CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and

GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of
Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial
Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT,
and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III,
THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P.
MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at
Manila, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.

Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R.
Nos. 82827 and 83979.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners
were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding
of the existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3)
whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of
the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies
available under the law has lost factual support.

It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due
process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting
his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his
right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that
the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant
of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down
guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and
clarified in this resolution.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus,
with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.

As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because
of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and
that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the
parties.

As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused
their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition
prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction

on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos.
82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the
Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is
LIFTED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in
its opening statement. However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution
of the libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I
believe this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should be resolved now rather
that later.

Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should
not hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial
justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case
which is involved but broader considerations of governmental power versus a preferred freedom.

We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic
and one who enjoys unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper
columnist, the publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor and the
business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.

I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a
newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted
personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend
to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case is not a simple
prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the
investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels so
terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the
invocations of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.

I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to
fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge.

There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the
harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an
unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of
sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the
demarcation line.

As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that
"(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to
be expected and should be borne for the common good.

In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such
exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the
eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman,
and has equal rights with every other man." (at p. 900)

In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of affording immunity from
slanderous and libelous charges, would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create
sensation. It would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person
should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a high government official. Again,
the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.

This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977])
that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the
shelter of the free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to
continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous,
there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of
newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in
society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column,
the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press
would be highly injurious.

Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must
call attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed
in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as libel." (Lopez
v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).

The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:

In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to
give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of
state law. N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S Ct
328. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace,
obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the other various other formulae for
the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can
claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured
by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.

xxx xxx xxx

Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government. They recognized the risk to which all human institutions are subject.
But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for
its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination;
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsel is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its
worst form. ...

Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national

commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ... (at
pp. 700-701)

Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there a prima facie showing that
Messrs. Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas
knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects
of these petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their particular liabilities be taken
instead of lumping up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes
publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to
publishers and editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel
is not protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative
words, which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public figure, may really be
intended to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality. Will
not a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the
variety of public debate? There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which
have not been considered.

I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to narrowly
drawn ones. I see no reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them. The first issue
on prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently
amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a warrant of arrest.
Anent the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent President should
not be sued. At the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if
somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.

The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take exception.
I know that most of our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any
considerations of possible consequences to their careers to stand in the way of public duty. But
why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the possibility of the
trial court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully
explore the more important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving government
power and freedom of expression.

However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself
to reiterating the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v.
Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:

If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is
that criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only
when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of
expression.

In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of
expression should be faithfully applied.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in
its opening statement. However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution
of the libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I
believe this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should be resolved now rather
that later.

Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should
not hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial
justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case
which is involved but broader considerations of governmental power versus a preferred freedom.

We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic
and one who enjoys unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper
columnist, the publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor and the
business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.

I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a
newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted
personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend
to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case is not a simple
prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the
investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels so
terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the
invocations of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.

I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to
fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge.

There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the
harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an
unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of
sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the
demarcation line.

As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that
"(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to
be expected and should be borne for the common good.

In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such
exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the
eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman,
and has equal rights with every other man." (at p. 900)
In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of affording immunity from
slanderous and libelous charges, would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create
sensation. It would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person
should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a high government official. Again,
the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.

This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977])
that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the
shelter of the free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to
continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous,
there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of
newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in
society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column,
the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press
would be highly injurious.

Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must
call attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed
in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as libel." (Lopez
v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v.
Gutierrez, supra).<äre||anº•1àw>

The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:

In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to
give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of
state law. N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S Ct
328. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace,
obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the other various other formulae for
the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can
claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured
by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.

xxx xxx xxx

Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government. They recognized the risk to which all human institutions are subject.
But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for
its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination;
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsel is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its
worst form. ...
 Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ... (at
pp. 700-701)

Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there a prima facie showing that
Messrs. Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas
knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects
of these petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their particular liabilities be taken
instead of lumping up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes
publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to
publishers and editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel
is not protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative
words, which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public figure, may really be
intended to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality. Will
not a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the vigor and limit the
variety of public debate? There are many other questions arising from this unusual case which
have not been considered.

