the law (December 5, 1933), had been sentenced by
final judgment;
(10) Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension.

(7) What are the instances when the death penalty could not be imposed, although it should
otherwise be meted out? (1997; 1998)

ANS: Under Art. 47 of the RPC, the death penalty shall not be imposed when:

(1) The guilty person is below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, or
(2) Is more than 70 years of age, or
(3) When upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the SC, the required majority vote
is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty.

(8) What is the doctrine of implied conspiracy? (1998; 2003)

ANS: The doctrine of implied conspiracy holds two or more persons participating in the
commission of a crime collectively responsible and liable as co-conspirators although absent any
agreement to that effect, when they act in concert, demonstrating unity of criminal intent and a
common purpose or objective. The existence of a conspiracy shall be inferred or deduced from their
criminal participation in pursuing the crime and thus the act of one shall be the act of all.

(9) What is an impossible crime? (1993; 2003)

ANS: It is an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment, or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means. (Art. 4, par. 2)

But where the acts performed which would have resulted in an impossible crime also (1)
constitute an offense under the RPC, or (2) would subject the accused to criminal liability although of a
different category, the penalty to be imposed should be that for the latter and not that for an impossible
crime.

(10) What are heinous crimes? (1995; 1997)

ANS: Heinous crimes are those grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which by reason of
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity, are repugnant and outrageous
to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. They
are punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. (WHEREAS CLAUSE, R.A. 7659)

(11)What is the purpose of the Probation Law (1986; 1989)

ANS: The purposes of the Probation Law are:

a. To promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment;
b. To provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be
less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
c. To prevent the commission of offenses.

BAR TYPE QUESTIONS

Based on the Ponencia of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing
Question No. 1
A, a security guard, heard a loud scream of a person seemingly being slaughtered. He
peeped through a small hole and saw X standing where the body of the victim C, was sprawled.
He went out and was informed that somebody was stabbed. At this juncture, A saw X moved away
from the scene of the crime. He whistled for him to stop but X continued running away. A chased X
but the latter was able to get away. Thereafter, A called the police authorities.
When the police arrived, they gathered from the witnesses that prior to the stabbing
incident, C and X had a confrontation. Suddenly, they heard a loud scream and saw C fell down
and X ran away, holding a bag. The same bag was recovered later at the scene of the crime and
found to contain things belonging to the victim, C. A bloodied screwdriver was also recovered at
the situs criminis. Several hours later, X was arrested and in his possession was found the wallet,
personal effects, watch and pendant of the victim.

Is X guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide? Reason.

ANS: NO. The crucial elements in robbery with homicide is the presence of criminal design on
the part of the accused to commit robbery, and the commission of homicide by reason, or on occasion, of
the robbery. Thus, the phrase "by reason" covers homicide committed before or after the taking of
personal property of another, as long as the motive of the offender (in killing a person before the robbery)
is to deprive the victim of his personal property which is sought to be accomplished by eliminating an
obstacle or opposition or (in killing a person after the robbery) to do away with a witness or to defend the
possession of the stolen property.
But in the case at bar, there is no evidence showing that the death of the victim occurred by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Where the homicide is not conclusively shown to have been
committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, or where the robbery was not proven at all, there can be
no conviction for robo con homicidio. At most, X can only be convicted of the separate and distinct crimes
of Homicide and Theft. (PEOPLE vs. SANCHEZ, GR No. 120655, October 14, 1998)

Question No. 2
Francisco agreed to buy on installment from Francel Realty a townhouse unit in Cavite.
Upon execution of the contract to sell, Francisco issued 48 post dated checks as required by the
realtor, each amounting to P9,4785.90 covering 48 monthly installment. However, after moving in
his unit, Francisco complained with the realtor regarding defects in the unit. He served to them 2
notarial notices to the effect that he was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending
compliance with the project plans.
Notwithstanding the notarial notices, the realtor continued to present for encashment the
checks in question. Meanwhile, Francisco sent stop payment orders to the bank. Eventually, the
bank advised Francisco to simply close his checking account amounting to P150,000 to avoid
paying bank charges every time he makes a stop payment order on the forthcoming checks.
Because of this, the bank dishonored the remaining checks.

If the realtor files a case against Francisco for violation of BP Blg. 22, do you think the
action will prosper?

ANS: NO. It must be noted that the elements of violation of BP Blg. 22 are as follows: (a) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (b) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (c) the subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawee,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Here, the 2nd and 3rd elements were not established. Francisco had P150, 000.00 cash or credit in
the bank at the time of the presentment of the checks. The closure of his account was made upon the
advise of the bank to avoid bank charges each time he issues a stop payment order to prevent
encashment. Moreover, Francisco only relied on Sec 23 of PD 957 to suspend payments until such
time as the developer had fulfilled its obligation to the buyer. This exercise of statutory right to
suspend installment payments is a valid defense against the purported violation of BP Blg.22.
(SYCIP vs. CA, GR No. 125059, March 17, 2000)

Question No. 3
One afternoon, X called A, the 13-year old niece of his common-law wife, to his house. X
gave A “lugaw.” After eating the porridge, A felt dizzy. X then told A to go to the bedroom. There, X
removed A’s clothes and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. A tried to extricate herself
from X but because the latter was stronger and because she felt dizzy, A’s resistance proved futile.
 During the trial for the crime of rape, X interposed the defense that he and A were
sweethearts, and even produced an undated letter, allegedly written by A to him. A for her part
denied having written the letter.

Is X guilty of the crime of rape? Reason.

ANS: YES. A drug or substance was used to cause the victim to submit to the accused’s sexual
advances. It has been ruled that if the ability to resist is taken away by administering a drug, even though
the woman may be conscious, sexual intercourse with her will be rape. In contrast, the "sweetheart
defense" proffered by X is too worn-out to deserve serious consideration. As an affirmative defense, said
"love affair" needs convincing proof. X provides but little evidence that such a romantic relationship
existed. Other than his self-serving assertions and the letter, which A denied having written, there is no
support to his claim that he and A were in love. (PEOPLE vs. CARATAY, GR No. 119418, October 5,
1999)

Question No. 4
Sometime in 1985, Y joined X’s business and they formed a partnership under the style
“Success Manufacturing.” However, the partnership was short lived. In January 1986, the parties
agreed to terminate the partnership. Upon liquidation of the business, the partnership had, as of
May 1986, receivables and stocks worth P1.8M. Y’s share of the assets was P900,000. To pay for
said shares of Y, X issued 4 postdated checks, payment of which is conditioned on the
subsequent realization of profits from the unsold goods and collection of the receivables of the
firm.
Y was able to encash the first, second and fourth checks, but the third check was
dishonored on October 14, 1986 for insufficiency of funds. X denied liability, claiming that the
check had been given upon demand of Y in May 1986 only as “assurance” of his share in the
assets of the partnership and that it was not supposed to be deposited until the stocks had been
sold.

Is the subsequent dishonor of the subject check upon presentment enough to render the
accused automatically guilty under BP 22? Decide.

ANS: NO. The subsequent dishonor of the subject check issued by X merely engendered the
prima facie presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds, but did not render X automatically
guilty under B.P. 22. Note that X issued the check merely to evidence the proportionate share of Y in the
partnership assets upon its dissolution. Payment on that share in the partnership was conditioned on the
subsequent realization of profits from the unsold goods and collection of the receivables of the firms. The
condition must be satisfied or complied before Y can actually “encash” the check. Thus, prior to the selling
of the goods and collecting of the receivables, Y could not, as of yet, demand his proportionate share in
the business.
There is no evidence that X signed and issued the four checks actually knowing that funds
therefor would be insufficient at the time Y would present them to the drawee bank. For it was uncertain at
the time of issuance of the checks whether the unsold goods would have been sold, or whether the
receivables would have been collected by the time the checks would be encashed. Since petitioner
issued these four checks without actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, she could not be held
liable under B.P. 22.
Moreover, the subject check was issued merely to evidence complainant’s interest in the
partnership. Thus, the check was not intended to apply on account or for value; rather it should be
deemed as having been drawn without consideration at the time of issue. Absent the first element of the
offense penalized under BP 22, which is “the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply on
account or for value,” X’s issuance of the subject check was not an act contemplated in nor made
punishable by said statute. (IRMA IDOS vs. CA and PEOPLE, GR No. 110782, September 25, 1998)

Question No. 5
X and Y were charged and convicted by the RTC of the crime of robbery with homicide and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. X and Y appealed their conviction.
The Solicitor General, while agreeing with the basic finding of guilt by the trial court,
nonetheless recommended the modification of the penalty in conformity with RA 7659. He
suggests that the penalty imposed should be modified to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Perpetua, as
maximum.

Is the Solicitor General’s recommendation correct? Reason.

 ANS: NO. Although Sec. 17 of RA 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty
(20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original
classification as an indivisible penalty.
Article 63 of the RPC provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have
attended the commission of the deed. If reclusion perpetua was reclassified as a divisible penalty, then
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and basis for existence. The imputed duration
of thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, therefore, only serves as the basis for determining the convict's
eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties.
(PEOPLE vs. RAGANAS and DALEON, GR No. 101188, October 12, 1999)

Question No. 6
Pedro and his brother, Manuel attended a dance party. An past midnight, about 1:30 am,
violence erupted. On signal by Manuel, Pedro fired his .38 caliber revolver at Ignacio, but missed
and hit Mildred and Carol instead. Pedro again fired a second shot, this time hitting Ignacio who
slumped on the floor. Meanwhile, Manuel grabbed Rosie and poked a knife at her neck when the
latter hysterically shouted “si Bodoy, si Bodoy” in allusion to Pedro, and threatened to kill her.
Soon after, the two brothers fled.
The victims of the gunfire were transported to the hospital, where Carol and Ignacio died.
Mildred sustained physical injuries.

(a) Was there conspiracy between the brothers Pedro and Manuel in the killing of the two
victims?
(b) According to Pedro, he should not be held liable for the death of Carol and the injuries
sustained by Mildred since he did not intend to shoot either of them. Is his contention
correct?
(c) Granting there was conspiracy, should Manuel be held liable for the death of Carol and
the injury of Mildred? Decide.

