Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Fall 18 Sales - Outline
Fall 18 Sales - Outline
Fall 18 Sales - Outline
B. Uniformity
a. We are still talking about agreements like common law. First of all we have to look to
what the contract actually says and apply its facts to Article 2.
b. The rule narrowing in this class is done with the code not case law
c. In doing our analysis we want to look at the actual contract, the code, cases
interpreting the code, and finally common law.
d. American code law differs than foreign code law like the CISG. The American code
system reads statutes narrowly and does not like to broaden the scope so we have
holes in the code due to the narrowness of our interpretation The holes are filled in
by court interpretation and common law
a. Business culture: People act in certain ways to gain more business and have a
strategy when conducting business, but in the back of their minds is the law.
The law is the business cultures dispute resolution. We are their last resort and
we try to make decisions to maintain relationships among business people
c.
KTM
a. Definitional: There are lots of places the code does not supply definitions.
Like bargain and consideration
c. Common law serves a complimentary function: Common law fills out things
and makes it broader than the code
There is truly not a uniform code. Many states enact pieces of a code and court
interpretation.
b. In a “thick market” where supply and demand both are high, there is not
as much of a need for companies to protect themselves with Ks -
example: iphone
2. Possibility of mistake
Country coming out of communism into free market - in regard to UCC, it is helpful to fill
in gaps in sales but it does not provide definitions and is not complete as an independent
commercial code
- you would want to inform the country of the course of dealings’ role in the formation of
default usage of UCC
- History
a. Law merchant
Arguments against their code: not in the best interest of all businesses that would be
impacted by federal code and mandates
In 1940s they revised the Sales Act and attempted to implement Llewlellen’s vision-gap
fillers, that reduce expected contracting costs, by mimicking the arrangement most
commercial parties would have made for themselves
- UK is not in convention
-CISG - article 1
1. This convention applies to Ks of sale of goods between parties whose places of business
are in diff countries
b.
- Scope of CISG
2. Contract for sale - signature features are comparable to domestic contracts for sale -
consist of the transfer of ownership of goods for the price of the good
3. Sale of goods - excludes goods bought for personal, family, or household use because
these are Ks with individual consumers - this is excluded because no country wants to
sign on to a treaty that would force it to bid against its own citizens’ interests by
appearing not to protect their consumers in their country - tangible and moveable -
traits of goods which are applicable to CISG scope
- CISG article 1
KTM
- (1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose
places of business are in different States:
- (b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a
Contracting State.
- EX: seller place of business - usa vs buy place of business - Germany = both
contracting countries so article 1a applies
- Ex 2: seller usa buyer uk - uk is not contracting country - CISG applies per Art.
1(1)(b) if P-I-L requires application of usa law (or law of another Contracting
State).
CISG article 95
Any state may declare at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession that it will not be bound by subparagraph 1b of article 1
of this convention
- CISG article 6
Parties may exclude the application of this convention or - subject to article 12 , derogate
from or vary the effect of any of its provisions
- CSIG article 2
A. Of goods bought for personal, family, or household use, unless the seller, at any
time before or at the conclusion of the K, neither knew nor ought to have known that the
goods were bought for any such use
- CISG article 5
This convention does not apply to the liability of the seller for the death or personal injury
caused by the goods to any person - this is for political purpose - not popular to use
international law for personal matters - especially when the personal matter involves injury
or death
CISG article 4b
KTM
This convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and
obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract. In particular, except as
otherwise expressly provided in this Convention, it is not concerned with . . . the effect
which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold.
- Phelps v mcquade :
Walter gwynne pretends to be Baldwin gwynne fraudulently used Baldwin gwynee’s credit
Dennis had No knowledge that Walter did not own the ring and obtained fraudulently -
Dennis mcquade bought the ring from Walter who fraudulently took ring - so when phelps
jewelry store discovered fraud, they went after Dennis, despite his lack of knowledge of fraud
when purchasing ring from Walter
- Jewelry store was in best position to prevent the loss in the first place - did not detect
initial instance of fraud
Place of business usa and factory in Mexico and buyer in usa - probably would not use
CISG because if buyer has no reason to know the factory was in Mexico then it probably
will not use CISG and also if good is for personal use then not apply - if seller knew of
personal use then even more reason not to apply CISG but CISG does not tell us if seller
did not know whether it matters on application
8/27/18
C. Finland to ship product to NY by certain date and velero announces this deal will be
subject to NY law and Greeni does not object
a. Hurricane occurs
- CISG article 6 - parties may exclude application of this convention or subject to article 12
derogate from or cary the effect of any of its provisions
- however - because the K said NY law applies, the issue is whether the CISG
should apply or NY apply
that Greeni is not subject to NY law and CISG applies because they did not expressly state
that CISG does not apply even though they did agree the K was under NY law
- Fed law trumps NY state law and because CISG is a treaty, it is = to fed law - therefore, a
treaty to US is NY law
- This is the reason that the court upholds the requirement for both countries to expressly
state CISG will not apply - because if you want it excluded and solely use NY law then
you must expressly state this in the K
- Why is Velero wrong in arguing article 1b? - because they are both contracting
countries so only 1a would apply
- Both Canada and usa are contracting countries contract say rhode island law governs
- Article 6 - court finds the parties did expressly agree to rhode island law to govern but didn’t
really expressly state CISG doesn’t apply but court does not hold in same way as it did in Finland
case - Velero decision is probably correct
- The importance of the contract’s express language is important - because the two
decisions are inconsistent, there is room to argue your position
- TOPIC B
- Scope of article 2
- Whether UCC article 2 will actually apply to given parties under a given situation - what is
covered under these provisions
- a. Course of performance
- b. Course of dealing
KTM
- c. Usage of trade
The gap fillers ought to reflect to the extent possible what the parties would have done if they had taken
the time/done without error
- how these two parties have interacted in the past and or how other similar parties have
interacted under the K’ing question in this field
- the place for delivery of goods is the seller’s place of business or if he has none his
residence; but
- in a K for sale of identified goods which to the knowledge of the parties at the time of
K’ing are in some other place that place is the place for their delivery and
- course of performance would suggest that they already had established a place where goods would be
delivered but the “unless otherwise agreed” language states that the agreement does not need to be
expressly stated but instead, an agreement can be based on the course of performance which is the
act of consistently delivering it to the same place 3 times prior to this - this trumps the gap filler -
repeated actions of performance - amounts to a course of dealing
- If there is no course of dealing, then delivery would have gone to seller’s place of business
- usage of trade
- “24 to a case”
- Order 150 cases - 24 per case - the city refuses to accept delivery
- Chicago argues they can reject because they did not conform to usage of trade - under UCC 1
303c
- (a) express terms prevail over course of dealing and course of performance;
- (b) course of performance prevails over course of dealing and usage of trade; and
Scope of article 2 includes not only express terms of a K and gap fillers but also a,b, and c
- Kor it sued modern materials for breach of warranty when their product did not work -
nothing about this in the K - apply a rust prevention product
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified under IC 26-1-2-316, an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
modern materials argues that the implied warranty should not apply because the UCC does not
apply to services - only applies to sale of goods - therefore it is governed by common law rather than
UCC - in common law Ks, you must expressly state if there is a warranty, which was not done in this K
- modern materials does not want to be governed by UCC because then they are subject to the
implied warranty, which would make them liable for damages
Court holds that an agreement for sale of services is not UCC but then says many modern day Ks for
services are a blend of both goods and services - the coating material plus the service of application
KTM
Precedent case vary in outcome - predominant thrust test applicability of UCC is determined by
analyzing whether the service is the primary part of the K or if the good is the primary part of the K and
the bifurcation approach separates the service and the goods - IN court applies predominant thrust test
-Language of k
-Circumstances of the parties and the primary reason they entered into the K
-The costs involved for the goods and services whether the purchaser was charged only for a
good or a price based on both goods and services
- TOPIC C
- Problem 1.3
- UCC would not apply if it was a service and implied warranty is only in UCC
- Scope - unless the context otherwise requires, this article applies to transactions
in goods
- IC - SELLER is the party who creates warranties no just ppl who engage in
transactions
a. Real property - one way to look at real prop K is to use predominant thrust test
26 1 2 107 - A k for the sale of minerals or the like or a structure or its materials to be removed from
realty is a k for the sale of goods within ic 26 1 2 if they are to be severed by the seller but until
severance of a purported present sale thereof which is not effective as a transfer of an interest in land is
effective only as a K to sell
8/29/18
KTM
Example q: summer social - beer kegs rented and beer bought - one explodes and injures someone - is
this the sale of beer or a K for the leasing of kegs - if lease then UCC 2a and if considered beer purchase
then UCC 2 - USE PREDOMINANT THRUST TEST
- Touseley was supposed to dig any remove clay for colgate - did not fulfill obligation and Colgate sues
- ISSUE[1] Did the trial court commit reversible error in instructing the jury under the provisions of the
UCC?
