ANTONIO GELUZ

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by
petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was
then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had
herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of
a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not
know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued
petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as
damages, P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed
thedecision.

ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs
injury, his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the
unbornchild?

RULING:

Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive

personality. It is, of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus
will be considered as never having possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action
could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did
accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical
personality.

It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under

Article 40 of the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional
personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive.

In the present case, the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of
the rights of the deceased child.
 ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant
58 Phil. 866
November 28, 1933

FACTS:
This is an appeal by plaintiff and defendant regarding the trial court's
decision of denying part of the relief sought by plaintiffs, where Antonia compels Cesar
to recognize Ismael and Pacita, and of requiring defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco
and to pay for his maintenance.
Cesar Syquia, twenty-three years old, and an unmarried scion of the
prominent family in Manila, courted Antonia de Jesus who was 20 years old. Amorous
relations between them resulted in de Jesus giving birth to a baby boy on June 17,
1931. They lived together for one year until Antonia got pregnant again. Cesar left to
marry another woman, but he recognized his paternity of the first child in writing with a
letter to the priest and uninterrupted possession of natural child status for one year.
Regarding Pacita, no recognition mentioned.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the
father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be
compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the
Civil Code.

HELD:
The trial court was right in refusing to give damages to De Jesus for
supposed breach of contract. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add
that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart
from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of
such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an
action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring
the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs.
 ARNEL L. AGUSTIN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005

CORONA, J.:

FACTS:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged
biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente
lite before the Regional Trial Court. In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel
supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of
wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The
babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered
the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins
support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and
intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He
claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their
relationship started in 1993 but he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because
(she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be
scheming and overly demanding and possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-
and-off affair. In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied
having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the
case.

Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action,
considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the
law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative
father.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support
without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination.

RULING:

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and
the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from
semen recovered from a rape victims vagina were used to positively identify the
accused Joel KawitYatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of
his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against
self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution.

Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v.
Torres, where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification system
embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar
all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance
public service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures,
and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to
privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already
stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no
water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the
simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an
accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see
no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire
consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.

In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness,
passion, prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its
jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would have
only been an error in judgment. As we have discussed, however, the decision of the
respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.

ROSENDO HERRERA, Petitioner, v. ROSENDO ALBA, minor,

represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA
CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Respondents.

FACTS:

Then 13 yr old Rosendo Alba (“respondent”), represented by his mother Armi Alba,
filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages
against petitioner. Petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he
is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with
respondent’s mother. Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity
testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the
testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D.; In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the
process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of
99.9999% in establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and
contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA
paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination. The RTC: granted
respondent’s motion to conduct DNA paternity testing. Petitioner filed a MR and
asserted that “under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to take
would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite
specimen..., unconstitutional.”- DENIED

Petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
He asserted that the trial court rendered the Orders“in excess of, or without jurisdiction
 and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
Petitioner further contended that there is “no appeal nor any [other] plain, adequateand
speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. CA: Denied petition; Affirmed RTC; stated
that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial court’s evaluation of evidence. Thus,
appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA
paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right
applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that
petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing.
Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it
authorized the trial court “to embark in [sic] a new procedure xxx to determine filiation
despite the absence of legislation to ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official
recognition as made clear in Lim vs. Court of Appeals and the presence of technical and
legal constraints in respect of [sic] its implementation.” Petitioner maintains that the
proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE:

Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine

filiation or whether DNA analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove paternity.

RULING:

Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence

People v. Vallejo- “DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet been accorded
official recognition by our courts.” In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs
taken from the rape victim matched the accused’s DNA profile. We affirmed the
accused’s conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. We declared:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002,
there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as
evidence. The Court moved from the issue of according “official recognition” to DNA
analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA
analysis.
Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence

Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in
giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

We also repeat the trial court’s explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in
an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother
and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from
the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The
alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in
his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types do not
match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match,
then he is not excluded as the father.

It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father.
A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the
putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the
highest standard adopted in an American jurisdiction, trial courts should require at least
99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (“W”) prior to a paternity
inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father
compared to the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An
appropriate reference population database, such as the Philippine population database,
is required to compute for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W
will never equal to 100%. However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the
putative father, mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those
conducted between the putative father and child alone.

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive
proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA
analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or
higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of
paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.

Right Against Self-Incrimination

Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a
paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the
right against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is
“communicative” in essence taken underduress.

The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a
prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
(testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his
body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test
to extract virus from his; the substance emitting from the body of the accused was
received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness; morphine forced out of the mouth was
received as proof; an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size
was allowed; and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for
pregnancy test, since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on “testimonial
compulsion.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 29 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders
dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759.

People v. Yatar- a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the
victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court. The
Court, following Vallejo’s footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant because the
physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of
rape with homicide

In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.- the convict-petitioner
presented DNA test results to prove that he is not the father of the child conceived at
the time of commission of the rape. The Court ruled that a difference between the DNA
profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile of the victim’s child does not
preclude the convict-petitioner’s commission of rape.