ANS: (a) YES. Manuel demonstrated not mere passive presence at the scene of the crime. He
stayed beside his brother Pedro while the dance party drifted late into the night till the early hours of the
morning the following day. At the signal of Manuel, Pedro commenced shooting at the hapless victims.
Also, Pedro fled from the crime scene together with his brother. And while getting away, Manuel grabbed
Rosie and poked a knife at her neck when the latter hysterically shouted “si Bodoy, si Bodoy” in allusion to
Pedro, whom she saw as the gunwielder. All told, Manuel, by his conduct, demonstrated unity of
purpose and design with his brother Pedro in committing the killing. He is thus liable as co-
conspirator.
(b) NO. Pedro cannot escape culpability on the basis of aberratio ictus principle. Criminal liability
is incurred by any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act be different from that which he
intended.
(c) NO. The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ignacio and no one else. For acts done
outside the contemplation of the conspiracy, only the actual perpetrators are liable. (PEOPLE vs.
HERMOGENES FLORA and EDWIN FLORA, GR No. 125909, June 23, 2000)

Question No. 7
Y was pacing back and forth in X’s yard, armed with a scythe and shouting at X, who was
looking out of the window, to come down so they could fight to the death. Suddenly, Y leaped at X
who was standing with his head out of the window and slashed X with his scythe but missed.
Thereafter, X went down and grappled with Y for the possession of the scythe. Upon gaining
possession of the scythe, X hacked Y 12 times. Thereafter, X voluntarily surrendered to the
barangay captain.

(a) Can X invoked the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of relatives?

(b) What mitigating circumstance/s can be appreciated in favor of X, if any?

ANS: (a) NO. When X was able to disarm Y of the scythe, there was no longer any real peril to
the life or safety of X or his family. When unlawful aggression which has begun earlier no longer exists,
the one making the defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.
(b) There are two mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated in favor of X: (1) that sufficient
provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the killing, and (2) that
appellant voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents. A barangay captain being
a person in authority, voluntary surrender to him can be considered a mitigating circumstance. (PEOPLE
vs. ALBERTO DANO, GR No. 117690, September 1, 2000)
Question No. 8
After learning that his dog was slaughtered and eaten by Lito and the latter’s family, Danilo
confronted Lito and shouted at the latter that he “would have his day also.”
That night while Lito and his family were preparing for bed, an explosion was heard,
followed by the sounds of footsteps. Lito’s wife, Clara, looked through their window and saw
Danilo coming out from under their house, stooping and carrying a long firearm. Upon seeing her
husband shot, Clara shouted to her children for help, but it was too late as her husband was
already dead.

(a) Was the qualifying circumstance of treachery present in the commission of crime?
(b) Considering that the triggerman fired the shot from outside the house, can the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated against the accused? Reason.

ANS: (a) YES. The two conditions for treachery to be present are (1) that at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular
means, method, or form of attack employed by him.
In the case at bar, the victim had absolutely no idea that he was going to be shot as he went to
bed, from under his own house at that. He was not in a position to defend himself, being unaware and
unexpectant of an attempt on his life, in the particular manner purposely adopted by Danilo. Clearly, Lito
was killed in a treacherous manner.
(b) YES. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused
should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim
was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the
assault from without. (PEOPLE vs. DACIBAR and DICON, GR No. 117690, February 17, 2000)

Question No. 9
Pat. X and Pat. Y were assigned to maintain peace and order at the Junior and Senior Prom
of Pili Barangay High School. At around 9:00 pm, after being informed that somebody was making
trouble at the back of the school’s temporary building, Pat. X and Pat. Y, armed with an armalite
and a .38 caliber revolver respectively, proceeded to check what the trouble was all about.
Outside the temporary building, C was vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the
school’s building. Without warning, Pat. X fired his gun. C was hit and was pronounced dead on
arrival at the hospital.

Should the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty be considered in favor of Pat.

X? Is there any mitigating circumstance that can be considered in favor of Pat. X?
Reason.

ANS: The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty cannot be considered in favor of Pat. X.
However, Pat. X’s liability can be mitigated by the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty.
In the instant case, only the first requisite of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty is
present: that Pat. X acted in the performance of his duty. The second requisite is lacking, for the killing
need not be a necessary consequence of the performance of his duty. His duty is to maintain peace and
order during the Junior and Senior Prom. However, he exceeded such duty when he fired his armalite
without warning. (PEOPLE vs. PATROLMAN DOMINGO BELBES, G.R. No. 124670, June 21, 2000)

Question No. 10
Brothers Jose and Danilo were having a drinking session with Pablo in the latter’s
store/house. Suddenly, an altercation started between Jose and Pablo. Pablo then struck Jose in
the face with a bottle. Jose retaliated by stabbing Pablo in the stomach. Danilo tried to intervene
but could not separate them since Jose was holding a bolo. Fearing also for his life, Danilo run
away.
After stabbing Pablo, Jose totally lost control of himself and went on a rampage. He
continued to stab even Pablo’s wife, Fe, who was sleeping inside the house. He also stabbed
Pablo’s three daughters, Sheryl, Tina, and Joy, ages 7, 4 and 2 respectively, who were also
sleeping inside the house. Pablo, his wife, Fe, and their three daughters died as a result of the
stab wounds sustained by each of them.

(a) Was the qualifying circumstance of treachery present in the killing of Pablo, his wife,
Fe, and their three daughters?
(b) Should the aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated against Jose?
(c) What mitigating circumstance can be appreciated in favor of Jose? Reason.
 ANS: (a) As to Pablo, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime because the attack
was preceded by an argument. In treachery, the mode of attack must be planned and must not spring
from the unexpected turn of events. But as to Pablo’s wife, the killing was attended by treachery since she
was sleeping at the time of the attack, and was in no position to defend herself. Likewise, treachery
attended the killing of the three children, Sheryl, Tina and Joy, since they were mere children of tender
years who were killed while they were sleeping.
(b) The generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling did not attend the killing of Pablo because
he gave sufficient and immediate provocation for the attack when he hit Jose with the bottle. Dwelling is
aggravating only if the offended party has not given provocation.
However, with respect to the killing of Fe and the three young children, dwelling as an
aggravating circumstance is present considering that the killings were committed in the domicile of the
four victims, without provocation on their part.
(c) The alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered as mitigating in favor of
Jose since it was sufficiently shown that (a) at the time of the commission of the criminal act, he has taken
such quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of certain degree of control, and (b)
that such intoxication is not habitual, or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. It was this
intoxication which led to his impetuous, frenzied and furious attack on the victims. (PEOPLE vs.
ALEJANDRO MARQUITA and JOSEPH MARQUITA, GR No. 119958, March 1, 2000)

Question No. 11
While a jeep driven by Ned, with Peter, Bobby and Andrew, as passengers, was negotiating
an uphill portion of the highway, several shots were fired by Andrew from his .38 caliber gun
without warning, causing injuries to Peter, which caused his death; a wound at the nape of Ned
which could have caused his death were it not for the timely medical attendance; and wounds on
the left wrist of Bobby. All three victims were shot from behind as they sat at the front seat of the
jeep, while Andrew sat at the back. Thereafter, Andrew took from Peter P20,000 which the latter
won at a cockfight.

What crime/s did Andrew commit? Decide.

ANS: Considering that the shootings were carried out in a sudden and unexpected manner,
without warning, with neither Ned, Bobby and the deceased Peter expecting the attack, there was present
in the shooting the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Thus, with respect to Ned who survived the
attack, Andrew must be held liable for frustrated murder. In this case, the perpetrator performed all acts
necessary to produce the crime but, for some reason other than his own spontaneous desistance (in this
case, the timely medical attendance), the felony is not consummated.
As for Bobby’s injuries, Andrew must be held liable for attempted murder. A felony is attempted
when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance, such as the absence of lethal or mortal wounds. In this case, Bobby was
only shot at his left wrist, which is not a mortal wound per se.
Regarding Peter’s death, the taking by Andrew of the money of the victim qualified the crime into
robbery with homicide. After shooting Peter which caused the latter’s death, Andrew took his money worth
P20,000. From these circumstances, there can be no other conclusion than that Andrew robbed Peter,
who was shot to death on the occasion of the robbery. (PEOPLE vs. JARANDILLA, GR No. 115985-86,
August 31, 2000)

Question No. 12
In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, should treachery, if properly
alleged and proven, be considered as a generic aggravating or a qualifying circumstance?

ANS: In People v. Salvatierra, it was ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in
the RPC. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the RPC. Here, treachery
forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically
it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine
the penalty to be imposed. (PEOPLE vs. MACABALES, et al., GR No. 111102, December 8, 2000)

Question No. 13
At 1:00 am, A forced himself into the house of B and, with a foot-long double blade,
threatened and demanded money from the latter. And as if robbing poor B wasn’t enough, A
dragged her into the kitchen and raped her. Eventually, B was charged, tried and convicted of the
crime of Robbery with Rape under the second paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

(a) If nighttime was alleged in the information, should the trial court consider the same as
an aggravating circumstance?
(b) Was the aggravating circumstance of dwelling present in this case?
(c) Would the appreciation of the dwelling as an aggravating circumstance still be
necessary? Reason.

ANS: (a) NO. Although the crime was committed during nighttime, by and of itself, the same is
not an aggravating circumstance. There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the
objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense;
and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the
offender. The abovementioned facts do not show that nighttime was purposely sought by the offender, or
that it facilitated the commission of the crime.
(b) YES, considering that the crime was committed in the domicile of the victim without
provocation on her part. Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the
sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do
him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.
(c) NO. Considering that A stands accused of the crime of Robbery with Rape with the use of
deadly weapon, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Art. 294 of the RPC, the
appreciation of the dwelling as an aggravating circumstance is no longer necessary. (PEOPLE. vs.
ERNEST BELO, GR No. 109148, December 4, 1998)

Question No. 14
Can an accused who is a Cash Custodian of a bank be convicted of the crime of Estafa if
he or she misappropriates and converts to her own personal use and benefit money in the bank’s
vault, which is under her direct custody and/or accountability? Reason.

ANS: NO. The possession of a cash custodian of cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a
bank teller, both being mere bank employees. Hence, one of the elements of estafa through conversion or
misappropriation, i.e., that the offender receives money, goods, or any personal property in trust or on
commission or for administration, which requires that there should be both material and juridical
possession by the offender, is absent in the case at bar. The accused may be convicted of Qualified Theft
instead. (CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE vs. CA,GR No. 109595, April 27, 2000)

Question No. 15
For purposes of the enforcement of an employer’s subsidiary liability found in Art. 103 of
the RPC, when can the existence of an employer-employee relationship of the accused driver and
the alleged vehicle owner be determined?