I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to narrowly
drawn ones. I see no reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them. The first issue
on prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently
amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a warrant of arrest.
Anent the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent President should
not be sued. At the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if
somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.

The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take exception.
I know that most of our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any
considerations of possible consequences to their careers to stand in the way of public duty. But
why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the possibility of the
trial court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully
explore the more important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving government
power and freedom of expression.

However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself
to reiterating the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v.
Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:

If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is
that criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only
when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of
expression.
In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of
expression should be faithfully applied.

Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco (16 Phil 534)

Posted: August 10, 2011 in Political Law

The three plaintiffs in error severally sued the defendants in error, alleging that Mr. Forbes was
the governor general of the Philippines, Trowbridge chief of the Secret Service of Manila, and
Harding chief of police of the same; that the plaintiff was a Chinese person, lawfully resident in
the Philippines, and that the defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff to China, and forcibly
prevented his return for some months; that the plaintiff returned on March 29, 1910, and that the
defendants threatened and were trying to expel the plaintiff again,—Trowbridge and Harding
acting throughout under the order of the defendant Forbes. There was a prayer for an injunction
and damages. The defendants demurred, but the demurrer was overruled and a temporary
injunction granted. Thereupon Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of prohibition
against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the expulsion was carried out in the
public interest and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese government in the
Philippines, and was immediately reported to the Secretary of War. The complaints were
demurred to, but the supreme court overruled the demurrers, granted the prohibition, and ordered
the actions dismissed. The judge, having declined to join in the applications for writs of error,
was made a respondent, and the cases are here on the ground that the plaintiffs have been
deprived of liberty without due process of law. Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, § 5,
32 Stat. at L. 691, 692.

The purpose of the first suits, of course, was to make the governor general personally answerable
in damages for acts done by him by color of his office and in pursuance of what he deemed to be
his duty, as well as to prevent his exercising similar power in the future. This sufficiently appears
by the declarations, which suggest and do not exclude official action, and is alleged in the
complaints for prohibition. On April 19, 1910, in less than three weeks after the original suits
were brought, the Philippine legislature passed an act which, reciting that the governor general
had authorized the deportation ‘in the exercise of authority vested in him by law,’ enacted that
his action was ‘approved and ratified and confirmed, and in all respects declared legal, and not
subject to question or review.’ So that, if ratification by that body can dispose of the matter, no
court has authority to entertain the suits.
3

The first doubt that naturally would occur is whether, if a right of action had vested previously, it
could be taken away by such a statute. But it generally is recognized that in cases like the
present, where the act originally purports to be done in the name and by the authority of the state,
a defect in that authority may be cured by the subsequent adoption of the act. The person who
has assumed to represent the will and person of the superior power is given the benefit of the
representation if it turns out that his assumption was correct. O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209
U. S. 45, 52, 52 L. ed. 676, 678, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 439; United States v. Heinszen, 206 U. S. 370,
382, 51 L. ed. 1098, 1102, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 742, 11 Ann. Cas. 688; The Paquete Habana, 189 U.
S. 453, 465, 47 L. ed. 901, 903, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593; Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 6 Q. B. 1, 23, 10
Best & S. 1004, 40 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 28, 22 L. T. N. S. 869; Secretary of State v. Kamachee Boye
Sahaba, 13 Moore, P. C. C. 22, 86, 7 Moore, Ind. App. 476. Compare West Side Belt R. Co. v.
Pittsburgh Constr. Co. 219 U. S. 92, 55 L. ed. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196; Dunbar v. Boston & P.
R. Corp. 181 Mass. 383, 385, 386, 63 N. E. 916.

