Introduction

1. PP v. Avecilla, G.R. No. 117033, February 15, 2001

Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearms; Murder; Where murder or homicide results from
the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal possession, but murder
or homicide, as the case may be, and the use of the unlicensed firearm shall be appreciated as a
mere aggravating circumstance.—It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide
results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal possession,
but murder or homicide, as the case may be. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is
not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance.
In view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294 to Presidential Decree No.
1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead,
illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the
homicide case.

Same; Same; The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed only
where the unlicensed firearm is not used to commit any of the crimes of murder, homicide,
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat.—The crime of illegal possession of
firearm, in its simple form, is committed only where the unlicensed firearm is not used to commit
any of the crimes of murder, homicide, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat.
Otherwise, the use of unlicensed firearm would be treated either: (1) as an essential ingredient in
the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat; or (2) as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide.

Same; Same; R.A. 8294, being favorable to the accused, may be retroactively applied.—
Inasmuch as the amendatory law is favorable to accused-appellant in this case, the same may be
retroactively applied. This new law applies even to violations that occurred prior to its effectivity
as it may be given retroactive effect under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. R.A. 8294 took
effect on July 6, 1997. The crime involved in the case at bench was committed on May 5, 1991.
As a general rule, penal laws will generally have prospective application except where the new
law will be advantageous to the accused. In this case R.A. 8294 will spare accused-appellant
from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. Accordingly, said law
should be given retroactive application.

Same; Same; Murder; Right to be Informed; The accused cannot be convicted of homicide or
murder with “the use of the unlicensed firearm as aggravating” where said felonies are not
charged in the information but merely mentioned as the result of the use of the unlicensed
firearm.—With more reason, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of homicide or murder with
“the use of the unlicensed firearm as aggravating,” inasmuch as said felonies are not charged in
the information but merely mentioned as the result of the use of the unlicensed firearm. Accused-
appellant was not arraigned for homicide or murder. Hence, he cannot be convicted of any of
these crimes without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, not to mention his right to due process. [People vs. Avecilla, 351 SCRA 635(2001)]

2. Rait v. PP, G.R. No. 180425, July 31, 2008

Criminal Law; Rape; Attempted Rape; Words and Phrases; Under Article 6, in relation to Article
335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission
of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.—Unlike in Baleros, the acts of petitioner clearly establish his intention to commence
the act of rape. Petitioner had already successfully removed the victim’s clothing and had
inserted his finger into her vagina. It is not empty speculation to conclude that these acts were
preparatory to the act of raping her. Had it not been for the victim’s strong physical resistance,
petitioner’s next step would, logically, be having carnal knowledge of the victim. The acts are
clearly “the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the
offense after the preparations are made.” Under Article 6, in relation to Article 335, of the
Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Same; Same; Same; An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.—This Court has held that an overt or
external act—is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. The raison d’être for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases,
the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being
equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the
crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the
overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the “first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made.” The act done need not constitute the
last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal
relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.
Same; Same; Penalties; It is error for the trial court to sentence an accused to a prison term
without specifying the period such sentence covers.—We note that the trial court’s Decision
sentenced petitioner to a prison term without specifying the period this sentence covers. We will
rectify this error even as we affirm petitioner’s conviction. The penalty for attempted rape is
prision mayor, or two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the penalty for consummated rape.
Petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence the minimum of which is in the
range of prision correccional, or within six months and one day to six years, and the maximum of
which is prision mayor medium, or within eight years and one day to ten years. In this case, the
trial court sentenced petitioner to “an Indeterminate Sentence of PRISION

ARTICLE 3

1. PP v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987

Criminal Law; Evidence; Death inflicted under exceptional circumstances; Elements of Art. 247
being present, trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of murder.—We agree with the
Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There is no question
that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit
copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any
of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this
case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.

Same; Same; Same; The provision in Art. 247 of the Revised Penal Code that the accused shall
kill any of them or both of them immediately after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse
does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter.—Though quite a length of
time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife
having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting
must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant.
The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should
commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate
result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act
of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and
must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of
the accused's rage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is more of an exempting
circumstance, the penalty is intended more for the protection of the accused than a
punishment.—As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the
abovequoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or
benefit—amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment—to a legally
married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious
physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the
accused—who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder,
or serious physical injury, as the case may be—is punished only with destierro. This penalty is
mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a
punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical injuries other than serious
are inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the
exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even
where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result
to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct
crime, would make the exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused from
criminal liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to
plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation would be illogical
if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral
element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissions . . . constituting the offense" should be
pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or
exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential element of the offense charged—but a
matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of the court—need not be pleaded.

Same; Same; Same; Death under exceptional character cannot be qualified by either aggravating
or mitigating circumstances.—It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating
or other qualifying circumstances. We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.

Same; Same; Same; No liability for frustrated murder for injuries suffered by the Amparados
since inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder.—The next question refers
to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and
Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. The
Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the
accusedappellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where
we disagree. The accusedappellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple.

Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that
rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. But the case at bar requires distinctions.
Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the
deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore
hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
Same; Same; Same; Liability of accused appellant for injuries suffered by the Amparados is less
serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence.—This does not mean,
however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that
he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be
entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning
words ("an waray labot kagawas"), that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries
sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold
him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical
injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. [People vs. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735(1987)]

2. Abdulia v. PP, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005

Criminal Law; Presumption of Innocence; Recognizing the primary of the right to be presumed
innocent, the Supreme Court, where doubt exists, has invariably resolved it in favor of the
accused.—So precious to her is the constitutional right of presumption of innocence unless
proven otherwise that appellant came all the way to this Court despite the fact that the sentence
imposed upon her by the Sandiganbayan was merely a fine of three thousand pesos, with no
imprisonment at all. And recognizing the primacy of the right, this Court, where doubt exists, has
invariably resolved it in favor of an accused.

Same; Same; It has often happened that at the commencement of a trial, people’s minds,
sometimes judges too, would have already passed sentence against the accused—an allegation,
or even any testimony, that an act was done should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was
really done.—The Court’s faithful adherence to the constitutional directive imposes upon it the
imperative of closely scrutinizing the prosecution’s evidence to assure itself that no innocent
person is condemned and that conviction flows only from a moral certainty that guilt has been
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the words of People vs. Pascua: Our findings in
the case at bar should not create the mistaken impression that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses should always be looked at with askance. What we are driving at is that every accused
is presumed innocent at the onset of an indictment. But, it has often happened that at the
commencement of a trial, people’s minds, sometimes judges too, would have already passed
sentence against the accused. An allegation, or even any testimony, that an act was done should
never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Proof must be closely examined under
the lens of a judicial microscope and only proof beyond reasonable doubt must be allowed to
convict. Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.

Same; Same; Illegal Use of Public Funds (Technical Malversation); Presumptions; The
disputable presumption of the existence of unlawful or criminal intent presupposes the
commission of an unlawful act—the presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply
to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is
per se not an unlawful act.—The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its
reliance on Section 5(b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant.
For sure, the procedural rule relied upon does not apply at all to this case. Indeed, clear it is from
its very language that the disputable presumption of the existence of unlawful or criminal intent
presupposes the commission of an unlawful act. *** *** The presumption of criminal intent will
not, however, automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement
of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to
have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its
employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing
civil service laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made
such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent—a crime is not committed if the mind of
the person performing the act complained of be innocent (actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea).—The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day
for the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt
the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of
criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellant’s conviction. x x x. This calls to mind
the oft-repeated maxim ‘Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea,’ which expounds a basic
principle in criminal law that a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the
act complained of be innocent. Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes
made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent. It is true that a presumption of
criminal intent may arise from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is
that if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be presumed that
the act was done with criminal intention and that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption.
But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must be a
criminal act. In the case at bar, the act is not criminal. Neither can it be categorized as malum
prohibitum, the mere commission of which makes the doer criminally liable even if he acted
without evil intent.

Same; Same; Same; Elements.—The second assigned error refers to the failure of the
prosecution to prove the existence of all the essential elements of the crime of technical
malversation defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which are: “1. That the offender
is a public officer; “2. That there is public fund or property under his administration; “3. That
such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance; “4. That he applies the
same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has been appropriated by
law or ordinance.”

Same; Same; Same; In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly
technically malversed, the use thereof for another public purpose will not make the accused
guilty of violation of Art. 220 of the Revised Penal Code; An authorization given by the
Department of Budget and Management for the use of an allotment for the payment of salary
differentials of secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Art. 220,
thus, the use by the accused of the remainder of the amount released for the payment of the
terminal leave benefits of other school teachers cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in
the absence of any provision in the law specifically appropriating said amount for payment of
salary differentials only.—The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary
differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third
element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should
have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of
Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for
payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law
contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court has unequivocably ruled in
Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan that in the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the public
fund allegedly technically malversed (in that case, the absence of any law or ordinance
appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road), the use thereof for
another public purpose (there, for the payment of wages of laborers working on projects other
than the Barangay Jalung Road) will not make the accused guilty of violation of Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave
benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical
malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said
amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the
crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus
in order. [Abdulla vs. People, 455 SCRA 78(2005)]

3. People vs. Opuran

Criminal Law; Exempting Circumstances; Insanity; A man’s act is presumed voluntary—it is

improper to assume the contrary, i.e., that acts were done unconsciously, for the moral and legal
presumption is that every person is presumed to be of sound mind, or that freedom and
intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person; He who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it, for insanity as a defense is in the nature
of confession and avoidance.—In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor,
voluntariness is an essential element. Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the
imposition of the corresponding penalty cannot be legally sanctioned. The human mind is an
entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but is dependent to a large
degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. A man’s act is presumed voluntary. It is
improper to assume the contrary, i.e. that acts were done unconsciously, for the moral and legal
presumption is that every person is presumed to be of sound mind, or that freedom and
intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. Thus, the presumption under Article 800
of the Civil Code is that everyone is sane. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by
evidence of insanity, which under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code exempts a person
from criminal liability. He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden
of proving it, for insanity as a defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused
invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he
is insane. The testimony or proof of an accused’s insanity must, however, relate to the time
immediately preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is
charged. It is, therefore, incumbent upon accused’s counsel to prove that his client was not in his
right mind or was under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity immediately before or at the
time he executed the act attributed to him.

Same; Same; Same; Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties which is manifested in language and conduct, but not every aberration of the mind or
mental deficiency constitutes insanity; A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and
conclusively prove that he is legally so.—Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not
susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of
another, the state or condition of a person’s mind can only be measured and judged by his
behavior. Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of which
we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine whether the acts
conform to the practice of people of sound mind. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted
condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language and conduct. However, not
every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity. As consistently held by
us, “A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally
so.” Thus, we had previously decreed as insufficient or inconclusive proof of insanity certain
strange behavior, such as, taking 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consuming three
sticks of marijuana before raping the victim; slurping the victim’s blood and attempting to
commit suicide after stabbing him; crying, swimming in the river with clothes on, and jumping
off a jeepney.

Same; Same; Same; Tests; Witnesses; The stringent standard established in People v.
Formigones, 87 Phil. 658 (1950), requires that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, i.e., the accused acted without the least discernment because of a complete
absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will; Establishing the insanity of an
accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the accused, has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on
his own perception, or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.—The stringent standard
established in People v. Formigones requires that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted without the least discernment because of a complete
absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will. In People v. Rafanan, Jr. we
analyzed the Formigones standard into two distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition—
whether there was a “complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act” and
(b) the test of volition—whether there was a “total deprivation of freedom of the will.” We
observed that our case law shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the
test of volition, and has failed to turn up any case where an accused is exempted on the sole
ground that he was totally deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying
“complete deprivation of intelligence.” This is expected, since a person’s volition naturally
reaches out only towards that which is represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that
intelligence be diseased or healthy. Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion
testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has
rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception; or is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.

Same; Same; Same; It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act
which is the subject of the inquiry.—Truly, there is nothing that can be discerned from Dr.
Verona’s short psychiatric evaluation report and her testimony that Anacito’s judgment and
mental faculties were totally impaired as to warrant a conclusion that his mental condition in
1998 when he killed his victims was the same in 2000 when he was psychiatrically examined.
The most that we can conclude is that her findings refer to the period after the stabbing accident
and, hence, would prove Anacito’s mental condition only for said time. It could be that Anacito
was insane at the time he was examined by Dr. Verona. But, in all probability, insanity could
have been contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He was without contact
with friends and relatives most of the time. He was perhaps troubled by his conscience, by the
realization of the gravity of his offenses, or by the thought of a bleak future for him. The
confluence of these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium. It must
be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act which is the subject of
the inquiry. His mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for
purposes of determining his criminal liability.