ANS: There are two instances: one, during the criminal proceeding; and the other, during the
proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both cases, the alleged employer should be given the
opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due process. (LUISITO BASILIO vs. CA, GR No.
113433, March 17, 2000)

Question No. 16
While R and his friends are happily drinking and singing songs in a baptismal party. A, a
soldier, drunk and armed with an M16 rifle, approached R’s table and shouted “Bata ako ni
Honasan” and cocked his rifle and fired one shot into the air. Thereafter, A walked up to R and
shot him in the face. R fell down, and while lying on the floor, A shot him again at the back.
Eventually, A was charged and convicted of murder, qualified by treachery.

(a) Did the court properly considered the presence of treachery as a qualifying
circumstance?
(b) Was there present in the commission of the crime any other aggravating
circumstance?
(c) What about mitigating circumstance? Reason.

ANS: (a) NO. The qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently proven. While the
attack on the victim was sudden, it does not appear that A consciously adopted the means, method, and
manner of attack on the victim. There being only one qualifying circumstance alleged in the information,
and none being proven, A should be held guilty of the lesser crime of homicide.
(b) YES. The generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of one’s public position is
present. A, at the time of the commission of the crime, was a member of the former PC-INP, therefore a
public officer.
(c) YES. The alternative circumstance of intoxication should be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance since it was not habitual and subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. (PEOPLE vs.
ACAYA, GR No. 108381, March 7, 2000)

Question No. 17
X, while standing on the highway waiting for a ride home, was shot by Y, a policeman. X
was hit on his right leg. The incident happened after X shouted damning curses at the driver and
passengers of the jeepney, on which Y was riding, when the jeepney swerved dangerously
towards X. X died due to massive loss of blood on account of the gunshot wound, despite
attempts by medical personnel to save him.
Y was initially restricted by his commanding officer within their camp pending the
investigation of the case. Later on, however, he was surrendered by his commanding officer to the
custody of the court.

(a) Is Y entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender?

(b) Is the killing qualified by treachery?
(c) Can Y be exculpated by alleging that the death of the victim was due to the lack of
prompt and proper medical attention? Decide.

ANS: (a) NO. In this instance, it was Y’s commanding officer who surrendered him to the custody
of the court. Being restrained by one’s superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the
investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law. The
essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save
them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
(b) NO. The shooting was done at the spur of the moment. The victim was shouting damning
curses at the driver and the passengers of the jeepney. The shooting was an instantaneous response to
the cursing. For treachery to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the
accused consciously adopted the mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself.
(c) NO. The perceived delay in giving medical treatment to the victim does not break at all the
causal connection between the wrongful act of Y and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not
constitute efficient intervening cause. The proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting
by Y. The fact that the injured did not receive proper medical attendance would not affect Y’s criminal
responsibility. The rule is founded on the practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue
to escape from the just consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were otherwise, many criminals could
avoid just accounting for their acts by merely establishing a doubt as to the immediate cause of death.
(PEOPLE vs. ACURAM, GR No. 117954, April 27, 2000)

Question No. 18
X was on his way home when he met Y on the road. As he knew Y, X greeted Y by nodding
his head to which the latter responded by also nodding his head. When X was about to proceed, Y
blocked his way by pointing a firearm at X. X tried to run, but Y fired successive shots at him
causing him to fall to the ground wounded. Almost simultaneously, A, B, C and D appeared and
took turns in shooting X.
A then turned to B and fired at the latter hitting him on the right thigh to make it appear
that the shooting was in self-defense. Thereafter, A approached the body of X and placed the gun
he used in shooting B near the hand of X. Then A placed some live bullets into the pocket of X.

(a) Is treachery present?

(b) Is conspiracy present in the commission of the crime? Decide.

ANS: (a) YES. There was nothing in the behavior of Y that could have forewarned the victim of an
impending danger. Both X and Y knew each other. Y even acknowledged the greeting of the victim. The
victim was walking on his way home when he was gunned down. The victim gave no provocation for the
attack. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation
on the part of the person attacked. Clearly, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in this
situation.
 (b) YES. The conduct of the malefactors before, during or after the commission of the crime is
sufficient to prove conspiracy. In the case at bar, the circumstances show that Y, A, B, C and D acted
concertedly to kill X. First, after Y fired at the victim incapacitating the latter, A, B, C and D arrived almost
simultaneously and took turns in shooting the victim. Second, A thereafter fired a shot at the thigh of B to
make it appear that the shooting was in self-defense. Third, A planted a firearm near the body of the
victim and placed bullets in the pocket of the victim. These aforementioned acts clearly point to their
common purpose, concert of action, and community of interest. (PEOPLE vs. ENOJA, et al., GR No.
102596, December 17, 1999)

Question No. 19
X, while washing some clothes, was hit by her nephew, Y, by a round, thick piece of wood.
The blow landed on her right eyebrow and rendered her unconscious. Upon regaining
consciousness, X dragged herself to their nipa hut wherein she found her husband. Due to the
timely medical attention given to X, she survived.
Y was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide. Y contends that the victim’s injuries
are not fatal and he should be liable only for physical injuries. On the other hand, the prosecution
argues that there was intent to kill on the part of Y when he inflicted the injuries to his aunt.

Was there intent to kill? Is Y guilty of the crime charged? Decide.

ANS: YES. Intent to kill must be evidenced by an act which, at the time of its execution, is
unmistakably calculated to produce the victim’s death by adequate means. Applying this to the case at
bar, the intent to kill cannot be doubted. Y armed himself with a heavy wooden club and aimed his blow at
the victim’s head. The blow hit her in the head, and she lost consciousness. But, because of timely
medical assistance, X survived.
Y is guilty of frustrated homicide. Here, the crime of homicide was not consummated by reason
other than Y’s desistance. Y had performed all the acts of execution, but the felony of homicide was not
produced by reasons independent of the will of Y. Hence, Y is liable for frustrated homicide because the
victim lived. Had she died, he would have been liable for the graver offense of consummated homicide.
(PEOPLE vs. ARCILLAS, GR No. 126817, December 27, 2000)

Question No. 20
While on their way to buy copra and abaca, Lorenzo (driver of the truck), Vicente, Julian
and Jose were stopped by Danilo who stood at the left side of the road. Danilo approached the
truck and shot Lorenzo once, killing the latter instantly. After shooting Lorenzo, two persons
appeared from nowhere and approached the back of the truck and told the other three men to lie
face downward. The assailants then took the bag containing the money carried by Lorenzo and
hurriedly ran towards the mountainside.
Danilo was eventually arrested. He was charged and convicted by the trial court of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Was the trial court correct in convicting Danilo of robbery with homicide even if the driver
was killed before the robbery? Reason.

ANS: YES. The phrase "by reason" covers homicide committed before or after the taking of
personal property of another, as long as the motive of the offender in killing a person before the robbery is
to deprive the victim of his personal property which is sought to be accomplished by eliminating an
obstacle or opposition, or in killing a person after the robbery to do away with a witness or to defend the
possession of the stolen property. Thus, it matters not that the victim was killed prior to the taking of the
personal properties of the victim. What is essential in robbery with homicide is that there be a direct
relation and intimate connection between robbery and killing, whether both crimes be committed at the
same time. (PEOPLE vs. TORRES, GR No. 130661, June 27, 2001)

Question No. 21
While preparations for the wedding was going on at the groom’s residence, Berto shouted
at the cooks and their helpers. Finally, when Berto became violent and disrupted the wedding
festivities, Reynaldo called on the barangay captain Teodoro to help him pacify Berto. Upon
reaching the groom’s residence, Reynaldo and Teodoro heard the angry shouts and curses of
Berto. Reynaldo rushed to attend to his wife who had collapsed due to fear and a heart ailment,
while Teodoro proceded to the kitchen to see Berto. Teodoro approached the irate Berto from
behind. He pulled out his gun and fired at Berto, hitting him in the nape. Two shots followed in
rapid succession and Berto fell face downward, dead. Teodoro then fled.
 The autopsy report showed that the victim had suffered three gunshot wounds at the
lateral side of the neck and in the chest.

(a) Did Teodoro act in self-defense?

(b) Is Teodoro entitled to any mitigating circumstance? Reason.

ANS: (a) NO. The victim was shot at the lateral side of the neck. The location of the gunshot
wound is significant since it establishes the relative position of the appellant as not in front of the victim
when the first shot was fired, but was behind him and towards the latter side. The nature and number of
wounds inflicted upon the victim are important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense. The
gruesome, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted upon the deceased show that appellant's act was not one of
self-defense, but was a determined and purposeful attack upon the victim.
(b) YES. The appellant must be accorded the mitigating circumstance that sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. The shooting was precipitated by
the unruly, wild behavior of the victim who was drunk, shouting for food and armed. This prompted the
family of the groom to call the barangay chairman who responded. (PEOPLE vs. UBALDO, GR No.
129389, October 17, 2001)

Question No. 22
Palmero was driving a passenger jeepney when Ferdinand waved at him to stop the jeep,
uttering offensive words. Palmero did not stop the jeep but proceeded to the police outpost to
seek assistance. There Palmero found SPO1 Cura who accompanied him to look for Ferdinand. It
turned out that on the previous day, a small damage was caused by Palmero’s jeep to Ferdinand’s
tricyle.
On their way, SPO1 Cura and Palmero got stuck in a traffic jam. Upon seeing them,
Ferdinand, with his brother Alexander, alighted from the tricycle and grabbed Palmero out of the
jeep. Ferdinand was able to pin Palmero’s head under his armpit and while in this position,
Alexander stabbed Palmero at the back twice with a fan knife. While the fight was going on, SPO1
Cura alighted from the jeep, but before he could make a warning shot, Alexander stabbed him.
Thereafter, Ferdinand got possession SPO1 Cura’s gun and shot Palmero. While all these were
going on, some companions of SPO1 Cura tried to come to Palmero’s rescue, but to no avail.
The victims were brought to the hospital. SPO1 Cura survived because of the timely
medical assistance; Palmero died.