- PARTIES' CONTENTIONS According to Tousley-Bixler, the sale of clay soil is not a sale of goods within
the meaning of Ind. Code subsection 26-1-2-107(1) or XX-X-X-XXX(2) [hereinafter cited by UCC
numbers only], because the clay soil is to be removed by the buyer, not the seller, and because such
soil is part of the realty.
- Colgate counters that the UCC is a codification of the common law, so no error or prejudice could
result from the giving of instructions under both the common law and the UCC. In any event, the UCC
is applicable.
- IC 26-1-2-105
- Definition of goods - goods means all things including specially manufactured goods which are
movable at the time of ID to the k for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid
investment securities (IC 26-1-8.1), and things in action. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of
animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in the section on
goods to be severed from realty (IC 26-1-2-107).
- IC 26 1 2 107 goods to be severed from realty…. Above “if they are to be severed by the SELLER”
- The distinction here is the buyer was going to be the party who was doing the severing not the seller
as the statute requires - touseley’s argument
- IC 26 1 2 107 (2)
(2) A contract for the sale apart from the land of growing crops or other things attached to realty and
capable of severance without material harm thereto but not described in subsection (1) or of timber to
KTM
be cut is a contract for the sale of goods within IC 26-1-2 whether the subject matter is to be severed by
the buyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the realty at the time of contracting, and the
parties can by identification effect a present sale before severance.
Court of appeals holds this is a subsection 1 not subsection 2 - real estate law not within scope of UCC
2009 - Shell sues power company for violation of K in 2001 - K for sale of coal - plaintiff is shell
equipment severed but shell equipment was the seller so the severance was not by the seller - statute of
limitations under common law is ten yrs and sol under UCC is 4 years so court agrees with power
companies and says it is a k for sale of goods because severing party or party responsible for the
severing was seller
Tort law
1.4 dr keller contact lenses - if not sale of goods then it would fall under tort law and have to prove
negligence instead of violation of K
9/10/18
Notes in notebook
9/12
- Consequential damages resulting from the sellers breach include any loss resulting from gen or
particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to
know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise and b- injury to the
person ——
- Rejects or revokes or
KTM
- fails to pay or
- Repudiates
- There are certain remedies for each prob - mapped out in 2-709 - price/ 2-708-recover damages
for nonacceptance etc
TOPIC E
IC 26 1 2.1 523
2.1-527
- except as otherwise provided with respect to damages liquidated in the lease agreement - 504- or
otherwise determined pursuant to agreement of the parties IC 26-1-1-102(3) and 2.1-503 if the
disposition is by lease agreement substantially similar to the original lease agreement and the new
lease agreement is made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner the lessor may
recover from the lessee as damages I accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of the commencement of
the term of the new lease agreement
- 7. A new lease can be substantially similar to the orig lease even its term extends beyond the
remaining term of the orig lease so long as both a the lease terms are commercially comparable eg -
- Future value - measuring the value of a sum of money in your possession today at a time in the
future
- The discount rate is the second number in denominator which is added to the first number -
surrounded by parenthesis and exponent outside of parenthesis
‣ Problem 23.2
1)After a default by a lessee under the lease contract of the type described in IC 26-1-
2.1-523(1) or IC 26-1-2.1-523(3)(a) or after the lessor refuses to deliver or takes
possession of goods (IC 26-1-2.1-525 or IC 26-1-2.1-526), or, if agreed, after other
default by the lessee, the lessor may dispose of the goods concerned or the undelivered
balance thereof by lease, sale, or otherwise (3)
If the lessor's disposition is by lease agreement that for any reason does not
qualify for treatment under subsection (2), or is by sale or otherwise, the lessor may
recover from the lessee as if the lessor had elected not to dispose of the goods and IC
26-1-2.1-528 governs.
(1) After default by the lessee under the lease contract of the type described in IC 26-1-
2.1-523(1) or IC 26-1-2.1-523(3)(a) or, if agreed, after other default by the lessee, if the
lessor complies with subsection (2), the lessor may recover from the lessee as damages:
(a) for goods accepted by the lessee and not repossessed by or tendered to the lessor,
and for conforming goods lost or damaged within a commercially reasonable time after
risk of loss passes to the lessee (IC 26-1-2.1-219): (i) accrued and unpaid rent as of the
date of entry of judgment in favor of the lessor; [continued]
CISG art 25
KTM
A break of K committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other
party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitles to expect under the contract unless the party
in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would
not have foreseen such a result
When buyer 1. Wrongfully rejects or revokes or 2. Fails to pay or 3. Repudiates 4. AND THE BREACH IS
FUNDAMENTAL
CISG art 62 -
CISG art 77 - a party who relies on a breach of k must take such measures as are reasonable in the
circumstances to mitigate damages —
CISG art 28 - if in accordance with the provisions of this convention one party is entitled to require
performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific
perf unless the court would do so under its own Law in similar ks of sale not governed by this convention
Gen rule of 1-305a - put the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had
fully performed
buyer has accepted and may no longer revoke — then § 2-714 for warranty breaches OR buyer
has no goods bc seller never delivered or buyer rightfully returns under 2-711 - § 712 cover and § 2-713
market
Goods carry with them warranties of fitness and warranties of merchantability - intended
purpose
- ex before the delivery of a product, you know you are no longer interested in
fulfilling the K - what was the motivation of the breaching party?