Same; Same; Same; Alibis and Denials; It has been held that the invocation of denial and alibi as
defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his mental faculties; The shift in theory
from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after the accused realized the futility
of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere concoction or afterthought.—
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the
first time in the year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and
denial. It has been held that the invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the
accused was in full control of his mental faculties. Additionally, the trial judge observed that,
during the hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to the questions
propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made
apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that
insanity is a mere concoction or an afterthought. In any event, Anacito failed to establish by
convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio Jr. and Allan Dacles. He
is thus presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm his conviction.

Same; Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Diminished Willpower; In the cases where the
Court credited the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower after rejecting a plea of
insanity, it was clear from the records that the accused had been suffering from a chronic mental
disease that affected his intelligence and willpower for quite a number of years prior to the
commission of the act he was being held for.—We likewise reject the alternative plea of Anacito
that he be credited with the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. In the cases where
we credited this mitigating circumstance after rejecting a plea of insanity, it was clear from the
records that the accused had been suffering from a chronic mental disease that affected his
intelligence and willpower for quite a number of years prior to the commission of the act he was
being held for. The situation does not exist in the cases at bar. It was only in 2000 that Anacito
was diagnosed as “psychotic” with flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations and was found to
be schizophrenic. There is nothing on record that he had these symptoms the previous years or at
the time he stabbed the victim. Curiously, Dr. Verona did not make a diagnosis of schizophrenia
in her report, only at the witness stand.

Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; For treachery to be considered, it must

be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.—We agree with the trial
court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the killing of Allan is concerned because the
sole eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault. For treachery to be considered, it
must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars
are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration with treachery cannot be supposed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded
by descriptive words as “qualifying” or “qualified by” to properly qualify an offense.—We do
not find merit in appellant’s contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of
Demetrio, Jr. because treachery was not alleged with “specificity” as a qualifying circumstance
in the information. Such contention is belied by the information itself, which alleged: “All
contrary to law, and with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.” In any event, even
after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need
not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an
offense.

Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and
emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs—a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family.—Apart from the civil indemnity,
we shall award in favor of the heirs of each victim moral damages in the amount of P50,000
consistent with controlling case law. Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of
mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish
on the part of the victim’s family. [People vs. Opuran, 425 SCRA 654(2004)]

4. PP v. Chua, G.R. No. 149878, July 1, 2003

Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Four requisites for a valid warrant; A mistake in the
identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be
searched is properly described.—There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e.: (1) it
must be issued upon “probable cause”; (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, a mistake in the
name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant, especially since in this case,
the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of the accused. In fact, a
“John Doe” warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descriptio personae such as
will enable the officer to identify the accused. We have also held that a mistake in the
identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be
searched is properly described.

Same; Same; Same; It is mandatory that for the search to be valid, it must be directed at the place
particularly described in the warrant.—We affirm, however, the illegality of the search
conducted on the car, on the ground that it was not part of the description of the place to be
searched mentioned in the warrant. It is mandatory that for the search to be valid, it must be
directed at the place particularly described in the warrant. Moreover, the search of the car was
not incidental to a lawful arrest. To be valid, such warrantless search must be limited to that
point within the reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the
means of committing violence or of escaping. In this case, appellants were arrested inside the
apartment, whereas the car was parked a few meters away from the building.

Same; Admissions; Admissions, provided they are voluntary, can be used against appellants
because it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is their fault if they do
not.—An admission is an act or declaration of a party as to the existence of a relevant fact which
may be used in evidence against him. These admissions, provided they are voluntary, can be
used against appellants because it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is
their fault if they do not.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Requisites for prosecution of illegal possession of a
dangerous drug; Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under
the Dangerous Drugs Act.—In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must
be shown that (1) appellants were in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the appellants
were freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. We also note that the
crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does
not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal
authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. [People vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA
280(2003)]

5. PP v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182348, November 20, 2008

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; Elements in illegal possession of dangerous
drug.—The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in possession
of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. On the
third element, we have held that the possession must be with knowledge of the accused or that
animus possidendi existed with the possession or control of said articles.

Same; Same; Same; Prosecution clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a
showing of either actual or constructive possession by the accused-appellant.—The prosecution
in this case clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a showing of either actual
or constructive possession by the accused-appellant.

Constitutional Law; Warrantless Arrest; Requisites for a warrantless arrest to be valid.—The

warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a), arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. [People vs. Dela Cruz, 571 SCRA
469(2008)]

6. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Statutes; Statutory Construction; The whole
gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic
principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.—
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution. Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative
act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This
strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one
branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate
branch—the legislature. If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly
rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining
whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed
with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be
adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort.
In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an
interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; As it is written, the Plunder Law contains
ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation; As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or
rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained.—As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable
standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature
of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable
certainty and particularity. x x x As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule
that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the
counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty
that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating
ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated
in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; A statute is not rendered uncertain
and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use.—Petitioner,
however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
“combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts”
foundinSec.1,par.(d),andSec.2,and the word “pattern” in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to
petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad
and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. The rationalization seems to us to be
pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we
have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long
as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a
statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless
it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.—It
is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers
who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers—to use statutory phraseology in
such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary contains the
following commonly accepted definition of the words “combination” and “series:”
Combination—the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine
is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series—a number of
things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Combination,” Explained.—Thus when the
Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under
different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury
in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National
Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Series,” Explained.—On the other hand, to constitute a
“series” there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public
treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for “combination” and “series,” it would have taken greater
pains in specifically providing for it in the law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Pattern,” Explained.—As for “pat-tern,” we agree with the
observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term
issufficientlydefinedinSec.4,inrelationtoSec.1,par.(d),andSec.2.—As for “pattern,” we agree with
the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation
to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2—xxxx under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a ‘pattern’ consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d).
Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an ‘overall unlawful scheme’ or ‘conspiracy’
to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term ‘overall unlawful scheme’
indicates a ‘general plan of action or method’ which the principal accused and public officer and
others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if
there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary,
the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

Same; Same; Criminal Law; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Words and Phrases; The “void-for-
vagueness” doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the
effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute—it can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.—It cannot
plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner ’s reliance on the “void-for-vagueness”
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most
commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that
is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; When a statute lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application,
the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects—it violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid, and,
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.—A statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution
in two (2) respects—it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in
imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to
those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first
may be “saved” by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice; The “vagueness” doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld—not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.—The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void
for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed,
however, that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld—not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in
all other statutes.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; Facial Challenges; The allegations that the
Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity.—Moreover, we
agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the
deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not
justify a facial review of its validity—The void-forvagueness doctrine states that “a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law.” The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that “a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.” A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The
theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks
on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.” The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not
apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of
penal statutes.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot
be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at
the want of scientific precision in the law; It will take more than nitpicking to overturn the
wellentrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law.—In light of the
foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so
tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity,
where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish
support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the
law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take
more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder
Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware
that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by
reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal
implications and sound constitutional anchorage.

Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; Presumption of Innocence; “Reasonable Doubt” Standard; In

a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal—the use of the “reasonable doubt” standard is indispensable to command
the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law.—The running
fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for
plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence
which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by
proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The
use of the “reasonable doubt” standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence
of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal
law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his
ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This
“reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law
as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.

Same; Same; Under Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law, what the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.—The thesis that Sec. 4
does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal
misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to
prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused
in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder
with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all
these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond
reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.

Same; Same; A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law brings the
logical conclusion that “pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy” inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden
wealth—such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d).—AreadingofSec.2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings
us to the logical conclusion that “pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy” inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing
hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-
product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common
sense.

There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash
P50,000,000.00 or more, than “a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.” The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to
prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the
predicate acts.

Same; Same; All the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and “pattern” is not one of them; Being a
purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of
the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy, it is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law.—We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential elements
of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par.
(d), and “pattern” is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is
clear and unequivocal: SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence.—For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder xxxx It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a
criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish
any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is
only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is
flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the
rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing
rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.
Same; Same; Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.—As regards the
third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires
proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion—x x x Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Death Penalty Law (R.A. 7659); It is now too late in the day to
resurrect the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682 (1997), to the archives of jurisprudential
history.—To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of
RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say, however, that it is now too late in the day
for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People vs.
Echegaray to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA
7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary
effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.

Same; Same; Public Officers; Graft and Corruption; The Plunder Law is especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grandscale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread
like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation.—
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high
places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become
more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and
more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically
catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread
like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation.
The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately
eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public
office. [Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394(2001)]

Article 4 – Case Digests

“Article 4, RPC. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.”

1. People v. Flora [334 SCRA 262] G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; Elements in illegal possession of dangerous
drug.—The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in possession
of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. On the
third element, we have held that the possession must be with knowledge of the accused or that
animus possidendi existed with the possession or control of said articles.

Same; Same; Same; Prosecution clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a
showing of either actual or constructive possession by the accused-appellant.—The prosecution
in this case clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a showing of either actual
or constructive possession by the accused-appellant.

Constitutional Law; Warrantless Arrest; Requisites for a warrantless arrest to be valid.—The

warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a), arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. [People vs. Dela Cruz, 571 SCRA
469(2008)]

2. People v. Gonzales, Jr. [359 SCRA 352], G.R. No. 139542, June 21, 2001

Criminal Law; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; The suddenness of the attack,
the infliction of the wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the
time the attack was made or the fact that the victim was unarmed do not by themselves render the
attack as treacherous.—Treachery under par. 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is
defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime
against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be
appreciated two elements must concur: 1) the employment of means of execution that would
insure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim and leaving the latter
without an opportunity to defend himself; and 2) the means employed were deliberately or
consciously adopted by the offender. The suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound
from behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made or
the fact that the victim was unarmed do not by themselves render the attack as treacherous. This
is of particular significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he
gained an advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and was
rendered defenseless. The means employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of
attack must be shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure
the consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation
from the intended victim.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The determining factor on whether or not the commission of a crime
is attended by treachery is not the resulting crime committed but the mode of attack employed in
its execution.—This Court has also had occasion to state that whether or not the attack succeeds
against its intended victim or injures another or whether the crime committed is graver than that
intended is immaterial, as long as it is shown that the attack is attended by treachery, the said
qualifying circumstance may still be considered by the court. Thus, the determining factor on
whether or not the commission of a crime is attended by treachery is not the resulting crime
committed but the mode of attack employed in its execution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A single and continuous attack cannot be divided into stages to make
it appear that treachery was involved.—The trial court’s finding that the loading of the gun, the
cocking of the hammer and finally the pulling of the trigger constitute a deliberate effort on the
part of appellant to use the gun as a means of a treacherous attack is patently erroneous. A single
and continuous attack cannot be divided into stages to make it appear that treachery was
involved. The entire incident happened in a matter of minutes, as testified to by witnesses, and as
noted by the trial court. It was error to our mind for the trial court to divide the assault in stages
to arrive at the conclusion that the mode of attack was consciously employed by the appellant.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court that the appellant prepared the gun before getting out of
his car, the appellant testified that he loaded his gun before he left the house and that it was ready
to fire when he alighted his car. There was no time for him to reflect on the mode of attack since
he just picked up his gun and alighted from his car and shot at the FX a few seconds after Dino
and Noel Andres started shouting at each other. We note further that the trial court pointed out
that from the fact that the appellant prepared his gun to shoot, this was an indication of the
deliberate employment of thegun as a means to kill; i.e. that the use of an automatic, pistol shows
that the shooting was attended by treachery.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The weapon used, by itself, is not determinative of treachery, unless
it is shown that the accused deliberately used the gun to insure the commission of the crime and
to render the unarmed victim defenseless.—We do not agree that the weapon used, by itself, is
determinative of treachery, unless it is shown, and it is not herein shown, that the appellant
deliberately used the gun to insure the commission of the crime and to render the unarmed victim
defenseless. As discussed above, the encounter between the appellant and the Andresses was a
chance encounter and the appellant’s gun was in the glove compartment of his car even before he
left his house. The shooting was clearly a spur of the moment or impulsive decision made by the
appellant preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of the private complainant.
Jurisprudence teaches us that under the circumstances, treachery is not obtaining.

Same; Physical Injuries; The intent to kill determines whether the crime committed is physical
injuries or homicide and such intent is made manifest by the acts of the accused which are
undoubtedly intended to kill the victim.—As regards the injuries sustained by the two children
we find that the crime committed are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill
determines whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is made
manifest by the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill the victim. In a case
wherein the accused did not know that a person was hiding behind a table who was hit by a stray
bullet causing superficial injuries requiring treatment for three days, the crime committed is
slight physical injuries. In case of doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be
convicted of the lesser offense of physical injuries.

Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Passion and Obfuscation; Requisites; Provocation must be

sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must be
commensurate to the crime committed; The aggressive behavior of the complainant towards the
accused and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot
at the complainant’s vehicle.—The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also
not obtaining. For this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that: (1) an
unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended
victim; (2) that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission
of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused’s mind; and that (3) “the passion
and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge.”
Noel Andres’ act of shouting at the appellants son, who was then a nurse and of legal age, is not
sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation as it is claimed by the accused. Besides, the
appellant’s son, Dino was shouting back at Noel Andres. It was not a case wherein the
appellant’s son appeared helpless and oppressed that the appellant lost his reason and shot at the
FX of Noel Andres. The same holds true for the appellant’s claim of provocation on the part of
Noel Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed
and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of
provocation varies according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel
Andres towards the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient
provocation to shoot at the complainant’s vehicle.

Same; Same; Incomplete Defense of Relative; The mitigating circumstance of incomplete

defense of a relative is unavailing where the act of complainant in cursing and shouting at the
accused and his son do not amount to art unlawful aggression against them.—The plea for the
appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is also
unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant and his son do not
amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez.

Same; Same; Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong; The mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong obtains when there is a notable disparity between the
means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed; The
intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the
weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim.—The plea for
the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is
likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable
disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested
from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The
appellant’s use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should
have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of
a gun is

Same; Complex Crimes; Homicide; Slight Physical Injuries; Where the offenses committed by
the act of the accused of firing a single shot are one count of homicide, a grave felony, and two
counts of slight physical injuries, a light felony, the rules on the imposition of penalties for
complex crimes, which requires two or more grave and/or less grave felonies, will not apply.—
The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal
Code are not applicable in this case. Art. 48 applies if a single act constitutes two or more grave
and less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means of committing another; in such a
case, the penalty for the most serious offense shall be imposed in its maximum period. Art. 9 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 25 defines grave felonies as those to which the law
attaches the capital punishment or afflictive penalties from reclusion perpetua to prision mayor;
less grave felonies are those to which the law attaches a penalty which in its maximum period
falls under correctional penalties; and light felonies are those punishable by arresto menor or fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos. Considering that the offenses committed by the act of the
appellant of firing a single shot are one count of homicide, a grave felony, and two counts of
slight physical injuries, a light felony, the rules on the imposition of penalties for complex
crimes, which requires two or more grave and/or less grave felonies, will not apply.

Same; Damages; Even if there is no evidence as to the victim’s actual income at the time of her
death, in view of her temporary separation from work because of her pregnancy, the Court does
not consider it reversible error for the trial court to have pegged her earning capacity to that of
the salary of a government nurse under the salary standardization law, as a fair or reasonable
assessment of her earning capacity at the time of her death.—The pecuniary award granted by
the trial court for actual damages was duly established by the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses as supported by the original receipts for hospitalization and other medical expenses
presented in evidence by the prosecution. The award for loss of earning capacity is likewise
sustained for the reason that while Feliber Andres was pregnant and was unemployed at the time
of death, it is not disputed that she was a registered nurse and had earning capacity. Noel Andres
also testified that he and his wife had plans to go back to Saudi Arabia to work after Feliber had
given birth to their second baby. While there is no evidence as to Feliber’s actual income at the
time of her death, in view of her temporary separation from work because of her pregnancy, we
do not consider it reversible error for the trial court to peg her earning capacity to that of the
salary of a government nurse under the salary—standardization law, as a fair estimate or
reasonable assessment of her earning capacity at the time of her death. It would be grossly
inequitous to

deny her spouse and her minor children damages for the support that they would have received,
considering clear evidence on record that she did have earning capacity at the time of her death.
PARDO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Criminal Law; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; The accused’s conscious use of
a firearm with pre-loaded multiple missile bullets against a defenseless man who was totally
unaware of the danger to his life, as the events moved fast and he did not even hear the shot,
constitutes treachery.—Treachery under Article 14, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code is
defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime
against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be
appreciated, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that would
insure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim and leaving the latter
without an opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution employed
were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. The means employed for the
commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously or
deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the crime and at the same
time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation by the victim. At the time of the shooting, the
complainant was having a tiff with accused’s son. He knew that the complainant was not armed
and there was no imminent and grave danger to the life of his son. His conscious use of a firearm
with pre-loaded multiple missile bullets against a defenseless man who was totally unaware of
the danger to his life, as the events moved fast and he did not even hear the shot constitutes
treachery. Accused insured the success of the crime without risk to himself arising from defense
or retaliation. The complainant could not defend himself from such firepower, much less
retaliate. He was without any firearm. Even if the attack was frontal, it was sudden and the
victim was unarmed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether or not the attack succeeds against its intended victim or
injures another, or whether the crime committed is graver than that intended is immaterial, as
long as it is shown that the attack is attended by treachery, the qualifying circumstance may still
be considered.—Whether or not the attack succeeds against its intended victim or injures
another, or whether the crime committed is graver than that intended is immaterial, as long as it
is shown that the attack is attended by treachery, the qualifying circumstance may still be
considered. [People vs. Gonzalez, Jr., 359 SCRA 352(2001)]

3. People v. Acuram, [331 SCRA 129], G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000

Criminal Law; Murder; Policemen; That a policeman could display such indifference to a crime
committed in his presence—ignoring a shooting incident and going his way—is highly
incredible.—To begin with, while appellant denies that he fled and hid after the shooting
incident, we find that his behavior proves otherwise. Appellant admits that he was at the scene of
the crime at the time the shooting happened. Considering that he is a law enforcement officer, the
unusual incident should have at least elicited his curiosity and he should have inquired about it.
However, he chose to ignore the incident and go his way. That a policeman could display such
indifference to a crime committed in his presence is highly incredible. While it was true that he
reported for duty the day after the incident, the following day, he was ordered by his
commanding officer restricted within the camp pending investigation of the case. By this time,
appellant must have learned that his commanding officer had received a radio message and that
he was already a suspect. As the trial court noted, no superior officer will hold back from any of
his men involved, such a grave charge. Despite these, appellant did not present himself before
the police in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. Instead, he was conveniently nowhere to be found.

Same; Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Voluntary Surrender; The essence of voluntary
surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save
them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture; Being restrained by
one’s superior to stay within the camp without submitting to the investigating authorities
concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law.—Appellant’s first
contention that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, in our view,
is quite untenable. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the
accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because
he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred
in his search and capture. In this case, it was appellant’s commanding officer who surrendered
him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one’s superiors to stay within the camp
without submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary
surrender as contemplated by law. The trial court is correct in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in appellant’s favor.

Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery cannot be appreciated where the
accused shot the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate
act of the will.—On his second assignment of error, however, we find convincing merit.
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that the killing was qualified by
treachery. On this point, we agree. For treachery to be considered an aggravating circumstance,
there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. In this case, the shooting was done at the spur
of the moment. As observed by the trial court, the victim had shouted damning curses at the
driver and the passengers of the jeepney. The shooting was on instantaneous response to the
cursing, as appellant correctly claimed. Treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused shot
the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the
will.

Same; Same; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites; Direct evidence of the commission
of the crime is not the only matrix where the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings—
from direct evidence of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of circumstances the mind is led
intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, towards a conviction that from said fact or
facts some other facts may be validly inferred.—Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
ruling that he was the perpetrator of the crime. He claims he was not conclusively identified and
the alleged fatal weapon was not positively tested. True, prosecution witnesses did not positively
identify appellant as the one who fired the gun at the victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix where the trial court may draw its conclusions
and findings of guilt. It is settled that conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence
provided that the following requisites must concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial
evidence could be of similar weight and probative value as direct evidence. From direct evidence
of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of circumstances the mind is led intuitively, or by a conscious
process of reasoning, towards a conviction that from said fact or facts some other facts may be
validly inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial
than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime.

Same; Same; Paraffin Tests; Negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that
a person did not fire a gun.—Appellant’s insistence on his innocence in view of the absence of
paraffin and ballistic tests, in our view, is far from convincing. Suffice it to state that even
negative findings of the nitrates could be explained if a person discharged a firearm with gloves
on, or if he thoroughly washed his hands thereafter.

Same; Same; Physicians; The perceived delay in giving medical treatment to the victim does not
break at all the causal connection between the wrongful act of the accused and the injuries
sustained by the victim—it does not constitute an efficient intervening cause; Anyone inflicting
injuries is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal act such as death that supervenes
in consequence of the injuries, and the fact that the injured did not receive proper medical
attendance would not affect the malefactor’s criminal responsibility.—We cannot hold the
attending doctors liable for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in giving medical
treatment to the victim does not break at all the causal connection between the wrongful act of
the appellant and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not constitute an efficient
intervening cause. The proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by the
appellant. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all the consequences of his
criminal act such as death that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact that the
injured did not receive proper medical attendance would not affect appellant’s criminal
responsibility. The rule is founded on the practical policy of closing to the. wrongdoer a
convenient avenue of escape from the just consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were
otherwise, many criminals could avoid just accounting for their acts by merely establishing a
doubt as to the immediate cause of death. [People vs. Acuram, 331 SCRA 129(2000)]
4. People v. Intod, [215 SCRA 52], G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992, impossible crime

Criminal Law; Impossible crime; To be impossible, the act intended by the offender must be by
its nature one impossible of accomplishment.–—That the offense cannot be produced because
the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its
nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2)
physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime.

Same; Same; Same; Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would
not amount to a crime.––Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,
would not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances
where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there
is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act;
and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.

Same; Same; Same; Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.–—On the other
hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man
who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and
finds the pocket empty.

Same; Same; There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the
concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.–—The aforecited cases are the same cases which
have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted
murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at
hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept
and appreciation of impossible crimes.

Same; Same; Same; In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2) expressly
provided for impossible crimes and made them punishable.–—In the Philippines, the Revised
Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made them punishable.
Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding
this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code.
Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense
to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the
impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility.
Same; Same; Same; In American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime.–—To
restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible of
accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt
to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore,
that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the
other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held
liable for any crime–—neither for an attempt nor for an impossible crime. The only reason for
this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an attempt.

Same; Same; Same; In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized.–—This is not true in
the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of
accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself.
Furthermore, the phrase “inherent impossibility” that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguiere debemos.

Same; Same; Same; Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense.–—x x
x Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have
been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no
defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.

Same; Same; Same; Legal impossibility is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal
liability for an attempt.–—Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be
invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt.

Same; Same; The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment.–—The factual situation in the case
at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient
to make the act an impossible crime. [Intod vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 52(1992)]

5. Tan vs Ballena, [557 SCRA 229], G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008, mistake of fact
Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; The strict and rigid application of the rules
of procedure which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must always be eschewed.—It is a well-settled principle that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. In deciding a case, the appellate court has the
discretion whether or not to dismiss the same, which discretion must be exercised soundly and in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, taking into account the circumstances of the
case. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse
and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the
case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.

Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court has already allowed the relaxation of the requirements of
verification and certification so that the ends of justice may be better served.—Under justifiable
circumstances, we have already allowed the relaxation of the requirements of verification and
certification so that the ends of justice may be better served. Verification is simply intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of
the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith; while the
purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping.

Same; Same; Forum Shopping; The well-settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the
certification of non-forum shopping; Exception is when the petitioners show reasonable cause for
failure to personally sign the certification.—On the requirement of a certification of non-forum
shopping, the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the certification of non-forum
shopping. The reason for this is that the persons who have signed the certification cannot be
presumed to have the personal knowledge of the other non-signing petitioners with respect to the
filing or non-filing of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition. The rule,
however, admits of an exception and that is when the petitioners show reasonable cause for
failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must be able to convince the court that
the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.

Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Probable Cause; Definition of Probable Cause.—

Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean “actual and positive cause”
nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.