(a) Was treachery present in the commission of the crime?

(b) What crime or crimes was/were committed?

ANS: (a) NO. Treachery is committed when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means,
methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his person. In this case, attendant circumstances, including the
sequence of events, rule out the presence of the first element of alevosia. True, Alexander stabbed
Palmero at the back while Ferdinand’s arm was encircled tightly around the victim's neck. But recall,
however, that Palmero was together with an armed policeman SPO1 Cura. Note likewise that the incident
happened during a traffic jam, when there were many people. The presence of Cura and his companions
who came to Palmero’s rescue shows that the victim was not completely helpless.
Neither is there sufficient evidence to establish that accused consciously adopted the mode of
attack. The facts show that (1) a day earlier there was a mishap involving Palmero’s jeepney and
Ferdinand’s tricycle; and (2) a verbal confrontation with curses had ensued between Ferdinand and
Palmero. This was before the adversaries found themselves in a traffic jam when the two brothers yanked
Palmero out of the jeepney. Treachery is not present where the victim, before being attacked, had a
heated argument with one of the malefactors which must have placed him on guard, aside from standing
face to face with them, so that the initial assault was not sudden or unforeseen. Even if the aggression
was from behind, it is not treacherous if preceded by a heated argument. Moreover, the meeting by the
two groups was accidental, caused by the traffic jam.
(b) Since the killing of Palmero and the stabbing of SPO1 Cura was not attended by treachery,
the crime committed is only homicide and frustrated homicide. It is frustrated homicide in the case of
SPO1 Cura because were it not for timely medical attention, SPO1 Cura would have died from said
wounds. (PEOPLE vs. SALVA, GR No. 132351, January 10, 2002)

Question No. 23
According to X, since LPI (payee) deposited the checks on June 5, 1986, or 157 days after
the Dec. 30, 1985 maturity date, the presumption of knowledge of lack of funds under Sec. 2 of BP
Blg. 22 should not apply to him.
 Is X’s argument correct? Reason.

ANS: Contrary to X’s assertion, nowhere in BP Blg. 22 does the law require a maker to maintain
funds in his bank account for only 90 days. Rather, the clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie
presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment
within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make
arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the check must be
deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of
knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner
from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof. (WONG vs. CA
and PEOPLE, GR No. 117857, February 2, 2001)

Question No. 24
Because of a labor strike, Company Y failed to fund the checks issued by its President, Mr.
Norton, to Company A as payment for rental arrearges. Thereafter, Company A foreclosed the
property of Company Y in its possession in a public auction sale to satisfy Company A’s unpaid
rentals. But despite having collected already the value of the checks, Company A filed a case
against Mr. Norton for violation of BP 22.

Should Mr. Norton be convicted of BP 22 even if the rental arrearges of Company Y was
already paid by the foreclosure of their properties by the creditor, Company A? Reason.

ANS: NO. The checks issued were corporate checks that Company Y allegedly failed to fund for
a valid reason (i.e., the labor strike) duly communicated to the payee. Company A, through a notarial
foreclosure and auction sold Company Y’s property for cash to satisfy Company A’s claim for unpaid
rentals. Thus, by the time the criminal charges were filed, the civil obligation of Company Y to Company A
was no longer subsisting. In other words, Company A has already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh
through foreclosure and auction sale as its chosen remedy.
Under these circumstances, the charges against Norton could not be upheld without running afoul
of basic principles of fairness and justice. Although the gravamen of the violation of B.P. 22 is the
issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, penal laws should
not be applied mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of
and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law
ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this
case where a debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor
having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of
rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under
B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations. (GRIFFITH vs. CA, GR No. 129764, March 12, 2002)

Question No. 25
According to the witness Izza, after watching a dance at the Mac Mariano Elementary
School, she saw Jose stabbed Larry on the chest while the latter was being held by three persons.
After Jose was done, the latter left. Thereafter, Berto came and stabbed Larry, also on the chest.
As a result of the stab wounds, Larry died.

Was there conspiracy? Reason.

ANS: NO. The facts show that Jose stabbed Larry and after such stabbing, Jose left. It was after
he left that Berto came and also stabbed the victim. The attacks were not simultaneous. Nor was there
any showing that these attacks were done for a common purpose. The rule is that conspiracy must be
shown as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. In the case at bar, no positive
and conclusive evidence was shown to establish conspiracy. Thus, Jose and Berto should be liable only
for their individual acts. (PEOPLE vs. REAPOR, GR No. 130962, October 5, 2001)

Question No. 26
Among the guests in a birthday party were A and B, and the brothers X and Y. At about
10:00 pm, X took a nap on a long bench. In jest, A slapped him on the face. X was awakened and
instinctively threw an empty whiskey bottle at A but did not hit the latter. Irked by what happened,
A and B left the house. Moments later, X and Y also left the place.
 Just outside the gate, the brothers X and Y saw A and B a few meters away. As the
brothers approached A and B, B handed the knife to A. A suddenly stabbed Y and thereafter
stabbed X. Y died while X survived.

Is conspiracy present in the case so as to make B a principal? Reason.

ANS: NO. For conspiracy to exist, the participants must agree to the commission of the felony
and decide to commit it, which agreement may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission
of the offense or inferred from the acts that point to joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of intent. Although the knife used by A belonged to B, his handing the knife to A was not by
itself an act of conspiracy. Nothing in the facts show that the two had a preconceived plan to commit the
crime. There is no showing B was motivated by the criminal design similarly entertained by A at the same
time. In case of doubt, the milder form of responsibility should be attributed to the accused. Hence, B’s
participation was only that of an accomplice in the offenses committed. (PEOPLE vs. SAUL, GR No.
124809, December 19, 2001)

Question No. 27
Joel is the owner of two carabaos, the care of which he entrusted to Rosalina. One night,
at about 2:00 a.m., two persons, later identified as Jose and Joselito, together with two others,
went to the corral where the two carabaos were kept. They untied the carabaos, rode on them and
proceeded to the cane-fields. Upon seeing what happened, Dionesio, who was himself watching
his cornfields, reported the taking of the carabaos by Joselito’s group to Rosalina. The latter in
turn reported to Joel the said incident. Thereafter, Joselito’s group was charged with violation of
P.D.533, known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.

(a) Should Jose and Joselito be convicted of violation of P.D.533?

(b) Did P.D.533 supersede the crime of qualified theft of large cattle under the RPC?
Decide.

ANS: (a) YES. As defined by PD 533, cattle rustling is the taking away by any means, method or
scheme, without the consent of the owner or raiser of cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass, or other
domesticated member of the bovine family, whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or
without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. Cattle rustling includes the
killing of large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser. The "owner"
includes the herdsman, caretaker, employee or tenant of any firm or entity engaged in the raising of large
cattle or other persons in lawful possession of such large cattle.
In this case Rosalina, the caretaker of the carabaos, did not consent to the taking away of the
carabaos. In fact, she immediately informed Joel, the owner, that his carabaos had been stolen. Hence,
Jose and Joselito should be convicted of PD 533.
(b) NO. P.D.533 merely modified the penalties provided for qualified theft of large cattle under
Article 310 of the RPC by imposing stiffer penalties thereon under special circumstances. (PEOPLE vs.
ESCARDO and VILLACASTIN, JR., GR No. 120548, October 26, 2001)

Question No. 28
A charge of murder and illegal possession of firearm were filed against the three suspects
who are detention prisoners. Albert, one of the suspects, is a former policeman. He contends that
he cannot be charged with illegal possession of firearm because as a policeman, he is authorized
to carry and possess said firearm, as evidenced by a Memorandum Receipt (MR) which has not
been recalled or cancelled.

Is his contention correct? Decide.

ANS: NO. The claim of Albert that he had a valid MR authorizing him to carry the .38 caliber
revolver is of no moment. While an MR is an authority to possess a government firearm, when Albert was
charged and detained at BBRC, he was already at that moment a detained prisoner and therefore,
unauthorized to carry a firearm. A military man or a member of the PNP who commits a crime, is
immediately disarmed upon his arrest and stripped of all the rights and privileges that go with the function
of his office, and this includes, in the case of Albert, his MR. Thus, when he shot Alejandro Flores with
his .38 caliber revolver, this firearm was already unauthorized and its use and possession illegal.
However, it must be remembered that the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is
not a separate crime, but merely a special aggravating circumstance as declared in People vs. Castillo,
G.R. 131592-93, February 15, 2000. (PEOPLE vs. ABRIOL, et al., GR No. 123137, October 17, 2001)
Question No. 29
When Rose’s mother, Rosalina, noticed that her daughter was nowhere to be found, she
reported Rose’s disappearance to the police. The police organized two search teams. One of the
search teams found Rose in the company of an old man named Fred inside a restaurant.
Thereafter, Fred was arrested and charged with kidnapping.

If you were the judge, would you convict Fred of the crime charged? Reason.

ANS: NO. Under Art. 267, the primary element of the crime of kidnapping is actual confinement,
detention and restraint of the victim. However, in the case at bar, the facts do not adequately prove that
the victim was forcefully transported, locked up or restrained by the accused. There is here no indubitable
proof of purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim, hence, there was no
taking coupled with intent to complete the commission of the offense. Therefore, the accused Fred should
be acquitted. (PEOPLE vs. UBONGEN, GR No. 126024, April 20, 2001)

Question No. 30
New Durawood Company is engaged in the buy and sell of construction materials;
Mariano was one of their regular customers. Mariano issued a Security Bank check, post dated
Sept. 23, 2002, amounting to P384, 904.00 corresponding to the amount of materials he ordered.
The said check was dishonored because it was drawn against insufficient funds. Upon filing of the
case, Mariano admitted issuing the check but denied having received the materials he ordered,
prompting him not to deposit the amount in the check. The said materials were delivered to Ernie
and Nardo who were not in anyway related to his business. The trial court convicted Mariano of
estafa under par. 2 (d) of Art. 315 of the RPC.

(a) What are the elements of Estafa under par. 2 (d) of Art.315 of the RPC?
(b) Is the conviction of Mariano proper? Reason.