- Law helps sort out the legitimacy for backing out of contract
- Ic § 2-610 - when either party repudiates the k with respect to a performance not
yet done the loss of which —
- IN RE Beech Systems 94
- A K for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other’s expectation
of receiving due performance will not be impaired. When reasonable grounds
for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other
ay in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he
receives such assurance —
- If someone repudiates then you the non breaching party would have remedy
under 2-610
- CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
- Buyers can
- 3 limitations
- Foreseeability, cause and fact, and duty to mitigate - duty to mitigate is most
important
- On exam**
- 10/1
- parties to a commercial transaction are seldom aware of all the small print and details of
the contract
- The UCC recognized that the contract should still be a contract even if they are not
mirror image of one another - even if the understanding of the K is not mirrored by
buyer and seller - the K shall remain a K
KTM
- Think of 2207 like this - a written acceptance or confirmation that contains additional or
different terms:
- Where a contract is formed under 2207 the terms will be determined by § 2207(2)
- Even if writings dont establish a K - conduct can still establish a contract under §
2207(3)
- Even where the writings dont est a contract, the conduct by both parties can
establish a contract - the conduct that legitimizes a K are found in § 2207-3
- 2207-3
- Distinction between additional term and different term within 2207 is important
10/3
- DIFFERENT TERMS^
- ADDITIONAL TERMS^
- Once you’re at the point of writing a confirmation, you have already entered
into a K so you cant unilaterally alter or try to get out of it
- Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict each party
must be assumed to object to a clause of the other conflicting with one on the
confirmation sent by himself. As a result the requirement that there be notice
of objection which is found in subsection 2 is satisfied and the conflicting
terms do not become a part of the k - the k then consists of the terms
originally expressly agreed to, terms on which the confirmations agree and
terms supplied by the act including subsection 2
- Acceptance and confirmation charts are in slides from class 13 - slides 35-43 ish
-
10/15
- International sales
- Problem 4.2
10/17
Express warranties
- problem 8.2
- Used car seller asks about car - she’s a humdinger all right - owner says about car
- Any affirmation of fact or promise made but he seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates and
express w that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise
- any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
- any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample
or model.
It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words
such as warrant or guarantee or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty but
KTM
an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the
seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty
8.2 b
seller says they are like camels - gas mileage is like camels
8.3 c
your mom goes along and knows a lot about cars and says these cars get good gas
mileage and the seller gives same camel line
Comment 3 of 2-313
The present section deals with affirmations of fact by the seller, descriptions of the goods or
exhibitions of samples, exactly as any other part of a negotiation which ends in a contract is
factors is made part of the basis of the bargain. In actual practice affirmations of fact made
by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of
in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which
is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative
the court cant determine this as a matter of law if these were breached because how
do you define these things?
court says issue of material fact
Rispens warranty
the seller agrees to deliver such seeds in good merchantable condition as hereinafter
defined of good germination for the crop of the current year the phrase in good merch
condition is defined as seeds properly fitted for seeding purposed by thorough screening
and where necessary by hand picking approx freee from foreign seeds distinguishable by
their appearance
goods being sold will work the way they are supposed to work
2-312
2-214 2 tells us
a-f —-
Plaintiff must show breach of warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained
The defendant can refute this with an affirmative showing that the harm or loss resulted
after delivering the product to the buyer
KTM
Or seller can also defend himself by obtaining evidence that shows seller exercised care in
the manufacture, processing or selection of the goods is relevant to deciding if warranty
was actually broken
10/31
- Private right or cause of action - when private citizen has right to bring a lawsuit
under a fed statute or state statute - private cause of actions can be brought under
federal securities act if they meet the factors
- MMWA says on its face that there is a private right or cause of action in
Breach of the implied warranty for purpose under CISG - virtually identical to it under
UCC - BUT CISG doesn’t apply to consumer transactions
- topic O
- Particularly in commercial transactions there is tension when it comes to
warranties -
- Tension occurs when:
- seller and buyer do not agree on consequential damages
- Also do not agree freedom of k vs oppression of customers - the
protections offered
- FULL 90 day warranty on missing or defective parts
- Seller will promptly - on handout
- Magnuson moss warranty requires this anyway
- These 90 day w make the warranty begin on the date of purchase
- MMWA § 2308 implied warranties
- Restrictions on disclaimers or modifications.
- No supplier may disclaim or modify except as provided in subsection b of this
section any implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such consumer
product if 1 such supplier makes any written warranty to the consumer with
respect to such consumer product or 2 at the time of sale or within 90 days
thereafter, such supplier enters into service k w/ the consumer which applies
to such consumer product
- FULL vs limited warranty - full - seller cannot cut back on implied w of merch?
- Limited - Seller can cut back on implied warrant of merchantability with
disclaimer?
- So if you say its a full warranty then it has to come with an implied w of
merchantability
- If you want to say its limited then you can w a disclaimer
- Magnuson moss does not prohibits a seller from disclaiming or limiting damages
but does prohibit a seller from disclaiming or limiting warranties *
- Dont confuse the warranty language and the damages language in ks * - did this in
q 3 homework
- FULL 90 DAY WARRANTY ON MISSING OR DEFECTIVE PARTS
- Seller will promptly supply without charge any missing part provided that a description
of the missing part in the model number of the product is given to Seller during the 90-
day warranty period, which begins on the date of purchase. Seller will promptly repair or
replace without charge any defective part provided the part is returned to Seller during
the 90-day warranty period, which begins on the date of purchase. The warranty does not
apply to defects discovered after purchase which were caused by damage (not resulting
from defects) or which were caused by unreasonable use. — SELLER MAKES NO
OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH RESPECT TO ITS
PRODUCTS, THEIR MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE. IN NO CASE SHALL SELLER BE LIABLE FOR ANY INCIDENTAL OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THIS OR ANY OTHER
WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WHATSOEVER, EXCEPT THAT DAMAGES
FOR PERSONAL INJURY SHALL NOT BE PRECLUDED. —SOME STATES DO
KTM
11/14
Topic O
- Ucc § 2-719 contractual modification or limitation remedy
- Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential
purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this act
- Official comment 1 - inder this § parties are left free to shape their remedies to
their particular requirements and reasonable agreements limiting or modifying
remedies to their particular requirements and reasonable agreements limiting or
modifying remedies are to be given effect
- However it is of the very essence of a sales k that at least min adequate remedies be
available - if the parties intend to conclude a k for sale within this article they must
avvepv the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for
breach of the obligations…
- Seller sells to buyer - k makes something hard for buyer in k - make arguments for
buyer - or both sides - sample scenario on final ** 13.3 reference
- Topic P
- Reject - buyer refused to accept goods at all/ revoke - after acceptance, change
mind and returns or tries to undo acceptance
- UCC 2-206
- Acceptance of goods occurs when buyer
- After a reas opp to inspect the goods signifies to the seller that goods
are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of their non
conformity or
- Fails to make effective rejection § 2 602 but such acceptance does not
occur until buyer has had a reas opp to Inspect them or
- Does any act inconsistent w seller’s ownership but if an acceptance only
if ratified by him - for example - buy a sweatshirt has a rip but buyer
wrote name on tag and ripped off the tags
- Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire unit
KTM
- buyer may reject any installment which is non conforming if the non conformity
substantially impairs value of that installment and cannot be cured or if the non
conformity is a defect in the required docs; but if the non conformity does not fall within §
2 612 3 and the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure the buyer must accept that
installment
a. There is an abstract notion within article 2 that it has a bunch of dispute resolution
provisions which are in favor of the court and defined remedies so makes things
easier for courts.