Same; Same; Same; The determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor; Definition of preliminary investigation.—The determination of probable cause is a
function that belongs to the public prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by the RTC
are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively
pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor. This broad prosecutorial power
is, however, not unfettered, because just as public prosecutors are obliged to bring forth before
the law those who have transgressed it, they are also constrained to be circumspect in filing
criminal charges against the innocent. Thus, for crimes cognizable by the regional trial courts,
preliminary investigations are usually conducted. As defined under the law, a preliminary
investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

Same; Same; Same; Findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of
probable cause is subject to the power of review by the Department of Justice; The power of
review does not preclude the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals from intervening and
exercising their own powers of review with respect to the DOJ’s findings.—The findings of the
prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject to the
power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the
resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or
move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. This power of
review, however, does not preclude this Court and the Court of Appeals from intervening and
exercising our own powers of review with respect to the DOJ’s findings. In the exceptional case
in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals may take
cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Same; In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the
parties’ evidence is not required; Only prima facie evidence is required.—In a preliminary
investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only
such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. Certainly, it does not involve the determination of whether or
not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the person. Only prima
facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a given
fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party’s claim or defense; and which, if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. Therefore, matters of evidence are more
appropriately presented and heard during the trial. [Tan vs. Ballena, 557 SCRA 229(2008)]

6. People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003

Criminal Law; Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged
such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution.—It bears
stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory
facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are
controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged
such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution.

Same; Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution
for a crime requiring specific intent; Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence.— Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where
circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or
objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. Specific intent involves a
state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act.
Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a
crime requiring specific intent. Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes. Specific intent
may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the
circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record.

Same; Specific intent is not synonymous with motive; As a general rule, proof of motive for the
commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does
not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder.—Specific intent is
not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the
accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime
and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the
commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does
not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder.

Same; Evidence; In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond cavil of doubt.—In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The proof against the
accused must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment.

Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites for Circumstantial Evidence to be Sufficient

Basis for Conviction.—What was once a rule of account respectability is now entombed in
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence,
sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment
of conviction if the following requisites concur: “x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.”

Same; Same; Conspiracy; There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a
felony and decide to commit it; To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as
to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime.—There is conspiracy when two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with
the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence. Conspiracy is deducible from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the
commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiment. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to the
existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of the
commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. If
conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. It matters not who among the
accused actually shot and killed the victim.

Same; Same; Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with respect to minor,
collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the
prominent facts.—A truth-telling witness is not always expected give an error-free testimony
considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the
mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the
witness’ credibility nor the veracity of his testimony. Variations on the testimony of witnesses on
the same side with respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of
their united testimony to the prominent facts. Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only
serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of
rehearsed testimony.

Same; Same; The testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated
terms.—The testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated terms
and the true meaning of answers to isolated questions propounded to a witness is to be
ascertained by due consideration of all the questions propounded to the witness and his answers
thereto.

Same; Same; Alibi; The defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in criminal prosecution
because the same is easy to concoct between relatives, friends and even those not related to the
offender.—Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in criminal
prosecution because the same is easy to concoct between relatives, friends and even those not
related to the offender. It is hard for the prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit approbation
by the trial court and this Court, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are burdened to prove with clear and
convincing evidence that they were in a place other than the situs criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime; that it was physically impossible for them to have committed the said
crime. They failed to discharge their burden.

Same; Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery and abuse of superior strength must be
alleged and proved clearly and conclusively as the crime itself.—Qualifying circumstances such
as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly and conclusively
as the crime itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly insufficient and
cannot produce the effect of qualifying the crime. As this Court held: “No matter how truthful
these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of
aggravating the condition of defendant.”

Same; Same; Same; Elements for Treachery to be Appreciated as a Qualifying Circumstance.—

For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to
prove the following elements: (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately
or consciously adopted.

Same; Same; Same; To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force that is
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.—To take advantage
of superior strength means to purposely use force that is out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked. What is primordial, this Court held in People v. Rogelio
Francisco is that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their combined strength in order to
consummate the crime. It is necessary to show that the malefactors cooperated in such a way as
to secure advantage from their superiority in strength.

Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Alibi; The defense of alibi, being one that can easily be
fabricated, is inherently weak and cannot be expected to withstand the positive identification
made by credible witnesses.—Between the positive identification made by the eyewitnesses and
the bare denial of appellants, there is scarcely any serious doubt but that decisive weight must be
given to the positive testimony of Randy Manalo Bantas. The defense of alibi, being one that can
easily be fabricated, is inherently weak and cannot be expected to withstand the positive
identification made by credible witnesses.

Same; Same; Motive; While the motive of an accused in a criminal case might generally be
immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive could be important and consequential
when the evidence on the commission of the crime would be short of moral certainty.—In
arriving at its verdict convicting appellants for “aggravated murder,” the trial court considered
the act of the accused of forcibly taking Modesto Delim from his house as being likewise enough
to substantiate the killing of the victim. The conclusion could rightly be assailed. The accounts of
Randy and his mother Rita would indicate that the forcible taking of Modesto was carried out in
absolute silence, with not one of the five intruders uttering any word which could give a clue on
the reason for the abduction and, more particularly, whether the same was carried out for the
purpose of killing Modesto. The two witnesses were unaware of any existing grudge between the
malefactors and the victim that could have prompted them to violently snuff out the life of the
latter. While the motive of an accused in a criminal case might generally be immaterial, not
being an element of the crime, motive could be important and consequential when the evidence
on the commission of the crime would be short of moral certainty. [People vs. Delim, 396 SCRA
386(2003)]

Article 6 – Stages of a Felony

1. Rivera et al v. People, GR No 166326, January 25, 2006 (Attempted Murder)

Criminal Law; Murder; Homicide; An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in
their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim
immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.—An essential element of
murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of
the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or
circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a
felony by dolo.

Same; Same; Same; If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to
kill is presumed.—In People v. Delim, 396 SCRA 386 (2003), the Court declared that evidence
to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of
the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the
victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.

Same; Attempted Felony; Essential elements of an attempted felony; Elements of the first
requisite of an attempted felony.—The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; 2. He does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; 3. The offender’s act be not
stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; 4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was
due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. The first requisite of an attempted
felony consists of two elements, namely: (1) That there be external acts; (2) Such external acts
have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.

Same; Same; Concept of an overt or external act elaborated in People vs. Lizada, 396 SCRA 62
(2003).—The Court in People v. Lizada, 396 SCRA 62 (2003), elaborated on the concept of an
overt or external act, thus: An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The act is that, in a majority of cases, the
conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal;
and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal
that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the
commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been
committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can
say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have
been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the “first
or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made.” The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion.
It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the
words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.

Same; Treachery; Even if the attack is frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no
opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself, there would be treachery.—We reject
petitioners’ contention that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the commission of the
felony. Petitioners attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was walking
with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He had no chance
to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the synchronized assault of the three
siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim. Even if the
attack is frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or
defend himself, there would be treachery. [Rivera vs. People, 480 SCRA 188(2006)]

2. Serrano v. People, GR No 175023, July 5, 2010 (Attempted/Frustrated Homicide)

Criminal Law; Appeals; Evidence; As a rule, the Supreme Court accords the greatest respect for
the findings of the lower courts, especially the evaluation by the trial judge who had the distinct
opportunity to directly hear and observe the witnesses and their testimonies.—At the outset, we
clarify that we shall no longer deal with the correctness of the RTC and the CA’s appreciation of
the victim’s identification of the petitioner as his assailant. This is a question of fact that we
cannot entertain in a Rule 45 review, save for exceptional reasons that must be clearly and
convincingly shown. As a rule, we accord the greatest respect for the findings of the lower
courts, especially the evaluation by the trial judge who had the distinct opportunity to directly
hear and observe the witnesses and their testimonies. As we explained in People v. Lucena, 356
SCRA 90 (2001)—[It] has been consistently held by this Court that the matter of assigning
values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial
judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility
by the various indicia available but not reflected in the record. The demeanor of the person on
the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause,
the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or
the guilty blanch—these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his teeth.

Same; Witnesses; Human experience tells us that it is unnatural for a victim to accuse someone
other than his actual attacker—in the normal course of things, the victim would have the earnest
desire to bring the guilty person to justice, and no other.—The victim’s credibility is further
strengthened by his lack of improper motive to falsely accuse the petitioner of the crime. Human
experience tells us that it is unnatural for a victim to accuse someone other than his actual
attacker; in the normal course of things, the victim would have the earnest desire to bring the
guilty person to justice, and no other. We consider, too, that the victim consistently and
positively, in and out of court, identified the petitioner as his assailant. The victim testified that
the petitioner was a neighbor who lived just a few houses away from his house.
Same; Homicide; Factors to Determine Intent to Kill; Intent to kill is a state of mind that the
courts can discern only through external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at
the time of the assault and immediately thereafter.—The petitioner posits that he can only be
held liable for serious physical injuries since the intent to kill, the necessary element to
characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently proven. The assailant’s intent to kill is
the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide.
The crime can only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven. Intent to kill is a state of mind that
the courts can discern only through external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused
at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera vs. People, 480 SCRA 188
(2006), we considered the following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the
means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of
the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of
the accused. We also consider motive and the words uttered by the offender at the time he
inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors.

Same; Same; Attempted Felony and Frustrated Felony, Distinguished.—In Palaganas vs. People,
50 SCRA 533 (2006), we made the following distinctions between frustrated and attempted
felony as follows: 1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender
merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all
the acts of execution. 2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime
is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony,
the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s
own spontaneous desistance. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted
which must be supported by independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient
to cause the victim’s death without timely medical intervention.

Same; When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without medical
intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt—the doubt created by the lack
of evidence should be resolved in favor of the accused.—When nothing in the evidence shows
that the wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the
realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved
in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated,
homicide. Under these standards, we agree with the CA’s conclusion. From all accounts,
although the stab wound could have been fatal since the victim testified that he saw his intestines
showed, no exact evidence exists to prove the gravity of the wound; hence, we cannot consider
the stab wound as sufficient to cause death. As correctly observed by the CA, the victim’s
attending physician did not testify on the gravity of the wound inflicted on the victim. We
consider, too, the CA’s observation that the medical certifications issued by the East Avenue
Medical Center merely stated the location of the wound. There was also no proof that without
timely medical intervention, the victim would have died. This paucity of proof must necessarily
favor the petitioner.

Same; Frustrated Homicide; Elements.—The view from the “frustrated” stage of the crime gives
the same results. The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his
victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal
or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the
qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
present. Since the prosecution failed to prove the second element, we cannot hold the petitioner
liable for frustrated homicide.

Same; Damages; If the actual damages, proven by receipts during the trial, amount to less than
P25,000.00, the victim shall be entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in
lieu of actual damages.—We modify the CA decision with respect to the petitioner’s civil
liability. The CA ordered actual damages to be paid in the amount of P3,858.50. This is
erroneous and contrary to th prevailing jurisprudence. In People v. Andres, 409 SCRA 141
(2003), we held that if the actual damages, proven by receipts during the trial, amount to less
than P25,000.00, the victim shall be entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00,
in lieu of actual damages. The award of temperate damages is based on Article 2224 of the New
Civil Code which states that temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proven with certainty. In
this case, the victim is entitled to the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages considering that
the amount of actual damages is only P3,858.50. The amount of actual damages shall be deleted.

[Serrano vs. People, 623 SCRA 322(2010)]

3. Epifanio v. People, GR No 157057, June 26, 2007 (Attempted/Frustrated Murder)

Criminal Law; Appeals; It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the
whole case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision on the basis of
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.—The non-presentation of the doctor to
testify on the nature of the wounds, while not raised as an issue in the RTC, does not bar the
petitioner from raising it on appeal. It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case
throws the whole case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision on the basis of
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.

Same; Attempted and Frustrated Felonies; Words and Phrases; In attempted crime, the purpose
of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him
to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all the acts which should produce the crime
as a consequence, which act it is his intention to perform; The subjective phase in the
commission of a crime is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with
prior acts, should result in the consummated crime.—It must be stressed that it is not the gravity
of the wounds alone which determines whether a felony is attempted or frustrated, but whether
the assailant had passed the subjective phase in the commission of the offense.In the leading case
of United States v. Eduave, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, distinguished an attempted
from a frustrated felony. He said that to be an attempted crime, the purpose of the offender must
be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the
moment when he has performed all the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence,
which act it is his intention to perform. The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that
portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission
of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime. Thereafter, the phase is objective.

Same; Same; Same; In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective phase
in the commission of the crime—the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the
acts of execution which should produce the crime; A crime is frustrated when the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which should result in the consummation of the crime—the
offender has passed the subjective phase in the commission of the crime.—In case of an
attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective phase in the commission of the crime.
The offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts of execution which should
produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary
desistance. On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts
of execution which should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the
subjective phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing
interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did all that was
necessary to consummate the crime; however, the crime is not consummated by reason of the
intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender.

Same; Physical Injuries; Murder or Homicide; If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the
latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had
no intention to kill the victim—or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or
attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim.—In homicide cases, the offender is
said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and
could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance. If one inflicts
physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated
physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim; or frustrated or attempted
homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim.
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons
used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the
victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the
time the injuries were inflicted by him on the victim.