ANS: (a) The elements of estafa under Art. 315 par. 2 (d) are as follows: (1) Post dating or
issuing of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at time the check was issued; (2) Lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) DAMAGE to the payee thereof.
(b) NO. There is no ample proof that Mariano or his representative ever received the
merchandise ordered. On the contrary, the construction materials were received by Ernie and Nardo, all
of whom were not authorized by Mariano. Nor was it shown that these persons turned over the materials
to Mariano.
Clearly, one element of estafa is missing in this case: NO DAMAGE was sustained by the
company by reason of Mariano’s issuance of the check. It was not proved that Mariano received
something of value from the company, thus he had no obligation to make good the check he issued.
Hence, the decision is improper. (PEOPLE vs. TAN, GR No. 120672, August 17, 2000)

Question No. 31
While Artemio, Manolito and Jose were walking along the road in Brgy. Mainit, Manila,
Balas and Ruben emerged from both sides of the road armed with boloes and stopped them
saying, “here are the two persons we are waiting for” and immediately, Ruben stabbed and
hacked Artemio, hitting him on the forehead, then on his left shoulder and different parts of his
body including his left thigh where the blade of the bolo broke and got stuck, then on the stomach
and armpit when the bolo no longer had the pointed blade. Simultaneously, Balas stabbed and
hacked Jose. Ruben also stabbed Manolito, but the later evaded the thrust and was able to run
away unhurt. Artemio was also able to run away, and because of the timely medical intervention,
he survived. But as to Jose, he was found lying dead in the middle of the road.
Consequently, a criminal case was filed against Balas and Ruben. After trial, both were
convicted of murder and attempted murder.

(a) Does conspiracy exist in this case?

(b) Was the trial court correct in convicting the assailants of murder and attempted
murder? Reason.

ANS: (a) YES. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It is sufficient that at the time of the aggression all the
accused manifested by their acts, a common intent or desire to attack so that the act of one accused
becomes the act of all. Here, the accused waiting in ambush, one at each side of the road, attacked the
victims shouting, “Here are the two persons we are waiting for”. Thus, there is collective criminal
responsibility.
 (b) The conviction of murder is proper but as to attempted murder, it is improper. It should be
frustrated murder because were it not for the timely medical assistance, Artemio would have also died. It
must be stressed that it is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines whether a felony is
attempted or frustrated, but whether or not the subjective phase of the commission of the offense has
been passed and the objective phase has been reached. Subjective phase means that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act
performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that
time forward the phase is objective. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any
cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an
attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated. (PEOPLE vs.
MEDIOS and CABURAL, GR No. 132066-67, November 29, 2001)

Question No. 32
When charged with the crime of rape, Remigio, in his defense, painted Vilma (victim) as a
young whore who at 17, already lived-in with a 72 year-old pensioner. He also questioned the fact
that the case was only filed 5 years after the alleged crime was committed.

Are Remigio’s defenses tenable? Reason.

ANS: NO. The rule is that the victim’s character in rape is immaterial. There is absolutely no
nexus between the reputation of a rape victim and the odious deed committed against her. It may be true
that the offended person had therefore had relations with other men, but that fact did not justify the
accused in having illicit relations with her against her will and consent and by force and violence. The law
punishes those who have carnal relations with a woman by force or intimidation. Virginity is not one of the
elements of the crime of rape.
Delay in making criminal accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if such
delay is satisfactorily explained. Considering that at the time of rape, the victim was only 11 years old
and the accused was close to them, who threatened to kill her and her entire family if she would tell
anyone of the incident, the delay of 5 years was understandable. (PEOPLE vs. DELA PEÑA, GR No.
128372, March 12, 2001)

Question No. 33
Honesta, a businesswoman from Naga City, was persuaded by Manuel to purchase cans of
marine preservatives worth P1,500.00 per can from a peddler. In turn, Manuel would buy these
cans from Honesta at P2,000.00 each. The following day, a person named Glenn appeared at
Honesta’s store and introduced himself as an agent who sold said marine preservatives. Like a
fish going after a bait, Honesta purchased a can which she sold to Manuel for P1,900.00.
Encouraged by huge profits, she purchased 215 more cans for P322,500 from the money
she borrowed from a certain Jose at 10% interest. Soon after the payment, Glenn and Manuel
vanished. It was found out later by the NBI agents that the contents of the cans were starch.

What crime, if any, was committed in this case?

ANS: The crime committed was estafa or swindling under par. 2(a) of Art.315 of the RPC. The
elements of this crime are as follows: (a) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent
means; (b) that such false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party must have relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; and (d) that as a result
thereof the offended party suffered damage.
In this case, Glenn misrepresented himself as a seller of marine preservatives, which
misrepresentation Honesta fell for. The lure of profits offered by Manuel and Glenn made her borrow
money and then they disappeared from the scene after taking the money from her. The doctrine of caveat
emptor – let the buyer beware – cannot be applied because in caveat emptor, there must not have been
any false representation from the seller. In this case, there was such misrepresentation. (ERQUIAGA vs.
CA, GR No. 124513, October 17, 2001)

Question No. 34
Dyesebel, an 8 years old girl, was found raped and strangled to death near the riverbank.
In the autopsy report, it was found out that the pubic area of the victim bore blisters brought
about by a contact with a lighted cigarette. When confronted about the crime, Vicente admitted
that he raped and killed Dyesebel.
 Is there any aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime? Reason.

ANS: YES. The aggravating circumstance of ignominy under Art 14, No. 17 of the RPC should be
appreciated against the accused considering that the pubic area of the victim bore blisters brought about
by a contact with a lighted cigarette. This added disgrace and obloquy to the material injury inflicted upon
the victim of the crime. (PEOPLE vs. VALLA, GR No. 111285, January 24, 2000)

Question No. 35
Maria was on her way to the post office to mail some letters when Jose grabbed her hand
and pushed her inside a waiting tricycle. The tricycle brought Maria and Jose to the house of the
latter in Lagro Subdivision. Maria was detained by Jose inside the latter’s house for a total of 10
days. During such time, he would give her drinks which would cause her to feel drowsy and when
she would wake up, she would find herself naked and her private part aching. Maria soon became
so weak that she could hardly shout for help. Finally, after the tenth day of Maria’s abduction,
when police were already looking for Jose, the latter released her.
Thereafter, Jose was charged with the crime of forcible abduction with rape.

(a) According to Jose, Maria’s failure to ask for help, or to escape during her detention,
should be construed as a manifestation of consent to the sexual acts done by him. Is
his contention correct?
(b) Is the charge of forcible abduction with rape correct?

ANS: (a) NO. In this case, Maria was given by Jose drinks which caused her to feel drowsy.
When she would wake up, Maria would find herself naked and her private part aching. It is clear that the
act of Jose in giving Maria drinks were deliberately done to deprive the latter of reason and the will to
resist his sexual assault. The effect is thus similar to that of violence in overcoming resistance with which
she could very well have successfully thwarted the lustful act. Jose had clearly committed rape by
depriving Maria of reason to be able to have carnal knowledge of her without the latter having shown any
sign of consent. In a rape of a woman deprived of reason or who is unconscious, the victim has no will. In
that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual
intercourse.
(b) NO. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of the accused is
to rape the victim. In this case, Maria was repeatedly raped by Jose, showing that the main objective of
Jose was to rape Maria. (PEOPLE vs. SHAREFF ALI EL AKHTAR, GR No. 130640, June 21, 1999)

Question No. 36
At about 12:00 in the evening, Pedro, armed with a curved knife, went inside the tent of
Imelda, a 21 year-old mental retardate, and stabbed the latter on the different parts of her body
which caused her death. Thereafter, Pedro fled.

Was there present in this case abuse of superior strength?

ANS: YES. An attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless
woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in
the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. (PEOPLE vs. MADELO
ESPINA, GR No. 123102, February 29, 2000)

Question No. 37
George was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence on the
ground of reasonable doubt without ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of
the judgment, the CA found George civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify the victims. In
finding petitioner civilly liable, the CA noted that at the time the accident occurred, George was in
a state of intoxication, a clear violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Thus,
pursuant to Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, a statutory presumption of negligence existed.

It is now the contention of George that having been acquitted by the trial court of the crime
charged, he should not be held civilly liable. Is his contention correct?

ANS: NO. The law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First is on the acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to
be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission.
There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may
be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this
case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in
Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although
the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. (MANANTAN vs. CA, GR No. 107125, January 29, 2001)

Question No. 38
Fifteen year-old Janet was invited by her boyfriend Allan to have a drinking spree with him
and his other friends, Oliver, Miguel and Pablo. After finishing one bottle of Tanduay Rhum, of
which Janet drank five shots, Allan began kissing her on the cheeks and lips. She told Allan to
stop but the latter persisted. Subsequently, Allan held her by the right arm and took her to the
back of a pigpen. Here, Allan continued kissing her for 30 minutes while she repeatedly told him to
stop. Allan then told her to lie on the cardboard spread on the ground. As they both lay on the
cardboard, Allan lowered his shorts and had sexual intercourse with her. Janet tried to fight and
push Allan away for ten minutes, but she was too weak to slap or kick him, nor shout for help,
because she was too drunk and her voice would not come out.
While all these was happening, Miguel, Oliver and Pablo stood by, watching and laughing
at a distance of four or five meters. After Allan finished having intercourse with Janet, Miguel
lowered his pants and pulled out his sex organ. He sucked Janet’s breast for half an hour while
lying on top of her. She tried to push Miguel away with her hands, but he got off her only when
she vomited.

Allan and Miguel were charged with the crime of rape. If you were the judge, would you
convict them of the crime charged?

ANS: NO. In the case of Allan, his guilt is not proven with moral certainty. It appears that Janet
did not offer any real resistance to the advances made by Allan, who was admittedly her boyfriend. Allan
kissed Janet for 30 minutes before he lowered his shorts. Janet could have resisted and left within those
30 minutes, particularly since it did not appear that she was forced or threatened by Allan. This she did
not do.
With respect to Miguel, the facts are bereft of evidence that Miguel had carnal knowledge of
Janet. Even admitting that Miguel stroked and sucked her breasts, the records do not show that Miguel
forced, or attempted to force, his manhood on Janet. For conviction of rape to stand, there must be clear
and convincing evidence to prove the allegation that the person charged had carnal knowledge of
complainant against her will. At most, Miguel could only be liable for the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
This offense is necessarily included in the charge of rape. (PEOPLE vs. CASTILLO, et al., GR No.
131200, February 15, 2002)

ADDITIONAL CASES
POLITICAL CRIMES

REBELLION

ENRILE vs SALAZAR
186 SCRA 127

FACTS: Appellant Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers of the National Bureau of Investigation on strength of a warrant. The warrant was issued on an
information charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Enrilo and Gregorio Honasan with
the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of
the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed a
petition for habeas corpus, alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in having been,
among others, held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books.
The Court issued the writ prayed for and set the plea for hearing. The Solicitor General filed a
consolidated return which urged that the petitioners’ case does not fall within the Hernandez Ruling
because the information in Hernandez charged murder and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between complex crime arising from an offense
being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48,
RPC, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime arising from a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph,
with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.