Therefore the deportation is to be considered as having been ordered by the governor general in
pursuance of a statute of the Philippine legislature directing it, under their combined powers, and
it is unnecessary to consider whether he had authority, by virtue of his office alone, as declared
by the statute, or whether, if he had not, he had immunity from suit for such an official act done
in good faith. The former matter now is regulated by a later statute providing for a hearing, etc.
No. 2113. February 1, 1912. On the question thus narrowed the preliminaries are plain. It is
admitted that sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and seemingly that Congress
is not deprived of this power by the Constitution of the United States. Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U. S. 698, 707, 728, 37 L. ed. 905, 911, 918, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U. S. 228, 231, 41 L. ed. 140, 141, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 977; Fok Yung Yo v.
United States, 185 U. S. 296, 302, 46 L. ed. 917, 920, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686; United States ex rel.
Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 289, 290, 48 L. ed. 979, 983, 984, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 719.
Furthermore, the very ground of the power in the necessities of public welfare shows that it may
have to be exercised in a summary way through executive officers. Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, supra; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 263, 49 L. ed. 1040, 1044, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep.
644; Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 84, 85, 53 L. ed. 410, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 235. So that the
question is narrowed further to the inquiry whether the Philippine government cannot do what
unquestionably Congress might.
5

As Congress is not prevented by the Constitution, the Philippine government cannot be

prevented by the Philippine Bill of Rights alone. Act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. at
L. 691, 692. Deporting the plaintiffs was not depriving them of liberty without due process of
law, unless on other grounds the local government was acting beyond its powers. But the local
government has all civil and judicial power necessary to govern the Islands. Act of March 2,
1901, chap. 803, 31 Stat. at L. 895, 910, act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, § 1, 32 Stat. at L. 691.
The forms are different, but as in Hawaii, the proximate source of private rights is local, whether
they spring by inheritance from Spain or are created by Philippine legislation. See Kawananakoa
v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 354, 51 L. ed. 834, 836, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526; Perez v. Fernandez,
202 U. S. 80, 91, 92, 50 L. ed. 942, 945, 946, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561. It would be strange if a
government so remote should be held bound to wait for the action of Congress in a matter that
might touch its life unless dealt with at once and on the spot. On the contrary, we are of opinion
that it had the power as an incident of the self-determination, however limited, given to it by the
United States.

By § 86 of the act of July 1, 1902, all laws passed by the Philippine government are to be
reported to Congress, which reserves power to annul them. It is worthy of mention that the law
under consideration was reported to Congress and has not been annulled. The extension of the
Chinese exclusion and immigration laws to the Philippine Islands has no bearing on the matter.
The right to remain, for instance, under the act of April 29, 1902, chap. 641, § 4, 32 Stat. at L.
176, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 524, does not prevail over a removal as an act of state.

It is held in England that an act of state is a matter not cognizable in any municipal court.
Musgrave v. Pulido, L. R. 5 App. Cas. 103, 108, 49 L. J. P. C. N. S. 20, 41 L. T. N. S. 629, 28
Week. Rep. 373. And that was the purport of the Philippine act declaring the deportation not
subject to question or review. As the Bill of Rights did not stand in the way, and the implied
powers of the government sanctioned by Congress permitted it, there is no reason why the statute
should not have full effect. It protected the subordinates as well as the governor general, and took
jurisdiction from the court that attempted to try the case.

8
Whether prohibition is technically the proper remedy, historically speaking, we need not inquire.
On such a matter we should not interfere with local practice except for good cause shown. In
substance the decision of the Supreme Court was right.

Judgment affirmed.

Forbes v. Tiaco

W. CAMERON FORBES v. CHUOCO TIACO

G.R. No. L-6157, July 30, 1910

FACTS:

April 1, 1910, the defendant Chuoco Tiaco filed a suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila against the plaintiffs alleging that on the 19th of August, 1909, under the orders of the
said W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, he was deported therefrom
and sent to Amoy, China, by the aforesaid J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge, chiefs, as above
stated, of the police and of the secret service, respectively, of the city of Manila, and that having
been able to return to these Islands he feared, as it was threatened, that he should be again
deported by the said defendants, concluding with a petition that a preliminary injunction should
be issued against the plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from deporting the defendant,
Chuoco, and that they be sentenced to pay him P20,000 as an indemnity.

Respondent argued that It is true that the said defendant Chuoco Tiaco, was, with 11 others or his
nationality, expelled from these Islands and returned to China by the plaintiffs J. E. Harding and
C. R. Trowbridge, under the orders of the plaintiff W. Cameron Forbes, but the said expulsion
was carried out in the public interest of the Government and at the request of the proper
representative of the Chinese Government in these Islands.