Same; Same; Same; In considering the extent of injury done, account must be taken of the injury
to the function of the various organs, and also the danger to life.—The prosecution failed to
present testimonial evidence on the nature of the wounds sustained by Crisaldo. The Court has
discussed the importance of ascertaining the degree of injury sustained by a victim in People v.
Matyaong, 359 SCRA 392 (2001), thus: In considering the extent of injury done, account must
be taken of the injury to the function of the various organs, and also the danger to life. A division
into mortal and nonmortal wounds, if it could be made, would be very desirable; but the
unexpected complications and the various extraneous causes which give gravity to the simplest
cases, and, on the other hand, the favorable termination of some injuries apparently the most
dangerous, render any such classification impracticable. The general classification into slight,
severe, dangerous, and mortal wounds may be used, but the possibility of the slight wound
terminating with the loss of the person’s life, and the apparently mortal ending with only a slight
impairment of some function, must always be kept in mind. x x x The danger to life of any
wound is dependent upon a number of factors: the extent of the injury, the form of the wound,
the region of the body affected, the blood vessels, nerves, or organs involved, the entrance of
disease-producing bacteria or other organisms into the wound, the age and constitution of the
person injured, and the opportunities for administering proper surgical treatment. x x x

Murder; Homecide; Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be
fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as
attempted, not frustrated, murder.—No evidence in this case was introduced to prove that
Crisaldo would have died from his wound without timely medical attendance. It is well-settled
that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not
medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted,
not frustrated, murder. [Epifanio vs. People, 525 SCRA 552(2007)]

4. People v. Caballero et al, GR Nos. 149028-30, April 2, 2003 (Frustrated Murder)

Criminal Law; Murder; Conspiracy; Direct proof of person in agreement to commit a crime is
not necessary; It is not enough that at the time of the commission of a crime, all the malefactors
have the same purpose and are united in their execution; Once established, all the conspirators
are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of each of them for
in contemplation of the law, the act of one is the act of all.—The trial court correctly found that
all the appellants conspired to kill Eugene and assault Arnold; hence, they are criminally liable
for the death of Eugene and for the injuries sustained by Arnold. Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it
consists primarily of a meeting of minds and intent. Conspiracy must be proved with the same
quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. However,
direct proof is not required. Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy
may be proved through the collective acts of the accused, before, during and after the
commission of a felony, all the accused aiming at the same object, one performing one part and
another performing another for the attainment of the same objective, their acts though apparently
independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.
Direct proof of a person in agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the
time of the commission of a crime, all the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in
their execution. Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of participation of each of them for in contemplation of the law, the act
of one is the act of all.

Same; Same; Same; Co-conspirators are criminally liable only for acts done pursuant to the
conspiring on how and what are the necessary and logic consequence of the intended crime.—
Criminal conspiracy must always be founded on facts, not on mere inferences, conjectures and
presumptions. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the act without cooperation or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy absent the
intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common objective and
purpose. Moreover, one is not criminally liable for his act done outside the contemplation of the
conspirators. Co-conspirators are criminally liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiring
on how and what are the necessary and logic consequence of the intended crime.

Same; Same; Same; All appellants by their simultaneous collective acts before and after the
commission of the crimes were united in one common objective, to kill Eugene, and cause
injuries to Arnold for trying to intervene and prevent bloodshed; Hence, all the appellants are
criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold.—In this case, when
appellant Armando asked Eugene at the store of Wilma whether the latter was going to buy
something from the store, Eugene was peeved and remonstrated that he and Armando had no
quarrel between them. Appellant Armando was likewise irked at the reaction of Eugene because
from the store, appellant Armando stationed himself by the gate of the Mondragon Compound
near the sari-sari store of Wilma. Appellants Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined their
brother, appellant Armando at the gate. Appellant Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with
knives. When Eugene passed by the gate to the compound, appellant Armando pulled Eugene to
the gate but when the latter resisted, all the appellants ganged up on Eugene. Appellant Armando
took the wooden support of the clothesline and hit Eugene with it. Eugene was stabbed three
times on his chest even as he tried to parry the thrusts. When Arnold rushed to the situs criminis
to pacify the appellants and accused Robito, appellant Ricardo stabbed him on the left side of his
body. The other appellants and accused Robito joined appellant Ricardo and ganged up on
Arnold. They stabbed Arnold anew twice on his forearm. Teresito Mondragon, the father-in-law
of appellant Ricardo intervened and forthwith, all the appellants, including accused Robito
returned to the Mondragon Compound. Patently, all the appellants by their simultaneous
collective acts before and after the commission of the crimes were united in one common
objective, to kill Eugene, and cause injuries to Arnold for trying to intervene and prevent
bloodshed. Hence, all the appellants are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the
injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who among the appellants stabbed Eugene or inflicted
injuries on Arnold. The act of one is the act of the others.

Same; Same; Treachery; Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is sudden and the victim is
unarmed; The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim.—In
Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are guilty as co-principals by direct participation of
murder, qualified by treachery. In order that treachery may be considered as a qualifying
circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove that: . . . . (1) the employment of means of
execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Even a frontal attack is
treacherous if it is sudden and the victim is unarmed. The essence of treachery is a swift and
unexpected attack on the unarmed victim. In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He had no inkling
that he would be, waylaid as he sauntered on his way to his girlfriend Susana’s house. On the
other hand, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole while appellant Ricardo and
accused Robito were armed with knives. The attack on the hapless Eugene was swift and

Same; Frustrated Homicide; Elements.—In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are
guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the
Revised Penal Code which reads: A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for
its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The essential
elements of a frustrated felony are as follows: Elements: 1. The offender performs all the acts of
execution; 2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence; 3. But the
felony is not produced; 4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

Same; Attempted Crime; Words and Phrases; To be an attempted crime, the purpose of the
offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to
stop prior to the moment when he has performed all the acts which should produce the crime as a
consequence, which act it is his intention to perform.—In the leading case of United States v.
Eduave, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, distinguished an attempted from frustrated
felony. He said that to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a
foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he
has performed all the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which act it is his
intention to perform.

Same; Same; In an attempted crime, the offender does not arrive at the point of performing, all of
the acts of execution which should produce the crime; He stopped short of that point by some
cause apart from his voluntary desistance.—The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is
that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the
commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts,
should result in the consummated crime. Thereafter, the phase is objective. In case of an
attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective phase in the commission of the crime.
The offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts of execution which should
produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary
desistance.

Same; Frustrated Crime; Words and Phrases; A crime is frustrated when the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which should result in the consummation of the crime.—On
the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective
phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted
the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did all that is necessary to
consummate the crime. However, the crime is not consummated by reason of the intervention of
causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide cases, the offender is said to have
performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause
the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance.

Same; Intent to Kill; Elements.—If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter
survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no
intention to kill the victim or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted
murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a)
motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature
and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e)
words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

Same; Same; Appellants performed all the acts of execution but the crime was not consummated
because of the timely medical intervention.—In this case, appellant Armando was armed with a
wooden pole. Appellant Ricardo and accused Robito used knives. Dr. Quisumbing, who attended
to and operated on Arnold, testified that the stab wound sustained by Arnold on the left side of
his body was mortal and could have caused his death were it not for the timely and effective
medical intervention. x x x It cannot be denied that the appellants had the intention to kill
Arnold. The appellants performed all the acts of execution but the crime was not consummated
because of the timely medical intervention.
Same; Alibi; Alibi as a defense is inherently weak for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove.—Equally barren of merit is appellants' defense of alibi. Alibi as a defense is inherently
weak for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. To merit approbation, the appellants
were burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence that at the time the crimes were
committed, they were in a place other than the situs of the crimes such that it was physically
impossible for them to have committed said crimes. The appellants dismally failed in this
respect. They testified that they were at the house of appellant Ricardo, which was conveniently
near the place where Eugene was killed and Arnold was assaulted. Moreover, the records show
that Marciano, Jr. was treated for his superficial injuries on August 4, 1996, a day after the
incident. This belies the claim of appellants Ricardo and Armando that they were allegedly in the
hospital at the time of the incident.

Same; Same; Abuse of superior strength, concurring with treachery is absorbed by treachery.—
The trial court imposed the death penalty on appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-1218 on its
finding that treachery and abuse of superior strength were attendant in the killing of Eugene. The
Solicitor General does not agree with the trial court and contends that abuse of superior strength
was absorbed by treachery; hence, should not be considered as a separate aggravating
circumstance in the imposition of the penalty on the appellants. The Court agrees with the
Solicitor General. Abuse of superior strength, concurring with treachery is absorbed by
treachery. [People vs. Caballero, 400 SCRA 424(2003)]

5. People v. Lanuza, GR No 188562, August 17, 2011 (Frustrated Homicide)

Criminal Law; Frustrated Homicide; Elements; Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, of the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of,
or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed, and the motive of the accused.—The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the
accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault;
(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, of the means used by the malefactors; the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of,
or immediately after the killing of the victim; the circumstances under which the crime was
committed; and the motive of the accused. These elements are extant in the case at bar.

Same; Same; Witnesses; When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if
not conclusive effect, and this is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate
court.—There is no cogent reason for the Court to disturb the foregoing findings and conclusions
of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Accused-appellant’s implausible alibi of accident
cannot overcome private complainant’s positive and forthright testimony that accused-appellant
shot private complainant with intent to kill. It must be emphasized that when the credibility of a
witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored
on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such
findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this
Court. [People vs. Lanuza, 656 SCRA 293(2011)]

Article 8 – Conspiracy

People v. Chito Nazareno, G.R. No. 196434, October 24, 2012 (COMMON DESIGN
AND PURPOSE) - None

Violeta Bahilidad v. People, G.R. No. 185196, March 17, 2010 (OVERT ACT) - None

Rosie Quidet v. People, G.R. No. 170289, April 8, 2010 (UNITY OF ACTION /
SIMULTANEOUS ACTS)

Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; the essence of
conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose.—Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The
essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position
to evaluate the testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by the Supreme Court.—As a
general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the
testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by this Court. But where the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this
palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of
constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; For failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt, petitioner’s liability is separate and individual.—For failure of the
prosecution to prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner’s liability is separate
and individual. Considering that it was duly established that petitioner boxed Jimmy and
Andrew and absent proof of the extent of the injuries sustained by the latter from these acts,
petitioner should only be made liable for two counts of slight physical injuries. In addition,
he should pay P5,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Jimmy and another P5,000.00 as
moral damages to Andrew. Actual damages arising from said acts cannot, however, be
awarded for failure to prove the same.
Criminal Procedure; Conspiracy; Appeals; An appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.—The crime committed was
attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew
sustained were not life-threatening. Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their
conviction, this part of the appellate court’s judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are
entitled to a reduction of their prison terms. The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more
of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of
the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Criminal Law; Civil Indemnity; Civil indemnity is automatically granted to the heirs of the
deceased victim without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the
crime.—Civil indemnity is automatically granted to the heirs of the deceased victim without
need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime. In addition, the
trial court should have awarded moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 in consonance with
current jurisprudence. As to actual damages, the prosecution was able to prove burial-related
expenses with supporting receipt only to the extent of P5,000.00. [Quidet vs. People, 618
SCRA 1(2010)]