ISSUE: Is the Hernandez ruling prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder or with any other offense committed in the occasion thereof, applicable in the case at bar?

HELD: YES. The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the court, which is
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner’s guilt or innocence is not here inquired
into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The court’s ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner’s complaints about
the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does
in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as simple rebellion.

PEOPLE vs. DASIG

221 SCRA 549

FACTS: Pfc. Manatad was gunned down by a group of 8 men while manning the traffic at M.N. Briones
St. and Bonifacion St. in Mandaue City. As a result of the killing, two teams of police officers were tasked
to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the Sparrow Unit located in Cebu City.
Here, they were able to arrest Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nunez. Dasig executed an extrajudicial
confession wherein he confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nunez killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise
admitted that he and Nunez were members of the Sparrow Unit.
In the present appeal, Dasig contends, among others, that assuming he conspired in the killing of
Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

ISSUES: (1) Granting that appellant is guilty of the killing of Pfc. Manatad, did the trial court err in
convicting him of murder with direct assault instead of simple rebellion?
(2) Assuming that he is guilty of rebellion, is the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable to him?

HELD: (1) YES. The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in the furtherance of rebellion though crimes in
themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer,
knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority, is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or
an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.
Moreover, in the case of People vs. Mangallan (160 SCRA 116), the SC held that where the
accused who was charged with murder admitted his membership with the NPA and the killing of a
suspected PC informer, the crime committed is not murder but rebellion punishable under Art. 134 and
135 of the RPC.
(2) NO. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion.
(Sec. 2, RA 4203)

PEOPLE vs. LOVEDIORO

250 SCRA 389

FACTS: SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was killed by a gunshot. The man who shot Lucilo had three other
companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After
taking Lucilo’s gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.
The man who fired the fatal shot turned out to be defendant-appellant Elias Lovedioro. Thereafter
he was charged with the crime of murder and the lower court convicted him.
In this appeal, appellant argues that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion and
not murder, he being a member of the New People’s Army. Additionally, he contends that because the
killing of Lucilo was “a means to or in the furtherance of subversive ends,” said killing should have been
deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the RPC.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder instead of rebellion.
HELD: NO. The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government.
By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitude involving crowd action, which
cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of
rebellion is that the other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself
because they acquire a political character.
In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to
ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act
should be conclusively demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a
state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are
duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of their
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act
complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing,
etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held
that the crime would be separately punished as a common crime and would not be absorbed in the crime
of rebellion.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be
convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and
mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself,
suffice.
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of
SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, the SC is satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of
murder.

CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT REBELLION

U.S. vs. FIGUERAS, et. al.

2 Phil 491

FACTS: The defendants were accused of committing the crime of conspiracy under Sec. 4 of Act No.
292. The witness of the prosecution testified that various persons, some forty, more or less in number,
were conspiring to overthrow the constituted Government. Paulino Legaspi, a witness of the prosecution
heard the defendants conspiring to overthrow the Government. When asked to repeat the words which he
heard them say, he stated the following:” What a life this is, so full of misery, constantly increasing. When
will our wretchedness end? When will the authorities remedy it? What shall we do?” However, he testified
that he did not hear anything beyond this, and it appears that he relies solely upon these words, used by
the defendants, as a basis for his assertion that they were conspiring. The trial court rendered its
judgment against the defendants.

ISSUE: Whether herein defendants are guilty of the crime charged against them.

HELD: NO. The proof presented by the prosecution was based merely on hearsay, other than this, the
witness testified to no concrete fact relative to the conspiracy herein prosecuted, and does not
even know if the accused have formed any determination evidencing their intention to conspire,
nor does he know if they have collected contributions or attempted to obtain possession of arms
for the purposes of the conspiracy. The assertion appears clearly to be the result of an arbitrary
and gratuitous conclusion, because, although these words reveal discontent on account of the
evils, real or fictitious, to which they refer, they are not alone sufficient to prove the existence of a
conspiracy to rebel, much less with the aid of force against the constituted Government.

SEDITION

US vs. LAPUS, et al.

4 Phil 148

FACTS: The defendants were all charged with the crime of sedition. The complaint alleged that on the
night of June 3, 1902, a band composed of about 400 men, among whom were the accused, armed with
guns and other deadly weapons, raided the town of Cabiao. The band went through the streets of the
town firing their guns, yelling and frightening the inhabitants thereof. Some members of the band raided
several houses and took with them 60 or 70 of the inhabitants thereof, including the municipal president,
whom they carried away with them when they left the town. These captives were detained by the band
until about noon the next day, when they were released.
 Some members of the band told the prisoners that if the wealthy landowners continued
oppressing the poor, they would not stop disturbing the towns, because the law must be equally applied to
rich and poor.
It was proved during the trial that the association to which the band belongs was organized for the
purpose of performing acts of hatred and vengeance against the authorities and the wealthy people of the
towns.

ISSUE: Are the defendants liable for the crime of sedition?

HELD: YES. The facts as stated constitute the crime of sedition. The appellants were members of an
illegal association and had publicly and tumultuously attacked the town of Cabiao and roamed over its
streets, firing shots, yelling, and threatening the residents with death, and thereby frightening them. They
performed acts of violence on the persons of the president and other residents of the town, against the
law and the supreme authority and with political-social purposes. For these reasons the acts performed
by the defendants constitute sedition. The crime of sedition was consummated, even though the object of
the defendants was not realized.

PEOPLE vs. PEREZ

45 Phil 599

FACTS: Isaac Perez, municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon and Fortunato Lodovice became engaged in
a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood which resulted in Perez shouting a
number of times: “ The Filipinos like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood’s head for having
recommended a bad thing for Filipinos, for he has killed our independence.”
The lower court convicted Perez of violation of then Art. 256 of the Penal Code, which had to do
with contempt of ministers of the crown or other persons in authority. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court correctly convicted the accused of contempt of ministers of the crown.

HELD: NO. The court ruled that the law infringed in this instance is not Art. 256 of the Penal Code but
rather a portion of the Treason and Sedition Law as the words of the accused did not tend to defame,
abuse or insult, a person in authority.
Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state. It is a revolt against legitimate
authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course
of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or
the subversion of the Constitution.
Hence, having uttered the said words, Perez is guilty of a violation of sec. 8 as amended, of the
Treason and Sedition Law, act 292.
 PEOPLE vs. TAHIL and TARSON
52 Phil 318

FACTS: Because of their refusal to pay the land taxes, Lieutenant Angeles of the Constabulary met Datu
Tahil, then the third member of the provincial board of Sulu, to try and convince the latter to pay the
required taxes. Lieutenant Angeles was informed by Datu Tahil that the people are requesting for an
extension for the payment of land taxes; the Lieutenant said that he would convey their message to the
Governor. However, upon his return, Lieutenant Angeles was informed that the extension requested was
nothing more than a pretext to gain time in order to construct a fort. Indeed, a few days after, the
construction of the fort was commenced. Once constructed, Datu Tahil gathered his people therein,
including Datu Tarson. Their principal purpose was, among others, the abolition of the land tax and the
removal of certain provincial officials, including Governor Moore, with the threat that if their requests were
not granted, they would oppose the Government by forcible means.
The provincial fiscal filed a complaint against Datu Tahil and his followers, charging them with
sedition. A warrant of arrest was issued. Governor Moore initially tried to convince Datu Tahil and his
followers to desist from their intentions, but when his efforts proved futile, he finally delivered the warrant
of arrest for enforcement.
Datu Tahil and his followers resisted the government forces when they came to enforce the
warrant. However, they were overcame by the government forces. Some days later, Datu Tahil
surrendered to the authorities. He and his followers were convicted of rebellion by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court correctly convicted them of rebellion and not of sedition.

HELD: No. Upon its being intimated to Datu Tahil that he surrender with the object of complying with a
judicial warrant of arrest against him and his followers, he resisted the order by means of force, thus
preventing the officers charged with this duty from performing it. This already constitutes a crime.
The facts proven constitute the crime of sedition and not of rebellion, the acts committed being
limited to preventing the government officials, through force, from complying with their duties in
connection with a judicial order, the enforcement of which was entrusted to them.

PEOPLE v. NABONG
57 Phil. 455

FACTS: During the necrological service of the leader of the communist in the Philippines, Major Gallardo,
of the Philippine Constabulary, arrested Juan Feleo while the latter was making a speech and, at the
same time, removed the red flag displayed on the platform. Because of this, appellant Ignacio Nabong
delivered a speech in Tagalog, in the course of which, he criticized the members of the Constabulary,
using words substantially to the following effect:
“They committed real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary are bad
because they shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug…In view of this we ought to be united
to suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present government and estasblish our own government , the
government of the poor. Use your whip so that there may be marks on their sides.”
Subsequently, a case was filed against Nabong, charging him with sedition under section 8 of Act
No. 292, as amended by Act No. 1692. The trial court convicted him of the offense charged.

ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of sedition?

HELD: YES. The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the government by
violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to
be understood. The word “overthrow” could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary change by
the exercise of the elective franchise. The use of the whip, an instrument designed to leave marks on the
sides of adversaries, is inconsistent with the mild interpretation which the appellant would have us impute
the language. It was the purpose of the speaker, beyond doubt, to incite his hearers to the overthrow of
organized government by unlawful means. The words used by the appellant manifestly tended to induce
the people to resist and use violence against the agents of the Constabulary and to instigate the poor to
cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes. They also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies,
thereby tending to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community and the order of the government. It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words
used should in fact result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities. The law is not aimed
merely at actual disturbance, and its purpose is also to punish utterances which may endanger public
order.