KTM
1. Implied warranties: The P’s are favored in implied warranties because they do not
have to bargain for these in the contract they are implied. D’s will not favor these
2. Statute of limitations: In a normal contract SOL’s are 6-10 years. In Article 2 the
statute of limitations are 4 years, but no tolling meaning if you have a latent defect
which means a P fails to discover a defect in the product within the 4 years they are
out of luck and cannot bring the claim. In a normal contract the statute begins to run
once the P discovers the defect, but in Article 2 the statute begins to run from the day
you buy the item whether or not you discover the defect. The D will be in favor in
this part
c. The contract said the city would get 24 per case and 12 per case. Does this mean 24
pairs or 12 individual traps.
a. We have to first to look to the contract term, but the contract does not answer
it, next look to trade usage, and constructive knowledge
e. First thing we have to look to is 2-102: This code states article 2 applies to
transactions in goods. The word transaction is not identified, but good is. Goods are
defined in 2-105; which states goods which are movable at the time of identification
to the contract. Goods are not money, investment securities, and things in action
which are like legal rights that are intangible.
a. P suing the city because water the city as suppose to provide was
contaminated, which screwed up the pork the P were selling.
b. This case deals with implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
c. This case is a scope issue because if we fall under Article 2 we deal with gap
fillers and warranties.
d. If we were dealing with the common law there would not be any implied
warranties because the parties would have to bargain for them.
e. The issue at hand in this case was whether water was a good. The court
reasoned water could be measured by a device so it constituted a good. The
water can be measured by flow. Due to the courts reasoning 2-105 applies
which is the scope code.
i. First you have to look to whether or not we fall into the scope of
article 2 which would be 2-102. We then have to decide whether or not
we are dealing with a good which is defined in 2-105, the courts
emphasized if the good was measurable it would be classified a good.
Finally we go to 2-315: this is the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, which states where the seller at the time of
contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the sellers skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded
or modified an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
ii. How does the seller become aware of the particular purpose
Cook v. Downing
a. This case deals with the scope because if we assume article 2 applies we have to see
if D violated implied warranty of merchantability.
d. The question in this case is whether or not a dentist is a merchant. If the court
determines the dentist is not a merchant than no implied warranty.
f. Another issue the court deals with is the contract is a services and goods contract in
essence a hybrid contract because the dentist is making the dentures but is providing
the service of installing them and performing the work to make sure they all fit which
is a service.
Review
c. The first thing in our analysis we should look to is 2-102 which defines the scope of
article 2 is transactions and goods. A good is defined by 2-105.
d. We want to know the scope because of applicability and the gap fillers. If article 2
applies it comes with strings attached like gap fillers and implied warranties.
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Article 2 is supplemented by the common law 1-103: unless displaced by the particular
provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity shall supplement its provisions.\
The city of Huron case defined what was movable, something movable does not have to be
something you can physically pick up and move, IT JUST HAS TO BE MEASUREABLE
Gap fillers can only be used if there is a gap, if the contract address the issue then a party cannot
insert gap filler
c. The issue in this case is if contract was formed at the time of purchase of the
computer then the arbitration clause not a part of the deal
d. This case deals with whether 2-207 can apply because only one form involved in this
case
f. Contract formation depends on the sale you are getting involved in. If you go to a
hardware store to buy a rake the moment of contract formation is when you hand the
money to the clerk and the clerk takes it
g. If you go buy a car the contract formation is longer and more formal. The example
about the rake and car deal with one merchant and one consumer
h. If we have two merchants who wish to buy and sell copy machines the parties may sit
down and draft a detailed contract. This is a rare occurrence because usually the sale
would take place as an open account sale, where the buyer will make some
communication with the seller about what the buyer wishes to purchase.
i. The buyers communication may be by phone or use purchase orders. Purchase orders
are used in at least 2 different ways
a. The purchase order might serve as the offer to the seller. This way we have to
determine whether or not a deal has been made
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b. The purchase order might be used by the buyer as a way to confirm an oral
agreement that has already been reached in a phone call prior to the written
purchase order being sent. In this situation we are reiterating the key terms
and key issues of the contract.
j. After the seller receives the buyers order in an open account sale the seller will check
the buyers credit. If the buyers credit checks out the seller will forward the buyers
order to the sellers shipping department.
a. The buyer can say he wants all the warranties available and all the damages
c. In common law the acceptance would have to mirror the offer (mirror image
rule). If the offeree gives a acceptance with additional terms then this would
be a counteroffer and no contract. Article 2 does not work this way because or
we enforce the mirror image rule in sales we will never have a contract in
commerce because merchants will always be going back and forth.
i. 2-204
ii. 2-205
iii. 2-207
e. 2-204: Anything that will show an agreement even conduct will prove there
is a contract. This rule is liberal because Article 2 promotes contract
formation. This rule is for definiteness requirement in offer
f. 2-205: This is the firm offer rule; an offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods
in signed writing is not revocable for a lack of consideration. If offeror is a
merchant and makes offer to leave open cannot revoke for lack of
consideration during the time stated or if no time is stated than a reasonable
time, but not to exceed 3 months. The firm offer rule is opposite from
option contracts.
g. 2-206: This rule deals with offer and acceptance in formation of contract. In
common law when the offeror makes an offer the offeree uses the same
method to accept. In article 2 it is any reasonable method of acceptance. The
rule operates this way because Article 2 promotes contract formation.
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h. 2-207(1): This rule gets involved with additional terms in acceptance. This
rule is the opposite of mirror image rule. A party can add additional terms
unless party imposes a requirement. Ultimately much of the acceptance of the
additional term will depend on whether the additional term is common to the
buyers and sellers industries.