4. People v. Danilo Feliciano, et.al., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014 (COLLECTIVE
LIABILITY)

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Probable Cause; Due Process;
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor against the
accused, in compliance with the due process of the law.—It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights
that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.”
This includes the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and “to be
informed of the nature and accusation against him.” Upon a finding of probable cause, an
information is filed by the prosecutor against the accused, in compliance with the due process
of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that: A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
Criminal Law; Aggravating Circumstances; Failure to state an aggravating circumstance,
even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such.—It should be remembered that
every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to
state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as
such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of
“wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
Same; Same; Disguise; In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because,
like nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries
out his crimes.—In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like
nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his
crimes. The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that
the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including
disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an
aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The
inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the
accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to
conceal their identity.
Same; Conspiracy; Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is the act of all.”—The
information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of
one is the act of all.” This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal
their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have
done so. In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated
murder, and attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that
the elements of the crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time,
place, and persons involved in the offense.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; As a general rule, the findings of fact by the
trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are given great weight and credence on
review.—As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, are given great weight and credence on review. The rationale for this was
explained in People v. Daniel Quijada, 259 SCRA 191 (1996), as follows: Settled is the rule
that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the
witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush
of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the
calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the
solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. There are, of course, recognized exceptions to
this rule. In People v. Leticia Labarias, 217 SCRA 483 (1993), this court stated that: It is the
policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the reasonable
assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the
testimonies of the witnesses, who reveal much of themselves by their deportment on the
stand. The exception that makes the rule is where such findings are clearly arbitrary or
erroneous as when they are tainted with bias or hostility or are so lacking in basis as to
suggest that they were reached without the careful study and perceptiveness that should
characterize a judicial decision.
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an
eyewitness of a crime would endeavor to find ways to identify the assailant so that in the
event that he or she survives, the criminal could be apprehended.—It would be in line with
human experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a crime would endeavor to find ways to
identify the assailant so that in the event that he or she survives, the criminal could be
apprehended. It has also been previously held that: It is the most natural reaction for victims
of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the
manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body
movements thereof, creates a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory.
Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, a witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception.—As a general rule,
“[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, x x x.” All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are
inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the
general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus: Section 42.
Part of res gestae.—Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae.
Same; Same; Res Gestae; Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made
immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in
res gestae.—There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a
school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders
were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as
evidence given in res gestae.
Criminal Law; Alibi; It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the victim.—It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the victim. In People v. Benjamin Peteluna, 689 SCRA 190 (2013),
this court is stated that: x x x In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their
attackers while the accused-appellants merely offered alibis and denials as their defense. The
credibility of the victims was upheld by both the trial court and the appellate court while
giving little credence to the accused-appellants’ alibis. There is, thus, no reason to disturb
their findings.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; The swiftness and the suddenness of the
attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves.
Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.—The victims, who were unarmed, were also
attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows was with
their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and outnumbered, it would be impossible
for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute,
which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the
incident. The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims
to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
Same; Conspiracy; Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the
accused, regardless of their degree of participation.—It should be remembered that the trial
court found that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants and the appellate court
sustained this finding. Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all
ofthe accused, regardless of their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or
crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act
of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that “when two
or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition
of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone.” Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than
his own, “when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible
for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy.” The
imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where
this Court held that ... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator)
with- out taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the
criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime
must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ...
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible. Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and
confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused
conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even
investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the
scene of the crime. x x x.
ABAD, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; View that in every criminal
action, the prosecution has to establish the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.—In every criminal action, the prosecution has to establish
the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
its first duty is to prove the identity of the offender for, even if the commission of the offense
can be established, no conviction can take place without proof of his identity beyond
reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law; Alibi; View that true, alibi is a weak defense in the face of positive
testimonies of prosecution witnesses that the accused committed the crime.—True, alibi is a
weak defense in the face of positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses that the accused
committed the crime. But such testimonies must be credible and must come from credible
witnesses. Several circumstances militate against the mauling victims’ testimonies that they
were able to identify their attackers.
Remedial Law; Evidence; View that the circumstances of the separate identifications, taking
place in split seconds, defy belief.—Just what are the chances that four out of five witnesses
who were fleeing and, indeed, running for their lives would just look back, risk stumbling
and crashing down, to put in evidence the identities of some of those whom the RTC and the
CA convicted? Very little. It appears a convenient excuse for providing evidence where none
existed. The circumstances of the separate identifications, taking place in split seconds, defy
belief. What baffles me is the fact that the trial court acquitted SJ Morano whom SR Fortes
and Gaston identified while looking back on the run but convicted SJ Zingapan, Soliva, and
Medalla who were also targets of look-back testimonies.
Same; Same; Res Gestae; View that the statement of the bystanders, made while some of the
wounded were bleeding there and the excitement lingered, may be given in evidence as part
of the res gestae.—The statement of the bystanders, made while some of the wounded were
bleeding there and the excitement lingered, may be given in evidence as part of the res
gestae. Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence provides: Sec. 42. Part of the res
gestae.—Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae. x x x These statements are spontaneous reactions
inspired by the excitement of the moment. It may be assumed that, unlike tardy witnesses, the
bystanders who made the statements had no opportunity to deliberate or fabricate. The words
they uttered are part of the commotion they described. The res gestae contradicts the attempt
of prosecution witnesses to show that a number of the attackers wore masks or that
identification was possible because the masks of some fell off.
Constitutional Law; Right to Remain Silent; View that the right to silence is given to persons
under suspicion for committing some crimes, not to the victims whose duty is to promptly
assist the police investigators in pinpointing criminal responsibilities.—The right to silence is
given to persons under suspicion for committing some crimes, not to the victims whose duty
is to promptly assist the police investigators in pinpointing criminal responsibilities. No
evidence has been presented to show that the UP police force was partial to the opposing
fraternity. I am thus unable to blame the accused for believing that the only possible reason
in this case for withholding information from the police from day one was that the victims
and their counsel had yet to put their acts together.
 Criminal Law; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; View that while the attack by masked
men is doubly condemnable, not only for the treachery involved but also for the cowardice
and deception that came with it, the Supreme Court cannot hastily send to prison those
charged with these crimes without proof beyond reasonable doubt that they committed
them.—While the attack by masked men is doubly condemnable, not only for the treachery
involved but also for the cowardice and deception that came with it, the Court cannot hastily
send to prison those charged with these crimes without proof beyond reasonable doubt that
they committed them. The Constitution ordains this. In a case like this, where the identities
and participations of the several accused involved are difficult to prove, the ideal solution is
to convince the least guilty of them, the one who showed the most reluctance and delivered
the lightest blows, to turn state witness. I am unable to say if efforts in this direction were
taken by the NBI or the prosecutors to ensure that they had a good case. [People vs.
Feliciano, Jr., 724 SCRA 148(2014)]

People v. Reggie Villariez, G.R. No. 211160, September 2, 2015 (EFFECT OF DEATH
OF A CO-CONSPIRATOR AND DISMISSAL FO THE CASE AS TO ANOTHER) -
None

Article 11

People v. Samson GR 214883 Sept 2, 2015 (none)

Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan GR 120744 June 25, 2012

Evidence; Extrajudicial Confession; The extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is

admissible only against said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused.—Indeed, the
extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against said accused, but
is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in court his
extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other accused is
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against both
accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission. It is thus perplexing why, despite
the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latter’s testimony
implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence
when, in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-participation in
the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied due process in
this prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the
inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.

Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Fulfillment of Duty; Lawful Exercise of a Right; The
availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or
office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in
the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury
caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.—The availability of the justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of
the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty
or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed
is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such
right or office. The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the
part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal
intent or with fault or negligence. Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an
acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has committed the offense charged for
which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary
consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such
force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm; He is,
however, never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton
violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.—A
law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary
to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if
he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm. United States v. Campo has laid down the rule
that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force,
except in an extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other
means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender. In
case injury or death results from the exercise of such force, the same could be justified in
inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the officer had used necessary force.
He is, however, never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton
violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.

Same; Mistake of Fact; In the context of criminal law, a “mistake of fact” is a misapprehension
of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the
prosecution.—We find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure.
In the context of criminal law, a “mistake of fact” is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true,
would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a
reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent
component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only
general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all
to the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a)
that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute
prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.

Evidence; The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the evidence
of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does not relieve the prosecution of its
responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.—The precept in all criminal cases is
that the prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not
on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does not relieve the
prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. By reasonable doubt
is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. The overriding consideration is
not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.

Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy
when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need
not be proven by direct evidence; Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing
a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment.—Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven
by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating
a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found,
continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To
hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
[Yapyuco vs. Sandiganbayan, 674 SCRA 420(2012)]

Nacnac v. People GR 191913 March 21, 2012

Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Requisites for a Valid Self-defense.—

The Revised Penal Code provides the requisites for a valid self-defense claim: ART. 11.
Justifying circumstances.––The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts
in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur: First.
Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Same; Same; Same; Unlawful Aggression; Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not
have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if
the other elements are present.—Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-
defense. We explained, “Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand
on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements
are present.” It would “presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
on the life and limb of a person––not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude––but most
importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. x x x There is
aggression in contemplation of the law only when the one attacked faces real and immediate
threat to one’s life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just
speculative.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude; The act
of the [deceased] of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist cannot be categorized as unlawful
aggression.—Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference between the act
of drawing one’s gun and the act of pointing one’s gun at a target. The former cannot be said to
be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. In People v. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680 (1999),
We ruled that “for unlawful aggression to be attendant, there must be a real danger to life or
personal safety. Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or
imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude x x x. Here, the
act of the [deceased] of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist cannot be categorized as
unlawful aggression. Such act did not put in real peril the life or personal safety of appellant.”

Same; Same; Same; Reasonableness of the Means Employed; To successfully invoke self-
defense, another requisite is that the means employed by the accused must be reasonably
commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted; The lone gunshot
was a reasonable means chosen by petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of the
armed victim, his drunken state, disobedience of an unlawful order, and failure to stand down
despite a warning shot.—To successfully invoke self-defense, another requisite is that the means
employed by the accused must be reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent of the
attack sought to be averted. Supporting petitioner’s claim of self-defense is the lone gunshot
wound suffered by the victim. The nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are
constantly and unremittingly considered as important indicia. In People v. Catbagan, 423 SCRA
535 (2004), We aptly held: The means employed by the person invoking self-defense is
reasonable if equivalent to the means of attack used by the original aggressor. Whether or not the
means of self-defense is reasonable depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the
physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as
those of the person who invokes self-defense; and also the place and the occasion of the assault.
In the instant case, the lone wound inflicted on the victim supports the argument that petitioner
feared for his life and only shot the victim to defend himself. The lone gunshot was a reasonable
means chosen by petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of the armed victim,
his drunken state, disobedience of an unlawful order, and failure to stand down despite a warning
shot.

Same; Same; Same; Lack of Sufficient Provocation; The last requisite for self-defense to be
appreciated is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or
herself.—The last requisite for self-defense to be appreciated is lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself or herself. As gleaned from the findings of the trial
court, petitioner gave the victim a lawful order and fired a warning shot before shooting the
armed and drunk victim. Absent from the shooting incident was any evidence on petitioner
sufficiently provoking the victim prior to the shooting. [Nacnac vs. People, 668 SCRA
846(2012)]

People v. Fontanilla GR 177743 January 25 2012

Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Elements of Self-Defense.—In order for

self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following
elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no
unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is
nothing to repel.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Once an accused in a prosecution for murder or
homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to
prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would
avoid his criminal liability.—By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting
the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution
for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed
the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance
that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the
victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-
defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be
disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.

Criminal Law; Murder; Penalties; Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes reclusion
perpetua to death as the penalty for murder.—The imposition of reclusion perpetua by the CA
was warranted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes reclusion perpetua
to death as the penalty for murder. Under the rules on the application of indivisible penalties in
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed if there
are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances. Yet, the Court points out that the RTC
erroneously imposed “RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH” as the penalty. Such imposition
was bereft of legal justification, for reclusion perpetua and death, being indivisible, should not be
imposed as a compound, alternative or successive penalty for a single felony. In short, the
imposition of one precluded the imposition of the other.

Same; Same; Civil Indemnities; Damages that may be Awarded when Death Occurs due to a
Crime.—The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only
the death indemnity of P50,000.00. When death occurs due to a crime, the damages to be
awarded may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (b) actual or
compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.

Same; Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of
the surviving family were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must
nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of the deceased to their moral
status quo ante.—The CA and the RTC should also have granted moral damages in addition to
the death indemnity, which were of different kinds. The death indemnity compensated the loss of
life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental
anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of Olais. Although mental anguish and
emotional sufferings of the surviving family were not quantifiable with mathematical precision,
the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of the deceased to
their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, P50,000.00 should be reasonable as moral
damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we are bound to award despite the absence
of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional suffering.

Same; Same; Same; Temperate Damages; It is already settled that when actual damages
substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than P25,000.00, temperate damages of at least
P25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser amount actually proved by
receipts.—Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-recognition of the right of the
heirs of the victim to temperate damages. The victim’s wife testified about her family’s incurring
funeral expenses of P36,000.00, but only P18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is already settled
that when actual damages substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than P25,000.00, temperate
damages of at least P25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser amount
actually proved by receipts.

Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may
be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability “when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances.”—The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages
may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability “when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances.” The Civil Code permits such damages to be
awarded “by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.” In light of such legal provisions, the CA and
the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages
on account of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant
circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. [People vs.
Fontanilla, 664 SCRA 150(2012)]

People v. Recto GR 129069 October 17, 2001

Criminal Law; Murder; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Defense of Relatives;

Requisites; For defense of a relative to prosper, the accused must prove the concurrence of the
first and second requisites of self-defense and the further requisite, in case the provocation was
given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein.—By invoking
self-defense and defense of a relative, appellant plainly admits that he killed Antonio Macalipay
and Emiliano “Renato” Santos and fired the shots that injured Melchor Recto and Percival Orbe.
Thus, appellant has shifted the burden of evidence to himself. Consequently, to escape criminal
liability, he must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of the essential
requisites of self-defense, namely, (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. For defense of a relative to
prosper, appellant must prove the concurrence of the first and the second requisites of self-
defense and “the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that
the one making the defense had no part therein.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; There is unlawful aggression when the
peril to one’s life, limb or right is either actual or imminent—there must be actual force or actual
use of weapon.—“There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb or right is
either actual or imminent. There must be actual force or actual use of weapon.” In this case,
Antonio Macalipay was unarmed and actually trying to pacify appellant when the latter shot him.
After shooting Antonio, appellant again cocked his gun, pointed it at Emiliano Santos and shot
him. The latter’s act of drawing his gun and firing at him was merely self-defense.

Same; Same; Direct Assault; Two Modes of Direct Assault.—Direct assault, a crime against
public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by “any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition”; and second, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, “shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance.” The first mode is tantamount to rebellion or
sedition, without the element of public uprising. The second mode, on the other hand, is the more
common form of assault, and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon, or
(b) when the offender is a public officer or employee, or (c) when the offender lays a hand upon
a person in authority.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; An agent of a person in authority is “any person who,
by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged
with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as
barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid
of persons in authority; A barangay chief tanod is clearly an agent of a person in authority.”—An
agent of a person in authority is “any person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority.” In the case at bar,
the victim, Melchor Recto—being then the barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang,
Romblon—was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However, contrary to the findings of
the trial court, he was not “engaged in the performance of his official duties” at the time he was
shot. Neither was he attacked “on the occasion of such performance,” as we will now show.

Same; Same; Same; Where a barangay chief tanod was a mere bystander at the crime scene, he
not acting, and had no occasion to act, in the performance of his official duties, the attack on him
did not amount to direct assault.—Unquestionably, Melchor Recto was a barangay chief tanod;
however, at the crime scene he was a mere bystander. Apparently, he was not acting and had no
occasion to act in the performance of his official duties that afternoon. Thus, the attack on him
did not amount to direct assault.

Same; Attempted Homicide; If the wounds would not normally cause death, then the last act
necessary to produce homicide has not been performed by the offender, and his liability amounts
only to attempted, not frustrated, homicide.—We now determine the criminal liability of
appellant with respect to the attack. He shot Melchor only once, but the latter sustained five
gunshot entry wounds all located at his backside, at the vicinity of his buttocks. Because the gun
used by the former was a de sabog, each bullet contained several pellets inside. In other words, a
single shot from a de sabog results in the spewing of several pellets. The nature of the weapon
used for the attack and the direction at which it was aimed—the victim’s back—unmistakably
showed appellant’s intent to kill. However, for reasons other than his own desistance, appellant
was not able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to consummate the killing, since the
wounds he inflicted were not mortal. In United States v. Eduave, this Court has held that if the
wounds would not normally cause death, then the last act necessary to produce homicide has not
been performed by the offender. Thus, appellant’s liability amounted only to attempted, not
frustrated, homicide.

Same; Direct Assault; An attack on the barangay captain, a person in authority, amounts to
qualified direct assault where he was attacked on the occasion of the performance of his duty.—
In Criminal Case No. 1971, the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on Percival
Orbe—then a barangay captain, a person in authority—amounted to qualified direct assault,
because he was attacked on the occasion of the performance of his duty. At the time, he was
attempting to pacify appellant and to keep the peace between the two groups.

Same; Frustrated Felonies; Words and Phrases; A felony is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.—A
felony “is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.” In this case, the nature of the weapon used by
appellant unmistakably shows that he intended to kill Orbe. However, like the wounds inflicted
by the accused on Melchor Recto, those on Orbe were not fatal. As evidenced by the Medico-
Legal Certificate prepared by Dr. Ramon D. Villanueva of the Romblon Provincial Hospital and
the testimony given by Dr. Giovannie C. Fondevilla of the same hospital, Orbe sustained several
gunshot wounds in the vicinity of his right elbow. Those injuries could not have caused his
death. Moreover, according to Dr. Fondevilla, no surgical intervention was required; only
medication was given to him to prevent any secondary infection from setting in. Evidently,
appellant had not yet been able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to bring about the
death of Orbe, because the latter was able to run away after being fired at. Although appellant
had already directly commenced the commission of a felony by overt acts (shooting Orbe with a
de sabog), he was not able to consummate that felony for some reason other than his spontaneous
desistance. Thus, he committed attempted homicide.

Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery does not exist when the evidence does
not show that the accused deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to ensure the killing of
the victim with impunity, and without giving the victim an opportunity to defend himself.—
Evidently, the victim had all the opportunity to escape or defend himself from the aggression that
was to ensue, yet chose not to grab the opportunity and instead placed himself in a position more
open to attack. Equally important, his vulnerable position had not been deliberately sought by
appellant. It was thrust on the latter by the former himself. In short, appellant did not deliberately
choose the mode of attack to kill the victim with impunity and without risk to himself.
Jurisprudence teaches us: “Treachery does not exist [when] the evidence does not show that
appellant deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to ensure the killing of [the victim] with
impunity, and without giving the victim an opportunity to defend himself. Further, the shooting
took place after a heated exchange of words and a series of events that forewarned the victim of
aggression from appellant. In this case, it appears to have occurred on sudden impulse but
preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that indicated an imminent
attack and put the deceased on guard. [People vs. Recto, 367 SCRA 390(2001)]

People vs. Marcelo, G.R. No. 140385

Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Witnesses; Appeals; The settled rule is that the trial court’s
findings are accorded finality.—The settled rule is that the trial court’s findings are accorded
finality, unless there appears on the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower
court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which if properly considered,
would alter the result of the case. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court of
observing at close range the conduct, demeanor, and deportment of the witnesses as they regale
the trial court with their testimonies.

Same: Same; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; This Court has consistently held that like
alibi, self-defense is inherently weak.—This Court consistently held that like alibi, self-defense
is inherently weak. When the accused invokes self-defense as an affirmative defense, the burden
of evidence is shifted on him to prove his defense with clear and convincing evidence. By
interposing self-defense, the accused thereby admits having deliberately killed or inflicted
injuries on the victim. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. If he fails to prove his defense, the evidence of the
prosecution can no longer be disbelieved and the accused can no longer be exonerated of the
crime charged.

Same: Same; Same; Same; Elements; To sustain his affirmative defense of self-defense, the
appellant was burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements.—To sustain
his affirmative defense of self-defense, the appellant was burdened to prove the confluence of the
following essential elements, viz.: (1) there must be unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that
the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (3) that there was
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There can be no self-
defense, complete or incomplete, unless the accused proves unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. Unlawful aggression is a sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger
thereof, and not merely a threatening or an intimidating attitude.

Same: Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Elements; There is treachery in the

commission of the crime when the following are met.—There is treachery in the commission of
the crime when (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself;
(b) the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and forms of
attack employed by him.

Same; Same; Same; Nighttime; Nighttime must be shown to have facilitated the commission of
the crime.—We note that the offense was committed at nighttime. However, in order for the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime to be appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the
commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the
purpose of impunity. However, it was not shown that the same was specifically employed to
facilitate the commission of the crime.
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Voluntary Surrender; Elements; For voluntary surrender
to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present.—For voluntary surrender to be
appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1) the offender has not been actually
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and
(3) the surrender was voluntary. The surrender must be spontaneous, made in such a manner that
it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because
he acknowledged his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses that would
necessarily be incurred in the search and capture. [People vs. Marcelo, 427 SCRA 363(2004)]

Razon vs. People, G.R. No. 158053

Appeals; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; While there are instances when the Court allows a
relaxation in the application of the procedural rules, such liberality is not intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity—liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.—While appeal is an essential part of our judicial system, a party must strictly
comply with the requisites laid down by the Rules of Court on appeals, mindful of the fact that
an appeal is purely a statutory right. Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases. Both courts and litigants are therefore enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While there
are instances when the Court allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, such liberality is
not intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in
the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. Indeed, the CA may dismiss an appeal for failure to file appellant’s
brief on time. It is given the discretion which must be exercised in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.

Same; Attorneys; Negligence; Negligence of counsel binds the client—the only exception is
when the negligence of said counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is
deprived of his day in court.—In this case, the CA gave petitioner sufficient opportunity to file
his appellant’s brief. Instead of complying, however, petitioner chose to ignore the many
directives of the CA and now puts the blame on his former counsel Atty. Gallardo, who was
allegedly guilty of gross negligence. Even if the Court were to admit that Atty. Gallardo was
negligent, the rule is that negligence of counsel binds the client. The only exception is when the
negligence of said counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his
day in court.No such excepting circumstance can be said to be present in this case because as
properly observed by the appellate court, petitioner himself was guilty of negligence.

Criminal Law; Homicide; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Self-defense cannot be

justifiably appreciated when uncor-roborated by independent and competent evidence or when it
is extremely doubtful by itself.—It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but
invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his
plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his
admission that he killed the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by
itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused
claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
the prosecution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites.—To escape liability, the person claiming self-defense
must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that: (1) the victim committed
unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person
claiming self-defense; (2) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the person claiming self-
defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression.

Same; Same; Same; Same; There can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.—The condition sine qua non for the
justifying circumstance of self-defense is the element of unlawful aggression. There can be no
self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to
self-defense. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or
imminent danger thereof and not just a threatening or intimidating attitude. In case of threat, it
must be offensive, strong and positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. For a
person to be considered the unlawful aggressor, he must be shown to have exhibited external acts
clearly showing his intent to cause and commit harm to the other.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Retaliation is not the same as self-defense—in retaliation, the
aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him,
while in self-defense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the
accused.—Petitioner unequivocally admitted that after the three men went out of his taxicab, he
ran after them and later went back to his cab to get his colonial knife; then he went down the
canal to swing his knife at the victim, wounding and killing him in the process. Such can no
longer be deemed as self-defense. It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away,
unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful
aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor;
otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed.Retaliation is not the same as self-
defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when
the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression was still existing when the
aggressor was injured by the accused.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be
commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be
rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.—The defense employed by
petitioner also cannot be said to be reasonable. The means employed by a person claiming self-
defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted,
and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.The nature or quality
of the weapon; the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the
aggressor as well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and the place and the occasion
of the assault also define the reasonableness of the means used in self-defense. In this case, the
deceased was a polio victim, which explains the presence of the wooden cane at the scene of the
crime. Petitioner also admitted that when he went after Gonzalo, he had in his possession two
knives, the Batangas knife he wrested from the hold-uppers and the colonial knife which he took
from his cab.

Same; Same; Damages; In instances where actual expenses amounting to less than P25,000.00
are proved during the trial, the award of temperate damages of P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of
the actual damages of a lesser amount.—Anent actual damages, the Court resolves to delete the
same and in lieu thereof imposes temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. This is
consistent with the ruling of the Court in People v. Werba, 431 SCRA 482 (2004), citingPeople
v. Villanueva, 408 SCRA 571 (2003), which held that in instances where actual expenses
amounting to less than P25,000.00 are proved during the trial, the award of temperate damages
of P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of the actual damages of a lesser amount. In this case, Gonzalo’s
heirs were only able to present receipts amounting to P4,925.00. [Razon vs. People, 525 SCRA
284(2007)]

People vs. Cabrera, G.R. L- 31178

Criminal Law; Evidence; The conclusions of the trial court on the question of credibility is
entitled to great weight. This rule is not, however, absolute.—The resolution of this case hinges
on whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of Cabrera beyond reasonable doubt.
Time and again we have stated that when it comes to the question of credibility the findings of
the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason that it was able to
observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But we have
also said that this rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions
upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses
circumstances of weight and substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.

Same; Same; Where a witness, soon after the shooting incident, was asked what she did when the
two groups stood up and she answered she ran away, her later testimony in court, after she
transferred residence to the town, where the deceased was a mayor, that she saw appellant shoot
the mayor’s companion is unreliable.—Alicia Abella was a hostess living at the Alta Vista Club
when the incident happened. She was questioned about it soon thereafter and in her testimony
she admitted that when she was then asked, “What did you do when the companions of the
Mayor and those of the NBI stood up? Her answer was, “I ran away.” In other words, she could
not have seen Cabrera shoot Lintongan. It was only during the trial that she fingered Cabrera as
having also shot Lintongan. But at that time she had transferred her residence to Pikit, Cotabato,
where the deceased Matalam was the mayor and where she worked as a salesgirl. Considering
the circumstances of persons, time and place which need not be spelled herein, Abella’s
testimony that she saw Cabrera shoot Lintogan is obviously unreliable.