The said complaint having been filed with the defendant A. S. Crossfield, he, granting the
petition, issued against the plaintiffs the injunction requested, prohibiting them from deporting
the defendant Chuoco Tiaco.

The plaintiffs filed a demurrer against the same and presented a motion asking that the injunction
be dissolved, the grounds of the demurrer being that the facts set out in the complaint did not
constitute a motive of action, and that the latter was one in which the court lacked jurisdiction to
issue such an injunction against the plaintiffs for the reasons set out in the complaint;
notwithstanding which, the defendant A. S. Crossfield overruled the demurrer and disallowed the
motion, leaving the complaint and the injunction standing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts can take jurisdiction in any case relating to the exercise of this inherent
power in the deportation of aliens, for the purpose of controlling this power vested in the
political department of the government.

HELD:

Under the system of government established in the Philippine Islands the Governor-General is
"the chief executive authority," one of the coordinate branches of the Government, each of
which, within the sphere of its governmental powers, is independent of the others. Within these
limits the legislative branch cannot control the judicial nor the judicial the legislative branch, nor
either the executive department. In the exercise of his political duties the Governor-General is,
by the laws in force in the Philippine Islands, invested with certain important governmental and
political powers and duties belonging to the executive branch of the Government, the due
performance of which is entrusted to his official honesty, judgment, and discretion. So far as
these governmental or political or discretionary powers and duties which adhere and belong to
the Chief Executive, as such, are concerned, it is universally agreed that the courts possess no
power to supervise or control him in the manner or mode of their discharge or exercise.

Estrada v. Desierto

JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)

G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was elected Vice-President.

Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or
more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator
Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.

Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as
judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.

When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the
ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had
assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner
and the 11 senators.

January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A
10-km line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.

January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to
the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed
services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your
Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we
are withdrawing our support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General
Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.

January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President
of the Philippines. Petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.

January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers the duties of the Presidency.

February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting
any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after
the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted."

February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for
judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to
have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."
ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.

Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting
President.

HELD:

Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-
taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President xxx.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner's claim of inability.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That
claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
RICARDO T. GLORIA v. CA, GR No. 119903, 2000-08-15
Facts:
petitioner [private respondent herein] was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division
of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino.
respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the Philippines that the petitioner
be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute of Science and Technology], to
fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its
Superintendent,... President approved the recommendation... copy of the recommendation for
petitioner's reassignment, as approved by the President, was transmitted by Secretary Gloria to
Director Rosas for implementation.
On October 14, 1994, Director Rosas, informed the petitioner of his reassignment, effective
October 17, 1994.
Petitioner requested respondent Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but the latter
denied the request. The petitioner prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994 to the President of the
Philippines, asking for a reconsideration of his reassignment,... he subsequently changed his
mind and refrained from filing the letter... petitioner filed the instant petition.
Court of Appeals denied private respondent's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO).[3]
On November 22, 1994, it set aside its earlier resolution denying the prayer for the issuance of a
TRO; and thereafter, restrained the petitioners "from implementing the re-assignment of the
petitioner [private respondent herein] from incumbent Schools Division Superintendent... of
Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and
Technology."... hereby declared to be violative of petitioner's right to security of tenure, and the
respondents are hereby prohibited from implementing the... same.
Petitioners are now before the Court seeking relief from the decision of the appellate court,
Issues:
FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS BUT ACTUALLY QUESTIONING AN ACT
OF THE PRESIDENT.
whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent of Quezon
City to Vocational School Superintendent of MIST is violative of his security of tenure?
Petitioners maintain that there is no violation of... security of tenure involved.
Ruling:
Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks
an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are
those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be
questioned before the... courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction.[
Private respondent has clearly averred that the petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or excess of jurisdiction in reassigning the... private
respondent in a way that infringed upon his security of tenure. And petitioners themselves
admitted that their questioned act constituted a ministerial duty, such that they could be subject
to charges of insubordination if they did not comply with the presidential order.
doctrine enunciated in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals[10] -- that "a reassignment that is indefinite
and results in a reduction in rank, status and salary, is in effect, a constructive removal from the
service"
After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment
of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite".
there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is
temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or
fixed; which fact... evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent
with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely
violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent.
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service.
petition is hereby DENIED