ESPUELAS vs PEOPLE
90 Phil 524
FACTS: Appellant Espuelas had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at
the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth, he was merely standing on a
barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of the same to several newspapers
and weeklies of general circulation throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication, with a
suicide note or letter. The note or letter was made to appear that it was written by Alberto Reveniera and
addressed to the latter’s supposed wife. The letter read as follows:
“…My dear wife, if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not
pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.
“And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in
Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about Julio Guilen and the banditry of Leyte.
“Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our
government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.
“Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas, if and when they come across one…”
The accused was charged and convicted of sedition.

ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of sedition?

HELD: YES. The essence of seditious libel is its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the
point of illegal courses, or to induce people to resort to illegal methods in order to redress the evils which
press upon their minds. A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest
persons (“dirty”), infested with Nazis and Fascists, i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce
dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain royal to the government, is a
scurrilous libel against the government.
Any citizen may criticize his government and government officials and submit his criticism to the
“free trade of ideas.” However, such criticism should be specific and therefore constructive, specifying
particular objectionable actuations of the government; it must be reasoned or tempered, and not
contemptuous of the entire government set-up.

CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION

DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS

PEOPLE V. ALIPIT et al.

44 Phil 910

FACTS: The election of the municipal president was contested on the ground of minority. He yielded the
chair to the vice-president. The meeting of the municipal council presided over by the vice-president was
stopped by the chief of police and the municipal president by arresting the vice-president and threatening
the councilors with arrest if they would continue holding the meeting. The councilors then dispersed,
leaving the premises.

ISSUE: Whether the defendants are guilty of disturbing the municipal council.

HELD: YES. Nobody has the right to dissolve, through violence, the meeting of a council. Any stranger,
even if he be the municipal president himself or the chief of police, must respect the meeting of the
municipal council which for the time being, at least, raises the presumption that no defect exists to render
it illegal. That meeting of the municipal council was entitled to this respect on the part of the defendants
and the aforesaid presumption was effective as to them.
 QUESTION AND ANSWER
Q: May a crime be committed without criminal intent? (1988 Bar Question)
A: Yes. Criminal intent is not necessary in the following cases:
1) When the crime is a product of culpa/ negligence, reckless imprudence, lack of foresight or lack
of skill.
2) When the crime is a prohibited act under a special law.

Q: Alexander, an escaped convict, ran amuck on board a Superlines Bus bound for Manila from
Bicol and killed ten (10) persons. Terrified by the incident, Carol and Benjamin who are
passengers of the bus, jumped out of the window and while lying unconscious after hitting the
pavement of the road, were ran over and crushed to death by a fast moving Desert Fox bus tailing
the Superlines Bus.
Can Alexander be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin although he was completely
unaware that the two jumped out of the bus? Explain. (2001 Bar Question)
A: Yes. Alexander can be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin because his felonious act of
running amuck was the proximate cause of the victim’s death. The rule is that when a person, by a
felonious act, generates in the mind of another a sense of imminent danger, prompting the latter to
escape from or avoid such danger and in the process, sustains injuries or dies, the person committing the
felonious act is responsible for such injuries or death. (U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 1497; People vs. Apra, 27
SCRA 1037)
Under Art. 4, RPC, any person committing a felony shall incur criminal liability although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

Q: What constitutes insanity as an exempting circumstance?

A: Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be “ so insane as to be
incapable of entertaining criminal intent.” He must be deprived of reason and acting without the least
discernment because there is complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom
of the will. (People vs. Wilson Antonio, Nov. 27, 2002)

Q: When should the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty be
considered in favor of the accused?
A: The following are the requisites of voluntary surrender: (1) that the offender had not actually been
arrested; (2) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent; and (3)
that the surrender was voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous, showing the intent of
the accused to submit himself unconditionally, either because: (1) he acknowledges his guilt, or (2) he
wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
On the other hand, the requisites for voluntary plea of guilty are as follows: (1) that the offender
spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before
the competent court that is to try the case; and (3) that the confession of guilt was made prior to the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution.

Q: Must the information alleged the exact words of the law to qualify the crime? Must the
descriptive words “qualifying” or “qualified by” be specifically used in the information to refer to
a qualifying circumstance so that the crime can be raised to a higher category?
A: No. In the case of People vs. Guerrero, Sr., et al., (GR No. 134759, September 19, 2002), it was held
that while the information did not allege the qualifying circumstance in the exact words of the law,
outraging the dead and scoffing at the victim’s corpse are nevertheless deducible from the recital in the
information. The sequence of events as “attack, assault, club, beheaded and cut the penis of the victim,”
alleged in the information points to the outrage committed on the dead.
With respect to the use of the descriptive words “qualifying” or “qualified by,” Sec. 8 of Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court merely requires the information to specify the qualifying or aggravating circumstances;
it does not require the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" to refer to the circumstances. It is not
the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific
allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher
category. (People vs. Aquino, August 6, 2002)

Q: May a frontal attack be considered treacherous?

A: Yes. If an attack on the victim, though frontal, was sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no
opportunity to defend himself, then the attack is considered treacherous. (People vs. Bartolo, September
27, 2002)
Q: Can two felonies which have a common element be complexed?
A: It depends. They can be complexed in a delito compuesto, e.g., in parricide and murder committed
with one single shot. Since intent to kill on the part of the offender is a common element and the two
deaths result from a single act, the crime is complex.
However, when it comes to delito complejo, they cannot be complexed for the obvious reason
that if that element is used to complete the requirements for integrating one crime, the other crime would
be incomplete in that element and consequently non-existent. Thus, there can be no complex crime of
estafa through the falsification of a private document as both crimes require damage as an element which
if used for one renders the other incomplete. (People vs. Reyes, 56 Phil. 286)

Q: In what cases is Art. 48 not applicable?

A: The rules in Art. 48 are not applicable:
a. When the crimes subject of the case are covered by the doctrine of common elements;
b. When the crimes involved are subject to the rule of absorption of one crime by the other;
c. Where the two offenses resulting from a single act are specifically punished as a single crime,
such as less serious physical injuries with serious slander of deed, since this is punished under
Art. 265 par. 2, as the single crime of less serious physical injuries with ignominy;
d. In special complex crimes;
e. When the crimes involved cannot be legally complexed, viz:
(1) Malicious obtention or abusive service of search warrant (Art. 129) with perjury;
(2) Briberty (Art. 210) with infidelity in the custody of prisoners;
(3) Maltreatment of prisoners (Art. 235) with serious physical injuries;
(4) Usurpation of real rights (Art. 312) with serious physical injuries; and
(5) Abandonment of persons in danger (Art. 275) and crimes against minors (Arts. 276-278)
with another felony.

Q: Is RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law) a violation of the constitutional proscription on cruel,

degrading or inhuman punishment?
A: No. In the case of People vs. Echegaray (267SCRA 682), the SC upheld the validity of the Death
Penalty Law and rejected the contention that the same is cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or lingering death. Cruel punishment implies
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. (People vs.
Marcos, 147 SCRA 204)

Q: What do you call the aggravating circumstances which causes the imposition of the death
penalty?
A: They are denominated as special qualifying aggravating circumstances. To be considered, they must
be properly alleged and proven.

Q: Who are not entitled to avail of the benefits of the Probation Law? (1988 Bar Question)
A: The following are not entitled to avail of the benefits under the Probation Law:
(1) Those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than 6 years;
(2) Those convicted of any offense against the security of the State, such as subversion, or any
crime against national security or public order;
(3) Those who have been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than 1 month and 1 day or a fine of not less that P200;
(4) Those who are already serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of the Decree;
(5) Those who have been once on probation under the provisions of the Decree.

Q: What is the difference between Piracy and Robbery on the High Seas?
A: When the offender is a member of the complement or a passenger of the vessel and there is violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things in taking the property in the vessel, it is common
robbery; if the offender is an outsider, it will be piracy.
Q: Are common crimes absorbed in sedition?
A: No. In People vs. Umali, et. al. (96 Phil. 185), it was held that the crimes committed were those of
sedition, multiple murders, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. In People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil.
64), the constabulary men were found guilty of the separate crimes of sedition in one case, and multiple
murder with grave injuries in another.

Q: Is the crime of sedition committed only by private citizens?

A: No. Art. 139 of the RPC makes guilty all persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain
by force or other means outside of legal methods, any of the five objects. In defining sedition, the law
makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64)

Q: Is good faith a defense in falsification?

A: Yes. There is no falsification of a public document if the act of the accused is consistent with good
faith. Misstatements or erroneous assertion in a public document will not give rise to falsification as long
as he acted in good faith and no one was prejudiced by the alteration or error. ( Layug v. Sandiganbayan,
August 16, 2000)

Q: Supposing the offender stole the savings passbook of the offended party and then was able to
withdraw the amount in the bank by falsifying the signature of the owner of the savings passbook
in the withdrawal slip. What is the crime committed?
A: The crime is estafa through falsification of commercial document, not theft. When it is proved that a
person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or
inference is justified, that the person is the forger. (Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533)

Q: In falsification of private documents, what will determine whether the crime committed is estafa
or falsification?
A: If the falsification of the private document was essential in the commission of estafa because without
the falsification, estafa cannot be committed, the crime is falsification; estafa becomes the consequence
of the crime.
If the estafa can be committed even without resorting to falsification, the latter being resorted only
to facilitate estafa, the main crime is estafa; falsification is merely incidental, since even without
falsification, estafa can be committed.

Q: A had a P 500.00 counterfeit note. He placed this under the top cover of his table, then B
entered his house and took the money. What crime or crimes have been committed?
A.: Although the money is counterfeit money, to a person who is in possession of it as a token or souvenir,
that is not a crime. When B entered the house and stole the some he is committing theft or robbery as the
case maybe. Now, if B spent the money, he may be criminally liable if he knew that it is a counterfeit
money; but if he has no knowledge that this counterfeit money and he uses it, he is not criminally liable for
illegal use of counterfeit money.