J. If we are dealing with different terms from the buyer and seller the knock
out rule comes into play and both terms cancel each other out, but if both
sides are dealing with different warranty terms it will not get canceled out
because the gap filler of implied warranties will keep it in. The mere fact that
the terms are contrary to a particular terms in the offer should mean that the
offeror has in effect objected to them in advance.
k. 2-315: Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. This one deals with
a non merchant seller. Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there
is unless excluded or modified an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
k. The last shot doctrine is when a the buyer sends its terms and seller sends
its terms after, but they are different and the parties proceeded to perform
the contract the acceptance with the different terms would be considered a
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counteroffer that was accepted by the buyers performance. Thus the sellers
form would control the terms of the contract since it was the last form sent
prior to performance.
K. 2-207(3): You only go here when the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract. The court has to decide what to do when a buyer wants all
the remedies and warranties but the seller says the opposite and both parties
Rodo case. When both parties do this they are kicked out of article 2 and go to
Common law. We only use 2-207(1) and 2-207(2) if there is an agreement. In the
Rodo case the court said the parties CONDUCT shows there was an agreement
So we do not have to totally default to the common law. The writing said no deal
But the actions of the parties showed there was a deal. The court said retain the
Terms that were in writing and use gap fillers. The court says the parties conduct
Shows there was a deal so we do not have to completely default to common law.
The writing of the parties shows no deal, but the conduct shows the party
Intended to get into a deal. The court says retain the terms that were in writing
And include gap fillers. Usually if both parties have opposite terms meaning
Buyer says warranties and seller says no warranties there will usually be no deal,
But like the Rondo case where actions show a contract existed the 2-207(3)
Analysis is done
The big picture with the battle of the forms is we want to encourage contract formation
unlike the old common law mirror image rule where the acceptance has to mirror the offer
or else no deal.
Review
d. 2-102 and 2-105 deal with the scope of article 2 and the definition of goods
a. 2-104: Merchant means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his
occupation hold himself out as having such knowledge or skil
Statute of Frauds
a. Many businesses do not adjust their behavior to UCC. They make business reasons
based on time and money
b. They rely in the sanctioning approach. If a party screws up they will not do business
with them again it the party will be known in that trade of business for what he has
done
c. The dialectic in the statute of frauds is the absence of writing increases fabrication
and fraud versus making things in writing. If things are in writing people will start
denying oral agreements
ii. Statute of frauds is not worried about fraud when the stakes are
low meaning under 500 dollars
iv. 2-201(3)(B): If the party trying to get out of the deal admits in
pleadings, testimony, or in court that there was a contract then the
court then there is no need for the Statute of Frauds
b. The fact that it is so severe of penalty and that consequences of not enforcing
the statue are minimal
d. If we want to be lose with what happens with the original goal of preventing
fraud
e. Today we have other tools to evaluate the parties intentions, unlike back in the
days
a. The applicable section in this case is 2-201 because the good is over 500
dollars.
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b. We first start with 2-102 which is the scope rule. Then we go to 2-105 which
is the definition of goods. Then we go to 2-201 because it is a statute of frauds
issue
a. Signature
b. Quantity term
c. Words of agreement
f. 2-201(3)(B) deals with the deficiency of writing and if the party against whom
enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court
that a contract for the sale of good existed.
g. The issue in this case is under 2-201(3)(B) is how far should one party be able
to go based on speculation to illicit an admission of a contract. Judge Posner
says P cannot go on with the case because if a person already stated under
oath that no contract existed, the chances of getting a different answer at trial
will be slim and it will causing the D to perjur himself. Also the costs,
inconvenience, and unpleasantness. It is a valid policy argument that people
get relief at some point, D already denied a contract exited once. Another
reason to not let the case go on is the ability in having lawyers twist a
deponents words. Finally court and jury error is another policy to not let this
case go on.
i. Dissent: Dissent wants the P to go fishing and there should be a case by case
individualized approach when a P wants to go beyond a sworn affidavit. The
dissent says the TC has discretion to determine how much discovery the P can
do
j. The dissent got to their argument by doing a statutory analysis; Every word in
a statute has meaning so every word must be given effect. The language that is
given interpretation TESTIMONY OR OTHERWISE IN COURT this is
the language that if you follow a cost/benefit analysis you are erasing the part
of the statute. Judges cannot do this when interpreting
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K . In this case there is dialectic between somebody given a sworn denial versus if
something less is given like a statement of I do not remember. Which one will P
have more wiggle room to do discovery.
n. The dissent points out there was no unequivocal denial in the affidavit that was
signed, but in the answer it is not denied which is not under oath. In affadavits the
lawyers are drafting them and they can twist and turn words and feed testimony.
This is one reason why the dissent says there should be more discovery.
c. This is not a writing dispute because we have a written agreement which says no oral
modifications, everything has to be in the contract
d. The issue in the case deals with the 9/30 agreement and 2-201(2)
e. The court says 9/30 agreement does not meet the requirement of 2-201(2)
f. 2-201(2): This provision deals with merchants. If a buyer or seller makes an oral
agreement of some sort and sends a confirmatory response. The signature that is
needed to enforce the contract is the person trying to enforce the contract not the
party trying to get out. If the party sends the confirmatory response the other party has
10 days to object to the oral agreement. This is the otherside or the balance so people
cannot just send fake oral agreements. All this can satisfy the writing requirement.
There is a content requirement which means the confirmatory response has to be
precise and informative
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g. The 9/30 agreement does not meet 2-201(2) because of content requirement is what D
said. The terms of the agreement are not specific. The confirmatory memorandum,
does not confirm a deal was made
h. The court says the 11/19 agreement does not satisfy 2-201(2). Not because of content,
but because Walmart objected to the confirmatory memorandum
a. Form in writing
Review
Parol Evidence
a. This and Statute of Frauds are related because both effect enforceability of oral
evidence
b. For Statute of Frauds the oral agreements have to be in writing, the parol evidence
rule is a evidentiary bar. This rule stops somebody from saying we also agreed to this
c. A merger clause and a no oral modification clause are usually accompanied together.