Same; Same; Testimony of one of the deceased mayor’s men against the accused is highly
biased. Moreover, he testified that he ran for cover when the shooting started.—As to Osin
Sinsuat it suffices to say that he was one of Matalam’s men and, therefore, a naturally highly
biased witness. Moreover, he could not have seen Cabrera shoot Lintongan because he testified
that immediately after Villamor had shot Matalam, he sought cover by going to the combo stand
with his back of course turned from Villamor, Matalam, Lintongan and Cabrera.

Same; Same; The evidence shows that the accused and the deceased NBI agent Villamor went to
the nightclub for feminine company and not to hunt for Mayor Matalam, who a notorious
troublemaker.—Guiapal also testified that at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of August 20,
1967 (the night of the incident), Cabrera, Villamor and their companions went to Paradise Night
Club to ask if there were girls available and if Matalam was there. When given a negative
answer, they left. This incident as well as that of July 19, 1967, were construed by the trial court
as evidence of the conspiracy to kill Matalam. Not so. There is nothing in the actuations of
Cabrera and Villamor on July 19 and August 20, 1967, as narrated by Guiapal to show
conspiracy to kill Matalam. When Cabrera and company went to the Paradise Night Club on
August 20, 1967, they were not hunting for Matalim but looking for feminine company and on
being told that there were no more girls available they left and went to the Alta Vista. True, they
asked if Matalam was in the Paradise Night Club but their reason was possibly to avoid an
encounter with Matalam who was a notorious troublemaker as the event at the Alta Vista was to
prove.

Same; Same; The killing of Mayor Matalam by NBI agent Villamor who died himself was
justified as Mayor Matalam fired his gun without apparent reason.—When Matalam without
apparent reason, but probably due to drunkeness, fired his gun several times at the Vista Club,
Villamor and Cabrera had to intervene for they were with the NBI. They would have been remiss
in their duty if they did not. True, Villamor shot Matalam who died as a result thereof. But we
would be doing injustice to a deceased agent of the law who cannot now defend himself to state
that when he approached the trouble making Matalam he had a preconceived notion to kill. We
have to presume that he acted pursuant to law when he tried to discharge his duty as an NBI
agent and that the killing of Matalam was justified under the circumstances. We can do no less
for Villamor and by the same token for Cabrera. [People vs. Cabrera, 100 SCRA 424(1980)]

People vs. Tan, G. R. 116200-02

Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Justifying Circumstance; Two requisites for the justifying
circumstance of lawful performance of duty may be rightfully appreciated.—The defense
invokes the justifying circumstance of lawful performance of duty. For this circumstance to be
rightfully appreciated, two requisites must concur: (1) that the accused acted in the performance
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; (2) that the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise
of such right or office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Not even the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
can be resorted to by appellants, nor does it find application in this case because they were no
longer performing a duty when they immediately fired their weapons.—The Rules of Court
mandates that the police officer or any person conducting arrest must identify himself as such
and state his intention to arrest when there is no danger to himself or it would not prejudice the
arrest. Further, the rules of engagement, of which every police officer must be thoroughly
knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest caution, does not require that
he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person asked or to be accosted does not
heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his next move and not vengeance for personal
feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of
suspects since the completion of the process pertains to other government officers or agencies.
The victims in this case and all those on the pumpboat were not under any obligation to
surrender since they were not prisoners who had escaped from detention, nor were they
identified suspects. Not even the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty can be
resorted to by appellants, nor does it find application in this case because they were no longer
performing a duty when they immediately fired their weapons.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The party who invokes a justifying circumstance has the burden of
proof.—The party who invokes a justifying circumstance has the burden of proof. Failure on
their part to discharge that burden justifies their conviction because of their admission of having
authored the criminal act. This is the essence of a justifying circumstance which applies not only
to self-defense cases but equally to the defense of performance of duty. For this reason, the Rules
of Court allows the reversal of proceedings by requiring the party who invokes a lawful defense
to present evidence ahead of the prosecution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The defense of performance of duty, as an affirmative allegation,
should be demonstrated with convincing credibility.—Moreover, the defense of performance of
duty, as an affirmative allegation, should be demonstrated with convincing credibility. Accused-
appellants version is lacking in truth, aside from being a mere afterthought and contrary to
human nature. The physical evidence in this case runs counter to the testimonial evidence, in
which case the former prevails.

Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Issue of credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court.—As
mentioned earlier, the ultimate question, where the factual version of the prosecution and the
defense contradict each other as in this case, is one of credibility of witness. Such issue is best
left to the trial court because of its unique opportunity of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witness’ deportment on the stand while testifying, an
opportunity denied to the appellate courts, which usually relies on the cold pages of the silent
records. In this case, it was not convincingly shown that the court a quo had overlooked or
disregarded significant facts and circumstances which when considered would have affected the
outcome of the case or would justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the court
below. The foregoing disquisition clearly demonstrates that the trial court’s findings of facts are
binding on this Court although not necessarily with respect to its conclusion drawn from such
facts.

Same; Same; Same; Treachery; There is treachery if the attack was so sudden and unexpected
that the deceased had no time to prepare for his defense.—There is treachery if the attack was so
sudden and unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his defense. When Lapot,
Gabitan, Villaflor, Cerilles, the two other waitresses and the rest of the group were already in the
pumpboat, they were suddenly fired upon by accused-appellants. Placed in that dangerous
situation, their only means of escape was to be far from the reach of the bullets. The remaining
immediate option was to move the pumpboat as fast as they can towards the sea. Those on board
had no time to prepare for any defense or even to seek cover. Under these circumstances, the
suddenness and severity of the attack constituted treachery.

Same; Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; Elements for evident premeditation to be

appreciated.—For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be
proved as conclusively as the crime itself, i.e., by proof beyond reasonable doubt: (1) The time
when the accused decided to commit crime; (2) An overt act manifestly indicating that he has
clung to his determination; (3) Sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to allow
the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Premeditation must be based on external acts which must be
notorious, manifest and evident—not merely suspecting—indicating deliberate planning.—The
essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. To be considered, it is indispensable to show how and when the plan
to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. Premeditation must
be based on external acts which must be notorious, manifest, and evident—not merely
suspecting—indicating deliberate planning.

Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy; Conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it.—There is
conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and the execution of the felony is decided upon. It is not necessary that there be direct
proof that the co-conspirators had any prior agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being
sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
Conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the
felony and forth-with decide to pursue it. So that whenever conspiracy is proven the act of one is
the act of all.

Same; Criminal Procedure; Information; It is not the designation of the offense in the
Information described by the prosecution that governs, rather, it is the allegations in the
Information that must be considered in determining what crime is charged.—However, the
Informations in the two attempted murder cases failed to allege the essential elements necessary
to convict accused-appellants of the said crimes. In particular, there was nothing in the latter two
Informations from which it may be concluded that accused-appellants commenced the
commission of the felony directly or by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than their own
spontaneous desistance. Without these allegations, the elements necessary to constitute the
felony of attempted murder cannot be said to have been properly alleged, and accused-appellants
cannot be convicted of a crime with which they were not charged. Otherwise, to convict them of
attempted murder, when the same is not the crime charged in the Information, would be to
violate their constitutional and statutory right to criminal due process, and in particular, their
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. It must be
remembered that it is not the designation of the offense in the Information described by the
prosecution that governs, rather it is the allegations in the Information that must be considered in
determining what crime is charged. [People vs. Tan, 359 SCRA 283(2001)]

People vs. Peralta, G. R. 128116

Criminal Law; Murder; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Where the accused invokes self-
defense, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defense and it is the duty of
the latter to establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.—That appellant killed the
victim is not disputed. However, the appellant invokes the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Consequently, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defense and it is
the duty of the latter to establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. The defense
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for
even if that were weak it cannot be disbelieved after the appellant himself has admitted killing
the victim.

Same; Same; Same; Same; There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb or
right is either actual or imminent—there must be actual physical force or actual use of a
weapon.—There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb or right is either actual
or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. It is a statutory and
doctrinal requirement that for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence of
unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Policemen; The plea of self-defense invoked by a policeman is belied
by the failure of the accused to immediately report to his superior officer on the night of the
incident that he shot somebody with his service firearm in self-defense.—The plea of self-
defense is also belied by the failure of the appellant to immediately report to his superior officer
on the night of the incident that he shot somebody with his service firearm in self-defense. In
fact, the appellant testified in court that he did not know he hit anyone after he allegedly fired his
gun accidentally. Aside from being inconsistent with his plea of self-defense, this feigned
ignorance of the appellant is not persuasive. Firstly, it was impossible for the appellant to have
overlooked the reaction of the victim who was just beside him during the shooting incident
inasmuch as the area was illuminated by a lamppost. Secondly, there was no scuffle. Thirdly, the
act of twice firing his service firearm suggests that appellant was acting deliberately when he
pulled the trigger for the second time as he had full control of the handle and the trigger of the
gun.

Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Elements; Where the shooting incident
was a result of a heated argument between the victim and the assailant, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery may not be appreciated; The suddenness of the attack does not, of
itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the
decision was made all of a sudden and the victims helpless position was accidental.—The
shooting incident was a result of the heated argument between the victim and the appellant.
Hence, the qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be appreciated. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. The
elements of treachery are: (1) the means of execution employed gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted. It does not follow that a sudden and unexpected attack is tainted with treachery for it
could have been that the same was done on impulse, as a reaction to an actual or imagined
provocation offered by the victim. Provocation of the appellant by the victim negates the
presence of treachery even if the attack may have been sudden and unexpected. The suddenness
of the attacl does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to
kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim’s helpless position was
accidental. The qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be simply deduced from
presumption as it is necessary that the existence of this qualifying or aggravating circumstance
should be proven as fully as the crime itself in order to aggravate the liability or penalty of the
culprit.

Same; Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; Requisites.—This Court also rules out the presence
of evident premeditation. For the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation to be
appreciated, the following requisites should be proved: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung
to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution,
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In the case at bar, there was no proof of
the time when appellant allegedly determined to commit the crime against the victim. The
appellant did not even know the victim and vice versa prior to their confrontation at the place of
the shooting incident. The Solicitor General correctly pointed out that appellant’s act of tailing
the victim’s group is not an overt act that reflects appellant’s determination to kill Rimando.
Appellant followed the jeep in order to effect an arrest of women whom he suspected to be
prostitutes.

Witnesses; A witness may be said to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is
such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color or pervert the truth, or to state what
is false.—Appellant attempts to impeach the credibility of prosecution witnesses Crizaldo
Esguerra, Delfin Soriano and Danilo Gaa for the reason that they were biased witnesses.
Appellant pointed out that Esguerra testified that as a fraternity brother he would do anything
and everything for the victim. A witness may be said to be biased when his relation to the cause
or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color or pervert the
truth, or to state what is false. To impeach a biased witness, the counsel must lay the proper
foundation of the bias by asking the witness the facts constituting the bias. In the case at bar,
there was no proper impeachment by bias of the three (3) prosecution witnesses. Esguerra’s
testimony that he would do anything for his fellow brothers was too broad and general so as to
constitute a motive to lie before the trial court. Counsel for the defense failed to propound
questions regarding the tenets of the fraternity that espouse absolute fealty of the members to
each other. The question was phrased so as to ask only for Esguerra’s personal conviction. And
even if Esguerra’s credibility were impeached, it does not follow that the testimonies of Soriano
and Gaa should also be undermined as they were not asked the same question on cross-
examination.

Exempting Circumstances; Fulfillment of Duty; Policemen; Two (2) requisites must concur
before the defense of acting in the fulfillment of a duty can prosper, namely, (1) the accused
must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, and (2)
the injury caused or the offense committed should be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty.—Appellant claims that he shot the victim while he was in the performance
of his police duties. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the
fulfillment of a duty does not incur any criminal liability. Two (2) requisites must concur before
this defense can prosper: (1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) the injury caused or the offense committed should be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty. We find the requisites absent in the case
at bar. Appellant was not in the performance of his duties at the time of the shooting for the
reason that the girls he was attempting to arrest were not committing any act of prostitution in his
presence. If at all, the only person he was authorized to arrest during that time was Roberto
Reyes, who offered him the services of a prostitute, for acts of vagrancy. Even then, the fatal
injuries that the appellant caused the victim were not a necessary consequence of appellant’s
performance of his duty as a police officer. The record shows that appellant shot the victim not
once but twice after a heated confrontation ensued between them. His duty to arrest the female
suspects did not include any right to shoot the victim to death. [People vs. Peralta, 350 SCRA
198(2001)]