Q: Who is an “accountable public officer” under Art. 217 (malversation) of the RPC?
A: An accountable public officer, within the purview of Art. 217 of the RPC, is one who has custody or
control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. To be liable for malversation, an
accountable officer need not be a bonded official. The name or relative importance of the office or
employment is not the controlling factor. What is decisive is the nature of the duties that he performs and
that as part of, and by reason of said duties, he receives public money or property which he is bound to
account. (Quiñon vs. People, September 19, 2002)

Q: What is hazing as defined by law? What does the law require before initiation rites may be
performed? (2002 Bar Question)
A: Hazing, as defined by law, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law) states that no hazing or initiation rites in any form
or manner shall be allowed without prior written notice to the school authorities or head of organization
seven (7) days before the conduct of such initiation. The written notice shall indicate (a) the period of the
initiation activities which shall not exceed three (3) days; (b) the names of those to be subjected to such
activities; and (c) an undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such initiation
rites.

Q: The victim Y was found dead, with his shirt and pants on, bathed on his own blood, and lying
by the side of the rice paddy. X was arrested three years later and charged with the murder of Y.
During the trial, X testified that upon surprising his wife having sexual intercourse with Y, he
shouted invectives upon the copulating pair. X then reached for the bolo to stab the pair. Y was
able to parry the first thrust, after which he wrestled with X for the possession of the bolo. As X
and Y fell to the ground, X was able to stab Y and kill him. Thereafter, he fled the scene of the
crime.
Does the case fall under Art. 247 (Death under exceptional circumstances)?
A: No. To satisfy this burden, X must prove that he actually surprised his wife and Y in flagrante delicto,
and that he killed Y during or immediately thereafter. However, when found, the body of Y was fully
clothed in a shirt and a pair of pants. If the victim had been caught by surprise while engaged in the sex
act, he would not have had the opportunity to put on his pants, parry the forthcoming thrusts, and then
grapple with X. Further eroding the defense of X is the fact that he immediately fled from the scene right
after the stabbing incident. He hid for about three years until he was arrested by the authorities. His flight
betrays his defense, because he could have easily relayed his story to the proper authorities, if he had
indeed caught his wife and the victim Y in flagrante delicto. (People vs. Puedan, September 2, 2002)

Q: A and B were having a drinking spree at a nearby store. Halfway on his bottle, A left to look for
a place to relieve himself. Suddenly, a man walked past B, approached A and stabbed him at the
side. A retaliated by striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost suddenly, a group
of men, numbering about 7, ganged up on A and hit the latter with assorted weapons. The victim
fell to the ground dead.
The assailants are charged and convicted of murder. On appeal, they claim that they
should not have been convicted of murder but of death caused in a tumultuous affray. Are they
correct?
A: No. The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of individual, one of whom was
sufficiently identified as the principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not,
as the defense suggests, a “tumultuous affray” within the meaning of Art. 251 of the RPC, i.e., a melee or
free-for-all, where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a
confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them. (People vs.
Unlagada, September 17, 2002)

Q: Is the detention of a person, for the purpose of compelling him to pay his obligation, by
demanding payment from his family in exchange for the victim’s release, be considered
kidnapping for ransom?
A: Yes. “Ransom” under American rulings has been held to mean in its ordinary sense as “money, price,
or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that
releases from captivity.” Since a demand for money was made as a requisite for releasing the victim held
in captivity, whatever other motive may have impelled the captors to detain the victim, the money
demanded is still ransom under the law. (People vs. Castro, et al., July 23, 2002)

Q: When there is conspiracy and homicide is committed on the occasion of a robbery, are all the
accused guilty of robbery with homicide even if not everyone participated in the killing?
A: Yes. Where conspiracy is established, it matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed
the victim. The consistent doctrinal rule is that whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will
also be held guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, even if some of
them did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it appears that those who did not do so endeavored
to prevent the homicide. (People vs. Guimba, November 27, 2002)

Q: In the commission of the crime of robbery, is it necessary that the person from whom the
property was taken by means of threats and violence, be the owner thereof?
A: No. Art. 293 of the RPC employs the phrase “belonging to another” and this has been interpreted to
merely require that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property
by the person dispossessed thereof suffices. In fact, it has been held that robbery may be committed
against a bailee or a person who himself has stolen it. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal
property from another against the latter’s will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro,
robbery is the offense imputable to the offender. (People vs. Reyes, March 26, 2003)

Q: Where robbery was committed with violence against or intimidation of persons, and force upon
things was also present and employed by the offender, should the crime be categorized and
punished under the first mode (Art. 294) or the second mode (Art. 299)?
A: In the case of People vs. Sebastian, et al. (85 Phil. 601), it was held that the crime should be
categorized under the first mode, i.e., through violence or intimidation under Art. 294 and not under the
second mode (Art. 299). This was justified on the theory that violence or intimidation should supply the
controlling qualification since it is graver than robbery through force upon things and produces greater
disturbance to social order and the security of the individual.
 However, a modification of this rule appears to have been later introduced by Napolis vs. CA, et
al., (43 SCRA 301) and People vs. Disney, et al. (GR No. L-41336, February 18, 1983). Here, it was held
that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons takes place
without entering an inhabited house under the circumstances in Art. 299. When both circumstances were
present, the offense shall be considered as a complex crime under Art. 48, and the penalty shall be for
the graver offense in the maximum period.

Q: Accused X was charged and convicted of robbery with rape. The records of the case show that
on the night in question, while the victim was sleeping, X suddenly covered her mouth and poked
a knife at the side of her neck. With the knife poked at the victim, X succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. After X satisfied his lust, he left the victim, but not before X surreptitiously
got the P500 from inside the pocket of the victim’s shorts.
Was the trial court correct in convicting X of robbery with rape?
A: No. For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was
committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. In this type of felony,
the intent to gain precedes the intent to have illegal carnal intercourse with another, since robbery with
rape is basically a crime against property. If the original design was to commit rape but the accused, after
committing rape, also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal act should
be viewed as two distinct offenses.
Applying the above rules to the case at bar, X should not be convicted of the crime of robbery
with rape. However, neither he be convicted of the distinct crimes of robbery and rape. Note that the
victim’s money was surreptitiously taken by the accused after consummating the rape, such that the
intimidation or force employed in the perpetration of the rape appears to have had no bearing on the
illegal taking of the P500. Thus, X should only be liable for theft, not robbery, and rape. (People vs.
Tamayo, July 30, 2002)

Q: Distinguish robbery with violence from grave coercion.

A: The only distinction between the two crimes is just a matter of intention. If the purpose of the accused
in taking somebody’s property by force or intimidation is to obtain gain, the crime is robbery; but if his
purpose is to compel another to do something against his will, without authority of law, but believing
himself to be the owner or creditor, and thereby seizes property, then the crime is grave coercion.

Q: S Company purchased, through its buying agent O Company, jeans from A/U Corp. Payment
was advanced by S Company to A/U Corp., which advance payment was remitted to the account
of Mr. X. However, when O Company contacted A/U Corp. to follow up on the production the jeans,
they learned that only 3,000 meters out of the 10,000 meters of fabric required for the order was
purchased by Mr. X. Subsequently, a demand was made upon A/U Corp. to return the money
advanced. For failure to return the money, S Company filed a case against Mr. X for estafa.
It is the contention of Mr. X that the third element of estafa is not present as the party
prejudiced is S Company to whom Mr. X had no obligation to account the proceeds of the amount
withdrawn. Is his contention correct?
A: No. Art. 315 of the RPC provides that “any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned [in Art. 315]” may be held liable for estafa. The use by the law of the word “another” instead of
the word “owner” means that as an element of the offense, loss should have fallen upon someone other
than perpetrator of the crime. Thus, it does not matter if the party prejudiced (in this case, S Company) is
not the owner of the sum misappropriated. (Jorge Salazar vs. People, October 15, 2002)

Q: X was charged with estafa under Art. 315 (2)(d) of the RPC. However, for failure of the
prosecution to prove all the elements of estafa, the trial court convicted X instead of violation of
BP Blg. 22. Was the trial court correct?
A: No. X cannot be convicted of a crime for which he was not properly charged, for that would violate his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. Moreover, BP Blg. 22 cannot be deemed
necessarily included in the crime of estafa under the RPC, Art. 315 (2)(d). The offense of fraud defined
under the RPC is malum in se, whereas BP Blg. 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law, is malum
prohibitum. Fraud or estafa under the RPC is a distinct offense from the violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law. They are different offenses, having different elements. (People vs. Cuyugan November 18, 2002)

Q: May a person be prosecuted for estafa under The Revised Penal Code and also under BP 22?
A: Yes. Since there is a variance between the elements of an offense in one law and another law, there
will be no double jeopardy. The element of damage in estafa is not required in BP 22. In view of the
purpose of the enactment of BP 22, the crime defined and penalized there is against public interest, while
the crime of estafa is against property. Deceit is an element of estafa. This is not required under BP 22.
Q: What is a memorandum check? Is a person who issues a memorandum check without
sufficient funds guilty of violating B.P Blg. 22? (1995 Bar Question)
A: A memorandum check is an ordinary check with the word “Memorandum,” “Memo,” or “Mem” written
across the check, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay its holder absolutely, thus partaking
the nature of a promissory note. It is drawn on a bank and is a bill of exchange within the purview of Sec.
185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
A person who issued a memorandum check without sufficient funds is guilty of violating B.P Blg.
22 as said law covers all checks whether it is an evidence of indebtedness, or in payment of a pre-
existing obligation, or as deposit or guarantee. (People vs. Nitafan, 215 SCRA 79)

Q: Joselito married Ramona in July 1995, only to learn later on that Ramona was previously
married to David, from whom Ramona had been separated for more than ten years. Believing that
his marriage to Ramona was an absolute nullity, Joselito contracted a subsequent marriage with
Anabelle.
Can Joselito be prosecuted for bigamy? Explain. (1996 Bar Question)
A: Yes. The following elements of bigamy are present in the case at bar: (1) that the offender is legally
married; (2) that the marriage has not been dissolved or, in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second marriage or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
Despite the nullity of the first marriage, Joselito should have filed a case of declaration of nullity of
such marriage under Art. 40, Family Code, before contracting a second marriage with Anabelle.

Q: Is the act of suspension under Sec.13 of RA 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft Law
mandatory? Is it automatic? (1999 Bar Question)
A: Yes. The act of suspension under the act is mandatory. The word “shall” used in Sec.13 is an express
index of this conclusion.
However, the suspension is not automatic. Before a suspension order can be issued, a hearing
on the issue of the validity of the information must first be had. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted
to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a basis to either
suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or correct any part of the
proceeding which impairs its validity.