The merger clause says we intend the writ v ing to be it and anything before the
agreement was signed and merged into the written contract and anything else that is
not in the written contract is gone.
e. Parol evidence rule must be in writing, but there can be things in writing that are not
the final expression of the parties. If parties do not agree on what is written look to
the intent of the parties. If there is no writing and no intent then no 2-202 problems.
h. The idea of a merger clause if both parties are going to take all the time to hammer
out all the terms of what they want then it does not make sense to leave room for side
deals
a. In this case there is a written contract which is the only way there can be a parol
evidence problem
c. The P wanted out because they wanted the plane to have more gas range
d. The more range information was not in the contract it was in a letter from a
representative of the D which came before the written contract so that is the parol
evidence
e. 2-201 says we can’t use the letter to contradict the written contract. The letter says the
plane has more range, but the contract does not have this information.
c. Whether the extrinsic term is one that the parties would certainly have
included in the document had it been part of their agreement ( If there
was a term the parties agreed to it would have made its way into the written
contract )
e. The nature and scope of both prior negotiations between the parties and
any purported extrinsic terms. (The extrinsic term in this case which is the
more range is really one sided which favors the P
h. The intent in sophistication can be a problem if we toy with it like everybody is not
sophisticated in legal contract dealing. Also if evidence of
a. The D receives the equipment to make bottles and sends a letter to P to let
them know there ready to make the bottles the P wanted
b. Some time passes by and P places no order so D sends a letter rescinding the
contract because P placed no orders
e. P says they are not liable because D was suppose to send samples to the P
before P would place an order. This was customary in the trade. This was no
where written in the contract.
f. If this is true D’s are saying there is a term contradicting what is written in the
contract, but P is saying it is implied because it is custom
h. The outside terms that are trying to come in must not contradict what is
written in the contract unless they are custom and trade usage
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i. The common law will say we do not care about custom trade usage only
four corners of the contract, but the UCC will allow looking outside the
contract only if it fits into one of the two categories
a.
n. If the term being disputed would have certainly came in the written contract the
court would not allow it in
a. This is a helpful argument for a litigator. This argument is used to explain good faith
and duty in dealing between parties. In common law there is no moral dealing, but in
UCC there is
a. The UCC is supposed to throw away formalities of common law and work with
business. The code instructs to liberally construe the facts to make things efficient and
stray away from the mechanalistic common law
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2-202 analysis
a. The nature of the written contract is what is used as the basis to exclude parol
evidence
d. The fact that a written contract is silent in regards to a term does not necessarily mean
it does not come in
Buyers Perspective
a. Buyers get express warranties which are based in the contract by making promises
that this product does certain things, through samples, and through spec sheets
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b. Implied warranties are created through the operation of law imposed by article 2
unless disclaimed. The two main implied warranties are 1. Implied warranty of
merchantability ( 2-314 ) 2. Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
(2-315).
Article 2 is geared toward consumer protection not just rich companies arguing
b. Applies were the seller is a merchant the buyer does not have to be a merchant. This
is different than 2-207 which talks about between merchants
a. A 2 year old got ahold of a lighter that was in his mothers purse on top of the frige.
The lighter had no safety feature so the house caught on fire and three people died
including the child and his mother and another sibling.
d. TC granted the SJ because ordinary purpose of the lighter was to produce a flame and
it did what it was suppose to do. This is an instrumental definition. TC said the lighter
did not malfunction. The two main questions when analyzing a problem that deals
with 2-314 is did it malfunction and did it fulfill its purpose
e. The Pennsylvania supreme court reverses and reasoned the TC abused its discretion.
The supreme court of PA got to their analysis through a rule narrowing
c. As soon as this court altered the language of the warranty the scope of the
warranty is also altered which either widens the scope or narrows it
g. The merchantability is satisfied if the good is fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used
b. In the case of fungible goods are of fair average quality within the description
c. Are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used
d. Run within the variations permitted by the agreement of even kind, quality,
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved
b. The kid who started the fire was not an intended user. Usually warranties are
extended from seller to buyer. The kid was not the buyer the mother ways, but
2-318(A) makes the kid a 3rd party beneficiary which warranties the kid. For
example say A and B enter into a contract to give A’s family member piano
lessons. The family member is the intended beneficiary. This court construed
2-318(A) liberally, by hanging onto the words AFFECTED BY. This court
says the kid was an intended user
k. The TC said the lighter did not malfunction so no defect, but there was a defect in the
design which was there was no child safety feature. The defect was not in terms of
malfunction, but defect in unsafe functioning. This court expanded the defect
definition
b. The implied warranty also applies to used goods, A contract for the sale of
second hand goods involves only such obligation as is appropriate to such
goods as sued
i. Acts done with bad motive and reckless disregard. P in this case has
supporting evidence of this from their experts who stated D was aware
and had knowledge of personal injury occurring because there was no
safety device, death also occurred. The D’s also had knowledge
children were attracted to flames. Finally it was economically possible
for D to fix the problem
k. As far as broader terms about this case there is comparative negligence on the part of
mom who left the kid unintended, this is a tort theory. From a warranty theory there is
an intended user and intended use of product
l. To what extent should we have our judicial branch be a market place to decide what
is a safe product and what is not
m. This court used 2-319(A) to say the kid was affected by the lighter
Leal v. Holtvogt
a. This case deals with 2-315 which is the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular use.
b. The statute has the language KNOW so we are dealing with actual and
constructive knowledge
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c. In this case the P wanted to get into the horse industry and would frequently
visit D’s horse farm and would learn about the trade through D who were
horse experts
d. P and D went into a business adventure and purchased one of D’s horses with
the potential of using it as a stud
e. The horse had a lamness problem so it was prone to injury and limping
h. The D’s knew this because the P told them they wanted to start breeding
program and other conversations.
j. The part of the warranty which states; buyer is relying on the skill and
judgment is satisfied by
i. The P was a non expert relying on the D who is an expert and all the
other reasons stated above
i. The horse was not fit for breeding which was what the P wanted
n. When we define the purpose of the deal we can define it narrowly or broadly
The narrow purpose would be to buy a horse to make babies. The broad
Purpose would be to make babies that have a high profit sale and this
c. Has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required
d. Has reason to know that the buyer is relying on the sellers skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods
e. There is an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose
a. It will not promote commerce because if a buyer purchases something from a non
Merchant that fails to work, the buyer does not have any way to return the product
d. Expections are different from buyers perspective because they are buying from a non
merchant which is not the same as buying something from a big company like dell
e. If you are a non merchant and you sell a computer with a problem and don’t disclose
the problem you are not liable under 2-314, but may be liable under 1-203 which is
the obligation of good faith.
f. There are two standards of good faith 1-201(19) and 2-103(B) which deals with
merchants who have a higher standard.
g. At some point a party goes from being a non merchant to a merchant. If a party is
making an isolated sale like selling one computer you are not a merchant, but if you
are holding an annual sale where you sell computers you turn into a merchant because
you are annually selling computers and the party is always selling computers
Privity
b. Privity says there is a contract relationship. People who are not apart of the contract
are not in privity
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d. Under traditional common law contract law only people in privity are the contract
party, others are not.
Notice
a. One way to simplify commercial transactions is to regulate how one party gets notice
of breach
a. Disclaimers of warranties
b. Statute of limitations
f. Lack of notice and lack of privity are two big affirmative defenses
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d. D files SJ and they raise the affirmative defense that P did not give notice
e. The notice rule is 2-607(3); Where a tender has been accepted the buyer must
within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any
breach notify the seller of the breach or be barred from any remedy
g. There is a time period to reject the goods after delivery. The language within a
reasonable time depends on the context of the transaction.
k. The time of the accident and P giving notice to the D was two years
l. The time in this case is unreasonable because the truck had been destroyed
before notice was given so D had no chance to prepare a defense and inspect
the vehicle. Two reasons why the P may have disposed of the truck would be
emotional reasons ( the P was permanently injured and does not need to be
reminded of the accident over and over again ) and the insurance may have
gotten rid of it.
m. Another bad thing about the truck being destroyed is preservation of evidence
for examination.
n. A policy reason for notice is if there is a warranty issue giving prompt notice
to the warrantor will give them a chance to fix the problem, in this case the D
cannot cure the problem because the car is totaled, but there can be cases
where the warrantor can cure the problem like if there was broken toaster.
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ii. Notice minimizes prejudice to the seller from the passage of time
r. Content of Notice
i. Notice need only be such as informs the seller that the transaction is
claimed to involve a breach.
Privity
a. There are two types of privity horizontal privity and vertical privity.
b. Vertical privity is
a. Manufacturer
Wholesaler
Retailer
Consumer
c. Technically the consumer and the manufacture do not have privity. One way to get
around this is the vouch in process which is if the manufacturer does not get
involved in the law suit the fact findings between retailer and consumer in their
dispute stand. So it is in the manufactures best interest to get involved. State law is
the other way to get around this.
d. Horizontal Privity
a. Manufacturer
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c. 2-318 comes into play when dealing with third party beneficiaries and how far
it will go. There are three options under 2-318. A is the narrowest and C is the
broadest
c. Brown (manufacturer) sells to Food Craft (assemblers) which then sells to Church
(consumer) then Crews (P) gets injured
d. Foodcraft received the parts to assemble a walk in freezer for the church
e. There was a sign inside the frezer that said you will not get locked in and foodcraft
had a safety latch that if you pressed door would open. Foodcraft employees checked
it out and made sure it worked
f. The button got frost around it after a few days so when the girl walked into the frezer
and the door closed behind her she tried to press the button but it did not work.
g. The girl lost numerous toes due to frost bite because she did not have any shoes when
she walked into the frezer
h. P suing foodcraft because they were negligent and breach of express warranties and
breach of the two implied warranties.
k. There is no privity requirement for express warranty that is directed to the ultimate
user
m. The court talks about privity requirements and warranties is the starting point. If there
is no privity then there is no claim unless legislative or judicial removal of this
barrier.
n. A legislative removal is section 2-318, but the court reasons P does not fall under the
category of this because she is not a member of the family of the church and a church
cannot be considered a home
p. One way to get around family, household, and guest language in 2-318 is by saying
she is a guest of the church, but the home language is hard to get around because a
church is not a home, but we can say it is gods home
q. Usually the language of family in 2-318 is defined using the nuclear family, there has
to be a balance because what a court does will set precedent and you do not want to
be to broad
b. The major goal of this act is to protect consumers from unscrupulous warrantors
c. This act says if you give a warranty there are federal minimal standards to what the
warranty must include
Scope of coverage
b. Goods that are not customarily available to the ordinary person are not consumer
products
c. Medical devices that are surgically implanted are not consumer products; the
consumer has no access to such products
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Kemp v. Pfizer
b. Court said no not available to the consumer and not distributed through commerce
and medical devices are not covered
c. The way to analyze what a consumer product is you have to look to consumer access
and consumer use
e. What happens if you have a consumer product and you fall under Magnuson
Moore act
b. In this case P had 27K in attorneys fees, but the court awarded 7K
d. The appeals court said TC abused its discretion when they awarded the 7K and the
elements that have to be looked at are
b. Result obtained
e. The appeals court said you have to look to the remedial goal of MMA. The court
wanted to encourage usage of the act even on small claims. If courts will not award
attorneys fees people will not bring cases because disproportion among recovery and
attorney fees which will give manufacturers a free pass
f. The second issue is the MMA has a jurisdiction issue. Even though the act is a federal
question act if the claim is not over 50,000 the federal court will not here it
a. If we are dealing with express warranties we follow what has been stated
above
b. If we are dealing with implied warranties you have to follow state law
c. The judiciary did not want all MMA cases to be brought in federal court
because there will be to many nickel and dime cases
Commercial Impracticality
a. The risk the seller takes is they will be able to product the goods or acquire
them from a third party and that the cost of raw materials and labor will not
rise tremendously
b. The risk the buyer takes is that the buyer will continue to need the ordered
goods and that the market price for similar goods will not fall dramatically
d. Sometimes things happen that are thought to be sufficient to excuse non performance
by the affected third party
c. The contract was a take or pay type. D undertook to purchase gas each year
even if the D’s did not want the gas they had to pay for it
d. Enron says they f onto have to pay for the gas and are excused because market
price of gas went up, people were not using it, foreign competitors are selling
to who they sold to so they do not need as much gas, less demand for gas, the
change in the regulations
e. We go to 2-615
f. Most of the excuses D was asking for was dealing with price fluctuation and D
was getting the short end of the stick. The court says to bad to D, these types of
issues are inherent in every contract. The price that was negotiated in the contract
has both parties intention of what will happen in the marker. Market price
fluctuation is rarely the basis for a excuse claim
g. The enactment of the new federal regulation is one good excuse for Enron
h. One situation where price fluctuation will give excuse to get out of K
a. These would be in situations like the trash case from last semester
population of 40 pecent.
b. The presupposed condition in this case was GM would provide the chasis so D can
sell them to P
c. D says he should not be liable because he didn’t get the chasis from GM which means
he cannot sell to the buyer
d. This argument does not work for D because there was other suppliers he could have
gotten the chasis from. It was not impossible for D to perform
e. The K did not provide GM would be the only source of supply for the chasis
f. There were alternative suppliers because the P was able to get the chasis on their own.
They were able to cover
a. The D did not notify P which is what D is suppose to do. This is important
because P needs as much time as they can get to cover. The earlier P covers
the cheaper it may be for them to find an alternative
b. Also the governmental argument fails because there was an affirmative clause
for D that even if regulatory law changes occurred D would be responsible for
it. Private law negated the general provision.
h. Force Majeure
a. This is boiler plate language. It is a private agreement that parties will lay out
what they consider impartibility and impossibility
b. The parties are trying to plan ahead if something like this were to come up
c. The problem with having clauses like these are they are vague and unclear
d. It is humanly possible to plan for all the intricacies that can occur
Unconscionability
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b. Even though there is no question that the parties agreed to the K when we look back
we say we cannot enforce these type of contracts
d. There is nothing wrong with hard bargaining like the two brother case from last
semester
e. Oppression is not ok
c. The water heater never worked so National the company who sold the water
heater are in breach of K. The fact that National went out of business has
nothing to do with the K between Fidelity Financial. The P’s have to keep
paying the loan. The P’s have to keep paying unless they have an excuse
iii. The court can insert language of their own to re construct, but
American Law does not like this other courts around the globe will
do this more often
i. Value of the house was only 40,000, but they were buying a water
heater for 16,000. These are excessive terms of the price
ii. The security fee deal was oppressive. If P did not pay the D, D can
foreclose on their house, keep the money, and take the water heater
away. There is cross collaterization that is excessive
unconscionability.
a. If we do not have this then we only rely on what is on the paper which
are the terms the partys agreed to so it will abolish this principle
i. An argument for P is the very fact that somebody entered into an irrational
deal will prove there was some tricky procedural stuff going on
a safety valve.
Our epistemology is the way we see the world is what determines our ethics which is how
we will act in the world. Posner says if we allow people to get out of their deals, people
whose credit or income level is not as high will not have access to these deals. The reason
why terms are groosly high for people with bad credit is because creditors are taking a
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chance on these people and the probability is high they will default. Once these deals are
gone for these people many things will be stripped away and take away from the economy.
Judge Martone says who cares about creating deals we care about fairness. I do not agree
with the law and economic theory because we should care about being human instead of
economically efficient. Do we want people to live in vermin infested places with no running
water because it promotes economic efficiency.
Risk of loss
b. These rules define which party is responsible to the destruction or damage of goods. Who has
the risk of loss if something happens in between from getting the product form the sellers
warehouse to the buyer
c. Article 2 gives a set of default rules. These rules only apply if the parties have not other wise
agreed to something else. Once again we see this private law distinction coming in
d. These default rules apply when neither party buyer nor seller is at fault but some third party
usually a carrier is at fault
h. If it is a shipment contract the buyer is usually responsible for the damaged goods if due
delivery is satisfied
j. If the parties do not include this in the contract the default rule is a shipment contract so
they buyer will responsible.
k. Who bears the burden if something happens from getting the product from the sellers
warehouse to the buyers place.
c. The question in this case was whether the machine was duly
delivered. The seller is duly delivering to carrier at sellers place of
business. As soon as carrier loads the product on the truck risk of
loss shifts to the buyer.
d. The carrier does not secure the product and it falls of the truck and
gets damaged
e. The buyer is arguing the seller did not verify the insurance so the
seller did not duly deliver so the risk of loss is with the seller not
buyer
f. What does it mean to duly delivery: If the seller fails to protect the
goods like if the seller sends a product that needs to be frozen with a
non frozen carrier he did not duly deliver. Also if a seller is shipping
plants that need to be watered and the sellers does not make sure the
carrier is capable of watering the plants the seller is not duly
delivering
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h. The more investigation you do as a seller the more you keep your
liability down to have the risk of loss shifted back to you
b. The seller will not satisfy due tender if the goods are non conforming
c. In a due tender case we are looking for this idea of conforming goods
c. The court said the rejection was not timely because a representative
of the sellers was going to come a week later to install the product
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d. This case comes down to how the right to reject ties in with
conformity or non conformity
e. The delivery contract risk of loss remains on the seller provided that
there is due tender. Due tender means conforming goods are given to
the buyer
Review
a. Due tender
b. Due delivery
c. Shipment contract
d. Delivery contract
b. A shipment contract the risk of loss shifts when due delivery is made
c. A delivery contract the risk of loss shifts when due tender is made
b. In the sellers remedy analysis we always start with 1-106: this is the spirit of the
remedies section which has two principles
1. the goal of all remedy provisions in the UCC is that the non breaching
Party may be put in as a good a position as if the other party had fully
Performance
2. Consequential damages are not allowed unless there are specific provisions
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Made for them in the code. These damages are not allowed because sellers rarely
Suffer. Also we are dealing with goods that are almost always fungible so sellers
c. After the 1-106 analysis we go to 2-703: which is the catalogue of sellers remedies and
the catalogue of the various ways in which a buyer might breach its contract with the
seller.
4. anticipatory repudiation
1. Withhold delivery
Repudiation
3. Numbers 1-4 are actions a seller can take to limit damages; 5-7 are
Measures of damages
Resale Damages
a. If the seller has to sell products that buyer does not want and if the resale value
different than the original contract price the seller can recover
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a. If the seller cannot find a buyer this is the route the seller will take, basically
using the market value of the item and the seller recovers that price
Lost profits
a. When the seller had a buyer who was going to buy over market price but this
buyer is gone because he purchased the goods from another buyer and the original buyer
breached.
Cancel the K
a. Once the buyer breaches the seller can say the K is terminated
a. The action for the price is essentially an action for specific performance
b. The seller has to satisfy this to use this ( the seller can use under these conditions )
1. When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due to the seller may
Recover with any incidental damages under the next section the price
3. Where the seller has identified goods to the contract and there is no
Price
c. In a case involving the breach of a contract for the sale of goods, a seller may recover
the entire contract price if the seller is unable to resell the goods at a reasonable price
or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing. Sack v
Lawton
1.The seller has to hold onto the goods that are the subject of the contract and that
He has identified
2. Also the seller while holding the goods is able to resale them he must deduct
Sack v. Lawton
b. D failed to pay
c. P is seeking the money he would have received if the buyer purchased the painting
d. This was a valid contract for the sale of the painting between P and D
f. D also offered to sell P a painting for 10,000,000 but did not sell it
g. P is brining a lost profit claim for 5,000,000 because P was going to sell the painting to
a. The seller has to identify the goods which the P in this case did and the P in this
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case tried every think to resale the painting but nobody wanted it. The P tried to
sell the painting publicly at a gallery but failed to do so ( this is the third clause
j. Consequential damages
b. In common law and other countries judges have more room to germinate and
d. One way sellers try to get around this is say these damages are incidental
damages.
e. Apart from the UCC some statutes allow non breaching sellers to recover
Interest from the date of the breach to the date of judgment at a rate
custody of goods after the buyers breach, in connection with return or resale or
otherwise resulting from the breach. ( these are limited and related specifically
to the breach of the contract which are the out of pocket expenses )
a. K+ID
a. First determine how the buyer breached through 2-703. Then we have to determine
whether or not the resale was made in good faith and a commercially reasonable manner. For
example it was not unduly delayed
c. The seller has to give notice to the buyer so the buyer can drum up interest to have
a. The passage of time was it reasonable; the longer the passage of time the less
sellers wait to sell the good there is a time lag so things change like market prices.
The longer seller weights the less there is a relationship between the time of
b. The market price obtained for the good 3 years out has nothing to do with the market
c. The courts says the delay was not unreasonable because P mad significant strives to
resale. Also there were ongoing consistent good faith efforts to resale.
d. One theory is maybe P was negligent and lazy which is why there was a delay
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e. If the market was volatile and P keeps waiting they are in a win win situation. P would
f. There was no suspicion the court found P was driving up market value
g. Reasonable means: Depends on the nature of the goods and condition of the market,
h. Even though the machine is a specially manufactured some of parts inside the machine
can be sold separately and then the seller can put in another piece.
i. When there is an extended period of time between the date of the breach and the
date of the resale, will the seller be compensated for the time value of money lost due
to delay
a. Does the term commercially reasonable charges include interest on the lost
is to put the seller in as god a position as performance would have done (1-106)
a. Market price is measured as of the time and place of tender, both of which should be
Or delivery contract